The taxability of royalty paid on mining operations is an old issue continuing from the Service tax regime to GST regime. The intelligence officers of DGGSTI, have gathered information from the State Government offices about the exploration of Minerals from the Mining lease and issuing show cause notices for the recovery of Service Tax on royalty paid to the State Government in the pre GST period.

– Ramesh Chandra Jena

The show cause notices are based on the payment of royalty made to the Government in respect of exploration and disposal appears to be covered under the definition of “Taxable Services” under Section 65B(51) of the Finance Act,1994. The recovery process has been initiated by the department in terms of the provisions of Finance Act, 1994, Central Excise Act, 1944 and rules made thereunder are validated under Section 174(2) of the CGST Act, 2017.

Concept of Royalty

Royalty is fee or consideration paid to the property owner for the right to use the property or patentee for the use of a patent or property against money obtained on sold of each patent or value of extract resources during the licensed period. Royalties are agreed upon as a percentage of gross or net revenues obtained from the use of an asset so authorised by the party assets owns. In terms of Section 9 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 the holder of mining lease shall pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed / consumed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa and others v. M/s Steel Authority of India Ltd. (AIR 1998 SC 3052), the Apex Court opined that Section 9(1) of the MMDR Act, 1957 also contemplates the levy of royalty on the mineral consumed by the holder of a mining lease in the leased area, hence processing of mineral amounts to consumption and, therefore, the entire mineral is eligible to levy of royalty.

Service Tax on Royalty

With effect from 1’st April’2016 amendments have been made to levy of Service Tax on Royalty under Reverse Charge Mechanism, on the Services provided by Government to business entities to bring leasing of Natural Resources like Mining etc. in the Service Tax net. According to the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC), when the Government grants license to a business entity to exploit a natural resources from the mines, it is a taxable service, and hence liable for service tax. In terms of Notification No.30/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 read with amended Notification No.7/2015- ST dated 01.03.2015, the Central Government imposed the service tax on mining royalty under reverse charge. Under reverse charge, business entities have to pay Service Tax on the amount of mining royalty paid to the Government.

The Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC) had issued Notification Nos. 22/2016- ST, 24/2016-ST both dated 13.04.2016 and Circular No. 192/02/2016-Service Tax dated 13.04.2016 dealing with applicability of service tax on services provided by Government or a local authority, whereas the said circular clarifies that any activity undertaken by the Government against a consideration constitutes service, even if such activity was undertaken as a statutory or mandatory requirement under any law. Service tax was also applicable on any payment, in lieu of any permission or license granted by the Government. The said Circular clarified that the service tax will be payable on right to use natural resources in view of rule 7 of point of Taxation Rules’2011 as amended vide Notification No. 24/2016-ST dated 13.04.2016. Thus as per the clarification given under the said Circular and Notification, the royalty to be paid by mining lease holder as per provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 was subject to payment of service tax w.e.f. 01.04.2016.

Controversy on Royalty whether it is ‘Tax’ or ‘Service’

Royalty is not a payment in respect of any taxable service at all and it is imposed under Section 9 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 in respect of any mineral “removed or consumed” by the holder of a mining lease from the leased area, at the rate specified in the Second Schedule. Clearly, therefore, royalty is a price of wining minerals from the land and represents the State’s share in this respect and the levy of Service Tax is illegal.

The levy of tax on royalty is the disputed issue in the erstwhile Service Tax regime and there was conflicting decisions of the Apex Court on the matter of tax on royalty. The question of mining royalty whether tax or not is pending before the Supreme Court on account of conflicting decisions and the same decisions are summarised as under:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of India Cement Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu

& Ors. – [(1990) 1 SCC 12], (Seven judge Bench of Supreme Court) held that royalty is a tax and royalty is separate and distinct from land revenue and that it is not related to land as a unit. On the other hand, royalty is payable on the proportion of the minerals extracted and it has relationship to mining as also to the mineral won from the mine under a contract by which royalty is payable on the quantity the mineral extracted. In this sense royalty was viewed as a kind of tax linked either directly or indirectly to the intrinsic economic value of a mineral realized through sale by the lessee.

The Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. & Ors. [(2004) 10 SCC. 201], (Five Judge Bench of Supreme Court) held that Royalty on mineral rights is not a tax on land but a payment for the user of land. Royalty is paid to the owner of land who may be a private person and may not necessarily be state. A private person owing the land is entitled to charge royalty but not tax. The lessor receives royalty as his income and for the lessee the royalty paid is an expenditure incurred. Royalty cannot be tax.

The Supreme Court in its decision in Mineral Area Development Authority v. M/s. Steel Authority of India & Ors., (2011) 4 SCC 450 has referred to a Bench of nine learned Judges, the core issue as to whether royalty is in the nature of a tax and whether the majority decision in the State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. & Ors., (2004) 10 SCC 201 could be read as departing from the law laid down in the seven Judge Bench decision in India Cement Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (1990) 1 SCC 12.

In view of two conflicting decisions of the Apex Court, aforesaid two conflicting decisions rendered in case of India Cement Ltd (supra) and Kesoram Industries (supra) and made request to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India to constitute a Nine judge Bench to answer the reference, one of the reference referred there to is whether the royalty is in the nature of a tax.

The reference has not been answered as yet by the nine judges Bench and the answer whether the royalty is a tax has not been conclusively decided. So the matter is res integra.

Therefore, the question of royalty whether a tax is pending before the larger Bench of nine judges of the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court holds that mining royalty itself is tax there would not be service and again on mining royalty as the tax cannot imposed on it. Once royalty is decided as tax, it cannot be said to be a service simultaneously.

Service Tax on Royalty stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

The Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan in the case of Udaipur Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Union of India, reported in 2018(8) G.S.T.L.470 (Raj.) held that “Taking into consideration all these principles relating to “consideration”, we are of considered opinion that the royalty is nothing but a “consideration” to have mining operations in the leased area on execution of a mining lease. It is a part of agreement arrived between the parties to have lease of a mining area to undertaking mining operations. The royalty being “consideration” certainly places assignment of right to use natural resources deposited in the leased area as a “service” as defined under Section 65B(44) of the Act of 1994, according to which, any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration is a service. The finding arrived by us as above is sufficient to say that the notification dated 13-4-2016 is not at all in conflict with its enabling Act i.e. the Finance Act, 1994 and the same does not suffer from any illegality.”

The above judgement of the Rajasthan High Court has been stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Union of India, reported in 2018(10) G.S.T.L.J167 (S.C.) held that “Until further orders payment of service tax for grant of mining lease/royalty by the petitioners shall remain stayed.”

In another case the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tamanna Begum v. UOI in Special Leave to Appeal (c) Nos. 3150-3155/2018, held that the decision on 5-02-2018 in the same letter and spirit.

Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Barwala Royalty Co. & others v. The State of Haryana in Writ Petition (C) No.1119/2021, on 20-10-2021 on the same issue has maintained the same letter and spirit and has granted stay on the demand of Service Tax on royalty until further orders.

Service Tax on Royalty stayed by the Various Hon’ble High Courts: Subsequent to the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s Stay Order of Levy of Service Tax on ‘Royalty” other High Courts also issued interim stay order for the levy / collection of Service Tax on Royalty in the following cases:

  1. The Hon’ble High Court Bombay at Goa in the case M/s Goa Mining Association and Anr v. Union of India vide Writ Petition No.1076 of 2016 dated 22.08.2017.
  2. The Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in the Case M/s Gujmin Industry Association v. Union of India, reported in 2019(20) G.S.T.L. 11(Guj.) vide Order dated 19.09.2018.
  3. The Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in the case M/s Zeenath Transport Company v. Principal Addl. Director DGGI, in Writ Petition 148059 /2020 and Order dated 25.01.2021.
  4. The Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand while disposing a bunch of writ petition on levy of Service Tax / GST on Royalty in quarrying stones for removed or consumed by the holder of a mining lease from the leased area has been stayed reported in 2021 (3) TMI 601-Jharkhan High Court.

GST on Royalty

The taxable event under GST is ‘supply’ of goods or services. The term ‘supply’ has been defined under section 7 of the CGST Act in an inclusive manner and includes all activities undertaken for consideration except activities prescribed under Schedule II and Schedule III.

The issue of taxability of royalty paid on mining operations is continuing into the GST regime as well because the statutory liability for payment of GST on such Government services is covered under Reverse Charge Mechanism. FAQ issued by the CBEC for levy of GST on Royalty has clarified the issue and accordingly it is assumed that the Royalty other charges collected by the Government the consideration for rights granted to use the natural resources is “taxable services”. The activity of rights to use natural resources is treated as supply of services and the licensee is required to pay tax on the amount of consideration paid in the form of royalty or any other form under reverse charge mechanism.

The rate schedule was earlier amended to impose GSTon royalty from January 1, 2019, the tax research unit of the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC)clarified that the tax would also be applied from July 1, 2017 and December 31, 2018. GST came into force on July 1, 2017. The rate of tax on royalty prescribed vide Notification No.11/2017- Central Tax (Rate)

, dated against item No.17 under Heading No.997337 @ 18% as rate applicable on the rate of goods i.e. minerals and whatever is the rate of tax on minerals, the same rate has been accepted as tax on Royalty. There are several advance Rulings has passed on GST rate on royalty.

Advance Rulings

  1. In Re – M/s KSF -9 Corporate Services Ltd- AAR-Ruling No. KAR ADRG 03/2020, reported in 2020-TIOL-65-AAR- GST, held that “we find that Kuvempu University is an establishment of the State Government. Therefore, Kuvempu University is not liable to discharge tax under reverse charge basis. Hence the applicant is liable to discharge GST @ 18% (9% CGST + 9% KGST) on forward charge mechanism on the said supply of manpower services.”
  2. In Re- M/s NM D C Ltd, AAR-Ruling No.KAR ADRG 69/ 2019-reported in 2019-TIOL-397-AAR-GST, held that “Royalty paid in respect of Mining lease is a part of consideration payable for licensing services for right to use minerals including exploration and evaluation falling under Heading 9973 – is taxable at the rate applicable on supply of like goods involving transfer of title in goods up to 31.12.2018 and taxable at 9% CGST and 9% SGST from 01.01.2019 under residual entries of Sr. no. 17 of 11/2017-CTR as amended: AAR”
  3. In Re- M/s Raj Quarry Works, AAR- Ruling No. GUJ/GAAR/ R/2020/09.held M/s. Raj Quarry Works, Tulsi Gam, Taluka Savali, Vadodara having a GSTIN : 24AADFR5577NIZN, is a partnership company filed an application for Advance Ruling under Section 97 of VGST ACT,17 and Section 97 of the CGST Act,2917 in FORM GST ARA-01 discharging the fee of Rs. 5,000/- each under the CGST Act and the SGST Act.M/s. Raj Quarry Works is carrying out mining activity on a plot of land leased from the government of Gujarat. The applicant is quarrying “BLACK TRAP” products used for concrete mixing and sells it to the customers. BLACKTRAP material attracts GST at 5% under Heading 2517 in Schedule-I of the CGST Act, 2017.
  4. In Re- M/s Uttarakhand Development Corporation- AAR- Ruling-reported in 2020-TIOL-123, No.2020-TIOL-123- AAR- GST, held that Royalty payable to Govt. of Uttarakhand in respect of Reta, Bazri  & Boulders extracted as per permission of govt. authorities is chargeable to tax under RCM at the same rate as on supply of like goods involving transfer of title in goods i.e. 5% and w.e.f 01.01.2019 @18%: AAR”
  5. In Re– M/s Penguin Trading and Agencies Limited, AAAR- Ruling No. ARA/Odisha/BBSR/2019/10/11660A dated 23 08 2019, observed that GST rate applicable against Sl.No. 17 item of Notification No. 11/2017 prior to 01.01.2019 is applicable to unlike or leasing of goods and held that the amendment carried out vide Notification No.27/2018 –C.T. (Rate) dated 31.12.2018, which restricted the same rate applicable to supply of goods. we hereby order that licensing services for the right to use minerals including its exploration and evaluation received by the Applicant is taxable @ 18 % [9 % CGST and 9 % OGST] during 07/ 2017 to 12/2018. Thus, the reference from the Odisha Authority for Advance Ruling stands disposed of accordingly.

Due to conflicting views of rate of GST on royalty by the various Advance Ruling authorities, the GST Council in it’s 45th meeting held on 17th September’2021 has recommended the services by way of grant of mineral exploration and mining rights attracted GST rate of 18% w.e.f. 01.07.2017.

GST on Royalty has stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lakhwinder Singh v. Union of India- reported in [2021]131taxmann.com 168 (S.C.), 18% GST on Royalty has stayed the payment of service tax on mining lease until further orders.

Conclusion

Thus, the taxability of Royalty on mining operations or explorations is the matter of litigation with regard to whether it is “service’ or ‘tax ‘in the pre-GST period. The said issue is pending before the larger Bench of nine judges of the Supreme Court in respect of Service Tax liability in the pre-GST Period. The recovery of the service tax on Royalty on mining lease has been stayed by the Supreme Court. Similarly, whether the taxability of royalty on account of mining operations it is ‘goods’ or ‘services’ is also matter of conflicting views of the Authority of Advance Rulings. The litigation of tax on royalty is very long pending unsettled issue in the Indian taxation system and continuing from Service tax regime into GST regime as well.Under the above circumstances the field formations should not harass to the taxpayers by initiating recovery process of tax on account of royalty on mining operations as service tax or GST when the recovery of service tax or GST has been stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

(This Article was published in Souvenir of National Tax Conference held on 26th & 27th February 2022 at Kolkata)

“Whatever you believe, that you will be, If you believe yourselves to be ages, ages you will be tomorrow. There is nothing to obstruct you.”
— Swami Vivekananda

Various problems are cropped up during GST i.e. ‘Good & Simple Tax’ regime. Out of the same now let us discuss regarding taxability of incentive, discount and liquidated damages under the said Act.

As per GST Law, definition of Services says – Services means anything other than goods, money and securities but includes activities relating to the use of money or its conversion by cash or by any other mode, from one form, currency or denomination for which a separate consideration is charged.

INCENTIVE

Here it is pointed out that as that of VAT Law, GST Law doesn’t speak about ‘incentive” specifically. But the Assessing Officers are taxing the same under the ambit of GST Law as the same is related to supply of Goods or Services.

Here is the case of a works contractor, who, having completed the work before the schedule time was eligible to get incentive from the concerned Executive Engineer as per agreement. He has disclosed the entire turnover in his returns those he has received towards execution of the works contract. The Executive Engineer when made payment of the incentive amount didn’t deduct TDS from the Gross Payment towards payment of incentive. The Tax Payer also didn’t disclose the same in its return filed under the GST Law as the incentive was neither coming under the ‘goods’ nor ‘services’. The Assessing Officer issued notice to the Tax Payer to reconcile the WAMIS data with that of the returns filed by him and file revised return accordingly. In response to the notice the Tax Payer replied that there was no discrepancy hence filing of revised return doesn’t arise. The Proper Officer sent SCN u/s.73 of the Act with GST DRC-01 stating therein the tax and interest payable for the escaped turnover. Thereafter the AO sent the DRC- 07 mentioning the tax, interest and penalty payable for not including the incentive amount and making payment of GST thereon. The Tax Payer carried on correspondences with the concerned contractee accordingly. The contractee wrote a letter to his higher authority with a copy to the Tax Payer as under:-

“In this matter it is to put forth that, incentive is an award system in a contract which comes into operation only after completion of all forms of supply of goods or services or both such sale, transfer, bater, exchange, license, rental, lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a person in the course of furtherance of business under Clause-7(1) of SGST and CGST Act.

It is not a perquisite for this supply in contrast to the inference made by the GST assessing authority. For an Agency to be eligible for incentive neither he has to supply any goods nor render any services. It becomes operational once the work is completed before stipulated date of completion. No further work is done or measurement is taken in order to receive incentive. It is a Reward system of Government. The incentive is allowed by the Government in token of acceptance of the efforts of the Agency who saves the Government from time over run of the Project.

Because this is only a reward therefore neither its value is included in the estimate nor amount put to tender. There is no instance of refund of GST in case penalty is levied over a work when the Agency delays the work. The averment made by GST authority for supply of the service at a higher performance is an implied conclusion which has no direct mention in the Law. In this matter the term “Supply” is from the point of view of the person who is supplying and not the person who is receiving the supply. Hence Sec- 12(2)(C) of the GST Rules may not be applicable in this case as incentive is neither a supply of ‘Good’s nor ‘Service’.

Considering these aspects GST was not allowed during release of the incentive to the Agency. However, if it is found pertinent to charge GST on incentive, then it may so be directed for taking action at this end.”

That the AO without considering the submissions of the Tax Payer when passed order imposing tax, interest and penalty on it, the Tax Payer has raised the submissions in the First Appeal as under:-

Section-2(31)(a) ‘Consideration’- any payment made or to be made, whether in money or otherwise. In respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government”.

Section-2(52) ‘Goods’-means every kind of movable property other than money and securities but includes actionable claim, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before supply or under a contract of supply.

Section-2(102) ‘Services’-means anything other than goods, money, and securities but includes activities relating to the use of money or its conversion by cash or by any other mode, from one form, currency or denomination, to another form, currency or denomination for which a separate consideration is charged.

Section-2(119) ‘Works Contract’-means a contract for building, construction, fabrication, completion, erection, installation, fitting out, improvement, modification, repair, maintenance, revocation, alteration or commissioning of any immovable property wherein transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) is involved in the execution of such contract.

Section-7(1)(a) ‘Supply’ includes- all forms of supply of goods or services or both such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, license, rental, lease, or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a person in the course of furtherance of business.

Section-15(2)(c) Value of taxable supply shall include- incidental expenses, including commission and packing, charged by the supplier to the recipient of a supply and any amount charged for anything done by the supplier in respect of the supply of goods or services or both at the time of, or before delivery of goods or supply of services.

In the FAQ released by CBIC on 15/12/2018 it has been clarified at Q No.7 as under:-

Whether post-supply discounts or incentives are to be included in the transaction value?

“Ans. Yes. However, where the post- supply discount is established as per the agreement which is known at or before the time of supply and where such discount specifically linked to the relevant invoice and the recipient has reversed input tax credit attributable to such discount, the discount is allowed as admissible deduction under Section 15 of the CGST Act.”

The CBIC in Circular No.92/11/2019- GST dated 07th March, 2019 declared as under:-

Therefore the goods or services or both which are supplied free of cost (without any consideration) shall not be treated as supply under GST (except activities mentioned in Schedule I of the said Act).

The Advance Ruling Authority of Karnataka vide No.KAR- ADRG- 76/2018 dated-24/09/2019 in case of M/s KwalityMobikes Private Ltd. have held that :-

“The volume discount received on purchases in form of credit note without any adjustment of GST is not liable for GST.

  1. The volume discount received on retail (on sales) in the form of credit note without any adjustment of GST is not liable for GST.
  2. Since the amount received in the form of credit note is actually a discount

    and not a supply by the applicant to the authorized supplier, the applicant need not issue tax invoice for this transaction”.

Besides, the Tax Payer has cited the case law as under:-

That during the Service Tax regime the same view was taken towards receipt of “post-sale incentive/discount” as not taxable in the hands of the recipient. In case of Grey Worldwide (I) Pvt. Ltd-v.- Commissioner of Service Tax, Hon’ble CESTAT, West Zone, Mumbai held as under:-

Therefore, it can be seen that the Tribunal has been consistently taking the stand that the incentives received by an advertising agency cannot be levied to service tax under the category of BAS. These amounts are in any case payable to the media as and when the claim is lodged and therefore, this amount cannot be construed as consideration received towards services rendered”.

DISCOUNT

Under the General sales Tax Act ‘sale price’ means the amount payable to a dealer as consideration for the sale or supply of any goods, less any sum allowed as cash discount according to ordinary trade practice, but including any sum charged for anything done by the dealer in respect of the goods at the time of, or before, delivery thereof.

Under the CST Act “sale price” means the amount payable to a dealer as consideration for the sale of any goods, less any sum allowed as cash discount according to the practice normally prevailing in the trade, but inclusive of any sum charged for anything done by the dealer in respective of the goods at the time of or before the delivery there of other than the cost of the freight or delivery or the cost of the installation in cases where such cost is separately charged.

Under the VAT Law ‘sale price’ means the amount of valuable consideration received or receivable by a dealer as consideration for the sale of any goods less any sum allowed as cash discount or trade discount at the time of delivery or before delivery of such goods but inclusive of any sum charged for anything done by the dealer in respect of the goods at the time of or before delivery thereof.

That even if “trade discount” has not been mentioned in the definition of “sale price” either under the Central Sales Tax Act or under the General Sales Tax Act, but the Hon’ble Courts while deciding the cases have categorically held that ‘trade discount’ will not form a part of sale price.

Few case laws on ‘trade discount’ of the erstwhile Acts are reproduced hereunder for appreciation:-

Orient Paper Mills Ltd -v.- State of Orissa reported in 35–STC-84(Ori.),

  1. AdvaniOerlikon (Pvt.) Ltd. reported in 45-STC- 32(SC),
  2. Deputy commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) Board of Revenue (Taxes) Ernakulam v. Motor Industries Co. reported in 53- STC-48(SC),
  3. Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Ernakulam -v.- Kerala Rubber & Allied Products reported in 90-STC- 170(SC),
  4. T. V. Suranam Ayangar & Sons Ltd reported in 65-STC- 41(AP),
  5. Mapra Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. -v.- State of Bihar & Others reported in 135-STC-157(Patna),
  6. Commercial Taxes Officer, Circle-A, Jaipur -v.- Singhal Paints Limited (1998)-111-STC-27(RTT),
  7. Mohan Breweries and Distilleries Limited -Versus- Commercial Tax Officer, Porur Assessment Circle, Chennai and Others (2005)-139-STC- 477(Mad.),
  8. DCCT, Corporate Division v. MRF Ltd (2008) 14-VST- 124(WBTT),
  9. Dey’s Medical Stores Limited -Versus- Commissioner, Trade Tax,U.P. (2004)134-STC-14 (Alld.),
  10. IFB Industries Ltd.- v.- State of Kerala -(2012)49- VST-1(S.C.),
  11. Southern Motors –Vrs- State of Karnataka and Others in the Civil Appeal Nos.10955-10971 of 2016 dated- 18/01/2017(SC)

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

The meaning of ‘liquidated damages’ in common parlance is that the damages or a sum of money which is agreed upon in a contact to be paid by one party to the other in the event of breach of any term or condition of the contract. That means the terms of a contract specify a sum payable for non-performance, which amount is to be treated as a penalty or as liquidated damages. In the Finance Act, 1994 nowhere the liquidated damages were defined. Scope of supply is defined in section 7 and charging section (levy and collection) is governed by section 9 of CGST Act 2017.

Under the Indian Contract Act, 1872- ‘Liquidated Damages’ have not been defined. But by the combined reading of sec 73 and sec 74 of the said act some light can be thrown on the above subject. Then another question automatically comes to mind that whether liquidated damages and penalty are one and the same.

There is no definition of Liquidated damages under the CGST Act, 2017. According to Section-7 of the CGST Act the scope of ‘Supply’ is defined. If we will read section 7(1) after amendment as on 1.2.2019:-

Sec-7(1) defines the expression “supply”, which includes:-

  1. all forms of supply of goods or services or both such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, licence, rental, lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a person in the course or furtherance of business;(b) import of services for a consideration whether or not in the course or furtherance of business and; (c) the activities specified in Schedule I, made or agreed to be made without a consideration;

7(1A) defines – where certain activities or transactions, constitute a supply in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1), they shall be treated either as supply of goods or supply of services as referred to in Schedule II. Schedule II only gives the classification of treatment of activities which are to be treated as supply of goods or supply of service. According to schedule II, Clause 5(e) says – agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation, or to do an act. Therefore Liquidated damages

are covered in the residual entry of services as there is no specific Service Accounting Code (SAC) for liquidated damages. It may be covered under the Heading “9997” (reference may be made to Central Tax (Rate) Notification No.11/2017 dated-28.06.2017) on which GST is payable comes @18%.

In view of above, it may be noted that a separate tax invoice should be issued by the field units against the deduction made from the invoice of the supplier on account of liquated damages. The field units charging liquidated damages shall issue Tax Invoice as per the GST Acts and the rules made thereunder. The example given under clause 8 of GST Circular No.3 under reference stands deleted.

The payment should be made net of invoice(s) received from the supplier and invoice(s) issued by the field unit in respect of the liquidated damages. In respect of any deduction in the invoice other than liquidated damages, the Credit Note needs to be issuedby the supplier.

Besides, the Circular No. 102/21/2019- GST play a vital role in determination of Liquidated Damages under the CGST Law. This Circular clarifies regarding applicability of GST on additional/penal interest and in case of EMIs (Equated monthly instalments) for repayment of Loan. Interest and penal fee charged by the banks for non-payment of EMI within the due date.

Let us discuss various Rulings of AARs on Liquidated Damages In GST, favoring it inclusion in entry No 35 as per clause 5(e) of schedule II:- (2018)(13) GSTL- 177(AAR- GST) (5) TMI-1332-AAR- Maharashtra.

The above decision of the AAR was upheld in the AAAR, Maharashtra reported in (2018)(17) GSTL-451(App. AAR- GST) 2018(9) TMI-1185(AAAR-Maharashtra)- In Re-Maharashtra State Power Generation Co. Ltd.

Similar Rulings are made by the AAR(s) in the following cases:

  1. In re M/s. North American Coal Corporation India Private Limited (GST AAR Maharashtra); Advance Ruling No. GST-ARA-07/2018- 19/B-63; 11/07/2018,
  2. In re Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd (GST AAR Ansdhra Pradesh); Advance Ruling No. AAR 01/ AP/GST/2019; 11/01/2019, (3) In re M/s. Dholera Industrial City Development Project ltd. (GST AAR Gujarat); Advance Ruling No. GUJ/GAAR/R/2019/06; 04/03/ 2019,(4) In re Bajaj Finance Limited (GST AAAR Maharashtra); Order No. MAH/ AAAR/SS-RJ/24/ 2018-19; 14/03/2019

The view taken by various Courts/ Tribunals towards levy of ‘service tax’ on ‘liquidated damages’ during the earlier regime are as under:-

  1. M.P. Poorva Kshetra Vidyut Vitaran Company Ltd – Versus- Principal Commissioner, CGST & C. EX., Bhopal, 2021 (46) G.S.T.L. 409 (Tri.- Del.),
  2. South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. –v- Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax (CESTAT Delhi) [Appeal Number: Service Tax Appeal No. 50567 of 2019 Date of Judgment/ Order: 22/12/2020],
  3. K.N. Food Industries Pvt. Ltd. -v.- Commissioner of CGST and Central Excise Kanpur [2019-TIOL-3651-CESTAT-ALL-2020(38) G.S.T.L. 60(Tri. – All.)],
  4. Lemon Tree Hotel –v.- Commissioner, Goods and Service Tax [2020-TIOL- 1114-CESTAT-DEL (2020) (34) G.S.T.L. 220 (Tri. – Del.)].
  5. Neyvali Lignite Corporation Lt.-v.- Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax, Chennai [2021] 128 taxmann.com 405 (Cennai CESTAT),
  6. AmitMetaliks Limited-v.- Commissioner of CGST, Bolpur – 2020 (41) GSTL 325 (Tri. Kolkata),
  7. Mormugao Port Trust-v.- Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise & ST, Goa – 2017 (48) STR 69 (Tri. Mumbai) which was confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Commissioner- v.- Mormugao Port Trust – 2018 (19) GSTL J118 (SC),
  8. GE T&D India Limited (Formerly Alstom T&D India Limited)-v.- Dy. Commissioner of Central Excise – 2020 (1) TMI 1096 – Madras High Court,
  9. CST, Chennai v. Repco Home Finance Limited – 2020 (7) TMI 472 – CESTAT Chennai,
  10. Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd –v.- Commissioner of Customs (CESTAT Delhi),
  11. Central Board of Excise and Customs -v.- Larsen & Toubro Ltd. (2015) 39S.T.R. 913 (SC).

In case of South Eastern Coal Fields Ltd-v.-Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax (CESTAT, Delhi) it has been observed as under:-

“It is in this context and in the context of section 74 of the Contract Act, which the Supreme Court observed:

Section 74 declares the law as to liability upon breach of contract where compensation is by agreement of parties pre- determined, or where there is a stipulation by way of penalty. But the application of the enactment is not restricted to cases where the aggrieved party claims relief as a plaintiff. The section does not confer a special benefit upon any party; it merely declares the law that notwithstanding any term in the contract for predetermining damages or providing for forfeiture of any property by way of penalty, the court will award to the party aggrieved only reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount named or penalty stipulated.

The Supreme Court also noticed that section 74 of the Contract Act merely dispenses with the proof of – actual loss or damages. It does not justify the award of compensation, when in consequence of the breach no legal injury at all has resulted, because compensation for breach of contract can be awarded to make good the loss or damage which actually arose or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach’. The Supreme Court also found that there was no evidence that any loss was suffered by the plaintiff in consequences of the default by the defendant, save as to the loss suffered by being kept out of possession of the property. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that plaintiff would be entitled to ST/50567/2019 retain only an amount of Rs. 1000/- that was received as earnest, out of amount of Rs. 25,000/-.

The conclusion drawn by the learned authorized representatives of the Department from the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court that compensation received is ‘synonymous’ with ‘tolerating’ or that the Supreme Court acknowledged that in a breach of contract, one party tolerates an act or situation is not correct.

It is, therefore, not possible to sustain the view taken by the Principal Commissioner that penalty amount, forfeiture of earnest money deposit and liquidated damages have been received by the appellant towards consideration for tolerating an act leviable to service tax under section 66E(e) of the Finance Act.

The impugned order dated December 18, 2018 passed by the Commissioner, therefore, cannot be sustained and is set aside. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.”

From the foregoing discussions it is thus open to the readers to argue their cases before the competent authority that GST is not leviable on incentives/ discounts/ liquidated damages as neither they can be termed as ‘goods’nor ‘services’ under the relevant provisions of GST Law. For the present it is a debatable question.

Hence, Indirect Tax (GST) Representation Committee of AIFTP is requested to bring the above matter to the knowledge of the FINMIN/CBIC/GST Council,as the case may be, for an amendment in the statute on the above aspects in order to avoid unnecessary disputes in future by misinterpreting the provisions of Law.

(This Article was published in Souvenir of National Tax Conference held on 26th & 27th February 2022 at Kolkata)

CA Kinjal Bhuta

The Finance Minister proposed 39 amendments in the Finance Bill 2022 vide a notice of amendments dated 23.03.2022. The Finance Bill, 2022 was passed in Loksabha on 25th March, 2022. Later, the Finance Bill, 2022 enacted on 30th March 2022 and therefore all the changes are part of Finance Act 2022 now. This article attempts to covers the major amendments to the Finance Bill 2022. Some of the amendments are not taken in depth as there are exhaustive articles on the topic scheduled for the same.

    1. Inclusions/exclusions to provisions of Updated Return
      1. Section 139(8A) was introduced to file updated returns. Second provision to section 139(8A) provides restrictions to filing of updated returns. It mentions that any case where search is initiated u/s. 132A or survey is conducted u/s. 133A, or when accounts or assets are requisitioned, updated return shall not be allowed to be filed for the relevant assessment year and preceeding two assessment years. Now the amendment to Finance bill, 2022 provides replaces ‘previous two assessment years’ with ‘any assessment year’. This would mean that for the above stated restricted circumstances, filing of updated return will not be allowed at all.
      2. Fourth provision is introduced to section 139(8A) which provides that a loss return can be updated if it is a return of income which means that the updated return should not be a loss return. In other words, an updated return cannot be used to show more losses in an already filed loss return, however if there is any additional income which has remained to be reported, that can be very well filed in the updated return.
      3. Fifth proviso is added section 139(8A) to provide that if as a result of filing an updated return for one of the years, if the loss claimed under chapter VI, or unabsorbed deprecation u/s.32, or tax credit carried forward u/s. 115JAA and 115JD is reduced for any subsequent years, then updated return shall have to be filed for each of such subsequent years. The idea behind this provision would be just to cover and correct the consequent losses which are connected and get affected by the losses of its previous years.
    2. Penalty and recomputation of income on claim of surcharge and education cessSection 40(a)(ii) states that any sum paid on account of any ‘rate’ or ‘tax’ levied on the profits or gains of any business or profession shall not be eligible as a deduction. Courts have upheld this view in a few judgments that provision of Section 40(a)(ii) does not expressly use the term ‘cess’ or ‘surcharge’ and accordingly, taxpayers could claim deduction on account of ‘cess’ or ‘surcharge’ under section 40.The Finance Bill 2022 proposed to insert an Explanation 3 with retrospective effect from assessment year 2005-06 that for Section 40(a)(ii), the term ‘tax’ shall include and be deemed to have always included ‘surcharge’ or ‘cess’. Accordingly, even for the past period, the deduction for ‘cess’ or ‘surcharge’ shall not be available.

      Now, the amendments to Finance Bill, 2022 has inserted a new sub-section (18) to section 155 to provide that the claim of ‘surcharge’ or ‘cess’ in any previous year shall be deemed as under-reporting of income. If an assessee has claimed the deduction on account of ‘surcharge’ or ‘cess in any previous year and such deduction is not allowable under section 40, it shall be deemed that assessee has under-reported income for such previous years for the purpose of Section 270A(3). Also, the exceptions in sub section (6) of section 270A shall not apply to such cases. The Assessing Officer has been empowered to re-compute the total income of the assessee for such a previous year in which he claimed deduction of surcharge or cess. The income so computed shall be treated as under-reported income, and the assessee shall be liable to pay tax on it along with a penalty of 50% of the amount of tax payable on under-reported income.

      However, proviso to Section 155(18) provides relief from considering the addition so made as under-reported income, if the following conditions are satisfied:

      1. The assessee makes an application in the prescribed form and prescribed time to the Assessing Officer;
      2. The application is filed to request the AO for recomputation of the total income of the previous yearwithout allowing the deduction of surcharge or cess; and
      3. The assessee pays the amount due within the specified time.

Section 154 authorises the Income-tax authorities to rectify any mistake in the order. Sub-section (18) of Section 155 provides that the period of 4 years specified under Section 154(7) to be reckoned from the end of the previous year commencing on the 01-04-2021.

    1. Loss from Virtual Digital assets (VDAs)A new section 115BBH was introduced in the budget which sought to tax any income arising on transfer of VDAs. However, there were lot of concerns and open ended issues in the newly introduced provisions. There are various amendments therefore made to the Finance Bill, 2022 to reduce such uncertainties and provide clarifications at appropriate places.
      1. No set off of losses from transfer of one VDAs from gain of another VDAs Finance Bill, 2022: The sub section (2) of section 115BBH deters setting off loss under any other head of income from the VDAs income and also prohibits the loss on account of transfer of VDAs to be adjusted against income from any other head of income. To be specific, sub clause (b) of section 115BBH (2) provided that ‘no set off of losses from transfer of the VDAs shall be against income computed under any other provisions of this Act’. The sub-section also provides that loss from transfer of VDAs shall not be allowed to be carried forward to succeeding assessment years.Finance Act, 2022: The word ‘other’ in the clause (b) created a perception that loss from transfer of VDAs can be set off against gains from transfer of VDAs. The amendment made in the Finance Bill, 2022 removes the word ‘other’ and now clarifies that even the loss from transfer of one class of VDAs shall not be allowed to be adjusted against income from transfer of another or same class of VDAs. This amendment clarifies that no loss whatsoever shall be allowed to be adjusted and therefore the taxpayer will not be able to take benefit of set off of losses from VDAs internally with same stream income too. This amendment mirrors the intention of the government as had also been mentioned by them several times in the past that they would not like to encourage any transactions from VDAs and therefore the same shall be taxed exhaustively, without conferring any benefits, exemptions, deductions etc.
      2. Transfer definition u/s. 2(47) to apply to VDAs held in any formFinance Bill, 2022: Section 115BBH provides that income from transfer of VDAs shall be taxed under that section. Therefore, the definition of the word ‘transfer’ becomes imperative to tax the VDAs income. The definition of transfer becomes applicable only account of transfer of any capital asset. So, the issue was that whether if the VDAs are not retained by the taxpayer as a capital asset then in that case whether the income from transfer of such VDAs shall be taxed under the computation method provided u/s. 115BBH.Finance Act, 2022: Sub section (3) is now introduced to section 115BBH which provides that the definition of transfer shall apply to any VDAs, whether held as capital asset or not. As a consequence of this amendment, it has been clarified that any income on transfer of VDAs shall be taxed under section 115BBH only even if the character of income falls under other heads of income like Income from Business or Profession or Income from other sources.
      3. Over-riding provisions enabled for sub- section (1) of section 115BBHFinance Bill, 2022: Section 115BBH when introduced was brought about with two sub-sections. Sub section (1) provided the rate of tax of 30% of income on account of transfer from VDAs whereas sub-section (2) provided the computation mechanism. Sub section (2) started with a non-obstante clause. However similar ‘notwithstanding provisions’ were not made in sub-section (1). Absence of non-obstante clause in sub- section (1), instilled a doubt that, absence of such provisions would mean that lower tax may be applied in certain cases, if the Income Tax Act provides for lower tax rate in some other sections.Finance Act, 2022: To reduce the air of confusion, over-riding provisions are also introduced under sub section (1). Therefore, this would mean that notwithstanding any provisions of the Act, the tax rate of 30% shall apply to any income arising on account of transfer of VDAs.
      4. Income from transfer of VDAs shall be taxed even in case there is not cost of acquisitionFinance Bill, 2022: The computation mechanism under section 115BBH (2) provides that no deduction or expenditure shall be allowed to be reduced from income on transfer of VDAs except the cost of acquisition. It has been held by various courts especially in case of B C Srinivasa Shetty (5 Taxman 1) by Apex Court that if there is no cost of acquisition, the computation mechanism of capital gains fails. There was an apprehension that in cases where VDAs are not acquired by way of cost, whether computation mechanism under section 115BBH will fail.Finance Act, 2022: It is therefore now clarified by adding the words ‘if any’ after cost of acquisition of provisions are produced in the section. This implies that whether there is any cost or not, the income from transfer of VDAs shall be computed as per the section.
      5. TDS to be deducted even when consideration of VDAs is received in kindSection 194S was introduced in the Finance Bill, 2022 which provided that any person who is responsible to pay to a resident, any sum by way of consideration. The provisions as regard to his provided that payer shall ensure that tax is paid on this transfer. The amendment clarifies that tax is required to be deducted by the payer also, and only ensuring that tax is paid is not enough. Therefore, this amendment basically makes it abundantly clear that payer has to deduct tax as per section 194S whether the payment is by way of a sum or in kind.
      6. TDS can be deducted under other sections too apart from 194SSub section (4) of section 194S provides that when tax is deducted u/s. 194S for a particular transaction, then no tax shall be deducted or collected under any other section. This sub-section is now omitted and therefore, that would mean that deduction or collection of tax at source can be done under other sections too, even if the transaction is subject to TDS u/s. 194S.
    2. Clarification of TDS on Long term capital gains to non-residentsIn respect to TDS from the income of a non-resident person, Part II of Finance Act provides for 10% TDS from income by way of long-term capital gains referred to in section 112A. Capital gains upto Rs.1 lakh is exempted from tax as per section 112A. However, as per the literal reading of the TDS provisions, the tax was required to be deducted on the total long- term capital gains and not in excess of Rs. 1 lakh. It is now clarified that deduction of tax from the long-term capital gains shall be only in excess of Rs. 1 lakh.
    3. Cancellation provision introduced to provisionally approved institutionsThe Finance bill, 2022 had introduced fifteenth provision to section 10(23C) which empowers the PCIT or CIT for cancellation of approval of fund or institutions u/s. 10(23C) in case of certain prescribed circumstances. Now these provisions are extended to even the provisional registration granted
    4. Restriction on using exemptions u/s. 10(23C) and 10(46)The amendments to Finance bill, 2022 has provided that any institution cannot take the simultaneous benefit of exemption u/s. 10(46) and section 10(23C). So once an institution is notified u/s. 10(46), the approval granted u/s.10(23C) shall become inoperative.
    5. Books of account in digital form Books of account is defined u/s. 2(12A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The existing definition includes day books, ledgers, cash books etc. whether kept in written form or as print stored. Now it is provided that the definition shall also include books of account kept in electronic and digital forms. Therefore, books of account maintained on cloud, or on softwares shall now be considered as books of account. One has to be therefore more vigilant in the electronic accounts now maintained.
    6. Relaxation to resident unit holders for claim of exemption u/s.10(4D):Section 10(4D) provides exemption of income for certain incomes of specified funds. One such condition for category III AIF Fund located in IFSC was that all of its units are managed by non-residents. The provisions are now relaxed with the amendment, to provide that even if the non-resident unit holder becomes resident the exemption shall continue provided that unit holder does not hold more than 5% of the total units of that fund.
    7. The provider of perquisite or benefit has to deduct TDS u/s. 194RSection 194R was introduced by the Finance Bill 2022, which stated that provider of any benefit or perquisite to a resident, whether convertible into money or not, arising from business or the exercise of a profession, shall, before providing such benefit or perquisite to such resident, ensure that tax has been deducted in respect of such benefit or perquisite at the rate of ten per cent of the value or aggregate of value of such benefit or perquisite. To remove confusion on how section 194R is to be complied with, the following changes has been made:
      1. the words “ensure that tax has been deducted” in section 194R, are replaced with words “ensure that tax required to be deducted has been deducted”;
      2. the provision of section 194R, as originally proposed, is renumbered as sub-section (1);
      3. sub-section (2) is inserted to empower the CBDT to issue guidelines for removal of difficulties if any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of the section;
      4. Sub-section (3) is inserted to provide that guidelines issued by the CBDT under section 119 for removal of difficulties shall be binding on the assessee and the assessing authority.

CBDT guidelines will presumably provide guidance on how to ensure that tax has been deducted if the benefits or perquisites are in kind and what shall be the value of such benefit or perquisite. As has been the practice over the last few years, most likely the CBDT will issue these guidelines through a Circular.

  1. Avoidance of repetitive appealsThe Finance Bill 2022 introduced a new section 158AB for the new provision relating to avoidance of repetitive appeals. Section 158AB allows avoidance of repetitive appeal before Income-tax Appellate Tribunal or to the Jurisdictional High Court. Such a decision to avoid the repetitive appeal is taken by the collegium. On receipt of communication from the collegium, the PCIT/CIT may direct the AO to make an application to the ITAT or the High Court in a prescribed form within 60 days from the date of receipt of the order of CIT(A) or within 120 days from the date of receipt of the order of Tribunal.Following changes in Section 158AB are now made:
    1. It expressly provides that the provisions of section 158AB shall override the respective provisions providing time limits and procedural directions for filing an appeal to ITAT or the High Court;
    2. The time limit within which the application is to be filed with the ITAT has been increased to 120 days from 60 days;
    3. It is also expressly provided that all the provisions of Appeal to ITAT and Appeal to High Court of Chapter XX shall apply, as the case may be, when an appeal is being filed under section 158AB (4).
  2. Time limit for completion of assessment in search and requisition casesThe Finance Act, 2021 had introduced a sunset clause and accordingly, the provisions of section 153A were made inapplicable from 01-04-2021. Section 153B provides a time limit for completion of assessment and reassessment in search or requisition cases. The time limit provided under sub-section (1) is 21 months from the end of the financial year in which the last authorisation of search or requisition was executed. The provisos to sub-section (1) provide for reduced time limits for different assessment years.Sixth proviso to sub-section (1) of section 153B is added which provides that the completion date of such assessments. The limitation period for completion of assessment in search/requisitioned cases is given in the below table:
Date of search Limitation period
Before 01.04.2019 till

31.03.2020

Within 12 months from the end of the financial year in which last of the authorisations for search/requisition was executed
Between 01.04.2020 to

31.03.2021

On or before 30-09-2022
On or after 01.04.2021 Within 12 months from the end of financial year in which notice was sent (as per section 153 for assessments to be now done under section 147)
  1. Extension of timelimit of assessments for AY 2020-21 Section 153 provides time limits to completion of assessments, re- assessments and re-computations under various provisions. The amendment seeks to increase time limit to complete assessments for AY: 2020-21 u/s. 143(3) or 144 of the Act from existing 12 months to 18 months. The amendment is made only for assessments of AY: 2020-21.
  2. Application of income for the benefit of interested personsHitherto, section 10(23C) did not have any provision similar to section 13(1)(c) regarding benefits to interested parties. The Finance Bill 2022 inserted twenty-first proviso imposing restriction to apply the income of a 10(23C)(iv)/(v)/(vi)/(via) institution for the benefit of an interested person referred to in section 13(3). Such income shall be deemed to be the income of the said institution which has provided the benefit. However, the Finance Bill inadvertently mentioned that such benefit should become income of that person to whom the benefit is provided. Now the same is corrected by providing that such income shall be deemed to be the income such fund or institution of the previous year in which it is so applied.
  3. Overriding effect to provisions of Section 115BBIThe Finance Bill 2022 introduced section 115BBI which provides that the income which does not enjoy exemption under section 11 is taxable at the rate of 30%. On the other hand, proviso to section 164(2)  providing for taxation of a charitable trust at maximum marginal rate (MMR) is not deleted. Hence, literally, both the provisions apply to a trust. Thus, it was not clear whether section 115BBI or section 164(2) should apply to a trust for taxation of certain incomes.It is now amended to provide that notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the Act, the specified incomes shall be taxable under section 115BBI. Thus, the provisions of section 115BBI would have an overriding effect over anything contrary contained in the Act.
  4. No exemption if a person as referred to in section 13(3) receives gifts from trustSection 56(2)(x) deals with deeming provisions when a person receives gifts or acquires an immovable property or specified moveable assets without consideration or for inadequate consideration. Clauses (VI) and (VII) of proviso to Section 56(2)(x) provides exemption from applicability if any sum of money or any property is received:
    1. From any fund or trust or institution or any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution referred to in Section 10(23C); or
    2. From or by any trust or institution registered under section 12A/12AA/12AB.

    sThe amendment has now inserted a second proviso to section 56(2)(x) to provide that, the clauses (VI) and (VII) of the first proviso shall not apply if any sum of money or property has been received by any person referred to in section 13(3). Section 13 of the Act denies the benefit of exemption to a charitable or religious trust or institution if any part of its income or property is used or applied for the benefit of interested persons.

  5. Validation of proceedings completed on predecessor entitySection 170 of the Income Tax Act relates to succession to business otherwise than on death. Finance Bill, 2022 had proposed that any proceedings initiated on the predecessor during a business reorganization would be deemed to have been initiated on the successor. “Business reorganization” was to be defined to mean the reorganization of business involving the amalgamation, demerger, or merger of business of one or more persons. Under the Finance Bill amendments, business reorganization is replaced with “succession” and the definition of business reorganization deleted from section 170. The amendments also provide that in the case of succession, any proceedings initiated against the predecessor during the succession are deemed to have been initiated against the successor.The term ‘succession’ is wider than the term ‘business reorganisation’. ‘Succession’ means an end of an entity carrying on the business, and its place has been taken by an entirely new entity to run, in continuity and as a going concern, the same business. Succession involves a change of ownership – the transferor goes out, and the transferee comes in. It connotes that the whole business is transferred and also implies that substantially the identity and the continuity of the business are preserved [CIT v. K. H. Chambers, (1965) 55 ITR 674 (SC)]. In a recent case, the Mumbai ITAT held that transfer of an undertaking by way of a slump sale will be considered as succession [ITO v. Archroma India (P.) Ltd. [2021] 124 taxmann. com 432]. Thus, the assessment or other proceedings initiated or completed on the predecessor in the event of succession shall be deemed to have been made on the successor.

Dharan Gandhi, Advocate

In life, it is evidenced that an action is initiated with a particular purpose, but with the passage of time, either the purpose changes or is lost. This is so often witnessed under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’). A particular section is inserted with a particular object, but then the section gets amended over a period of time and the purpose seems to fade away.

Also, sometimes, it is seen that a particular section is introduced with a very limited scope, which may be constitutionally valid. But then, slowly and steadily, the scope of the section is expanded such that the section becomes very lethal and, in fact, unconstitutional. In hindsight, when one sees the pattern of amendments, it appears, that a long- term strategy was chalked out by the Government to slowly and steadily introduce some sweeping provisions, so that the same goes unnoticed or the same does not garner much attention. u/s

One of such instances is very recently witnessed and is subject matter of the present article.

New reassessment scheme

In the Finance Bill, 2021, the Hon’ble Finance Minister proposed sweeping changes in so far as the reassessment provisions are concerned. She proposed to introduce a completely new scheme with new jurisdictional requirements, new procedures and new time limits. In the Explanatory Memorandum to Finance Bill, 2021, it is stated that now the Department is driven by information received from third parties and that there is a need to completely reform the system of assessment or reassessment which will result in less litigation and would provide ease of doing business to taxpayers.

The Hon’ble Finance Minister in her Budget Speech, had stated that “I therefore propose to reduce this time-limit for re-opening of assessment to 3 years from the present 6 years. In serious tax evasion cases too, only where there is evidence of concealment of income of Rs. 50 lakh or more in a year, can the assessment be re-opened up to 10 years. Even this reopening can be done only after the approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner, the highest level of the Income Tax Department.”

Thus, vide Finance Act, 2021, the entire scheme of reassessment under the Act was replaced by a completely new scheme. In fact, even the provisions relating to search assessments u/s 153A and 153C of the Act are discontinued and all the assessments pursuant to search and survey are to be completed u/s 147 of the Act. There are several new jurisdictional requirements prescribed in section 147, 148, 148A, 149 and 151 of the Act as amended by Finance Act, 2021. The onus will be on the Assessing Officer (‘AO’) to demonstrate that all the jurisdictional requirements are satisfied to issue notice u/s 148 of the Act. Some of the important conditions which need to be fulfilled are as under:

  • AO must have information in his possession which suggests that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in the case of the assessee for the relevant assessment year – first proviso to section 148
  • Such information must be either an information in accordance with the risk management strategy formulated by the Board or based on audit objection or based on information which is received by the AO from some sources– Explanation 1 to section 148.
  • Before issuing a notice u/s 148 of the Act, procedures u/s 148A have to be complied with which includes providing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee, by serving upon him a notice to show cause as to why a notice u/s 148 should not be issued on the basis of information which suggests that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and after hearing the assessee, the AO has to pass a speaking order to decide whether or not it is a fit case to issue a notice u/s 148. All such steps are to be taken with the prior approval of the specified authority.
  • Any reassessment after 1.4.2021 has to be with the approval of the specified authority as per section 151 of the Act. Further, different authorities are prescribed for approval if the assessment is sought to be reopened within 3 years and a case where it is sought to be reopened beyond 3 years.
  • An assessment can be reopened only upto 3 years from the end of the relevant assessment year. If an Officer wants to reopen beyond 3 years and upto 10 years, then, certain additional conditions are required to be fulfilled by the AO which is discussed later on.

Whether applicable with effect from 1.4.2021?

The biggest tax controversy of the year 2021 was whether such amendments brought in by Finance Act, 2021, to replace the old reassessment provisions with the new provisions are applicable from 1.4.2021 or 1.7.2021. This is on account of notifications issued under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (hereinafter referred to as ‘TOLA’).

Section 3(1) of the TOLA, empowered the Central Government to extend the time-limit

and date of compliance of any action specified therein including issuing notice and according sanction under the Act. Utilising such power, the Government, inter alia, issued a Notification No. 20/2021 on 31.03.2021 which is the last day to issue notice u/s 148 of the Act under the old scheme. In the said notification, the due date to issue notices u/s 148 of the Act and to obtain sanction u/s 151 of the Act, which due dates were to expire on 31.03.2021 were extended by one month i.e., upto 30.04.2021. Another Notification bearing number 38/2020 dated 27.04.2021 was issued to further extend such dates to 30.06.2021. In both the notifications, the Government added an Explanation to the effect that for the purposes of such extension, one has to consider the provisions of section 148, 149 and 151 as it stood prior to its amendment by Finance Act, 2021; meaning thereby, such Notifications not only extended the time limit to issue notice u/s 148 of the Act but it also sought to revive the old provisions which were already repealed and substituted by the Finance Act, 2021.

Under the shelter of the above-mentioned notifications, Tax Department issued notices u/s 148 of the Act under the old law from 01.04.2021 till 30.06.2021. Such notices were challenged by way of thousands of writ petitions filed across various High Courts in India.

Barring one judgment, viz., single judge order of the Hon’ble Chhattisgarh High Court in case of Palak Khatuja vs. Union of India and Ors., W.P.(T) No. 149 of 2021, all other judgments by six different High Courts have held such notices to be bad in law and have held that the new reassessment provisions inserted by the Finance Act, 2021, are applicable from 01.04.2021. These judgments are as under:

  • [2021] 439 ITR 1 (All.) Ashok Kumar Agarwal v. UOI;
  • [2022] 441 ITR 207 (Del.) Mon Mohan Kohli v. ACIT;
  • [2022] 440 ITR 300 (Raj.) Bpip Infra (P.) Ltd. v. ITO;
  • [2022] 325 CTR 148 (Madras) Vellore Institute of Technology v. CBDT;
  • [2022] 441 ITR 359 (Cal.) Bagaria Properties and Investment (P.) Ltd. v. UOI
  • [2022] 135 taxmann.com 5 (Rajasthan) Sudesh Taneja v. ITO
  • [2022] 137 taxmann.com 2 (Bombay) Tata Communications Transformation Services Ltd. v. ACIT

All the above judgments have held that, vide Finance Act, 2021, the old reassessment provisions have been repealed without any savings clause. By virtue of the notifications issued under TOLA, only the date to issue notice has been extended however, the notice has to be issued under the new law. Further, the explanation in the notification has been struck down as unconstitutional.

Amendments in section 149 of the Act by Finance Act, 2022

  • Reassessment beyond 3 years – income represented in the form of asset

I have already brought out earlier, the extract of the speech of the Hon’ble Finance Minister while delivering Budget for the year 2021-22. It was stated that the time limit to reopen the assessment was reduced to 3 years from the existing 6 years. Only in case in serious tax evasion cases too, only where there is evidence of concealment of income of Rs. 50 lakh or more in a year, can the assessment be re-opened up to 10 years. Even this reopening can be done only after the approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner, the highest level of the Income Tax Department.

Such provisions are contained in section 149 of the Act. Section 149 deals with the time limits for issue of notices. Before amendment, it stated that, no notice u/s 148 shall be issued for the relevant assessment year,—

  • if three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless the case falls under clause (b);
  • if three years, but not more than ten years, have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the AO has in his possession books of accounts or other documents or evidence which reveal that the income chargeable to tax, represented in the form of asset, which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount to rupees fifty lakh or more for that year.

The old time limits have changed from 4 to 6 and 16 years to 3 to 10 years. The outer limit for reopening the assessment is 3 years now. However, if the following conditions are fulfilled, then the assessment could have been reopened upto 10 years from the end of the relevant assessment year:

  • AO has in his possession books of accounts
  • or other documents or evidence
  • Such documents etc. reveal that the income

    chargeable to tax has escaped assessment

  • Such income is represented in the form of asset
  • Income escaping assessment is Rs. 50 lakhs or more.

Thus, if all the above conditions are fulfilled, only then the assessment could have been reopened beyond 3 years and upto 10 years.

Such kind of provision also finds mention in fourth proviso to section 153A of the Act, which was inserted vide Finance Act, 2017. There again it was restricted to an income escaping assessment represented in the form of asset. Explanatory Memorandum to Finance Act, 2017, explained that, in order to protect the interest of the revenue in cases where tangible evidence(s) are found during a search or seizure operation (including 132A cases) and the same is represented in the form of undisclosed investment in any asset. Thus, the logic was to tax any undisclosed asset found during the course of search. Since, the search and reassessment provisions were merged, therefore, the same wordings were continued in the new section 149 of the Act.

Now, the Finance Act, 2022, has amended the said clause (b) of section 149(1). Instead of the condition that income should be represented in the form of asset, now the clause has been expanded to even include income in the form of

  • asset,
  • expenditure in respect of a transaction or in

    relation to an event or occasion; or

  • an entry or entries in the books of account.

The explanatory memorandum to Finance Bill 2022, gives a very simple explanation in this regard i.e., “To bring clarification and align them with the intent”.

The implications of the above amendment are grave. The promise was to reopen an assessment beyond 3 years only if serious tax evasion cases were identified where the income escaping assessment was more than Rs. 50 lakh. Such serious tax evasion cases were cases, where the assessee is apparently found to be the owner of some undisclosed assets. However, this has now been expended to included income in the nature of expenditure in resect of a transaction or in relation to an event or occasion and most importantly any entry in the books of account. Each and every transaction is recorded in the books of account. Thus, almost everything gets covered by the impugned amendment. Clearly, the Legislature has gone back on the promise made. Now the Department can reopen any assessment beyond three years without there being any concealed or undisclosed asset by taking shelter under the last limb viz., any entry in the books of accounts.

Such an interpretation, in my humble opinion, cannot be accepted. Therefore, it would be pertinent to give contextual meaning to such words “any entry in books of accounts”. Since, the intent it to reopen only serious tax evasion cases, therefore, such entry in books of account should cover only cases where there is an allegation of accommodation entry or a bogus entry, which does not lead to any unearthing of any undisclosed asset. Similarly, the second limb which deals with expenditure in respect of transaction or an event, should be an undisclosed expenditure.

Thus, it can be seen that the slowly and steadily, amendments are made so as to go back on the promise made, and expand the scope of section to reopen.

In any case, the requirement of section 149(1) (b) of the Act, is that the AO needs to have in his possession, books of accounts or other documents or evidence. For the first time the word “evidence” has been used. Such words are used in contradistinction to the word “information” used in section 148 of the Act. Thus, to satisfy the conditions of section 149(1)(b) of the Act, the AO needs to have something more than mere information. The terms “books of accounts”, “documents” and “evidences” connotes different meaning, but the common thread running through all such terms is that it has be something more than information.

Apart therefrom, such documents, books etc. should “reveal” that income has escaped assessment; meaning thereby, from such documents, books etc., the AO should come to a certain conclusion that there is an income which has escaped assessment. Mere presumption, conjecture or a reason to believe that income has escaped assessment would not suffice.

Reassessment for AY 2021-22 and prior years

First proviso to section 149 is a clause which, in a sense, restricts the retrospective application of the new reassessment provisions. Proviso to section 149(1)(b) deals with reassessment of AY 2020-21 and earlier years. The new reassessment scheme is applicable w.e.f. 1.4.2021, therefore, it shall apply to all the reassessments taking place after 1.4.2021. In case of assessment years, prior to AY 2020-21, technically speaking, the same can be reopened for 10 years, though such years would be outside the scope of reassessment under the old regime. Therefore, the proviso to protect the assessee. It states that if assessment years, prior to AY 2020-21, could not have been reopened as on 1.4.2021 as being beyond 6 years under the erstwhile section 149(1)(b), then the same cannot be reopened under the proposed section 149(1)(b). Thus, AY 2014-15 would become time barred as on 31.03.2021 under the erstwhile section 149(1)(b). All years prior to and including AY 2014-15 cannot be reopened under the new provisions, though it will fall within the extended time limit of 10 years. Similarly, AY 2015-16 has become time barred on 31.03.2022, AY 2016-17 will become time barred on 31.03.2023 and so on and so forth.

Now, an amendment has been made in the said section. The amendment is concerning the search related assessments. The amendment now provides that no notice u/s 148 shall be issued at any time in a case for the relevant assessment year beginning on or before 1st day of April, 2021, if such notice could not have been issued at that time on account of being beyond the time limit specified u/s 153A(1)(b) or section 153C of the Act, as the case may be, as they stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021.

If a search has been initiated u/s 132 of the Act on or after 01.04.2021, then assessments related to such search have to be made u/s 147 of the Act. Such assessments can be made for 10 years prior to the year of search u/s 149(1)(b) of the Act. However, under the old section 153A and 153C of the Act, an AO can go beyond six years only on fulfilling certain conditions as specified in fourth proviso to section 153A of the Act. Such proviso provides that in cases where an AO has in his possession books of account or other documents or evidence which reveal that the income, represented in the form of asset, which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount to fifty lakh rupees or more in the relevant assessment year or in aggregate in the relevant assessment years, then he can reopen beyond 6 years. Thus, though under the amended provisions of section 149(1)(b) of the Act, an assessment can be reopened beyond 6 years even if the income is represented in the form expenditure or book entry, however, if such reopening is on account of search u/s 132 of the Act, and if it pertains to AY 2021-22 or prior years

and such reassessment is after 6 years from the end of the relevant assessment year, then to reopen such assessment, income escaping assessment has to be represented in the form of asset only.

Income escaping assessment spread over a period of more than 1 year

If an assessment is to be reopened beyond 3 years from the end of the assessment year, the threshold prescribed is Rs. 50 lakhs. Further, first two limbs of section 149(1)(b) talk about asset or expenditure in relation to an event etc. There might be some cases, where the income escaping assessment in the form of investment in asset or expenditure is less than Rs. 50 lakhs in a particular year but more than Rs. 50 lakhs if 2 or more years combined. As a result, a new subsection (1A) has been inserted. It states that notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), where the income chargeable to tax represented in the form of an asset or expenditurein relation to an event or occasion of the value referred to in section 149(1)(b), has escaped the assessment and the investment in such asset or expenditure in relation to such event or occasion has been made or incurred, in more than one previous years relevant to the assessment years within the period referred to in section 149(1)(b), a notice u/s 148 shall be issued for every such assessment year for assessment, reassessment or recomputation, as the case may be. Again, here the Legislature has backtracked from its promise. The statement of the Hon’ble Finance Minister was that an assessment can be reopened beyond 3 years, only if the income escaping assessment is more than Rs. 50 lakh. However, now they have amended the section wherein, an assessment can be reopened even if income escaping assessment is less than Rs. 50 lakh. It is pertinent to note that, section 149(1A) does not apply to income escaping assessment being in the nature of book entry.

The above demonstrates how, the Legislature slowly expands the scope of provisions thereby violating the promise or statement made. In such situations, the principles of “promissory estoppel” should apply with full force.

Provisions relating to taxation of charitable trusts or exemption provided to charitable trusts have been fine tuned in recent times for plugging many unaddressed issues.

Brief BackgroundThe term “charitable purpose” is defined in Section 2(15) in an inclusive manner. The objectives for which a charitable trust or institution is created deserves tax relief and there is no dispute about it. However, it is the last limb of the definition that is “advancement of any other object of general public utility is yet to be free from litigations.

The exemption to trusts or institution is available under the following two regimes:

Regime One: Any fund, institution, trust, any university, other educational institution, any hospital or other medical institution approval under sub-clauses (iv), (v), (vi) and (via) of Section 10(23C), and

Regime two: The trusts registered under Section 12AA/12AB

Section 11 provides for an exemption to trusts or institutions registered under Section 12AA/12AB. Similarly, Section 10(23C) provides an exemption to certain funds or institutions is approved under this provision.

An organization cannot simultaneously have approval / registration under both the sections and has to opt only for anyone form of approval / registration under Section 12AB.

Amendment to Section 12A(1)(b) and tenth proviso to Section 10(23C)Following tenth proviso shall be substituted for existing tenth proviso to clause (23C) of Section 10 by Finance Act, 2022 with effect from 1.4.2023.

Tenth proviso to Section 10(23C) provides that where the total income of the fund or institution or trust or any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution under both the regimes, without giving effect to Section 10(23C) or Section 11 and 12 exceeded maximum amount which is not chargeable to tax, such trust or institution or institution shall:

  • keep and maintain books of account and other documents in such form and manner and at such place, as may be prescribed, and
  • get its accounts audited in respect of that year before the specified date and furnish by that date, the report of such audit in the prescribed form duly signed and verified by such accountant and setting forth such particulars as may be prescribed.

It is to be noted that this condition to maintain books of account is in addition to the conditions requiring the trust or institutions to get registration, audit of books of account and filing of the return of income. Thus, if the trust fails to comply with any of these conditions, the benefit of exemption under Section 10(23C) or Section 11 shall not be available.

Section 10(23C) is independent of Section 11 to 13. The objective is to amend Section 10(23C) to limit its scope and merge rest of the provisions contained therein with Section 11 to 13. 

Section 10(23C)(iiiad), University or other educational institutionIt applies to any university or other educational institution with effect from assessment year 2022-23. Any University or other educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for the purposes of profit and which is solely for educational purposes and not for the purposes of profit if the aggregate annual receipts from such University or Universities or educational institution or institutions do not exceed five crore rupees; or

Section 10(23C)(iiiae): Hospital or other institution providing medical relief for philanthropic purposes and not purposes of profitThis section applies to any hospital or other institution for the reception and treatment of persons suffering from illness or mental defectiveness or for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation, existing solely for philanthropic purposes and not for the purposes of profit, if the aggregate annual receipts of the person from such hospital or hospitals or institution or institutions do not exceed five crores. 

Explanation

For the purposes of sub-clauses (iiiad) and (iiiae), it is clarified that if the person has receipts from University or Universities or educational or educational institution or institutions as referred to in sub-clause (iiiad), as well as from hospital or hospitals or institution or institutions as referred to in sub-clause (iiae), the exemptions under these clauses shall not apply, if the aggregate of annual receipts of the person from such University or universities or educational institution or institutions or hospital or hospitals or institution or institutions exceed five crore rupees.

Wholly or substantially financed by the  GovernmentThe term “wholly or substantially financed by the Government” would mean that the Government grant to such University or such other educational institution, hospital or other institution mentioned above exceeds 50% of the total receipts including any voluntary contributions received by it during the relevant previous year (Rule 2BBB).

These amendments have been brought to nullify the interpretation given in Children’s Education Society’s case [2013] 358 ITR 373 (Kar.) wherein it was held that each educational institution is a separate entity controlled under various statutes for various purposes. Similar view was found held in Vivekanand Society of Education and Research vs. CIT [IT Appeal No. 23 of 2014 dated 29th December, 2007 of Jammu and Kashmir]. The monetary limit and tax exemption of the income thus was applied with reference to each education institution. This amendment has been brought to nullify the interpretations given in the aforesaid cases.

The term hospital or other institution has not been defined hence the question would arise whether pharmacy and / or chemist shop would be considered as a part of the “hospital or other institution”. Similarly, educational institution has not been defined hence the question would arise when books and uniforms are sold by a store run by educational institution would be considered as “educational institution”.

Section 10(23C): Income of certain funds, trust or institutions (Clause 4): Existing Provision: Section 10(23C) exempts the income of certain funds, trust or institutions which fulfill various criteria. Once, such criteria is trusts or institutions which are approved by the prescribed authority. The said prescribed authorities will be Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. The amendment will be effective from 1st April, 2021.

Voluntary Contribution received by the temple, mosque, gurudwara etc. for repairsExplanation 1A: For the purposes of this  proviso, where the property held under trust or institution referred to in clause (v) includes any temple, mosque, gurudwara, church or other place notified in clause (b) of sub-section  (2) of Section 80G, any sum received by such trust or institution as a voluntary contribution for the purposes of renovation or repair of such temple, mosque, gurudwara, church or other place, may, at its option, be treated by such trust or institution as forming part of the corpus of the trust or institution as forming part of the corpus of that trust or institution, subject to the condition that the trust or institution.

  • Applies such corpus only for the purpose for which voluntary contribution was made;
  • Does not apply such corpus for making contribution or donation to any person;
  • Maintains such corpus separately identifiable; and
  • Invests or deposits such corpus in the form and modes specified under Section 11(5).

Explanation 1B:

For the purposes of Explanation 1A, where any trust or institution referred to in sub-clause (v) of Section 10(23C) has treated any of the conditions specified in clause (a) to (d) of the above Explanation is violated, such sum shall be deemed to be the income of such trust or institution of the previous year during which violation takes place.

Explanation 3 to Section 10(23C) amended with effect from 1.4.2023:

For the purposes of determining the amount of application under this proviso, where 85% of the income is not applied wholly and exclusively to the objects during the previous year but is accumulated or set apart, either in whole or in part, for application to such objects in subsequent years, such accumulated income shall not be included in the total income, if the following conditions are complied with:

  • Furnish a statement to the Assessing Officer stating the purpose for which the income is being accumulated or set apart, which shall in no case exceed five years; in computing due to an order or injunction of any Court, shall be excluded.
  • The money so accumulated or set apart is invested or deposited in the forms or modes specified is Section 11(5); and
  • The statement referred to in clause (a) is furnished on or before the due date specified under Section 139(1) for furnishing the return of income of the previous year.

Explanation 4:

Any income referred to in Explanation 3, which

  • is applied for purposes other than the objects for which the fund or institution or trust is established or ceases to be accumulated or set apart for application thereto, or
  • Ceases to remain invested or deposited in any of the forms or modes specified in sub-section (5) of Section 11; or
  • Is not utilized for the purpose for which it is so accumulated or set apart during the period referred to in clause (a) of Explanation 3, or,
  • Is credited or paid to any trust or institution or trust or university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution referred to in sub-clause (iv) or sub-clause (v) or sub-clause (vi) or sub-clause (via), shall be deemed to the income of the previous year;
    • In which it ceases to remain so invested or deposited under clause (a); or
    • In which it ceases to remain so invested or deposited under clause (b); or
    • Being the last previous year of the period, for which the income is accumulated or set apart under clause (a) of Explanation 3, but not utilized for the purpose for which it is so accumulated or set apart under clause (c); or
    • In which is it is credited or paid to any fund or institution or trust or any University or other educational institution or any hospital or any other medical institution under clause (d). 

Amount not deductible:

Section 40(a)(ia) and 40A(3) shall, mutatis mutandis, apply in computing the income chargeable under the head “profit and gains” of business or profession.

No deduction in respect of expenditure or allowances or set-off of any loss shall be allowed:

New 23rd proviso provides that for the purposes of computing income chargeable to tax under twenty second proviso, no deduction shall be allowed to the assessee under any other provisions of this Act.

This amendment will take effect from 1st April, 2023 and will accordingly, apply in relation to assessment year 2023-24 and subsequent assessment years.

In my view this proviso is harsh. Any loss of the trust or instituted be allowed to set off against the income of the subsequent year.

Section 11(1): Explanation 4 and Explanation 5inserted by Finance Act, 2021 with effect from 1.4.2022

Explanation 4: For the purposes of determining the amount of application under clause (a) or clause (b):

  • Application for charitable or religious purposes from the corpus as referred to in clause (d) of this section shall not be treated as application of income for charitable or religious purposes.

    Provided that the amount not so treated as application, or part thereof, shall be treated as application for charitable or religious purposes in the previous year in which the amount or part thereof, is invested or deposited back, into one more of the forms or modes specified in sub-section (5) of Section 11 maintained specifically for such corpus, from the income of that year and the to the extent of such investment or deposit; and

  • Application for charitable or religious purposes, from any loan or borrowing, shall not be treated as application of income for charitable or religious purposes.

    Provided that the amount not so treated as application or part thereof, shall be treated as application for charitable or

     religious purposes in the previous year in which the amount or part thereof, is invested or deposited back, into one or more of the forms or modes specified in sub-section (5) maintained specifically for such corpus, from the income of that year and to the extent of such investment of deposit; and

  • Application for charitable or religious purposes, from any loan or borrowing, shall not be treated as application of income for charitable purposes.

    Provided that the amount not so treated as application, or part thereof, shall be treated as application for charitable or religious purposes in the previous year in which the loan or borrowing or part thereof, is repaid from the income of that year and to the extent of such repayment.

    Repayment of debt incurred for the purpose of the trust or loan advanced by educational trust to students for higher studies amounted to application of income. The Circular issued by CBDT and various High Court’s decisions in this connections are nullified and application for charitable or religious purposes from any loan or borrowing shall not be treated as application of income for charitable or religious purposes.

Explanation 5:

It clarifies that the calculation of income required to be applied or accumulated during previous year shall be made without any set- off or deduction or allowance of any excess application of any of the year preceding the previous year.

 Section 11(1A)For the purposes of sub-section (1)

  • Where a capital asset, being property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes is transferred and the whole or any part of the net consideration is utilized for acquiring another capital asset to be so held, then the capital gain arising from the transfer shall be deemed to have been applied to charitable or religious purposes to the extent specified hereunder:
    • The whole of the net consideration is utilized in acquiring the new capital asset, the whole of such capital gain;
    • Where only a part of the net consideration is utilized for acquiring the new capital asset, so much of such capital gain as is equal to the amount, if any, by which the amount so utilized exceeds the cost of the assets transferred.

Explanation to this sub-section defines the meaning of “appropriate fraction”, cost of transferred asset” and the “net consideration”.

Section 11(1B)Where any income in respect of which an option is exercised under clause (2) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) is not applied to charitable or religious purposes in India during the period referred to in sub-clause (a) or, as the case may be, sub-clause (b) of the said clause, then, such income shall be deemed to be the income of the person in receipt thereof-

In the case referred in sub-clause (i) of the said clause of the previous year immediately following the previous year in which the income was received; or

  • In cases referred to in sub-section (ii) of the said clause of the previous year immediately following the previous in which the income was received.

Requirement for filing Income-tax ReturnClause (c) of Section 139(4C) mandates that a trust or institution which is otherwise eligible for blanket tax exemption under Section (23C) meaning thereby an educational institution or hospital not being run for the purposes of profit, have to file the return where the total income before giving effect to the provisions of Section to exceeds the basic exemption limit.

Failure to furnish the Return of Income Section 272A(2)provides that failure to furnish the income-tax return under Section 139(4C) is liable for penalty of Rs. 100/- for every day during which the failure continues.

Requirement to maintain Books of Account – From A.Y. 2023-24Under the Income-tax Act, tax payers are required to maintain books of account and get them audited. The requirement to maintain books of account are prescribed under Section 44AA. However, there is no specific provision under the Act providing for the books of account to be maintained by trusts or institutions.

The Finance Bill, 2022 proposes an amendment to Section 12A(1)(b) and tenth proviso to Section 10(23C) to provide that where the total income of the trust or institution under both the regimes, without giving effect to exemption under Section 10(23C) or Sections 11 and 12 exceeds the maximum amount which is not chargeable to tax, such trust or institution shall maintain books of account and other documents in such form and manner and at such place, as may be prescribed.

The condition to maintain books of account is in addition to the conditions requiring the trust or institutions to get registration, audit of the books of account and filing of return of income. Thus, if the trust fails to comply with any of

these conditions, the benefit of exemption under Section 10(23C) or sections 11 and 12 shall not be available. 

Cancellation of Registration or approvalIt is the general law that registration once granted shall remain in force till the Commissioner cancels it. Under the existing provisions of the Income-tax Act, the registration can be cancelled if the Commissioner is satisfied that the activities of the trust or that the trust or institution has violated requirements of any other law which was material to achieve its objects. However, the Commissioner shall given an opportunity of being heard before the cancellation of registration of the trust. The following amendments to Section 12AB and fifteen proviso to Section 10(23C) to empower the authorities to cancel the registration. The registration or approval can be cancelled by the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (Pr. CIT) or CIT can cancel the registration or approval can be cancelled.

  • Final registration or provisional registration granted under clause (a) or clause (b) of Section 12AB(1);
  • Final registration granted under clause (b) of Section 12AA(1);
  • Institute approval under clauses (iv), (v), (vi) and (via) of Section 10(23C).

Circumstances under which registration or approval can be cancelled.

  • PCIT or CIT has noticed one or more occurrence “specified violations” during any previous year;
  • PCIT or CIT has received a reference from the Assessing Officer under second proviso to Section 143(3) for any previous year.
  • Such a case has been selected in accordance with risk management strategy, formulated by the Board from time to time for any previous year.

Specified Violations: The following shall be considered as “specified violation”.

  • If any income, derived from property held under trust wholly or in part for charitable or religious purposes, has been applied other than for the objects of the trust or institution.
  • The trust or institution has income from profits and gains of business which is not incidental to the attainment of its objectives.
  • Separate books of account are not maintained by such trust or institution in respect of the business which is incidental to the attainment of its objectives.
  • The trust or institution has applied any part of its income from the property held under a trust for private religious purposes, which does not enure benefit of the public.
  • The trust or institution established for charitable purposes has applied any part of its income for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste.
  • Any activity being carried out by the trust or institution is not genuine or is not being carried out in accordance with the conditions subject to which it was registered.
  • The trust or institution has not complied with the requirement of any other law for the time being in force as is material to achieve its objects, and the order, direction or decree, by whatever name called, holding that such non-compliance has occurred, has either not been disputed or has attained finality.

PCIT/CIT to satisfy himself about the occurrence or otherwise of any specified violation:

  • The PCIT or CIT shall call for such documents or information from the Trust or institution or make such inquiry about the occurrence or otherwise of any specified violation. He shall pass an order in writing, cancelling the registration of such trust or institution after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard for the previous year and all subsequent previous years, if he is satisfied that one or more specified violations have taken place.

    If the PCIT/CIT is not satisfied about the occurrence or more specified violations. In such as case, he shall pass an order in writing, refusing to cancel the registration of such trust or institution.

    PCIT/CIT shall forward a copy of the cancellation order or order refusing to cancel the registration, as the case may be, to the Assessing Officer and such trust or institution.

Time limit to pass cancellation order The cancellation order or order refusing to cancel the registration, as the case may be, shall be passed before the expiry of six months to be calculated from the end of the quarter in which the first notice is issued by PCIT or CIT, on or after 1st April, 2022 calling for any document or information or for making any inquiry.

Year of Taxability of unutilized Accumulated Income under Section 11(2)With effect from assessment year 2023-24, if a trust is not able to apply 85% of its income in a particular year, it can accumulate the shortfall to be used for religious or charitable purposes within the next five years.

The accumulation is allowed if the Assessing Officer is informed about the purpose of  accumulation and the period for the income is to be furnished in Form 10 on or before the due date for furnishing the return of income under Section 139(1).

The income set apart or accumulated has to be utilized in terms of the provisions of Section 11(2). However, the accumulated income is not applied and remains to be invested even after five years, in such a case, the amount or part of the accumulated income which has not been so utilized shall be treated as income of the trust of that previous year under Section 11(3). However, if the accumulated income is not utilized in the year immediately following the expiry of the 5 years period, the trust has one more year for utilization of accumulated funds. Though Section 11(2) provides a 5 years period for accumulation but by virtue of Section 11(3), the penal provisions are attracted only after the expiry of sixth year. The Act provide a one year grace period to utilize the income accumulated under Section 11(2). Therefore, if the accumulated income is not applied within 5 years, it shall be taxed in the sixth year.

The Finance Bill 2022, purposes to amend the provisions of section 11(3) of the Act to provide that any income referred to in Section 11(2) which is not utilized for the purpose for which it is so accumulated or set apart shall be deemed to be the income of such person of the previous year being the last previous year of the period, for which the income is accumulated or set apart but or not utilized for the purpose for which it is so accumulated or set apart.

Thus, after the proposed amendment, if the accumulated income is not applied within 5 years, the same shall be taxed in the 5th year itself.

Restriction on extending the benefit of specified personUnder Section 13, trusts or institutions registered under Section 12AA/12AB are required not to pass any unreasonable benefit to the trustee or any other specified person.

The Finance Bill, 2022 proposes to insert twenty- first proviso in Section 10(23C) of the Act to provide that where income or part of income or property of any trust or institution has been applied directly or indirectly for the benefit of any person referred to in Section 13(3), such income or part of income or property shall be deemed to be the income of such person of the previous year in which it is so applied. The provisions of Section 13(2)(4) and (6) of the Act shall also apply to trust or institution referred to in Section 10(23C).

Interested PersonThe following are interested person –

  • The author of the trust or the founder of

    the institution;

  • Any person who has made a total contribution upto the end of the relevant previous year of an amount exceeding Rs. 50,000;
  • Where author, founder or substantial contributor is an HUF, a member of the HUF;
  • Any trustee of the trust or manager of the institution;
  • Any relative of such author, founder, substantial contributor, member, trustee, manager as aforesaid; and
  • Any concern in which any of the persons referred to above has a substantial interest

Meaning of Relative
Relative in relation to an individual means

  • His spouse;
  • His brother or sister; 
  • Spouses of the brother or sister;
  • Brother or sister of his spouse;
  • Spouses of brother or sister of his spouse;
  • His lineal ascendant or descendant and of his spouse;
  • Spouses of any of his lineal ascendant or descendant;
  • Spouses of his spouse’s lineal ascendant or descendant;
  • Any lineal descendant of his or his spouse’s brother or sister.

Meaning of substantial interestA person is deemed to have substantial interest in a concern if he (or along with interested persons as mentioned above) at any time during the previous year.

  • Holds atleast 20% of equity share capital in the company; or
  • Entitled atleast 20% of profits, in case of any other concern.

Benefit of medical or educational servicesWhere a charitable or religious trust is running a hospital or a medical institution, or an educational institution and it provides medical or educational services to interested persons, the value of medical / educational services to interested persons, the value of medical / educational services is deemed to be income of the trust or institution derived from property held under trust. The value of such services is chargeable to tax during the previous year in which such services are rendered. The exemption of Section 11 or Section 10(23C) shall not apply to the value of such services.

The income or the property applied for benefit of interested person:

The income or the property of the trust shall be deemed to have been applied for the benefit of interested person in the following cases.

  • Loan without adequate interest or security

    An interested person is deemed to be benefitted if any part of the income or property of the trust or institution is (or continues to be) lent to any interested person for any period during the previous year without either adequate security or adequate interest or both.

  • Use of property without any rent

    An interested person is deemed to be benefitted if any land, building or other property of the trust or institution is (or continues to be) made available for use by any interested person, for any period during the previous year without charging adequate rent or other compensation.

  • Excess payment of salary

    Any interested person is deemed to be benefitted if any amount is paid by way of salary, allowance or otherwise during the previous year to any interested person, out of the resources of the trust or institution and the amount so paid is in excess of what may be reasonably paid for such services.

  • Inadequate remuneration for services rendered

    An interested person is deemed to be benefitted if the services of the trust or institution are made available to an interested person during the previous year without adequate remuneration or other compensation.

  • Excess payment for purchases

    An interested person is deemed to be benefitted if any share, security or other property is purchased by or on behalf of the trust or institution from an interested person during the previous year for consideration which is more than adequate consideration.

  • Consideration of sales

    An interested person is deemed to be benefitted if any share, security or other property is sold by or on behalf of the person during the previous year for consideration which is less than adequate consideration.

  • Diversion of income

    An interested persons is deemed to be benefitted if any income or property of the trust or institution is diverted during the previous year in favour of the interested person and the aggregate value of such income and property exceeds Rs. 1,000.

  • Investment in a concern

    An interested person is deemed to be benefitted if any funds of the trust or institution are or continue to remain, invested for any period during the previous year, in any concern in which the interested person has a substantial interest. However, if the aggregate of funds invested in a concern, in which any interested person has a substantial interest, does not exceed 5% of capital of that concern, exemption under Section 11 will be denied only from the income arising to the trust form such investment. 

    In other words, in such a case, the exemption under Section 11 will not be denied for any income other than the income arises out the said investment. In Birla Charity Trust [1987] 34 Taxman 504 (Cal), the Hon’ble High Court held that if the funds of the trust are construed to include assets (other than money in hand or bank account), the same are not capable of being invested as such other assets of the trust, apart from money in hand or cash will have to be converted into money or cash before the same can be invested. Therefore, only cash and bank balances are included in the expression of “funds” for the purpose of section 13(2)(h).

ConclusionThe law of charitable trust/institution has been complicated frequent changes in law which makes compliance difficult. Lots of judgments of various Courts have been nullified by making amendments in various sections of charitable trust / institutions such as Section 10(23C) (iiiad), Section 10(23C)(iiiae), Section 11(1A), Section 11(2), capital gain etc. Litigations will increase considerably. Thus trust funds would be affected due to heavy tax demand. The law of charitable trust / institution could have been made simple and easy for various compliances.

“Take up one idea, make that one idea your life. Think of it, dream of it, Live on that idea let the brain, muscles, nerves, every part of your body be full of that idea, and just leave every other idea alone. This is the way to success.”

  — Swami Vivekananda

 

Friends,

We have completed 100 days of the year 2022. The first initial days have been full of activities after a successful National Executive Committee Meeting at Kolkata. Today when I am writing this after a splendid One Day Conference at Bhubaneswar combined with Puri Darshan organised by Orissa Team of Eastern Zone on 15th April, 2022 and in this one month, we are having another day conferences at Vizag on 23-04-2022 and at Surat on 30-04-2022. Northern Zone is going to organise National Executive Committee Meeting with National Tax Conference at Srinagar on 10th, 11th & 12th of June, 2022. Number of webinars and other zonal conferences are being organised all over the country.

As we all are aware that we are passing through an era of change in laws, work, technology all over and in this context Federation has to work stronger and every members owes a duty to work for growth and welfare of every professional colleague within and outside the Family of All India Federation of Tax Practitioners and in scenario of significant changes taking place at National Level, time has come for all the individuals / Associations / Institutions to come together, think together, work together with hand holding each other for serving the Society & Nation and Federation has to play an important role as it accepts all kinds of Professionals into one Conglomeration with a single objective of providing a constructive role by the Federation to help professionals in achieving excellence in their professional life.

Friends I have received full support and immense co-operation from my fellow members in first three months of this term & I am sure & confident that the same support & co-operation shall be extended in the coming months also.

Sincerely Yours,

D. K. Gandhi

National President, A.I.F.T.P.

 

Dear Friends,

Wish you all a very happy Financial Year 2022-23. We all celebrated on 2nd April 2022 New Year’s Day as per “Hindu” calendar in several parts the country and remaining parts are celebrating it when I am writing this editorial. We all should be proud be of the diverse culture of our country which makes life colorful and makes celebration a 24/7 affair.

Hon’ble Bombay High Court has also confirmed the view taken by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court, Delhi High Court and Rajasthan High Court and quashed the notices issued under section 148(1) of the Income tax Act,1961 (Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) post 1st April, 2021 without following the procedure prescribed under section 148A the Act. The executive to overcome these decisions, has again tinkered with the provision of section 149 of the Act through Finance Act, 2022. This important topic is covered by Adv. Dharan Gandhi in his article which is part of this issue of the journal. As mentioned in my earlier editorial, the policy statement made by the Hon’ble Finance Minister, while introducing the Finance Bill, 2021 is substantially diluted with amendments introduced to section 149 of the Act through the Finance Act, 2022. The time limits to reopen an assessment which has reached finality has not been restricted to 3 years it has now been extended to 10 years. The statutory provisions, as the stand today, are bound to generate litigation.

The Russia-Ukraine war is causing economic hardship globally. When the world was slowly limping back to normal economic activity. The Russia’s aggression over Ukraine has pushed back the global economy into crisis. This is taking a huge toll on the smaller economies like Sri Lanka, Nepal etc. It is going to have an impact on our economy as well. The inflation is hurting the vulnarable sections of the society. It is the right time for the Union Government to consider to slash the GST rates on those items which effect the prices of essential comodities. As per figures made available by the Finance Ministry the direct tax collections have surpassed the target in the fiscal year 2021-22. The estimate made at Rs. 12.50 lakh crores( inclusive of corporate as well as personal income tax) was surpassed by actual collections at Rs. 13.63 lakh crores, which is 9.04% more than the target. This trend can be maintained if the rationalization of GST rates takes place. I am concsious of the fact that this has to be carried out through GST Council. At least this proposal should be considered in the fourth coming Council meeting.

The prevailing conditions do present uncertainties, but, the same will not be enough to put out the flame of hope. “Uncertainty, in the presence of vivid hopes and fears, is painful, but must be endured if we wish to live without the support of comforting fairy tales. It is not good either to forget the questions that philosophy asks, or to perusade ourselves that we have found indubitable answer to them. To teach men how to live without certainty, and yet without being paralyzed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can still do for those who study it. Bertrand Russell in Introduction, the History of Western Philosophy.

In the present issue of the journal we are providing articles on several issues which are important and relevant for day to day practice. I thank all the esteemed professionals for taking out their valuable time to contribute to the AIFTP- Journal’s April, 2022 issue.

  1. S. 2(1A) : Agricultural income – Income derived from sale of saplings and seedling grown in a nursery alone shall deemed to be agricultural income – subsequent operation, i.e., supply of fertilizer, supply of soil, engaging horticulturists, insuring the plant, making pits and other related activities carried out in assessee’s nursery but in client’s site cannot be termed as secondary operation and hence not agricultural income. [S. 10(1)]

    The Tribunal observed that the primary operation done in assessee’s nursery confine only with regard to growing of plants and saplings. The subsequent operation, i.e., supply of fertilizer, supply of soil, engaging Horticulturists, insuring the plant, making pits and other related activities even assuming it is secondary operation was never carried out in assessee’s nursery but in client’s site. Plants and saplings are planted in the client’s site and became the property of the client. Thereafter the assessee’s role is only to tend these plants and saplings. The services so performed are in the nature of maintenance and cannot be termed as secondary operation in the strict sense of the term. The Tribunal held that income derived by the assessee by activities other than sale of plants raised in its own nursery is not in the nature of agricultural income falling within the definition of section 2(1A) of the I.T. Act. (AY. 2016-17)

    Jayanti Botanical Gardens v. ITO (2021) 61 CCH 342/ 211 TTJ 15 (UO) (SMC) (Bang) (Trib.)

  2. S. 9(1)(i): Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – If an Indian agent has been paid an arm’s length remuneration, nothing further could be taxed in hands of Assessee – DTAA- India – Mauritius [Art, 5(4)]

    The Assessee being a foreign telecasting company incorporated in Mauritius sold advertising time and collected subscription revenues through its Indian affiliates Zee Telefilms and El Zee. It is the claim of the Assessee that it did not have any permanent establishment in India, and so, no part of its income was taxable in India. Further on without prejudice basis the Assessee contended that if that Assessee was held to have a dependent agent permanent establishment, no further profits could be attributed in the hands of the Assessee as the agent had been paid arm’s length remuneration services rendered. Upon appeal by the revenue, the Hon’ble Tribunal observed that the case of the revenue is clearly confined to the existence of DAPE on the facts of this case. The existence of dependent agency permanent establishment is wholly tax-neutral, unless it is shown that the agent has not been paid an arm’s length remuneration, and when it is not the case of the AO, that the agents have not been paid an arm’s length remuneration, the question regarding the existence of dependent agency permanent establishment, i.e., under article 5(4), is a wholly academic question. (AY. 02-03,04-05,05-06)

    ADIT v. Asia Today Ltd (2021) 210 TTJ 8 (Mum) (Trib.)

  3. S. 10B: Export oriented undertakings – Production and Export of pasteurized crab meat – procurement of non-living dead crab and then process into chemical mixed pasteurized crab meat in a series of manufacturing process – Fall under the new definition of manufacture -Deduction allowable [S. 2(29BA)]

    The AO disallow deduction claimed u/s.10B stating that, the activities carried out by the assessee for production and export of pasteurized crab meat is not a manufacturing activity because the term ‘manufacture’ has been defined by insertion of new definition by the Finance Act, 2009 u/s.2(29BA) of the Act. Tribunal held that, the assessee is a newly established 100% export oriented undertaking, set-up a new manufacturing facility at Madras Export Processing Zone. The EOU set up by the assessee for manufacture and export of pasteurized crab meat was approved by the Development Commissioner, Govt. of India as a 100% export oriented unit for manufacture and export of goods or things. The assessee is also registered under the Central Excise Act, 1944 as a manufacturer and the goods manufactured by the assessee are treated as distinct commodities under Customs and GST laws. Activities carried out by the assessee as a manufacturing or production of goods or article or thing, which qualifies for deduction u/s.10B and there is no change in activities carried out by the assessee in the year 2004-05 when the deduction was first allowed and in the year 2009-10 when the deduction was rejected by the AO by virtue of new word ‘manufacture’ inserted under clause 2.(29BA) of section 2 of the Act. As per activities undertaken by the assessee, said activity was considered as manufacture or production for the purpose of deduction u/s.10B of the Act. There is no change in physical activities carried out by the assessee. The purpose of S.10B is to give effect to EXIM policy. Therefore, the statute has provided deduction all units established as 100% EOU as per EXIM Policy u/s 10B of the IT Act. (AY. 2010 – 2011)

    Handy Waterbase India Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2021) 211 TTJ 950 (Chennai)(Trib.)

  4. S. 11: Property held for charitable purposes- Amount spent on construction of buildings for its medical college would be treated as application of income for objects of trust and, hence, would qualify for exemption under section 11- factum of incurring such expenses by way of cash alone could not be a ground to hold that those expenses were related to non-specified purpose- Denial of exemption was held to be not justified – No violation. Section. 13 of the Act [S. 2(15), 12A, 13 69C, 132(4)]

    The assessee is a charitable trust registered under Section 12A of the Act. A search was carried out at the premises of the assessee on 18th July, 2013. It was held that:

    1. Amounts paid to contractors in cash or for other non-specified purposes cannot be added as unexplained expenditure under Section 69C of the Act simply because they have been paid in cash, and without any material to sustain the addition and merely if the assessee has not produced evidence in addition to the books of account, if the assessee has accounted for the expenditure in its books of account, and the same has been audited as genuine and the Assessing Officer has not rejected the books of account, the addition is to be deleted. Even if the expenditure is deemed to be for non-specified purposes, the assessee must have the benefit of the Explanation to Sections 11(1) and 11(2) of the Act.

    2. Information found during the course of search pertaining to amounts given as unsecured loans cannot be added to the income of the assessee since the CIT(A) has given a clear finding that the amounts do not belong to the assessee. Also, the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for the limited purpose of verifying the bank statement showing payments of the amounts not from the assessee but from an account of a third party viz. Hotel Solitaire.

    3. Amounts withdrawn by the assessee from the bank and alleged to have been made to three parties cannot form the basis of addition since additions cannot be made on surmises and conjectures. The amounts were recorded in the books of account and there was nothing to show that payments had been made to the three parties mentioned. Also, the break-up of payments were not provided the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer ought to have made an enquiry pursuant to the books of account but none was made and hence the addition is deleted.

    4. Amounts received as development fee over and above that prescribed by the government cannot be termed as capitation fee is the Assessing Officer has no material to show that the amounts received were not in the nature of voluntary donations. Reliance placed on statements of persons that the assessee collected capitation fee cannot be accepted since no opportunity of cross examination was provided to the assessee. Also, there was no evidence to show that payments were made de hors the books of account. Hence, the additions on account of capitation fee are to be deleted and exemption under Section 11 to be given.

    5. A statement made during course of search under Section 132(4) of the Act cannot form basis of addition even if the same is not retracted since neither the assessee nor the AO could justify the addition and in fact the assessee has produced evidence through books of account that the payment was made towards construction. It is the duty of the Assessing Officer to prove the same with corroborative documentary evidence and failure to do so would warrant deletion of addition. Also, the assessee had made the statement under a wrong notion of law and to buy peace with the department . (AY. 2010-2011,2011-20122012-2013 2013-2014, 2014-2015)

    Sri Srinivasa Educational & Charitable Trust v. ACIT (2021) 211 TTJ 663 / 182 ITD 554/ 204 DTR 265 (Bang) (Trib.)

  5. S. 32 : Depreciation -Biometric system’ is a ‘Computer’ and depreciation is to be allowed @60%

    The Hon’ble Tribunal held that, if the biometric system is detached from the computer, the same does not serve the purpose for which it is intended. Therefore, held that biometric system is a computer and the depreciation required to be allowed is at higher rate. (AY. 13-14)

    Instrument Technologies v. ACIT (2021) 209 TTJ 675 (Vishakha) (Trib.)

  6. S. 32 :Depreciation -Goodwill – Capitalized goodwill on account of excess consideration – Commercial rights – Eligible depreciation. [S. 32 (1)(ii)]

    The Hon’ble Tribunal relying on the SC decision of CIT v. Smifs Securities Ltd. (2012) 348 ITR 302 (SC) and Hyderabad Tribunal in case of M/s SKS Micro Finance Ltd held that depreciation could not be denied to the Assessee merely because the assets were classified as ‘goodwill’ in the books of account without appreciating the true nature of the assets if they can fall under the scope of ‘any other business or commercial rights of similar nature’. It was further held that the specified intangible assets acquired under slump sale agreement were in the nature of “business or commercial rights of similar nature” specified in section 32(1)(ii) of the Act and were accordingly eligible for depreciation under that section. (AY. 2015-16)

    JX Nippon Two lubricant India Pvt Ltd v. DCIT (2021) 210 TTJ 722 /202 DTR 59 (Delhi)(Trib)

  7. S. 32 : Depreciation – Westland Helicopters – Block of asset User of asset – The concept of user of assets has to apply upon block of asset as a whole instead individual assets – Denial of depreciation is held to be not valid . [ S. 2(11) ]

    Held that when a particular asset is part of block of assets even when that particular asset is not used in the relevant assessment year, the depreciation is allowable. Followed Sony India (P) Ltd v. CIT ( 2017) 88 taxmann.com 580 ( Delhi)( HC),CIT v. Oswal Agro Mills Ltd (2011 ) 341 ITR 467 ( Delhi)( HC) ( AY. 1995 -96)

    Pawan Hans Helicopters Ltd. v. DCIT (2021) 212 TTJ 1010 / 204 DTR 347 / (2022) 192 ITD 142 (Delhi) ( Trib)

  8. S. 36(1)(va) : Any sum received from employees – Where assessee deposited employee’s contribution to ESI after the due date under the respective Act but before the due date of filing the return of income under the Act, the same would not warrant any disallowance.[ S. 2(24)(x), 139(1)]

    During the year, the assessee deposited employee’s contribution to ESI amounting to Rs. 5,540 after the due date under the respective Act but before the due date of filing the return of income under the Act. The AO disallowed the same and the Ld. CIT(A), on further appeal, remanded the issue back to the AO to verify the claim and allow the same in case the payment was made before the due date of filing the return of income for the year. On appeal by the Department, the action of the Ld. CIT(A) was confirmed by the Hon’ble Tribunal. (AY. 2015-16)

    DCIT v. Saileela Synthetics Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 199 DTR 201/ 210 TTJ 763 (Jodhpur) (Trib)

  9. S. 37(1):Business expenditure – The expenditure necessary to maintain Assessee’s corporate personality would be an allowable expenditure even when no business was undertaken.

    Tribunal held that the expenditure which was quite necessary to maintain Assessee’s corporate personality would be an allowable expenditure since without incurring the same, the Assessee could not have remained into existence. Therefore, directed the learned AO to identify such expenditure and allow the same to that extent. (AY. 08-09 to 14-15)

    Sir Pratap Heritage Hotels (P) Ltd v. ACIT (2021) 209 TTJ 1 (UO) (Jodhpur) (Trib.)

  10. S. 40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Contractor – Disallowance section is not warranted where the payee furnishes the return of income taking into account the sum(s) received from the payer, tax due on the return income has been paid and certificate of a Chartered Accountant to that effect has been furnished.[ S. 194C]

    Tribunal held that Pfizer Ltd. had taken into account the sum received from the assessee and has appropriately discharged it tax liability on its returned income. Further, it had also furnished a certificate from a Chartered Account to this effect. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Tribunal following the order of Assessee’s own case for AY 2009-10 and deleted the disallowance made by the AO by holding that the disallowance section 40(a)(ia) is not warranted in view of the second proviso read with the first proviso to section 201(1) inserted vide Finance Act, 2012 and which has been held to be retrospective by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in CIT v. Ansal Land Mark Township (P.) Ltd ,ITA No. 160/ 2015 dt. 26 -8 -2015 . (AY. 2006-07)

    DCIT v. Pfizer Products (India) Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 198 DTR 273 / 210 TTJ 908 (Mum) (Trib)

  11. S. 43B : Certain deductions only on actual payment – Interest payable to Government of India is crystalized based on facts, even though not accounted in books due to comments of statutory auditor, and hence is allowed as expense on accrual basis even not accounted for in books.[S. 145]

    The Tribunal held that the liability to pay the interest amount payable to the Government of India is crystalized as evident from the waiver request of Aviation Ministry has been rejected by the Ministry of Finance and hence the deduction for the same cannot be disallowed on the grounds that it has not been accounted in the books of accounts when the same interest expenditure is allowed in the previous years. (AY. 1990-91)

    Pawan Hans Helicopters Ltd. v. DCIT (2021) 212 TTJ 1010/ 204 DTR 347/ (2022) 192 ITD 142 (Delhi) (Trib.)

  12. S. 45 : Capital gains – Amalgamation – sale of shares prior to transfer of business by way of slump sale and amalgamation – scheme of amalgamation approved by High Court and shareholders – allegation of scheme of amalgamation as an afterthought without any basis – capital gains already offered for tax by the amalgamating company – same cannot be taxed again in the hands of amalgamated company.

    In this case the Tribunal held that scheme of amalgamation was duly approved by two High Courts and shareholders, creditors and bankers of both the companies, Registrar of Companies, etc. at two places, after giving due notice by publication in newspapers and, therefore, it could not be said that the scheme of amalgamation was a colourable device and an afterthought. Therefore, consideration received on sale of share of another company by the amalgamating company prior to the scheme of amalgamation can be taxed in hands of amalgamating company only. (AY. 2003-04 to 2005-06).

    ACIT v. Investment trust of India Ltd. (2021) 211 TTJ 777 (Chennai) (Trib)

  13. S. 56: Income from other sources – Money kept in capital reserve account was invested in shares – Entire transactions were only in capital field no incidence of tax.[S. 2(47, 45(3) , 45(4), 56(2)(viia), 186]

    The Assessee was a partnership firm belonging to Shriram Group and held 100% shares in a group company Novus. Piramal Enterprises Ltd decided to acquire 20% stake in group company Shriram Capital Ltd (‘SCL’). However, since SCL could not allot shares to outsider directly due to restrictions from private equity investors, it decided to do so by joining assessee as a partner and infusing capital which was partly kept in capital reserve. The said money was utilized to make investment in the shares of Novus who inturn invested in shares of SCL and later got merged with SCL. As a result, SCL allotted shares to assessee.

    The AO held that Shriram group as a whole should have paid tax on the consideration received and the entire transaction was devised in order to avoid the tax liability and the same should be taxable under section 56(1) or section 56(2)(viia) of the Act.

    On assesses appeal the Ld. CIT(A) deleted the addition by holding that the capital reserves are created from capital receipts meant for capital investments and/or large anticipated expenses. As there was no income, section 56(1) is not applicable. The process adopted in assesses case was strategic and systematic investment by one industrial group in another group to synergise their mutual strengths and no colourable devise/tax planning was done.

    The Hon’ble Tribunal held that assessee firm even though had acted as an intermediate entity, it could not be construed as a conduit between the group companies and the whole transactions were to be understood in a holistic manner and could not be construed as a colorable device or a sham transaction. Accordingly, Hon’ble Tribunal held that the transaction was capital in nature and no addition under section 56(1) can be made. Further, since it is not the case of the AO that the money received is without any consideration or inadequate consideration, addition under section 56(2)(viia) could not be made. (AY. 2014 -15, 2015 -16)

    ITO v. Shrilekha Business Consultancy Pvt. Ltd (2021) 210 TTJ 34 / 202 DTR 361 (Hyd)(Trib)

  14. S. 56: Income from other sources – Not applicable where the sum has been received from non -resident -Addition was deleted. [S. 56(2)(viib), 68, Companies Act, 2013, S. 102]

    The Hon’ble Tribunal held that looking at the provisions u/s. 56 (2) (viib), it clearly applies to the resident and not to a sum received from a non-resident. Further looking at the various evidence produced by the Assessee, evidence obtained by the learned AO in terms of article 26 of the DTAA, the Tribunal held to not have found an iota of doubt about the creditworthiness and genuineness of the about transaction of allotment of compulsorily convertible redeemable shares resulting into allotment of shares from K start LLC of Mauritius. (AY. 16-17)

    Usekiwi Infolabs (P.) Limited v. ITO (2021) 209 TTJ 59/ 197 DTR 66 (Delhi) (Trib.)

  15. S. 56 : Income from other source – When the Assessee has adopted DCF method, one of the methods prescribed by the Act to determine fair value, then the AO cannot discard the same and adopt other method- The matter was restored back to the file of AO for afresh decision. [S. 56 (2)(vii)(b), R. 11UA]

    The Hon’ble Tribunal held that the AO could scrutinize the valuation report and if the AO is not satisfied with the explanation of the Assessee, he has to record the reasons and basis for not accepting the valuation report submitted by the Assessee and only thereafter, he can go for own valuation or to obtain the fresh valuation report from an independent valuer and confront the same to the Assessee. But the basis has to be DCF method, and he cannot change the method of valuation which has been opted by the Assessee. For scrutinizing the valuation report, the facts, and data available on the date of valuation only has to be considered and actual result of future cannot be a basis to decide about reliability of the projections. The primary onus to prove the correctness of the valuation Report is on the Assessee as he has special knowledge, and he is privy to the facts of the company and only he has opted for this method. The matter is thus restored back to the file of the AO for a fresh decision with directions as above stated. (AY. 2014-15 )

    TSI Yatra (P.) Ltd v. ACIT (2021) 209 TTJ 596 (Delhi)(Trib.)

  16. S. 68 : Cash Credit – Addition not sustainable when the assessee has discharged its onus by filing necessary documentary evidences to prove genuineness of the transaction – no evidence brought on by AO to prove that the assessee has introduced its undisclosed income in the form of share application money.

    Assessee was asked to prove the genuineness and creditworthiness of the share applicants for which its inter-alia submitted complete details of share allotment including PAN of the applicants and relevant financial statements. However, the AO observed that some of the share applicants shared the same address while opining that neither of the share applicants carried out significant business activities and their profits as well as reserves were low. Further, notices under section 133(6) of the Act were issued to confirm the transaction but they did not elicit any satisfactory response. Even when the assessee filed affidavits of all share applicants and their latest communication address, the AO still made additions under section 68 of the Act. The Hon’ble Tribunal, ongoing through the facts and relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Lovely Exports Pvt. Ltd. (216 CTR 195), concluded that the assessee had sufficiently proved the identity, genuineness, and creditworthiness of the share applicants while the Revenue failed to bring on record any evidence indicate malice on part of the assessee. The Hon’ble Tribunal, therefore, quashed the addition made under section 68 of the Act. (AY. 2015-16)

    DCIT v. M/s. Saileela Synthetics Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 199 DTR 0201(Jd) / (2021) 210 TTJ 0763 (Jd)

    Editorial: Due to divergence in approach adopted by coordinate benches, the Hon’ble Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Lotus Logistics & Developers Ltd (ITA Nos. 4057/Mum/2019) has proposed to constitute and refer the matter to the larger bench to adjudicate on the validity of the addition of share premium under section 68 of the Act where the identity, genuineness and creditworthiness of the party and the transaction has been established by the Assessee.

  17. S. 72: Carry forward and set off of business losses – Set off of loss returned by Assessee in subsequent assessment years could not be declined only for the reason that assessment for assessment year in which the losses arose, was in progress and pending. [S. 240]

    The Hon’ble Tribunal held that bearing in mind entirety of the case, the plea of the Assessee is upheld so far as set-off of loss returned by the Assessee cannot be declined by the AO in subsequent assessment years, only for the reason that the assessment for the assessment year 2014-15 is in progress. The AO is to be directed to allow, for the time being, the claim for set-off of loss brought forward, in the light of the above observations. The above direction, however, should not be construed as a direction for the grant of refund, if any is found admissible as a result of income computed as above, for the simple reason that a call will have to be taken by the AO as to whether, in the light of the discussions above, refund of taxes is permissible in such a situation in the light of first proviso to section 240. (AY. 16-17)

    Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd. v. DCIT (2021) 209 TTJ 587/ 197 DTR 265 (Mum) (Trib.)

  18. S. 73 : Losses in speculation business – Share broker – Purchase and sale of shares – Loss incurred from error trades – Not speculative – Allowable as business loss [S. 28(i)]

    Hon’ble Tribunal held that assessee had carried out the transactions of purchase and sale of shares on account of a business exigency and not with an intention to earn profit, therefore, the same would not come within the purview of “Explanation” to section 73 of the Act. The loss on account of transaction in shares cannot be held to be speculation loss hence deleted the disallowance. (AY. 2003-04)

    CLSA India Private Limited v. ACIT (2021) 210 TTJ 484 (Mum) (Trib.)

  19. S. 92B : Transfer pricing – The term international transaction includes capital financing, which, in turn, also includes guarantee – effects of furnishing corporate guarantee directly percolated to the principal debtor, namely, AE for whom the assessee stood surety – thus, the department contention that the act of furnishing guarantee be treated as shareholder’s activity, is devoid of any merit. [S. 92C, 92CA]

    In the present case, the Appellate Tribunal held that on going through the ambit of “shareholder activity” as given in the OECD Guidelines on a general perspective, it becomes imminent that such activities are certain acts performed by a company solely because of its shareholding in other group companies, which is obviously not the case here. Au contraire, the effect of furnishing corporate guarantee directly percolated to the principal debtor, namely, the AEs for whom the assessee stood surety. Thus, the ground urging that the act of furnishing guarantee be treated as shareholder’s activity, is devoid of merits. Moreover, now with the statutory amendment specifically treating ‘guarantee’ as an international transaction, there remains no doubt whatsoever that the furnishing of corporate guarantee by an assessee is an international transaction. This ground is thus dismissed. (AY. 2014-15)

    Bilcare Ltd. v. ACIT (2021) 211 TTJ 429/ 207 DTR 257 (Pune) (Trib.)

  20. S. 92C: Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Depreciation adjustment can be allowed for computation of operating profit, only if there is variance in the depreciation rates applied with the comparable.[S. 32]

    The Tribunal held that, an adjustment in terms of sub-clause (iii) of rule 10B(1)(e) may be warranted when there is a difference in recording certain expenses on principle i.e., in the instant case, depreciation adjustment in the computation of Operating Profit can be allowed only when the rates at which the Assessee charged depreciation on fixed assets are at variance with rates at which the chosen comparables charged depreciation. It was for the verification of this, that the Tribunal had restored the matter earlier, and not to adjudicate the proposition already rejected. Further heeding to the plea of the Assessee for providing another opportunity to furnish this data, the Tribunal restored to the file of AO/TPO for deciding this issue afresh in the light of new calculation sheet(s). (AY. 07-08, 08-09)

    Vishay Components India (P.) Ltd v. ACIT (2021) 209 TTJ 664 / 198 DTR 102 (Pune) (Trib.)

  21. S. 92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Transfer Pricing adjustment cannot extend to non-AE transactions and to that extent a proportionate adjustment is warranted.

    The Tribunal held that the transfer pricing adjustment cannot extend to non-AE transactions. The matter is remitted to the file of AO/TPO for restricting the transfer pricing adjustment only in respect of the AE transactions. (AY. 2015-16)

    Knorr Bremse Systems for Commercial Vehicles India (P.) Ltd v. DCIT (2021) 209 TTJ 1035 (Pune) (Trib.)

  22. S. 92C : Transfer pricing – Arms’ length price – safe harbour rules are optional for an eligible assessee – assessee has not exercised option for the safe harbour rules – entire set of rules from 10TA to 10TG cannot be operationalised. (ITR, 10B(1)€ & 10 TA)

    In this case the Appellate Tribunal held that if an assessee has not exercised option for the safe harbour rules, the entire set of rules from 10TA to 10TG cannot be operationalized in determining the Arm’s Length Price under the TNMM, or for that matter any other method under rule 10B, rule 10TA is not relevant. As such the TPO is not justified in applying the definition of ‘operating profit’ and ‘operating expense’ given under rule 10TA for the purposes of determining the Arm’s Length Price of the international transactions in the ‘manufacturing activity’ under the TNMM as enshrined in rule 10B((1)(e) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. (AY.203-14)

    Dana India (P) Ltd v. DCIT (2021) 211 TTJ 271 (Pune) (Trib.)

  23. S. 115BB : Winning from lotteries – Irrespective of the head of the income, the winnings from lotteries shall be taxed at a special rate-The business loss incurred by the assesse after exclusion of prize money earned from the unsold lottery tickets is eligible for set off against such winnings from lotteries. [S. 2(24) (ix) 28(i), 56(2)(ib), 58(4), 71]

    The Tribunal held that the loss incurred by the area distributor from the unsold lottery tickets shall be eligible for set off against winnings from lotteries under Section 71 of the Act and the lottery winnings from lotteries shall be taxed under Section 115BB irrespective of the head to be taxed i.e., business income or income from other sources. (AY. 2014-15)

    Pooja Marketing v. PCIT (2021) 212 TTJ 306/ 204 DTR 1 (Mum) (Trib)

  24. S. 115BB : Winning from lotteries – Irrespective of the head of the income, the winnings from lotteries shall be taxed at a special rate-The business loss incurred by the assesse after exclusion of prize money earned from the unsold lottery tickets is eligible for set off against such winnings from lotteries.[S. 2(24) (ix) 28(i), 56(2)(ib), 58(4), 71]

    The Tribunal held that the loss incurred by the area distributor from the unsold lottery tickets shall be eligible for set off against winnings from lotteries under Section 71 of the Act and the lottery winnings from lotteries shall be taxed under Section 115BB irrespective of the head to be taxed i.e., business income or income from other sources. (AY. 2014-15)

    Pooja Marketing v. PCIT (2021) 212 TTJ 306/ 204 DTR 1 (Mum) (Trib)

  25. S. 147: Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – No allegation in the reasons recorded of any omission or failure on the part of the assessee in disclosing fully and truly all material facts necessary of assessment – Notice is void-ab-initio.[S. 148]

    It has been held by the appellate tribunal that the impugned notice is issued under section 148 of the Act after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year and the AO nowhere stated in the reasons recorded that there was any omission or failure on the part of the assessee in disclosing fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment under section 143(3) of the Act, impugned notice under section 148 as well as subsequent proceedings under section 147 of the Act is invalid. (AY. 2004-05)

    Bharti Cellular Ltd. v. DCIT (20221) 211 TTJ 760 (Delhi) (Trib.)

  26. S. 147: Reassessment- Initial year was AY 2010-11 wherein AO after detailed verification allowed the deduction – Subsequent year i.e. AY 2013-14 also deduction was allowed – Reopening is nothing but change of opinion and hence quashed. S.80IB(11C), 148]

    The Tribunal held that reopening of assessment was on the basis of information that was already available on record and no fresh information was received by the AO. Revisiting the same issue which was already considered in original assessment and taken the decision amounts to difference of opinion and on difference of opinion the reopening of assessment is not permissible. The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment is bad in law and accordingly, quashed the notice issued u/s 148 and annul the assessment. (AY .2012-13)

    Ramya Hospitals v. ITO (2021) 62 CCH 29 / 211 TTJ 36 (UO)(Vishakha) (Trib.)

  27. S. 147: Reassessment – Value of sub-registrar on spot verification or value as returned by assessee to be taken into consideration. [S.50C, 148]

    The Assessing Officer must have some material and the material must be reliable before reopening the assessment. The valuation of the sub-registrar on spot verification showing an increase in the value of property for the purpose of addition under Section 50C of the Act is not supported by any revaluation order and no reference is made by the Director of Stamps to the sub-registrar and therefore no addition can be made.(AY. 2009-2010)

    Dhoot Stono Crafts Private Ltd. v. ACIT (2021) 212 TTJ 409 (Jaipur) (Trib.)

  28. S. 147: Reassessment – Reopening by issuing notice under Section 148 but no notice under Section 143(2)- Reassessment is bad in law. [S.143(2), 292BB]

    The reopening of an assessment cannot take place if only the notice under Section 148 of the Act is issued and no notice under Section 143(2) of the Act is issued prior to passing the reassessment order under Section 143 r.w.s 147 of the Act. The defect is not curable under Section 292BB of the Act.(AY. 2008-2009 )

    DCIT v. Board of Cricket Control in India (2021) 212 TTJ 937 (Mum) (Trib)

  29. S. 153A: Assessment – Search or requisition-No additions can be made in case of completed Assessments under search, without any incriminating evidence. [S. 132, 143(1), 143(3)]

    The Hon’ble Tribunal held that no assessment proceedings were pending against Assessee on the date of search, and it was not a case of abated assessment. Upon perusal of the assessment, it is evident that learned AO has not referred to any incriminating material against the Assessee and the additions made therein are also not based on any incriminating material. The business expenditure claimed that is sought to be disallowed was already claimed in the original return of income. Hence the additions are set aside. (AY. 08-09 to 14-15)

    Sir Pratap Heritage Hotels (P) Ltd v. ACIT (2021) 209 TTJ 1 (UO) (Jodhpur) (Trib)

  30. S. 153C : Assessment – Income of any other person – Search and seizure – loose paper in question was found from the possession of searched party – affidavit of searched person filed by the assessee to show that cash payment were made to landowners – deponent was not examined by the AO – No adverse inference can be drawn against the assessee.[S. 132]

    It has been held by the appellate tribunal that addition on account of on-money allegedly received by the assessee on sale of land could not be made in the assessment under s. 153C simply on the basis of some vague noting on a nondescript loose paper seized from the possession of the searched person (purchaser) and the statement of the said third party, without cross-examination, more so when the purchaser has filed an affidavit whereby he has affirmed on oath that the cash payments were not made to the assessee but to some old landowners/ Banakhat owners and others who were claiming ownership in the said land and the contents of the affidavit remain uncontroverted. (AY.2013-14)

    Kantibhai P. Patel v. DCIT (2021) 211 TTJ 187/ 208 DTR 54 (Ahd) (Trib)

  31. S. 154: Rectification of mistake apparent from record- No merger of order passed under Section 143(3) r.w.s 144C(1) with the reassessment order passed under section 147 if issues forming subject matter of assessment order not part of reassessment order which is quashed and assessment order can be rectified by AO with respect to those issues-Rectification cannot be made after CIT(A) has quashed assessment order [S. 115JB, 143(3)]

    If the addition was made under Section 115JB inadvertently, the same can be rectified under Section 154 by the AO and added under Section 143(3) instead of Section 115JB, the mistake being one apparent from the face of the record. It is settled law that there is no merger of the order of assessment with respect to issues not forming part of the reassessment order. Hence, the rectification of the assessment order to that extent is permissible .The rectification of the assessment order cannot be made after the appellate authority namely the Commissioner(Appeals) has quashed the assessment order in appeal. This would amount to acting contrary to the provisions of law and not rectifying but enhancing the assessment.(AY. 2009-2010)

    Intelenet Global Services (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2021) 212 TTJ 182/ 202 DTR 169 (Mum) (Trib.)

  32. S. 195: Deduction of tax at source-Other sums- Tax at source(TAS) not liable to be deducted and no interest payable for failure to deduct TAS[S. 201(IA)]

    Where a transaction takes place between two foreign companies such that the shares of a third company being held by one the companies are purchased from that company and such that the third company is a parent of companies holding assets located in India, no deduction of tax at source ought to be made by the purchaser of the shares since the provision providing for deduction of tax was not in existence when the transaction took place making the deduction at source impossible. The transaction was effected on 11th July, 2008 and Explanation 2 to Section 195 was introduced w.r.e.f from 1st April, 1962 by the Finance Act, 2012. The deduction of tax at source was therefore held to be impossible. Consequentially no interest under Section 201(1A) is payable.(AY. 2009-2010)

    DCIT v. WNS Capital Investment Ltd (2021) 211 TTJ 641 (Mum) (Trib.)

  33. S. 240 : Refund –Refund due to the assessee as per the order passed by settlement commission – AO is bound to issue refund. [S. 199, 245C, 245D(4)]

    In this case the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that order passed by the Income Tax Settlement Commission under S.245D(4) of the Act even de hors the filing of return under s. 139 is an order passed under ‘other proceedings un this A

    td (2021) 211 TTJ 907 (SMC) (Pune) (Trib.)

  34. S. 251 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Powers – Additional evidence -Where the AO has not been provided adequate opportunity to go through the additional evidence, the admission and examination of the additional evidence by Ld. CIT(A) is completely inadequate. [S. 254(1), Rule 46A of Income-Tax Rules, 1962]

    During the year under consideration, the assessee issued shares at a premium by way of preferential and equity allotment which the AO held as unjustifiable due to the assessee’s negative earnings per share. Consequently, the AO made additions of the capital raised under section 68 of the Act. On appeal to the Ld. CIT(A), the assessee argued that it was not given a proper opportunity of being heard and submitted certain evidence which he could not before the AO. The Ld. CIT(A) accepted the additional evidence noting that the AO did not provide his comments despite the matter being remanded to him. The appellant proceedings were concluded with the Ld. CIT(A) deleted the additions relying on the additional evidence.

    On further appeal, the Hon’ble Tribunal observed that the AO was not provided with adequate time to provide his comments on the additional evidence. Further, the additional evidence provided to the AO for his comments consisted of bank statement along with the annual report and confirmation of the share subscribers but the Ld. CIT(A)’s order also mentioned of a share subscription agreement between the subscribers, the assessee company and its promoters being filed which was not provided to AO. This agreement was one of the basis of the Ld. CIT(A)’s favourable order and it was not provided to the AO for his comments. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Tribunal held that the admission of the share subscription agreement was in violation of Rule 46A of the Income-Tax Rules, 1962. The Hon’ble Tribunal further went on to hold that the rule of natural justice applies equally to Assessees and the Revenue and that the Ld. CIT(A) has committed an error by not affording the AO an opportunity of being heard and provide his comments. Finally, the Hon’ble Tribunal observed that the Ld. CIT(A) has neither effectively assessed the reasonability of the premium charged by the Assessee nor established the genuineness of the transaction. Accordingly, the matter was remanded back to AO for verification of the Assessee’s claim considering the additional evidence. ( (AY. 2009-10)

    DCIT v. Pipal Tree Ventures Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 210 TTJ 258 (Mum) (Trib.)

  35. S. 253 : Appellate Tribunal – Order of CIT(A) quashing the reassessment proceedings in the absence of valid sanction under section 151 not challenged before Appellate Tribunal – Appeal not maintainable on merits of the case. [S. 143(2), 147, 151, 253(2)]

    In this case the department did not challenge the order of the first appellate authority in quashing of reassessment proceedings in the absence of fresh tangible material and sanction under section 151 of the Act is invalid. Thus, the order of the Ld. CIT(A) on these questions becomes final and any result of department appeal cannot change the fate of departmental appeal. The revenue appeal would not be maintainable and is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. (AY.2007-08 to 2010-11)

    ACIT v. SG Portfolio (P) Ltd (2021) 211 TTJ 970(Delhi)(Trib.)

  36. S. 254(1): Appeal to Appellate Tribunal-Powers – Request for adjournments of six months on account of COVID-19 pandemic was rejected – Lat opportunity was granted.

    Adjournments cannot be granted routinely but in view of the prevailing situation and the impact of COVID-19, a last chance/adjournment was granted to the Revenue. Adjournment of six months to be granted to the Revenue was rejected.(AY. 2014-2015)

    DCIT v. Saroj Kumar Poddar (2021) 212 TTJ 250 / 90 ITR 223 (Kol) (Trib.)

  37. S. 254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake apparent from the record – Order of the Tribunal, accepting the withdrawal of the appeals, passed on incorrect facts which were mistakenly represented and admitted by assessee’s counsel has resulted in an error in such Order and is liable for rectification [S. 263]

    The Tribunal held that the Order of the Tribunal having passed the Order accepting the request for withdrawal of appeals on the basis of mistaken representation made by the assessee’s counsel that the appeals did not survive under a wrong impression that the related assessment has been set aside by the CIT for de novo assessment in his order under Section 263, whereas the CIT had directed to examine specific issues, same has resulted in an error in the Order which is liable for rectification under Section 254(2) of the Act. Therefore, the Order of accepting the withdrawal has been recalled and the appeal needs to be adjudicated on merits. (AY. 2006-07 & 2008-09)

    Motia Construction Ltd. v. DCIT (2021) 212 TTJ 398 (Chd) (Trib.)

  38. S. 263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Depreciation – Lease hold rights- Revision is held to be valid [S. 32 (1)(ii)]

    The Hon’ble Tribunal held that in order to fall within the realm of ‘any other business or commercial rights of similar nature’ as contemplated in S. . 32(1)(ii) of the Act, and therein to be construed as an “intangible asset” eligible for depreciation under the said statutory provision, the ‘right’ under consideration would require to cumulatively satisfy a twofold test viz. (i). the right should be a business or commercial right; and (ii) the right though need not answer the description of the six specified intangible assets viz knowhow, patents, copyrights, trademarks, licenses, or franchises, but must be of a similar nature. The claim of the Assessee is thus rejected.. (AY. 12-13)

    Goldmohar Design and Apparel Park Ltd v . PCIT (2021) 209 TTJ 863 (Mum) (Trib.)

  39. S. 263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Limited scrutiny -The Revisional jurisdiction u/s 263 cannot be exercised for broadening the scope of jurisdiction that was originally vested with the A.O for limited scrutiny while framing the assessment and enlarging his scope of limited enquiry.[S. 143(3), 147]

    Held that the PCIT cannot invoke the jurisdiction under section 263 when there is no adverse finding in the limited scrutiny and in the absence of following the instructions No. 5/ 2016 dated 14-07-2016 issued by the CBDT, revisional jurisdiction under section 263 cannot be exercised. ((AY. 2015-16)

    Mahendra Singh Dhankar HUF v. ACIT (2021) 212 TTJ 902 / 204 DTR 377 (Jaipur)(Trib.)

  40. S. 263: Revision of orders prejudicial to Revenue- Twin conditions to be satisfied-Assessment order cannot be said to be erroneous in law- Revision was quashed.[S. 54F]

    Where the assessee, an individual, sold one property and purchased two properties, the disallowance with respect to 50% of the investment by the Assessing Officer cannot be said to be an erroneous decision. There must be some material with the Commissioner to revise the assessment order. Also, if the Assessing Officer has made all enquiries it cannot be said that there has been a lack of enquiry. Also, the proviso to Section 54F is not violated- the date of purchase vide registered sale deed and consequent possession is to be taken into consideration which is well beyond the period of one year, and not the agreement of sale.(AY. 2015-16)

    Virendra Singh Bhadauriya v. PCIT (2021) 211 TTJ 452/ 204 DTR 400 (Jaipur) (Trib.)

  41. S. 271(1)(c): Penalty for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income-Assessee intimated Assessing Officer well in advance of inadvertence of including receipt-Assessing Officer did not specify in notice whether notice is issued for concealing income or furnishing inaccurate particulars. [S. 143(2)]

    The Assessing Officer must clearly specify whether he is imposing penalty proceedings for inaccurate particulars of income or concealment of income. Also, when the assessee wrote to the Assessing Officer well in advance before the Section 143(2) notice was issued that the interest income was inadvertently not included then the Assessing Officer cannot initiate penalty proceedings against the assessee. (AY. 2009-2010)

    FCI Asia Pte Ltd. v. DCIT (2021) 212 TTJ 9 (UO) (Delhi)(Trib)

Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015

  1. S. (11): Asset located outside India – Beneficial interest – Notice issued to assessee and order passed making addition on account of amount received in bank account where assessee is allegedly beneficial owner – Assessee not liable to be taxed. [S. 5, 10(3) Companies Act, 2013, S. 89(10), 90 (1)]

    The assessee cannot be held to be beneficial owner of the amounts lying in the bank account merely because its name appears as beneficial owner in the account opening form along with passport for identification. In the absence of corroborative evidence addition under the Act cannot be sustained. The money does not belong to the assessee but the son of the assessee on account of voluminous evidence produced in that regard. (AY. 2016-2017)

    ACIT v. Jatinder Mehra (2021) 212 TTJ 681 (Delhi) (Trib.)

Wealth-tax Act, 1957.

  1. S. 2(ea) : Asset- Lack of evidence to support the land being vacant as of the cut-off date and evidence to the contrary, issue set aside to the file of AO for verification, whether the particular asset can be brought to tax under the Wealth Tax Act [S. 16(3)]

The Assessee held immovable asset, the value of which during the relevant AY 2008-09 was more than Rs. 15 lakhs. The Assessee had not filed return of wealth for the AY 2008-09. Therefore, the assessment has been reopened under s. 16(3) of the WT Act, 1957 (hereinafter ‘the Act’).

The AO noticed that the Assessee is the owner of an asset on which a residential house originally existed. In the relevant AY, the Assessee entered into a joint development agreement (hereinafter JDA) and as a consequence, the building was demolished, and the asset became a vacant land as on 31st March 2008 and 31st March 2009.

The Assessee contended that there was a building on the land as on the valuation date i.e., on 31st March 2008 and 31st March 2009 and only after the JDA, the building was demolished between April 2009 to March 2010. Therefore, there was a building on the land as on 31st March 2008 and 31st March 2009 and hence, land cannot be included in the definition of asset as defined under s. 2(ea) of the Act. Upon further appeal to the CWT(A), the CWT(A)upheld the findings of the AO.

The Hon’ble Tribunal after much scrutiny observed that, for the impugned AY 2007-08 and 2008-09, the land was not a vacant urban land and the existing building was demolished, is not supported by any evidence. It restored the matter to the AO for his verification on whether building is used for own residential purpose or business purpose or the same has been let out during the relevant previous year. Further also held that simply on the ground that there was a building in the impugned land, the same cannot be excluded from the ambit of wealth-tax, & that the AO needs to verify above facts before concluding whether a particular asset comes under the definition of asset as defined under S. 2(ea) of the Act or not. (AY. 08-09; 09-10)

Giridhari Govindas (HUF) v. ACIT (2021) 209 TTJ 953 (Chennai) (Trib.)

  1. S. 2(14)(iii) : Capital asset – Agricultural land – Land continued to be agricultural land in the revenue records – located 20 kms. away from municipal corporation limits – Cutting and carrying away of rubber trees did not change classification of land from agricultural to non-agricultural land – User by buyer is not relevant for assessing the gain in the hands of the assesse – Not liable to be assessed as capital gains [S. 45]

    The assessee sold the agricultural land. As per the condition of MOA the assessee agreed to cut and carry away all rubber trees on said land at his own expenses before sale. Land continued to be agricultural land in the revenue records and the land is located 20 kms. away from municipal corporation limits. The Assessing Officer held that with cutting and carrying away of rubber trees land became barren land and a barren land could not be treated as agricultural land and, further, KSIDC, in due course of time, upon purchase from assessee, converted said land into an industrial Estate. The Assessing Officer assessed the gain on sale of said land as liable to capital gains tax. The Tribunal held that the sale of agricultural land cannot be assessed as capital gains. On appeal by the revenue land the Court held that the land in question was located 20 kms. away from municipal corporation limits. Assessee had demonstrated that classification of land continued to be an agricultural land in revenue records even as on date of sale. Land was put to use only for agricultural purposes by assessee. The assessee could not be expected to have control over activities of buyer once transfer was completed. Cutting and carrying away of rubber trees did not change classification of land from agricultural to non-agricultural land. Order of Tribunal was affirmed. (AY. 1996-97)

    CIT v. Cochin Malabar Estates & Industries Ltd. (2021) 208 DTR 119 / (2022) 440 ITR 121 / 324 CTR 246 / 134 taxmann.com 162 (Ker)(HC)

  2. S. 2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Advance against sale of commercial space – Addition cannot be made as deemed dividend.

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that Tribunal had given findings of fact that advance received by assessee from company was not in nature of loan or advances as contemplated in section 2(22)(e), but was trade advance against booking of commercial place being built by assessee. Deletion of addition was affirmed.

    PCIT v. Anumod Sharma (2021) 283 Taxman 564 (Delhi) (HC)

  3. S. 4 : Charge of income-tax-Capital or revenue-Non-compete fee-Sharing customer database and sharing of trained employees-Fee received is not taxable. [S. 28(i)]

    Held the non-compete fee was received for sharing the customer database and sharing of trained employees. The receipt towards the transfer was not attributable to transfer of any assets or right and from the mere fact that the receipt was not attributable to the non-compete covenant, it could not be automatically concluded that the receipt was either from business or income of an activity recurring in nature. The amount was not assessable. (AY.1997-98)

    CIT v. ABB Ltd. (2021)439 ITR 554 (Karn.)(HC)

  4. S. 4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Sale of emission reduction credit – Capital receipt [S. 28(i)]

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held the sale of certified emission reduction credit, which the assessee had earned on the clean development mechanism in its wind energy operations, is a capital receipt and not taxable. (AY. 2009-10)

    CIT v. Wescare (India) Ltd. (2021) 439 ITR 657 (Mad.)(HC)

  5. S. 4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Sale of Certified Emission Reduction Credit – Not assessable as business income [S. 28(i)]

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that the proceeds realized by assessee engaged in wind power project on sale of Certified Emission Reduction Credit, which assessee had earned on Clean Development Mechanism in its wind energy operations was not an off-shoot of business, but an offshoot of environmental concerns and hence being a capital receipt would not be taxable. (AY. 2009-10)

    CIT v. Prabhu Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. (2021) 283 Taxman 89 (Mad.) (HC)

  6. S. 10(23C) : Educational institution – Computation of income -Receipt from education institution was less than 1 Crore – Entitle to exemption – Receipts of educational institution cannot be clubbed with other income of the society for the purpose of computing exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiad) of the Act. [S. 10(23C)(iiiad), 12AA, IT Rules, 1962, 2BC]

    Assessee-society established an educational institution. Assessing Officer disallowed the exemption on ground that excess income over expenditure of said institution run by assessee was carried to account of society for taxation and other purpose and since aggregate of fee receipts of institution and receipts of society exceeded prescribed upper limit of Rs. 1 crore. The order of the Assessing was affirmed by the Tribunal. On appeal the Court held that the receipts of Institution were below Rs. 1 crore. In the computation of income Assessing Officer himself recognized and acknowledged difference between receipts of institution and receipts of society. Allowing the appeal the Court held that the receipts of institution could not be clubbed with other income of assessee-society for purpose of considering benefit of section 10(23C)(iiiad) of the Act.. The Court also observed that the Tribunal was erred in looking at the provisions of section 12AA of the Act. Exemption was allowed. (AY. 2007-08)

    Manas Sewa Samiti v. Add. CIT (2021) 323 CTR 737 / 208 DTR 41 (2022) 284 taxman 418 (All)(HC)

  7. S. 10(26B): Income of Body Corporation established or wholly financed by Central or State Government for promoting interests of Scheduled castes or Scheduled Tribes – Engaged in work of development of National Safai Karamcharis who were involved in upliftment of Safai Karamcharis and Manual Scavengers who belong to Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or Other Backward Classes and also in inhumane practice of scavenging and other sanitation activities-Entitle to exemption.

    Held that the assessee company was fully owned by Government of India and engaged in work of development of National Safai Karamcharis who were involved in upliftment of Safai Karamcharis and Manual Scavengers who belong to Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or Other Backward Classes and also in inhumane practice of scavenging and other sanitation activities, it would be entitled to claim benefit of section 10(26B) of the Act. (AY. 2017-18)

    CIT(E) v. National Safai Karamcharis Finance and Development Corporation (2021) 283 Taxman 576/ 323 CTR 816/ 208 DTR 57 (Delhi) (HC

  8. S. 10B : Export oriented undertakings-Manufacture-Blending of Tea does not constitute manufacture-Not entitled to exemption-Interpretation of taxing statute-Provision for exemption-In case of ambiguity in an exemption provision the benefit has to go to the revenue.

    The term “manufacture” was not defined in the substituted provisions as was available before its substitution to include even processing. Explanations to this section define certain terms used. Explanation 3 was added in the section which begins with the words “for the removal of doubts”. It is to treat the profits and gains derived from onsite development of computer software outside India as income deemed to be derived from export of computer. Explanation 4 was added by the Finance Act, 2003, with effect from April 1, 2004 to define “manufacture or produce” to include cutting and polishing of precious and semi precious stones. The insertion of Explanation 4 clearly establishes the fact that wherever the benefit was to be extended, the needful was done. It had been authoritatively held by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Tara Agencies (2007) 292 ITR 444 (SC) that mixing of different kinds of tea does not fall within the ambit of manufacturing. Court held that blending of tea does not amount to manufacture and the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of section 10B. Court also held that while interpreting the provision for exemption, in case of ambiguity in an exemption provision the benefit has to go to the revenue. Followed Commissioner Customs v. Dilip Kumar and Co. (2018) 6GSTR-OL-46 (SC). (AY.2002-03 to 2005-06)

    PCIT v. V. N. Enterprises Limited (2021) 439 ITR 624 (Cal.)(HC)

    CIT v. Tea Promoters (India) Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 439 ITR 624 (Cal.)(HC)

  9. S. 11 : Property held for charitable purposes-Improve public transport system in the country and the road safety standards-Revenue from laboratory testing and consultancy-Not to earn profit for share holders-Entitle to exemption-Proviso to section 2(15) is not applicable-No substantial question of law. [S. 2(15)]

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held the association has not been earning any profit as the main object of the assessee-association is to improve the public transport system in the country and the road safety standards. Undoubtedly, the activities of laboratory testing and consultancy are bringing revenue to the assessee-association but the intent of such activities is not to earn profit for its shareholders/owners.. No question of law Followed Ram Kumar Aggarwal & Anr. vs. Thawar Das (through LRs), (1999) 7 SCC 303 has reiterated that under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the orders passed by the Courts below is confined to hearing on substantial question of law and interference with finding of the fact is not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence. there is no perversity in the findings of the ITAT. Referred State of Hryana & Ors v. Khalsa Motor Ltd (1990) 4 SCC 659, Hero Vinoth (Minor)) v. Thawar Das Through LRs (1999) 7 SCC 303.

    CIT (E) v. Association of State Road Transport Undertakings (2021) 208 DTR 313 /324 DTR 165 (Delhi) (HC)

  10. S. 11 : Property held for charitable purposes-Running a printing press and publishing a news paper-Profit generated was ploughed back to charitable activities-Entitle to exemption [S. 2(15) 10(23C)(vi), 12A, 80G]

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that object of the society is charitable in nature and the profit earned from running a printing press and publishing a news paper was ploughed back to charitable activities. The assessee is entitle to exemption. Proviso to section 2(15) is not applicable.

    PCIT v. Servants of People Society (2021) 208 DTR 409 (2022) 324 CTR 167 /133 taxmann.com 244 (Delhi) (HC)

  11. S. 11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Charitable purpose – Objects of general public utility – Improve public transport system – Revenue from testing automobile parts and consultancy charges – Entitle to exemption [S. 2(15)]

    Assessee is an apex co-ordinating body of all nationalized State Road Transport Corporation working under aegis of Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Government of India.Its main object was to improve public transport system in country. It also earned revenue from laboratory testing of automobiles and consultancy services. Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that merely because the had receipts under head revenue from testing laboratory and consultancy receipts which were of commercial nature, it could not be said that activities of assessee did not fall under categories of education, medical relief, relief to poor, preservation of environment and, hence, assessee-association was charitable in nature.

    CIT (E) v. Association of State Road Transport Undertakings (2021) 283 Taxman 555 (Delhi) (HC)

  12. S. 11 : Property held for charitable purposes-Engaged in promotion of rapid and orderly establishment, growth and development of industries in State and provided for industrial infrastructural facilities-Object of general public utility, proviso to section 2(15) was not applicable-Entitle for exemption [S. 2(15, 12AA]

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that the asseessee which is engaged in promotion of rapid and orderly establishment, growth and development of industries in State and provided for industrial infrastructural facilities. Object of general public utility, proviso to section 2(15) was not applicable. Entitle for exemption. Followed Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board v. ADDIT(E) (2020) 277 Taxman 36 (Karn)(HC) (AY. 2013-14)

    PCIT(E) v. Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (2021) 130 taxmann.com 407 (Karn) (HC)

    Editorial : SLP is granted to the revenue, PCIT(E) v. Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (2021) 283 Taxman 10(SC)

  13. S. 11 : Property held for charitable purposes-Construction of building for Government-Commission from Government-Involves carrying on of activity in the nature of trade commerce or business-Denial of exemption is held to be justified [S. 2(15), 12A]

    One of the objects of the assessee is to take up construction work of any nature to establish a chain of retail outlets. In the relevant financial year the assessee completed 34 building projects. The Assessing Officer denied the exemption which was affirmed by the Tribunal. On appeal the Court held that purpose of construction of building for Government cannot be accepted as an activity coming within the meaning of advancement of any other object of general public utility. Denial of exemption was held to be justified. (AY. 2019 10, 2013-14)

    Nirmithi Kendra v. Dy. CIT (E) (2021) 323 CTR 865 (Ker) / 208 DTR 249 (Ker) (HC)

  14. S. 11 : Property held for charitable purposes-Construction of building for Government-Commission from Government-Involves carrying on of activity in the nature of trade commerce or business-Denial of exemption is held to be justified [S. 2(15), 12A]

    One of the objects of the assessee is to take up construction work of any nature to establish a chain of retail outlets. In the relevant financial year the assessee completed 34 building projects. The Assessing Officer denied the exemption which was affirmed by the Tribunal. On appeal the Court held that purpose of construction of building for Government cannot be accepted as an activity coming within the meaning of advancement of any other object of general public utility. Denial of exemption was held to be justified.(AY. 2019 10,, 2013-14)

    Nirmithi Kendra v. Dy. CIT (E) (2021) 323 CTR 865 (Ker) / 208 DTR 249 (Ker) (HC)

  15. S. 17(2) : Perquisite-Permission for providing COVID treatment-Show cause notice-Revocation of permission was lifted-Order was set aside [S. 15, 17(ii)(b),ITATR, 1962, R. 3A, Art, 226]

    Petitioner-hospital filed application seeking renewal of approval under clause (ii)(b) of proviso to section 17(2)(viii) of the Act. Revenue issued show cause notice and rejected the application on ground that State Government had cancelled permission granted to petitioner for providing COVID treatment. On writ allowing the petition the Court held that since revocation of permission was later lifted by the State Government and petitioner was permitted to provide treatment, very basis of show cause notice stood removed order was to be set aside.

    Park Health System (P) Ltd v. P CIT (2021) 323 CTR 628 / 208 DTR 12 (Telangana) (HC)

  16. S. 28(i) : Business income-Sale of technical know how – Cost was claimed as revenue expenditure-Receipt assessable as business income. [S. 56]

    Court held that in the first round of litigation, after rejecting the claim of the assessee that the transaction was a slump sale, the Tribunal held that if the assessee treated the cost and expenses relating to acquisition and improvement and development of intangible non-depreciable assets in the revenue field the gains arising as a result of sale thereof would have to be necessarily treated in the revenue field either under section 28 or section 56. The order passed by the Tribunal at the first instance had reached finality. Hence the amount was assessable. (AY.1997-98)

    CIT v. ABB Ltd. (2021) 439 ITR 554 (Karn.)(HC)

  17. S. 28(i) : Business income-lease rent-Scheme sanctioned by BIFR-Assessable as business income. [S. 14]

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that the assessee was obligated to work under a statutory approved scheme; the lease of eight years was to ATL, which was in the same business and the lease was for utilising the plant, machinery, etc. for manufacturing tyres; the actuals were reimbursed to assessee by ATL; the work force of the assessee had been deployed for manufacturing tyres; the total production from the assessee unit was taken over by ATL; over all affairs of assessee company were made viable by entering into settlement; coupled with all other primary circumstances, the assessee employed commercial assets to earn income. The scheme was for providing a solution to the business problem of the assessee. The claim of lease rental receipt as income of business was justifiable for the assessment years. (AY.1996-97 to 2003-04)

    CIT v. Premier Tyres Ltd. (2021) 439 ITR 346 (Ker.)(HC)

    CIT v. PTL Enterprises Ltd. (2021) 439 ITR 346 (Ker.)(HC)

  18. S. 28(i) : Business income-Income from lease-Exploitation of property and not exploitation of business assets-Assessable as income from other sources-Quality loss-No business carried on-Not allowable as deduction. [S. 2(14), 56]

    Assessee continuing lease agreement and renewing it every year. The assessee claimed the income from lease as business income. the assessing Officer treated the income from other sources. Appellate Tribunal affirmed the view of the Assessing Officer. On appeal the High Court affirmed the order of the Tribunal and held that lease rental was rightly assessed as income from other sources. The court observed that the assessee exploited the property and not exploitation of business assets. Relied on Universal Plast Ltd v. CIT (1999) 237 ITR 454 (SC). Claim of quality loss was not allowed as there was no business was carried on during the relevant years. (AY.2004-05 to 2009-10)

    PTL Enterprises Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2021) 439 ITR 365 (Ker.)(HC)

  19. S. 28(i) : Business loss-Recording notional loss or profit – Method of accounting – Current assets – Loss on revaluation and sale of bonds-Consistent method-Allowable as business loss. [S. 37(1), 145]

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that the assessee had got cash only upon sale of the bonds. Till such time the bonds could not be treated as capital asset and not even as stock-in-trade. The assessee had recorded notional loss or profit on revaluation of the earlier years and had followed such procedure in the subject assessment year 1996-97 also. There was consistency in the pattern followed by the assessee and considering the nature of business it was doing the bonds were rightly treated as current assets. The findings of facts recorded by the Tribunal were proper and correct. The option of treating the receivables converted as bonds realisable at a future point of time was tenable and running out of cash reserves the decision to treat the bonds also as receivables had been taken. On the facts, the treatment of an entry in a particular method needed to be appreciated. (AY.1996-97)

    CIT v. Bhageeratha Engineering Ltd. (No. 1) (2021) 439 ITR 704 283 Taxman 110 (Ker.)(HC)

  20. S. 32 : Depreciation-Roads-Improvement and development of State Highways-Entitle was entitled depreciation prescribed to building.

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that the Tribunal is justified in holding that although road is certainly not a plant or machinery, it can still be eligible for depreciation as a building, as per Appendix prescribing rate of depreciation which says building includes roads. Followed whether following CIT v. Tamil Nadu Road Development Co Ltd (2021) 279 Taxman 125 (Mad) (HC) (AY. 2002-03 to 2005-06)

    CIT v. Tamil Nadu Road Development Co. Ltd. (2021) 283 Taxman 168 (Mad.)

    Editorial: Tamil Nadu Road Development Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2009) 120 ITD 20 (Chennai) (Trib) is affirmed.

  21. S. 32 : Depreciation-Plant and machinery-Ponds and reservoirs-Pollution control equipments-Depreciation allowable at 25% as against 100% claimed by the assessee-Approach road, drainage, borewells, reservoirs etc-Depreciation allowable at 10 % as against 25% claimed by the assessee.

    The assessee is in the business of prawn cultivation. The assessee claimed depreciation on ponds and reservoirs at 100% treating the same as pollution control equipments. Tribunal affirmed the order of Assessing Officer who allowed the depreciation at 25%. High Court affirmed the order of Tribunal. The assessee also claimed depreciation at 25% on approach road, drainage, borewells, reservoirs etc. The Assessing Officer allowed the depreciation at 10%. The Tribunal affirmed the order of the Assessing Officer. On appeal High Court affirmed the order of Tribunal. (AY. 1994-95, 1995-96)

    Industrial Incubators (P) Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2021) 323 CTR 1001 / (2022) 209 DTR 277 (Orissa)(HC)

  22. S. 37(1): Business expenditure-Interest-Prepayment premium-Corporate debt restructuring-Allowable as deduction.

    Held that one time payment made by assessee towards pre-payment premium and interest compense to banks for agreeing to reduce rate of interest on loan pursuant to Corporate Debt Restructuring was business expenditure to be allowed deduction as revenue expenditure. (AY. 2007-08)

    CIT v. Thiru Arooran Sugar Ltd. (2021) 283 Taxman 156 (Mad.)(HC)

  23. S. 37(1): Business expenditure-Discount on issue of ESOP-Allowable as deduction.

    Held that discount on issue of ESOP was not a contingent liability but an ascertained liability hence the discount on issue of ESOP was an allowable deduction under section 37(1) as same was to be treated as remuneration to employees for their continuity of service. (AY. 2003-04)

    CIT(LTU) v. Biocon Ltd. (2021) 131 taxmann.com 187 (Karn) (HC) Editorial : Notice is issued in SLP filed by the revenue, CIT(LTU) v. Biocon Ltd. (2021) 283 Taxman 290 (SC)

  24. S. 35D : Amortisation of preliminary expenses-Share premium expenses-Not part of capital employed-Cost of acquisition does not constitute cost of project-cost of acquisition of companies could not be treated as asset for allowing deduction under section 35D.

    Dismissing the appeal the Court held that the Tribunal was right in holding that the share premium collected on the issue of share capital by the assessee could not be taken as part of the capital employed for allowing deduction under section 35D. Followed Berger Paints India Ltd. v. CIT (2017) 393 ITR 113 (SC). Court also held that there is a vast difference between expansion and extension. The Tribunal was right in law in holding that the cost of acquisition of companies could not be treated as asset for allowing deduction under section 35D. (AY.2008-09)

    Subex Ltd. v. CIT (2021) 439 ITR 495 (Karn.)(HC)

  25. S. 37(1) : Business expenditure –Capital or revenue – Expenditure for raising floor height of Godown – Expenditure incurred to run the business profitably is revenue expenditure.

    Where the assessee had incurred expenditure to conduct its business more efficiently and to increase its profits, while no new asset was brought into existence, it would be a revenue expenditure. (AY. 1991 -92)

    Jetha Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2022) 440 ITR 524 / 209 DTR 201/ 324 CTR 326 (Bom) ( HC)

  26. S. 37(1) : Business expenditure-Penalty-Not compensatory in nature-Not allowable as deduction. [Kerala General Sales tax Act, 1963, S. 45A]

    Dismissing the appeal of the assessee the Court held that in the absence of any material to show that any element of compensation was involved in the penalty imposed under section 45A of the Kerala Act the amount of Rs. 52 lakhs could not be termed as an expenditure for the year 2004-05. (AY. 2004-05)

    PTL Enterprises Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2021) 439 ITR 365 (Ker.)(HC)

  27. S. 37(1): Business expenditure-Statutory obligation-Contribution to common good fund-Special assistance fund-Allowable as deduction.

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that the amounts had been spent only out of statutory obligation, amount expended on funds will be allowable as deduction while computing income of assessee co-operative bank, even when said expenditure did not come under section 37(1) of the Act. (AY. 2007-08)

    PCIT v. Karnataka State Co-op. Apex Bank Ltd. (2021) 283 Taxman 106 (Karn) (HC)

  28. S. 40(a)(i) : Amounts not deductible-Deduction at source-Non-resident-Commission charges to overseas agents-Service rendered outside India-Cannot be considered as fes for technical services-Not liable to deduct tax at source-Art, 12-OECD Model convention [S.9(1)(vii)), 195]

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that the assessee had paid commission charges to overseas agents for services rendered outside India and not any lump sum consideration for rendering managerial, technical or consultancy services, such payments could not be considered as fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. Not liable to deduct tax at source. (AY.2013-14, 2014-15)

    PCIT v. Gopakumaran Nair (2021) 283 Taxman 173 (Mad.) (HC)

  29. S. 40(a)(ia): Amounts not deductible-Deduction at source-Payment of freight and carriage charges for previous year 2006-07 (1-4-2006 to 31-3-2007)-Disallowance is held to be not valid-Commission payment disallowance is held to be justified. [S.194C]

    Assessing Officer had disallowed the payment of freight and carriage charges for failure to deduct tax at source. The Order was affirmed by the Tribunal. on appeal the Court held that since liability for deducting tax at source for payments made to individual contractors above monetary limits arose only with effect from 1-6-2007, for failure to deduct tax at source for previous year 2006-07, (i.e. 1-4-2006 to 31-3-2007), assessee should not be made liable to deduct TDS and, consequently, disallowance made under section 40(a)(ia) for non-payment of TDS under section 194C was to be deleted. As regards commission and brokerage and claimed deduction for same but failed to furnish record or material to show that commission or brokerage was paid to different individuals and each one of such payment was less than monetary limit of Rs. 20,000, said sum was to be disallowed for non-deduction of TDS under section 194H of the Act. (AY. 2007-08)

    Sudarsanan P.S. v. CIT (2021) 283 Taxman 84 (Ker.)(HC)

  30. S. 43B: Deductions on actual payment-Tax paid under Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act-Not allowable as deduction [S. 10(1), 37(1), Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1991]

    Dismissing the appeal of the assessee the Court held that Agricultural income is excluded from the scope of s. 10(1) of Cent Act. Agricultural income does not form part of computation under Section 14 of the IT Act. Tribunal was justified is holding that agricultural income being exempt from taxation under the Central IT Act, the agricultural income tax paid by the assessee under Kerala Agricultural income Tax Act cannot be allowed as a deduction under the Income tax Act. (AY. 2007-08 to 2010-11, 2012-13)

    Oil Palm India Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2021) 208 DTR 345 (Ker.)(HC)

  31. S. 48 : Capital gains-Computation-Full value of consideration-Retention of money in Escrow account-Possession was handed over-Amount of money in Escrow account has to be considered while computing the capital gain for the purpose of full consideration. [S. 45]

    Assessing Officer held that amount which was kept in escrow account would only constitute an application of its income and whole consideration had to be deemed to accrue to assessee on execution of agreement for sale. Accordingly, capital gain was recomputed. Order of the Assessing Officer was affirmed by the Tribunal. On appeal the Court affirmed the order of Tribunal. (AY. 2003-04)

    Caborandum Universal Ltd v. ACIT (2021) 283 Taxman 312 (Mad.) (HC)

  32. S. 54F : Capital gains – Investment in a residential house – Relevant is date of acquisition of property and not on date of payment – It is not necessary that same sale consideration should be used for construction of a new house property – Allowed exemption . [ S.45 ]

    Assessee transferred shares held by him in two companies on 21-8-2008 and claimed exemption under section 54F on account of purchase of new residential house property for which sale deed was executed on 28-3-2011. Tribunal held that the payment were made prior to one year before date of transfer of shares and, therefore, assessee was not entitled to claim exemption. On appeal the Court held that since sale deed was executed in favour of assessee within a period of three years from date of transfer of shares, finding recorded by Tribunal that payments were made prior to one year before date of transfer of shares was not entitled to claim exemption under section 54F was perverse .Court also observed that for claiming exemption under section 54 of the Act is dependent on date of acquisition of property and not on the date of payment and it is not necessary that same sale consideration should be used for construction of a new house property . (AY. 2009-10)

    M. George Joseph v. Dy. CIT (2021) 282 Taxman 386/ 206 DTR 51/ 322 CTR 563/ ( 2022 ) 440 ITR 589 (Karn)(HC)

  33. S. 68 : Cash credits-Share application money-Shell companies-Share holders could not explain their source-Addition is held to be justified.

    Allowing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that the Assessing Officer clearly brought out as to how so-called investors, who were either shell companies or without any financial capacity, had brought in such monies for purpose of investment. Assessee had not established creditworthiness and genuineness of transaction and thus, failed to discharge primany onus cast upon it. Assessing Officer was justified in making addition under section 68 of the Act. (AY. 2003-04)

    CIT v. Midas Golden Distilleries (p) Ltd. (2021) 283 Taxman 395 (Mad) (HC)

  34. S. 69C : Unexplained expenditure-Failure to explain the source-Justified in confirming the disallowance.

    Dismissing the appeal the court held that the assessee had failed to furnish relevant details to prove source in respect of claim for deduction, Assessing Officer was justified in holding that amount was incurred out of undisclosed sources and making addition. (AY. 2007-08)

    Sudarsanan P.S. v. CIT (2021) 283 Taxman 84 (Ker.)(HC)

  35. S. 80HHB : Projects outside India-Gross total income-Additional deduction to be computed on the basis of recomputed gross total income.

    Allowing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that by virtue of the decision of the Tribunal the claim of the assessee for loss on revaluation and sale of Government bonds had been accepted. In accounting parlance, these items were to be deleted from the gross total income of the assessee. The quantification under section 80HHB should have been done correspondingly. The deduction under section 80HHB under the quantifying order dated July 28, 2003 was correct. (AY.1996-97)

    CIT v. Bhageeratha Engineering Ltd. (No. 2) (2021) 439 ITR 713 (Ker.)(HC)

  36. S. 80HHC : Export business-Deduction granted under section 80IB must be excluded. [S. 8IA(9), 80IB]

    Dismissing the appeal of the assessee the Court held that, the provisions are explicit that if any deduction is claimed and allowed under section 80-IA as an eligible business, the assessee cannot claim deduction to the extent of such profits and gains coming under other heads of deduction of Chapter VI-A of the Act. Section 80HHC which relates to deductions in respect of the profits and gains from export business falls under the heading “C” of Chapter VI-A. There is no ambiguity in section 80-IA(9) of the Act. The intention of the Legislature is clear that there cannot be a simultaneous deduction under section 80-IA and under section 80HHC. The profits and gains allowed as deduction under section 80-IA have to be excluded while computing the deduction under section 80HHC.(AY.2000-01, 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05)

    Kanam Latex Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2021) 439 ITR 218 (Ker.)(HC)

  37. S. 80P : Co-operative societies – Society formed for enabling financial and social welfare of toddy tappers and workers for tapping and selling toddy — Could not be considered co-operative society engaged in collective disposal of labour of its members — Eligibility of assessee for deduction as society engaged in marketing of agricultural produce grown by its members — Matter remitted to Tribunal.[S.80P(2)(a)(vi)]

    The assessee, a registered co-operative society formed in the year 2001 for enabling financial and social welfare of toddy tappers and workers for tapping and selling toddy within the Hosdurg jurisdiction, claimed exemption under section 80P(2)(a)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The AO denied the said exemption on ground that assessee-society was granted registration as a miscellaneous society and, thus, could not be treated as a society engaged in collective disposal of labour of its member. On appeal, the assessee contended that toddy vending by members of assessee-society was for marketing agricultural produce grown by its members which was dealt in sub-clause (iii) of section 80P(2)(a), therefore, its claim for deduction of income earned by society under section 80P(2)(a) was legitimate. The Tribunal merely upheld the decision of the AO. On appeal to the High Court:

    HELD:

    (i) that the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee-society could not be considered a co-operative society engaged in the collective disposal of labour of its 2016 members as contemplated under section 80P(2)(a)(vi) of the Act and therefore was not eligible for deduction under section 80P of the Act. Decision in Peravoor Range Kallu Chethu Vyavasaya Thozhilali Sahakarana Sangham v. CIT (2016) 380 ITR 34 (Ker) was followed.

    (ii) That on the issue of eligibility of the assessee for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act the matter was to be remitted to the Tribunal for consideration and disposal, in accordance with law. (AY. 2009 -10, 2010 -11, 2011 -12)

    Hosdurg Range Kallu Chethu Thozhilali Vyavasaya Sahakarana Sangham v. CIT (2022) 440 ITR 65 (Ker) (HC)

  38. S. 92C : Transfer pricing-Arm’s length price-TNM method-Transaction of buying services for sourcing garments in India-Addition made to ALP by applying cost plus 5 per cent mark-up on FOB value of exports among third parties was not supported under rule 10B(1)(e) and was liable to be deleted. [R. 10B(1)(e)]

    Assessee, a subsidiary of a Mauritius based company, had entered into an international transaction of buying services for sourcing garments, leather etc. in India for its AE and computed ALP of said transaction by adopting TNM method.Assessing Officer accepted application of TNMM by assessee as most appropriate method however addition made by TPO in assessee’s ALP by applying cost plus 5 per cent mark-up on FOB value of exports among third parties. Tribunal deleted the addition which was affirmed by the High Court. (AY. 2011-12)

    PCIT v. Li & Fung (India) P. Ltd. (2021) 130 taxmann.com 438 (Delhi) (HC)

    Editorial : SLP is granted to the revenue ; PCIT v. Li & Fung (India) P. Ltd. (2021) 283 Taxman 4 (SC)

  39. S. 92C : Transfer pricing-Arm’s length price-Functionally different-Justified in directing for exclusion of ABCL from the list of comparables-Interest receivable-Notional interest for relating to alleged delayed in collecting receivable-No substantial question of law-Question as to whether in a given case transfer pricing adjustment on delayed receivable could apply even to a debt-free company or not. does not arise on facts and is left open [S. 260A]

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that the Tribunal is justified in directing for exclusion of ABCL from the list of comparables. Court also held that there can be no notional computation of delayed receivables’ only ignoring the receivables received in advance. Appeal was dismissed. Question as to whether in a given case transfer pricing adjustment on delayed receivable could apply even to a debt-free company or not. does not arise on facts and is left open.(AY. 2014-15)

    PCIT v. Mckinsey Knowledge Centre India (P) Ltd. (2021) 323 CTR 360/ 207 DTR 60 (Delhi) (HC)

  40. S. 115JB : Book profit-Provision for bad and doubtful debts-Corresponding amount reduced from loans and advances on assets side of balance sheet-Net provision is shown-Provision not to be added in computing book profit. [S. 36(1)(vii)]

    The Tribunal held that since the assessee had simultaneously obliterated the provision from its accounts by reducing the corresponding amount from the loans and advances on the assets side of the balance-sheet and consequently, at the end of the year shown the loans and advances on the assets side of the balance sheet as net of the provision for bad debts, it would amount to a write-off and such actual write-off would not be hit by clause (i) of the Explanation to section 115JB. On appeal dismissing the appeal the Court held that the Tribunal was right in deleting the addition on account of the provision for bad and doubtful debts in the computation of the book profits for computation of minimum alternate tax liability in the light of clause (i) of the Explanation to section 115JB.(AY.2004-05)

    PCIT v. Narmada Chematur Petrochemicals Ltd. (2021) 439 ITR 761 (Guj.)(HC)

  41. S. 127 : Power to transfer cases – Assigning of reasons in notice — Search proceedings showing that assessee residing in Nagaland and had financial interests in Kerala — Transfer for purposes of co-ordinated investigation — Cogent and credible reasons assigned in notice — notice sent to registered office in Kerala and received by Assessee — Order for transfer valid [Rule 127 of the Income-tax Rules]

    The S group of companies was promoted by the assessee, MKRP and the other assessees were his wife, sons and daughter. The entities of the S group were located in Nagaland and in Kerala. Subsequent to a search and seizure conducted under section 132 in their business and residential premises, assessment and reassessments were made. Thereafter, notices were issued and the cases were transferred under section 127 from Dimapur, Nagaland to Kollam, Kerala. Writ petitions were filed by all the assessees before the High Court. The assessees alleged that the transfer had been done without proper notice and without assigning any reasons as to why such transfer was being made, thus in violation of section 127. Further, it was argued that since the notice itself was not served upon the assessee as was liable to have been done under the provisions contained in the Income-tax Act and the rules framed therein, it was also violative of section 282 as well as rule 127 of the Income-tax Rules.

    The single judge allowed the petitions and gave an opportunity to the Revenue to proceed afresh against the assessees by giving fresh notices under section 127 and accordingly fresh notices were issued. The notice issued to the assessee, MKRP stated that the assessees were either partners or directors in the various firms and companies of the S group which were all based in Kerala, that over several years he had directed the transfer of sums of money from several bank accounts in Nagaland to his family businesses and family members who were all based in Kerala, that it was manifest from the modus operandi followed by him that although the source of funds lay in Nagaland, its ultimate destination was in assets in Kerala belonging to him or his family members and to the businesses controlled and managed by him or his family members in Kerala, that his financial interests were centered largely in Kerala, and the undisclosed investments admitted by the assessee were also in Kerala and that therefore, the cases were transferred to Assistant Commissioner, Kollam, Kerala so as to facilitate the assessments. The order further stated that when nobody made representation before the concerned authority which had passed the transfer order, another notice was sent which was returned with a remark “Addressee unclaimed – return to sender” and thereafter, the order of transfer of cases were passed. The single judge dismissed the writ petitions filed against the fresh transfer orders. On appeals:

    Held, dismissing the appeals, that cogent and credible reasons were assigned in the notices issued by the authorities as required under section 127 for transfer of the cases. Such transfer of cases had to be made on administrative exigencies and for better assessment by the Revenue and the authorities were the best judge in such matters. As far as the service of the notices was concerned, the single judge had examined in detail in his order wherein he had held that notices were sent twice. It was admitted that the first notice was served at the assessees’ address in Kerala. It was not the case that the notices were sent to the wrong address. The notices were sent at the registered address of the company in Kerala which had also been received by the assessees, a fact which had been reiterated over and again by the Revenue and had not been negated by the assessees. It was therefore sufficient compliance under rule 127 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 as the notices were sent at the registered office of the assessees’ company. Since no response was filed, notices were sent again. Unlike the first time, the second time it came with an endorsement of the postal authority that it was “unclaimed”. A presumption could be drawn that when the first time notices were received at the same address, the second notices could not remain “unclaimed” and therefore, the plea of the assessees that the second time notices were never received by them had been rightly rejected by the single judge. The only requirement of the law was that while passing an order of transfer, the reasons must be assigned. The orders of transfer of cases need not be interfered with.

    Varun Raj Pillai v. PCIT (2022) 440 ITR 47 (Gau)( HC)

  42. S. 127 : Power to transfer cases – Assigning of reasons in notice — Search proceedings showing that assessee residing in Nagaland and had financial interests in Kerala — Transfer for purposes of co-ordinated investigation — Cogent and credible reasons assigned in notice — Notice sent to registered office in Kerala and received by Assessee — Order for transfer valid [S. 132 ITR Rule 127, Art. 226]

    Held, dismissing the appeals against the order of single judge the Court held that cogent and credible reasons were assigned in the notices issued by the authorities as required under section 127 for transfer of the cases. Such transfer of cases had to be made on administrative exigencies and for better assessment by the Revenue and the authorities were the best judge in such matters. As far as the service of the notices was concerned, the single judge had examined in detail in his order wherein he had held that notices were sent twice. It was admitted that the first notice was served at the assessees’ address in Kerala. It was not the case that the notices were sent to the wrong address. The notices were sent at the registered address of the company in Kerala which had also been received by the assessees, a fact which had been reiterated over and again by the Revenue and had not been negated by the assessees. It was therefore sufficient compliance under rule 127 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 as the notices were sent at the registered office of the assessees’ company. Since no response was filed, notices were sent again. Unlike the first time, the second time it came with an endorsement of the postal authority that it was “unclaimed”. A presumption could be drawn that when the first time notices were received at the same address, the second notices could not remain “unclaimed” and therefore, the plea of the assessees that the second time notices were never received by them had been rightly rejected by the single judge. The only requirement of the law was that while passing an order of transfer, the reasons must be assigned. The orders of transfer of cases need not be interfered with.

    Varun Raj Pillai v. PCIT (2022) 440 ITR 47 (Gauhati)( HC)

  43. S. 132(4) : Search and seizure-Statement on oath-Undisclosed income-Retraction-Failure to produce any evidence contrary to the statement-Order of Tribunal is affirmed [S. 132]

    On the basis of statement recorded in the course of search and seizure action addition was made in the assessment. The addition was affirmed by the Tribunal. On appeal the High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and directed to decide in accordance with law. The Tribunal once again passed the order confirming the addition on the ground that the assesee has not produced any evidence contrary to the material placed before the Tribunal. On appeal the High Court affirmed the order of the Tribunal. (BP. 1989-90 to 22nd June 1998.)

    Nayaar Patel v. ACIT (2021) 323 CTR 1005 (Ker)(HC)

  44. S. 132B : Application of seized or requisitioned assets-Jewellery seized-Failure to pass an order within period of 120 days on which last authorisation of search was executed-Entire jewellery seized was directed to be released [S. 132, Art, 226]

    In the course of search jewellery and cash of certain amount was seized. The Assessee filed an application under section 132B for release of seized jewellery.No action was taken by revenue on said application filed by assessee within stipulated period of 120 days from date on which last authorisation for search was executed under section 132 of the Act.On writ the Court held that provisions of section 132B got triggered, once period of 120 days from date of last of authorisation for search under section 132 expired,therefore, entire seized jewellery was to be released to assessee. (AY.2015-16, 2018-19)

    Kamlesh Gupta v. UOI (2021) 283 Taxman 237 (Delhi) (HC)

  45. S. 139 : Return of income-Voluntary retirement scheme-Bank employee-Claimed exemption after by filing the letter after passing of assessment order-Filing the revised return-Delay was not condoned by CBDT-High Court directed the CBDT to condone the delay and grant refund without interest. [S. 10(10C), 89(1), 119(2)(b), 139(5), 143(1), Art. 226]

    The assessee did not claim exemption under section 10(10C) of the Act the on the superannuation benefit amount. An assessment order was passed/s 143(1) of the Act, wherein the Assessing Officer stated that no exemption under section 10(10CC) was claimed but only relief under section 89(1) was claimed. The assessee filed rectification application to the Assessing Officer by a letter dated March 18, 2008 stating that the amount of superannuation benefit was not taken into consideration for tax exemption. As no response was received the assessee filed a revised return and filed an application seeking condonation of delay under section 119(2)(b)of the Act. The application was rejected as time barred on the ground that Circular No. 9 of 2015 dated June 9, 2015 ([2015] 374 ITR (St.) 25) of the Central Board of Direct Taxes did not permit condoning the delay beyond the period of six years. On writ the Court held that the assessee’s entitlement to exemption under section 10C) was noticed by the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer’s observation in his assessment order regarding exemption under section 10(10C) indicated that he was aware of non-claiming of the exemption by the assessee. Prima facie an order considering the letter of the assessee, dated March 18, 2008, as a rectification application and passing an order would be a legally justifiable order. As no order was passed, the assessee had decided to explore the possibility of filing a revised return. In view of Circular No. 014 (XL-35) dated 11-4-1955 and the peculiar facts of the case, including that letter that could be construed to be a rectification application was not decided, on the merits of the claim for exemption, the revised return could be considered. The reasons assigned while seeking condonation of delay were satisfactory. The order rejecting the condonation of delay under section 119(2)(b) was set aside and the delay was condoned. As regards the grant of refund, eventually on account of the delay, there would be exclusion of interest on the amount of refund. The court made it clear that the order had been passed in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and accordingly, could not be considered to have laid down the law as regards the aspect of condonation of delay under section 119(2)(b) or on other issues dealt with. (AY.2004-05)

    Devendra Pai v. ACIT (2021) 439 ITR 532 (Karn.)(HC)

  46. S. 143(3) : Assessment –Show cause notice granting time of only four days – Assessment order passed in violation of principles of natural justice to be set aside. [Art , 226]

    Where the show cause notice issued by the Assessing Officer only granted a period of four days for filing the details and the assessee requested for an accommodation of fifteen days. As the limitation for passing the assessment order was not expiring for another two months, and yet, the Assessing Officer passed the assessment order without granting an adjournment and without even referring to the request for adjournment, the order was to be set aside. (AY. 2018-19)

    Deepak Garg v. UOI [2022] 440 ITR 575 (Delhi) (HC)

  47. S. 143(3): Assessment-Cash credits-Natural justice-COVID-19-Failure to grant reasonable opportunity for furnishing details-Assessment order was set aside [S. 68, 132 Art, 226]

    In notice, several details were asked from assessee which were to be produced within two or three days which was not complied within such short possible time during COVID-19 pandemic period. The Assessment was completed by making huge additions. On writ allowing the petition the Court held that it could not be reasonably expected that assessee would be able to collect all documents and produce before revenue within 2 to 3 days. The order was set aside with the direction to grant some more opportunity produce those documents. Matter was remanded. (SJ)

    Manickam Subramanian v. ACIT (2021) 283 Taxman 32 (Mad.) (HC)

  48. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Principle of Natural justice is violated-Cash credits-Order was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing-Order was set aside [S. 68, 142(1), 143(3), Art, 226]

    The assessment order was passed making addition u/s 68 of the Act, without issuing the show cause notice. On writ the Court held that the issuance of show cause notice is the preliminary step is required to be understanding. The purpose of show cause notice is to enable a party effectively deal with the case made out by the respondent. On the facts the addition was made without issue of show cause notice, the order was quashed and set aside. Followed Om shri Jigar Association v.UOI,1994 SCC Online.Guj 77.

    Shreji Investment & Advisory Services v. NFSC (2021) 207 DTR 357/ 323 CTR 505 (Bom)(HC)

  49. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Principle of Natural justice is violated-Cash credits-Order was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing-Order was set aside [S. 68, 142(1), 143(3), Art, 226]

    The assessment order was passed making addition u/s 68 of the Act, without issuing the show cause notice. On writ the Court held that the issuance of show cause notice is the preliminary step is required to be understanding. The purpose of show cause notice is to enable a party effectively deal with the case made out by the respondent. On the facts the addition was made without issue of show cause notice, the order was quashed and set aside. Followed Om shri Jigar Association v. UOI, 1994 SCC Online.Guj 77.

    Shreji Investment & Advisory Services v. NFSC (2021) 207 DTR 357/ 323 CTR 505 (Bom)(HC)

  50. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Violation of principle of natural justice-Order passed without giving a reasonable opportunity-Order was quashed and directed to pass appropriate orders on merits in accordance with law [S. 143(3), Art, 226]

    Allowing the petition the Court held that the order has been passed without following the principles of natural justice is liable to be quashed. The respondents are directed to pass appropriate orders on merits and in accordance with law within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The assessee is also directed to file reply within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (SJ)

    Sathya Jyothi Films v. NFAC (2021) 208 DTR 102 (Mad) (HC)

  51. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Violation of principle of natural justice-Issue of show cause notice and draft assessment order is mandatory-Assessment order, notice of demand and penalty notice was quashed-Matter was remanded back to Assessing Officer, who shall issue a draft assessment order and thereafter pass a reasoned order in accordance with law [S.143(3), 144B(7) 156, 271AAC, Art, 226]

    Assessment order was passed without issue of show cause notice and draft assessment order. On writ the Court held that there was a blatant violation of principles of natural justice as well as mandatory procedure prescribed in Faceless Assessment Scheme. The assessment order, notice of demand and notice of penalty were set aside and matter was remanded back to Assessing Officer who shall issue a draft assessment order and thereafter pass a reasoned order in accordance with law. (AY. 2018-19)

    Akashganga Infraventures India Ltd. v. NFAC (2021) 283 Taxman 37 (Delhi) (HC)

  52. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Violation of principle of natural justice-Order passed without issuing a mandatory draft assessment order-Assessment order, notice of demand and penalty notice was quashed-Revenue was given an opportunity to pass a fresh assessment order in accordance with law. [143(3), 156, 270A,271AAC, Art, 226]

    Assessment order was passed without issuing a mandatory draft assessment order or a show cause notice to assessee. On writ the Court held that order passed without issuing a mandatory draft assessment order and show cause notice being contrary to statutory scheme, as provided in section 144B of the Act, the assessment order issued under section 144, read with section 144B as well as demand notice issued under section 156 and notice for initiating penalty proceedings issued under sections 270A and 271AAC(I) were set aside. Revenue was given an opportunity to pass a fresh assessment order in accordance with law. (AY. 2018-19)

    Anju Jalaj Batra v. NEAC (2021) 283 Taxman 81 (Delhi) (HC)

  53. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Violation of principle of natural justice-Order was set aside-Liberty to Assessing Officer to continue assessment proceedings from stage at which they were positioned when show cause notice was issued [S. 143(3), Art, 226]

    Allowing the petition the court held that the assessment order having been passed without providing adequate opportunity to submit reply in response to notice to show cause-cum-draft assessment order as time frame set out in show cause notice was extremely narrow and e-filing portal was allegedly dysfunctional, impugned assessment order was to be set aside with liberty to Assessing Officer to continue assessment proceedings from stage at which they were positioned when show cause notice was issued.

    Centum Finance Ltd v. NFAC(2021) 283 Taxman 232 (Delhi) (HC)

  54. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Violation of principles of natural justice-Reply filed to show cause notice was not considered-Order was quashed-Assessing Officer was directed to re do the assessment afresh [Art, 226]

    Against the order passed u/s 144B of the Act, the assessee filed writ before the High Court. Allowing the petition the Court held that the order was bad on account of violation of principles of natural justice and, consequently, assessment order was to be quashed and Assessing Officer was directed to re-do assessment afresh. (AY. 2018-19)

    Ezhome Service Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. ITO (2021) 283 Taxman 567 (Ker) (HC)

  55. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Violation of principle of natural justice-Portal was not working-Failure to file reply-Order was passed without giving reasons-Order was set aside [Art, 226]

    A notice-cum-draft assessment order was served upon the assessee proposing an addition of huge amount against return income. Assessee failed to file its reply to said notice-cum-draft assessment order as portal of assessee was not working between 1-6-2021 and 17-6-2021 i.e. last date for filing reply to said notice-cum-draft assessment order. Assessing Officer passed a final assessment order copying such proposed additions to income of assessee without giving any reason. On writ the Court held that the assessment order passed by Assessing Officer was in violation of principal of natural justice inasmuch as assessee did not have a reasonable opportunity to file a reply to notice-cum-draft assessment order and, thus, same was to be set aside. (AY. 2018-19)

    Faqir Chand v. NEAC(2021) 283 Taxman 51 (Delhi) (HC)

  56. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Violation of principle of natural justice-Order passed without issuing show cause notice and draft assessment order-Order set aside [S. 144B(9), Art, 226]

    Allowing the petition the court held that the final assessment order had been passed without issuing a show-cause notice and draft assessment order, department’s action was violative of principles of natural justice and provisions of section 144B of the Act. The assessment order was set aside and matter was remanded back to Assessing Officer. (AY. 2018-19)

    Floral Realcon (P) Ltd. v. National Faceless Assessment Centre (2021) 283 Taxman 488 (Delhi) (HC)

  57. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Violation of principle of natural justice-Order passed without issuing show cause notice and draft assessment order-Order was set aside and remanded with the direction too pass a reasoned order in accordance with law [S. 143(3), 144B(7), Art, 226]

    Allowing the petition the Court held that section 144B (7) mandatorily provides for issuance of a prior show cause notice and draft assessment order before issuing final assessment order. When there was no prior show cause notice as well as draft assessment order had been issued before passing assessment order in faceless manner, there was a violation of principles of natural justice as well as mandatory procedure prescribed in Faceless Assessment Scheme’ and stipulated in section 144B of the Act. The order was set aside and directed the Assessing Officer to pass a reasoned order in accordance with law. (AY 2018-19)

    Globe Capital Foundation v. National E-assessment Centre. (2021) 283 Taxman 411 (Delhi) (HC)

  58. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Violation of principle of natural justice-No draft assessment order was passed-Order was set aside [S. 143(3), Art, 226]

    Allowing the petition the Court held that the assessment proceeding had been completed in violation of principle of natural justice and no draft assessment order was passed. Assessment order was set aside. along with notice of demand arising therefrom were to be set aside. (AY. 2017-18)

    International Management v. NFAC (2021) 283 Taxman 78 (Delhi) (HC)

  59. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Violation of principle of natural justice-Order passed without issuing show cause notice and draft assessment order-Order was set aside and remanded [Art, 226]

    Allowing the petition the Court held that the Assessing Officer passed a final assessment order without issuing a show cause notice and passing a draft assessment order, the assessment order was to be set aside and matter remanded. (AY. 2014-15)

    Javin Construction (P) Ltd v. NFAC(2021) 283 Taxman 42 (Delhi) (HC)

  60. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Violation of principle of natural justice-No show cause notice and draft assessment order was issued-Assessment order was set aside and remanded back to Assessing Officer [Art, 226]

    Allowing the petition the Court held that the order passed without issue of show cause notice and draft assessment order is violation of principles of natural justice as well as mandatory procedure prescribed under Faceless Assessment Scheme. The assessment order was set aside and matter was remanded back to Assessing Officer. (AY. 2018-19)

    Novelty Merchants (P) Ltd v. NFAC (2021) 283 Taxman 385 (Delhi) (HC)

    Pooja Singla Builders and Engineers (P) Ltd v. NAFC (2021) 440 ITR 413/ 283 Taxman 491 (Delhi) (HC)

    Religare Enterprises Ltd. v. NFAC (2021) 283 Taxman 408 (Delhi) (HC)

  61. S.144B : Faceless Assessment-Violation of principle of natural justice-Without affording personal hearing-COVID-19-Order was set aside and remanded back for adjudication a fresh [S. 143(3), Art, 226]

    Assessment order was passed without granting an opportunity of filing objections against notices-cum-draft assessment orders as State of Delhi was under lockdown due to second wave of Covid-19 Pandemic between date of notices and date by which replies had to be filed. On writ High Court set aside the matter and remanded back to Assessing Officer for taking appropriate steps in accordance with law. (AY. 2018-19)

    Ramprastha Buildwell (P) Ltd v. NEAC (2021) 283 Taxman 235 (Delhi) (HC)

  62. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Violation of principle of natural justice-Opportunity of personal hearing was not granted-Order was set aside-Directed the Assessing Officer to pass a reasonable order in accordance with law [S. 143(3), 144B(7) Art, 226]

    Assessing order was passed without granting opportunity of personal hearing. On writ the High Court held that there was no hearing had been granted to assessee before passing impugned assessment order passed under section 143(3) read with section 144B, there was a violation of principles of natural justice as well as mandatory procedure prescribed in Faceless Assessment Scheme, assessment order as well as demand notice and all proceedings initiated pursuant thereto were to be set aside and matter was to be remanded back to Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh. (AY. 2018-19)

    Umkal Healthcare (P) Ltd. v. NFAC (2021) 283 Taxman 504 (Delhi) (HC)

  63. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Cash credits-Violation of principle of natural justice-Two days time was not granted-Draft assessment order was not provided-Assessment order was set aside [Art, 226]

    The assessment order was passed making addition of Rs 29, 51, 28, 460 under section 68 of the Act, without giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing also not providing the draft assessment order. The assessee filed the writ petition. High Court set a side the order of the Assessing Officer for violation of natural justice and not providing draft assessment order. (AY. 2018-19)

    Setu Securities (P) Ltd v. NFAC (2021) 323 CTR 646 / 207 DTR 425 (Bom) (HC)

  64. S. 144C : Reference to dispute resolution panel-Power of enhancement-Any matter relating to assessment-Writ was dismissed. [S.92C, 144C(8), Art, 226]

    Dismissing the petition the Court held that DRP being a specialised Panel is provided with power to propose variations relating to any matter arising out of assessment proceedings and Explanation to sub-section (8) of section 144C stipulates that enhancement is to be made with reference to matter arising out of assessment proceedings relating to draft assessment order. Court also held that there is no impediment as such for DRP to consider any matter arising out of assessment proceedings relating to draft assessment order and no matter, such an issue was discussed in draft assessment order or not, but it should not be totally unconnected with assessment proceedings or draft assessment order. (AY. 2013-14) (SJ)

    Delphi-TVS Diesel Systems Ltd. v. ITO (2021) 323 CTR 508 /207 DTR 329 (Mad) (HC)

  65. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment-Principle of natural justice-Cash credits-Order was set aside. [S. 68, 143(3), Art. 226]

    The assessment order was passed making addition of cash credits of more than 40 Crores. On writ the assessee contended that no reasonable opportunity of hearing was given. Allowing the petition the Court observed that before going into the merits of the issue whether the income of the assessee was taxable under section 68 or not, though the assessee had not sought a personal hearing, it became incumbent on his part to seek a personal hearing to explain with the documents already submitted to the Department to establish the genuineness of the transaction under which the assessee had accepted the sum from the lender through the bank. The order was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the assessing authority with directions to give one day personal hearing to the assessee. (AY.2018-19)

    Nagalinga Nadar M. M. v. Add. CIT (2021) 439 ITR 147 / 207 DTR 241 / (2022) 284 Taxman 244 / 324 CTR 195 (Mad.)(HC)

  66. S. 144B: Faceless Assessment –Assessment order without complying with the procedure- Assessing Officer was directed to pass a fresh order, after complying with requirement of section 144B.[S. 143 (3), Art , 226]

    Where the assessment order was passed without first issuing a show cause notice on the assessee as provided for in section 144B, such an assessment order was bad in law and was to be set aside. However, opportunity was to be given to the Assessing Officer to pass a fresh order after complying with the requirements of section 144B. (AY. 2017-18)

    Sribasta Kumar Swain v .UOI [2022] 440 ITR 545 (Orissa) (HC)

  67. S. 144B : Faceless Assessment – Contention of denial of opportunity of personal hearing requested by Assessee — Assessment order stayed.[Art , 226]

    On a writ petition contending that the assessment made under section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be examined by the High Court without insisting upon filing of an appeal and no personal hearing was provided. The High Court directed issue notice of the writ petition and stay application and stayed the effect and operation of the assessment order in the meanwhile.

    Inder Prasad Mathura Lal v. NEAC (2022) 440 ITR 73 (Raj) ( HC)

  68. S. 147: Reassessment-After the expiry of four years-Seeking clarification-Retention money-No failure to disclose material facts-Reassessment is bad in law [S. 148, Art, 226]

    The assessment was completed u/s 143(3) of the Act. The notice for reassessment was issued after the expiry of four years for seeking clarifications. The assessee filed writ challenging the issue of notice u/s 148 of the Act. Single judge dismissed the writ petition. On appeal allowing the petition the Court held that there appears to be no power vested with the AO to seek such clarifications-Nevertheless, the assessee has furnished the reply and the reply specifically stated that the retention money has already been offered to tax in the subsequent period. There is no allegation against the assessee of any failure on his part to disclose full particulars at the time of original assessment, nor there is any fresh tangible material brought out by the AO on record justifying his exercise of power under section 147 read with section 148 of the Act. Notice was quashed. (AY. 2011-12)

    Subrahmanyan Constructions Co. (P) Ltd v. A CIT (2021) 207 DTR 289 (Mad) (HC)

  69. S. 147: Reassessment-After the expiry of four years-Interest expenses-No failure to disclose material facts-Reassessment notice was quashed [S. 57, 148, Art, 226]

    The assessment was completed u/s 143(3) of the Act. The Reassessment notice was issued on the ground that the interest paid to HDFC bank was not allowable as deduction u/s 57 of the Act. The assessee filed the writ petition to quash the reassessment notice, allowing the petition the Court held that there is no failure on the part of the assessee to truly and fully disclose all primary facts necessary for the purpose of assessment. Accordingly the reassessment notice was quashed. Followed Calcutta Discount Co Ltd v. ITO (1961) 41 ITR 191 (SC), Ananta Land Mark Pvt. Ltd v. Dy.CIT (2021) 439 ITR 168 (Bom) (HC). (AY. 2012-13)

    Kalpataru Plus Shrayans v. Dy. CIT (2021) 207 DTR 138 /323 CTR 747 (Bom) (HC)

  70. S. 147 : Reassessment-After the expiry of four years-Objections to notice-Order disposing the objections must be passed by passing speaking order-Order disposing the objection was set aside. [S. 148, Art. 226]

    The assessee challenged the issue of notice u/s 148 of the Act and order disposing the objection. Allowing the petition the Court held that the Assessing Officer had to pass a speaking order taking into consideration the objections raised by the assessee. The cryptic manner of dealing without any semblance of reasons necessitated a remand. (AY.2013-14)

    Shilp Realty Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO (2021) 439 ITR 478 (Guj.)(HC)

  71. S. 147 : Reassessment-Arithmetical mistake-Issue subject matter of appeal before CIT(A)-Reassessment invalid-Electricity duty short provision of interest on Government loan-Deletion of addition is held to be justified. [S. 43B, 148]

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that the reassessment proceedings had been initiated contrary to the second proviso to section 147(1). What was pending before the Commissioner (Appeals) was the very same subject matter for which notice under section 148 was issued. Court also held that the Tribunal was right in confirming the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) and quashing the order thereby deleting the additions made on account of electricity duty and short provision of interest on Government loan, made under section 43B, relying on the court’s decision in the assessee’s own case for earlier assessment years. Followed Kerala State Electricity Board v. Dy CIT (2010) 329 ITR 91 (Ker.)(HC) (AY. 2005-06)

    PCIT v. Kerala State Electricity Board (2021)439 ITR 323 (Ker.) (HC)

  72. S. 147: Reassessment – After the expiry of four years –Shipping Reserve — Amendment in law with effect from 1.4.1996 restricting deduction to 50% of income derived from operation of ships — Amendment not applicable in respect of earlier AY — Failure to furnish reasons recorded as requested by assessee — No failure on part of assessee to disclose all material facts fully and truly – Reassessment was quashed. [S. 33AC , 148, Art , 226 ]

    For the AY 1994-95, the assessee’s income was revised at nil after allowing deduction under section 33AC. After a period of four years, the assessee received a notice under section 148 to reopen the assessment under section 147. On a writ petition:

    Held, allowing the petition, that the Finance Act, 1995 amended the provisions of section 33AC with effect from April 1, 1996 and restricted the deduction to be allowed at 50% of the profits derived from the business of operation of ships (computed under the head “profits and gains of business or profession” before making a deduction under the section). The deduction under section 33AC as it stood in the AY 1994-95 was to be allowed on the basis of the total income. The period of limitation of four years had expired and the reasons for reopening of the assessment did not disclose any finding that the assessee had failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. The reasons for re-opening showed that the conclusion had been drawn from the case record of the assessee itself. The entire reasons proceeded on the basis of “perusal of details” and on “perusal of records” and stated that the assessee had wrongly claimed certain deductions which had been accepted by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the fact that the assessee had been allowed a deduction under section 33AC in respect of income from dividends, long-term capital gains and interest was no ground for issuing notice under section 148 to initiate reassessment proceedings. (AY. 1994-95)

    Great Eastern Shipping Company Limited v. K. C. Naredi, Addl. CIT (2022) 440 ITR 59 (Bom) ( HC )

  73. S. 147: Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Condition Precedent — Notice not specifying failure to disclose any material facts truly and fully by assessee — Notice and subsequent order invalid [S. 148, Art. 226]

    For the AY 1998-99, the assessee filed a second revised return declaring a loss as a result of demerger of its bottling division. The AO issued notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1) along with a questionnaire. The assessee furnished the reasons for filing the revised returns of income and provided clarifications in response to the various queries raised and the balance sheet and the profit and loss account. Thereafter, the AO passed an order under section 143(3) computing the total income of the assessee at Nil after making certain disallowances and after setting off earlier years’ losses. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).

    The Commissioner by an order under section 263 directed the AO to pass a fresh assessment order after considering the issues identified in his order. Thereafter, an order under section 143(3) read with section 263 was passed.

    After the expiry of four years the AO issued a notice under section 148 to reopen the assessment under section 147. On a writ petition:

    Held, allowing the petition, that the reasons recorded for reopening of the assessment did not state that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment of the AY 1998-99. The notice issued under section 148 after a period of four years for reopening the assessment under section 147 and the consequential order passed were quashed and set aside. (AY. 1998-99)

    Coca-Cola India P. Ltd. v. DCIT (2022) 440 ITR 20 (Bom) ( HC)

  74. S. 147: Reassessment – Two assessment years reopened – One with in four years – One after the expiry of four years – Condition Precedent — Primary facts necessary for assessment fully and truly disclosed — AO had applied his mind – Not open for the AO to reopen assessment based on very same material and to take a different view – Notices for reopening on change of opinion – Invalid [S. 148, Art , 226 ]

    The assessee sold beauty care products and provided consultancy services. It declared income from sale of products and income from provision of services. The AO issued a notice under section 142(1) and the assessee furnished the details of advertisement expenses as sought for. Thereafter, an order under section 143(3) was passed accepting the return of income. After a period of four years, a notice under section 148 was issued to reopen the assessment under section 147 for the AY 2012-13 and within period of four years for AY 2013-14, on the ground that the advertisement and marketing expenditure incurred by the assessee was not deductible under section 37 since the assessee was prohibited from advertising under the provisions of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 , read with Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002. The objections raised by the assessee were rejected. On writ petitions :

    Held, allowing the petitions, that in the original assessment the AO was aware of the issue of expenses incurred on advertisement and marketing by the assessee. Once he had applied his mind in the regular assessment proceedings of the assessee having incurred advertisement and marketing expenditure, it was not open for him to reopen the assessment under section 147. In the original assessment the assessee was called upon to differentiate between the nature of expenses shown under the head depreciation and amortization vis-a-vis advertisement and marketing expenses shown in the profit and loss account. The requisite details, including a copy of agreement, actual advertising invoices, were filed and the issue was discussed with the Assessing Officer at length before he passed the order under section 143(3). The notices under section 148 for reopening the assessment under section 147 were issued merely on change of opinion and therefore, set aside. Followed Aroni Commercial Ltd v. Dy CIT (2014) 362 ITR 403 (Bom) (HC), Marico Ltd v. ACIT (2019) 111 taxmann.com 53 ( Bom) (HC) (AY. 2012-13, 2013-14)

    Rich Feel Health and Beauty Private Limited v. ITO (2022) 440 ITR 41/ 284 Taxman 286 (Bom) ( HC)

  75. S. 147 : Reassessment – Reason to believe – Sanction for issue of notice – Recording of separate reasons not necessary – Reassessment notice is held to be valid. [S. 148 , 151 Art , 226]

    The sanctioning authority is not required to separately record his reasons for granting a sanction if he approves the reasons recorded by the AO. In such a case, it cannot be said that the sanction has been granted in a mechanical manner and, therefore, the proceedings are bad in law. Further, since in this case, no questions were asked on the issue in which reassessment was sought to be done, it would not constitute a case of change of opinion. (AY. 2014-15)

    Premlata Soni ( Smt.) v. NEAC (2022) 440 ITR 578 (MP) (HC)

  76. S. 147 : Reassessment – With in four years- Where the necessary details were disclosed, reopening is not valid. [S. 54, 148, Art. 226]

    The Assessing Officer initiated reassessment proceedings on the ground that the assessee had failed to file several details pertaining to its claim of deduction under section 54 of the Act such as proof of cost of improvement etc. Held that the assessee’s computation of capital gains after considering the deduction claimed under section 54 of the Act was on record. Further, the details regarding the cost were also filed. Therefore, the Assessing Officer proceeded on a wrong presumption that the details were not on record. Accordingly, he could not have recorded a reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment and the proceedings were to be quashed. (AY. 2012-13)

    Bankim Bhagwanji Chaauhan v. ITO (2022) 440 ITR 485 (Guj) ( HC)

  77. S. 147 : Reassessment –With in four years- Where the necessary details were disclosed, reopening is not valid. [S. 148, Art. 226]

    The Assessing Officer sought to reopen an assessment on the ground that due to delay in submission of TP study, the arm’s length price of the transaction could not be examined. Quashing the proceedings, the High Court held that Form 3CEB as well as the TP study were filed in time and that it was apparent from the record that the Assessing Officer had decided to neither refer the matter to the Transfer Pricing Officer nor did he himself examine the transactions. Having done so, he could not change his opinion and reopen a concluded assessment. (AY .2013-14)

    JRS Pharma and Gujarat Microwax Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy.CIT (2022) 440 ITR 557 (Guj) ( HC)

  78. S. 153A : Assessment-Search or requisition-Warrant of Authorisation-Effect of amendment of Section 132(1) by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009-Amendment has retrospective effect from June 1, 1994 and is clarificatory-Additional Director of Income-Tax had Authority to issue warrant of authorisation-Without incriminating material proceedings u/s 153A is not valid. [S. 132]

    Court held that Section 132(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 authorizing the Additional Director or the Additional Commissioner or the Joint Director or the Joint Commissioner to issue a search warrant. This provision was given retrospective effect from June 1, 1994. In terms of the clarification issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes the amendment is clarificatory. Warrant of Authorisation issued by the Additional Director of Income-tax was held to be valid. Court also held that there being absolutely no incriminating materials found or seized at the time of search, there was no justification for the initiation of assessment proceedings under section 153A. The assessment proceedings were not valid. (AY.2002-03 to 2008-09)

    Smrutisudha Nayak (Smt.) v. UOI (2021) 439 ITR 193 / 208 DTR 1 / 323 CTR 617 (Orissa)(HC)

  79. S. 154 : Rectification of mistake-Loss return-One day delay in filling of return-Mistake must be obvious-Assessment order passed without considering the delay in filing of return-Mistake which could be rectified-Liberty given to the assessee to file an application before CBDT. [S. 80, 119(2)(b), 139(3)]

    Dismissing the appeal the Court held that the return claiming loss had been submitted with a delay of just one day and even that was caused by a bona fide error. The mistake could be rectified. Court gave liberty to the assessee to file an application under section 119(2)(b) of the Act before the competent authority seeking condonation of delay in filing returns and thereafter carry forward of loss to the subsequent assessment year which were incurred during the assessment year 2004-05.(AY.2006-07)

    Kolar and Chickballapur District Co-Op. Bank Ltd. v. A CIT (2021) 439 ITR 678 (Karn.)(HC)

  80. S. 154 : Rectification of mistake-Expenditure on account of stores and spares-Omission to make addition in the assessment order-Income assessed as income from other sources and not as business income-Rectification is held to be valid. [S. 28(1), 37(1), 56]

    Affirming the order of the Tribunal the Court held that the assessee had not been carrying on any manufacturing activity for the assessment year 2004-05, and the rental income received by the assessee for that year could not be treated as business income. In view of the finding, the disallowance of the expenditure on stores and spares by the Assessing Officer was correct. The omission of the Assessing Officer to make the addition while computing the total income was liable to be rectified. The order of rectification was valid. (AY.2004-05)

    PTL Enterprises Ltd. v. Dy.CIT (2021) 439 ITR 365 (Ker.)(HC)

  81. S. 226 : Collection and recovery-Modes of recovery-Stay of recovery-Pendency of appeal before CIT(A)-Alternative remedy-Directed to approach the Assessing Officer for stay-Writ is not maintainable. [S. 220(6), 246, 246A, Art. 226]

    The assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A) which was pending for final disposal. For stay of recovery the assesee filed writ before the High Court. Dismissing the petition the Court held that the assessee could approach the Assessing Officer under section 220(6) of the Act. Merely because of some apprehensions in the minds of the assessee, it cannot be stated that the Assessing Officer would not decide the issue in the proper perspective. The Assessee directed to file application under section 220(6) of the Act. (AY.2018-19)

    Aiman Education and Welfare Society v. NFAC (2021) 439 ITR 651 (Mad.)(HC)

  82. S. 226 : Collection and recovery-Garnishee proceedings-Criminal proceedings against assessee with reference to particular amount-Money in excess in Bank can be adjusted towards tax dues of assessee. [S. 226(4), Code of Criminal Procedure code, 1973, S. 451, 457, Indian Penal Code 1860, S 120B, 420, Art. 226]

    The petition was filed before the Court to transfer money in excess in Bank which can be adjusted towards tax due of the assessee. Court held that according to the status report filed by the Bureau, the amounts transferred by the Russian company to the assessee in the London account, in relation to the transaction totalled to a sum of USD 2,15,71,843.90. However, the amount which was frozen and received in India was beyond the amount in relation to transaction with the Russian company. The amount received in excess of the amount received from the Russian company by the assessee qua the transaction could not be prima facie termed as case property or the proceeds of the crime liable to be confiscated or for compensation in case the assessee were charged and convicted. Consequently the Special Judge was to retain the amount received in lieu of the frozen amount of USD 2,15,71,843.90 along with the interest accrued thereon from the date of receipt till date and transfer the balance amount along with the interest accrued thereon received in the account to the Income-tax Department.

    Ravina and Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2021) 439 ITR 667 / 208 DTR 25 / 323 CTR 908 (Delhi)(HC)

  83. S. 192 : Deduction at source-Salary-Credit for tax deducted-Collection and recovery of tax-Bar against direct demand on assessee-Failure to deposit the tax in Government treasury by the employer-Credit cannot be denied to the employee-Directed to give credit [S.199, 201, 205, Art, 226]

    Assessee was an employee of Kingfisher Airlines. Airlines deducted TDS on salary made to assessee but did not deposit same in Government treasury.The credit was not given by revenue and demand has been raised with interest. On writ the Court held that TDS having been deducted by employer of assessee, it will always been open for department to recover same from said employer and credit of same could not have been denied to assessee. Court also held that if tax had been recovered the assessee is entitle to refund with the interest.Followed Devarsh Pravinbhai Patel v. ACIT (SCA Nos. 12965 /12966 of 2018 dt. 24-9 2028, ACIT v. Om Prakash Gattani (2000) 242 ITR 638 (Delhi)(HC) (AY. 2009-10, 2011-12)

    Kartik Vijaysingh Sonavane v. Dy. CIT (2021) 208 DTR 441 / 324 CTR 111/ 132 taxmann.com 293 / (2022)) 440 ITR 11/ 284 Taxman 278 (Guj.) (HC)

  84. S. 194H : Deduction at source-Commission or brokerage-Sale of prepaid SIM cards to distributors-Discounts given by assessee-telecommunication company on sale of prepaid SIM cards to distributors-Not liable to deduct tax at source

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that that no TDS provisions under section 194H were attracted on discounts given by assessee-telecommunication company on sale of prepaid SIM cards to distributors.

    CIT(TDS) v. Vodafone Cellular Ltd. (2021)131 taxmann.com 191 (Bom) (HC)

    Editorial : Notice is issued in SLP filed by the revenue, CIT(TDS) v. Vodafone Cellular Ltd. (2021) 283 Taxman 292 (SC)

  85. S. 201 : Deduction at source-Survey-Failure deduct tax at source-Payment to non-residents-Appeal pending before two earlier assessment years-Writ was dismissed-Directed to pursue alternative remedy of appeal. [S. 133A, 201 (1), 201(IA) Art, 226)

    Dismissing the petition the Court held that the assessee has already availed of its remedies of appeal in relation to two assessment years hence the writ was dismissed and directed to avail the appeal proceedings in accordance with law.

    BT (India) (P) Ltd v. ITO 323 CTR 661/ 207 DTR 377 (Delhi) (HC)

  86. S. 234B : Interest-Advance tax-Tax deducted at source-Non-resident-Payer deducted tax at source-Levy of interest is held to be not justified.

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court payer, who was required to make payments to assessee-non-resident, had deducted tax at source, question of payment of advance tax by assessee (payee) would not arise and, therefore, it would not be permissible for revenue to levy interest under section 234B upon assessee. Followed DIT (IT) v. Texas Instruments Incorporated (2020) 275 Taxman 614 (Ker)(HC) AY. 2011-12)

    CIT v. IBM Singapore (P) Ltd. (2021) 131 taxmann.com 189 (Karn) (HC)

    Editorial : Notice issued in SLP filed by the revenue against High Court order, CIT v. IBM Singapore (P) Ltd. (2021) 283 Taxman 288 (SC)

  87. S. 234E : Fee – Default in furnishing the statements – Provision for levy of late fee for delay in filing — Valid — Intimation calling for payment of late fee for delaying filing of return — Not sustainable for periods prior to June 1, 2015 [S. 200A, Art, 226]

    During FY 2012-13 and 2013-14, TDS was timely deducted and deposited by Petitioner companies, however, there was delay in filing quarterly returns. Revenue processed belated quarterly returns under section 200A and issued intimation that Petitioner was under statutory obligation under section 234E to pay late fee for delayed filing of TDS return. On writ petitions against the said intimations, a single judge declared the intimations illegal. On appeal before the Division Bench:

    Since provisions of section 200A were amended to enable computation of fee payable under section 234E at time of processing of return and said amendment came into effect from 1-6-2015 (in view of CBDT Circular No. 19 of 2015 dtd. 17-11-2015), intimations issued under section 200A dealing with fee for belated filing of TDS returns for period prior to 1-6-2015 were invalid and were to be set aside.

    Olari Little Flower Kuries (P.) Ltd. v. UOI (2022) 440 ITR 26 (Ker) (HC)

  88. S. 234E : Fee – Default in furnishing the statements – Provision for levy of late fee for delay in filing — Valid — Intimation calling for payment of late fee for delaying filing of return — Not sustainable for periods prior to June 1, 2015 [S. 200A, Art, 226]

    During FY 2012-13 and 2013-14, TDS was timely deducted and deposited by Petitioner companies, however, there was delay in filing quarterly returns. Revenue processed belated quarterly returns under section 200A and issued intimation that Petitioner was under statutory obligation under section 234E to pay late fee for delayed filing of TDS return. On writ petitions against the said intimations, a single judge declared the intimations illegal. On appeal before the Division Bench:

    Since provisions of section 200A were amended to enable computation of fee payable under section 234E at time of processing of return and said amendment came into effect from 1-6-2015 (in view of CBDT Circular No. 19 of 2015 dtd. 17-11-2015), intimations issued under section 200A dealing with fee for belated filing of TDS returns for period prior to 1-6-2015 were invalid and were to be set aside.

    Olari Little Flower Kuries (P.) Ltd. v. UOI (2022) 440 ITR 26 (Ker) (HC)

  89. S. 244A : Refund-Interest on refunds-Interest granted earlier-Directed not to charge the interest. [S. 220(2)]

    Held that the interest under section 244A of the Act was paid by the Department for the delay caused in giving refund due to the assessee. Interest on the interest paid under section 244A of the Act not being provided under the statute, the Tribunal rightly held that the Assessing Officer shall recompute the interest chargeable under section 220(2) of the Act by reducing only the principal amount of tax from the refund granted earlier and not charge interest on the interest granted earlier under section 244A. (AY.1997-98)

    CIT v. ABB Ltd. (2021) 439 ITR 554 (Karn.)(HC)

  90. S. 245D : Settlement Commission-No procedural error committed by Settlement Commission-Order of single judge allowing the writ petition of the revenue was set aside-Order of settlement commission was affirmed. [S. 245D(4), Art. 226]

    Single judge allowed the writ petition of the revenue. On appeal allowing the appeal the Court held that the findings rendered by the Settlement Commission was not a concession extended by the Commissioner (Departmental representative), but in fact, accepting the verification report which was submitted. Therefore, the Department, on a wrong premise that the Settlement Commission had recorded that a concession was given, had filed a writ petition which was unnecessary, as the Commission had not recorded any concession, but taken up the matter, considered the case of the assessee as well as the Department, and settled the case based upon the increased offer made by the assessee. On a cumulative reading of the order, it was clear that one of the disputes which was subject matter of the settlement proceedings was unaccounted excess stock. On account of the stand taken by the Department as well as the assessee the Commission had directed verification of the data from the impounded computer server. There was no procedural error committed by the Settlement Commission, warranting interference by the court. The order of the Settlement Commission was not to be construed as a concession given by the Commissioner (Departmental representative), but a finding rendered by the Commission with regard to the verification of the data from the impounded computer server. Therefore, when there was no procedural irregularity the order of the Settlement Commission, which had attained finality and given effect, it need not be interfered with. The order allowing the writ petition filed by the Department was set aside.

    G. Rajam Chetty and Sons v. CIT (2021) 439 ITR 687 (Mad.)(HC)

    Editorial : Decision of single judge in CIT v. ITSC (2021) 439 ITR 684 (Mad)(HC) set aside.

  91. S. 246A : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Writ against assessment order – Non-interference of court in view of the availability of the alternate remedy.[S. 143(3), 248, Art, 226]

    Where the assessee challenged an assessment order by way of a writ petition, the assessee was to be relegated to the alternate remedy of appeal since the exceptions to the alternate remedy, i.e., (i) a breach of fundamental rights; (ii) a violation of the principles of natural justice; (iii) an excess of jurisdiction; or (iv) a challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation were not present. Writ petition was dismissed. (AY. 2014 -15 )

    Sree Krumariamman Granites v. ACIT (2022) 440 ITR 537/ 209 DTR 283/ 324 CTR 418 (Mad) (HC)

  92. S. 254(1) : Appellate Tribunal-Powers-Remand of case-Power to be used only in exceptional cases-Order of remand was set aside.

    Allowing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that on the facts of the case, the Tribunal was not right in setting aside the well reasoned order passed by the Assessing Officer for re-examination, especially when the Assessing Officer had duly examined all the material placed while passing the assessment order which was affirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals). Order of Commissioner (Appeals) is restored. (AY.2015-16)

    PCIT v. Prabha Jain (2021) 439 ITR 304 (Mad.)(HC)

  93. S. 254(2) : Appellate Tribunal-Rectification of mistake apparent from the record-Additional grounds-Order can be rectified on account of mistake of the counsel for the parties. [S. 253, Art. 226]

    At the time of hearing the counsel for the assessee inadvertently, failed to bring to the notice of the Tribunal that issue raised inn ground no Nos. 6 and 7 of the grounds of appeal. The assessee filed the miscellaneous application which was rejected on the ground that there was no mistake in the order of the Tribunal. On writ allowing the petition the Court held that, the amendment to the order of the Tribunal under section 254(2) could also be made, if it was triggered on account of a mistake of the counsel for the parties. This power would also extend to a situation where the assessee’s counsel withdrew the appeal, for the reason that, the issue concerning the transfer pricing adjustment in respect of the assessment year 2011-12 stood resolved. The order passed by the Tribunal in the miscellaneous application was to be set aside. The Tribunal was directed to adjudicate the issues pertaining to the additional grounds raised by the assessee. Relied on CIT (Asst) v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd (2003) 305 ITR 227 (SC), S.Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka (1993 Suppl. 4SCC 595 (AY.2011-12)

    Federal Mogul Goetze (India) Ltd. v. ACIT (2021) 439 ITR 204 (Delhi)(HC)

  94. S. 254(2): Appellate Tribunal-Rectification of mistake apparent from the record-lease rent-Tribunal followed order of earlier year and not followed the Judgement of Supreme Court-Miscellaneous application was dismissed-Order rejecting miscellaneous application was set aside-Non-consideration of judgement of Supreme Court is a mistake apparent on record-Matter remanded to Tribunal to decide on merits in accordance with law [S. 37 (1)), 200A]

    The assessee claimed deduction of lease rental paid on cars taken on financial lease as revenue expenditure. The AO disallowed the expenditure. CIT (A) allowed the appeal. On appeal by the revenue the assessee relied on the decision of Supreme Court in I.C.D.S Ltd v. CIT (2013) 350 ITR 527 (SC). The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the revenue following the earlier order of the Tribunal in assesse’s own case for the Assessment year 2013-14. The assessee filed miscellaneous application and relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in CIT v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd (2008) 305 DTR 227 (SC) for the proposition that non-consideration of a decision of the Jurisdictional High Court or the Honourable Supreme Court is a mistake apparent from records. Tribunal dismissed the miscellaneous application. On appeal High Court held that The Tribunal can take a stand that the issue is debatable and for doing so the Tribunal should record the reasons as to what are the other decisions on the very same point which may not support the case of the assessee. Accordingly the order rejecting the miscellaneous application filed by the assessee was held to be not justified. Order of Tribunal was set aside and Directed the Tribunal to decide on merit in accordance with law. (AY. 2004-05)

    Philips India Ltd v. PCIT (2021) 323 CTR 992 / 208 DTR 211 (Cal) (HC))

  95. S. 254(2): Appellate Tribunal-Rectification of mistake apparent from the record – Delay of 1924 days (Eight years) – Condonation of delay was dismissed. [S. 260A]

    Where there was a delay of around eight years in filing a miscellaneous application before the Tribunal and the reason for the delay was mentioned to be the reason that the concerned officers of the assessee and its tax consultants had retired/changed, the Tribunal was right in concluding that the same was not a sufficient reason to entertain the appeal and condone the delay. Accordingly, dismissal of the miscellaneous application by the Tribunal was correct and does not call for interference. (AY. 2007-08)

    South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. PCIT (2022) 440 ITR 568 (Chhattisgarh) (HC)

  96. S. 260A : Appeal-High Court-Central Board of Direct Taxes Circulars-Question was not argued before Tribunal-Appeal is not maintainable. [S. 80IC, 268A]

    Dismissing the appeal the Court held that once the Department had not raised the plea of applicability of clause 10(c) of the Board’s Circular No. 3 of 2018, dated July 11, 2018 it could not be allowed to raise such plea in the appeal before the court. No such ground was raised by the Department before the Tribunal requiring it to decide the matter on the merits in view of clause 10(c) of Circular No. 3 of 2018, July 11, 2018. The Tribunal had correctly held that the appeal was not maintainable in view of the mandate of Circular No. 17 of 2019, dated August 8, 2019. No question of law arose. (AY. 2012-13)

    PCIT v. Surya Textech (2021) 439 ITR 215 (HP)(HC)

  97. S. 260A : Appeal-High Court-Territorial jurisdiction of High Court-Transfer of case-Pendency of proceedings-Ahmadabad Tribunal decided the appeal-Appeal was filed at Allahabad High Court-Jurisdiction vest with Gujarat High court-Appeal was dismissed. [S. 120, 127(2)]

    The case of the assessee was transferred from Ahmadabad to Noida by order dated 29 th December 2020. The appeal of the assessee for the assessment year 2012-13 was decided by the Appellate Tribunal on 12 th November, 2020 Assessment order was passed on 28th Dec. 2017 CIT (A) decided the appeal on 31st Jan., 2019. Appellate Tribunal decided the appeal on by the Tribunal on 12th Nov., 2020. On the dt. 29th Dec, 2020, the assessment case of the assessee for asst. yr. 2012 13 was not pending Even if one were to apply the principle of appeal being continuation of the assessment, the fact that the Revenue has chosen to file the instant appeal in June, 2021, it cannot be relied to contend that proceeding was pending on 29th Dec, 2020. Therefore jurisdiction to hear the appeal would continue to vest with the Gujarat High Court and not before the Allahabad High Court. The appeal has been wrongly instituted before Allahabad High Court. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed (AY. 2012-13)

    PCIT v. Dileep Kumar (2021) 323 CTR 998 / 208 DTR 110 (All)(HC)

  98. S. 263 : Commissioner-Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue-Order passed without providing adequate opportunity to the assessee was held to be not valid-Revision order which was affirmed by the Tribunal was set aside-directed the Commissioner to pass the order in conformity with the provisions of the Act. [S. 254(1)]

    Allowing the appeal of the assessee the Court held that the Commissioner is duty bound to give an opportunity of being heard, while exercising the revisionary jurisdiction, to the assessee while enhancing or modifying the assessment or cancelling the assessment or directing for fresh assessment in conformity with the provisions contained under section 263. Accordingly the order passed by the Commissioner, without giving reasonable opportunity to the assessee which was affirmed by the Tribunal was set aside. Directed the Commissioner to pass the order in conformity with the provisions of the Act in conformity with the provisions of the Act. (AY.2014-15)

    Ashoka Ispat Udyog v. PCIT (2021) 439 ITR 391 (Orissa)(HC)

  99. S. 263 : Commissioner-Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue-Violation of principles of Natural justice-Matter remanded to PCIT [S. 143(3), Art. 226]

    Allowing the petition the Court held that when the law specifically requires the giving of an opportunity of being heard, that must be followed lest such failure render the order legally fragile on the anvil of breach of principles of natural justice. The procedure followed by the Principal Commissioner in passing the order without giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee was in violation of section 263 and in breach of principles of natural justice. The order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Principal Commissioner.

    Narayanachetty Roja v. PCIT (2021) 439 ITR 104 / 323 CTR 861 (AP)(HC)

  100. S. 263 : Commissioner-Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue-Amortisation of preliminary expenses-Granted in initial year of expenditure-Deduction cannot be withdrawn in subsequent year. [S. 35D]

    Allowing the appeal the Court held that Amortisation of preliminary expenses granted in initial year of expenditure cannot be withdrawn in subsequent year without disturbing the decision in the initial year. Followed, Dy. CIT v. Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers co. ltd (2013) 356 ITR 460 (Guj.)(HC). (AY.2008-09)

    Subex Ltd. v. CIT (2021) 439 ITR 495 (Karn.)(HC)

  101. S. 263 : Commissioner-Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue-Limitation-Reassessment-Issue which was not subject matter of reassessment limitation has to be computed from the original assessment-Revision was held to be barred by limitation [143(3), 147, 263 (2)]

    The assessment was completed u/s 143(3) of the Act on 28 th December 2006. The reassessment was completed on 30 the December 2011. The revision order was passed on 26 th March 2014. The Tribunal held that the issue which was not subject matter of reassessment while computing the limitation the issue which was was not subject matter of reassessment limitation has to be computed from the original assessment-Revision was held to be barred by limitation. Relied on CIT v. Alagendran Finance Ltd (2007)) 293 ITR 1(SC), Asoka Buildcon Ltd v. ACIT (2010) 325 ITR 574 (Bom) (HC), CIT v. ICICI Bank Ltd (2012) 252 CTR 85 (Bom)(HC) (AY. 2004-05)

    CIT v. Indian Overseas Bank (2021) 207 DTR 202 (Mad) (HC)

  102. S. 263 : Commissioner-Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue-Merger-Subject matter of appeal-Investments written off-Book profit-Issue was not subject matter of appeal-Revision was quashed [S.115JB]

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that the revision was held to be bad in law though the issue of investments written off whether allowable deduction or not was not subject matter of appeal. Revision order was quashed. Followed ITA No. 18/2004 dt 16-1-2020 and ITA No. 142 / 2016 dt.22-1.2020 (AY. 2006-07)

    CIT, LTU v. Vijaya Bank (2021) 131 taxmann.com 136 (Karn) (HC)

    Editorial : SLP is granted to the revenue, CIT, LTU v. Vijaya Bank (2021) 283 Taxman 295 (SC)

  103. S. 263 : Commissioner-Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue-Dispute resolution panel-Draft assessment order-No notice of demand attached-Order cannot be revised-No loss to revenue [S.144C]

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that the draft assessment order is only a proposed assessment order and there is no demand notice attached to draft assessment order and draft assessment order by itself cannot levy tax on assessee. Revision of draft assessment order is bad in law. (AY. 2010-11)

    PCIT v. Apollo Tyres Ltd. (2021) 283 Taxman 388 (Ker.)(HC)

  104. S. 263 : Commissioner-Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue-Prima facie satisfaction was not arrived by the Commissioner-Interim order-Matter was adjourned to 26-8 2021. [Art, 226]

    Writ petition was filed against the revision order Whether where there was no prima facie satisfaction recorded by Principal Commissioner on basis of materials available on record that order of Assessing Officer which was sought to be reviewed under section 263 was an erroneous order as Principal Commissioner was yet to arrive at his prima facie conclusion and wanted matter to be examined further in-depth, no action could have been taken against assessee pursuant to proceeding initiated under section 263. Interim order was passed. The matter was adjourned to 26-8-2021 (SJ)

    CMJ Breweries (P) Ltd v. UOI (2021) 283 Taxman 226 (Gauhati) (HC)

  105. S. 263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Matter to be remanded to Commissioner where evidence was not considered by him.[ S.153A, 254(1), 260A]

    Where the Commissioner revised an assessment and the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s contention that the Commissioner had not examined the submissions and evidence, the Tribunal should have either examined the matter itself or remanded the matter back to the Commissioner. Since the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s contentions without following either of the two options, the matter was to be remanded to the Commissioner to consider the issue afresh. ( AY. 2008 -09,to 2011-12, 2013 -14)

    PCIT v. Shalimar Pellet Feeds Ltd. (2022) 440 ITR 530 (Cal) (HC)

  106. S. 271(1)(c) : Penalty-Concealment-Non striking off of irrelevant portion-Order of Tribunal confirming the penalty notice was set aside [S. 274]

    Allowing the appeal the Tribunal held that validity of the order of penalty must be determined on the basis of the initiation of penalty proceedings. Notice was issued in the printed format without non-striking off irrelevant portion. Defects being ex facie apparent in the notices issued, the ignition of proceedings being vitiated, the order of the Tribunal confirming the order of the authorities was set aside. (AY.2003-2004-05)

    P.M. Abdulla v. ITO (2021) 323 CTR 1077 / 208 DTR 93 (Karn)(HC)

  107. S. 271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – On money – Survey – Income voluntarily offered- Deletion of penalty is held to be justified [S. 131(IA), 133A]

    Where pursuant to survey proceedings, the assessee had voluntarily offered certain income to tax, the same would not be liable to penalty. These facts are different from a case where income is offered in a revised return of income after the addition is discovered by the Assessing Officer. (AY. 2012-13)

    PCIT v. Shreedhar Associates (2022) 440 ITR 547 (Guj) ( HC)

  108. S. 279 : Offences and prosecutions-Sanction-Chief Commissioner-Failure to file return within stipulated time-Issue of summons was only for one year-Reasons Remanded to the Commissioner for fresh consideration. [S. 139(1), 279(2), Art. 226]

    The commissioner proposed for launching prosecution for delay in filing of return. The assessee moved application for compounding which was rejected. On writ allowing the petition the court held that the reason stated by the assessee for failure in filing the return of income under section 139(1) in time by the assessee for the assessment year 2013-14 had not been considered in the proper perspective by analysing before rejecting the reasons.. The reason cited by the assessee, after giving him an opportunity, could once again be considered in the proper perspective and accordingly, a fresh order could be passed by the Chief Commissioner. The order was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Chief Commissioner for reconsideration. (AY.2013-14)

    Mahalingam Chandrasekar v. CCIT (2021) 439 ITR 698 (Mad.)(HC)

  109. S. 281B : Provisional attachment-Mere apprehension on the part of the respondents that huge tax demands are likely to be raised on completion of assessment is not sufficient-Attachment of fixed deposit was quashed. [S.153A, Art, 226]

    The fixed deposits of petitioner was attached invoking section 281B of the income-tax Act. On the ground that huge tax demands are likely to be raised. The assessee challenged the order by filing writ petition. Allowing the petition the Court held that mere apprehension on the part of the respondents that huge tax demands are likely to be raised on completion of assessment is not sufficient for the purpose of passing a provisional order of attachment. Exercise of power for order of provisional attachment must necessarily be preceded by formation of an opinion by the authorities that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of protecting the interest of Revenue. Before the order of provisional attachment, the CIT must form an opinion on the basis of the tangible material available for attachment that the assessee is not likely to fulfill the demand payment of tax and it is therefore necessary to do so for the purpose of protecting the interest of the Revenue-Radha Krishan Industries vs State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors (2021) SCC Online SC 334 followed. Order passed by the respondent was quashed.

    Indian Minerals & Granite Co. v. Dy. CIT (2021) 323 CTR 352 / 207 DTR 164(Karn) (HC)

Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020

  1. S. 2(1)(a)(i): Appellant-Pending appeal-Appeal was filed on 29th March 2013 and numbered-High court condoned the delay-The Rejection of application was quashed-Entitle to file Form No-4 in response to Form No 3 [S. 260A, Art, 226]

    The appeal before the High court was filed on 29 th March 2013. The application of the petitioner was rejected referring to FAQ No. 59 of the CBDT Circular No 21 of 2020, dt. 4th Dec, in respect of the taxpayer in whose case, the time limit for sing an appeal has expired before 31st Jan., 2020, but an application for condonation of delay has been filed and whether such an assessee is eligible to avail DTVSV Scheme. First of all, the question No. 59 cannot be applied to the assessee’s case, since while condoning the delay in representation, the Court has held that the appeals were filed before this Court on 29th March, 2013 and the crucial date shall be reckoned as 29th March, 2013 for all purposes Therefore, the assessee’s case cannot be brought under the ambit of the case dealt with in question No. 59. Therefore, the order of cancellation of Form 3 dt. 17th Sept, 2021, is not sustainable in law. This order was passed when the miscellaneous petitions were pending before this Court and the matter was adjourned to 15th Sept, 2021 at the instance of the Revenue by order dt. 1st Sept 2021 Thereafter, on earlier occasion, i.e., on 15th Sept, 2021, once again, at the instance of the Revenue, it was adjourned to 21st Sept., 2021 Thus, the order dt. 17th Sept, 2021 rejecting assessee’s declaration having been issued when the matter was pending before this Court, that too, without seeking leave of this Court, the order dt. 17th Sept, 2021 is quashed. As a consequence, the assessee would be entitled to file Form 4 in response to Form 3. Delay in filing the appeal was condoned by the High Court.

    Precot Meridian Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2021) 323 CTR 272 / 207 DTR 173(Mad)(HC)

    Precot Meridian Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2021) 323 CTR 279/ 207 DTR 179 (Mad)(HC)

Securities Transaction Tax-Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004

  1. S. 98 : Securities Transaction tax-Short collection of tax-Interest and penalty-Purchase or sold through a broker registered with the stock exchange-Stock exchange was not liable to any interest and penalty. [S. 15, 99, 104, Securities Transaction Tax Rules, 2004, R. 3]

    The Tribunal held that the STT is collected through a member broker under a particular client code. The client code is provided by the brokers and not by the stock exchange. Responsibility of the stock exchange is to ensure firstly that STT is collected as per s. 98, secondly, it has been determined in accordance with s. 99 read with r. 3 and Explanation thereto, and lastly, such STT collected from the purchaser or seller is credited to the Central Government as provided under s 100 Tribunal further held that the stock exchange can only ensure determination of the value of taxable securities transaction purchased and provided sold through a client code at the prescribed rate. However, there is no mechanism provided enabling the stock exchange to collect STT beyond the client code. If a broker had not taken any separate client code then the stock exchange cannot be held responsible. Such failure could not be ascribed to the stock exchange because the client codes were not provided by the stock exchange but by the member brokers. Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that under the statute stock exchange was not liable for any alleged short deduction of STT and therefore, no fault can be prescribed to the stock exchange and to hold the stock exchange to be in default for short collection of STT. (FY. 2005-06)

    PCIT v. National Stock Exchange (2021) 323 CTR 1025 (Bom.) (HC)