Branch Transfer vis-à-vis inter State sales

Query: A company has standard production which is transferred to branches as per projections made by the sales team. The sales team projects the sales based on market movements. The sales tax department in contemplating that such projection means sales and hence it amounts to inter State sales from the State of movement. Whether the Stand of the department is justified?

Reply: Inter-states sales can take place, if there is movement due to any pre-committed sales. The burden to prove the inter-state sales is on department. Only having sales projections for dispatch purpose cannot amount to sending the goods as per any pre-committed sales. It is possible that while making the projections, the sales team might have considered demand of prospective buyers. However, that is not the criteria for determining sales. At the most, such is a cause for transfer of goods for sale but not a movement due to sale.

From the goods actually transferred, the ascertainment for delivery to particular buyer will be made at the branches and hence it will be sale in such State in light of section 4 of the CST Act, 1956. In my opinion, the department is not justified in contemplating interstate sales under above circumstances.

Certain judgments can also be referred to as under;

Central Distillery & Breweries Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P., Lucknow (115 STC 296)

“The petitioner was a manufacturer of liquor having a distillery at Meerut in the State of Uttar Pradesh, with its Head Office at Delhi. Its tender to the Delhi Administration for supply of rum for the years 1984-85 to 1986-87, for sale at Government run retail vends in Delhi was accepted and agreements for the three years were executed. Under the agreement the petitioner was granted a licence to supply rum to the retail vends in Delhi. The orders for the actual purchase and sale were to be placed subsequently by the Collector at fortnightly intervals and the licensee was required to keep a buffer stock of at least two truck loads at warehouse within the territory of Delhi. Clause 18 of the agreement required the dealer to have licensed premises within the State of Delhi for which purpose it could be allowed the use of a bonded warehouse established by the Government on payment of the specified rent and furnishing of a security deposit. Clause 16 specifically stated that by virtue of this agreement, the Government did not guarantee purchase of any specified quantity of rum during the year or during any portion of it and the licensee shall not be entitled to any compensation or relief on the ground that the sufficient orders were not placed. The Sales Tax Department took the view that the goods in question were taken to Delhi from the State of U.P. to be supplied to the Delhi Administration in pursuance of the agreements, referred to above, and, therefore, the goods moved to Delhi in pursuance of the said agreements, which occasioned the movement of goods from U.P. to Delhi and, therefore, the transactions amounted to inter-State sales within the meaning of section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. This was confirmed by the Tribunal. On revision petitions: Held, that the intention of the parties was to bring about intra-State sales at Delhi from the warehouse of the dealer that it was required to establish within the territory of Delhi
where the dealer was required to maintain a buffer stock of at least two trucks without any guarantee that any purchase would be actually made by the Delhi Administration. As and when the Delhi Administration made the purchase, the dealer who was to be a L1-A licensee would supply the goods and replenish the stocks. Therefore, as indicated by the agreement, the movement of the goods to Delhi was not in pursuance of any transaction of sale but in pursuance of the licence under
which the dealer was to maintain a warehouse with a minimum stock within the territory of Delhi. The agreement by itself did not bring about any sale or purchase and, therefore, the transport of goods from the distillery in U.P. to the warehouse in Delhi could not be treated as a movement of goods occasioned by any sale or purchase. There was no evidence to show that the supply of rum to the Delhi Administration in the three years resulted in any inter-State sales taxable in State in U.P.”

State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Coromandel Paints & Chemicals Ltd.(98 STC 82)

“The Shipping Corporation of India called for tenders for the supply of paints suitable for marine ships. The respondent submitted its tender, which was accepted. The terms of the acceptance of the tender, were, inter alia, that during the period of contract the respondent should supply paints to vessels owned, managed and chartered vessels against the orders placed by the officers/agents of the Shipping Corporation of India at the rates and on the terms mentioned in the Schedule. On the basis of the tender agreement the sales tax assessing authority held that there had been inter-State sales of goods and, rejecting the claim that the movement of goods was by way of stock transfers covered by Form F, brought the goods to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The Tribunal held in favour of the respondent. On revision petitions:

Held, dismissing the petitions, that where the terms of the agreement enjoin supply of goods against an order already placed, it amounts to a contract if the goods are specified but they are to be delivered at a future date as and when specified. But, where neither the quantity nor the goods have been specified and the supply has to be made at a stated period of the required quantity, it cannot be said that there was a sale or even an agreement to sell, it is merely a standing offer. In the instant case, the terms of the letter of acceptance of the tender contemplated that the respondent would keep paints of the varieties, which were the subject-matter of tender, ready at their sub-offices or branches and that they were bound to supply as and when the order was placed by the Shipping Corporation with the respondent; this would only be a standing offer but not a “sale” or an “agreement to sell”. Neither was there an agreement to sell containing a stipulation regarding movement of goods from one State to another, nor did the goods in fact move from one State to another in pursuance of the contract. Acceptance of the tender of the respondent to meet the requirements of the orders that would be placed from time to time resulted in a standing offer by the respondent pursuant to which arrangements were made for the sale of paints to the Shipping Corporation. There was no obligation on the Shipping Corporation to accept the goods which had been moved to the branches; nor could there be any complaint for not taking of the goods after the goods had arrived at the branches; here the process of sale commenced only after an order was placed by the Shipping Corporation with the respective branches which delivered the goods and effected sales. There were therefore no inter-State sales taxable under the Central Sales Tax Act.”

Balabhagas Hulaschand vs. State of Orissa ((37 STC 207)(SC)

The Hon’ble Supreme Court along with example explained as under;

“Case No. II-A, who is a dealer in State-X, agrees to sell goods to B but he books the goods from State X to State Y in his own name and his agent in State Y receives the goods on behalf of A. Thereafter the goods are delivered to B in State Y and if B accepts them a sale takes place. It will be seen that in this case the movement of goods is neither in pursuance of the agreement to sell nor is the movement occasioned by the sale. The seller himself takes the goods to State Y and sells the goods there. This is, therefore, purely an internal sale which takes place in State Y and falls beyond the purview of section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act not being an inter-state sale.”

Indian Duplicators Ltd. vs. State of Tamil Nadu (57 STC 263)(Mad.)

The gist of said judgment is as under:

“The assessee, a manufacturer and dealer in duplicators, its accessories and duplicating ink, etc., in Madras with branches outside, dispatched goods to its Hyderabad branch and the branch supplied the goods to local buyer against orders placed by the buyers with the branch office at Hyderabad. There was no contract for supply of goods by the Madras office to the Andhra Pradesh buyer. The bills were raised and collected in the name of the branch at Hyderabad and sales tax was also paid according to the rates prevailing in Andhra Pradesh. But the goods had the mark of the Andhra Pradesh buyer’s name on them. The assessee claimed exclusion of such turnover on the ground that it represented stock transfer from Madras to the Hyderabad branch. The assessing authority held that the goods in question were moved from Madras specifically for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of the buyer in Andhra Pradesh, and that the sales were inter-State sales falling under section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act. 1956. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held the transaction as representing stock transfer. The Board of Revenue, by its suo- moto powers, set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the ground that there was a close nexus between the order placed by the buyer in Andhra Pradesh, with the branch of the assessee at Hyderabad and the movement of goods for Madras to Hyderabad, and therefore, the turnover was to be regarded as representing inter-State sales falling under section 3(a) of the Central Act. On appeal to the High Court:

Madras High Court held that on the facts and circumstances of the case, that though there was a movement of goods from Madras to Hyderabad, such movement was of goods manufactured in the ordinary or general course of business of the assessee and for being sold as and when the manufacturers received orders for purchase at its branch office at Hyderabad. There was no establishment of any direct link or nexus between the assessee and the movement of goods for supply to the Andhra Pradesh buyer, especially when the goods dispatched by the assessee were manufactured by it in the ordinary course of its business. The mere fact that the mark of the Andhra Pradesh buyer’s name was found on the goods would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that there was a completed transaction of sale by the assessee in Madras by the appropriation of the goods towards any contract. Therefore, the transaction was not to be regarded as representing inter-Sate sales effected by the assessee.”

Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. State of Orissa and others (30 VST 334)(CSTAA)

The small gist of judgment is as under:

“The appellant, an undertaking of the Government of India, had a steel plant in Rourkela from where different items of iron and steel were manufactured and dispatched to its various branches located all over the country.

The Time Bound Scheme was evolved by the Central Government under the Iron and Steel Control Order, 1956, to estimate the demands for different kinds of steel products from different areas and to advise a suitable production programme to the steel plants. Demands from eligible customers for a quarter were registered making suitable allotments and offering and delivering the products at the specified price through branches.

The branch sales office, after compiling the demands under the TBS scheme and other schemes prepared the forecast and sent it to the Central Production Planning Department through its regional office. The Central Production Planning Department and the regional office finalised the branch-wise dispatch programme and sent it to the plants. The plants, on manufacturing the goods, dispatched them to the different branch sales offices. On receipt of the material mostly by rail the branch sales offices sent communications to the customers to deposit the sale price and take delivery of the goods. Acting on that the customers made full payment and lifted the goods from the wagon or stockyards on the basis of delivery order, challan and invoice issued by the branch sales offices. Claiming that the dispatches from Rourkela were in the nature of stock transfers and on that footing paying local sales tax to the respective States, the appellant filed F forms under section 6A of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, read with rule 12(5) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957, for most of the stock transfers and claimed exclusion of the value of stock transfers from the turnover under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The assessing authority disallowed the claim for exclusion and treated the transactions under the Scheme as inter-State sales and levied tax under section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, at four per cents, in the absence of C forms. The Assistant Commissioner confirmed the assessments but granted relief in regard to the quantum of turnover based on actual sales figures. The Tribunal confirmed the assessments granting some incidental reliefs. On appeal to the Appellate Authority:

Held, remanding the matter to the Tribunal for fresh disposal, that the Tribunal had not referred to documents to show the modus operandi of the transactions negating the case of the assessing authority that there was an inextricable link between the contract of sale and the movement of goods pursuant thereto. The goods were not tailor-made but they were of standard make and the production programme was based on assessment of market demand in general rather than to cater to the requirements of particular customers. The mere fact that the objective of the Scheme was stated to be to give commitment to the customers regarding supply materials against firm orders did not lead to the necessary inference that the offer and acceptance resulting in an agreement of sale would have come into effect before the goods were dispatched from the steel plant. It was wrong to characterise the scheme itself as spelling out an agreement of sale. A general statement of the objective did not control the operative clauses of the scheme and the actual modalities of the transactions.”

Thus, the legal position is required to be decided in light of above judgments, as well as other judgments on the issue. Further, it is also settled that each transaction is required to be examined.

Under above legal and factual position, there cannot be inter-state sales on the facts given in the query.

Income from Other Sources

Query No. 1: [Taxability of Single Premium Money Back Policy]

Mr. X has purchased single premium money back plan of LIC called New Bima Bachat Policy. Sum assured is
Rs. 7,00,000/-. He has paid a single premium of Rs. 5,59,843/-. He will be getting
Rs. 1,05,000/- as survival bonus after every three years from LIC during the span of 15 years and thereafter the sum assured with Bonus on maturity.

The survival bonus and sum assured with bonus, receivable during the lifetime of Mr. X, is taxable in his hands as there is no exemption available as per the provisions of section 10(10D) of the Income-tax Act. There will be TDS also on this amount. Mr. X has not claimed deduction under section 80C on this premium paid, which in any case would have been
Rs. 70,000/- only.

In this connection, the following questions arise:

1. Is there any specific provision under the Income-tax Act by which this amount is taxed under the head “Income from other sources”?

2. Is it possible to show the income under head Capital Gain?

3. Is there any provision to claim the investment made in the policy as cost against the survival benefits?

4. If yes then how the same is to be claimed i.e. can one claim the cost by dividing it against the survival benefit receivable after every three years and then pay tax on entire amount received on maturity.

5. If the investment made is not allowed to be deducted from the survival amount receivable, will it not be unconstitutional as this will amount to taxing gross receipt and not income.

Answer

From the facts, it is clear that Mr. X has taken money back insurance policy called as New Bima Bachat Policy. As per the terms of the said policy, it is a single premium payment policy, where sum assured will be paid back to the policy holder in the form of survival benefit periodically. First survival benefit will be given to the policy holder on completion of three years of the policy and thereafter completing every three years. At the end of the term, policyholder on maturity will receive a sum assured minus survival benefits paid plus bonus. If he dies within the term of policy, death benefit will be paid to his nominee i.e. sum assured plus bonus.

As stated correctly, Mr. X is only entitled to claim deduction at
Rs. 70,000/- as per section 80C(3A) read with section 80C(2), though he has paid premium of
Rs. 5,59,843/-. However, as stated he has not claimed any deduction under section 80C.

The amount receivable on maturity of the said policy would not be entitled to the benefit of section 10(10D) of the Act, amounting to
Rs. 1,75,000/- plus bonus (i.e. sum assured Rs. 7,00,000/- less survival benefits paid in five installments of
Rs. 1,05,000/-. i.e. Rs. 5,25,000/-).

So, the survival benefits received would be nothing but return of capital as it is money back policy, hence, the same is not liable to tax when it is received. But on maturity bonus amount would be taxable in the hands of Mr. X under section 56 of the Act as it cannot be taxed under any other head.

In view of the above, the queries raised in serial nos. 2 to 4 do not require any elaboration.

Further, there is nothing unconstitutional, as survival benefit is nothing but return of investment and on maturity bonus would be taxable as the same is not exempt under section 10(10D) of the Act.

As regards TDS deducted on each payment of survival benefit can be claimed as a refund.

Assessment

Query No. 2: S. 45(4): [Taxability of Distribution of assets during continuation of firm and on dissolution]

A firm having three partners and doing construction work.

In the said firm, there are tippers and JCB machines standing in balance sheet for business purpose.

Out of three partners, one partner wants tipper and another partner wants JCB machinery for his individual business purpose.

Can it be transferred by debiting their capital account and crediting machinery account during the continuation of partnership business without attracting capital gains tax.

What will be position, if the said transaction is effected on dissolution of firm?

Further, if the firm is decided to be dissolved on April 1, 2016 and the said transaction is made then as to whether the entry is to be passed on March 31, 2016 or April 1, 2016 and in that circumstances as to which date will be treated for taxation purpose i.e. March 31, 2016 or April 01, 2016 and in which year liability to pay income tax, if any, will arise?

Answer

If plant and machinery are withdrawn by the partners at book value during the continuance of partnership firm, then, the same can be debited to partners account and credited to plant and machinery account in such case there is no question of any liability of capital gains. [see Malabar Fisheries Co. (120 ITR 49) (SC)]

However, if partners withdraw at the time of dissolution of firm then as per section 45(4) of the Act, the liability in the hands of firm would arise on the basis of fair market value of the assets withdrawn on the ground that it amounts to distribution.

The dictionary meaning of the expression “distribution” is “to give each a share, to give several persons”. The expression ‘distribution’ connotes something actual and not notional. It can be physical, it can also be constructive. One may distribute amounts between different shareholders either by crediting the amount due to each one of them in their respective accounts due to him.
[see Punjab Distilling Industries Ltd. v. CIT (57 ITR) (SC)].

The Madras High Court in CIT vs. Vijayalakshmi Metal Industries [256 ITR 540] has held that the relevant date for ascertaining the year in which the tax is to be levied is the year in which the transfer takes place. That year may or may not be the year in which the dissolution of the firm takes place. Until such time such capital asset is transferred by way of distribution of the assets on the dissolution of the firm no occasion arises for brining to tax any capital gain on a transfer which has not taken place. The section itself gives no room for doubt as the year in which the capital gains to be brought to tax is “the previous year in which the said transfer takes place.”

Thus the year in which transfer takes place would create liability for taxation.

Income from Other Sources

Query No. 3: [S. 56(2) Gifts from Nana / Nani]

Gift given by Nana or Nani (i.e. mother side of assessee) is taxable or not? Whether Nana / Nani is covered under the definition of ‘Relative’? Whether lineal ascendant / descendant is also covered by mother side of assessee?

Answer

As per Explanation to section 56(2)(vii) “relative“ means in case of an individual:

(A) Spouse of the individual

(B) Brother or sister of the individual

(C) Brother or sister of the spouse of the individual

(D) Brother or sister of either of the parents of the individuals.

(E) Any lineal ascendant or descendant of the individual

(F) Any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the individual

(G) Spouse of the person referred to in items (B) to (F)

The term “lineal descendants” include all descendants and is not restricted to male descendants. [see Jagnnath vs. Kunja Behari (AIR 1929 PC 162)]. So lineal ascendant would include an ascent or in direct line of ascent of a child which includes Nana / Nani (i.e. parents of mother).

Capital Gains

Query No. 4: [Right in the flat, converted into flat]

An individual booked a flat in a building in April 2012, allotted flat no. A-1. Building is completed in March 2015 and possession given. The flat is resold in May 2016 whether it will be long term capital gain or short term capital gains

Answer

It is a long term capital gain as per Punjab and Haryana High Court in Mrs. Madhu Kaul vs. CIT [363 ITR 54]. In that case, the assessee was allotted a flat on June 7, 1986 conveyed on June 30, 1986. The assessee paid the first installment on July 4, 1986. The flat was later identified and delivery of possession was given on November 30, 1988. The assessee sold the flat on July 5, 1989. The assessee’s claim for treating
Rs. 2,38,609/- received from sale of a flat as long term capital gain was rejected treating it as short term capital gains. This was confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal held that as a specific flat was allotted to the assessee, on November 30, 1988,the allotment letter or payment of the first installment did not entitle the assessee to claim that the gains were long term capital gains.

However on appeal, the High Court held that the flat was allotted to the assessee on June 7, 1986, by a letter conveyed to the assessee on June 30, 1986. The assessee paid the first installment on July 4, 1986 thereby conferring a right upon the assessee to hold a flat, which was later identified and possession was delivered on a later date. The mere fact that possession was delivered later did not detract from the fact that the allottee was conferred a right to hold the property on issuance of an allotment letter. The payment of the balance installments, identification of a particular flat and delivery of possession were consequential acts, that related back to and arose from the right conferred by the allotment letter,

Note: Please send your queries relating to Direct, Indirect & International taxation, Accounting & Auditing Standards and Company Law, FEMA etc. to AIFTP, having interest to the Members.

Recently in the case of Larsen & Toubro and others1, the Apex Court had occasion to examine that whether imposition of service tax on composite works contract was valid under various sub-clauses of S. 65(105) as existed prior to 1-7-2012. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in G. D. Builder’s Case2 had held that service tax was leviable on service portion of a composite contract involving material and services even if the rules were not framed for computation of tax. In Larsen and Toubro’s case the ratio of G. D. Builder’s case was challenged and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 34 of the judgment referring to Mahim Patram Pvt. Ltd vs. UOI3 held that, “the Delhi High Court judgment unfortunately misread the aforesaid judgment of this Court to arrive at the conclusion that it was an authority for the proportion that a tax is leviable even if no rules are framed for assessment of such tax, which is wholly incorrect”. The conclusion reached by the Delhi High Court was held as wholly incorrect.

The core issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was that whether five taxable services, namely, ‘Consulting Engineer Service’ (sub-cl. g), ‘Erection Commission and Installation Service’ (sub-cl. zzh), ‘Technical Testing and Analysis Service’ (sub-cl. zzd), ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ (sub-cl. zzq) and ‘Construction or Complex Service’ (sub-cl. zzzh) were whether capable of imposing the charge on a composite contract, particularly when S. 67 target only value of taxable service i.e. “the gross amount charged by the service provider by such service provided by him”. The charging S. 66 seeks to levy charge of service tax on services defined in various sub–clauses of S. 65(105). The operating portion of S. 65(105) describe “taxable service” as “service provided or to be provided…………”. The combined reading of S. 65(105), S. 66 and S. 67 would unequivocally show that what is referred to in the law (Ch. V of Finance Act, 1994) is the taxability of the service contract simpliciter and not a composite works contract. In none of the relevant clauses, there was any provision to remove the property in goods transferred in the execution of works contract. In G. D. Builder’s case the Delhi High Court rejected the contention on the assessee holding that the provisions of the clauses (zzd), (zzq) and (zzzh) were applicable only to the service contracts and not to the composite works contract and the question of bifurcation of service element did not arise at all. The judgment of Delhi High Court in the impugned case is effectively overruled.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court found the findings of the Delhi High Court is misplaced that the term, ‘gross amount charged’ in S. 67 signifies the gross amount charged for the service portion and not the whole amount of the works contract as several deductions have to be made to arrive at the service portion from the indivisible works contract amount. The Court further observed that even in case of completion and finishing of service, the exemption for material portion was not allowed at all which means that the service tax was required to be paid on the entire portion including the material portion in the case of that service.

The argument of the revenue that the exemption notification4 providing for exemption of certain percentage of the contract value gave the enough sanctity to the levy was found illogical and irrelevant, thus, “whichever judgments which are in appeal before us and have referred to and dealt with such notifications will have to be disregarded. Since, the levy itself of service tax has been found to be non-existence, no question of any exemption would arise”. Therefore on the basis of the exemption notification, levy of service tax cannot be justified as valid as the ‘Erection, Commission and Installation Service’, ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ and ‘Construction or Complex Service’ as under the relevant provisions the levy of service tax is non-existence on composite works contract. The exemptions were only in respect of material portion, whereas the exemption u/s. 93 could be granted from the value of taxable service and not for material portion which was not a service at all. It is well settled that a notification cannot expand or enlarge the charging section. Further, the subsequent legislation, viz. the insertion of clause (zzzza) showed that the earlier legislation would not cover the composite works contract and the impugned exemption notification was ultra vires to the Act.

A view is expressed that from 1-6-2007 the levy of service tax is valid even under clauses (g), (zzd), (zzh), (zzq) & (zzzh). Such a view fails to appreciate that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that those clauses never gave power to the Government to tax other than the service element. Thus, the said judgment would hold good even after 1-6-2007 so far as the levy of service tax on composite works contract under those clauses is concerned. The power to levy service tax on service portion involved in composite works contract was assumed by the Government only from 1-6-2007 when the Parliament inserted sub-clause (zzzza) of clause (105) of S. 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 by the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2007 and provisions were made under the rules to compute value of taxable service under composite contract or to pay tax under composition scheme rules.

The fallout of the judgment

1. No service tax can be levied on composite works contract under sub-clauses (g), (zzd), (zzh), (zzq) & (zzzh) of S. 65(105), i.e. ‘Consulting Engineer Service’, ‘Technical Testing & Analysis Service’, ‘Erection, Commission and Installation Service’, ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ and ‘Construction or Complex Service’ at all, as these services refers only to pure service contracts.

2. S. 67 referring to valuation of service is applicable to pure services only and the exemption notifications with respect to material portion are of no consequence.

3. Service tax on construction of building where provision of material (transfer of property in goods) is also a part of the contract under sub-clauses (zzq) & (zzzh) is wholly outside the purview of the Finance Act, 1994. Thus, service tax on under-constructed sale of flats or units of immovable properties is also outside the purview of the law, being nothing but a specie of composite works contract as held by the Apex Court in K. Raheja Development Corporation’s5 case. With this judgment, all pending disputes of levy of service tax on under-constructed flats under sub clause (zzq) & (zzzh) of S. 65(105) may be resolved in assessee’s favour.

4. No service tax can be levied on completion and finishing contracts under sub-clauses (zzq) & (zzzh).

5. Free supply of material may not be covered under service tax as the exemption notification itself is invalid. The issue of leviability of service tax on free supply of material is pending in Supreme Court and it may be guided by this judgment.

6. The judgment can also have the repercussion on the Declared Service clause (b) of S. 66E from 1-7-2012, however, the same needs to be tested.

7. A question may arise of ability of claim of refund by the assessee who has paid service tax under the impugned clauses as existed prior to 1-7-2012. However, the refund depends on the factors like ‘unjust enrichment’ i.e. recovery of taxes from the buyers and the controversy as regards to time barring in refund claim which is not discussed here. However, in principle it is clear that under Article 265 of the Constitution of India no tax can be levied or collected expect with the authority of the law and this case may be regarded as perfect example of such unauthorised levy.

(Source: Article published in souvenir of National Tax Conference held at Varanasi on 10 & 11 October 2015)

Under the provisions of Income Tax Act 1961, when an assessment is made and demand is raised against the assessee, the assessee usually prefers first appeal before the CIT(A) and files application for stay of the demand in dispute before the AO within thirty days from the date of receipt of the assessment order.

But under the Indirect Tax Laws, the assessee being aggrieved with the order of assessment prefers Appeal before the First Appellate Authority along with an application for stay of the demand in dispute. The latter seems to be very much reasonable. Because, the authority, who would dispose of the first appeal would certainly apply his mind while disposing of the stay application filed before him.

Since the year 1961 the Income Tax Law came in to existence, it was never thought of that the AO who had passed the order of assessment would never act in a fair manner to grant stay on the demand in dispute. It is also not expected in common paralance that the AO, who has raised demand would grant stay on the demand to the assessee. Because if the AO will grant stay of the demand in dispute, he will mean that he is challenging his own order.

Section 220(6) of the Act provides that where an assessee has presented an appeal under section 246 or section 246A the Assessing Officer may, in his discretion and subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose in the circumstances of the case, treat the assessee as not being in default in respect of the amount in dispute in the appeal, even though the time for payment has expired, as long as such appeal remains un-disposed.

Besides that the First Appellate Authority i.e. the CIT(A) was not given with the power under the statute to hear and dispose of the stay application during the pendency of appeal. A few Hon’ble High Court(s) have taken view that the CIT(A) has inherent, implied and ancillary power to hear and dispose of the stay application although it is not expressly mentioned in the Statute. Some of citations are reproduced hereunder:-

(a) ITO v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi (1969) 71-ITR-815(SC).

(b) V. N. Purushothaman v. Agricultural ITO (1984) 149-ITR-120 (Kerala).

(c) Prem Prakash Tripathi v. CIT (1994) 208-ITR-461 (All.).

(d) Debashis Moulik v. CIT (1998) 231-ITR-737 (Cal.).

(e) Smita Agarwal v. CIT (2010) 321-ITR-491 (All.),

(f) Jagdish N.Hinduja v. CIT (2011) 59-DTR-333 (Karn.).

(g) UTI Mutual Fund v. ITO (2012) 345-ITR-71 (Bom.),

(h) Maheswari Agro Industries v. Union of India (2012) 346-ITR-375 (Raj.),

In the above judgment [ITO v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi (1969) 71-ITR-815 (SC)], the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has discussed about the power of the CIT(A) to grant stay as under.:—

In our opinion, the Appellate Tribunal must be held to have the power to grant stay as incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. This is particularly so when section 220(6) deals expressly with a situation when an appeal is pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but the Act is silent in that behalf, when an appeal is pending before the Appellate Tribunal. It could well be said that when section 254 confers appellate jurisdiction, it impliedly grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution and that the statutory power carries with it the duty in proper cases to make such orders for staying proceeding as will prevent the appeal if successful from being rendered nugatory.”

Similarly, in the judgment [Maheswari Agro Industries v. Union of India (2012) 346-ITR-375(Raj.)], cited supra the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court has held the same as under:—

“In view of aforesaid legal position culled out from different judgments and there being no contrary view available before this Court cited from the side of Revenue or otherwise, this Court is inclined to hold that First Appellate Authority, namely, Dy. CIT(A) or CIT(A) have inherent, implied and ancillary powers to grant stay against the recovery of disputed demand of tax while seized of the appeal filed before them in accordance with s. 246 or 246A of the Act. There is yet another reason for holding so, and such inherent powers have to be inferred even in the absence of any specific statutory provision conferring the power to grant stay upon such authorities under the Act.”

Although the legal position is very much clear but the CIT(A) is quite reluctant to exercise this power. On the other hand, they are not exercising this power at all. Such is the attitude on the part of CIT(A) to stay the demand during the pendency of an appeal. But the Parliament of India has not considered this aspect till this date and amended the law to that effect.

Against the stay order of the AO the assessee has to approach the Joint/Additional Commissioner and against the order of JCIT/Addl. CIT’s order, the CIT. These are all administrative orders. Being aggrieved with the stay order of the CIT the assessee may prefer Writ Application before the Hon’ble High Court.

In a number of cases where high pitch assessment is done by the AO and stay application is not considered by him, the assessee suffers a lot due to coercive measures taken by AO for realisation of the demand in dispute by way of attachment of bank accounts for recovery of the demand.

Further, it is generally understood that instructions of CBDT are binding on the AO. CBDT’s clarification on Instructions on Stay of Demand issued vide Letter [F. No. 404/10/2009-ITCC], dated 1-12-2009 is discussed below for better appreciation of the facts.

Many queries have been received by the Board regarding the applicability of Instruction number 95 dated 21-8-1969 vis-à-vis Instruction number 1914 dated 2-12-1993. Many assessees are taking the plea that Instruction No. 1914 does not supersede Instruction No. 95 dated 21-8-1969.

1. Instruction No. 95 dated 22-8-1969 was an assurance given by the then Deputy Prime Minister during the 8th Meeting of the Informal Consultative Committee held on 13th May, 1969. The observations made by the Deputy Prime Minister were as under:-

“Where the income determined on assessment was substantially higher than the returned income, say twice the latter amount or more, the collection of the tax in dispute should be held in abeyance till the decision on the appeal provided there were no lapses on the part of the assessee.”

The above observations were circulated to the field officers by the Board as Instruction number 95 dated- 21-8-1969.

2. The matter has been considered by the Board and the decision of the Board has been approved by the Finance Minister. It is hereby clarified that subsequent to Instruction No. 95 following Instructions/clarifications on the stay of demand were issued till 15th October, 1980:-

(i) Clarification to Instruction number 95 was issued on 14-9-1970 stating that it relates to disputed demands only.

(ii) Instruction number 635 was issued on 12-11-1973 stating that stay should be granted only in those cases where demands are attributable to substantial points of dispute.

(iii) Clarification to Instruction number 95 dated 13-7-1976 held that the Instruction becomes operative only in cases where there are no lapses on the part of the assessee.

(iv) Instruction number 1067 dated 21-6-1977 held that the ITO can pass the necessary orders u/s. 220 (6) in all cases except cases under section 144A or 144B where the approval of IAC is required.

(v) Instruction number 1158 dated 27th March. 1978 held that in suitable cases the assessee may be allowed to furnish security.

(vi) Instruction number 1282 dated 4th October 1979 held that requests should be made to CIT(A) and ITAT for early disposal of appeals and constant watch should be kept on progress of appeals.

(vii) Instruction number 1362 was issued on 15-10-1980 in supersession of all the earlier Instructions. It was an Instruction covering the issue in detail and in para 4 of the same there was a clear reference to the proposition laid down in Instruction number 95 which is as follows:- In exercising this discretion, the Income-tax Officer should take into account factors such as: whether the points in dispute relate to facts; whether they arise from different interpretations of law; whether the additions have been made as a result of detailed investigation; whether the additions are based on materials gathered through enquiry/survey/search and seizure operations; whether the disputed addition to income has been assessed elsewhere by way of protective assessment and the tax thereon has been paid by such person etc. The magnitude of addition to income returned cannot be the sole determinant in this regard. Each disputed addition will need to be considered to arrive at the quantum of tax that may need to be stayed.

3. It is clear that the substance of the assurance as laid down in Instruction number 95 dated 21-8-1969 was submerged in the Instruction number 1362 dated 15-10-1980 which was issued in supersession of all earlier Instructions on the subject. Instruction No. 1914 dated 2-12-1993 was issued subsequently in super-session of all the earlier Instructions on the subject and the said Instruction also covers unreasonably high pitched assessment order and genuine hardship cases.

4. It is therefore clarified that there is no separate existence of the Instruction No. 95 dated 21-8-1969. Instruction No. 95 and all subsequent Instructions on the issue ceased to exist from the date Instruction No. 1362 came into operation. In turn Instruction No. 1362 and all subsequent Instructions on the issue also ceased to exist the day Instruction No. 1914 came into operation i.e. 2-12-1993.The Instruction No. 1914 holds the field currently and a copy of Instruction No. 1914 is enclosed for reference.

Similarly, Instructions for Recovery of Outstanding Tax Demands have been issued by CBDT vide No. 1914 F. No. 404/72/93 ITCC dated 2-12-1993.

1. The Board has felt the need for a comprehensive instruction on the subject of recovery of tax demand in order to streamline recovery procedures. This instruction is accordingly being issued in supersession of all earlier instructions on the subject and reiterates the existing Circulars on the subject.

2. The Board is of the view that, as a matter of principle, every demand should be recovered as soon as it becomes due. Demand may be kept in abeyance for valid reasons only in accordance with the guidelines given below:

A. Responsibility

i. It shall be the responsibility of the Assessing Officer and the TRO to collect every demand that has been raised, except the following:

(a) Demand which has not fallen due;

(b) Demand which has been stayed by a Court or ITAT or Settlement Commission;

(c) Demand for which a proper proposal for write-off has been submitted;

(d) Demand stayed in accordance with paras B & C below.

ii. Where demand in respect of which a recovery certificate has been issued or a statement has been drawn, the primary responsibility for the collection of tax shall rest with the TRO.

iii. It would be the responsibility of the supervisory authorities to ensure that the Assessing Officers and the TROs take all such measures as are necessary to collect the demand. It must be understood that mere issue of a show cause notice with no follow-up is not to be regarded as adequate effort to recover taxes.

B. Stay Petitions

i. Stay petitions filed with the Assessing Officers must be disposed of within two weeks of the filing of petition by the tax- payer. The assessee must be intimated of the decision without delay.

ii. Where stay petitions are made to the authorities higher than the Assessing Officer (DC/CIT/CC), it is the responsibility of the higher authorities to dispose of the petitions without any delay, and in any event within two weeks of the receipt of the petition. Such a decision should be communicated to the assessee and the Assessing Officer immediately.

iii. The decision in the matter of stay of demand should normally be taken by Assessing Officer/ TRO and his immediate superior. A higher superior authority should interfere with the decision of the AO/TRO only in exceptional circumstances; e.g., where the assessment order appears to be unreasonably high-pitched or where genuine hardship is likely to be caused to the assessee. The higher authorities should discourage the assessee from filing review petitions before them as a matter of routine or in a frivolous manner to gain time for withholding payment of taxes.

C. Guidelines for staying demand

i. A demand will be stayed only if there are valid reasons for doing so. Mere filing an appeal against the assessment order will not be a sufficient reason to stay the recovery of demand. A few illustrative situations where stay could be granted are: It is clarified that in these situations also, stay may be granted only in respect of the amount attributable to such disputed points. Further, where it is subsequently found that the assessee has not co-operated in the early disposal of appeal or where a subsequent pronouncement by a higher appellate authority or court alters the above situation, the stay order may be reviewed and modified. The above illustrations are, of course, not exhaustive.

ii. In granting stay, the Assessing Officer may impose such conditions as he may think fit. Thus he may-

a. Require the assessee to offer suitable security to safeguard the interest of revenues,

b. Require the assessee to pay towards the disputed taxes a reasonable amount in lump sum or in installments,

c. Require an undertaking from the assessee that he will co-operate in the early disposal of appeal failing which the stay order will be cancelled.

d. Reserve the right to review the order passed after expiry of a reasonable period, say up to 6 months, or if the assessee has not co-operated in the early disposal of appeal, or where a subsequent pronouncement by a higher appellate authority or court alters the above situations;

e. Reserve a right to adjust refunds arising, if any, against the demand.

iii. Payment by installments may be liberally allowed so as to collect the entire demand within a reasonable period not exceeding 18 months.

iv. Since the phrase “stay of demand” does not occur in section 220(6) of the Income-tax Act, the Assessing Officer should always use in any order passed under section 220(6) [or under section 220(3) or section 220(7)], the expression that occurs in the section viz., that he agrees to treat the assessee as not being default in respect of the amount specified, subject to such conditions as he deems fit to impose.

v. While considering an application under section 220(6), the Assessing Officer should consider all relevant factors having a bearing on the demand raised and communicate his decision in the form of a speaking order.

D. Miscellaneous

i. Even where recovery of demand has been stayed, the Assessing Officer will continue to review the situation to ensure that the conditions imposed are fulfilled by the assessee failing which the stay order would need to be withdrawn.

ii. Where the assessee seeks stay of demand from the Tribunal, it should be strongly opposed. If the assessee presses his application, the CIT should direct the departmental representative to request that the appeal be posted within a month so that Tribunal’s order on the appeal can be known within two months.

iii. Appeal effects will have to be given within 2 weeks from the receipt of the appellate order. Similarly, rectification application should be decided within 2 weeks of the receipt thereof. Instances where there is undue delay in giving effect to appellate orders, or in deciding rectification applications, should be dealt with very strictly by the CCITs/CITs.

3. The Board desires that appropriate action is taken in the matter of recovery in accordance with the above procedure. The Assessing Officer or the TRO, as the case may be, and his immediate Superior Officer shall be held responsible for ensuring compliance with these instructions.

4. This procedure would apply mutatis mutandis to demands created under other Direct Taxes enactments also.

It is also observed by the Hon’ble High Court(s) that when the assessed income of the assessee is twice the returned figure, the demand raised in the assessment is stayed in full till disposal of appeal. A few case laws are cited hereunder for better appreciation of the facts:—

(a) KEC International Ltd. vs. B. R. Balakrishnan & Others (2001) 251-ITR-158 (Bom.),

(b) RPG Enterprises Ltd. vs. DCIT (2001) 251-ITR-(AT) 20 (Mum.),

(c) Cocacola (P) Ltd. vs. CIT (2006) 285-ITR-419 (Bom.),

(d) Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. vs. AO (2007) 295-ITR-42 (Bom.),

(e) Taneja Developers and Infrastructure Ltd. vs. ACIT (2010) 324-ITR-247 (Del.),

(f) Soul vs. DCIT (2010) 323-ITR-305 (Del.),

(g) UTI Mutual Fund vs. ITO (2012) 345-ITR-71 (Bom.),

But Hon’ble Kerala High Court in the judgment dated:-26/02/1996 in the case of Pradip Ratan Shi-Vrs.-CIT reported in 221-ITR-502(Kerala) held as under:—

“A reading of sub-section 6 of 220 will show that the discretion to be exercised under the said sub-section can only be exercised by the Assessing Officer and not by the Commissioner. As the order was passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax is without jurisdiction the order has to be set-aside and accordingly it is set-aside.”

It is thus understood from the above judgment that the CIT has no jurisdiction under the statute to grant stay on the demand in dispute. It is the AO, who has got only power as per provisions of section 220(6) of the Act to grant stay of the demand. It is not out of place to mention here that referring the judgment of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court some of the CIT(s) are not taking up stay application for hearing or rejecting the same being not maintainable before them.

It is thus pointed out here that merely writing an article in a souvenir or journal would not solve the purpose. Further, an assessee’s representation to the Government of India may not help in bring an amendment to the present law, which is beinging followed for years together. It is only All India Federation of Tax Practitioners, which may represent the FINMIN/CBDT to make an amendment in the Income Tax Law incorporating a clear provision so as grant of stay by the CIT(A) is concerned and modify the earlier instructions with a new one. It is not known whether the Direct Tax Code would come in to force and the same shall contain provisions as discussed above. However, the above aspect needs attention and every effort should be made to bring the above little change in the statute.

(Source: Article published in souvenir of National Tax Conference held at Varanasi on 10 & 11 October 2015)

The issue when rental income is chargeable under the head “Income from house property” and when under the head “Profits and Gains of business” has been an issue of controversy and repeatedly the matter has gone before the Courts for consideration. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Chennai Properties and Investment Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2015) 373 ITR 673 (SC) and also High Court of Calcutta in the case of Shyam Burlap Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax in ITA No. 163/2005 decided on 4-9-2015 have held that income in case of companies where Memorandum of Association provides for carrying on the business of letting out is in the nature of business income and chargeable accordingly and not under the head “Income from house property”. An attempt is being made in this Article to analyze the effect on above decisions on the controversy in regard to the matter.

The leading decision in regard to the matter has been of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1961) 42 ITR 49 (SC). In the facts of above case the company was incorporated with the object of developing a market on the land purchased for this purpose. Accordingly, shops and stalls were constructed on the land purchased. Certain shops were let out to different tenants and rental income was received by the assessee company. The issue accordingly, arises whether the income was chargeable to tax under the head “Income from house property” or same was chargeable as business income as was claimed by the assessee. The Hon’ble Supreme Court primarily proceeded on the basis that there is separate head of income provided in the Income-tax Act for taxability of income from house property and, therefore, the income is chargeable under the above head. It was observed that distinct heads specified in section 6 including the sources are mutually exclusive and income derived from different sources following under specific heads has to be computed for the purpose of taxation in the manner provided by the appropriate section. If the income from a source falls within specified head set out in sections, the fact that it may indirectly be covered by another head will not make the income taxable under the latter head. In this regard reference had been made to decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1957) 32 ITR 688, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had taken a view after exhaustive review of the authorities that under the Scheme of Income-tax Act, 1922, the heads of income, Profit and Gains enumerated in difference clauses of section are mutually exclusive. Each specific head covering items of income arising from a particular source. Accordingly, notwithstanding that the market was constructed pursuant to object of the company, rental income received from the shops held to be assessable under the head “Income from other sources” and not as business income.

After above referred decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. (supra) the issue came up repeatedly before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various High Courts. In large number of cases following the above decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court view had been taken that income is chargeable under the head “Income from house property”. In certain cases, however, a view was taken on the basis of facts of cases that income is chargeable as business income. In the case of
Karanpura Development Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1961) 44 ITR 362 (SC). The facts before the Supreme Court have been that income had been received pursuant to leasing of coal mining rights. The assessee company was formed with the object, inter alia, of acquiring and disposing of the underground coal mining rights in certain coal fields and it had restricted its activities to acquiring coal mining leases over large areas, developing them as coal fields and then sub-leasing them to collieries and other companies. The assessee had shown the income as business income. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observing that the object and the manner of its activities and the nature of its dealings with its properties have to be considered and accordingly had held the income to be in the nature of business income for the purpose of above case and not as income from house property.

The issue had again come up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Sultan Brothers (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1964) 51 ITR 353 (S.C.). In the facts of above case, the Appellant had let out building fully equipped and furnished for a term of six years for running a hotel and for other ancillary purpose. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that whether a particular letting is business has to be decided in the circumstances of each case. Further, it was observed that “each case has to be looked at from a businessman’s point of view to find out whether the letting was the doing of a business or the exploitation of his property by an owner”. It was also observed that merely an entry in the object clause showing a particular object would not be determinative factor to arrive at an conclusion whether the income is to be treated as income from business and such a question would depend upon the circumstances of each case viz. whether the particular business is letting or not. Accordingly, in the facts of above case the Hon’ble Supreme Court held the income to be in the nature of business income.

In the case of S.G. Mercantile Corporation P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income (1972) 83 ITR 700 (SC) again the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the issue in the circumstances where the assessee company was having its object of developing the market and had let out shops, stalls and ground spaces. The assessee company had taken the market place on lease and thereafter sub-leases were made. In this circumstances the question for consideration was whether the income was chargeable under the head “Business income” or under the head “Income from other sources”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that income in the facts of the case was assessable as business income and not under the head “Income from other sources”.

Reference in this regard can also be made to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Shambhu Investment P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2003) 263 ITR 143 (SC). In the facts of above case the assessee company was owning a immovable property. It had occupied a portion of the property. Rest of the property was let out to be used as table space by the occupants with furniture and fixtures and lights and air conditioners. The assessee also provided services like watch and ward staff, electricity, water and other common amenities. The monthly rent was being charged was inclusive of above facilities. The Calcutta High Court held that income from property was assessable in the hands of assessee as income from house property.
(2001) 249 ITR 7 (Cal.). On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the appeal holding that there was no reason to interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court.

In regard to the issue, as mentioned above, there have been large numbers of decisions of different Courts including of Hon’ble Supreme Court in regard to the matter. Reference of above decisions has been made herein only with a view to indicate that there has been consistently an issue in regard to the matter and the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Courts have taken view considering facts and circumstances of each of the case and if we strictly go through the facts of each case and the holding of Hon’ble Court, it is very difficult to make out what has been the consistent line of thinking and why decision in a particular case has been taken in one way or another.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the issue recently in the case of Chennai Properties and Investment Ltd. (supra). In the facts of this case the assessee company was having its main object in the Memorandum of Association to acquire the properties in the city of Madras (now Chennai) and to let out those properties. The rental income from such properties was shown as income from business in the return of income filed by the assessee. The Department considered the same as income chargeable under the head “Income from house property”. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) allowed the appeal of the assessee holding it to be income from business. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal also affirmed the order of Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). In appeal filed by the Department before the High Court of Chennai the Hon’ble High Court held that income was chargeable under the head “Income from house property”. The Madras High Court basically rested its decision on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of East India Housing Land Development Trust Ltd. (supra). Against the decision of High Court the assessee filed appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court analyzed decisions of Supreme Court in the cases of East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. and also in the case of Sultan Brothers (P) Ltd. (supra) and Karanpura Development Co. Ltd. (supra). In the facts of the case the Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that the entire income of the assessee was through letting out of two properties, namely, “Chennai house” and “Firhavin Estate” and there was no other income of the assessee. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that main object of the company was to acquire and hold properties and to let out those properties. After taking specific note of the decision of Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sultan Brothers (P) Ltd. (supra) in which case it was observed by the Hon’ble Court that each case has to be looked at from businessman’s point of view, held that in the facts of the case income was chargeable as business income.

The issue had also recently come up for consideration before the High Court of Calcutta in the case of Burlap Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (supra) decided on 4-9-2015. In the facts of above case the assessee company was in earlier years has been showing the income under the head “Income from house property” and same was being accepted as such by the Department. During the year under consideration the assessee company paid compensation to two of its tenants for vacating the property and intention of the company was to earn higher rental income by letting the property to new tenants. In these circumstances the assessee company claimed that its rental income was in the nature of business income and compensation paid by it was also deductible as business expenditure. The Department in these circumstances had taken a view that since the assessee company itself has been showing the income in earlier years as income from house property, it could not change its stand in this year and cannot claim the income as business income. The Commissioner allowed the claim of the assessee company after examining the Memorandum of Association and noting the fact that 85% of its income was by way of rent. The Tribunal, however, held that income was chargeable under the head “Income from house property”. Accordingly, the assessee filed appeal before the Calcutta High Court. Before the Calcutta High Court amongst other decisions, decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Properties and Investment Ltd. (supra) has also been cited by counsel on behalf of the assessee. There is, however, no specific discussion in the Judgement in regard to aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. The Hon’ble High Court, however, proceed in the matter taking cognizance of the object clause in the Memorandum permitting the assessee to carry on business in letting out of properties. Further, it has been noted that 85% of income of the appellant was by way of deriving rent and lease rentals. Accordingly, it has been held by High Court that income from rent constituted the business income of the assessee.

It can be observed on the basis of various decisions of the Courts in the past that in the case of East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. the Hon’ble Supreme Court had proceeded on the basis that since there is a separate head of income for taxability of income from house property, the income should be assessed under the above head. Thereafter in various decisions following the aforesaid view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court it was held that rental is chargeable under the head “income from house property”. In the case of
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ansal Housing Finance & Leasing Co. Ltd. & Ors. (2013) 354 ITR 180 (Del.)
the Hon’ble High Court had gone to the extent of holding that in respect of unsold flats owned by the assessee in the business of developing and selling the properties, which are held as stock-in-trade, taxability is to be determined under the head “Income from house property” on the basis of Annul Letting Value regardless whether actual income is received or not. The Hon’ble Court had not accepted the contention of the assessee company that since it was engaged in the business of building activity and flats held were part of its inventory of stock-in-trade and there was no actual letting out. Therefore, deemed income, which is the basis for assessment under the Annual Letting Value method should not be applied. The Hon’ble Court expressed its view that “This Court is of the opinion that arguments, though attractive, cannot be accepted. As repeatedly held in East India, Sultan and Karanpura, the levy of income-tax in the case of one holding house property is premised not an whether the assessee carries on business, as landlord, but on the ownership. The incidence of charge is because of the fact of ownership.

It can be said in the conclusion that broadly there has been thinking of the Courts that since property is held as a owner and rental income is being received as a result of ownership of the property the same is chargeable under the head “Income from house property”, notwithstanding it may be stock-in-trade of the business or the rental income is received as part of its business activities. Whereas the Courts from time to time have also been taking the view that income from properties is in the nature of business income. In the case of Chennai Properties and Investment Ltd. (supra) and thereafter Calcutta High Court in the case of Shyam Burlap Co. Ltd. has held that where rental income is being received as a result of carrying on the business of letting out, income would be in the nature of business income notwithstanding that there is separate head of income in the Income-tax Act, namely, income from house property. It is, therefore, submitted that the rental income where it is in the nature of business income keeping in view the activities of an assessee, should be considered as business income and not as income from house property. Similarly in case of developers no income should be assessed on the basis of notional annual value on the ground of ownership as the flats etc. are held by the builders/developers as stock-in-trade and not for the purpose of letting out and same are held only for the reason that they have not been able to sell the same. A distinction should be drawn whether the property is held as business asset or an investment. The basis and the criteria adopted in determining the nature of income earned in respect of shareholding, whether capital gain or business income, should equally be applicable for determining the nature of rental income for the purpose of taxability.

In this regard reference can also be made to the decisions where the issue had arisen in the context of dividend income, which is chargeable under the head “Income from other sources”. The Courts have taken a view that notwithstanding that it is taxable under the head “Income from other sources”, its nature is business income when dividend is received on shares held as stock-in-trade. In this regard reference can be made to the decisions of Supreme Court in the cases of
United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (`957) 32 ITR 688 (SC) and Western State Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1971) 80 ITR 21 (SC) and the dividend income has been allowed to be set off against brought forward loss arising in share deals. To the same effect have been number of other cases also.

(Source: Article published in souvenir of National Tax Conference held at Varanasi on 10 & 11 October 2015)

My Beloved Members,

NATIONAL TAX CONFERENCE – VARANASI 2015
‘MANTHAN’ ON TAX LAWS

With great pride, I must say that the above Conference organised by All India Federation of Tax Practitioners (AIFTP), (North Zone), and Income Tax Bar Association, Varanasi, at Hotel Clarks, Varanasi, on 10th and 11th October, 2015, for in-depth deliberations on tax laws was a unique success in as much as, it was inaugurated by the Chief Guest Hon’ble Justice Mr. R. K. Agarwal, Judge, Supreme Court of India and the Guest of Honour Hon’ble Mr. K. V. Chaudhary, Central Vigilance Commissioner, Government of India. Hon’ble Chief Guest at the inaugural address stressed the importance of taxes as the nation is governed/administered and developed on taxes only. At the same time, he stated that the structure and implementation of taxes is quite complex apart from its high incidence, and requires to be simplified for the benefit of the taxpayer, as was emphasised by great author and thinker ‘Chanakya’ in his ‘Arthashastra’, which advice is valid even today and we must follow it. Guest of Honour Mr. K. V. Chaudhary, Central Vigilance Commissioner, Government of India, informed the distinguished gathering, that huge unquantified black money is going out of the country in respect of which Government of India has no accounts. Therefore, according to him, it is necessary to make the law to arrest such outflow of huge money out of the economy of the country. In this respect, he made categorical statement that the citizens of this country who have stacked black money in various other countries must be proceeded with as per law, and monitored strictly by financial cyber crime agency of the nation.

The Conference Chairman Mr. Bharat Ji Agarwal, Sr. Advocate and Past President of the AIFTP also addressed the distinguished gathering on the importance of such conferences wherein continued study of tax laws and updating the knowledge takes place, which is of vital importance for the Bar, Bench as well as the Administration, who also takes part in such ‘Manthan’ and enrich themselves of the current developments that takes place in the field of direct and indirect taxes, which affects the fabric of the society as a whole.

In recognition of Mr. Bharat Ji Agarwal’s contribution in the development of direct and indirect tax laws of the country as well as shouldering the responsibilities as Chairman/President of the various Bar Associations, the Conference awarded him the citation of ‘Lifetime Achievement Award’ which was presented to him by Mr. P. C. Joshi, Advocate and Past President of the AIFTP.

Thereafter, technical sessions of direct and indirect taxes took place in which eminent faculties / authorities on the subjects deliberated extensively on the assigned subjects.

The unique feature of the Conference was panel discussion, appropriately titled, ‘Mann Ki Baat’ with the Senior officials of the IT, ST, VAT, Company Law, Depts. and the Industries Leaders, who exchanged freely and frankly their difficulties in resolving the grievances of the Trade and Industry, in mutual interests. This session of ‘Mann Ki Baat’ proved quite fruitful and at the end of the session, everybody participating in the session wore a very smiling face and reiterating that in future such sessions should be held regularly to resolve the difficulties of both i.e., the administration and taxpayers.

As usual the last session was of ‘Brain Trust’ in which Trustees answered queries received from the delegates to their satisfaction.

All in all, after undergoing hectic sessions of the Conference, the delegates visited the Temple of “Lord Kashi Vishwanath” for prayers and offered Ganga Pooja and Aarti, and then the delegates departed the venue of the Conference with great satisfaction.

Last but not the least, the leaders of AIFTP (NZ) and Income Tax Bar Association, Varanasi, deserves great appreciation for their hard work put in organising the above Conference.

ENSUING GST VISITED WITH GLOOM

Earlier, Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers’ Panel, released a draft report of ‘The Jt. Committee on businesses and processes for GST’ April 2015 on GST payment process. Thereafter, the said Committee released a draft report on Registration in July 2015 and the 3rd draft report on Refund process August 2015 for the deliberations of the public at large. Now, as per TOI (Times Business) report dated 14-10-2015, the GST Panel suggested black-listing defaulting dealers. It also suggested compliance rating of dealers, which obviously will hurt, buyers who will be denied input tax credit. This approach of the GST Panel is quite disturbing and putting a curtain of gloom on the entire exercise of expediting GST coming to India soon. As per suggestions, there are number of pain bearing points few of them are as under: –

  • A system of GST compliance rating could result in blacklisting of defaulting dealers. However, it is the buyer who will be denied input tax credit.

  • There is no centralised registration for Central GST and integrated GST.

  • Exporters will no longer be able to obtain non-duty paid inputs and will have to claim input credit / rebate at a later stage.

  • A partial refund will not be made upfront and automatically when a claim is filed; the entire refund will be made after due processing at one go, within the set time period.

  • Considering the above red-tape practices adopted at the initial stage of promoting GST, it is highly impossible to go for it. So, the trade and industry together with tax practitioners in general should be on alert whether they should advocate the GST still knowing that it will cause great hardships of no end to them.

CLAIMING MEDICAL EXPENDITURE UNDER I-T FOR TAX PURPOSES MADE EASY

The CBDT is always late when it comes to resolving the dues of income tax payers. The recent CBDT Notification No. 78/2015 dated 12-10-2015 is a testimony of its working. U/s 80DDB r/w amended Rule 11DD dated 12-10-2015, it had relaxed the condition of obtaining the certificate for claim of expenditure u/s. 80DDB in respect of specified ailments from a specialist doctors working in a Government hospital. Under the amended rule, it will not be mandatory to obtain a certificate from a specialist doctor working in a Govt. hospital but a certificate from a specialist treating the patient will suffice for the purpose of claiming deduction u/s. 80DDB r/w. Rule 11DD.

I-T GETS KUDOS FOR FASTER REFUND!

The Government has speeded up for tax refunds with some taxpayers getting them within a week of filing returns. But it appears that those who got it may be blessed by the Govt. Those who received reacted “Historic! I-T refund in less than a month of filing!” Jai Ho! tweeted Bhaskar Bhattacharya. Others such as Chartered Accountant Kamlesh Vikamsey and Krish tweeted accordingly (TOI dated. 24-8-2015). But we common persons will not receive refunds so fast. Thus, it appears that CPC is following pick and choose method for releasing refunds, one wonders! May we therefore appeal to CBDT to look into the matter?

With best wishes and regards,

J.D. Nankani
National President

National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act struck down by the Apex Court as unconstitutional – Independence of judiciary in manner of appointment of judges – Suggestions for improvement of present collegium system are invited from the Bar at the next hearing on November 3, 2015

In a landmark judgment, the Supreme Court has declared the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) unconstitutional. The collegium system where judges appoint judges, will continue, as according to the Supreme Court the NJAC Act interfered with the independence of judiciary.

One of the objects of the All India Federation of Tax Practitioners (the “Federation”) being “to strive and work for independence of Honourable Courts”, we at AIFTP welcome the Supreme Court judgment. The senior members of the Tax Bar were always of the opinion that the present system of the appointment of judges should be continued albeit with increased transparency.

The Tax Bar has witnessed how the Executive in the past has tried to interfere with the justice delivery system of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. It is only due to a Public Interest Litigation filed by the ITAT Bar Association, Mumbai, and with the strong support of the then President of the ITAT, Honourable Shri T. V. Rajagopala Rao, could the independence of the ITAT be saved by the higher Judiciary. It may be noted that the then Law Secretary was held guilty of contempt for interfering with the judicial functioning of the ITAT. [ITAT v. V. K. Agarwal (1999) 235 ITR 175(SC), Ajay Gandhi v. B. Singh (2004) 265 ITR 451 (SC)]. This scenario of developments must be kept in mind while welcoming the above Apex Court judgment.

One can only imagine if the Apex Court would not have interfered, then what could have been the fate of the Mother Tribunal of our country and the taxpayers. One would also appreciate that the then Honourable Prime Minster of India, Shri Atal Bihari Vajapyee, on 16-1-2004, on the occasion of the release of commemorative postage stamp in memory of late Shri N. A. Palkhivala at Mumbai, had stoutly deprecated the Emergency thus: “In those dark days, the battle for democracy was fought by many people in many different ways. Many of us in politics under the leadership of Jaiprakash Narayan fought it in prisons. But I have no doubt that one of the finest battles was fought in the Court rooms and that fighter was Nani Palkhivala”.

Judges could deliver verdicts such as that in Kesavanand Bharti’s case [AIR 1973 SC 1461] only because of their fierce independence. One would also appreciate that in taxation matters, the Government is always a party. If any High Court Judge decides a high-stake matter in favour of the assessee, the Government may brand him as a pro-assessee Judge thereby jeopardising his chances of being elevated to the Apex Court, if the NJAC was to continue. We are of the firm opinion that the Honourable Apex Court has rightly done its lawful duty by striking down the Act as unconstitutional. Having said that, we are also of the opinion that there is a lot of scope for improvement in the current process of selection of judges and we at AIFTP level shall contribute our mite in the process.

Therefore, while the Supreme Court has upheld the collegium system, it has also perhaps realised certain inherent flaws in its functioning which is why on November 3, 2015, the Supreme Court will consider suggestions for improvement of the present collegium system. One of the most vociferous criticisms of the collegium system is the lack of obvious transparency with which it functions. The Federation feels that integrity and merit are unequivocally the two most essential factors that should be considered in the appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. Therefore, the Federation in the interest of the nation suggests as under:

1. Steps must be taken to introduce transparency and wider consultations with Bar Associations and senior members of the Bar whose integrity is beyond reasonable doubt;

2. There could be three categories of selections:

(i) After looking at the performance of advocates in courts and after enquiring into their credentials, advocates may be selected by the collegium, and thereafter, he or she may be requested to forward an application in appropriate form.

(ii) Applications maybe invited by the Registry of High Courts from advocates who are eligible to be appointed as Judges.

(iii) Selection of Judges from the lower courts / judicial authorities such as the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, CESTAT as well as Sales Tax Tribunals across the country may be considered.

3. Eligibility criteria may be prescribed, such as:

(i) Cases involving important issues argued by the applicant;

(ii) Details of income to be declared for last five years by practising lawyers;

(iii) Recommendations of at least three Senior Advocates or Advocates having more than 30 years of practice in that High Court may also be considered;

(iv) Importantly, contribution to the development of the profession made by the lawyer may be given additional weightage in the selection process.

4. After scrutinising the applications, the names of shortlisted candidates may be circulated in the full court of the respective High Court or at least amongst its senior Judges and thereafter, the names of approved candidates be forwarded to the Supreme Court collegium.

5. In the era of specialisation, persons who are well conversant with certain specialised areas of law such as taxation, PIL, RTI, IPR etc. deserve to be appointed. In the Income–tax Appellate Tribunal, for instance, certain Judicial Members deserve to be appointed as High Court Judges. As per the transfer procedure, a professional appearing before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is not posted as a Member in the same State where he was practicing. Therefore, the collegium of the High Court concerned may not have the mechanism to judge the credentials of the prospective candidates from the Income–tax Appellate Tribunal. Thus, the collegium of the High Court may, in consultation with the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, devise an appropriate internal mechanism for obtaining feedback about the proposed candidates. This will help attract deserving candidates of the Income–tax Appellate Tribunal to the High Court.

6. As regards appointment and elevation to the Apex Court, the present system of collegium should be continued with greater transparency and accountability, only on merits

The above are some suggestions given in a limited time to improve the collegium system. Members are requested to send in their views to at
[email protected]

Dr. K. Shivaram
Editor-in-Chief

1. Contract of Agency – Agent cannot perform an act in his own right and for himself : Contract Act 1872 section 182

Agent cannot perform act in his own right and for himself as contract of agency is created when authority is given to agent to represent principal in dealing with third person or to do something for principal. In other words, it is the principal who, in law, is answerable to the third person for the acts done by his agent as long as the acts so performed fall within the scope of employment or authority of the agent.

Mumbai Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Mumbai v. Hon. Minister for Marketing Maharashtra State, Mantralaya & Ors. AIR 2015 Bombay 234

2. Right to vote – District Central Co-operative Bank – Non inclusion of defaulters names in voters list for not clearing outstanding dues, proper : Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1961

Denial of voting rights to petitioners and primary co-operative societies by not including their names in voters list for not clearing outstanding dues was held to be proper. It was also held that it does not amount to discrimination.

Prakash Bhanudas Kavade and Ors. v. Nashik District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Nashik AIR 2015 (NOC) 1116 (Bom.).

3. Winding up Petition – Unpaid salary, wages etc. is a debt – Ex employee has locus standi to file company petition as creditor of company: Companies Act, 1956

The outstanding or unpaid wages / salary of the workman/employee is a debt to be paid by the company. The expression creditor is intrinsically linked to the expression debt/ debts. Therefore the employee of the company has locus to file Company petition in respect of his unpaid wages/salary and emoluments, as having been filed by a creditor of the Company.

Jonathan Allen v. Zoom Developers Pvt Ltd. AIR 2015 Madhya Pradesh 152 (FB).

4. Release deed – Not registered – Would not confer any right on beneficiary : Registration Act, 1908 section 17

If Release Deed is not registered and property, subject matter of release deed, not belonging to executors, release deed cannot be termed as valid document it would not confer any right on beneficiary.

S. A. Ramalingam v. Elumalai. AIR 2015 Madras 235

5. Delegated Legislation – Delegatee cannot frame regulation that would not be in accord with statutory provisions

If on reading of the statute in entirety, such a power does not flow, a delegated authority cannot frame a regulation as that would not be in accord with the statutory provisions nor would it be for the purpose of carrying on the provision of the Act. The power to make subordinate legislation is derived from the enabling Act and it is fundamental that the delegate on whom such power is conferred has to act within the limits of authority conferred by the Act. Rules cannot be made to supplant the provisions or the enabling Act but to supplement it. What is permitted is the delegation of ancillary or subordinate legislative functions, or what is fictionally called a power to fill up details.

Petroleum And Natural Gas Regulatory Board v. Indraprastha Gas limited and others . AIR 2015 SC 2978.

6. Gift deed – Devolution of interest – Lis pendens – Transfer of property Act, section 122

When gift deed executed by deceased defendant during pendency of suit for partition in favour of donee defendant who was his brother but same could not be acted upon as another brother who was plaintiff’s husband was in possession of portion of property along with plaintiff and defendant died during pendency of proceedings, plaintiff will be entitled to share as section 8 of Hindu Succession Act would come into play and property will devolve on plaintiff, and other brothers and children of defendant being his class I heirs.

Kirpal Kaur v. Jitender Pal Singh and Ors. AIR 2015 SC 2967

7. Doctrines – Doctrine of stare decisis

Doctrine of stare decisis is based on legal maxim “stare decisis et non quota movere”. It means to stand by decisions rather to disturb what is settled.

Pradipta Padha & Ors. v. Laxmi Kanta Maity & Ors. AIR 2015 (NOC) 1176 (Cal.)

8. Limitation – Suit in wrong forum- Not barred by limitation

Prosecution of suit in wrong forum. Testamentary proceedings pursued in belief that rights of parties to estate of deceased would be decided therein. Filing of fresh suit laying claims to benefit of estates, not barred by limitation.

Vasantha Kumari and Anr. v. Rani Shantha alias Philomena and Ors. AIR 2015 Karnataka 167

9. Courts, Tribunal and Judiciary – Judicial Accountability – Ensured under the law via provisions of appeal, revision and review

No person, however high, is above the law. No institution is exempt from accountability, including the judiciary. Accountability of the judiciary in respect of its judicial functions and orders is vouchsafed by provisions for appeal, revision and review of orders.

State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Anil Kumar Sharma and anr (2015) 6 SSC 716.

10. Interpretation of Statutes – Taxing Statutes

In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used. It is trite that in case of reasonable doubt, the construction most beneficial to the subject is to be adopted.

Voltas Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (2015) 12 STD 658 (SC)

Ajay R. Singh

A. Classification of Service

Banking & Other Financial Service

1. The Tribunal held that where the assessee, a manufacturer of industrial gases, had supplied / loaned out insulated storage tanks to its customers for use, for a period of 3 years and for a fixed sum payable per month, it could not classified as financial leasing services since the assessee was not a banking company or financial institution or a commercial concern engaged in providing banking or other financial services.

Inox Air Products Ltd. v. CCE – (2015) 37 STR 1024 (Tri. Mum.)

2. The Tribunal held that the assessee a stock broker registered with SEBI, dealing in shares, bonds and securities on behalf of the client could not be considered as a financial institution liable to pay service tax on the said activities under the category of ‘banking and other financial services.

Parag Parikh Financial Advisory Services Ltd. v. C.S.T. Mumbai (2015) 38 STR 490 (Tri.-Mum.)

3. The Tribunal held that commitment charges levied by the banks on the customers who fail to draw their sanctioned loan is to compensate itself for the loss of interest that could have been earned by it if the customer had drawn money from the loan account and therefore is integrally connected with the lending services and hence liable for service tax

Punjab National Bank v. CCE & ST (2015) 38 STR 498 (Tri.-Del.)

Business Auxiliary Services

4. The Tribunal held that the process of grinding wheat into wheat products is in the nature of manufacture, not liable to service tax under the category Business Auxiliary Services.

Jayakrishna Flour Mills (P) Ltd v. CCE – (2015) 37 STR 1079

5. The Tribunal held that additional handling charges and facilitation charges charged to the buyer for sale of naphtha and furnace oil imported by the assessee was a transaction of sale of goods on principal to principal basis and hence demand of service tax on the said charges received under the category of business auxiliary services was unsustainable

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 501 (Tri.-Mum.)

6. The Tribunal held that the repair and maintenance services provided by the assessee to Modi Xerox pursuant to the service agreement with M/s. Modi Xerox in respect of the Modi Xerox machines located at the customer’s premises were services on behalf of client (i.e. Modi Xerox) and hence the same would be taxable only w.e.f. 10-9-2004 under the category of business auxiliary services (provision of service on behalf of the client) and not under Repairs and Maintenance Service

Kunjal Enterprises v. CST (2015) 38 STR 518(Tri.-Mum.)

Cargo Handling Service

7. The Tribunal held that the activity of loading and unloading of coal into tippers by deploying pay-loaders at the mining site was liable to service tax under the category of Cargo Handling Services.

Shreem Coal Carriers Pvt Ltd v. CCE – (2015) 37 STR 1067 (Tri.-Mum.)

8. The Tribunal held that shipping charges collected for transportation of imported goods from a mother vessel to a jetty was part of the transaction value of imported goods for Customs Duty purposes and therefore could not be classified as Cargo Handling services liable to service tax. It further held that transportation of goods along the cost would be chargeable to service tax under the category of cargo handling services but since the goods were fertilizers the said service would be exempt from service tax under Notification No. 30 / 2009 – ST.

United Shippers Ltd v. CCE – (2015) 37 STR 1043 (Tri. – Mumbai)

Club or Association Service

9. The Tribunal held that the promotion of cricket was not a public service and could not be considered as an activity of charitable nature, therefore requiring the assessee to pay service tax on the subscription charges received from its members, under the category of Club or Association Services.

Vidharbha Cricket Association v. CCE – (2015) 38 STR 99 (Tri. Mum.)

10. The High Court held that no service tax was leviable on the assessee, a co-operative society engaged in maintaining common effluent treatment plants (‘CETP’), for providing the facility of CETP under the category of Club or Association service as the relevant provisions i.e. Section 65(105)(zzze) had been held to be unconstitutional in Sports Club of Gujarat v. UOI (2013) 37 STR 961 (Guj.).

Green Environment Services Co-op Society Ltd v. UOI – (2015) 37 STR 961 (Guj.)

11. The Tribunal held that services rendered by member’s club to its members or by co-operative societies to its members would not be liable for service tax under the category of club or association services on the principle of mutuality

Matunga Gymkhana v. CST (2015) 38 STR 407 (Tri.-Mumbai)

12. The Tribunal held that considering the nature of activities carried out, the assessee organisations (FICCI & ECSEPC) were held to be having public service objectives, charitable in nature and hence were to be excluded from the definition of Club or Association Service. Further, on application of the principle of mutuality, services provided by the assessee to their respective members would not fall within the ambit of “Club or Association” service nor would the consideration whether by way of subscription/fee or otherwise received be exigible to service tax. The Tribunal held that one of the assessees (ECSEPC) was an organisation formed to effectuate the policy under the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, and also being an Export Promotion Council falling within the ambit of the Foreign Trade Policy, and therefore was outside the purview of “Club or Association” as defined in 65(25a) as it excludes any body established or constituted by or under any law.

Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry v. CST (2015) 38 STR 529 (Tri.-Del.)

Construction Services

13. The Tribunal held that the activity of fabrication of structure at site for clients, amounts to manufacture and therefore is not liable to service tax.

Plus Tech Engineering (P) Ltd. v. CCE, Surat 2015 (39) STR 454 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

Commercial Coaching & Training Services

14. The Tribunal held that providing training for speaking English could not be considered as vocational training and therefore would not be exempt from service tax under Notification No. 9 / 2003 or Notification No. 24 / 2004.

Ulhas Vasant Bapat v. CCE – (2015) 37 STR 1034 (Tri.-Mum.)

15. The Tribunal held that coaching in English language enables trainee to seek employment or undertake self-employment and therefore is entitled for benefit of Notification No. 9/2003-ST and that there was no mention of any foreign or Indian language in the said notification. It also held that, fees collected and services rendered up to 1-7-2003 do not attract service tax.

Darshan English Classes v. CCE&ST, Rajkot 2015 (39) STR 167 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

Intellectual Property Service

16. The Tribunal held that for a transfer of IPR only rights which are registered with trademark/patent authorities to be considered. It also held that since the issue of charging service tax as reverse charge under section 66A of FA, 1994 was under litigation before various Courts, the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked.

Rochem Separation Systems (India) P. Ltd. v. CST, Mumbai-I 2015 (39) STR 112 (Tri.-Mumbai)

Management Consultancy Service

17. The Tribunal held that the assessee rendering general support services (of infrastructural/utility facilities, staff, fire – fighting equipments etc.); operational services (assistance for waste disposal & use of sewerage system); and secretarial services was not liable for service tax under the category of “management consultancy” services.

Konkan Synthetic Fibres v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 403 (Tri.-Mum.)

Manpower recruitment and supply services

18. The Tribunal held that the assessee who had entered into contracts with sugar factories for providing services such as harvesting cane from the fields, loading them in the vehicles and delivering them at the factory site etc. cannot be said to be engaged in manpower recruitment and supply services

CCE v. Godavari Khore Cane Transport Co. Ltd. (2015) 38 STR 468 (Bom.)

Mandap Keeper Services

19. The Tribunal held that services rendered in relation to use of mandap for conducting marriages would be liable for service tax under the category of Mandap Keeper Services since marriage is a social function and not a religious function.

CCE v. Central Panchayat – (2015) 37 STR 1038 (Tri – Mum)

20. The Tribunal held that stalls allotted to different persons for selling toys, garlands, flowers, foods etc. is not covered under the scope of manda-keeper’s service.

Shri Chatushringi Seva Samittee v. CCE, Pune-III 2015 (39) STR 169 (Tri.-Mumbai)

Manpower Supply and Recruitment Services

21. The Tribunal held that charges levied on the basis of activities and material involved and not on the basis of number / nature or scope of manpower cannot fall under the category of Manpower Supply and Recruitment Services.

CCE v. M/s Shri K.M. Sharma – (2015-TIOL-1602-CESTAT-MUM)

Mining Services

22. The Tribunal held that the activity of mining of sand from river beds was liable for service tax under the category of Mining Services.

Shreem Coal Carriers P Ltd. v. CCE – (2015) 37 STR 1067 (Tri. – Mum.)

Online Information and Data Base Access or Retrieval Service

23. The Tribunal held that the large collection of photographs stored by the assessee may be copyrightable but providing access to said photographs and retrieval thereof by the client for a consideration is liable to service tax under Online Information and Data Base Access or Retrieval Service.

Photo-library India P. Ltd. v. CST, Mumbai 2015 (39) STR 637 (Tri.-Mumbai)

Outdoor Caterer Services

24. The Tribunal held that the meals prepared by the assessee were prepared at its own premises and simply supplied at pre-determined rates without it serving the meals in any manner and therefore would not get covered under the definition of outdoor catering services. The Tribunal held that the service covered under the ambit of service tax was outdoor caterer and not mere caterer.

M/s. Ambedkar Institute of Hotel Management v. CST – 2015-TIOL-1593-CESTAT-DEL

Port Services

25. The Tribunal held that only services rendered by a port in relation to vessel / goods would be liable for service tax under the category of Port Services and since the compensation received by the assessee was for granting permission to lay and use submarine pipelines within the port area it would be in the form of lease rental and not port services as it did not have control over the goods nor was it required to maintain or repair the pipeline.

CST v. Traffic Manager, Mumbai Post Trust (2015) 37 STR 993 (Tri. – Mum.)

26. The Supreme Court held that the assessee, a statutory body, who had granted licence for the construction and use of jetty was not liable to service tax under the category of Port Services as it had not rendered any services to the licensee, since the licensee had to keep the jetty in good condition capable of enabling vessels to berth alongside it to load and unload goods. It further held that the rebate granted to licensee was neither lease rent nor license fees as separate license fees was payable under agreement.

CCE, Bhavnagar v.. Gujarat Maritime Board (GMB), Jafrabad 2015 (39) STR 529 (SC)

Renting of Immovable Property

27. The Tribunal held that a contract between parties can prescribe as to who would ultimately bear the burden of service tax imposed and since as per lease deed in the present case, lessee is liable for payment of all taxes and service tax being an indirect tax the service tax liability shall be on the lessee.

Satya Developers Pvt.Ltd. v. Pearey Lal Bhawan Association 2015 (39) STR 429 (Del.)

28. The Tribunal held that as per section 65(105)(zzzz) of FA, 1994 service provided in relation to renting of immovable property for use in the course of or in furtherance of business or commerce is a taxable service and that the ambit of taxable service is neither restricted to short term lease nor are leases identified or classified in terms of their duration and therefore long term leases cannot be said to be outside the purview of taxable service of renting of immovable property.

New Okhla Industrial Development Authorities v. CCEC&ST. Noida 2015 (39) STR 443 (Tri.-Del.)

Sale of space for advertisement service

29. The Tribunal held that the product published by the assessee consisting of sheets of printed materials with table/charts therein, could be brought within the meaning of the term ‘book’ under inclusive definition of section 1(1) of Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 and hence covered by the term “Print Media” and therefore the definition of “Sale of space for advertisement” would not cover the said product.

CCE, Nagpur v. Media World Enterprise 2015 (39) STR 258 (Tri.-Mumbai)

Scientific and Technical Consultancy Service

30. The Tribunal held that the activity of locating of mineral deposits and preparing detailed reports are in the nature of survey and exploration of mineral services liable for service tax only w.e.f. 10-9-2004 and not prior to that date under the category of scientific or technical consultancy services and that the grant in aid received from the Government would not be liable for service tax since it was only a reimbursement of actual expenses incurred and not in the nature of fees for services and considering the fact that the exploration reports were kept by the assessee with itself and not given to the Government.

Mineral Exploration Corporation Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 421 (Tri.-Mum.)

Sponsorship Service

31. The Tribunal held that where the assessee had entered into a contract for sponsoring a cricket team it would not be liable to pay service tax under reverse charge mechanism on the sponsorship services since the sponsored team had paid service tax on the transaction under the category of business auxiliary services as a service provider and hence service tax cannot be demanded on the same transaction under the category of sponsorship services from the service recipient and that sponsoring the cricket team would not be covered within the sponsorship services.

Coca Cola India Pvt. Ltd. v. CST (2015) 38 STR 497 (Tri.-Del.)

32. The Tribunal held that sponsorship of IPL cricket tournament is in the nature of sponsorship of a sporting event and therefore would not be liable for service tax under the category of Sponsorship Services (at the relevant time)

Citibank NA. v. CST (2015) 38 STR 520 (Tri.-Mumbai)

Supply of Tangible goods Service

33. The Tribunal held that the mere activity of renting of bullock-cart without bullocks, wherein the possession and control over the cart did not lie with the service provider does not come within the purview of supply of tangible goods.

Bhima SSL Ltd. v. CCE&ST. Pune-III 2015 (39) STR 440 (Tri.-Mumbai)

Technical Inspection and Certification service

34. The Tribunal held that assessee’s activities of carrying out standard check of the vehicle for any manufacturing defects therein and carrying out rectification thereof on the basis of the vehicle data sheet provided by the manufacturer of vehicles would not be liable for service tax under the category of ‘technical inspection and certification’ services since the definition of ‘technical inspection and certification’ would not mean any check on functionality but would refer to checking the same as per any standards laid down in a statute or guidelines

Antony Garages Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 49 (Tri.–Mum.)

Tour Operator’s Service

35. The Tribunal held that the assessee, engaged in the business of providing buses to various companies for transporting their employees from designated spots to the company and back on contract basis, the pickup and drop schedule being determined by the company, could not be liable for service tax under the category of ‘tour operator services’ up to period ending 10-9-2004 since the buses used for transportation were not tourist vehicle but only contract carriage buses and the assessee was also not holding any tourist permit; and for the period post 10-9-2004 due to the aforesaid reason as well as the fact that the assessee was not engaged in planning, scheduling organising of tours.

Capricorn Transways Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 37 STR 1027 (Tri–Mumbai)

Transport of Goods Service / Transmission of Power

36. The Tribunal held that the assessee who had had undertaken the activity transportation of hazardous waste through pipeline for disposal was not liable to service tax under the category of transportation of goods as the term ‘goods’ under the service tax law means goods as per Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (every movable property which can fetch a price would be considered as goods) and the waste effluent transported by the assessee through pipelines was not to be purchased by anyone and therefore could not be considered as goods.

Gujarat State Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 37 STR 1076 (Tri.–Ahmd.)

37. The Tribunal in this case held that, all services relating to transmission and distribution of power were exempt under Notification No. 45/2010-ST for the period prior to 26-2-2010, hence demand raised was unsustainable.

J. C. Electricals v. CCE, Mangalore 2015 (39) STR 131(Tri.-Bang.)

Works contract Services

38. The Tribunal held that where the goods involved as a part of the service contracts are subjected to the levy of VAT / Sales Tax, the classification of service under the category of works contract services was proper and accordingly the assessee was entitled to payment of service tax under the works contract composition scheme

U. B. Engineering Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 37 STR 999 (Tri.–Mumbai)

39. The Tribunal held that where the construction services rendered by the assessee were more specifically classifiable under the category of “works contract services”, though the assessee had paid service tax under the category of “construction of complex services” or “commercial or industrial construction services”, the reclassification of the services under the new category of service was permissible but the assessee would not be eligible to the benefit of payment of service tax under the composition scheme in view of the Supreme Court decision in Nagarjuna Construction Company Ltd. vs. Government of India (2012) 28 STR561 (S.C.), however the benefit of Rule 2A of Valuation Rules would be available. Ahluwalia Contracts (India) Ltd. v. CST (2015) 38 STR 38 (Tri.–Del.)

B. Valuation

40. The Tribunal held that the value of electricity supplied by the assessee’s customer for operation of the air separation plant was not includible in the value of services received by the assessee who provided its customers operation and maintenance services as the assessee had not benefited from the supply of electricity since it was consumed in the manufacture of oxygen by the assessee’s client and not by it.

Inox Air Products v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 90 (Tri.–Mum.)

41. The Tribunal held that the value of free material supplied by the customer for commercial or industrial construction service is not includible in the value of taxable service following Larger Bench decision in Bhayana Builders (P) Ltd (2013) 32 STR 49 (LB)

Hindustan Steel Works Construction Co. Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 37 STR 1022 (Tri.–Del.)

42. The Court held that since the assessee had shown the value of consumables like transformer oils, components and parts separately in its invoices and paid VAT on that, the same was excludible from the value of taxable service under Notification No. 12/2003-ST dated 20-6-2003.

CCE v. Mahendra Engineering Ltd. (2015)38 STR 233 (All)

43. The Tribunal held that since the assessee for the repairs of transformers invoices disclosed value of goods [consumables like transformers oil, component parts like HV/LV coils] and service separately and on which VAT/sales tax was paid by it the repair contract would have to be treated as split contract for sale of goods and provision of service and service tax could be charged only on service portion, more so since the Rule 5(1) had been struck down as unconstitutional

Samtech Industries v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 240 (Tri.-Del.)

44. The Tribunal held that the inclusion of Reimbursements in the value of taxable services rendered by Customs House Agents on the grounds that the conditions prescribed for the exclusion from the value of taxable services under Rule 5(2) of the Valuation Rules had not been satisfied is incorrect since Rule 5(1) of the said Valuation Rules had been struck down as unconstitutional

Aashita International Ltd. v. CST (2015) 38 STR 246 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

45. The Tribunal held that incentive is a receipt for appreciation of performance of service provided and since it is not known as to whether such incentive would be received or not while providing the taxable service, the same would not be liable to service tax

Oswal Cable Products v. CST (2015) 38 STR 437 (Tri.-Del.)

46. The Tribunal held that in absence of any documentary evidence to show that amount received by the assessee from the service recipient was inclusive of service tax, cum tax benefit cannot be granted

CCE v. Rudra Galaxy Channel Ltd. (2015)38 STR 445 (Tri.-Mum.)

47. The Tribunal held that the service tax demand of Rs. 4.62 crores under Share Transfer Agency service levied by including the value of reimbursable expenses (on actual basis) viz. postage and other expenses incurred by the appellant in the taxable value was not sustainable since ‘Postage’ is in the nature of a duty/tax charged under the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 and service tax cannot be levied on an amount charged as duty/tax since the same is not consideration for rendering any service and that the reimbursement of postage and cost incurred towards stationery was recovered from the service receiver on actual basis by the appellant in the capacity as a pure agent and hence not includible in the taxable value u/s. 67 and that Rule 5(1) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 has been declared as ultra vires

Link Intime India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 705 (Tri.-Mumbai)

48. The Tribunal in this case held that as per explanation 1(viii) to Section 67 of FA, 1994 read with CBEC Circular No. 80/10/2004-ST, interest amount is not includible in gross value of services provided during period involved. Further, in view of Tribunal decision in ART Leasing Ltd. 2007 (8) STR 162 (Tri.-Bang.) rate of service tax prevailing on date on which contract entered was applicable.

Jaylaxmi Credit Company Ltd. v. CCE&ST, Daman 2015 (39) STR 164 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

49. The Tribunal held that only gross value of taxable services are taxable under FA, 1994 and margin of profit is a subject matter for Income Tax department thereby dismissing the contention of the department to raise demand of service tax on margin of profit of Bank arising out of foreign currency deals

SBI Commercial Branch v. CCE, Jaipur 2015 (39) STR 307 (Tri.-Del.)

C. CENVAT Credit

50. The High Court held that utilisation of CENVAT credit for payment of service tax as recipient of Goods Transport Agency services is permissible.

CCE & Customs v. Panchmahal Steel Ltd. (2015) 37 STR 965 (Guj.)

51. The Supreme Court held that since the transit Insurance of induction furnace and transformer was used indirectly in relation to the manufacture of the final products CENVAT credit thereon would be admissible.

UOI v. Raipur Rototcast Ltd. (2015) 37 STR 978

52. The Tribunal held that credit of service tax paid on Rent-a-Cab services used for providing transportation facility to customers, air travel service availed for business travel of partners and employees and rent of office premises was admissible since it is connected to business of manufacture.

Nash Industries v. CST (2015) 37 STR 1060 (Tri.–Bang.)

53. The Tribunal held that CENVAT credit of service tax paid on manpower recruitment or supply agency services availed in respect of personnel employed for maintaining the occupational health centre at the factory which was required to be maintained mandatorily under the Factories Act and on personnel recruited for project office and corporate office was admissible as was related to manufacture of final product / business of the assessee.

Binani Cement Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 37 STR 1071 (Tri.–Del.)

54. The Tribunal held that credit of service tax paid on consulting engineering services availed for construction of railway sidings which were used for transportation of coal for the captive power plant in the factory is admissible since the said services were covered under the expression ‘services in relation to procurement of inputs’ and was related to the manufacturing business of assessee.

RSWM Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 37 STR 1074 (Tri.–Del.)

55. The Tribunal held that the assessee, a manufacturer and a provider of port services, was permitted to utilize the CENVAT credit availed on port services for the purpose of discharging its excise duty liability Rule 3 of the Service Tax Credit Rules permitted taking of CENVAT credit on input services falling within the same category of output services and Rule 11 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 permitted utilization of unutilised balance of service tax credit availed under the Service Tax Credit Rules, 2002 for payment of duty liability under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Welspun Maxsteel Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 37 STR 1081 (Tri.–Mumbai)

56. The Tribunal held that the credit of service tax paid on marine insurance services received in the course of exports of goods was admissible where all the particulars required to be mentioned u/r. 9(2) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 were available on the insurance policy.

Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. v. CCE&ST (2015) 39 STR 68 (Tri.–Del.)

57. The Tribunal held that the credit of service tax paid on setting up of factory premises would be admissible.

Liugong India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 96 (Tri.–Del.)

58. The Tribunal held that where the assessee was engaged in providing the output service of commercial training and coaching, credit of service tax paid on brokerage for finding accommodation for faculties was admissible since provision of training services was not possible without availability of faculty

Tata Management Training Centre (2015) 38 STR 157 (Tri.–Mumbai)

59. The Tribunal held that CENVAT Credit of any input services used for providing output services which are exported is eligible for refund under Notification No. 5/2006-C.E. (N.T.). Further there was no restriction in the CENVAT credit rules for availing credit before registration is granted.

CST v. J. P. Morgan Services India Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 38 STR 410 (Tri.-Mumbai)

60. The Tribunal held that Manpower supply services used for cleaning the yard within the sugar factory so as to keep the factory premises clean in compliance with the mandatory requirement under Section 11 of the Factories Act, weighment of sugarcane and its unloading at the factory being an activity in relation to manufacture of sugar and cane area survey and sugarcane development by educating the farmers to ensure supply of good quality sugar cane was admissible as input credit.

Mawana Sugars Ltd. v. CCE&ST (2015) 38 STR 424(Tri.-Del.)

61. The Tribunal held that where CENVAT credit was taken but reversed without utilisation it did not attract interest liability

Oswal Cable Products v. CST (2015) 38 STR 437 (Tri.-Del.)

62. The Tribunal held that the assessee had by paying service tax on exempted services foregone the exemption under Notification No. 4/2004 and hence no credit was required to be reversed by it. Further there was subsequent retrospective amendment in credit rules by inserting Rule 6(6A) which clearly stated that there was no need to reverse credit in respect of services provided to SEZ.

Link Intime India Pvt. Ltd. v. CST (2015) 38 STR 506 (Tri.-Mum.)

63. The Tribunal held that Financial advisory services availed for making available finances to meet working capital requirement is in the nature of financing is covered within the definition of input services.

CCE v. GMR Industries Ltd. (2015) 38 STR 509 (Tri.-Bang.)

64. The Tribunal held that where the assessee had not charged service tax on two of its invoices it could be presumed that the assessee had rendered exempted services and hence was not required to reverse CENVAT credit.

Globe Ground India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE&ST (2015) 38 STR 510 (Tri.-Del.)]

65. The Tribunal held that CENVAT credit on security and maintenance services availed at the residence of the Managing Director did not have any nexus with the output service provided by the assessee and hence credit thereon is not admissible.

Globe Ground India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE&ST (2015) 38 STR 510 (Tri.-Del)]

66. The Tribunal held that CENVAT credit on chassis of motor vehicle which were converted by assessee into water carts and toilet carts to be used in providing airport services could be denied on the ground that the carts were not registered under Motor Vehicles Act and therefore would not be considered as capital goods.

Globe Ground India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE&ST (2015) 38 STR 510 (Tri.-Del)

67. The Tribunal held that credit of service tax paid on travel agents services availed for travelling of company officials for procurement of raw materials and marketing of goods was admissible

Indswift Laboratories Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 522 (Tri.-Del.)

68. The Tribunal held that credit of service tax paid on technical knowhow services acquired by the assessee for producing new products was admissible after the payment has been made for the value of input service. The same could be denied on the ground that the credit should be availed only when the commercial production of the product has commenced.

Indswift Laboratories Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 522 (Tri.-Del.)

69. The Tribunal held that where there is no dispute regarding consumption of input services and payment of service tax thereon, credit would be admissible even if the invoices are not in the name of assessee’s unit but in the name of its head office.

CCE & ST v. Dayalal Meghji and Company (2015) 38 STR 557 (Tri.-Del.)

70. The Tribunal held that CENVAT credit of service tax paid on input services availed by the job worker in respect of goods cleared for the principal manufacturer without payment of duty is admissible in view of the Larger Bench decision in Aurangabad Auto Engg. Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE 2011 – TIOL – 1010 – CESTAT Mum

Prerna Fine Chem Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 693 (Tri.-Mum.)

71. Where the appellant, a manufacturer of ‘concentrates’ used in manufacture of ‘aerated water’, had procured services of advertising and marketing for promotion of ‘aerated water’ that was not manufactured by them, the Tribunal following the propositions laid by the High Court in the appellant’s own case in Coca Cola India Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner (2009) 15 STR 657 (Bom.) for an earlier period, held that denial of CENVAT credit on advertisement and marketing services was incorrect on the ground that these services would fall within the ambit of ‘input service’ given under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 since the advertisement services for ‘aerated water’ impact the sale and manufacture of ‘concentrates’

Coca Cola India Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 695 (Tri.-Mum.)

72. The Tribunal held that credit of ‘Rent-a-Cab service’ is admissible prior to 1-4-2011 in view of CBEC Circular No. 943/4/2011-CX dated 29-4-2011 and credit of services of outdoor catering, insurance, pandal & shamiana, and testing and analysis is admissible as these services are related to promotion of assessee’s business which view has also been held by the Bombay High Court in CCE vs. UltraTech Cement Ltd.(2010) STR 577 (Bom.); and that credit of Sodexo coupons issued to employees was not admissible under ‘Business Auxiliary Service’ since it has no nexus in relation to any business activities of the Respondent.

CST v. Ford Business Service Centre Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 38 STR 700 (Tri.-Chennai)

73. The Tribunal allowed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on GTA service for outward transportation of freight paid for delivery up to buyers premises as the ownership and property of goods was transferred at the customer’s doorstep.

CCE, Rohtak v. Haryana Sheet Glass Ltd. 2015 (39) STR 392 (P&H)

74. The Tribunal allowed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on canteen services to employees as the same was statutory obligation imposed under factories Act, 1948.

CCE, Bangalore-II v. Tata Steel Ltd. 2015 (39) STR 402 (Kar.)

75. The Tribunal held that during the warranty period the assessee was duty bound to provide free repair & maintenance services to buyers of alternators and it was condition of sale and therefore the same is covered under definition of Input Service as activity relating to business.

Leroy Somer India Pvt Ltd. v. CCE, Noida 2015 (39) STR 466 (Tri.-Del.)

76. The Tribunal held that who had paid service tax was immaterial and any payment towards duty or service tax was entitled for input credit/ input service credit thereby allowing CENVAT credit of service tax paid by Goods Transporter Agency to the assessee.

Rucha Engineers P. Ltd. v. CCE, Aurangabad 2015 (39) STR 518 (Tri.-Mumbai)

77. The Tribunal held that, there is no provision in CCR, 2004 restricting availment only for services received after date of registration and that the essential criteria in Rule 9(2) of CCR, 2004 is that services ought to have been received, accounted and used in providing taxable service. There is no reason to take different view from judgment in Portal Wireless Solution Pvt. Ltd 2012 (27) STR 134 (Kar.). It further held that, there was no reason to deny CENVAT credit of service tax paid on renting of cafeteria, maintenance of air-conditioner, service of gym instructor as same were used for providing taxable output service.

CST, Chennai v. Verizon Data Services India P. Ltd. 2015 (39) STR 522 (Tri.-Chennai)

78. The High Court held that the process of issuance of an insurance policy by insurer and subsequent procurement of reinsurance policy from another company was an integral part of the total process. If entire service tax collected by insurer while selling insurance policies had to be deposited without being given credit of tax which is paid by it while procuring a policy of reinsurance, same would be against ethos of CENVAT Credit policy as same would amount to double taxation, which is not permissible in law.

CCE, Bangalore v. PNB Metlife India Insurance Co. Ltd. 2015 (39) STR 561 (Kar.)

79. The High Court allowed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on Rent-a-Cab service for transportation of employees from home to factory and back to home and on outdoor catering service for providing food to their employees.

CCE, Bangalore-I v. Interplex Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. 2015 (39) STR 578 (Kar.)

80. The Tribunal held that there is no provision in Trade Marks Act, 1999 or any rules mentioned under which it is obligatory on part of assessee to compulsory use trade mark himself. Packaging services are not availed directly for protecting trade mark/ brand name but to be considered to have been utilised for making of tea bags and therefore credit was not admissible to the assessee who provided IPR services and claimed credit on packaging of tea on its own account.

Gujarat Tea Depot Co. v. CST, Ahmedabad 2015 (39) STR 629 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

81. The Tribunal held that service recipient is not responsible for examining the correctness of service tax paid by service provider and they were entitled to claim the credit service tax charged by the Service provider.

India Vision Satellite Communications Ltd. v. CCEC&ST, Cochin 2015 (39) STR 684 (Tri.-Bang.)

82. The High Court held that service tax paid on housekeeping and gardening services availed by the employer to maintain their factory premises in an eco-friendly manner, would form part of the cost of final products and fall within the ambit of input services as a result of which the assessee was entitled to claim the benefit.

CCE&ST, LTU, Chennai v. Rane TRW Steering Systems Ltd. 2015 (39) STR 13 (Mad.)

83. The Tribunal held that car parking area charges and maintenance charges paid for utilisation of premises are for rendering output service hence credit thereon was admissible. Further it held that non-inclusion of the ground floor address in centralised registration certificate is a curable defect which was cured subsequently and could not be a ground for disallowance of Cenvat credit.

Nuware Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, Bangalore 2015 (39) STR 134 (Tri.-Bang.)

84. The Tribunal allowed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on maintenance and repair of Xerox machine as the same was in relation to business of the appellant.

Nirma Limited v. CCE&ST, Vadodara 2015 (39) STR 145 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

85. The Tribunal allowed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on construction services used for expansion of factory building and insurance premium for factory building as the said services were covered by definition of input service.

Pranav Vikas (India) Ltd. v. CCE, Delhi-IV 2015 (39) STR 153 (Tri.-Del.)

86. The Tribunal held that CENVAT credit was not to be denied to unregistered branches as service tax is paid on the basis of centralised registration therefore credit could be taken in centrally registered office.

Nuance Transcription Services India Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, Bengaluru 2015 (39) STR 241 (Tri.-Bang.)

87. The Tribunal allowed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on collection and remittance services provided by foreign banks and commission paid to agents for export order and promotional activities outsourced as the department had not brought any evidence that services were not in relation to goods manufactured and exported.

Lupin Ltd. v. CCE&ST (LTU) 2015 (39) STR 249 (Tri.-Mumbai)

88. The Tribunal held that service tax paid on services provided by an overseas service provider (RCM) to for removal of rust developed during transit, deburring of certain machined area of axles and cross checking of dimensions at buyers premises was in relation to business and therefore rightly covered in inclusive definition of Input Service.

CCE&ST, LTU, Chennai v. Axles India Ltd. 2015 (39) STR 281 (Tri.-Chennai)

89. The Tribunal allowed Cenvat credit of service tax paid on catering service as the same was mandatory and having nexus manufacture of final product. However, proportionate service tax credit in respect of service tax borne by employees was to be reversed along with interest. It is further held that, guest house services not being connected to manufacturing activities in any way was not an eligible input service.

CCE, Nashik v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. 2015 (39) STR 298 (Tri.-Mumbai)

90. The Tribunal allowed Cenvat credit of service tax paid on pandal & shamiana services utilised to safeguard machines lying in open for installation.

Dalmia Chini Mills v. CCE, LTU, New Delhi 2015 (39) STR 310 (Tri.-Del.)

91. The Tribunal held that CENVAT credit could not be denied to the recipient of input services on the ground that the service provider had not paid service tax since the recipient was unaware of the non-payment and claimed credit based on the CENVATABLE document.

Memories Photography Studio v. CST 2015 (39) STR (331) (Tri-Ahmd)

92. The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to CENVAT credit on inputs despite the fact that the conversion of black rods into bright bars, undertaken by it, did not amount to manufacture, since it had erroneously paid duty on the final product which was exempt.

RB Steel Services v. CCE & ST – (2015) 59 taxmann.com 13 (New Delhi – CESTAT)

93. The Tribunal held that 100 percent EOUs are entitled to avail and utilize CENVAT credit in respect of duty paid on inputs even if other inputs are procured duty free as it could exercise both options simultaneously.

Uniworth Ltd v. CCEST – 2015 59 taxmann.com 128 (New Delhi – CESTAT)

94. The Tribunal held that reimbursement of certain expenses to overseas branches for activities viz. registration, staff related expenses employed by distributor abroad, cost of promotional expense incurred by distributor abroad, VAT/GST paid by distributor/branches are towards services deemed to have been received and consumed by appellant in India and therefore liable for service tax and the assessee would be eligible for CENVAT credit on the same.

Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. CST, Ahmedabad 2015 (39) STR 97 (Tri-Ahmd.)

95. The Tribunal held that garden maintenance services which was a requirement cast by the Maharashtra State Pollution Central Board upon the Port, event management services incurred at ceremonial occasions, brokerage services, being essential for ensuring the availability of staff, telephone and outdoor catering services being essential services to run the business were allowable as input services.

M/s.Gateway Terminals (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE – 2015-TIOL-1471-CESTAT-MUM

96. The Tribunal held that since the assessee, in terms of Rule 65T of the Rajasthan Factories Rules, was required to maintain an occupational health centre as its employees were more than 500 and they carried out hazardous operations to be able to carry on the manufacturing activity, the service of receiving trained medical personnel through manpower supply agency for maintaining the occupational health centre had to be treated as in relation to manufacture of final product and would be eligible for CENVAT credit as input service.

Binani Cement Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Jaipur-II – [2015] 58 taxmann.com 8 (New Delhi – CESTAT).

97. The Tribunal held that the Factories Act only to avoid the hardship for an essential need provided that factories having more than 250 employees should provide a canteen service. However it did not mean that the service was not required for any industrial service or organisation having less than 250 workers. Accordingly CENVAT credit on outdoor catering services was allowed.

CST, Mumbai v. Reliance Capital Asset Management Ltd – [2015] 58 taxmann.com 189 (Mumbai – CESTAT)

98. The Tribunal held that once proportionate service tax was borne by the ultimate consumer of the service, namely the worker/ beneficiary, the manufacturer could not take credit of that part of the service tax and hence, proportionate credit, to the extent it is embedded in the cost of food recovered from the employee/beneficiary, was not admissible to the assessee and that the onus to establish with documentary evidence that the element of service tax paid by the assessee was not recovered from the beneficiary/employees was on the assessee.

Cema Electric Lighting Products India (P.) Ltd. v. CCE, Ahmedabad-III – [2015] 58 taxmann.com 94 (Ahmedabad –CESTAT)

99. The Tribunal held that merely because the assessee’s parent company reimbursed part cost of the advertising expenses, it did not mean that the assessee would become disentitled to the service tax actually paid by it as the financial arrangement between the subsidiary company and the parent company had no connection for the purpose of availability of credit of service tax paid by the assessee. Accordingly CENVAT credit was allowed.

Suzuki Motorcycle (I) (P) Ltd. v. CCE – [2015] 58 taxmann.com 343 (New Delhi –CESTAT)

D. Others

Abatement

100. The Tribunal held that since the assessee, who had rendered erection, commissioning and installation services, had subsequently reversed the Cenvat Credit earlier claimed, was entitled to the benefit of the abatement under Notification No 1 / 2006.

UB Engineering Ltd v. CCE – (2015) 37 STR 999 (Tri.–Mumbai)

Appeal

101. The High Court held that where the issue arising out of the Tribunal’s order was whether the acitivities carried on by the assessee would be considered as a service and if so whether taxable and under which category, the appeal against the Tribunal order would lie before Supreme Court and not High Court since the issue has a direct and proximate relation to rate of service tax and value of service.

CST v. Saumya Construction Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 38 STR 17 (Guj.)

102. The High Court held that, when plea was not raised before adjudicating authority, then it could not be raised for the first time in appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. CCE 2015 (39) STR 5 (All.)

103. The High Court held that it could not condone delay in filing appeal to Commissioner (Appeal) beyond condonable period of limitation under writ jurisdiction.

Sturdy Industries Limited v. UOI 2015 (39) STR 422 (P&H)

104. The High Court held that since the assessee had filed an appeal along with stay application, neither of which were disposed of, the recovery proceedings could not be initiated as the appeal would become infructuous.

Atharva Associates v. Union of India 2015 (39) STR (22) (Kar.)

105. The High Court held that the action of the Tribunal in deciding the stay application ex parte on second adjournment without considering the assessee’s request for adjournment, terming non-appearance as an abuse to the process of law was too harsh and therefore remanded the matter to the Tribunal.

CCE v. Federal Mogul TPR India Ltd. (2015) 59 taxmann.com 196 (Karnataka)

Demand / Extended Period

106. The Tribunal held that where there was of confusion about the scope of levy, the extended period of limitation was not invocable. Further where the issue involved was one relating to classification, imposition of penalties was not warranted

Shreem Coal Carriers (P) Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 37 STR 1067 (Tri.–Mumbai)

107. The Tribunal held that extended period of limitation was not invokable where the assessee had not paid service tax by relying upon a Tribunal decision in similar case as the plea of bona fide belief of the assessee was acceptable and there was no suppression.

CCE v. Central Panchayat (2015) 37 STR 1038 (Tri.–Mumbai)]

108. The Tribunal held that where the appellant’s records had been audited by the department on four occasions and where the DGCEI had itself after examining the documents concluded that there was no service tax liability payable by the assessee, the issuance of show cause notice by invoking the extended period of limitation was not permissible.

C. J. Shah & Co. (2015) 38 STR 152 (Tri.–Ahmd.)

109. The Tribunal set aside the demand holding that there is no ‘service’ rendered when commission received by the appellant is returned by him due to the fact that service could not be fully completed.

Agarwal Motors v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 775 (Tri.-Del.)

110. The Tribunal held that different classification of the same activity of the assessee for different periods based on the mode of payment made by the service receiver shows total confusion on the part of the Revenue as to the ‘nature of tax’ and the ‘measure of tax’ and hence the demand was held liable to be set aside.

Royal Western India Turf Club Ltd. v. CST (2015) 38 STR 811 (Tri.-Mum.)

111. The Larger Bench of Tribunal held that the relevant date for determining limitation period for refund of Cenvat credit on export of service is date of receipt of foreign exchange and therefore limitation period should start from that date.

CST, Goa v. Ratio Pharma India Pvt. Ltd. 2015 (39) STR 31 (Tri.-LB.)

112. The Tribunal held that the date of filing refund before wrong authority to be taken as date of filing for determining period of limitation.

CCE&ST, Tirupati v. Gimpex Ltd. 2015 (39) STR 143 (Tri.-Bang.)

113. The High Court held that notices of recovery initiated u/s. 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 before the show cause notices were adjudicated is illegal and required to be quashed.

Mrs. Prashanthi v. The Union of India – 2015-TIOL-1596-HC-KAR-ST

Penalty

114. The Tribunal held that the option of payment of 25% of penalty amount should be given to the assessee if the same is paid within 30 days from the date of communication of the O-I-O and thus, where the assessee had paid service tax along with interest before the issuance of show cause notice but no such option was given to the assessee in O-I-O, it granted the same to the assessee

Nasscom v. CST (2015) 37 STR 1041 (Tri.–Del.)

115. The Tribunal held that where the assessee had not paid the tax on renting of immovable property services in view of the Delhi High Court decision in case of Home Solutions Retail India Ltd., it was on account of a bona fide belief and hence no penalty was imposable

LMJ Service Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 64 (Tri.–Del.)].

116. The Tribunal held that imposition of penalty under section 78 was not warranted where the appellant entertained a bona fide belief that its activities were not liable for service tax but had discharged the entire tax liability on commencement of the investigation proceedings.

Maosaji Caterers v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 69 (Tri.–Del.)

117. The Tribunal held that minimum penalty imposable u/s. 76 is equivalent to amount of tax and maximum penalty imposable is twice the amount of tax. The authorities having no discretion to reduce the penalty below the minimum prescribed limit

CCE v. Rudra Galaxy Channel Ltd. (2015) 38 STR 445 (Tri.-Mum.)

118. The Tribunal held that there was a reasonable cause for waiver of penalty u/s. 78 since the non-payment of service tax was detected from the books of account of the assessee hence there appeared to be no intention to evade payment of service tax and that the assessee had paid the entire tax before issuance of the SCN and that the adjudicating authority had dropped the penalty u/s. 76 on the grounds of reasonable cause and also due to the fact that the assessee was declared as a sick unit.

Garodia Special Steels Ltd v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 527 (Tri.-Mum.)

Refund and Rebate

119. The Tribunal held that the substantial benefit of rebate under Notification No. 12/2005-S.T. dated 19-4-2005 cannot be denied for procedural failure of not filing the declaration prior to exports since the contents of the declaration were such that it could easily verified from records maintained by the assessee.

Crest Premedia Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 46 (Tri.–Mum.)].

120. The Tribunal held that service tax payable on advance received by the assessee where no services were subsequently rendered was to be considered as a deposit and not duty and therefore the provisions of section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 would not be applied for seeking refund of such amount and hence the refund was admissible and not time barred.

CCE&ST v. Madhvi Procon Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 38 STR 74 (Tri.–Ahmd.)

121. The Tribunal held that where the assessee had paid certain amounts during the course of investigation and contested the issue on merits, the payment would be considered as deposit and ‘deemed protest’ payment and accordingly refund of the same, on determination of the issue by the Tribunal in its favour, cannot be denied on the ground of time bar.

CC&ST v. H. K. Dave Ltd. (2015) 38 STR 77 (Tri.–Ahmd.)].

122. The Tribunal held that the refund of CENVAT credit availed on input services used for exports cannot be denied under notification No. 5/2006-C.E (NT) on the ground that the assessee had not obtained service tax registration at the time of exports and the services were used for providing output services before obtaining registration.

CST v. Sure Prep (India) Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 38 STR 44 (Tri.–Mum.)

123. The Tribunal held that refund of service tax paid on input services which were wholly consumed in SEZ would be allowable under Notification No. 9/2009-ST even though service tax was not leviable in the first place.

Barclays Technology Centre India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 35 (Tri.–Mumbai)

124. The Tribunal held that when an appeal is decided in favour of the assessee then all amounts deposited by it, whether by way of tax or interest, assume the character of ‘deposit’ and are liable to be fully refunded.

Roshan R. Jaiswal v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 772 (Tri.-Mum.)

125. The Tribunal held that the jurisdiction for filing of the refund claim in respect of export of goods lies with the Commissionerate having jurisdiction over the factory from where goods are exported and not the Commissionerate having jurisdiction over the registered office of the assessee

CCE v. Noble Grains Ltd. (2015) 38 STR 525 (Tri.-Mumbai)

126. The Tribunal set aside the order of the lower authorities rejecting the refund of service tax for the period July 2006 to July 2008 paid by the appellants, on the ground of time bar and unjust enrichment as letter written by the assessee to the department stating that payment was being made under pressure from department would be sufficient proof that such payments were ‘under protest’ and hence the provisions of time bar under section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 would not apply and the burden of unjust enrichment was discharged by the assessee evident from the letters written by it to the intended buyers that the price agreed was not inclusive of service tax and such tax had been paid by the assessee out of its own pocket which had been certified by a Chartered Accountant.

Ind Swift Lands Ltd. v. CCE&ST (2015) 38 STR 819 (Tri.-Del.)

127. The Tribunal held that while considering rebate claim for output service, the issue of nexus between input services and exported output services cannot be raised as there was no clear proposition or proposal for denial of CENVAT credit used for payment of service tax on output service in SCN.

Textron India Pvt. Ltd v. CST, Bangalore 2015 (39) STR 468 (Tri.-Bang.)

128. The Tribunal held that, there is no prohibition in law for making export from unregistered premises and once admissible CENVAT credit accumulates and rule provides for refund, such refund cannot be rejected.

Embitel Technologies (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, Bangalore 2015 (39) STR 612 (Tri.-Bang.)

129. The department in this case rejected refund claimed by SEZ Developer under Notification No.9/2009-ST of service tax paid on services used prior to commercial production in SEZ. The Tribunal held that, Notification No.9/2009-ST cannot disentitle immunity enjoyed under sections 7 and 25 of SEZ Act, 2005. Hence assessee is entitled to refund for services wholly consumed within SEZ in authorised operations.

Zydus Technologies Ltd. v. CST, Ahmedabad 2015 (39) STR 657 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

130. The Tribunal rejected the contention of the department, rejecting refund claim on the ground that address mentioned in invoice is not registered office and that unutilised, accumulated CENVAT credit refund amount exceeded the amount of CENVAT credit in ST-3 returns. It held that the address in the invoice was the address of a group company, which was subsequently recognised as registered office by Revenue and that business is a continuous activity and therefore CENVAT credit cannot be restricted to amount of CENVAT credit availed during the period as per service tax return.

Cararo Technologies India P. Ltd. v. CCE, Pune-III 2015 (39) STR 673 (Tri.-Mumbai)

131. The Tribunal allowed the rebate of service tax paid on commission received under BAS, which was rejected by the Revenue on the ground that the output service was not exported and held that the services provided were procurement of order and forwarding same to principal situated abroad, who was free to accept or reject the order and therefore was rendered to person situated abroad and was export of service.

Enervision Services P. Ltd. v. CCEC&ST, Hyderabad-II 2015 (39) STR 681 (Tri.-Bang.)

132. The Tribunal held that refund claim for a particular quarter need not be in respect of input service consumed in that quarter and since the assessee did not have any domestic sales it was entitled to refund claimed.

Ionnor Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE&ST, Chandigarh-I 2015 (39) STR 698 (Tri.-Del.)

133. The Tribunal held that, the refund of excess amount paid during investigation is not hit by limitation under section 11B of CEA, 1944 as there is no issue of unjust enrichment.

Metro Motors v. CCE, Daman 2015 (39) STR 77 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

134. The High Court held that any amount deposited during the pendency of adjudication proceeding or investigation is in the nature of deposit made under protest and therefore the principles of unjust enrichment do not apply in such cases.

CCE, Coimbatore v. Pricol Ltd. 2015 (39) STR 190 (Mad.)

135. The Tribunal held that an EOU can file quarterly refunds under Notification No. 5/2006-CE(NT) and since the said Notification is issued under Rule 5 of CCR, 2004 and not linked to refund procedure under section 11B of CEA, 1944, hence no time limit was applicable.

Quality BPO Services Pvt. Ltd v. CST, Ahmedabad 2015 (39) STR 230 (Tri.-Ahmd.)

136. The Tribunal held that procuring purchase orders from Indian Customers on behalf of foreign companies would be considered as an export of services since the effective use and enjoyment of the service was by the foreign company and therefore refund was allowable as the services were exported.

CST v Ishida India Pvt Ltd – 2015-TIOL-1719-CESTAT-DEL

137. The Tribunal held that since the recipient of services was located outside India and the payment was received in convertible foreign exchange the services provided qualified as export of services and merely because the services were used for investing in India, the department was incorrect in denying refund to the assessee.

CST v. NV Advisory Pvt LTd – 2015 (39) STR 210 (Tri-Mumbai)

138. The Tribunal held that time limit for filing refund claim extended to one year by Notification No. 17/2009-ST was applicable only to refund claims filed after 7-7-2009 and all for refund claims filed prior to that date the old time limit of six month would be applicable.

Associated Aluminium Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, Mumbai-I 2015 (39) STR 234 (Tri.-Mumbai)

139. The High Court held that the provisions of section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 are not applicable for refund of service tax paid erroneously and therefore the assessee could not be denied refund of wrongly paid service tax on services qualified as export of services. It held that once there was no compulsion or duty cast to pay service tax, there was no authority for the department to retain such amount and the refund was not relatable to section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 also considering the fact that the mistake in the present case was on account of fact and not on account of law.

M/s. Geojit BNP Paribas Financial Services Ltd. v. CST – 2015-TIOL-1602-HC-KERALA-ST

Service of Order

140. The Tribunal held that an appeal against orders dated 15-2-2008 & 31-3-2009 filed on 13-3-2013 were filed on time considering that the orders were received by it through speed post only on 2-3-2013. The Tribunal held that under section 37C the permitted mode of communication of order was through Regd. Post (A.D.) and not through Speed Post and since there was not sufficient compliance of the provisions of section 35C(1)(a) and the service of order would be deemed to be on 2-3-2013.

Marketing Times Automobiles Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 38 STR 414 (Tri.-Del.)

Show Cause Notice

141. The High Court held that, when there is a finding of fact that no show cause notice has been issued to the assessee then proceedings in connection therewith and the adjudication thereon was a nullity.

CCCE&ST, Guntur v. Narayana Coaching Centre 2015 (39) STR 433 (AP)

142. The Tribunal held that since the total amount of service tax mentioned is more than Rs. 5 lakhs the AC/DC could not have adjudicated SCN in view of provisions of section 83A of FA, 1994 read with Notification No. 30/2005-ST. It was also held that even the penalty proposed in annexure to SCN was more than impugned amount, therefore entire proceedings become invalid.

Raasi Refractories Ltd. v. CCEC&ST, Hyderabad-III 2015 (39) STR 472 (Tri.-Bang.)

143. The High Court held that mandatory pre-deposit under amended section 35F of CEA, 1944 is applicable only to appeal filed on or after 6-8-2014 even if SCN was issued prior to 6-8-2014. The second proviso to this section clearly indicates that the requirement of mandatory pre-deposit shall not apply to stay application and appeals which were pending prior 6-8-2014. It is further held that, High Court can dispense with the requirement of pre-deposit under the new section 35F, since powers of the High Courts under Article 226 of Constitution of India are not ousted.

Ganesh Yadav v. UOI 2015 (39) STR 177 (All.)

Miscellaneous

144. The High Court held that if the main contractor had paid service tax, the sub-contractor need not pay service tax but he had to prove that the payment was made by the main contractor.

Sew Infrastructure Ltd. v. CCE (2015) 37 STR 984 (Chhattisgarh)

145. The Tribunal held that the assessee, a service provider, can by way of a contract transfer the service tax burden on a third party but cannot ask the Revenue to recover the tax dues from such third party or wait for discharge of the liability till he has recovered the tax amount from such third party

Delhi Transport Corporation v. CST (2015) 38 STR 673 (Del.)]

146. The Court held that the service receiver in India was not liable to pay service tax in respect of the services received from a service provider located outside India prior to the introduction of section 66A i.e. before 18-4-2006.

CCC&E v. Moser Baer India Ltd. (2015) 38 STR 687 (All.)

147. The Court condoned a delay of 6 months in filing of appeal before the Tribunal as the order was not communicated to the assessee’s authorised person.

G.M.T.D. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. CC &CE (2015) 38 STR 691(Uttarakhand)

148. The Court held that pre-deposit of tax can be ordered where there is tax demand and penalty and that pre-deposit of penalty can be ordered where there is an appeal against the penalty.

Share Microfin Ltd. v. CCCEx&ST (2015) 38 STR 457 (A.P.)

149. The High Court held that the liability to pay service tax is upon service provider and he has right to collect said tax from service recipient and that there is no provision for recovery or reimbursement of any service tax by service provider from service recipient.

Multi Engg. & Scientific Corp. v. Bihar State Electricity Board 2015 (39) STR 414 (Pat.)

150. The Tribunal held that, the transaction undertaken by the assessee of procuring orders on behalf of overseas manufacturers and rendering of services if any, could not be considered as services provided in India and therefore set aside the impugned order denying export of services as it was unsustainable.

ATE Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. CST, Mumbai 2015 (39) STR 81 (Tri.-Mumbai)

151. The Tribunal held that the language used in section 85(4) of FA, 1994 has wider connotation and not restrictive as used in section 35A(3) of CEA, 1944 and therefore Commissioner (A) has powers to pass such orders as he thinks fit which includes the power of remand.

CCE, Panchkula v. Goel International Pvt. Ltd. 2015 (39) STR 330 (Tri.-Del.)

Sunil Moti Lala

1. ASSESSMENT

Hypothetical determination of turnover and procedural lapses in assessment – such assessments cannot be sustained and needed to be considered afresh for the entire year. Accordingly, the matters remitted back.

Kahan Chand & Sons Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. AO, Shimla (2015) 52 PHT 201 (HPTT)

2. CONDONATION OF DELAY

There was a delay of 907 days in filing the appeal to the Tribunal because of wrong communication of the order of dismissal by Appellate Authority. Instead of communicating at the address given in memo of appeal, communication was sent to the branch of the appellant. Even on personally writing the letters, status of appeal was not communicated. On hearing the appellant, High Court condoned the delay, holding that it was well settled that a party should not be condemned unheard and the case should not be rejected on technical grounds, rather should be decided on merit unless delay is attributable to gross negligence of a party.

B.K. Steels v. State of Punjab And Anr. (2015) 52 PHT 210 (P&H)

3. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

Prosecution story, in brief, was that on 16-12-2009 vehicle bearing No. PB-10-EC-1520 owned by petitioner was apprehended. It was found that the said vehicle was loaded with ‘Seera’ (mollases) without any bill or payment of tax. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has already deposited the penalty as imposed u/s. 56(c) of the PVAT Act, 2005. Thereafter, the vehicle of the petitioner was released along with goods. Hence, he pleaded that petitioners could not be criminally prosecuted qua the same offense. The HC after hearing allowed the petition and FIR No. 309 filed u/s. 420 of IPC was quashed.

Manish Kumar and Anr. v. State of Punjab (2015) 52 PHT 257 (P&H)

4. EX PARTE ASSESSMENT ORDER

Filing application before the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal against the ex parte assessment order. Plea that mandatory provision as contained in section 42 of the WBVAT Act, 2003 not followed while passing ex parte assessment order. Whether ex parte assessment order could be quashed? The Tribunal held in the negative because revisional application could not be entertained in view of the provision contained in Section 8(3) of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 r/w sections 32, 33, 42, 46 of the WBVAT Act, 2003. The Appellate Tribunal held that remedial measures available under the provisions of the Act were quite adequate and it shall not caused any undue hardship to the applicant. No substantial question of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or the specified State Act or Rules were involved either. Thus, the petitioner not having availed of remedial measures provided in the Act, the revisional application could not be entertained.

MMU Metaliks Udyog (P) Ltd. v. STO, Strand Road Charge (2015) 66 STA (Part-4) P-197 (WBTT)

5. FORGED RECEIPT REGARDING PAYMENT OF VAT

Petitioner dealing in electrical goods forged a receipt in Form 38, along with forged rubber stamp of the Authority to show that the transaction is genuine and thus usurped taxation amount of Rs. 16,230. FIR lodged against the petitioner. Petitioner applied for anticipatory bail, which was dismissed, keeping in view the seriousness of the allegations and to reach in the depth of the entire offence. The petitioner through their advocates contended that he had paid the VAT amount and it is only a nominal amount of Rs. 8,096/-. This was opposed by the State. In the circumstances, the application for anticipatory bail was rejected by the High Court.

Manoj Kumar Kansal v. State of Haryana (2015) 52 PHT 256 (P&H)

6. INTERPRETATION OF ENTRIES

A. Processed vegetables and fruits including fruit jams, pickle, fruits squash, paste, fruit drink and fruit juice covered by Entry-3 of the 3rd Schedule to the Karnataka VAT Act was under the consideration of the HC. In this context, a question arose whether it will include (a) Vegit – Aloo Harabara Kebab, (b) Vegit – Aloo Veg. Cutlet, (c) Vegit – Aloo Yummy Cheese Balls, (d) Vegit – Aloo Mazedar Bonda and (e) Vegit – Aloo Jatpat Tikki, which were generally known as vegit – snack mix. The Karnataka HC after going through exhaustive case laws held that no ordinary person treated these snack mixes as ‘processed vegetables’, though they contain 60% to 85% dehydrated vegetables. While construing the provisions relating to commodity classification, the understanding of the commodity in its popular and commercial sense was to be applied. Accordingly, the Division Bench has set-aside the order passed by the single Judge and confirmed the order passed by the Commissioner confirming the commodities as listed in (a) to (e) above would fall under residuary entry and not under Entry-3 of the 3rd Schedule of the said Act. Accordingly, the appeal of the State was allowed.

State of Karnataka And Anr. v. Merino Industries Ltd. (2015) 27 STJ 573 (Kar)

B. Computer and its parts and accessories – Computer servers, Storage and tape library, Network equipments (Routers, Switches), Workstation (Desktop), Printers, DCU and Connectors, Modems, Spot billing machines, Kiosk machines and Software were covered in computer and its parts and accessories, and, therefore, were exempt from Entry tax in Entry 8 of NTF No. 24 dt. 2-4-2007. But, UPS and battery, IP PBX and Phones, Workstation PC (UPS Table and Chairs) and Computer racks, Cables and Connectors were not covered in computer parts and accessories and therefore were liable for entry tax at 1%.

Reliance Infrastructure Ltd., Korba v. C.C.T. (2015) 27 STJ 611 (CG)

C. Pentasol S-10 (Monolithic & Ramming Mass) – it is a Refractory material / item – it was not covered in Entry 27(b) of Schedule-II of CG Entry Tax Act, which was relating to Bricks excluding fly ash bricks, but including fire bricks and fire clay. There being no any entry for Pentasol S-10 (Monolithic & Ramming Mass) in Schedule-II of the Entry Tax Act, it was exempt from Entry tax. This decision was arrived at after referring to Tata Steel Ltd. v. State of Odisha (2013) 57 VST 484 (Ori)

However, the Journal’s Editor note stated that before Pentasol S-10 (Monolithic & Ramming Mass) was treated as exempt from entry tax, it was necessary to examine whether it could be covered under Residuary Entry of Schedule-II, or whether it could be covered in Schedule-III of the Entry Tax Act.

RHI India Pvt. Ltd., Raigarh v. C.C.T., CG (2015) 27 STJ 615 (CG)

7. INTER-STATE SALE

Cereals and Pulses were exempted from tax under the M.P.C.T. Act, vide Notification dt. 10-7-1999 subject to the condition that the goods manufactured from the States were sold in the State or in the course of inter-State trade or in the course of export. The assessee in the present case transferred the ‘Dalhan’ (pulses) to agent outside the State who sold the same in that State. The only question raised for determination before the HC was whether the exemption was available to the assessee for the period in question on Dalhan sold outside the State through agents. The MP High Court allowed writ petition of the assessee on the ground that the assessee sold Dalhan outside the State through the agents and therefore, it was covered in inter-State sale and the assessee is entitled for benefit of notification dt. 10-7-1999. However, on appeal by the State before the Apex Court, the Apex Court set-aside the judgment of the MP High Court by holding that the assessee never raised the plea that he made inter-State sale to the agents. Though, the assessee referred certain documents to suggest that the inter-State sale was made to the agents, who in turn sold the Dalhan in the said State. But, in absence of any plea taken before the lower authorities and the High Court, the Supreme Court was not inclined to decide the said question in the appeal. Therefore, in this appeal the only question before the Supreme Court was whether sale of goods outside the State through agents could be treated as inter-State sale. Considering the scheme of Section 3 of the CST Act, the Supreme Court set-aside all the impugned judgments and lower orders and allowed the appeal of the State.

State of MP And Ors. v. S.K. Industries (2015) 13 STD 190 (SC)

8. NATURAL JUSTICE

Denial of proper chance of being heard by all the authorities below including Trial Judge was the question required to be dealt with in the appeal as well as writ petition by the Calcutta High Court. In the circumstances, the HC held that appeal could be disposed of merely on the ground of violation of natural justice and the order of the trial judge is set-aside. It was further held that the matter shall be resolved by the revising authority within 1 month from the date of communication of the Order. If no steps are taken in terms of the Order on receipt of those original documents, this order passed by us would stand recalled.

Lux Hosiery Industries Ltd. v. ACCT and Ors. 2015 66 STA (Part-4) Page 183 (Cal.)

9. PRE-DEPOSIT OF TAX U/S. 62(5) OF THE PVAT ACT, 2005

Claim of the appellant was that demand was created against him only for the reasons that the input credit of tax (ITC) claimed by him was rejected on the ground that his selling dealers had not deposited the tax so collected in the Govt. Treasury. Appeals of the selling dealers before the First Appellate Authority relate to cancellation of their registration, therefore, present appeals could not be clubbed with the cases pending before the Authority. However, the cases could be send back to the Assessing Authority (deciding the assessments to the selling dealers) in order to make out these were the bogus sales, there was connivance or collusion between the appellant and the purchasing dealers in order to avoid tax liability and also to recover the tax from the persons actually liable to pay the same. Thereupon, the HC held the appeal is accepted and impugned orders was set-aside and the case was remitted back to the assessing authority to frame the assessment along with the cases of assessment of the selling dealers. However, if the selling dealers did not deposit the tax, then, the purchasing dealer would pay the tax.

Friends High Tech Industries, Amritsar and Ors. v. State of Punjab (2015) 52 PHT 271 (PVT)

10. RECTIFICATION ORDER

Rectification order was passed under wrong section whether void, was the matter for the consideration of Punjab VAT Tribunal. The Tribunal after going through the original assessment record held that mere mentioning of the wrong section did not negate the Order so passed. The legality of it could be seen later as it was the subject-matter of merit. The condition of pre-deposit was to be complied with at this stage. Accordingly, Rectification Appln. was rejected.

Malwa Industries Ltd. v. State of Punjab (2015) 52 PHT 194 (PVT)

D. H. Joshi