Law of reassessment- An examination of recent judgments of various High Courts

Arjun Gupta, Advocate

Introduction

The law of reassessment is one, if not the most important self-contained codes under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“Act”). A self-contained code is one which is exhaustive and complete, forming an independent body of law. Invocation of the reassessment provisions by the AO is a serious step since the case of the assessee which has attained finality, or thought to have attained finality, after scrutiny assessment proceedings are complete(under Section 143(3)), is sought to be ‘reassessed’ or ‘re-adjudicated’. Or sometimes, the Department issues reopening notices after a gap of several years without there being any scrutiny assessment proceedings at all! This leads to the assessee’s being taken by surprise, and also greatly perturbed. The only recourse for them is to take the matter to the upper judiciary(High Courts) immediately, especially when there is complete lack of jurisdiction in the Assessing Officer (“AO”) to initiate such proceedings. This is not an illusion but a practical reality, and several Writ Petitions are filed daily under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 before various High Courts challenging reassessment proceedings initiated by the AO making the challenge to reopening notices the most litigious issue under income-tax law.

The reassessment provisions are couched in Sections 148A, 148, 147, 149, 151 and 153. These are the key provisions, while many other provisions of the Act are attracted, depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. By the Finance Act, 2021 inter alia a new Section 148A was introduced into the Act codifying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts vs. ITO1. In this article, I will be dealing with a few recent decisions of various High Courts on the validity of reassessment/reopening proceedings initiated by the AO. The judgments have been examined threadbare along with a few inputs and opinions for each decision.

Introduction

Law of reassessment- An examinaton of recent judgments of various High Courts Arjun Gupta, Advocate AIFTPJ – 801 The reassessment provisions are couched in Sections 148A, 148, 147, 149, 151 and 153. These are the key provisions, while many other provisions of the Act are attracted, depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. By the Finance Act, 2021 inter alia a new Section 148A was introduced into the Act codifying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts vs. ITO 1 . In this article, I will be dealing with a few recent decisions of various High Courts on the validity of reassessment/reopening proceedings initiated by the AO. The judgments have been examined threadbare alongwith a few inputs and opinions for each decision.

Recent Judgments on Reassessment

1. KEENARA INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED vs. ITO 2

AND

2. RAJEEV BANSAL vs. UOI & 3 ORS. 3 The Allahabad and Gujarat High Courts, in the batch of petitions before it, were called upon to decide important issues of limitation pertaining to the validity of reassessment for certain Assessment Years (“AY”)(2013-2014 to 2017-2018).

The issue in a nutshell was that certain notices were issued to various assessee’s between 1.4.2021 and 30.6.2021 under Section 148 for the AY’s mentioned above. The validity of these notices were challenged before the High Courts as being beyond limitation as prescribed by the Finance Act, 2021, even though the Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2020 and the notifications issued thereunder, extended the validity of the notices from 1.4.2021 upto 30.6.2021.

The petitioner-assessees argued that when the Finance Act, 2021 has specifically imposed new time limits w.e.f 1-4-2021, then the notifications extending the time limits beyond 1-4-2021 will have no force for the purposes of computing limitation, as otherwise, the limitation provided by the Finance Act, 2021, an act of Parliament, would be violated. Thus, in essence the argument was that since the Finance Act, 2021 provides for a limitation of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year for issuing the notice under Section 148, then any notice issued for AY’s 2013-2014 to 2017-2018 beyond March 31, 2021 would be beyond limitation, and the notifications would not come to the rescue of the Department. Therefore, the limitation exists upto March 31, 2021 only. As per Section 149(1)(b) as existing before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021, the limitation was four years, but not more than six years, if the income chargeable to tax that had escaped assessment is ` 1lac or more, hence the limitation for the AY’s 2013-2014 to 2016-2017 was March 31, 2021 and not beyond. For AY 2017-2018, the limitation would be permissible till March 31, 2021 under the old law and the amended law as well but only upto March 31, 2021. Hence notices had to be issued before March 31, 2021 only. That the notices could be issued only if the time limit had not expired under the unamended/old law. That the TOLA, 2020 did not per se extend the time-limit and the time-limit was only extended by the notifications being delegated legislation. The assessees also conceded that notices issued between March 20, 2020 to December 31, 2020 would stand extended to March 31, 2021. Lastly, that since TOLA, 2020 must be deemed to be repealed by the Finance Act, 2021 and the notifications would not survive and are to be deemed non-est in the eyes of law. The High Courts of Gujarat and Allahabad upheld these contentions of the petitioner- assessee’s and quashed the notices issued under Section 148 and orders passed under Section 148A(d) during the period 1.4.2021-30.6.2021 for the AY’s 2013-2014 to 2017-2018 on the ground of limitation. The Courts noted that when the Finance Act, 2021 has specifically provided a limitation of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year for issuing the notice under Section 148, the notifications extending the time limit to 30.6.2021 cannot have any force inasmuch as being a piece of delegated legislation, the same cannot override parent/ substantive law enacted by Parliament, namely, the Finance Act, 2021. That it was not the TOLA, 2020 which extended the limitation but the same was done by virtue of the notifications and hence the limitation can only apply to the pre-existing law and not beyond 1.4.2021 to 30.6.2021 due to the substituted law(Finance Act, 2021). The Courts made a detailed reference to the judgment of Ashok Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India 4 where the above propositions were laid down and purportedly upheld by the Supreme Court in Ashish Aggarwal. The argument of the Revenue that the notifications extended the timeline on account of the COVID-19 pandemic were dismissed, it was held that there was no presumption that the applicability of Section 148A was deferred. The decisions of the Rajasthan High Court and Bombay High Court which were passed before Ashish Aggarwal

were referred to show how the notifications extending the timelines was improper.

Authors view: In my view, the judgments of both the High Courts quashing the reassessment notices are seriously flawed and deserve reconsideration in the Supreme Court or otherwise on review. My reasons are as follows:

1. The controversy surrounding reassessment arose on account of the decision in Ashish Aggarwal 5 of the Supreme Court which held that notices issued after 1.4.2021 would be deemed to be show-cause notices under Section 148A(b), and that all defences would be kept open. The petitioner-assessee’s have tried to urge that notwithstanding the conversion of the notices issued under the unamended law, since all defences are to be kept open, the notices are still amenable to challenge on the ground of limitation. Hence, the notices be quashed as having being issued in violation of the amended law(Finance Act, 2021). However, the Courts have in my view, misinterpreted the judgment of Ashish Agarwal which sanctioned the notices issued under the unamended law to save reassessment proceedings issued on account of a bona-fide mistake. Naturally, the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal by stating that all defences will be left open simply alluded to the Section 148 notice issued under the unamended law before the Section 148A(b) notice is issued. The Supreme Court has allowed the conversion of the notices to Section 148A(b) notices during the same period (1.4.2021-30.6.2021) which was in dispute on the ground of limitation in the present cases. However, on the specious ground that the Finance Act, 2021 allows a limitation of only three years is sought to be pressed. The Supreme Court was well aware of the notifications issued. Thus, the CBDT has by Instruction 1/2022 infact, taken note that for AY’s 2013- 2014 to 2015-2016, the notices would be deemed to be within limitation only if they fall within Section 149(1)(b)(ten years) as amended by the Finance Act, 2021. For AY’s 2016-2017 and beyond, the notices are within the three year period having been extended to 30.6.2021 and hence within limitation. Thus, the position has been well explained by CBDT’s Instruction. Importantly, what is lost sight of is that the 90,000 odd notices upheld by Supreme Court were issued during the same period for the very same AY’s- no notice would be issued by the Department for AY 2018-2019 and beyond, since the limitation was expiring on 31.3.2022 and there was ample time for the Department to issue the notices for these AY’s. Hence to say that the notices are beyond limitation for AY’s 2013-2014 to 2017- 2018 would be an absurdity, since if they are now struck off, it would amount to striking off almost all the reassessment notices upheld in Ashish Agarwal on the ground of limitation!

2. The assessee’s before the Gujrat High Court have accepted that the notices issued between March 20, 2020 to December 31, 2020 would stand extended to March 31, 2021 for the purposes of limitation. In my view, a purposive interpretation is required to be given to the TOLA Act, 2020 and the ground realities have to be taken into account. COVID-19 cases were exorbitantly high during the first few months of 2021 and lockdown measures were put into place during this period. Hence, it was impossible for the Revenue to issue the notices under Section 148 during this period. However, the Courts have given a very strict and narrow interpretation to the law and decided the petitions on the ground that the Finance Act, 2021 imposes a three year time limit only. This is in complete ignorance of the TOLA Act, 2020 which has not impliedly but expressly provided the power to the Central Government to issue the notifications which extended the timelimits only during the pandemic and not
after the pandemic ceased. To say that the time-limits have not been extended is to completely ignore the effect of the pandemic and the reality of the situation by making mandatory issuance of the notices under Section 148 even within this period of pandemic which was an impossible task. This amounts to defeating the ends of justice.

period. However, the Courts have given a very strict and narrow interpretation to the law and decided the petitions on the ground that the Finance Act, 2021 imposes a three year time limit only. This is in complete ignorance of the TOLA Act, 2020 which has not impliedly but expressly provided the power to the Central Government to issue the notifications which extended the time- limits only during the pandemic and not after the pandemic ceased. To say that the time-limits have not been extended is to completely ignore the effect of the pandemic and the reality of the situation by making mandatory issuance of the notices under Section 148 even within this period of pandemic which was an impossible task. This amounts to defeating the ends of justice.

3. It is settled law, that when two parliamentary legislations are in conflict, an attempt must first be made at reconciliation of the two enactments. In my view, the two enactments namely the Finance Act 2021 and the TOLA, 2020 and the notifications issued thereunder had to first be attempted to be reconciled and given effect to. This task was not impossible and the High Courts have erroneously held that the Finance Act, 2021 would stand defeated by such an interpretation. Is it not possible to hold that in view of the COVID-19 pandemic the limitation stood extended to 30.6.2021 and the provisions of the Finance Act, 2021 would be applicable for the remaining/latter period? The pertinent question is would not such an interpretation meet the ends of justice? After all, the pandemic made the issue of notices impossible, and the two enactments and notifications could be reconciled to this extent. The argument that it was not the TOLA, 2020 which extended the period of limitation but the notifications, must fail since the power to issue the notifications has been derived from Section 3 of TOLA, 2020 which expressly gave power to the CBDT to issue the notifications. Hence, it is apparent that the law ought to have been reconciled and the notifications upheld due to the manifest impossibility of complying with the period of limitation during the pandemic. A technicality of delegated legislation cannot defeat the ends of justice when notifications/policy is regarded as law, has been validly issued, and is capable of reconciliation with the Finance Act, 2021 to meet the ends of justice.

3. CLEAR MEDIA (INDIA) PVT. LTD. vs. DCIT AND OTHERS 6

The Assessment Year is 2016-2017. The Petitioner is engaged in the business of FM radio Broadcasting. It filed a return of income claiming a substantial loss of ` 7,88,83,872/-. Certain notices were issued to it under Section 142(1) and Section 143(2). In response the Petitioner submitted the details of capitalisation of intangible assets being license fees paid to the government and the depreciation claimed thereon. The said notices culminated into a scrutiny assessment order under Section 143(3) accepting the return of income of the petitioner including the claim of depreciation on the intangible asset being payment towards license fees, without making any adjustment. A notice was issued to the Petitioner assessee under Section 148 as it stood prior to the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021 on 30th March, 2021. The reasons were supplied

stating that the depreciation claimed was not in accordance with Section 35ABB and instead the entire amount of depreciation has been claimed on the intangible asset @25% instead of the amount allowable under Section 35ABB.

The assessee is a license holder with the Government of Delhi in the telecommunications sector. It was allowed to migrate from Phase II to Phase III by making payment of a one time non-refundable fee of ` 31 crores~ towards the license. It claimed depreciation on the amount paid @25% amounting to ` 8 crore~ instead of following the provisions of Section 35ABB. Section 35ABB provides for deduction of expenditure incurred to acquire a telecommunications license for the previous years, when the said license is in force, or for the period of the license. The AO in the reasons recorded was of the view that only ` 2 crore~ was allowable after following the provisions of Section 35ABB and that the depreciation claimed was excessive. Thus, the AO concluded that the depreciation claimed was excessive and the balance ought to be disallowed.

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court noted that it was not the case of the Department that depreciation was not allowable, but only that an excess amount of depreciation had been claimed, which was already dealt with during original scrutiny assessment proceedings. The Hon’ble Court ultimately took the view that all details and documents were supplied to the AO during scrutiny assessment proceedings which culminated in the scrutiny assessment order and that there was no new information or tangible material and nothing new whatsoever for the AO to reopen the case of the assessee inasmuch as the claim of depreciation had been discussed and allowed for the relevant AY during original scrutiny assessment proceedings. Once the claim for depreciation is allowed, no fresh recomputation is permissible under reopening provisions. Also, it would be irrelevant if the same discussion was not made in the assessment order but in the replies to the notices issued to the assessee under Section 143(2) and Section 142(1).

In the authors’ view, the above observations are praiseworthy. Had it been the case of the AO that depreciation was not allowable, and only the deduction under Section 35ABB was allowable, there could be said to be reasons to believe income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment since the depreciation allowed earlier had to be withdrawn and it would amount to an incorrect application of law and there cannot be said that there is any change of opinion by the AO.

In view of the express terms of Section 35ABB, no depreciation under Section 32 would be allowable when there is a specific provision(Section 35ABB). Hence, if it was the claim of the AO that depreciation was not allowable, and only deduction under Section 35ABB was allowable, I believe the reopening could have carried more weight. The reopening notice issued under Section 148 was ultimately quashed and set aside.

4. MA MULTI-INFRA DEVELOPMENT PVT. LTD. vs. ACIT & ORS7

The Petitioner challenged the notice dated March 31, 2021 issued under Section 148 for AY 2015-2016 on the ground that sanction as required under Section 151 was not obtained from the appropriate authority. The sanction had been obtained by the AO from the Additional Commissioner whereas according to the Petitioner sanction ought to have been obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner. As per Section 151 as it stood at the relevant time, if four years elapsed from the assessment year then sanction had to be obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner. The AY is 2015-2016 and the notice is dated March 31, 2021, therefore four years had clearly elapsed.

However, the Revenue urged that the limitation to issue a notice under Section 149 stood extended to March 31, 2021 where the timelimit expired on March 31, 2020 by virtue of the Taxation and other laws(Amendment) Act, 2020 and this would apply to Section 151 as well. That four years expired on March 31, 2020 and the period stood extended to March 31, 2021 though for the purposes of Section 149. That if the limitation to issue notice is increased, sanction would have to be obtained from the original authority competent to grant sanction being the Additional Commissioner.

However, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court refuted these arguments after relying on its own judgment passed in J. M. Financial And Investment Consultancy Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT8 and quashed the notice issued under Section 148. In J.M. Financial it was held that Section 151 cannot be amended to change the nature of sanction when simply the time limit under Section 149 to issue the notice under Section 148 stood extended. Also, that in view of the express terms of Section 151, sanction had to be obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner only since four years had elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year

In the author ’s view, the judgment is valid and unassailable. Extension of limitation under Section 149 for issuing the notice cannot possibly amount to extension of limitation for the purposes of obtaining sanction under Section 151. Both the sections operate independently and there can be no iota of doubt that a notice issued beyond a period of four years would have to be approved by the Principal Chief Commissioner only.

5. SAURASHTRA INFRA AND POWER PVT. LTD. vs. DCIT & ORS.9

The Petitioner challenged the notice dated March 26, 2021 issued under Section 148 for AY 2015-2016. It is in the business of infrastructure development and also runs a container freight station. In its return of income, it claimed deduction under Section 80-IA(4) amounting to ` 10,24,27,306/-. The case of the petitioner was selected for scrutiny and notices under Section 142(1) and Section 143(2) were issued to the Petitioner. Replies containing documents to substantiate the claim of deduction were filed. The AO passed the assessment order on June 12, 2017 but however disallowed the deduction to the extent of ` 4,17,247/- only.

Section 80-IA(4) states that the benefit under Section 80IA will be available only to an enterprise operating an infrastructure facility subject to fulfilment of certain conditions. The Explanation to the section defines an ‘infrastructure facility’. In the reasons recorded, the AO for the first time took the view that a container freight station is not an infrastructure facility and hence, the deduction under Section 80-IA(4) could not be claimed. The reasons were based on an audit objection received from the Director General of Audit(Central), Mumbai. The reasons record that the decision of the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Continental Warehousing Corporation10 which held that a container freight station is an infrastructure facility was appealed to the Supreme Court and hence had not attained finality.

The Court upheld the Petitioner’s arguments that four years have elapsed from the end of the assessment year and there is no finding by the AO as to whether there was any failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts as required by the proviso to Section 147. Secondly, the SLP against the Bombay High Court decision in Continental Warehousing was dismissed by the Supreme Court, and that it was concluded that a container freight station is an infrastrucuture facility since the functions performed are similar to those of inland ports. Thirdly, there is a change of opinion inasmuch as an elaborate note containing details of the infrastructure facility were submitted. Hence, the reopening notice had no legs to stand on and was quashed.

In the authors view, there can be no doubt that if there is no failure to disclose material facts, and if there is already an elaborate discussion during original scrutiny assessment proceedings, it will be difficult to uphold the reopening proceedings. In the present case, not only was there no failure to fully and truly disclose material facts, but there were replies and notes submitted which were not dealt with. Hence, the case was also based on a pure change of opinion.

6. SHAHLON SILK INDUSTRIES P. LTD. vs. ACIT11

The Petitioner challenged the notice dated December 13, 2017 issued under Section 148 for AY 2012-2013. It is engaged in the business of manufacture of yarn and fabric. The Petitioner(sic: assessee-company?) claimed a deduction of ` 27,62,980/- on account of keyman insurance premium in its return of income. The assessee-company Shahlon Industries Pvt. Ltd. merged with the petitioner herein vide order dated August 27, 2014. The case of the Petitioner was selected for scrutiny and a show-cause notice dated March 9, 2015 was issued as to why disallowance should not be made under Section 14A. A reply dated March 12, 2015 was also sent why disallowance ought not to be made under Section 14A. The AO decided not to make any disallowance against keyman insurance premium but disallowance under Section 14A was made vide assessment order dated March 16, 2015. By letter dated September 30, 2015 the assessee informed the Department that it had merged with the Petitioner herein. The notice under Section 148 was issued and then the petitioner informed the AO that since the assessee-company had merged with the petitioner no return of income could be filed by it electronically. In the reasons recorded, the AO took the stand that the expenditure claimed towards keyman insurance policy ought to be disallowed since the policy was not a life insurance term policy but had investment plans also. Also, the value of investments was taken at a much lower figure than the actual figure for the purposes of computation of disallowance under Section 14A.

The Court held that the details of the keyman insurance policy were furnished before the AO and appeared in the balance sheet and audited annual accounts under long-term loans and advances. As for Section 14A, the assessee vide letter dated March 12, 2015 gave complete details as to why explanation disallowance under Section 14A is unwarranted and the AO in fact made the addition under Section 14A in the assessment order. Hence, on both counts, it was a case of a pure change of opinion.

In the authors view, as regards the disallowance under Section 14A, it is purely based on a change of opinion the AO having formed an opinion in the assessment order itself. However, a more liberal approach should be taken by the High Courts and though certain letters giving details of the keyman insurance premium were provided to the AO, could it be said that an opinion had been formed by the AO when simply books of account and documents were produced before the AO without any other document showing any query raised by the AO about keyman insurance premium? In the authors view, when there is silence without a query raised, there cannot said to be any opinion formed. Interestingly, the argument of the assessee that the notice was issued to an entity that ceased to exist was not considered.

7. PRAKASH KRISHNAVTAR BHARDWAJ VS. ITO & ORS.12

The Petitioner challenged the notice dated March 21, 2022 issued under Section 148A(b), the order dated April 2, 2022 issued under Section 148A(d), and notice dated April 2, 2022 under Section 148 for AY 2015-2016. The Petitioner is a non-resident Indian residing in Dubai, UAE and did not file his return of income for the said AY since his income did not exceed the maximum amount not chargeable to income-tax. The Petitioner alleged that the notice issued under Section 148 was never received by e-mail and was not signed by the issuing authority, the AO, either. Also, the said notice was beyond limitation.

The Revenue argued that a notice which is not signed is at most a curable defect under Section 292B and the proceedings could continue even if the notice remained unsigned.

After referring to various decisions, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court concluded that such notices which are unsigned do not amount to an inconsequential error, but infact amount to a jurisdictional error. That, the notice cannot be saved by Section 292B when it remains unsigned. The notice is not a mere procedural defect or irregularity.

In the authors view, due to the overwhelming decisions of various High Courts on this issue, it cannot be said that the unsigned notices amount to a procedural defect or irregularity. When the signature affixed on the notice gives jurisdiction to the AO to issue the notice, the signature is necessary. However, if the notice bears the name of the AO and if it remains unsigned due to oversight, and the oversight is evident from the records of the original file(the AO has been diligent and followed all procedures before issuing the notice), can it be said that the notice which is unsigned suffers from a jurisdictional error or a procedural error when the AO issues the notice?

8. RN FASHION VS. UOI & ORS.13

AND

9. RN FASHION VS. UOI & ORS.14

The Petitioner challenged the order dated June 23, 2022 passed under Section 148A(d) for AY 2018-2019.

A notice dated March 11, 2022 was issued under Section 148A(b) requiring the petitioner-assessee to submit its reply under Section 148A(c) within 7 days i.e by March 18, 2022. March 18, 2022 was declared a public holiday on account of Holi. The Petitioner did not furnish any reply and neither did it furnish an application requesting for an adjournment for filing a reply to the notice as required under Section 148A(b). The learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, no interference is called for and the proceedings initiated by the Department are valiud and the petitioner assessee will have one more chance to contest the proceedings when the notice under Section 148 is issued to it. Hence, the impugned order dated June 23, 2022 was upheld.

An intra-court appeal was filed by the Petitioner-appellant challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge dismissing the petition. The Division Bench noted that the reply was filed by the petitioner-appellant on March 21, 2022. The Bench noted that the argument of there being no application for extension of time fails since the reply dated March 21, 2022 is to be construed as a deemed application for extension of time. The Bench noted that March 18, 2022 was a public holiday and the next two days were Saturday and Sunday and the next working day was March 21, 2022 and the reply was uploaded on March 21, 2022 itself. That a purposive interpretation ought to be given and the AO ought to be aware of the General Clauses Act. Hence, the Bench imposed cost on the Department of ` 15,000/- to be deposited with the West Bengal State Legal Aid Services Authority within 3 days and the Department was free to recover the cost from the AO. The direction to impose cost was deleted after a statement of ld. Standing Counsel for the Revenue.

In the author’s view, the reply dated March 21, 2022 cannot be termed a deemed application for extension of time. It is apparent that the petitioner-assessee never filed an application for extension of time. It is also clear that it is not the case of the petitioner-assessee that it never received the notice or could not download the notice on March 11, 2022. Having no objection to having received the notice on March 11, 2022, it is unclear as to why no application for extension of time was filed by the assessee. The law provides for a mandatory application for extension of time if time is sought to be extended for filing reply and also allows 7 days at the minimum, for filing a reply. If there is a transgression of both these requirements, it is inconceivable how the Division Bench allowed the reply to be taken on record after there is ,admittedly, a flagrant violation of the law. In my view, the ld. Single Judge was correct by holding that the petitioner-appellant will have an opportunity to contest the Section 148 notice(sic: in appeal).

Conclusion

Pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal, the floodgates for reassessment litigation were opened. New issues arising on limitation, sanction etc. have sprung up which need to be effectively dealt with by the upper judiciary. Its not suprising that several bunch of matters will once again come before the Supreme Court in what may be the second or third round of litigation. However, what is important is that Ashish Agarwal in my view was rightly decided and the reassessment notices rightly saved15. It is only hopeful that the mired controversies surrounding reassessment are solved once and for all in the near future to avoid unnecessary harassment and mental agony for assessees.

1. [2003]259ITR19(SC)

2. R/Special Civil Application No. 17321/2022 & connected matters decided on 7.2.2023 (Gujarat)

3. Writ Tax No. 1086 of 2022 delivered on 22.2.2023 (Allahabad)

4. (2021) 131 taxmann.com 22 (Allahabad)

5. UOI vs. Ashish Agarwal & other cases [2022] 444 ITR 1 (SC)

6. [2023] 451 ITR 36 (Bom)

7. [2023] 451 ITR 181 (Bom)

8. [2023] 451 ITR 205 (Bom)

9. [2023] 451 ITR 51 (Bom)

10. [2016] 380 ITR (St.) 80 (SC)

11. [2023] 451 ITR 184 (Guj)

12. [2023] 451 ITR 27 (Bom)

13. [2023] 450 ITR 132 (Cal)

14. [2023] 450 ITR 134 (Cal)

15. My article published in (2023) 330 CTR (Articles) 1