

2014

DIGEST OF CASE LAWS

DIRECT TAXES

Supreme Court
High Courts
Tribunals
Authority for Advance Ruling
Allied Laws
Reference to CBDT Circulars and
Articles

(For Private Circulation)
Compiled by Research team

Disclaimer — The contents of this digest are solely for educational and informal purpose. It does not constitute professional advice or formal documentation. While due care and sincere efforts has been made in preparing this digests to avoid errors or omissions in this digests, the existence of mistakes and omissions herein not ruled out. Any mistake ,error or discrepancy noted may be brought to the notice which shall be considered in next digest. Neither the authors, publishers,nor it at online.org and its affiliates accepts any liabilities for any loss or damage of any kind arising out of in accurate or incomplete information in this digest nor action can be taken in reliance thereon. It is requested that to avoid any doubt the reader should cross check all the facts, law and contents of the digest with original reports referred by the authors. No part of this digests should be distributed or copied (Except for non-commercial use), without express written permission of itat onlne.org. We also acknowledge that the digest is prepared on referring the following Journals and magazines, we sincerely acknowledge their contribution. (ACCJ, BCAJ, CTC, CTR, DTR, ITD, ITR, ITR (Trib.), SOT, TTJ, Taxmann, itatonline.org, ctconline.org and taxmann.com. Contribution by the authors to bring out this digest is only on Honrrary basis to help the professionals to find out the case laws reported in various journals or magazines at one stop.

All disputes are subject to Mumbai Jurisdiction.

Compiled by Research team of KSA LEGAL CHAMBERS and AIFTP Journal Committee.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Sincere thanks to the research team and to the editorial team of the Journal Committee of the All India Federation of Tax Practitioners (AIFTP), the editorial team of www.itatonline.org and the research team of KSA Legal Chambers, staff members of the AIFTP, ITAT Bar Association, Mumbai and KSA Legal Chambers.

Sincerely thanks to the Editorial and Research teams of the AIFTP Journal Committee

Editorial Team

Adv Aarti Vissanji
CA H. N. Motiwalla
Adv Keshav B. Bhujle
Adv M. Subramanian
CA Pradip Kapasi
Adv Subhash S. Shetty

Research Team

Adv Arati Sathe
Adv Ajay Singh
CA Aliasger Rampurawala
CA Danesh Bafna
Adv Jitendra Singh
Adv Kalpesh Turalkar
CA Ketan Ved
Adv Neelam Jadav
Adv Paras S. Savla
Adv Preeti Shukla
Adv Prem Chandra Tripathi
Adv Rahul Hakani
Adv Rahul Sarda
Adv Sameer Dalal
Adv Sanjukta Chowdhury

PREFACE

2014 – Digest of case laws on direct taxes

We are glad to present “**2014 – Digest of case laws on direct taxes**”. This year’s digest is the third year of our private publication for the reference of professional colleagues who regularly appear before High Courts, the Tribunal and Commissioners of Income-tax (Appeals).

In this publication, our research team has digested section-wise, 2,590 cases which are reported in the year 2014 in various reports, journals, magazines and online media. The cases are digested in the descending order of relevance, i.e. Supreme Court, High Courts, Tribunal and Authority for Advance Ruling.

We have made an attempt to make editorial notes in some of the cases where the judgment of Tribunal is affirmed or reversed by High Courts or where an SLP is granted or rejected by the Supreme Court against the judgments of High Courts.

Important case laws on allied laws and interpretation of taxing statutes are also digested. A separate chapter on reference to circulars and articles is also provided which are arranged section wise and subject wise.

The index to case laws is prepared in alphabetical order. For instance, where the Revenue is the petitioner/appellant, the index is shown as under:

Case	Presented in index of case laws as ;
ACIT v. ACE Fire Services	ACE Fire Services; ACIT v. *
Dy. CIT v. Atul Products Ltd.	Atul Products Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. *
CIT v. Khazan Singh	Khazan Singh; CIT v. *
ITO v. Ram Prakash	Ram Prakash; ITO v. *
DIT (E) v. Sabarmati	Sabarmati; DIT v. *
UOI v. Tata Chemicals Ltd.	Tata Chemicals Ltd; v *
CWT v. Trustees of H.E. H.	Trustees of H.E.H; CWT *.

This digest is for private circulation in print form with the objective of facilitating quick reference for professional colleagues. The entire publication is hosted on www.itatonline.org for the benefit of tax professionals and public at large. Those who desire to refer to digest may download and store the same on their desktops/laptops mobiles and iPads.

In the year 2012, we have published “**Digest of case laws – Direct taxes – (2003-2011) – A Tax Companion**” to commemorate 150 years of the Bombay High Court, which was published jointly with the AIFTP and the ITAT Bar Association. In the year 2016, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal will be celebrating Platinum Jubilee and the ITAT Bar Association will be celebrating Golden Jubilee. To commemorate the Platinum Jubilee of the Tribunal and the Golden Jubilee of the ITAT Bar Association, we desire to publish digest of cases from 2003 to 2015, jointly with the AIFTP and the ITAT Bar Association. The publication could be in print form or in the form of a CD. We desire to have your valuable guidance and support in successfully bringing out the proposed publication. Your valuable suggestion may be sent to ksalegal@gmail.com. While referring to the digest, if any error or mistake is noticed by readers, they are requested to inform us by e-mail or in writing, which will enable us to take corrective measure in our next publication. We hope this publication will serve as a useful reference to busy professionals.

For Research and Editorial team,

Yours sincerely,

Dr. K. Shivaram
Senior Advocate

12-10-2015

ABBREVIATIONS

Journals, Reports, Magazines and online

Ahmedabad Chartered Accountants Journal	– ACAJ
All India Federation of Tax Practitioners Journal	– AIFTPJ
All India Tax Tribunal judgements	– TTJ
All India Reporter	– AIR
The Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal	– BCAJ
Bombay Law Reporter	– Bom.L.R.
The Chamber of Tax Consultants	– The Chamber's Journal
Company Cases	– Comp-Cas
Current Tax Reporter	– CTR
Direct Taxes Reporter	– DTR
Excise Law Times	– E.L.T.
Goods and Service Tax Reports	– GSTR
Income-tax Tribunal Decisions	– ITD
ITR's Tribunal – Tax Reports	– ITR (Trib.)
Income-tax Reports	– ITR
Journal of Rajasthan Consultants Association	– Tax world
Supreme Court Cases	– SCC
Selected Orders of ITAT	– SOT
Taxman	– Taxman
VAT and Services Tax cases	– VST

Online

www.bombayhighcourt.nic.in
www.ctconline.org
www.delhihighcourt.nic.in
www.itatonline.org
www.manupatra.com
www.taxlawsonline.com
www.taxmann.com

Abbreviations – Authorities

Additional Commissioners of Income-tax	– Addl. CIT
Authority for Advance Rulings	– AAR
Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax	– ACIT
Assistant Directors of Income-tax	– ADIT
Assessing Officer	– AO
Appellate Tribunal	– ITAT
Central Board of Direct Taxes	– CBDT
Chief Commissioner of Income-tax	– CCIT
Commissioner of Income-tax	– CIT
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)	– CIT(A)
Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax	– Dy. CIT
Director of Income-tax	– DIT
Director General of Income-tax	– DGI
High Court	– HC
Income-tax Officer	– ITO
Income-tax Settlement Commission	– ITSC
Joint Commissioner of Income-tax	– JCIT
Joint Directors of Income-tax	– JDIT
Supreme Court	– SC
Tax Recovery Officer	– TRO
Transfer Pricing Officer	– TPO
Union of India	– UOI

Courts

Supreme Court	– (SC)
High Court	– (HC)
Allahabad	– (All.)
Andhra Pradesh	– (AP&T)
Assam	– (Assam)
Bombay	– (Bom.)

Abbreviations

Bombay	– (Nagpur)
Bombay	– (Panaji-Goa)
Calcutta	– (Cal.)
Chhattisgarh	– (Chhattisgarh)
Delhi	– (Delhi)
Gauhati	– (Gauhati)
Gujarat	– (Guj.)
Himachal Pradesh	– (HP)
Jammu & Kashmir	– (J&K)
Jharkhand	– (Jharkhand)
Karnataka	– (Karn.)
Kerala	– (Ker.)
Madhya Pradesh	– (MP)
Madhya Pradesh (Gwalior)	– (MP)
Madras	– (Mad.)
Orissa	– (Orissa)
Patna	– (Patna)
Punjab & Haryana	– (P&H)
Rajasthan	– (Raj.)
Sikkim	– (Sikkim)
Uttarakhand	– (Uttarakhand)
Uttar Pradesh	– (UP)

Tribunal Benches

Agra	– (Agra)
Ahmedabad	– (Ahd.)
Allahabad	– (All.)
Amritsar	– (Asr.)
Bangalore	– (Bang.)
Bilaspur	– (Bilaspur)
Calcutta	– (Kol.)

Chandigarh	– (Chd.)
Chennai	– (Chennai)
Cochin	– (Cochin)
Cuttack	– (Cuttack)
Delhi	– (Delhi)
Guwahati	– (Gau.)
Hyderabad	– (Hyd.)
Indore	– (Indore)
Jabalpur	– (Jab.)
Jaipur	– (Jp.)
Jodhpur	– (Jodh.)
Lucknow	– (Luck.)
Mumbai	– (Mum.)
Nagpur	– (Nag.)
Panaji	– (Panaji)
Patna	– (Patna)
Pune	– (Pune)
Rajkot	– (Rajkot)
Ranchi	– (Ranchi)
Vishakhapatnam	– (Vishakhapatnam)

Case Laws Index

Name	Case No.	Page No.
3i Infotech Ltd. v. Add. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 405 / (2014) 162 TTJ 184 / 102 DTR 151 (Mum.)(Trib.)	100 770 1489	41 270 544
A		
A. C. Industries; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 55 (Mag)(Guj.)(HC)	840	294
A. K. K. Specific Family Trust v. CIT (2014) 220 taxman 395 (Mad.)(HC)	1962	735
A. P. Moller Maersk v. Dy. DIT (2014) 149 ITD 434 (Mum.)(Trib.)	144 1338 2159	58 475 816
A. P. Moller Maersk; Dy. DIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 50 (Mum.)(Trib.)	133	54
A. P. Moller Maersk; Dy. DIT v. * (2013) 158 TTJ 537 / (2014) 64 SOT 147 (URO) / 96 DTR 1 (Mum.)(Trib.)	137 1337 136	55 475 55
A. P. State Warehousing Corporation v. Dy. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 485 / (2015) 168 TTJ 679 / 115 DTR 335 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1291	457
A. Suresh Rao; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxman 228 (Karn.)(HC)	43	16
A. T. Kearney India Pvt. Ltd v. ITO(2014) 363 ITR 172/227 Taxmann 150 (Mag)(Delhi)(HC)	2142	810
A. Vijay Kumar; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 185 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 204(Mag.) (T&AP)(HC)	2339	893
A. W. Prod; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 70 (Mag.)(All.)(HC.)	1182	422
A. K. Films (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 29 ITR 308 (2015) 152 ITD 538 (Mum)(Trib.)	761	268
A. P. Mahesh Co-op. Urban Bank Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 55 taxmann.com 429 (Hyd.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	91	36
A.P.S.R.T.C v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 461 (2015) 120 DTR 386 (T&AP)(HC)	259	106
A.S. Kupparaju & Brothers Charitable Foundation Trust v. Dy. DIT (E)(2014) 149 ITD 531 /112 DTR 246 / 166 TTJ 752 (Bang.)(Trib.)	213 214	89 90
Aadinath Builder (P) Ltd v. ACIT(2014) 106 DTR 226 /163 TTJ 778(Mum.)(Trib.)	2408	922
Aamby Valley Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 270 CTR 57 / 106 DTR 457 / 221 Taxmann 458 (Bom)(HC)	1555	569
Aarvee Denims & Exports Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 35 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1521	557

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Aashna Sarin v. TRO(2014) 362 ITR 619 / 97 DTR 216 264 CTR 68 / 222 Taxmann 84 (Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)	1947	727
Aasthavinayak Real Estate (P) Ltd. v. ACIT(2014) 106 DTR 226 / 163 TTJ 778 (Mum.)(Trib)	2408	922
Abacus Distribution Systems (India) (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 1 / 159 TTJ 156 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1452 1453 1606	530 530 589
Abad Constructions (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 372 / 225 Taxmann 151 (Mag.) / 103 DTR 439 (Ker)(HC)	2369	904
Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 483 / 46 taxmann.com 422 (Mad.)(HC)	2182	823
Abdul G. Nadiadwala; ITO v. * (2014) 29 ITR 528 / 151 ITD 657 (Mum.)(Trib.)	762	268
Accentia Technologies Ltd.; ITO v. * (2014) 34 ITR 505 (2015) 67 SOT 165 (Mum.)(Trib.)	236	96
Accord Communication Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 120 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	565	211
Accounts Officer, Govt. Medical College, Jammu; ITO v. * (2014) 146 ITD 648 (Asr.)(Trib.)	2033	764
Accounts Officer, Govt. Medical College, Jammu; ITO v.* (2014) 146 ITD 648 (Asr.)(Trib.)	2010	756
Accounts Officer, Govt. Medical College, Jammu; ITO. v. * (2014) 146 ITD 648 (Asr.)(Trib.)	2008	755
Ace Fire Services; ACIT v. * (2014) 29 ITR 73 / 64 SOT 42 (URO)(Bang.)(Trib.)	820	288
Ace Multi Axes Systems Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 367 ITR 266/ 228 Taxmann 98 (Mag)(Karn.)(HC)	1286	456
Achila Sabharwal (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxman 171 (Mag.) / (2015) 371 ITR 219 / 123 DTR 174 (Delhi) (HC)	493	191
Achyut Ramchandra Samant v. ACIT (2014) 61 SOT 271(Mum.)(Trib.)	966	344
ACL Wireless Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 210 / 222 Taxmann 335 / 264 CTR 164 / 97 DTR 60 (Delhi)(HC)	676	243
Acorus Unitech wireless Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 362 ITR 417 / 223 Taxmann 181 (Mag.) / 102 DTR 177(Delhi)(HC)	1806	667
Actis Advisers (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 314 (Delhi) (Trib.)	1448	527
ACWT v. Vasantrao Sudam Pingle (2013) 145 ITD 97 / (2014) 159 TTJ 805 (Pune)(Trib.)	2559	983

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Adani Wilmar Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 122 (Ahd.)(Trib.)	1383 1395	494 502
Adani Wilmar Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 338 / 224 Taxmann 51 / 111 DTR 60 / 272 CTR 20 (Guj.)(HC)	1350	482
Adarsh Sood (Mrs.) v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 67 (P&H)(HC)	860	302
Adisankara Spinning Mills (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 233/226 Taxmann 44 (Mag) (Mad.)(HC)	2089	790
Adisankara Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 35 ITR 283 / (2015) 67 SOT 175 (URO) (Chennai)(Trib.)	88	35
ADIT v. WNS North America Inc (2014) 146 ITD 435 / 30 ITR 646 (Mum.) (Trib.)	182	77
Adithaya Bizorp Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI (Kar.)(HC), www.itatonline.org	2173	820
Aditi Developers; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 14(Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	2375	906
Aditi Technologies (P.) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 149 ITD 515 / 166 TTJ 313 (Bang.)(Trib.)	239	98
Aditya Ferro Alloys P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 490 (Mad.)(HC)	586	216
Aditya Medisales Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 600 / 266 CTR 98 / 218 Taxman 477 (Guj.)(HC)	970	345
Adobe Systems India P. Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) 365 ITR 376 /228 Taxman 141 (Mag)/ 110 DTR 178 (All.)(HC)	2304	877
Adobe Systems Software Ireland Ltd. v. ADIT(2014) 363 ITR 174 / 268 CTR 173 / 102 DTR 425/225 Taxmann 347 (Delhi)(HC)	1827	676
ADP (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 413 / 160 TTJ 50 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	2502	959
Advance Power Display Systems Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 761 / 165 TTJ 648 / 30 ITR 481 / 105 DTR 269 (Mum.)(Trib.) / 150 ITD 257	1449 757 1630	527 266 599
Advocates Association of Western India & Ors v. UOI (2015) 273 CTR 113 / 113 DTR 41 (Bom.)(HC)	2582	992
Agarwal Iron Industries; UOI v.* (2014) 272 CTR 313 / 112 DTR 137/ (2015) 370 ITR 180 / 229 Taxmann 124(SC)	1560	571
Agence France Presse v. ADIT(IT) (2014) 66 SOT 183 / (2015) 167 TTJ 149 (Delhi)(Trib.)	163	67
Agew Steel Mfg. (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 28 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1104	395
Agile Properties (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 107 DTR 201 / 225 Taxmann 107 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	1143 1142	408 408
Agilent Technologies International (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 165 TTJ 54 / (2015) 152 ITD 226 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1370	489

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Agilisys IT Services India (P.) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 176 (Visakhapatnam) (Trib.)	2382	909
Agrani Telecom Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 150 ITD 34 (Mum.)(Trib.)	736	260
Agrawal Sabha (Regd.) v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 244 / 271 CIR 704 / 223 Taxman 353 (All.)(HC)	312	124
Ahmedabad Advance Mills Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 326 (Guj.)(HC)	856	300
Ahmedabad Management Association; DIT(E) v.* (2014) 366 ITR 85 / 225 Taxman 223 (Guj.)(HC)	14	7
Air Liquide Engineering India (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 31 ITR 205 / (2015) 152 ITD 157 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1362	487
Air Liquide Engineering India; DCIT v. * (2014) 31 ITR 20 5/ 152 ITD 157 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1480	539
Aircom International Ltd, United Kingdom, In re (2014) 360 ITR 693 / 221 Taxmann 110 / 264 CTR 499 / 97 DTR 414(AAR)	2210 2212	835 836
Aiyub Umarji Patel v. ITO (2014) 222 Taxmann 126 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1049	377
Ajay s/o Shantilal Lalwani (HUF) v. Dy. CIT (2014) 270 CTR 588 (Bom.) (HC)	1610	590
Ajit Singh Rana v. ACIT (2014) 61 SOT 251 (Asr.)(Trib.)	2510	962
Ajitnath Hi-Tech Builders (P) Ltd. v. ACIT(2014) 106 DTR 226 / 163 TTJ 778 (Mum.)(Trib)	2408	922
Akilan Ramanathan (Dr.) v. Jt. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 98 (Mag.) (Mad.) (HC)	2100	794
Aktieselskabet Dampskibsselskabet Svendborg; ADIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 181 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)	139	56
Al Hind Tours & Travels (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2013) 29 taxmann.com 294 (Cochin)(Trib.) / (2014) 64 SOT 1 (Cochin)(Trib.)	2018 2019	759 759
Alcatel Lucant USA, INC; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 264 CTR 240 / 223 Taxmann 176 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	2155	815
Alcatel Lucent Technologies India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 108 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)	1381	494
Alcon Cement Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 146 (Mag.) (Bom.) (HC)	1273	451
Alembic Ltd. v. ACIT (2014)222 Taxmann 131(Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1520	557
Alfa Laval (I) Ltd. v. Dy. ITO (2013) 158 TTJ 409 / (2014) 149 ITD 285 (Pune)(Trib.)	1412	507
Alkaben B. Patel v. ITO (2014) 148 ITD 31 / 101 DTR 251 / 161 TTJ 417 / 31 ITR 231 (SB)(Ahd.)(Trib.)	1003	360

Name	Case No.	Page No.
All Gujurul Federation of tax Consultants v. CBDT (2014) 271 CTR 113 / 109 DTR 177 / 226 Taxmann 210 (Guj.)(HC)	1582	580
All India Children Care & Educational Development Society; CIT v. * (2013) 357 ITR 134 /(2014) 221 Taxmann 5 / 264 CTR 532(All.)(HC)	1542	565
All India Management Association v. DGIT (E) (2014) 362 ITR 451 / 266 CTR 232 / 99 DTR 387 (Delhi)(HC)	208	88
Allahabad Bank v. ITO (Agra)(Trib.),www.itatonline.org	2086	788
Allanasons Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 648 / 107 DTR 62 / 225 Taxmann 166 (Mag) (Bom.)(HC)	1703	624
Allcargo Global Logistics Ltd v. ACIT (2014) 150 ITD 651 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1444	525
Alliancce Infrastructure Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (Bang.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	371	147
Alliance Finstock Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 739 (Mum.)(Trib.)	758 1158	267 414
Alliance Hotels v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 163 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)	1139	407
Allied Exims; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 62/(2015) 230 Taxmann 84 (All.)(HC)	2043	770
Allscripts India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 157 TTJ 509 / (2014) 150 ITD 105 (Ahd.)(Trib.)	1392	498
Alpana Kirloskar (Smt.) v. ACIT (2014) 150 ITD 311 / 165 TTJ 542 / 108 DTR 21 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1963 1964	735 736
Alpex Exports P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 297 / 230 Taxman 140 (Delhi)(HC)	27	10
Alpha Impex (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 224 Taxmann 211(Mag) (Bom.)(HC)	1611	591
Alps Chemicals P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 594 /(2015) 55 taxmann. com 388 (Guj.)(HC)	1199 1247	427 442
Amadeus India (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 496 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1413	507
Amal Kumar Ghoshv. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 458 / 105 DTR 351 / 269 CTR 213 / 225 Taxmann 229 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)	1536	563
Amar Nath Agrawal v. CIT (2014) 371 ITR 183 / 227 Taxmann 126 (Mag.) / 273 CTR 344(All.)(HC)	1749	643
Amar Ujala Publication Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 70 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	2014	757
Amar Ujala Publication Ltd. v. ACIT (2014)222 Taxmann 70(Mag.) (All.)(HC)	2013	757
Amarchand Sharma and Udani; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 203 / (2015) 114 DTR 76 / 231 Taxmann 51(AP)(HC)	1622	596

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Amarjeet Singh; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 66(Mag.) (All.)(HC)	1849	685
Amarshiv Construction (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 659 / 102 DTR 33 / 223 Taxman 171 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	105	43
Ambika Solves & Ors v. CIT (2014) 101 DTR 1 / 267 CTR 258 / 231 Taxmann 508 (MP)(HC)	1557	570
Ambrish Manno Dhupalia v. DCIT (2014) 166 TTJ 584 (Mum.)(Trib.)	94	38
AMD Research & Development Centre India (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 167 TTJ 613 / 67 SOT 230 (URO) / 40 ITR 397 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	176	75
Amees Hosang Mistry; ITO v. * (2014) 29 ITR 397 /149 ITD 503 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2078	785
American Steel (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 181(Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1608	590
Amin Manilal & Co. (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 159 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	1550	568
Amitkumar Amblal Shah v. ITO (Ahd.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	945	336
Amod Stamping (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 256 (Guj.)(HC)	348 546	136 205
Amol Dicalite Ltd.; DCIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 140 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	2097	793
Ampro Products; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 449 (T&AP)(HC)	857	301
Amravathy Somasundaram v. Chief CIT (2014) 369 ITR 601 / 230 Taxmann 176 (Ker.)(HC)	2129	804
Amrit Banaspati Co Ltd. v. CWT (2014) 365 ITR 515 / 126 Taxmann 147 / 226 CTR 113 (SC)	2554	982
Amrutnanjan Finance Ltd.; CIT v. * (2011) 203 Taxman 295 / (2014) 363 ITR 135 (Mad.)(HC)	566 475	211 186
Amtrex Ambience Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 211(Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	2234	845
Amul Research and Development; ITO v.* (2014) 222 Taxman 217 (Mag) (Guj.)(HC)	2316	882
Amzel Ltd. v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.); swww.ctconline.org	2302	876
Anahaita Nalin Shah v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 171 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2507	961
Anand Food Products; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 40 (Mag.) (AP) (HC)	2364	902
Anand Kumar Modi; CIT v. * (2014) 104 DTR 139 / 44 taxmann.com 21 (Jharkhand)(HC)	1644	604
Anand Prakash Agrawal v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 526 / 225 Taxmann 40 (Mag.) / (2015) 121 DTR 227 (All.)(HC)	1764	649
Anand Transport P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 226 Taxmann 338 / (2015) 370 ITR 524 / 275 CTR 381 (Mad.)(HC)	784	275

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Ananda Marakala; Dy. CIT v.* (2014) 150 ITD 323 (Bang)(Trib.)	806	282
Andhra Pradesh Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Trade v. DIT (2014) 31 ITR 244 / (2015) 152 ITD 279 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1177	420
Andhra Sugars Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 195 / 52 taxmann.com 61 / (2015) 118 DTR 292 (T&AP)(HC)	887	315
Anees Firoz Sarkar v. ACIT (2013) 158 TTJ 650 / (2015) 152 ITD 323 (Ahd.)(Trib.)	1941	724
Angel Commodities Broking (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 754 / 164 TTJ 275 / 106 DTR 131 (Mum.)(Trib.)	570	212
Angel Infin (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxman 78 (Bom.)(HC)	397	158
Angelica Properties (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 151 ITD 160 / (2015) 167 TTJ 549 (Pune)(Trib.)	720	255
Anil H. Lad; CIT v. * (2014) 102 DTR 241 / 225 Taxmann 170 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	1250	443
Anil Kumar Nehru; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 26/(2015) 55 taxmann.com 100 (Bom.)(HC)	2149	813
Anish Kumar v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 203 (Mag.) (P&H)(HC)	2430	931
Ankit C. Maheshwari; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 146 /(2015) 229 Taxmann 73 (Guj.)(HC)	1684	617
Ankleshwar Taluka ONGC and Land Loser Travellers Co-op Society; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 92 / 223 Taxmann 237 (Mag)(Cal.)(HC)	799 2317	280 882
Ankleshwar Taluka ONGC and Land Loser Travellers Co-op Society; ITO. v. * (2014) 362 ITR 87 / 223 Taxmann 50 (Mag) (Cal.)(HC)	800	280
Anmol Marmo Grani (P) Ltd.; ITO v. * (2014) 159 TTJ 5 (UO) / 67 SOT 480 (Jodh.)(Trib.)	1095 1125	392 402
ANS Law Associates v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.) www.iatonline.org	1618	594
Ansal Housing and Constructing Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 29(Mag.)(Delhi.)(HC) / (2014) 220 Taxmann 157 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	394 1305 2352	157 462 898
Anson Financial Holidays; ITO v. * (2014) 29 ITR 620 / 50 taxmann.com 36 (Cochin)(Trib.)	823 838	289 294
Antwerp Diamond Bank NV; ADIT v. * (2014) 163 TTJ 175 / 65 SOT 23 (2015) 153 ITD 391 (Mum.)(Trib.)	816 918	286 326
Anuj Kumar Varshney v. ITO (Jaipur)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org	1123	401
Anupam Tele Services v. ITO (2014) 366 ITR 122 / 100 DTR 411 / 268 CTR 121 / 222 Taxmann 318 (Guj.)(HC)	847	297

Name	Case No.	Page No.
AON Specialist Services (P) Ltd.; ITO v.* (2014) 64 SOT 78 (Bang.)(Trib.)	2054	775
Apeejay School; CIT v. * (2014) 226 Taxmann 307 / (2015) 115 DTR 107 / 275 CTR 92 (All.)(HC)	1992	749
Apex Therm Packaging (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 125 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1048	377
Apex Urban Co-op. Bank of Maharashtra & Goa Ltd. v. ITO (2013) 163 TTJ 438 / 102 DTR 410 / (2014) 146 ITD 791 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2500	958
Apollo Health Street Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 67 SOT 64 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)	1353	482
Apollo Hospitals Internationals Ltd.; ITO v. * (2014) 64 SOT 302 (Ahd.) (Trib.)	2032	764
Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 756 / 31 ITR 477 (Cochin)(Trib.) / 64 SOT 203 (Cochin)(Trib.)	41 438 507 1265 1389 1411	15 173 194 447 497 507
App Labs Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 99 (Hyd)(Trib.)	1408 1409	506 506
Appadurai Vijayaraghavan v. Jt. CIT(OSD) (2014) 369 ITR 486 226 Taxmann 111 / (2015) 115 DTR 209 / 275 CTR 565 (Mad.)(HC)	921	327
Appollo Tyres Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 360 ITR 36 / 224 Taxmann 143 (Mag) (Ker)(HC)	2374	905
AR Magnetics (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 209 (Delhi)(HC)	31	12
Araska Diamond Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 203 / 119 DTR 310 / 170 TTJ 634 (Mum.)(Trib.)	882	313
Aravali Polymers LLP v. JCIT (Kol.)(Trib.), www.itatonline.org	961	342
Arcadia share & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 38 ITR 491 / 167 TTJ 493 (Mum.)(Trib.)	808	283
Arcane Developers (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 627 / 221 Taxmann 475 (Delhi)(HC)	550	207
Areez P. Khambhata; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 34 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1280	453
Arjundas Rajkumar v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 188 / 52 taxmann.com 359 (2015) 122 DTR 416 (T&AP)(HC)	957	339
Arjundas v. CGT (2014) 367 ITR 137 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 163(Mag.) (T&AP)(HC)	2538	974
Aroni Commercial Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 362 ITR 403/ 267 CTR 228/ 224 Taxmann 13 (Mag) (Bom.)(HC)	1800	664

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Aroni Commercials Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 405 / 270 CTR 483 / 108 DTR 81/ 52 taxmann.com 113 (Bom.)(HC)	1735	637
Artist Tree Pvt. Ltd. v. CBDT (2014) 369 ITR 691 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 108 / 273 CTR 14 / 113 DTR 370 (Bom.)(HC)	1580	578
Arun Malhotra; CIT v. * (2014) 363 TTR 195 / 98 DTR 38 / 47 taxmann.com 385 (Delhi)(HC)	1926	719
Arvind Bhartiya Vidhyala Samiti; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 37 (Mag.) (Raj.)(HC)	202	86
Arvind Shamji Chheda v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 368 / 112 DTR 143 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 341 (Bom.)(HC)	927	329
Arvind Singh Chauhan v. ITO (2014) 147 ITD 509 / 101 DTR 79 / 31 ITR 105 / 161 TTJ 791 / (Agra)(Trib.)	189 388	80 153
Asha Machiah (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 81 (Karn.)(HC) / 227 Taxmann 155 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	962 968	342 344
Asha Pal Gulati v. CBDT (2014) 361 ITR 73 / 98 DTR 361 / 265 CTR 332 / 226 Taxmann 97 (Delhi)(HC)	2524	966
Ashley Services Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 209 / 229 Taxmann 620/105 DTR 166(Mad.)(HC)	1166 1747	417 642
Ashok B. Jadhav v. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 85 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	2036	766
Ashok Chandrakant Gandhi; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 119 (Guj.)(HC)	1129	404
Ashok J. Patel; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxman 79 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	787 833	276 292
Ashok Kumar Jain; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 145 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 65 (Raj.)(HC)	1574	576
Ashok Kumar Ralhan; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 575 / 224 Taxmann 137 (Mag.) / 109 DTR 150 / 272 CTR 71 (Delhi)(HC)	1007	361
Ashok Mittal; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 12 / 222 Taxmann 233 / 100 DTR 233 (Delhi.)(HC)	421	168
Ashok P. Magajikondi v. ITO (2014) 221 Taxmann 446 (Karn.)(HC)	1131	404
Ashok Shukla; CIT v. * (2014) 99 DTR 250 (MP)(HC)	7	3
Ashoka Education Foundation v. CIT (2014) 42 CCH 90 (Pune)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	325	128
Ashoka Foods & Dehydrates Sansthan v. ACIT (2014) 151 ITD 46 / (2015) 167 TTJ 590 (Luck.)(Trib)	199	84
Ashutosh Bandopadhyay v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 168 / 107 DTR 344 / 270 CTR 556(Tripura)(HC)	2368	904

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Ashwani Kumar Goel v. ITSC (2014) 364 ITR 492 / 101 DTR 139 / 43 taxmannn.com 421 / 267 CTR 1 (Delhi)(HC)	2194	828
Asia Power Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 226 Taxman 136 (Mag.) / (2015) 370 ITR 257 / 122 DTR 201 (Karn.)(HC)	434 578	172 214
Asian Handloom; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 112(Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	1209	431
Asian Paints Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 511 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1398	503
Asiatic Oxygen Limited v. DCIT (2015) 372 ITR 421 (Cal.)(HC)	1785	657
Assistant Registrar, ITAT; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxman 221 (Bom.)(HC)	2285	869
Associate Technoplastics (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 17 (Delhi)(HC)	1146	409
Associated Capsules Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 717 (Bom.)(HC).	861	303
AT & T Communication Service India (P) Ltd. v. CIT(2014) 362 ITR 97 / 100 DTR 161 / 266 CTR 457 / 226 Taxmann. 381 (Delhi)(HC)	1586	582
Atomstroy export v. Dy. DIT (IT)(2012) 210 Taxmann 137/ (2013) 363 ITR 612 (Bom.)(HC)	1709	626
Attara Gas Service v. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 159 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	2505	960
Atul Intermediates; CIT v. * (2014)103 DTR 353 (2015) 373 ITR 638 (Guj.) (HC)	1256	445
Atul Kumar Swami; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 693 / 52 taxmann.com 47 (Delhi)(HC)	1802	664
Atul Oilcake Industries Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 107 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC))	1210	431
Atul Products Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 130 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	686 1512	246 554
Aurobindo Pharma Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 166 (URO) (Hyd.) (Trib.)	1390	497
Aventis Pharma Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 368 ITR 498 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 169 (Bom.)(HC)	1688	618
Avin Pumps (P) Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (2013) 26 ITR 345 / (2014) 61 SOT 116 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)	971	346
Avinash Jain; CIT v. * (2013) 214 Taxmann 260 / (2014) 362 ITR 441 (Delhi)(HC)	937	333
Avinashi Industries; ACIT v. * (2014) 149 ITD 80 (Ahd.)(Trib.)	1323	470
Avineon India (P) Ltd v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 404 / 150 ITD 543 (Hyd.) (Trib.)	1462 1463 1464	534 535 535
Avtar Singh (Dr.) v. ITSC(2013) 40 taxmann.com 434 / (2014) 360 ITR 588 (P&H)(HC)	2202	831

Name	Case No.	Page No.
AWB India Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 166 TTJ 521/(2015) 152 ITD 770 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1431	520
Axon Global (P) Ltd.; ITO v. * (2014) 146 ITD 473 (Jodh.)(Trib.)	558 752 755 837	209 265 266 293
Ayodhya Faizabad Development Authority; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 183 (All.)(HC)	318	126
B		
B. Bhaskar Rao v. Dy. CIT (2014) 34 ITR 277 / (2015) 152 ITD 280 (Hyd.) (Trib.)	1138	406
B. Fouress P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 204 (Karn.)(HC)	2306 2574	878 988
B. G. Mahesh; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 39 (URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)	1500	549
B. Kishore Kumar v. DCIT (2014) 112 DTR 121 / 273 CTR 468 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 614 (Mad.)(HC)	1856	688
B. M. & Brothers; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 149 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1299	459
B. Nagendra Baliga; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 410 / 47 taxmann.com 331 (Karn.)(HC)	1507 1920 1951	553 716 728
B. Ramachandhiran v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxman 22 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	1	1
B. S. Shantharaju v. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 51(Mag.) / (2015) 370 ITR 617 (Karn.)(HC)	1717	628
B. Satyanarayana; CIT v. * (2013) 356 ITR 323 /(2014) 220 Taxmann 86 (AP) (Mag.)(AP)(HC)	1895	706
B. Seenaiah & Co. Projects Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 150 ITD 189 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1524	558
B. Srinivasa Rao; ACIT v. * (2014) 159 TTJ 483 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	296	118
B. Suresh Baliga; CIT v. * (2014) 102 DTR 83 / 364 ITR 560 /225 Taxmann 228 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	1952	728
B.M.S. Projects P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 195 (2015) 228 Taxmann 213 (Mag) / 229 Taxmann 83 (Guj.)(HC)	693 797	248 279
B.PL. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 544 / 49 Taxmann.com 542 (Karn.)(HC)	2153	814
B.R.K. Finance & Inv. Company Ltd v. ITO (2014) 220 Taxmann 145 (All.)(HC)	1517	556

Name	Case No.	Page No.
B. Suresh Baliga; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 560 / 102 DTR 83 / 225 Taxmann 228 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	1506	552
B.V. Reddy Marketing (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 309 (Karn.)(HC)	973	347
Babul Harivadan Parikh; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 159 (Guj.)(HC)	2433	932
Babulal Agarwal; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 284 (Raj.)(HC)	1155 1649	413 606
Baghpat Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 319 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 320 (All.)(HC)	774	271
Bahadur Chand Investment (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 106 DTR 269 (P&H)(HC)	422	168
Bahara Shiksha Vikas Evam Sudhar Samiti v. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 747 / 105 DTR 169 / 164 TTJ 586 (Delhi)(Trib.)	16	8
Bajaj Bhavan Owners Premises Co-op-Society Ltd.v. ITAT (2014) 224 Taxmann 206 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	2258	856
Bajaj Hindustan Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 149 ITD 709 (Mum.)(Trib.)	511	195
Bal Bharti Nursery School v. CCIT (2014) 98 DTR 366 / 221 Taxman 77 (All.)(HC)	222	92
Bal Chand Jain & Sons v. DCIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 123 (All.)(HC)	1541	564
Bal Kishan Dhawan (HUF) v. Dy. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 581/55 taxmann.com 101 (P&H)(HC)	1277	452
Bal Kishan Dhawan (HUF) v. UOI (2014) 366 ITR 639 (P&H)(HC)	1534	562
Balaji Shivalingam v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 274/ 51 taxmann.com 119 / (2015) 273 CTR 532 (T&AP)(HC)	2420	928
Balaji Steel Re-Rolling Mills v. CCE & Customs (2014) 272 CTR 205 (SC)	2241	850
Balaramakrishna Engineering Contractor Corporation; CIT v. * (2013) 356 ITR 524 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 91(Mag.) (AP)(HC)	2453	940
Baldev Plaza; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 276 (All.)(HC)	1774	652
Baldwin Boys High School; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 637 / 45 taxmann.com 33 /108 DTR 373(Karn.)(HC)	1828	676
Baldwin Girls High School; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 637 / 45 taxmann.com 33 / 108 DTR 373(Karn.)(HC)	1828	676
Baljit Securities Private Limited; Dy. CIT v. * (Kol.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	370	146
Baljit Securities Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 470 /224 Taxmann 45 (Cal) (HC)	1168	417

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Bank of America v. Jt. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 145 (Mum.)(Trib.)	141 142	57 57
Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait v. Dy. DIT (2014) 64 SOT 125 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)	917	325
Bank of Maharashtra; ACIT v. * (Pune) (Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1667	611
Bannariamman Exports Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 591/221 Taxmann 199 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	1228	436
Bansal Abhushan Bhandar; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 476 / 264 CTR 102(P&H)(HC)	2522	965
Bartronics India Ltd.; ADIT v. * (2014) 62 SOT 141(URO) / (2015) 168 TTJ 595/ 120 DTR 1 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	2049	774
BASF Coatings (India) (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 802 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1410	506
Bazaar Décor (India) P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 389 / 222 Taxmann 328 (P&H)(HC)	621 677	226 243
BBC World News Limited v. ADIT (2014) 362 ITR 577 / 226 Taxmann 122(Mag.) / 267 CTR 460 (Delhi)(HC)	1816	670
Bechtel India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 733 (Delhi)(Trib.)	439 1437	174 523
Belgium Glass & Ceramics (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 209 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	2098	793
Bellary Steels and Alloys Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 491 / (2015) 370 ITR 226 (Karn.) (HC)	536 1028 1099	203 369 394
Bellwether Microfinance fund Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 165 TTJ 261 / 108 DTR 389 / 65 SOT 75 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	374	148
Bennet Coleman & Co. Ltd.; ITO v. * (2015) 152 ITD 331 (Mum.)(Trib.)	175	74
Bhairavnath Agrofin (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2013) 354 ITR 276 / 259 CTR 51 / 85 DTR 403 / (2014) 220 Taxman 1 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)	2 1066	1 383
Bhaktavatsalam Memorial Trust; Jt. CIT (OSD)(E) v. * (2014) 30 ITR 264 / (2015) 152 ITD 48 (Chennai)(Trib.)	279 340	111 134
Bhandari Spinning Mills Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 221 Taxmann 397 (Karn.)(HC)	646	234
Bharat Bijlee Ltd. v. ACIT.(2014) 364 ITR 581 / 105 DTR 157 / 223 Taxmann 418 (Bom.)(HC)	1689	619
Bharat Bijlee Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 258 / 224 Taxmann 282 / 107 DTR 249 / 270 CTR 579 (Bom.)(HC)	975	348
Bharat Int. Udhyog ; ITO v. * (2014) 159 TTJ 1 (UO) / (2015) 152 ITD 85 (Jodh.)(Trib.)	1670	612

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Bharat Int. Udhyog; ITO v. * (2014) 159 TTJ 1 / (2015) 152 ITD 85 (Jodh.)(Trib.)	1663	609
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.; ITO v. * (2014) 64 SOT 138 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2004 2024	754 761
Bharat Sewa Sansthan v. DCIT (Luck.)(Trib.);www.itatonline.org	1604	587
Bharati Airtel Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 101 DTR 154 (Delhi)(Trib.)	440	174
Bharati Airtel Ltd. v. Dy. CIT(2013) 26 ITR 263/ (2014) 61 SOT 111 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)	2017	758
Bharatiya Samskriti Vidyapith Trust; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxman 131 (Karn.)(HC)	266	108
Bhargav Book Depot; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 12 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	835	293
Bharti Airtel Limited v. ACIT (2014) 101 DTR 154 / 161 TTJ 428(Delhi) (Trib.) / 63 SOT 113 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1340 1492 1634 2279	477 545 601 866
Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 50 (URO) / 161 TTJ 283 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1379	492
Bharti Airtel Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 294 (Delhi)(HC)	528 651	200 236
Bharti Cellular Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 294 (Delhi)(HC)	528 651	200 236
Bharti Hexacom Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 294 / 265 CTR 294 / 221 Taxman 323 (Delhi)(HC)	528	200
Bharti Mishra; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 2 / 265 CTR 374 / 98 DTR 1 (Delhi)(HC)	1006	361
Bharti Telenet Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 294 (Delhi)(HC)	528 651	200 236
Bharti Teletech Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 150 ITD 185 / 163 TTJ 36 (UO) (Delhi)(Trib.)	365 501 514 748	142 193 196 263
Bhaskar Infrastructure & Developers v. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 210 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	2101	794
Bhatnagar Optical v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 77 (URO)(Agra)(Trib.)	1973	741
Bhavin Arun Shah v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 641 (Ahd.)(Trib.)	1292	457
Bhavya Manno Dhupalia (Ms.) v. DCIT (2014) 166 TTJ 584 (Mum.)(Trib.)	94	38
Bhharati Teletech Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 150 ITD 185 / 163 TTJ 36 (UO) (Delhi)(Trib.)	908	321

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Bhogal Export; ITO v. * (2013) 40 taxmann.com 82/ (2014) 61 SOT 102((URO)(Chd.)(Trib.)	2001	753
Bhogilal Ramjibhai Atara; CIT v. * (2014) 222 taxmann 313 (Guj.)(HC)	868	307
Bholanath Poly Fab (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 355 ITR 290 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 82 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1106	396
Bhoomi Construction; ITO v. * (2014) 146 ITD 639 (Rajkot)(Trib.)	2009	755
Bihar Sponge Iron Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 29 (Mag.)(Jharkhand) (HC)	607	222
Bilag Industries (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 162 (Mag.)(Guj.) (HC)	1708	626
Bilakhia Holdings P. Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 65 SOT 195 (Ahd.)(Trib.)	969	345
Bimal Paul v. CCIT (2014) 97 DTR 254 / 266 CTR 592 / 51 taxmann.com 423 Gau)(HC)	2114	799
Bina Indrakumar (Ms.); CIT v. * (2015) 370 ITR 552 (Bom.)(HC)	2341	894
Bindview India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 152 ITD 120 (Pune)(Trib.)	1360	486
Binjusaria Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 169 / 106 DTR 321 / 164 TTJ 417 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	62	25
Bipin Ram Chainani v. Add. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 257 (Mum.)(Trib.)	952	338
Bipinchandra K. Bhatia v. Dy. CIT (Guj.)(HC); www.itatonline.org	435	173
Birla Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 153 ITD 679/ 168 TTJ 189 (Jab.) (Trib.)	174	73
Birla Corporation Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 102 DTR 264 / 267 CTR 540 / (2015) 228 Taxman 370 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)	352	138
Birla Soft India Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 150 ITD 378 / 32 ITR 117 (Delhi) (Trib.)	1372	490
Bisakha Sales Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT(2015) 152 ITD 750 / 35 ITR 715 (Kol.)(Trib.)	2384	911
Biswanath Pasari; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 404 / 101 DTR 133 / 44 Taxmannn.com 128 / 267 CTR 290 (Cal.)(HC)	2214	836
Black & Veatch (I) (P) Ltd.; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 101 DTR 289 / 222 Taxman 1 / 267 CTR 183 (SC)	120	48
Blue Star Ltd.: CIT v. * (2013) 357 ITR 669 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 91(Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	2454	940
BMW India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 112 DTR 99 / 166 TTJ 657(Delhi) (Trib.)	1421	512
BNP Paribas; Dy. DIT v. * (2014) 61 SOT 285 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1336	475
Bombay Bar Association & Anr v. UOI (2015) 273 CTR 113 / 113 DTR 41 (Bom.)(HC)	2582	992

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Bombay Oil Industries Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 38 (Mag.)(Bom.) (HC)	22 608	9 222
Bombay Stock Exchange (No. 2) v. DDIT(E)(2014)(2014) 365 ITR 181 / 228 Taxmann 195 (Mag) / 106 DTR 121 (Bom.)(HC)	1734	636
Bon Sales (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 44 / 104 DTR 314 / 224 Taxmann 38 (Delhi)(HC)	1041	374
Booz and Company (Australia) P. Ltd. In re (2014) 362 ITR 134 / 265 CTR 449 / 223 Taxman 302 (AAR)	186	79
BPL Sanyo Finance Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 630 / 265 CTR 163 / 95 DTR 257 (Karn.)(HC)	2458	941
Brakes India Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) 363 ITR 13 / 222 Taxman 359 / 270 CTR 98 / 104 DTR 122 (Mad.)(HC)	74 1224	32 435
Brakes India Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 424/98 DTR 285 (2015) 231 Taxmann 898 (Mad.)(HC)	1255 2179	444 821
Bramha Corp. Hotel & Resorts Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (Pune)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	738	260
Branch Manager, Punjab National Bank v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 24 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)	2216 2520	837 965
Britto Amusement P. Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2013) 263 CTR 578 / 96 DTR 1 / (2014) 360 ITR 544 / 226 Taxman 45 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	28	11
Broadway Overseas Ltd. v. CIT (2014)98 DTR 73/223 Taxmann 218(Mag.) / 265 CTR 49(P&H)(HC)	2376	906
Brown & Sharpe Inc. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 126 (URO) / 160 TTJ 1 (Delhi)(Trib.) / (2014) 98 DTR 405	138 149	56 60
Brown and Sharpe Inc. v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 704 / (2015) 230 Taxman 69 / 120 DTR 134 (All.)(HC)	124	50
Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v. TRO (2014) 222 Taxmann 72(Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	2130	805
BSES Yamuna Powers Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 358 ITR 47 (2014) 220 Taxmann 51 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	478	187
Bunkim Finance & Investments (P.) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 796 (Mum.) (Trib.)	2508 2509	961 961
C		
C. Jaichander; CIT v. * (2015) 370 ITR 579 / 229 Taxman 10 / 115 DTR 251 (Mad.)(HC)	998	358
C. M. Smith and Sons v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 701 / 43 taxmann.com 412 (Guj.)(HC)	2197	829
C. Srikant v. Dy. CIT(2014) 361 ITR 332 (Mad.)(HC)	2261	858

Name	Case No.	Page No.
C. Sugumaran; CIT v. * (2015) 113 DTR 35 / 231 Taxman 468 (Mad.)(HC)	55	21
C. R. Auluck and Sons P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 360 ITR 193 / 227 Taxman 264 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	554	208
C. S. Daniel v. Dy. CIT, Central Circle (2014) 220 Taxman 336 (Ker.)(HC)	964	343
Cabot India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 158 TTJ 840 / (2014) 149 ITD 802 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1397 1676	502 614
Cadila Healthcare Ltd.; Dy. CIT v.* (2014) 146 ITD 502 / (2015) 67 SOT 188 (Ahd.)(Trib.)	1446	526
Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 155 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	2154	814
Calcutta Knitwears; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 673 / 101 DTR 217 / 223 Taxmann 115 (Mag) / 267 CTR 105 / (2014) AIR 2970(SC)	1928 2571	719 987
Calibreted Healthcare Systems India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 54 taxmann.com 53 (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1493	545
Canara Bank v. ACIT (2014) 265 CTR 385 / (2015) 228 Taxman 212 / 99 DTR 36 (Karn.)(HC)	345 579	136 214
Canara Bank v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (2014) 271 CTR 233 (Bom.)(HC)	2131	806
Canara Bank; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 156 (Karn.)(HC)	567	211
Canara Housing Development Co. v. DCIT (2014) 49 taxmann.com 98 / (2015) 114 DTR 162 / 274 CTR 122 (Karn.)(HC)	1858	690
Canon India (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. ACIT(2013) 218 Taxmann 405/ (2014) 102 DTR 420 (Delhi)(HC)	1788	657
Capital IQ Information Systems India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 809 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	2127	804
Capricorn Food Products India Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 61 SOT 196 (Chennai)(Trib.)	146	60
Capsugel Healthcare Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 142 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1432 1629	520 599
Carefour WC and C India P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 692 / (2015) 228 Taxman 261 (Mag.) / 121 DTR 249 (Delhi)(HC) / 90 CCH 124 (Delhi)(HC)	431 635	172 229
Caritor (India) P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 463 / (2015) 230 Taxman 411 (Karn.)(HC)	228	94
Cascade Holdings P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 84 / 45 taxmann.com 228 (Bom.)(HC)	2150	814
Casio India Co. Pvt. Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 30 ITR 577 / 62 SOT 110 / 166 TTJ 633 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1478	539

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Cavincare (P) Ltd. ; CIT. v. * (2014) 268 CTR 167 / 226 taxman 101(Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)	1205	430
Cbay Systems (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2015) 152 ITD 126 (Hyd.) (Trib)	1364	487
CCIT v. George P. Mathews (2014) 362 ITR 660 / 222 Taxmann 373 (Ker.) (HC)	2156	815
CCIT v. Sarva Equity (P) Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxman 172 (Karn.)(HC)	20	9
Cecilia Haresh Chaganlal (Smt.); ACIT v. * (2015) 37 ITR 567 / 58 taxmann.com 312 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2479	949
Cedrick Jordan Da Silva v. ITO (IT) (2014) 98 DTR 314 / 62 SOT 239(Panji)(Trib)	2065	779
Ceebros Property Development (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014)222 Taxmann 128 (Mag)(Mad.)(HC)	1302	460
Central Coalfields Ltd. v. CIT (A) (2014) 97 DTR 130 (Jharkhand)(HC)	2226	841
Central Mine Planning & Design Institute Ltd. v. CIT(A) (2014) 97 DTR 130 (Jharkhand)(HC)	2226	841
Central Warehousing Corporation v. CIT (2015) 228 Taxmann 169 / (2014) 364 ITR 503 (Delhi)(HC)	1733	636
Centre for Development of Telematics v. UOI (2013) 214 Taxman 653 / (2014) 360 ITR 184 (Delhi)(HC)	197	84
Centrica India Offshore Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT(2014) 364 ITR 336 / 104 DTR 33 / 224 Taxmann 122/270 CTR 1(Delhi)(HC)	2046	773
Century Metal Recycling Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 35 ITR 143/(2015) 67 SOT 351 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)	2481	950
Century Tiles Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (2014) 33 ITR 230 / (2015) 152 ITD 327 (Ahd.) (Trb.)	500 1157 1664	193 413 610
Cera Realities v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 366/ (2015) 274 CTR 358/ 114 DTR 212 / (2015) 56 taxmann.com 165 (Bom.)(HC)	2225	840
CGI Information Systems & Management Consultants (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 226 Taxman 319 / 275 CTR 72 / 115 DTR 115 (Karn.)(HC)	155	63
Chaman Lal Sekhri; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 225 (P&H)(HC)	1031	370
Chamundi Industrial Estate; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 339 (Karn.)(HC)	405	163
Chanakya Developers; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 164 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	859 1050	302 378
Chandra Prabha Kushwaha (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 66/225 Taxmann 130 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	1558	570
Chandra Prakash Jain v. ACIT (Inv.) Circle (2014) 107 DTR 81 / 270 CTR 192 / 224 Taxman 290 (All.)(HC)	54	20

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Chandrakant A. Gandhi v. ACIT (2013) 162 TTJ 270 / (2014) 146 ITD 346 (Ahd)(Trib.)	1954	729
Charan Dass Ashok Kumar v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 367 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 513 (P&H)(HC)	2401	919
Charanjiv Charitable Trust ; DIT (E) v. * (2014) 102 DTR 1 / 267 CTR 305 / 223 Taxman 71 (Delhi)(HC)	272 337	110 133
Chariot International P. Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 29 ITR 36 / 65 SOT 170 (Chennai)(Trib.)	38	14
Charu Home Products Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2015) 229 Taxmann 610 (Delhi) (HC)	2111	798
CHD Developers Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 177 / 99 DTR 401 / 266 CTR 360 / 225 Taxmann 154 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	1311	465
Chemm Finance Ltd. ; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 35 ITR 167 / (2015) 67 SOT 156 (URO)(Bang.)(Trib.)	494 495 1543 1602	191 191 565 587
Chetan Gupta v. ACIT (2013) 144 ITD 344 / (2014) 98 DTR 209 / 160 TTJ 9 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1098 1841 1842	393 682 682
Chief Accounts Officer, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagar Palike v. ITO(2015) 113 DTR 209 / 167 TTJ 390 (Bang.)(Trib.)	2038	768
Chief Medical Officer v. ITO(2013) 157 TTJ 281 / 2014) 61 SOT 112 (URO) (Indore)(Trib.)	2031	763
Chirag Vincom P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 273 / 227 Taxmann 64 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)	1552	568
Chiranjeevi Wind Energy Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 534 / 66 SOT 191 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)	532 1293	202 458
Chittaranjan A. Dasannacharya; ACIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 226 (Bang.)(Trib.)	387 2474	153 947
Chitti Parvatha (Smt.); ITO v. * (2014) 151 ITD 413 / (2015) 168 TTJ 403 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	980	350
Chokhani Brother v. JCIT (2014) 367 ITR 230/226 Taxmann 51 (All.)(HC)	1752	645
Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 680 / 227 Taxmann 18 (Mag) (Mad.)(HC)	2435	933
Choudhary Construction Company; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 20 (Mag.) (Raj.)(HC)	791	277
Chrys Capital Investment Advisors India (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 566 / (2015) 170 TTJ 185 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1407	505

Name	Case No.	Page No.
CHW Forge (P) Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 227 Taxmann 213 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	2099	794
Cibatul Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 133 (Guj.)(HC)	629	228
Cisco System Service B. E. India Branch v. ADIT(IT)(2015) 68 SOT 18 (URO) / 120 DTR 72 / 171 TTJ 367 (Bang.)(Trib.)	177 1427	75 517
Cisco Systems Asia Services; ACIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 32 (URO) (Bang.) (Trib.)	1977 1978	742 742
Citi Financial Retail Services India Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 34 ITR 92 / (2015) 152 ITD 235 (Chennai)(Trib.)	1518	556
City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 203(Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	1698	622
Clarion Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 167 TTJ 532 / 114 DTR 34 (Pune)(Trib.)	240	98
Classic Network Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 174 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1773	652
Cliantha Research Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 102 (Mag.) (Guj.) (HC)	1723	631
Climate Systems (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxman 174 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	585	216
CNB Finwiz Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 228 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 175 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	920	326
CNB Finwiz Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 159 TTJ 146 / 97 DTR 97 (Delhi) (Trib.)	99 517	40 196
Coastal Resorts (India) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 363 ITR 482 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 488 (Ker.)(HC)	445	176
Coca Cola India (P) Ltd v. Asst Registrar ITAT (2014) 364 ITR 567 / 223 Taxmann 58 / 268 CTR 417 / 103 DTR 337 (Bom)(HC)	2270	861
Coca Cola India (P) Ltd v. Asst Registrar ITAT (2014) 368 ITR 487 / 271 CTR 60 / 109 DTR 94 (2015) 228 Taxmann 353 (Mag)(HC) (Bom.)(HC)	2292	873
Cochin Stock Exchange Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 382 / 226 Taxmann 161 / 269 CTR 93 (Ker.)(HC)	56 934	22 332
Colt Technology Services India (P) Ltd.; ITO v. * (2014) 146 ITD 468 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1491	545
Comfort Living Hotels P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 182 / 227 Taxmann 145 (Mag.)(Delhi) (HC)	463	182
Commercial Motors Finance Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 264 CTR 217 / 221 Taxmann 90 (Mag.) / 221 Taxmann 90 / 97 DTR 137(All.)(HC)	492 2540	190 975
Commonwealth Developers v. ACIT (2014) 102 DTR 89/267 CTR 297 / 224 Taxmann 77 (Mag.) / (2015) 370 ITR 265 (Bom.)(HC)	1309	463

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Compagne Indo Francaise, Be Commerce P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 434 / 111 DTR 226 (T & AP)(HC)	2247	852
Computer Science corporation of India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 268 CTR 110 / 49 taxmann.com 107(MP) (HC)	2224	839
Comverse Networks Systems India P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 40 / 226 Taxmann 108/ 271 CTR 36 (Delhi) (HC)	1959	733
Connaught Plaza Restaurants Pvt. Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) BCAJ – October-P. 29 (Delhi)(Trib.)	510	195
Consulting Engineering Corporation v. JDIT (2014) 166 TTJ 341 (Delhi) (Trib.)	145	59
Consulting Engineering Group Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 284 / 267 CTR 447 / 102 DTR 311 / 223 Taxmann 440 (Raj.)(HC)	637 642 836	230 233 293
Controls and Switchgear Contractors Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 312 / 104 DTR 117 / 269 ITR 44 / 225 Taxman 61 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	534	202
Convergys India Services (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 269 CTR 127 / 221 Taxmann 114 (SC)	2311	881
Copal Market Research Ltd. ; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 226 Taxman 226 / 270 CTR 223 / (2015) 371 ITR 114 (Delhi)(HC)	121	48
Copal Market Research Ltd.; DIT (IT) v. * (2014) 226 Taxmann 226 / 270 CTR 223 / (2015) 371 ITR 114 (Delhi)(HC)	2206	833
Cordys R & D (India) (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 587 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1402 1403 1404	504 504 504
Cordys Software India (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 33 ITR 160 / (2015) 67 SOT 65 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)	1356	483
Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 132 / 51 taxman.com 545 (T&AP)(HC)	390 589 773	155 217 271
Coromondal Cement Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 144 / 52 taxmann.com 56 (T&AP)(HC)	592	218
Corporate Law Chambers India v. Dy. CIT (2014) 32 ITR 477 / (2015) 152 ITD 74 (Mum.)(Trib.)	425	169
Corrtech Energy (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2015) 372 ITR 97 / (2014) 272 CTR 262/ 223 Taxman 130 (Guj)(HC)	346	136
Cortech Energy Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (Guj.)(HC), www.itatonline.org	358	140

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Cosmos Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 90 (Pune)(Trib.)	437 504 568 909	173 194 211 322
Cotton Textiles Exports Promotion Council v. DIT (E) (2014) 64 SOT 167 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)	327	129
Council for the Indian School Certificate Examinations v. DGIT(E) (2012) 206 Taxman 466 / (2014) 362 ITR 436 (Delhi)(HC)	203	86
Council for the Indian School Certificate Examinations v. DGIT(E) (2014) 364 ITR 508 / 224 Taxman 210 / 269 CTR 228 / 106 DTR 9 (Delhi)(HC)	209	88
Creative Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. v. Amal Garg, Dy. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 596 / 102 DTR 412 / (2015) 58 taxmann.com 43 (Guj.)(HC)	1938	723
Crescent Organics (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 108 DTR 393 / 271 CTR 227 / 226 Taxman 289 (Bom.)(HC)	547 639	206 232
Crescent Property Development; ACIT v. * (Mum.) (Trib.); www.itatonline.org	2482	951
Crest Animation Studios Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 116 (URO) (Mum.) (Trib.)	1384	495
Crimson Properties (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 220 Taxmann 112 (Mag.) (Bom.) (HC)	1794	661
Crompton greaves Limited v. Dy. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 244 / 104 DTR 129 / 226 Taxman 375 (Bom.)(HC)	939	333
Crossings Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxman 26 /267 CTR 519 (All.)(HC) / 99 DTR 436	2410 2504	923 960
Crown Consultants Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT(2014) 362 ITR 368 / 102 DTR 77 / 224 Taxmann 81 (Mag)(Bom.)(HC)	1815	669
CTCI Overseas Corporation Ltd. v. DIT(IT) (2014) 366 ITR 33 / 224 Taxman 207 (Delhi.)(HC)	48	18
Cummins Inc v. DIT (2014) 146 ITD 460 (Pune)(Trib.)	168	69
Cummins India Limited v. ACIT (2015) 68 SOT 14 (URO) / 170 TTJ 746 (Pune)(Trib.)	1385	495
Curam Software International (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 149 ITD 458 (Bang.) (Trib.)	1417	508
Curam Software International (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 149 ITD 458 (Bang.) (Trib.)	1414 1415 1416 1418	508 508 508 509

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Cushman and Wakefield (India) (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 370 / 104 DTR 249 / 225 Taxmann 8 / 269 CTR 16 (Delhi)(HC) / 46 taxmann.com 317	616 1494 1495	225 546 546
Customer Asset India (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 37 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	160	65
Cyber India Online Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 1 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)	503	193
D		
D & M Components Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 179 / 223 Taxman 154 (Mag.)/103 DTR 325 (Delhi) (HC).	423	169
D. P. Kanodia; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 163 / 226 Taxmann 67 (Mag.) / (2015) 120 DTR 262 (All.)(HC)	1110	397
D. P. Vekaria; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 92 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	2080	786
D. Rama Kotaiah and Co. v. ACIT (2014) 368 ITR 441 (T & AP)(HC)	2071	782
D. V. Paranjape; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 173 / 226 Taxmann 169 (Bom.) (HC)	1817	671
Dahej Harbour and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 33 ITR 634 / (2015) 67 SOT 55 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)	1258 1259	445 446
Daikin Airconditioning India (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 335 (Delhi) (Trib.)	1447	526
Daisy Devaiah; CIT v. * (Smt.) (2014) 227 Taxman 153 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	967	344
Daisy Packers (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 331 (Guj.)(HC)	32	12
Damodar Mangalji Mining Co. v. JCIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 344 / 264 CTR 182 (Bom.)(HC)	489 710 1229	189 252 436
Darbhangha Mansion CHS Ltd.; CIT v. * (2015) 370 ITR 443 / 273 CTR 473 / 113 DTR 307 (Bom.)(HC) / 273 CTR 532 / 113 DTR 217 (Bom.)(HC)	66 68	27 29
Daulal Mohta (HUF); CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 680 (Bom.)(HC)	1016	364
Dawoodi Bohra Jamat; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 31 / 102 DTR 361 / 222 Taxman 228 (Mag.)/ 268 CTR 1 (SC)	333 2330	131 888
DBS Corporate Services (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 31 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	675	242
DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 720/(2015) 230 Taxmann 190 (SC)	1514	555
Debashis Moulik v. ACIT (Cal.)(HC); www.itatonline.org	1786	657
Debashu Services (P) Ltd. v. Dy.CIT (2014) 107 DTR 41 / 270 CTR 36 / 49 taxmann.com 41 (Bom.)(HC).	1790	659

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Deccan Cements Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 360 ITR 444 / 268 CTR 212 / 103 DTR 57 (AP)(HC) / 363 ITR 100 / 225 Taxmann 164 (Mag.) (AP)(HC)	1185 1511	423 554
Deccan Tools Industries P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 295/52 taxmann.com 55 (AP)(HC)	1510	554
Deco De Trend; CIT v. * (2013) 94 DTR 73 / (2014) 360 ITR 1 / 264 CTR 78 (Mad.)(HC)	254	104
Deepak Dalela v. ITO (2014) 101 DTR 334 / 161 TTJ 718 / 147 ITD 19(TM) (Jaipur)(Trib.)	2303	877
Deepak Fertilizers and Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 484 / 226 Taxman 42 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	2326	886
Deepak Gupta; CIT v. * (2013) 219 Taxmann 1 / (2014) 266 CTR 265 (All.) (HC)	1825	674
Deepak Real Estate Developers (I) P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 377 / 270 CTR 636 / 52 taxmann.com 75 / 107 DTR 259 (Raj.)(HC)	2343	895
Deepakbhai Ramjibhai Patel v. ITO (2014) 366 ITR 134 (Guj.)(HC)	1751	644
Deepkiran Foods P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 437 / 269 CTR 281 / 224 Taxman 135 (Mag.) / 105 DTR 29 / (Guj.)(HC) (Guj.)(HC)	253	103
Deloitte Consulting India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 362 ITR 46 / 224 Taxmann 209(Mag)(Bom.)(HC)	2273	862
Denso India Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 191 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)	1391 1396	498 502
Deraj Agrotech Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 164 TTJ 495 / 148 ITD 133 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2469	945
Deutsche Bank A.G; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 399 (Bom.)(HC)	563	210
Deutsche Post Bank Home Finance Ltd.; CIT v. * (2012) 209 Taxman 313 / (2014) 98 DTR 144 / 265 CTR 525 (Delhi)(HC)	85	34
Devasan Investment P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 452 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 273 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	928	330
Devdas Naik; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 12 / 112 DTR 162 / 227 Taxmann 157 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	992	355
Devdas Rama v. CIT(2014) 362 ITR 335 / 104 DTR 73 / 222 Taxmann 56 / 272 CTR 310(Bom.)(HC)	1537	563
Devesh Kumar; ACIT v. * (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1833	678
Device Driven (India) P. Ltd. ; ITO v. * (2014) 159 TTJ 1 / 97 DTR 53 / 29 ITR 263 (Cochin)(Trib.)	2064	779
Dewan Chand Ram Chandra Industries (P) Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 364 ITR 70/ 223 Taxman 161 / 270 CTR 569 / 108 DTR 170 (Delhi)(HC)	193 2568	82 986
Dhaanya Seeds (P.) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 15 (Bang.)(Trib.)	2002	753

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Dhampur Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2015) 370 ITR 194 / 273 CTR 90 / 229 Taxman 271 / 111 DTR 350 (All.)(HC)	349 634	136 229
Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 82 / 222 Taxman 24 (Mag.)(All)(HC)	84 701 702 706 1659	34 250 250 251 608
Dhampur Sugar Mills v. CIT (2014) 111 DTR 345 / (2015) 370 ITR 187 / 273 CTR 85 / 228 Taxman 326 (All.)(HC)	344	135
Dhanpat Rai & Sons; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 209 / 362 ITR 7 (P&H)(HC)	708	251
Dharamshi B. Shah; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 140 / 112 DTR 277(Guj.)(HC)	2447	938
Dharmendra Kumar Varshney v. CIT (2014) 360 ITR 563 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 94 (All.)(HC)	1113	398
Dholadhar Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT(2014) 362 ITR 111 / 227 Taxmann 146 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	2298	875
Dholgiri Industries (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 99 DTR 359 / 266 CTR 111 / 225 Taxmann 189 (Mag.)(MP)(HC)	867	306
Dhoomketu Builders and Developers P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 680/ 216 Taxman 76 (Delhi)(HC)	430	171
Dhram Industries; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 144/ 103 DTR 49 / (2015) 229 taxmann 423 (SC)	1193 2573	426 988
Dhruv Parulbhai Patel v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 234 /223 Taxmann 415(Guj.)(HC)	1818	671
DHTC Logistics Ltd.; CIT (TDS) v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 83 (Delhi)(HC)	2519	965
Diageo India P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 7 / 271 CTR 646 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 191 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	533	202
Diamines & Chemicals Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 218 / 271 CTR 98 / 109 DTR 62 (Guj.)(HC)	518	197
Diamond Carpet v. Addl. CIT (2013) 26 ITR 689 / (2014) 61 SOT 13 (URO) (Agra)(Trib.)	727	257
Digital Juice Animations (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 67 SOT 62 (URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)	1355	483
Dilip Annand Vazirani v. ITO (2015) 167 TTJ 194 / 113 DTR 26 (Mum.)(Trib.)	61	24
Dimension Apparels Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 52 taxmann.com 356 / (2015) 370 ITR 288(Delhi)(HC)	1609	590
Dineschandra Bhailalbhai Gandhi v. TRO (2014) 362 ITR 380 / 223 Taxmann 268 / 267 CTR 243 (Guj.)(HC)	2147	813

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Dinesh Jain HUF; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 160 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	1148	410
Dineshchandra Bhailalbhai Gandhi v. TRO (2014) 362 ITR 380 / 223 Taxmann 268 / 267 CTR 243 (Guj.)(HC)	2138	808
Dineshchandra Shantilal Shah (HUF); ITO v. * (2014) 149 ITD 79 (Ahd) (Trib.)	2407	921
Dineshkumar Chandmal Jain; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxman 367 (Guj.)(HC)	842	295
Dipak Kantilal Takvani; ACIT v. * (2013) 145 ITD 35/ (2014) 159 TTJ 304(TM) (Rajkot)(Trib.)	2526	968
Diptiben D. Patel; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 325 (Guj.)(HC)	1108	397
Disha Trust .v. DIT(E) (2014) 31 ITR 154 / (2015) 152 ITD 42 (Chennai) (Trib.)	323	127
Dishnet Wireless Limited v. ACIT (2014)361 ITR 449 / 105 DTR 262/225 Taxmann 202(Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)	2124	802
District Health & Family Welfare Society v. DCIT (2013) 24 ITR 604 / (2014) 61 SOT 41 (URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)	215	90
Divya Jewellers P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 671/(2015)230 Taxmann 321 / 121 DTR 74 (All)(HC)	1203 1204	429 430
Divyakant C. Mehta v. ITO (2014) 365 ITR 423 / 269 CTR 452 / 226 Taxmann 48 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	648	235
Diwan Rubber Industries; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 26 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	605	221
DLF Info City Developers (Chennai) Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 162 TTJ 531/103 DTR 322 / (2014) 146 ITD 123 (Delhi)(Trib.)	2391	914
DLF Info City Developers (Chennai) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 94 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)	1270	449
DLF Ltd. and another v. Addl. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 390 / 225 Taxmann 258/ 271 CTR 43 (Delhi)(HC)	1585	581
Dolphin Drilling Ltd. ; DIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 227 / 264 CTR 319 / 221 Taxman 489 (Uttarakhand) (HC)	777 829	273 291
Doon Valley Rubber Industries; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 40 / 268 CTR 102 (HP)(HC)	1284	455
DQ Entertainment (International) (P) Ltd.; ADIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 152 / 164 TTJ 84 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	2055	775
Dr. Bapuji Cherukuri v. Dy. CIT (2013) 21 ITR 714 / (2014) 149 ITD 502 (Chennai)(Trib.)	2484	951
Dr. Dinesh Jain v. ITO (2014) 363 ITR 210 / 226 Taxmann 27 / 272 CTR 73 (Bom.)(HC)	1144	408
Dr. Jaideep Kumar Sharma; ITO v. * (2015) 152 ITD 270 (Mum.)(Trib.)	812	284

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Dr. Murai Mohan Kokey v. ITO (Kol.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	2221	838
Dr. Raghuvendra Singh v. CIT (2014) 98 DTR 255 / 267 CTR 376 (2015) 229 Taxmann 554 (P&H)(HC)	1596 2334	585 890
Dr. Ram Autar Agarwal v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 173 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	1918 1046	715 376
Dr. Renu Mahesh (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 36 (Mag.)(All.)(HC.)	1595	584
Dr. Suresh Sharma; CIT v. * (2014) 267 CTR 73 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 85 (Raj.)(HC)	2320	883
Dr. Vikhe Patil Foundation; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 104 (Bom.)(HC)	267	108
Drs. X-Ray & Pathology Institute (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 358 ITR 27 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 88 (Mag.) (All.) (HC)	1944	726
Drs. X-Ray & Pathology Institute (P.) Ltd. ; Dy. CIT v. * (2013) 27 ITR 434 / (2014) 61 SOT 25 (URO) (Luck.) (Trib.)	1948	727
DSJ Communication Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 129 (Bom.)(HC)	1850	685
Dulla Ram, Labour Contractor, Kotkapura; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 24 (P&H)(HC)	1056	380
Durr India Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 160(Mad.)(HC)	2450	939
Dutron Plastics Ltd. v. Dy. CIT(2014) 223 Taxmann 108 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1217	433
Dv. Mercy v. ITO (2014) 368 ITR 616/ 52 taxmann.com 519 / (2015) 121 DTR 105 (Mad.)(HC)	1546	566
Dynamic Enterprises; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 331 / (2013) 359 ITR 83 / 263 CTR 138 (Karn.)(HC)(FB)	958	340
E		
E. Sudhir Reddy; CIT v. * (2014) 111 DTR 233 / (2015) 273 CTR 326 (AP)(HC)	1905	710
E.C.C. Project (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 159 (Mag.) (2015) 374 ITR 44 (All.)(HC)	2506	960
E.S. Jose; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 29 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC) / 220 Taxmann 32 (Ker.)(HC)	682 712 1091	244 253 391
East India Petroleum Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 293/52 taxmann.com 60 (T & AP)(HC)	2394	916
E-Cap Partners; Dy. CIT v.* (2014) 64 SOT 192 (Mum.)(Trib.)	942	334
Ecom Gill Coffee Trading P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2012) 209 Taxmann 190 / 252 CTR 281/ (2014) 362 ITR 204 (Karn.)(HC)	2306 2574	878 988

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Edac Engineering Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 341 / 159 TTJ 526 (Chennai)(Trib.)	753 781 1010	265 274 362
EDAG Engineers & Design India (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 166 TTJ 364/ (2015) 67 SOT 81(URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)	1357	484
EDAG Engineers & Design India Pvt. Ltd.; DCIT v. * (2014) 166 TTJ 364/67 SOT 81 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)	1429 1430	518 519
EDS Electronic Data Systems (I.)(P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2012) 211 Taxmann 133/ (2014) 265 CTR 31 (Delhi)(HC)	650	235
eFunds Corporation & Ors.; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 364 ITR 256 / 99 DTR 257/ 266 CTR 1 (Delhi)(HC).	129	52
eFunds IT Solution; DIT v. (2014) 364 ITR 256 / 99 DTR 257 / 266 CTR 1 (Delhi)(HC)	129	52
EIH Associated Hotels Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (Chennai)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org	378	149
Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 140 ITD 221 (2014) 29 ITR 637 / 155 TTJ 748 / 89 DTR 190 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	527	200
Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 637 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	763	268
Elegant Travels (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 67(Mag.) (Delhi) (HC)	1933	721
Eleganza Jewellery Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 232/269 CTR 475 / 52 taxmann.com 46 (Bom.)(HC)	1720	630
Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v. TRO (2014) 365 ITR 293 / 269 CTR 217 /46 taxmann.com 151 (Delhi)(HC)	2140	809
Emco Ltd. v. UOI (Bom.)(HC), www.itatonline.org	2272	862
Emerging Securities (P) Ltd. ; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 146 ITD 736 (Delhi) (Trib.)	949	337
Empire Builtech P Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 110 / (2015) 228 taxman 346 (Mag.)(Delhi.)(HC)	1032	370
Empire Pumps Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 229 Taxmann 379 (Guj.)(HC)	1188	423
Enchante Jewellery Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 8 (Mag.)(Delhi) (HC)	660 898	238 318
Endemol India (P) Ltd. (2014) 264 CTR 117 / 223 Taxman 183 (Mag.) / 361 ITR 340 / 97 DTR 33 (AAR)	184	78
Endemol India (P) Ltd. v. (2014) 361 ITR 658 / 99 DTR 397 / 222 Taxmann 67 / 266 CTR 142 (AAR)	160 2067	69 780
Endemol India (P) Ltd., In re (2014) 361 ITR 353 / 222 Taxman 59 / 264 CTR 128/ 97 DTR 44 (AAR)	153 185	62 79

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Engineers India Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 686/226 Taxmann 94 (Mag) (SC)	2310	880
English Indian Clays Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 25 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)	2052 2084	775 788
Enviro Control Associated (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 56 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	832	292
EPCOS AG v. Dy. DIT (2014) 64 SOT 257 (Pune)(Trib.)	135 165	54 67
Eqbal Inn & Hotels Ltd. v. CCIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 71(Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	2106	797
Ernakulam District Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. ITO (TDS) (2014) 34 ITR 662 / (2015) 152 ITD. 301 (Cochin)(Trib.)	2083	787
Ernst & Young Pvt. Ltd.; DCIT v. * (2014) 32 ITR 639 / 66 SOT 4 (Kol.) (Trib.)	2060	777
Essae Tera Oka (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT 266 CTR 246 / 222 Taxmann 170 / 366 ITR 408 (Karn.)(HC)	891	316
Essar Projects Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 363 / 223 Taxmann 344 (SC)	535 576	202 213
Essar Steel Ltd. ; Dy. CIT v. * (2013) 26 ITR 623 / (2014) 61 SOT 39 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)	194	82
Essar Steel Ltd. v. ADCIT (2014) 165 TTJ 25(UO) / 35 ITR 432 / (2015) 67 SOT 24 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)	723	256
Estate of Late HMM Vikramsingji of Gondal; CWT v. * (2014) 268 CTR 232/ 103 DTR 211/363 TTR 679 / 225 Taxmann 166(SC)	1961	735
Ester Industries Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 159 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	1515	555
Ester Industries Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 221 Taxmann 22 (Delhi)(HC)	1796	661
Euro India Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 97 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	628	228
Expo Globe India Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 147 / 227 Taxmann 149 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	1086	389
Express Securities (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 488 / 220 taxman 365 / 105 DTR 86 / 272 CTR 294 (Delhi)(HC)	227	93
F		
Fag Kugelfischer Georg Schafer KCAA v. CIT (2014) 227 Taxman 256(Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	156	64
Fairdeal Textile Park P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 497 / 229 Taxmann 97 (Guj.)(HC)	1109	397
Faizan Shoes P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 155 / 226 Taxmann 115 / 272 CTR 170 (Mad.)(HC)	776	272

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Farida Prime Tannery (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 145 (URO) / 31 ITR 461 (Chennai)(Trib.)	2058	776
Fateh Chand Charitable Trust v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 677 / 104 DTR 1 / 268 CTR 483 / 226 Taxman 271 (SC)	299	119
Federal Mogul Goetage (India) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 505 / 97 DTR 169 (Delhi)(HC)	361 2372	141 905
Fenoplast Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 761 / 52 taxmann.com 479 / (2015) 115 DTR 337 (T & AP)(HC)	1913	714
Ferment Biotech Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 246 (Mum.)(Trib.)	526 569	199 211
Ferromatik Milacron India P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 217 Taxmann 136 (Mag.) / (2014) 363 ITR 461 / (Guj.)(HC)	1695	621
Fertilizer Traders; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 323 / 222 Taxmann 162 (Mag.) (All)(HC)	1927	719
Fibres & Fabrics International (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014)222 Taxmann 141 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	2233	845
Finoram Sheets Ltd. v. ITO (2015) 152 ITD 77 (Pune)(Trib.)	164	67
Firestone International (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 150 ITD 151 (Mum.) (Trib.)	364 1371	142 490
FIS Logistics (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 26 ITR 605 / (2014) 61 SOT 24 (URO) (Kol.)(Trib.)	502	193
Fisher Sanmar Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 296 / 47 taxmann.com 364 (Mad.)(HC)	2169	819
Flawless Diamond (India) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 135 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)	1322	470
Flender Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 223 Taxmann 221 (Cal.)(HC)	1235	438
Flothern Engineers (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 223 (Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)	1768	650
Flouro Chemicals; CIT v. * (2013) 358 ITR 291 (SC)	2177	821
Flow Link Systems (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 149 ITD 604 (Chennai) (Trib.)	1406	505
Foresee Information Systems P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 335 / 226 Taxman 165 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	230	95
Fortune Hotels and Estates Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (Bom.)(HC) www.itatonline.org	2442	935
Four Soft (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 732 / 164 TTJ 561 (Hyd.) (Trib.)	1401	504

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Fr. Mullers Charitable Institutions; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 230 / 102 DTR 386 / (2015) 228 Taxman 319 (Karn.)(HC) / 275 CTR 558 (Karn.)(HC)	338 2370	134 904
Frick India Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 328 / 227 Taxman 128 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	45	17
Friends of WWB India v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 9 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1679	615
Frigoglass India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 429 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1400	503
Fujistu Optel Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 359 ITR 67 / 261 CTR 446 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 34 (Mag.) (MP)(HC)	1791	660
Funds Corporation & Ors; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 99 DTR 257 / 266 CTR 1 / 226 Taxmann 44(Delhi)(HC)	1813	669
Funds IT Solution; CIT v. * (2014)364 ITR 256 / 99 DTR 257 / 266 CTR 1/ 226 Taxmann 44 (Delhi)(HC),	1813	669
G		
G. C. Shah and Co.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 323 (Guj.)(HC)	919	326
G. Indira K. Reddy (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 600 (AP)(HC)	2423	929
G. K. Consultants Limited v. ITO (Delhi)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org	1838	681
G. K. Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 36 ITR 344 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	2480	950
G. S. Tiwari & Co.; CIT v. * (2013) 357 ITR 651 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 111 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	911	323
G. Shankar v. ACIT (Bang.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	814	285
G. V. Sons; ACIT v. * (Mum.)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org	1617	593
G. Venkateswar Rao v. ACIT (2014) 368 ITR 457 / 57 taxmann.com 232 (T&AP) (HC)	1908	712
G.M. (Telecom) BSNL; CIT v. * (2014) 101 DTR 401(All.)(HC)	2511	962
Gaja Advisors (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 726 (Delhi)(HC)	590	217
Galileo India (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 115(Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	2367	904
Galileo Nederland BV v. ADIT (IT) (2014) 367 ITR 319 / 271 CTR 568/ (2015) 228 Taxman 81 (Delhi)(HC)	123	49
Ganapati Enterprises v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 480 / 104 DTR 161 / 269 CTR 209 / (2015) 228 Taxman 211 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)	412 413	165 165
Ganeshi Lal Education Society v. CIT (2013) 40 taxmann.com 257 (P&H) (HC)	320	126
Ganga Corporation Asbestos (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 582 / 269 CTR 313 / 104 DTR 305 (All.)(HC)	1162 1163	415 415
Gangothri Textiles Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 28 (Mad.)(HC)	1254	444
Ganpatraj A. Sanghavi v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	740	261

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Gargi Construction Co. v. ITO (2014) 220 Taxmann 38 (Mag.) / (Guj.)(HC)	414	166
Garware Wall Ropes Ltd v. ACIT (2014) 65 SOT 86 (Mum.)(Trib.)	386	152
Gauranginiben S. Shodhan; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 238 / 224 Taxman 253 (Guj.)(HC)	1014	363
Gaurav Luthara v. ITO (2014)149 ITD 410 / 105 DTR 201 / 163 TTJ 129(Agra)(Trib.)	2398	918
Gaurav v. Shah v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 265 /227 Taxmann 188 (Mag.) (Guj.) (HC)	1970	739
Gayathri Associates v. ITO (2014) 221 Taxman 143 (Mag.)(AP)(HC)	1058	380
GCDA Employees Pension Fund Trust v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 532 / 229 Taxman 636 (Ker.)(HC)	302	120
GE BE (P) Ltd. ; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 129 (URO) / 164 TTJ 40 (Bang.)(Trib.)	1388	497
GE Energy Parts Inc v. ADIT (3014) 33 ITR 411 / 106 DTR 265 / 163 TTJ 697 (Delhi)(Trib.)	2276	865
GEBE P Ltd. v. A CIT (2014) 226 Taxman 114 (Mag.) (2015) 371 ITR 32 (Karn.)(HC)	244	100
GEBR Pfeiffer (I) (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 172 (URO)(Delhi) (Trib.)	366	142
GEC Alsthom India Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 304 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 569 (Mad.)(HC)	2267	859
Geetanjali Education Society v. ADIT(E) (2014) 101 DTR 337 / 223 Taxman 167 / 267 CTR 369 (Karn.)(HC)	216	90
Gemini TV P. Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 29 ITR 32 / 66 SOT 9 (URO)(Chennai) (Trib.)	759	267
General Electric International Operations Company Inc. v. ADIT (2014) 64 SOT 187 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)	2476	948
General Motors India P. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 360 ITR 527 / 226 Taxmann 80 (Mag)(Guj.)(HC)	1713	627
General Trading Co. v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 25 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	613	224
Genpact Mobility Services (India) (P) Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 706 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1439	523
Geojit Investment Service Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 67 SOT 37 (Cochin)(Trib.)	372	147
Gera Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) 42 CCH 91 (Pune)(Trib.); www. itatonline.org	505 811 1314	194 284 467
Ghatge Patil Transport Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 749 / 112 DTR 369 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 340 (Bom.)(HC)	893	317

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Ghatkopar Jolly Gymkhana v. DIT(E) (2014) 147 ITD 112 / 160 TTJ 620 / 99 DTR 41 (Mum.)(Trib.)	298	119
Ghaziabad Ispat Udyog Ltd. v. Dy.CIT (2014) 107 DTR 321 / 224 Taxmann 82 (All.)(HC)	1740	639
Ghosh & Chakraborty Transport v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 88(URO)(Kol.)(Trib.)	2000	752
GIA India v. DIT (E) (2014) 146 ITD 238 /161 TTJ 391/101 DTR 115 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1178	421
Gian Gupta; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 428 / 224 Taxmann 172 (Mag.)(Delhi) (HC)	1101	395
GIL Mauritius Holdings Ltd.; ADIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxman 107 (Mag.) (Uttarakhand)(HC)	126	51
Gilletle India Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 101 DTR 258 (Raj.)(HC)	671	241
Girish Dharod v. ACIT (2014) 61 SOT 99 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)	1008	361
GKN Holdings Plc v. DDIT(IT) (2014) 66 SOT 54 (URO) / 167 TTJ 408 (Pune)(Trib.)	1508	553
Glass Equipment (India) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 59 / 269 CTR 363 / 225 Taxmann 65 (Cal.)(HC)	1782 1853 2318	655 687 883
Global Associates; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 499 / 272 CTR 350 (Delhi)(HC)	2428	930
Global Educational Society; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxman 20 (Mag.)(P&H) (HC)	309	123
Global Signal Cable (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT(2014) 368 ITR 609 / 229 Taxmann 608 (Delhi)(HC)	1701	623
Global Vantage (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 438/225 Taxmann 193 (Mag.) (Delhi) (HC)	1348	481
Globus Infocom Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 14 / 108 DTR 363 (Delhi)(HC)	2338	893
Globus Infocom Ltd. v. CIT, Delhi (2014) 369 ITR 14 / 227 Taxman 48(Mag)(Delhi.) (HC)	2346	896
Globus Securities & Finance (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 201 / 224 Taxman 237 / 264 CTR 481 (Delhi)(HC)	1064	382
Gloster Jute Mills Ltd.; DCIT v. * (2014) 33 ITR 322 / (2015) 67 SOT 21 (Kol.)(Trib.)	87 1164	35 416
GMS Motors Pvt. Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014)-BCAJ-October-P. 29 (Delhi)(Trib.)	742	262
Goa Trading (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 737 (Mum.)(Trib.)	224	92
Godavari Electrical Conductors; CIT v. * (2015) 120 DTR 84 (AP)(HC)	1823	673
Godha Chemicals (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 353 ITR 679/ 257 CTR 10(2014) 220 Taxmann 31 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)	1223	435

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Godrej Consumer Products Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 151 ITD 566 / 97 DTR 33 / 159 TTJ 21 / (Mum.)(Trib.)	383 382 767	151 151 270
Godrej Consumer Products Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 717 (Bom.)(HC)	861	303
Goetze (India) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 505 / 97 DTR 169 / 225 Taxmann 133 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	361 2372	141 905
Gokul Chand Hari Chand; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 9 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	661	238
Golden Finance; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 162 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1149	410
Golden Investments Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 544 (Mad.)(HC)	2543	976
Goodrich Aerospace Services (P) Ltd.; ITO v. * (2014) 64 SOT 27 (URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)	1979 1980	743 743
Gopal Gupta; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 446 / 270 CTR 128 / 46 taxmann. com 312 (Delhi)(HC)	2198	830
Gopal Narayan Singh v. Dy. CIT (2014) 34 ITR 461 /164 TTJ 13 (UO) / (2015) 152 ITD 338 (Patna)(Trib.)	2380	908
Gopal Research Ltd. ; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 226 Taxman 226 / 270 CTR 223 / (2015) 371 ITR 114 (Delhi)(HC)	121 2206	48 833
Gopalakrishna Iyer Venugopal; ITO v. * (2014) 31 ITR 248 / (2015) 67 SOT 31 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)	965	343
Gopalan Enterprises; ACIT v. * (2014) BCAJ – August-P.25 (Bang)(Trib.)	1316	468
Gopi Apartment; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 411 / 270 CTR 447 / 46 taxmann.com 280 (All.)(HC)	1876	697
Gopi Ram Choudhary; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 355 / (2015) 57 taxmann. com 279 (Raj.)(HC)	1579	578
Gourav Goenka v. ACIT (2014) 364 ITR 186/ 271 CTR 183 (Cal.)(HC)	2437	934
Govindbhai Mamaiya; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 498 / 271 CTR 31 / 109 DTR 65 / (2015) 229 Taxman 138 (SC)	47 959	17 340
Gowri Ashram v. DIT(E)(2013) 356 ITR 328 / 217 Taxman 97 / (2014) 98 DTR 294 (Mad.)(HC)	317	125
Grasim Industries Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 90 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	2072	782
Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Secy. Deptt. of Science & Technology, Govt. of India (2014) 220 Taxmann 78 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	522	198
Grasim Industries Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 226 Taxmann 165 (Bom.)(HC)	2356	899
Green Infra Ltd v. ITO (2013) 145 ITD 240 / (2014) 98 DTR 187 / 159 TTJ 728 (Mum.)(Trib.)	428 766 1097	170 269 393

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Grindwell Norton Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 717(Bom.)(HC)	861	303
Groz Engineering Tools Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 36 ITR 237 (Delhi)(Trib.)	749	264
GTP Granites Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 26 ITR 369 / (2014) 61 SOT 36 (URO.) (Chennai)(Trib.)	258	105
Gujarat Alkalies and Chemicals Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 151 (Guj.)(HC)	2255	855
Gujarat Alkalies and Chemicals Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 58 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	459 460	181 181
Gujarat Borosil Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 217 Taxmann 139 (Mag. (2014) 363 ITR 293 /) (Guj.)(HC)	1822	672
Gujarat Carbon & Industries Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) July-BCAJ-P32(Ahd.)(Trib.)	756	266
Gujarat Carbon & Industries Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 464 (Guj.)(HC)	1700	622
Gujarat Co-op. Milk Marketing Federation Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 99 (Guj.)(HC)	461	181
Gujarat Filaments Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 384 (Guj.)(HC)	1509	553
Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals; CIT v. * (2013) 358 ITR 291 / 262 CTR 269 (2014) 222 Taxmann 349 (SC)	2092	791
Gujarat Fluro Chemicals; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 233 (Mag.)(SC)	2177	821
Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd. ; DCIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 30 (Mag.)(Guj.)(High Court)	464	182
Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 677 / 52 taxmann.com 49(Guj.)(HC)	1686 1687	617 618
Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 763/223 Taxmann 109 (Guj.)(HC)	1745	641
Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 28 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	544	205
Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd.; Addl. CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 117 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	480	187
Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxman 479 (Guj.)(HC)	351	138
Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd.; DCIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 30 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	529	201
Gujarat Paguthan Energy Corporation (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 70 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1767	650
Gujarat Pipavav Port Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2013) 166 TTJ 159 / (2014) 149 ITD 23 (Rajkot)(Trib.)	2026 2085	761 788
Gujarat Power Corporation Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 119 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	531	201

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Gujarat State Council for Blood Tranfusion; DIT (E) v. * (2014) 221 Taxman 126 (Guj.)(HC)	271	110
Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 358 ITR 323 / 217 Taxman 229 / (2014) 101 DTR 175 (Guj.)(HC)	354 674	139 242
Gujarat State Financial Service Ltd.; CIT v. * (Guj.)(HC); www.itatonline.org	2168	818
Gujarat State Plastic Manufactures Association v. Dy. CIT (2013) 359 ITR 516 / (2014) 222 Taxmann 182(Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1600	586
Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 170 / 265 CTR 64 / 223 Taxmann 398 (Guj.)(HC)	897	318
Gujarat State Warehousing Co.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxman 182 (Guj.)(HC)	101 458	41 181
Gujarat Tea Processors & Packers Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 426 (Guj.)(HC)	1809	668
Gujarat Themis Biosyn Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 105 DTR 72 (Guj.)(HC)	457	180
Gul Gopaldas Daryani v. ITO (2014) 367 ITR 558 / 227 Taxmann 190 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1968	738
Gulab Sundri Bapna; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 161 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	960	341
Gulab Wire Products (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 189 (Mag.) (Jharkhand)(HC)	2399	918
Gulshan Malik v. CIT (2014) 223 Taxman 243 / 102 DTR 354 (Delhi)(HC)	50	19
Gupta Overseas; DCIT v. * (2014) 30 ITR 738 / 99 DTR 162 / 160 TTJ 257 / (2015) 153 ITD 357 (Agra)(Trib.)	2238	847
Gupta Overseas; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 30 ITR 738 / (2014) 99 DTR 162 / 160 TTJ 257 (2015) 153 ITD 357 (Agra)(Trib.)	826 827	290 290
Gurinder Singh Bawa v. Dy. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 40 (Mum)(Trib.)	1866	692
Guru Harkishan Medical Trust; DIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 186 / 223 Taxman 253 (Delhi)(HC)	292	117
Gyan Chand Jain v. CIT (2013) 354 ITR 662 (2014) 220 Taxman 7 (Mag.)/ 258 CTR 467 (Raj.)(HC)	658	237
H		
H. H. Maharaja Jyotindrasinhji; CWT v. * (2014) 102 DTR 393 (Guj.)(HC)	2555	982
H. J. Siwani; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 356 / 105 DTR 265 / 226 Taxmann 394 (Karn.)(HC)	991 1892	355 704
H. M. Constructions; CIT v. * (2014) / 366 ITR 277 / 227 Taxmann 229(Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	1848	684

Name	Case No.	Page No.
H. Raghavendra Rao v. Dy. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 238/49 Taxmannn.com 425 (Karn.)(HC)	1327	472
H.B. Leasing and Finance Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 362 / 220 Taxmann 215 (Delhi)(HC)	487 488 490 491	188 188 189 189
Hackbridge Hewittic & Easun Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 171 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	1598	585
Haier Appliances India (P) Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 730 (Delhi)(Trib.)	519 1440	197 523
Haldor Topsoe; DIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 453 / 225 Taxman 105 / 106 DTR 305 (Bom.)(HC)	157	64
Halliburton Offshore Services Inc. v. Jt. CIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 414 (Uttarakhand)(HC)	1335	475
Handicrafts and Handlooms Export Corporation of India Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 130 / 268 CTR 341 / 102 DTR 211 (Delhi)(HC)	81	34
Hansraj Vallabhdas and Sons; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 227 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	858	301
Hanuman Dass v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 131 / 97 DTR 10 / 221 Taxmann 137 / 264 CTR 211 (P&H)(HC)	1059 1063	381 382
Hanuman Prasad Ganeriwala; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 126 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	408	164
Hanuman Sugar (Khandsari) Mills (P.) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 156 (All.)(HC)	1646	605
Happy Home Enterprises; CIT v. * (2014) 271 CTR 524 / 110 DTR 49 / 51 taxmann.com 281/(2015) 372 ITR 1(Bom.)(HC)	1304	462
Hardoli Paper Mills Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 717.(Bom.)(HC)	861	303
Hareesh Ravji Majithiya v. ACIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 211(Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	2102	795
Hari Singh & Associates; CIT v. * (2014) 102 DTR 306 / 267 CTR 442 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 177 (Raj.)(HC)	2361	901
Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 226 Taxmann 190 / 111 DTR 129 / (2015) 276 CTR 473 (Bom.)(HC)	2324	886
Harish Kumar (HUF); CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 180 (T&AP)(HC)	1040	373
Harish Vooyaya Shetty v. ITO (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org.	2495	956
Harnam Syntex (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 182 (Mag.)(SC)	1192	425
Harniks Park (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 62 SOT 15 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)	10	4

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Harper Collins Publishers India Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 166 TTJ 152 (2015) 54 taxmann.com 14 (Delhi)(Trib.)	744 1433	262 521
Hathway Industries (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 163 TTJ 141 / 146 ITD 605 / 104 DTR 217 (Mum.)(Trib.)	97 512 513	39 195 196
HCL Employees & Investments Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 17 (Delhi) (HC)	1146	409
HDFC Bank Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 505 / 107 DTR 140 / 226 Taxman 132 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	353 436 653	138 173 236
HDFC Bank Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 377 / 107 DTR 395 (2015) 228 Taxmann 350 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	1652 2344	607 895
Heaven Diamonds Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) The Chambers' s Journal – October-P-84 (SC)	1271	450
Heavy Metal and Tubes Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 609 / 50 taxmann. com 48(Guj.)(HC) / 225 Taxmann 86 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1725 1769	632 651
Hede Consultancy Co. (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 266 CTR 594 / (2015) 231 Taxman 421 (Bom.)(HC)	953	338
Hemant Kumar Sindhi v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 555 / 224 Taxmann 70 (Mag.)/ 272 CTR 166 (All.)(HC)	1569	574
Hemanth Kumar Bothra v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 33 (Mad)(HC)	2350	897
Hemla Embroidery Mills (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2104) 366 ITR 167 / 98 DTR 107 / 265 CTR 57 (P&H)(HC)	904	320
Henkel Adhesives Technologies India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 111 (URO) / 163 TTJ 491 (Pune)(Trib.)	1380	493
Hercules Pigment Industry v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 31 (Mum.)(Trib.)	768 1677	270 614
Hero Investments (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 106 DTR 269 (P&H)(HC)	422	168
Hero Management Service Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 68 / 220 Taxman 107 (Mag.)(Delhi.)(HC)	360	140
Hewlett Packard India Sales P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 499 / 226 Taxmann 139 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	622	226
Himatsingka Seide Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 266 CTR 141 / 100 DTR 37 / (2015) 228 Taxman 63 (Mag.)(SC)	243	99
Hinduja Global Solutions Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 145 ITD 361 / (2014) 98 DTR 266 / 164 TTJ 280 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1475 1374	537 490
Hindustan Coca Cola Marketing Co. (P) Ltd. v. DCIT(2014) 99 DTR 225 / 160 TTJ 382 / 65 SOT 147 (Delhi)(Trib.)	2503	959

Case Laws Index

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 733 /230 Taxmann 555 (Bom.)(HC)	1189	424
Hindustan Hydraulics; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 255 (P&H)(HC)	2419	928
Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 473 / 222 Taxmann 201 (Cal.) (HC)	524	199
Hindustan Lever Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 1 / 264 CTR 93 / 220 Taxmann 177 (Karn)(HC)	1990	748
Hindustan Organics Chemicals Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 1 / 107 DTR 105 / 270 CTR 478 (Bom.)(HC)	716 903	255 320
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 190 / 110 DTR 295 / 272 CTR 154 (Bom.)(HC)	1226	435
Hindustan Pipe Udyog Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 255 CTR 389 / 214 Taxmann 9 (Mag.) / (2014) 360 ITR 437 (All.)(HC)	1242 1513	440 555
Hindustan Ratna JV v. ITO (2014) 149 ITD 443 /166 TTJ 612 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	2006	754
Hiraben Govindbhai Patel; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 59 / (2015) 229 Taxman 17 (Guj.)(HC)	1013	363
Hitachi Home & Life Solutions (I.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxman 109 (Guj.)(HC)	356	140
Hitech Arai Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 577 / 227 Taxmann 216 (Mag.)/ (2015) 116 DTR 398 (Mad.)(HC)	584 1198	216 427
Hitech Chemical P Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 145 / 107 DTR 228/ 271 CTR 173 / 49 taxmann.com 33 (Jharkhand)(HC)	1950	728
Hitesh S. Bhagat; ACIT v. * (2014) 29 ITR 660 / 151 ITD 650 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1501	550
Holcim India P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 111 DTR 158 / 272 CTR 282 (Delhi) (HC)	350	137
Home De Royal; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 374 (MP)(HC)	2451	939
Honda Trading Corpn. India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 8 (URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)	1376	491
Honeywell Electrical Devices & Systems India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 514 (Chennai)(Trib.)	1399	503
Honeywell Electrical Devices and Systems India Ltd v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 347 / 64 SOT 118 (URO)(Chennai)(Trib.)	1458	533
Hosmat Hospital (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 71 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	2115 2107	799 797
Hotel and Allied P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 184 / 48 taxmann.com 50 (Ker.)(HC)	1234 2165	438 817

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Hotel and Allied Trades P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 328 / 49 taxmann.com 360 (Ker.)(HC)	1231	437
Hotel Arti Delux (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 227 Taxman 119 (Mag.) / (2015) 114 DTR 206 (All.)(HC)	391	156
Hotel Clarks Varanasi Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 62 (Mag)(All.)(HC)	1232	437
Hotel Krishna; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 445 (T&AP)(HC)	541	204
Hotel Krishna; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 445 (T&AP)(HC)	593	218
Hotel Shiv v. CIT (2014) 226 Taxman 80 (Mag)/ (2015) 116 DTR 228 (Delhi))(HC)	577	214
Housing & Urban Development Corpn. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 203 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	2431	931
Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd. v. J. P. Janjid (2014) 225 Taxmann 81 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	1763	649
HSBC Electronic Data Processing India (P) Ltd v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 128 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1368 1422	489 513
HSBC Invest Direct (India) Ltd. v. DCIT (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	368	145
HSIL Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2013) 38 taxmann.com 45 / (2014) 61 SOT 1 (Kol.)(Trib.)	2553	982
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 323 / 163 TTJ 549/ 105 DTR 150 (Delhi)(Trib.)	143	58
Hutchison Essar South Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 72/224 Taxmann 180 (Karn.)(HC)	1994	750
Hutchison Essar Telecom (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 294 / 265 CTR 130 / 221 Taxman 323 (Delhi)(HC)	528 651	200 236
Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 96 (URO) (Hyd.)(Trib.)	884	314
Hyderabad Pharma Infrastructure & Technologies Ltd. v. Addl.DIT (2014) 64 SOT 179 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	110 111 506	44 45 194
Hyderabad Race Club v. Dy. CIT (2013) 215 Taxmann 664 / (2014) 364 ITR 547 (AP)(HC)	1991	748
Hyderabad Urban Development Authority v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 126 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	2239	848
Hyundai Motors India Engineering (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014)30 ITR 655 / 165 TTJ 406 / (2015) 152 ITD 112 (Hyd.) (Trib.)	1369	489

Name	Case No.	Page No.
I		
I.D. Education Society v. Principal CCIT (2014) 369 ITR 307 / (2015) 230 Taxman 518 (All.)(HC)	218	91
IAL India Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 82 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)	1960	733
IATA BSP India ; Dy. DIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 290 / 164 TTJ 484 (Mum.) (Trib.)	2059	777
IBM Global Services India (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 107 DTR 372 / 366 ITR 293 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 351 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	626	227
ICICI Bank Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) CCH 175 (Mum.)(Trib.),www.itatonline.org	516	196
ICICI Bank Ltd.; DIT (IT) v. * (2014) 226 Taxmann 335 / (2015) 370 ITR 17 / 116 DTR 414 (Bom.)(HC)	2047 1333	773 474
ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 226 Taxmann 74 (Mag.)/272 CTR 82(Bom.)(HC)	2110	798
Idicula Trust Society, Faridabad; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxman 66 / 104 DTR 9 (P&H)(HC)	336	133
I-Flex Solutions Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 37(Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	1345	478
Impact Containers Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014)367 ITR 346 / 107 DTR 145 / 270 CTR 337 / 225 Taxmann 322(Bom.) (HC)	26 2576	10 989
Inderjeet Mehta v. CWT (2014) 264 CTR 322 (P&H)(HC)	2560	984
India Advntage Fund-VII; DCIT v. * (2014) 36 ITR 304/67 SOT 5 (URO) (Bang)(Trib.)	1958	733
India Fruits Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 274 CTR 67 / 228 Taxman 243 (Mag.) (AP)(HC)	17	8
India Fruits Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 586 (T & AP)(HC)	65	26
India Gelatine and Chemicals Ltd. (No.1) v. ACIT (2014) 364 ITR 649 / 224 Taxmann 187(Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1779	654
India Gelatine and Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT (No.2) (2014) 364 ITR 655 / 52 taxmann.com 141 (Guj.)(HC)	1775	653
India Hotels & Restaurants Association & Anr. v. UOI (2014) 268 CTR 241 / 103 DTR 65 / 34 STR 522 / 45 GST 455 / 71 VST 386 / 44 taxmann.com 455 (Bom.)(HC)	2581	992
India Infoline Insurance Services (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 34 ITR 119 (2015) 67 SOT 45 ((Mum.)(Trib.)	1830	677
India Railway Finance Corporation Ltd. ; CIT, Large Taxpayers Unit v. * (2014) 362 ITR 548 / 226 Taxmann 184 (Delhi)(HC)	483 695 696 1522	188 249 249 558

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Indian Explosives Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 16 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)	562	210
Indian Institute of Management; CIT v. * (2014) 226 Taxman 301 (2015) 370 ITR 81 / 115 DTR 251 / 275 CTR 424 (Karn.)(HC)	200	85
Indian Oil Corporation; CIT v. * (2015) 229 Taxmann 437 (Bom.)(HC)	2184	824
Indian Society of Anaesthesiologists v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 178 (URO) / 32 ITR 152 (Chennai)(Trib.)	287	115
Indian Vaccines Corporation Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 295 / 222 Taxmann 207 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	530	201
Indo American Jewellery Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 8 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	1351	482
Indo Aquatics Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 589 / (2015) 230 Taxman 412 (T&AP)(HC)	245	100
Indorama Software Solution Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 150 ITD 252 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1843	682
Indovax (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 164 (Mag.) (Delhi) (HC)	1251	443
Indraprastha Premises (P) Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 225 Taxmann 206 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	2409	923
Indu Nissan Oxo Chemical Industries Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 104 / 225 Taxmann 2 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	467 617 1642	183 225 603
Indus Towers Ltd. v. ACIT (TDS) (2014) 364 ITR 114 / 220 Taxmann 402/104 DTR 77 / 224 Taxmann 68 (Delhi)(HC)	2022 2069	760 781
Indusind Bank Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 682/ (2015) 231 Taxmann 690 (Bom.)(HC)	2429	931
Industrial Extension Bureau; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 270 / 225 Taxman 160 / 112 DTR 257 (Guj.)(HC)	265	108
Information Technology Park Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 460 / 225 Taxmann 25 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	409 410	164 164
Infosys BPO; ACIT v. * (2014) 150 ITD 132 / 64 SOT 36(URO) (Bang.) (Trib.)	1454 1981	530 743
Infosys Technologies Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 714 / 104 DTR 282 / 270 CTR 523 (Karn.)(HC) / 223 Taxmann 469 / 104 DTR 282 (Karn.)(HC)	703 704 705 234 632 633 631 1174	250 250 250 96 228 229 228 419

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Infrasoft Ltd.; DIT v. * (2013) 96 DTR 113 / (2014) 264 CTR 329 / 220 Taxman 273 (Delhi)(HC)	158 162	65 66
Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 297 / 102 DTR 251 (Mum.)(Trib.)	426	170
ING Vysya Bank Ltd. ; Dy. CIT v.* (2014) 149 ITD 611 / 62 SOT 26 (Bang.) (Trib.)	574	213
Ingersoll Rand International Ind. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 176 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	450	178
Inlay Marketing Pvt. Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2015) 167 TTJ 273 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1868	693
Insilco Ltd.; DCIT v. * (2014) 36 ITR 439 / (2015) 57 taxmann.com 134 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1424	516
Institute & Electronics Engineers Inc. v. DIT(E) (2014) 146 ITD 263 / 100 DTR 364 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	332	130
Institute of Literacy Development; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 37 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	1594	584
Inter-connected Stock Exchange Investor Protection Fund (ISE IPF) v. DIT (2014) 146 ITD 443 / 162 TTJ 218 / 102 DTR 330 (Mum.)(Trib.)	297	119
Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 28 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	1190	424
Interglobe Enterprises Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 40 CCH 22 (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	373	147
Intervet India (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 238 / 103 DTR 98 / 268 CTR 429 / 227 Taxmann 200 (Bom.)(HC)	2015	758
Intervet India Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (Bom.)(HC); www.itatonline.org	2016	758
Intezar Ali; CIT v. * (2014) 99 DTR 201 / 220 Taxmann 72 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	1074	386
Intoto Software India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 35 taxmann.com 421 / (2014) 146 ITD 360 / 30 ITR 504 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	242 1438	99 523
Inturi Rama Rao v. UOI (2015) 228 Taxmann 159(SC)	2230	843
Investeringsforeningen Bank Ivest I Afd Indien & Kina v. DDIT (2014) 36 ITR 146 /(2015) 67 SOT 242 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)	1845	683
Iqbal M. Chagala; ACIT v. * (2014) 34 ITR 636 / (2015) 67 SOT 123 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)	376	149
Irfan Razack Director of Prestige Estate Projects (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxman 121 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	3	2
Islamic Academy of Education; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 76 / (2015) 228 Taxman 314 / 117 DTR 422 (Karn.)(HC)	334	132
ITAT; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 215 / 100 DTR 265 / 266 CTR 337 (Delhi) (HC)	2307	879

Name	Case No.	Page No.
ITAT; DIT (Exemption) v. * (2014) 361 ITR 469/99 DTR 73 / 265 CTR 337/ (2015) 228 Taxmann 129 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	2123	802
ITC Hotels; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 254 / 269 CTR 308 / 103 DTR 103 / 225 Taxmann 73 (Karn.)(HC)	670 1233 1252	241 438 444
ITC Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 532 / 101 DTR 358 / 229 Taxmann 82 / 267 CTR 405 (Cal.)(HC)	672 896 892 895	241 318 316 317
ITD Cementation India Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 146 ITD 59 / 160 TTJ 628 / 98 DTR 452 (Mum.)(Trib.)	769 1673 1674	270 613 613
ITSC (No.1); CIT v. * (2013) 35 taxmann.com 443 / (2014) 365 ITR 68 / (2015) 116 DTR 301 / 267 CTR 7 (Bom.)(HC)	2196	829
ITSC (No.2); CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 87 (Bom.)(HC)	2196	829
ITSC; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 606 / 228 Taxmann 215(Mag.) / 273 CTR 559 (Ker.)(HC)	2201	831
ITSC; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 410 / (2013) 262 CTR 28 (Bom.)(HC) / (2014) 364 ITR 625 / 49 taxmann.com 165 (AP)(HC)	2193 2199	828 830
ITSC; DIT (IT) v. * (2014) 365 ITR 108 / 267 CTR 18 (Bom.)(HC)	2191 2192	826 827
Ittina Properties (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 236 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	1297	459
IVY Comptech (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 328 / 61 SOT 93 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1457	532
Ivy Health Life Sciences (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT (TDS) v. * (2014) 146 ITD 486 (Chd.)(Trib.)	2035	765
J		
J & P Coats Ltd., In re (2014) 360 ITR 686 / 264 CTR 494 / 221 Taxmann 106/97 DTR 409 (AAR)	2209	835
J. J. Leasing & Hiring Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 266 CTR 588(Cal.)(HC)	2291	872
J P Coats Ltd. In Re (2014) 360 ITR 686 / 221 Taxmann 106 / 264 CTR 494 / 97 DTR 409 (AAR)	2213	836
J. Anjaneya Sharma v. CIT (2014) 221 Taxman 148 (AP)(HC)	978	349
J. B. Construction v. ACIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 194 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1930	720
J. K. Synthetics Ltd v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 310 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 79 (All) (HC)	537 582	203 215

Name	Case No.	Page No.
J. L. Morrison (India) Ltd.; CIT v.* (2014) 366 ITR 593 / 270 CTR 405 / 225 Taxmann 17(Mag.) (Cal.)(HC)	2353	898
J. M. Baxi & Co. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 148 ITD 152/ 164 TTJ 378 (Mum.) (Trib.)	2468	945
J. V. Agrawal. v. ITO(2013) 257 CTR 112 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 32 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1736	638
J.E. Enterprises P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 571 / 272 CTR 102 / (2015) 228 Taxman 171 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)	247	101
J.K. Construction Co.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 181 / 225 Taxman 126 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	796	279
Jafari Momin Vikas Co-op. Credit Society Ltd; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 331/ 100 DTR 421/227 Taxmann 59 (Mag.) / (2015) 274 CTR 153 (Guj.)(HC)	1329	473
Jagan & Co.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 635 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 119(Mag.) (All.)(HC)	1891	704
Jagatkumar Satishbhai Patel; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 190 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1044	375
Jagdish Prasad Tewari; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 141 (All.)(HC)	1088	390
Jagjit Singh Chahal; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 260 (P&H)(HC)	2243	851
Jagpreet Singh; CIT v. * (2014)222 Taxmann 135 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	1902	708
Jagran Prakashan Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 534 / 226 Taxmann 36(Mag.)/ (2015) 122 DTR 43 (All.)(HC)	1756	646
Jagran Prakashan Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 368 ITR 687 / 230 Taxmann 652 (All.)(HC)	1760	647
Jagran Prakashan Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 39 (Mag.)(All)(HC)	2081	786
Jaguar Enterprises v. Dy. CIT (2014) 151 ITD 376 / 33 ITR 483 / (2015) 168 TTJ 792 (Delhi)(Trib.)	802 1662	280 609
Jai Kumar Bakliwal; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 217 / 101 DTR 377 / 224 Taxmann 87 / 267 CTR 396 (Raj.)(HC)	1075	386
Jai Kumar Chawla v. ITO (2014) 149 ITD 38 (Indore)(Trib.)	1017	364
Jai Palace v. CIT (2014) 51 taxmann.com 462 (All.)(HC)	2440	934
Jai Surgicals Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 150 ITD 60 / 106 DTR 333 / 163 TTJ 724 (Delhi)(Trib.)	737 750 2577	260 264 989
Jai Trikanand Rao; Dy. CIT v.* (2014) 149 ITD 112 (Mum.)(Trib.)	944 994	335 356
Jaihind Cycle Co.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 421 / 52 taxmann.com 112 (T&AP)(HC)	1912	713

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 137 (Delhi)(HC)	872	308
Jaipur Development Authority v. CIT (2015) 67 SOT 1 (Jaipur)(Trib.)	330	129
Jaipur Vidyut Vitaran Nigam Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 307 / 265 CTR 471 (Raj.)(HC)	902	319
Jaipur Vidyut Vitaran Nigam Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 70 / 265 CTR 471 (Raj.)(HC)	902	319
Jamshetji Tata Trust; DIT(E) v.* (2014) 362 ITR 357 / 101 DTR 145 / 267 CTR 157 (Bom.)(HC)	2305	877
Janapriya Engineers Syndicate; CIT v. * (2015) 371 ITR 439 / 113 DTR 311/ 274 CTR 439 / 229 Taxmann 366 (AP)(HC)	789	277
Janardan Yadav v. State of U.P. (2014) 220 Taxmann 218 (All.)(HC)	2143	810
Jashvantlal Natverlal Kansara v. ITO (2014) 362 ITR 115 / 43 taxmann.com 268 (Guj.)(HC)	1972	740
Jasjit singh v. ACIT (Delhi) (Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1877	698
Jaskaran Singh v. UOI (2014) 366 ITR 158 / 227 Taxmann 266(Mag.) (P & H)(HC)	2220	838
Jasubhai Somabhai Patel; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxman 158 (Guj.)(HC)	226	93
Jawahar Kala Kendra; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 515 / 100 DTR 65 / 222 Taxmann 222 (Raj.)(HC)	485	188
Jawahar Kala Kendra; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 132 / (2015) 273 CTR 522 / 229 Taxmann 625 (Raj.)(HC)	2418	927
Jawahar Lal Agrawal; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 289 (MP)(HC)	801	280
Jayaben Ratilal Sorathia; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 64 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1614	592
Jayakrishna Flour Mills (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 36 ITR 262 / (2015) 67 SOT 214 (Chennai)(Trib.)	719	255
Jayant Extraction Industries; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 44 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	875	310
Jayanthilal Surana; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 180 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	1675	614
Jayendra N. Shah; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 686 / 52 taxmann.com 54 (Guj.)(HC)	1141	407
Jayendra P. Jhaveri; ACIT v. * (2014)65 SOT 118 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)	1870	694
Jayesh Raichand Shah v. ACIT (2014) 360 ITR 387 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 108 (Guj.)(HC)	555 697 2269	208 249 860
Jayshree Gems and Jewellery; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 272 / (2015) 228 Taxman 63 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	233 2329	95 888

Name	Case No.	Page No.
JB Educational Society v. ACIT (2013) 28 ITR 284 / (2014) 159 TTJ 236 / 98 DTR 347 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	113	45
JB Educational Society v. ACIT (2013) 28 ITR 284 / (2014) 159 TTJ 236 / 98 DTR 347 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 322 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	42 1872	15 694
JC Bamford Investments Rocester v. DDIT (2014) 64 SOT 311 / 33 ITR 493/ 150 ITD 209/ 164 TTJ 433 (Delhi)(Trib.)	140	57
Jcdecaux Advertising India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 755 / 166 TTJ 121 / 35 ITR 211 (Delhi)(Trib.)	743	262
Jeans Knit (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 112 DTR 414 / (2014) 367 ITR 773 / 220 Taxmann 130 (Mag.) / (2015) 274 CTR 361 / 220 Taxmann 127 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	1793	661
Jehangir H. C. Jehangir v. ITO (2014) 112 DTR 262 / (2015) 229 taxmann 392 (Bom.)(HC)	2249	853
Jhaveri Industries; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 70 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1156	413
Jheendu Ram; ITO v.* (2014) 164 TTJ 22(UO) / 34 ITR 97(2015) 53 taxmann.com 80 / 68 SOT 179 (URO) (Luck.)(Trib.)	1854	687
Jindal Polyester & Steel Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 225 / (2015)232 Taxmann 488 (All.)(HC) / (2013) 221 Taxmann 30 (All.)(HC)	1184 2459	422 942
Jinkal Dineshbhai Virvadiya v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 713 / 223 Taxmann 26 /107 DTR 389 (Guj.)(HC)	1568	574
JM Financial Ltd. v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org.	379	150
Jodhpur Sahkari Bhoomi Vikas Bank v. ITO (2014) 164 TTJ 17(UO) (2015) 68 SOT 105 (Jodh.)(Trib.)	1603	587
Jogendra Singh and Co.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 78 /222 Taxmann 113 (All.)(HC)	1623	596
Joginapally B. R. Educational Society v. ACIT (2013) 28 ITR 284 (2014) 159 TTJ 236 / 98 DTR 347 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 322 (Hyd.) (Trib.)	42 113 1872	15 45 694
Johnson & Johnson Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 67 SOT 127 / 119 DTR 279(Mum.)(Trib.)	2126	803
Johnson & Johnson Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 377 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1373	490
Joint Stock Company Zangas; ACIT(IT) v. * (2014) 149 ITD 9 (Ahd.)(Trib.)	179	76
Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. UOI (2014) 102 DTR 51 (Delhi)(HC)	874	309
Joshna Rajendra (Smt.) v. CIT(A) (2014) 220 taxman 360 /268 CTR 462 / 103 DTR 259(Karn.)(HC)	2121	801
JRM Steel (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 198 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	2227	841

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Jubilant Biosys Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 99 (URO) / 32 ITR 343 / 163 TTJ 417 / (2015) 153 ITD 500 (Delhi)(Trib.)	2470	946
Jubilant Biosys Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 99 (URO) /32 ITR 343 / 163 TTJ 417 / (2015) 153 ITD 500 (Delhi)(Trib.)	2471 2472	946 946
Jubilant Foodwork (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 271 CTR 227 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 311 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	580	215
Jugal Kishore Dangayach; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 95 / 227 Taxman 222 (Mag.) / 265 CTR 215 (Raj.)(HC)	556 707	208 251
JWC Logistics Park (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 34 ITR 598 / (2015) 67 SOT 132 (URO) (Pune)(Trib.)	1257	445
Jyoti Prakash Dutta; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 568/271 CTR 159 / 109 DTR 17 / 227 Taxmann 234 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	1278	452
Jyotinder Singh Randhawa; ACIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 323 (Delhi)(Trib.)	117	47
K		
K. A. R. Investments (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 616 / 272 CTR 201 (AP)(HC)	441	175
K. Bhagyalakshmi (Mrs.) v. DCIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 225 /265 CTR 545 (Mad.)(HC)	2030	763
K. K. Enterprises; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 181 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)	451	178
K. Kannan v. ACIT (2014) 220 Taxman 250 / 103 DTR 300 (Mad.)(HC)	912	323
K. Kasi Vishwanathan & Bros. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 154 (URO) (Cochin) (Trib.)	1583	580
K. M. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 637 / (2015) 229 Taxman 467 (All.)(HC)	419	167
K. Mahesh Kumar Raj (Dr.) v. UOI(2014) 364 ITR 190 (AP)(HC)	2548	978
K. N. B. Investments (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 616 / 272 CTR 201 (AP)(HC)	441	175
K. Prakash Shetty v. ACIT (2014) BCAJ-August-P.24 (Bang.)(Trib.)	2492	954
K. Raheja Hotels & Estate (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 51 taxmann.com 257 (Karn.) (HC)	1505	552
K. Raheja Hotels & Estates (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 268 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	1504	552
K. Raheja IT Park (Hyderabad) P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 36 ITR 632(Hyd.)(Trib.)	2381	909
K. Ramakrishnan; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 59 / 225 Taxmann 123 (Delhi) (HC)	1002	359
K. Ramakrishnan; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 59 / 225 Taxmann 123 (Delhi) (HC)	1000	358

Name	Case No.	Page No.
K. Sivakumar v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 59 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	615 678 1054 1078	225 243 379 387
K. V. Balagangadharan v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 539/(2015) 152 ITD 294 (Cochin)(Trib.)	2389	914
K. V. George v. CIT (2014) 102 DTR 167 / 42 taxmann.com 261 (Ker.)(HC)	2515	963
K. V. George; ITO v.* (2013) 36 taxmann.com 548 / (2014) 64 SOT 18 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)	2406	921
K.E. Gnanavelraja; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 446 / 107 DTR 38 / 225 Taxmann 143 (Mad.)(HC)	1081	388
K.S.B.Pumps Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 717 (Bom.)(HC)	861	303
Kadakkal Educational Trust v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 59 / 224 Taxman 192 (Mag.) / 108 DTR 24 (Ker.)(HC)	290	116
Kadri Mills Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 595/222 Taxmann 108 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	1227	436
Kahan Chand v. CIT(2014) 264 CTR 322 (P&H)(HC)	2523 2561	966 984
Kaikara Construction Co. v. JCIT (2014) 64 SOT 22(URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)	2219	838
Kailash Chand Methi; CIT v. * (2014)366 ITR 333 / 269 CTR 201 /(2015) 228 Taxman 45 (Mag) (Raj.)(HC)	2354	898
Kailash Kumar; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 656 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 200 (P&H)(HC)	1029	369
Kailash Sarda v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 36/ 44 taxmann.com 407 (Mad.)(HC)	1932	720
Kajal Exports; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 328 / 226 Taxmann 65 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	553	207
Kaka Carpets v. CIT (2014) 101 DTR 33 / 224 Taxmann 335/ 266 CTR 485 (All.)(HC)	1587	582
Kakadia Builders P. Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 362 ITR 342 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 92 (Guj.)(HC)	2190	826
Kalanithi Maran v. JCIT (2014) 366 ITR 453 / 107 DTR 1/270 DTR 296(Mad.)(HC)	1797	663
Kalindi Rail Nirman Engg. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 304 /269 CTR 304 (Delhi) (HC)	2444	937
Kalpana Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (OSD) (2014) 29 ITR 633 / 66 SOT 190 (URO)(Jodh.)(Trib.)	2501	958

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Kalpatru Sthapatya (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 157 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1792	660
Kalyani Steels Ltd. v. ACIT (Pune)(Trib.), www.itatonline.org	385	151
Kamalabai Loya (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 429/52 taxmann.com 177 (T&AP)(HC)	2246	852
Kamdhenu Steel and Alloys Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 220 (Delhi)(HC)	1085	389
Kamlaben Sureshchandra Bhatti; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 692 / 44 taxmann.com 459 (Guj.)(HC)	1036 1102 2223	372 395 839
Kamlesh Kumar Jaiswal & Co.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 180 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	1640	602
Kamma Sangham v. DIT(E) (2014) 362 ITR 30 / 222 Taxman 264 (AP)(HC)	274	110
Kanakia Spaces P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 271 CTR 524/ 110 DTR 49/ 51 taxmann.com 281 (2015) 372 ITR 1 (Bom)(HC)	1304	462
Kanav Khanna v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 386 / 225 Taxmann 13 (Mag.)(P&H) (HC)	2132	806
Kanchanbag v. UOI (2014) 99 DTR 10 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 502 / 265 CTR 425 (MP)(HC)	2118	800
Kanchenjunga Greenlands Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (Hyd.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	2218	838
Kandi Friends Educational Trust v. CIT (2013) 357 ITR 84 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 50 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	2365	903
Kandla Port Trust; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 164 / 107 DTR 349 / 225 Taxman 145 (Guj.)(HC)	13 306	6 122
Kanishka Prints (P) Ltd. ACIT (2013) 143 ITD 716 / (2014) 159 TTJ 699 (Ahd.)(Trib.)	2161	816
Kannur District Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 343 / 226 Taxman 170 (Ker.)(HC)	572	212
Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. v. CIT (2014)222 Taxman 212 (Mag.) (Cal.)(HC)	2289	871
Kansai Nerolac Paints Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 364 ITR 632/ (2015) 117 DTR 94 (Bom.)(HC)	2268	860
Kansai Nerolac Paints Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 632 / (2015) 117 DTR 94 (Bom.)(HC)	2432	932
Kansal Fincap Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 151 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	1079	388
Kapil Chit Funds (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 529 / 164 TTJ 191 (Hyd.) (Trib.)	730 869 941	258 307 334

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Karan Thapar; ACIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 334 / 163 TTJ 405 / 105 DTR 257 (Delhi)(Trib.)	154 389	62 155
Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 220 Taxman 4 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	196	83
Karsanbhai Gandabhai Patel v. TRO (2014) 362 ITR 374 (Guj.)(HC)	2532	970
Kathiroor Service Co-op Bank Ltd v. CIT (CIB)(2013) 263 CTR 129 / (2014) 360 ITR 243 / 220 Taxmann 41(SC)	1571	575
Katpadi Co-op Township Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 368 ITR 632 / 52 Taxmann. com 474 (Mad.)(HC)	2133	807
Kaushal H. Patel v. ITO (2014) 365 ITR 383 / 226 Taxmann 175 (Guj.)(HC)	1057	380
Kaveri Thimmaiah (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 81 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 323 (Mag.) / 117 DTR 364 (Karn.)(HC)	962	342
Kaypee Mechanical India (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 346 / 108 DTR 237 / 271 CTR 591 (Guj.)(HC)	649 630	235 228
Kelvinator of India Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 149 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	2095	792
Kerala Cricket Association v. Addl.CIT (2014) 369 ITR 528 (Ker.)(HC)	289	116
Kerala State Beverage (M & M) Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 35 ITR 481/ 152 ITD 291 (Cochin)(Trib.) / (2015) 152 ITD 291 (Cochin)(Trib.)	729 907	258 321
Kerala State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 29 ITR 45 / 62 SOT 115 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)	380 873	150 309
Kerala Transport Co.; ACIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 149 / 270 CTR 214 (Ker.)(HC)	2183	824
Kerala Vision Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 328 / 35 ITR 81 (Cochin)(Trib.)	810	284
Kermex Micro Systems (India) Ltd. v. Dy.CIT (2014) 362 ITR 13 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 168(AP)(HC)	1615	593
Khazan Singh; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxman 22 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	4	2
Khetri Trust ; DIT(E) v.* (2014) 367 ITR 723 / (2015) 228 Taxman 172 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	261	106
KHS Machinery; ITO v. * (2014) 61 SOT 103(URO)(Ahd.)(Trib.)	2299	875
Khurana Engineering Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (OSD) (2013) 217 Taxmann 75 (Mag.)/ (2014) 364 ITR 600 (Guj.)(HC)	1584	581
Kikani Exports P. Ltd. (No.2); CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 500 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 217 / 117 DTR 462 / 276 CTR 369 (Mad.)(HC)	452	178
Kikani Exports P. Ltd. (No.2); CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 500 / (2015) 232 Taxmann 255 (Mad.)(HC)	2340	894
Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 98 DTR 245 / 265 CTR 240 (Karn.)(HC)	2530	969

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Kingfisher Airlines Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 134 (Mag.) (Karn.) (HC)	2079	786
Kiran Kapoor v. ITO (2014) 150 ITD 237 / 164 TTJ 157 (Delhi)(Trib.)	256 257	104 105
Kirloskar Brothers Limited v. DCIT (Pune)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1266	448
Kirloskar Computer Services Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 391 / 270 CTR 331 / 106 DTR 395 (Karn.)(HC)	552 688	207 247
Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 88 (Bom.)(HC)	80 2336	34 891
Kirloskar Systems Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 1 (Karn.)(HC)	709 1523 2157	251 558 815
Kisan Ratilal Choksey Share & Securities; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 485 (Bom.)(HC)	2335	891
Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. v. ITAT (2014) 220 Taxmann 117 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	521	198
Kishore Chand Jain; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 290/52 taxmann.com 156 (T & AP) (HC)	1911	713
Kishore Trading Co. v. ITO (2014)222 Taxmann 214(Mag.) (All.)(HC)	2256	855
Kishorebhai Bhikhabhai Virani v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 261 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 91/ 275 CTR 572 / 116 DTR 284 (Guj.)(HC)	955	339
Kishori Lal Agrawal v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 158 (All.)(HC)	23	9
Kodava Samaja v. DIT (2013) 158 TTJ 376 / 28 ITR 224 / 57 SOT 73 (2014) 150 ITD 71 (Delhi)(Trib.)	329	129
Kodur Service Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. DIT(2014) 367 ITR 22 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 497 / 273 CTR 67(Ker.)(HC)	1573	576
Kohinoor Foods Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 67 SOT 108 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)	1443	525
Kokilaben D. Ambani (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 226 Taxman 208 (Mag.)(Bom.) (HC)	396	158
Koncherry Coir Factories; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 463 (Ker)(HC)	1225	435
Kone Elevator India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of T.N.(FB 5 Judges)(SC) ,www.itatonline.org	2585	996
Koolnest (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 102 DTR 127 / 223 Taxmann 223 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	1249	442
Koottummal Groups; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 546 / 224 Taxmann 9 (Mag.) (Ker.)(HC)	2244	851

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Kostub Investment v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 436 / 102 DTR 97 (Delhi) (HC)	711	253
Krishak Bharati Co-operative Ltd v. CIT (2012) 208 Taxmann 37 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	543	205
Krishak Bharati Co-operative Ltd v. CIT (2012) 208 Taxmann 37 (Mag.) / (2014) 360 ITR 209 / 272 CTR 130 (Delhi)(HC)	1243 2371	440 905
Krishak Bharati Co-operative Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) 360 ITR 219 / 101 DTR 352 / 272 CTR 138 (Delhi)(HC)	1244	440
Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 290 / 220 Taxman 211 (All.)(HC)	319	126
Krishna Bajaj (Smt.) v. ACIT (2014) 221 Taxman 431 / 267 CTR 172 (Karn.) (HC)	1012	363
Krishna Chandra Ghandhi Janshika Nyas; CIT v. * (2014) 99 DTR 433 / 222 Taxman 108 / 267 CTR 85 (Jharkhand)(HC)	295	118
Krishna Gopal Maheshwari v. Addl. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 280 / 223 Taxman 33 / 101 DTR 392 (All)(HC)	21	9
Krupeshbhai N. Patel; CIT v. * (2013) 359 ITR 504 / 216 Taxman 61 / (2014) 99 DTR 209 (Guj.)(HC)	29	11
KSRTC Employees Death-cum-Retirement Benefit Fund; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 133 / 225 Taxman 113 (Karn.)(HC)	198	84
Kulathupuzha Service Co-op Bank Ltd. v. ITO (Int) (2014) 361 ITR 200 / 47 taxmann.com 290 (Ker.)(HC)	1572	575
Kuldeep Wines v. CIT (Appeals) (2014) 364 ITR 195 (AP)(HC)	2438	934
Kultar Exports; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 440 / 47 taxmann.com 417 (Delhi) (HC)	1746	642
Kunal Organics P Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 362 ITR 530 / 225 Taxmann 403 (Guj.)(HC)	1801	664
Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit. v. State of Gujarat (2014) 104 DTR 2 / 269 CTR 11 / 45 taxmann.com 250 / 126 SCL 442 (SC)	2587	1000
Kusum Products Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 632 / 106 DTR 372 / (2015) 230 Taxman 149 (Cal.)(HC)	79	33
Kutchi Dasa Oswal Moto Pariwar Ambama Trust; CIT v. * (2013) 212 Taxman 435 (2014) 362 ITR 194 / 271 CTR 595 (Guj.)(HC)	316	125
Kutti Spinners (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 34 ITR 470 / (2015) 67 SOT 23 (URO)(Chennai)(Trib.)	497	192
L		
L. Giridharlal and Co. v. ITO (2014) 369 ITR 377 / 111 DTR 69 / (2015) 273 CTR 526 (T&AP)(HC)	2414	926

Name	Case No.	Page No.
L. Vishnudas; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 642 / 271 CTR 100 (Ker.)(HC)	2436	933
Lachhmi Narain Gupta & Sons v. CIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 356 / 263 CTR 615 (P&H)(HC)	880	312
Lachhmi Narain Gupta & Sons v. CIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 356 / 263 CTR 615 (P&H)(HC)	1499	549
Lachmandas and Sons v. Dy. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 315 / 104 DTR 165 (2015) 230 Taxman 145 (Ker.)(HC)	51	19
Lahsa Construction (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 357 ITR 671 / (2014) 222 Taxmann 132 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	1590	583
Lakewood Construction Co. (P) Ltd.; ITO v. * (2014) 146 ITD 19 (Mum.) (Trib.)	1126	403
Lakhani Marketing Inc.; CIT v. * (2014) 226 Taxman 45 (Mag.) / 272 CTR 265 / 111 DTR 149 (P&H) (HC)	357	140
Lakshmangarh Estate & Trading Co. Ltd.; CIT. v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 122 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)	75	32
Lakshmi Constructions; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 271 / (2015) 116 DTR 86 / 230 Taxmann 78(T&AP)(HC)	1588	582
Lakshmi Sugar Mills Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 666 / 227 Taxmann 43 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	886	315
Lalita Ashwin Jain v. ITO (2014) 363 ITR 343 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 107(Mag) (Guj.)(HC)	1696	621
Lalita Wadhwa v. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 420 (P&H)(HC)	2122	802
Lalitha Chem Industries P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 213 / 225 Taxmann 225 (Mag.) / 265 CTR 348(Bom.)(HC) / 97 DTR 107	1694 1706	620 625
Lalitkumar M. Patel; DCIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 96 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1935	721
Lanco Kondapalli Power Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) 33 ITR 142/ (2015) 152 ITD 132 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	2379	907
Lark Chemicals Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 655 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 305 (Bom.)(HC)	2345	895
Larsen & Toubro (I) Ltd. ; DIT (IT) v. * (2014) 365 ITR 560 / 106 DTR 337/ 270 CTR 105 (Bom.)(HC)	2082	787
Larsen and Toubro Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 502 / 272 CTR 336/ 226 Taxman 222 (Mag) (Bom.)(HC)	2327 2452	887 940
Latha Ramachandra Inamdar (Ms) v. DCIT (2013) 218 Taxman 277 / (2014) 360 ITR 367 / 103 DTR 132(Karn.)(HC)	57	23
Laxmandas Tolaram Gurnani v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 143 (URO) (Ahd.)(Trib.)	2005	754
Laxmi Mehrotra (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014)222 Taxmann 111(Mag.)(All)(HC)	1776	653

Name	Case No.	Page No.
LDS Engineers (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 35 ITR 262 / (2015) 152 ITD 140 (Delhi)(Trib.)	499 1998	193 752
Le Passage to India Tours and Travels P. Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 109 / 54 taxmann.com 138 (Delhi)(HC)	1744	641
Learning Curve Technologies Bangalore P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 183/ 227 Taxmann 151 (Mag)(Karn.)(HC)	2176	821
Legg Mason Asia (Ex Japan) Analyst Fund; ADIT v. * (2014) 61 SOT 277 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1159	414
Lekshmi Traders v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 551/(2015) 117 DTR 98 / 55 taxmann.com 390 (Ker.)(HC)	2257	856
Lenoleum House vs. Income-tax Officer (2014) 223 Taxmann 83(Mag.) (All.)(HC)	2109	797
Leo Formulations P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 322 / 225 Taxmann 386 (Guj.)(HC)	1651	606
Leroy Somer and Controls (I) P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 218 Taxman 216 / 261 CTR 561 / (2014) 360 ITR 532 (Delhi)(HC)	2518	964
Lever India Exports Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 45 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)	1377	491
LG Electronics Inc. v. ADIT (All.)(HC) www.itatonline.org	1789	659
Li & Fung India (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 85 / 223 Taxmann 368 / 97 DTR 70 (Delhi) (HC)	1349	481
Liberty Footwear Co v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 250 / 51 taxmann.com 87 (P&H) (HC)	588	217
Liberty Group Marketing Division v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 2 (Mag.) (P&H)(HC)	468 619	183 226
LIC Housing Finance Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 458 / 272 CTR 10/ (2015) 228 Taxmann 188 (Bom.) (HC)	2355	899
Linde AG. Linde Engineering Division v. DDIT (2014) 365 ITR 1 / 268 CTR 274 / 103 DTR 137 / 224 Taxman 43 (Mag)(Delhi)(HC)	128 49	52 18
Linklaters; ADIT v. * (2014) 33 ITR 470/51 taxmann.com 412 /(2015) 67 SOT 18 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1885	701
Lionbridge Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT(2013) 358 ITR 599 / (2014) 225 Taxmann 130(Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	1627	598
Livingstones v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 362 / 41 taxmnn.com 499 (Mum.) (Trib.)	1459 1460 1461	533 534 534
Lodha Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT(2014) 106 DTR 226 / 163 TTJ 778 / 34 ITR 157(Mum.)(Trib)	2408	922

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Lodha Crown Buildment (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 106 DTR 226 /163 TTJ 778(Mum.)(Trib)	2408	922
Lodha Properties Development (P) Ltd. (2014) 106 DTR 226 / 163 TTJ 778(Mum.)(Trib)	2408	922
Lord Krishna Bank Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 416 / 107 DTR 138 (Bom.)(HC)	223	92
LS Cable & System Ltd., Korea Hyderabad Project, In re (2014) 362 ITR 18 / 222 Taxmann 39/ 266 CTR 75 (AAR)	2211	835
LSG Sky Chef (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT(2014)106 DTR 202/163 TTJ 808 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2077	785
Lucent Technologies GRL LLC; Addl. DIT v. * (2014) 159 TTJ 589 / 29 ITR 132/ 98 DTR 66/ 64 SOT 137 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)	2163 148	817 60
Lucknow Development Authority; CIT v. * (2013) 219 Taxman 162 (2014) 265 CTR 433 / 98 DTR 183 (All.)(HC)	273 318	110 126
Lumax Industries Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 149 ITD 371 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1405	505
Lummus Technology Heat transfer BV v. DCIT (2014) 162 TTJ 263 / 64 SOT 47 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)	1482	541
Lupin Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 224 Taxmann 225 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	1705	625
M		
M Far Hotels Ltd v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 442 / 268 CTR 99 / 102 DTR 416 (2015) 55 taxmann.com 103 (Ker.)(HC)	1884	700
M. Ahammedkutty v. ITO (Cochin)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	946	336
M. Baskaran; ACIT v. * (2015) 152 ITD 844 (Chennai)(Trib.)	377	149
M. C. Thomas v. District Collector and Ors. (2014) 264 CTR 437 / 49 taxmann.com 109 (Ker.)(HC)	2037	766
M. D. Overseas Ltd. v. DIG (Inv.) (2014) 266 CTR 158(All)(HC)	2319	883
M. Dinshaw & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 342 / 166 TTJ 516 (Mum.)(Trib.)	728	258
M. G. Brothers; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 603 (AP)(HC)	2545	977
M. G. Estate (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014)148 ITD 77 / 164 TTJ 325 (Delhi) (Trib.)	2516	963
M. J. Siwani; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 356 / 105 DTR 265 / 226 Taxmann 394 (Karn.)(HC)	991 1892	355 704
M. Jaffer Saheb (Decd.) v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 25 (AP)(HC)	2180	822
M. Jayabalan v. CIT(2014) 223 Taxmann 128(Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)	2396	917
M. Kalyan Chakravarthy; DCIT v. * (Hyd.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	11	5

Name	Case No.	Page No.
M. L. Sridhar; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 267 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 516 (Karn.)(HC)	1750	644
M. M. Sulaiman v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 746 / (2015) 67 SOT 32(URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)	805 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1136 1861 1862 1863 1864	281 398 398 399 399 399 399 406 690 691 691 691
MAA Khodiyar Construction; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 474/225 Taxmann 76 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	2402	919
Madan Gopal Bansal; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 319 / 223 taxman 169 (Mag.) (Raj.)(HC)	190	81
Madathil Zainuddin v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 118 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)	1127	403
Madeeha Enterprises v. ITO (2014) 225 Taxmann 294 / 112 DTR 340 (Karn.)(HC)	1551	568
Madhav Marbles and Granites v. ITAT (2012) 246 CTR 243 / 65 DTR 217 / (2014) 362 ITR 647 (Raj.)(HC)	2295	874
Madhav Marbles and Granites v. ITAT (2012) 246 CTR 243/ 65 DTR 217 / (2014) 362 ITR 647 (Raj.)(HC)	2296 2328	874 887
Madhu Kaul (Ms.) v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 54 / 271 CTR 107 / 225 Taxman 86 / 108 DTR 91 (P&H)(HC)	46	17
Madhukar Khosla v. ACIT(2014) 367 ITR 165/(2015) 55 taxmann.com 391 / 122 DTR 171 (Delhi) (HC)	1702	623
Madhya Pradesh Paschim Kshetra Vidyut Vitaram Company Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 99 DTR 7 /265 CTR 423 (MP)(HC)	2117	800
Madras Bar Association v. UOI (2014) 109 DTR 273/ 227 Taxman 151 / 187 Com cas 426 (2014) (308) E.L.T. 209(FB)(SC)	2552	981
Madras Forging and Allied Industries (CBE) Ltd. (In liquidation); CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 552 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 325 (Mad.)(HC)	449	177
Madras Madurai Properties (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2011) 9 taxmann.com 93 / (2014) 64 SOT 159 (URO) (Chennai)(Trib.)	35	13
Madras Spinners Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 116 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)	448	177
Madurai Chettiyar Karthikeyan; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxman 350 (Mad.) (HC)	24	10

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Maersk Global Center (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 101 DTR 1 / 161 TTJ 137 / 31 ITR 1 / 147 ITD 83 (SB)(Mum.)(Trib.)	1450	529
Maersk Line UK Ltd.; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 358 / 270 CTR 545 (Cal.)(HC)	1498	549
MAF Academy P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 258 / 224 Taxmann 212 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	1084	389
Mafatlal Dyes and chemicals Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 49 tamann.com 359 (Bom.)(HC); www.itatonline.org	644	233
Mafatlal Dyes and Chemicals Ltd.; CIT v. * (Bom.)(HC); www.itatonline.org	1331	473
Magnificent Construction (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 107 (Mag.)(MP)(HC)	844	296
Maha Avatar Trust v. ITO (2014) 32 ITR 178 / (2015) 152 ITD 31 (Chennai) (Trib.)	324	127
Mahabir Prasad Rungta v. CIT(A) & Anr. (2014) 99 DTR 11 / 266 CTR 175/ 43 taxmann.com 328 (Jharkhand)(HC)	1924	718
Mahak Finvest P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 769/52 taxmann.com51 / (2015) 274 ITR 189 (P&H)(HC)	1753	645
Mahalakshmi Housing; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 356 (Mad.)(HC)	1307	462
Mahalaxmi Motors Ltd. v. Secretary, ITSC (2014) 368 ITR 724 / (2015) 53 taxmann.com 147 (T&AP)(HC)	1900	708
Mahanagar Gas Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 80 (Bom.)(HC)	551 687	207 246
Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 341 / 269 CTR 70 / 225 Taxmann 363 / 104 DTR 145 (Raj.)(HC)	636 852	229 298
Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 347 (Raj.)(HC)	1880	698
Maharao Bhim Singh of Kota; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 485 / 103 DTR 401 / 268 CTR 369 / 45 taxmann.com 350 (FB)(Raj.)(HC)	195	83
Maharao Bhim Singh of Kota; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 485 / 268 CTR 369 / 45 taxmann.com 350 (FB) (Raj.)(HC)	2567	986
Maharashtra Cricket Association v. CIT (2015) 152 ITD 1 / 119 DTR 251 / 170 TTJ 559 (Pune)(Trib.)	322	127
Maharashtra Housing & Area Development Authority; DIT v. * (Bom.)(HC); www.itatonline.org	2274	864
Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 269 (Pune)(Trib.)	854	299
Mahashay Chunnilal Charitable Trust v. DCIT (2014) 362 ITR 314 / 101 DTR 209/225 Taxmann 250 / 267 CTR 334 (Delhi)(HC)	1732	636

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Mahavir Plantations Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 22 / (2015) 229 Taxman 160 (Ker.)(HC)	107	43
Mahesh Kumar Goyal & Ors.v. DIT (I) (2014) 366 ITR 15 / 272 CTR 329 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 50 (Cal.)(HC)	1567 1566	574 573
Mahesh Sunny Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. CST (2014) 267 CTR 327 / 100 DTR 395 / 44 GST 234/ 71 VST 215 / 43 taxmann.com 80 (Delhi)(HC)	2580	991
Maheshchandra G. Vakil; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 166 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1068	384
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 40 taxmann.com 522 / (2014) 29 ITR 95 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1455	531
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 365 ITR 560 / 106 DTR 337 / 270 CTR 105 / 225 Taxmann 306 (Bom.)(HC)	2082	786
Mahor Vaish (Mahajan) Sewa Sansthan v. CIT (2015) 67 SOT 57 (Agra) (Trib.)	1176	420
Majestic Auto Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 41 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	667 1650	240 606
Makino Asia (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 95 DTR 9 / (2014) 264 CTR 172 (Karn.) (HC)	2445	937
Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 378 (Ker.)(HC)	2041	770
Malpani Estates v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 105 (URO) / 164 TTJ 803 (Pune) (Trib.)	1313	466
Malwa Cotton Spinning Mills Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 604 (2015) 55 taxmann.com 397 (P&H)(HC)	1200 538 1201 1202	428 203 428 428
Man Mohan Kedia v. ITO(2014) 227 Taxmann 132 / (2015) 370 ITR 649 (Cal.)(HC)	1743	641
Manaksia Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 56 / 224 Taxmann 48 (Cal.)(HC)	1496	546
Mangal and Mangal; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 478 / 226 Taxmann 21(Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	1910	713
Mangalore Refineries Petrochemicals Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 58 (Bom.)(HC)	914	324
Manohar Lal Kalra v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 132(Mag.) (Uttarakhand) (HC)	1575	576
Manoharlal Agarwal v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 138 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	2073	782
Manoj Kabra (Dr.) v. ITO (2014) 364 ITR 541/ 227 Taxmann 20 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	2531	970

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Mansarover Impex; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 81 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	690	247
Mansukhlal Ghelabhai Doshi v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 628 (Rajkot)(Trib.)	989	353
Manzoor Admad Walvir v. Dy. CIT (2014) 61 SOT 70 (URO)(Asr.)(Trib.)	807	282
MAPS Enzymes Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 128 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1778	654
MAPS Enzymes Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 160 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1693	620
MARC Bathing Luxuries Ltd. v. ITSC (2014) 364 ITR 64 (Delhi)(HC)	2195	828
MARG Constructions Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 102 DTR 113 / 223 Taxmann 249 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	473	185
Marine Containers Services (India) Pvt. Ltd.; ITO v. * (2014) 61 SOT 260 (Rajkot)(Trib.)	1967	737
Marine Links Shipping Agencies v. CIT (2014) 360 ITR 709 / 220 Taxmann 198 / 102 DTR 268/267 CTR 509 (Karn.)(HC)	1966	737
Maritime Overseas v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 434 /227 Taxmann 150 (Mag.) (Cal.)(HC)	1191	425
Mark Auto Industries Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 358 ITR 43 (2014) 220 Taxmann 75 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	778 899	273 318
Market Probe India (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 85 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	2029	763
Marriott International Licensing Co. BV v. DDIT(IT) (2014) 98 DTR 27 / 151 ITD 653 (Mum.)(Trib.)	167	69
Maruti Insurance Distribution Services Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 63 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	602	220
Maruti Securities Ltd. v. ACIT (Hyd.)(Trib.)www.itatonline.org	1668	611
Maruti Suzuki (India) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 215 / 100 DTR 265 / 266 CTR 337/2014 (305) E.L.T. 199 (Delhi)(HC)	2307	879
Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 211 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	2259	857
Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 356 ITR 209 / (2014) 225 Taxmann 104 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	1770	651
Mascot Systems Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014)222 Taxmann 213 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	2252	854
Mathewsons Exports & Imports v. ACIT (2014) 112 DTR 233 / 166 TTJ 777 / 66 SOT 278 (Cochin)(Trib.)	780	274
Mathura Commercial Co.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 380 / 101 DTR 371 / 226 Taxmann 109 (All)(HC)	2456	941
Mayura Prime Estates Ltd v. ITSC (2014) 265 CTR 419 / 99 DTR 4 / 227 Taxmann 15 (Raj.)(HC)	2113	799

Name	Case No.	Page No.
MBA Nahata Charitable Trust; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 693 / 106 DTR 331 (Karn.)(HC)	268	109
McDowell & Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2015) 113 DTR 261 / 273 CTR 394 (Karn.)(HC)	863	305
McDowell and Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 699 (Karn.)(HC)	1161	415
McDowell and Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 293 / 227 Taxman 46 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	402 583	161 215
McDowell and Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 684 / (2015) 229 Taxman 354 (Mag.) / 273 CTR 394 (Karn.)(HC)	855	300
McLeod Russel (India) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 663 / 55 taxmann.com 102 (Cal.)(HC)	482 1656	187 608
MDLR Resorts P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR /265 CTR 356 / 221 Taxmann 83 (Mag)(Delhi)(HC)	1945	726
Me & Mummy Hospital v. ACIT (2014) 107 DTR 209 / 224 Taxmann 65 / 272 CTR 1 (Guj.)(HC)	1592	584
Medical Land v. CIT (Appeals) (2014) 363 ITR 81 / 45 taxmann.com 488 (Ker.)(HC)	1893 1917	705 715
Meditech v. JCIT (Jodh.)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org	2383	911
Meera Goyal; CIT v. * (2013) 214 Taxmann 298 / (2014) 360 ITR 346/267 CTR 225 (Delhi)(HC)	2321	884
Meher R. Surti v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 5 (URO) / 27 ITR 340 (Mum.)(Trib.)	995	357
Mekins Agro Products Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014)369 ITR 495/(2015) 230 Taxmann 86 (T&AP) (HC)	1881	699
Mentha and Allied Products Ltd v. UOI (2014) 363 ITR 504 / 223 Taxmann 208 (Mag) / 269 CTR 150 (All)(HC)	1206	431
Mentha and Allied Products Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 363 ITR 504 / 104 DTR 193 / 269 CTR 150 (All.)(HC)	1215	433
Merck Ltd. v. Tarakehwar Sigh, CIT (2014) 270 CTR 355 / 108 DTR 35 (Bom.)(HC)	2185	824
Meridian Impex v. ACIT (2014)149 ITD29 / 164 TTJ 289/ (Rajkot)(TM) (Trib.)	2467	945
Metal Powder Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 26 ITR 759 / (2015) 152 ITD 144 (Chennai)(Trib.)	90 363 498 1261 1262 1263	36 141 193 446 446 446

Name	Case No.	Page No.
MGB Metro Group Buying HK Ltd.; Dy. DIT v. * (2014) 146 ITD 343 (Delhi)(Trib.)	2091 2160 2164	791 816 817
Midas Polymer Compounds P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 309/225 Taxmann 82 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)	1281	453
Midas Rubber (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 27 (Mag.) (Ker.)(HC)	683	245
Mihir J. Doshi v. ACIT (2013) 26 ITR 652 (2014) 61 SOT 14(URO.) (Mum.)(Trib.)	2385 2387	912 913
Milton Laminates Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 106 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1213	432
Minda Wirelinks (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 81 (Mag.)(Delhi) (HC)	901	319
Mira Exim Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 359 ITR 70 / 262 CTR 441 / 94 DTR 41 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 156 (Delhi)(HC)	476	186
MISC Berhad v. ADIT(IT) (2014) 150 ITD 213 / 165 TTJ 185 / 108 DTR 313 (Mum.)(Trib.)	131	53
Misubishi Corporation India (P.) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 495 / 269 CTR 329 / 225 Taxmann 38 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	1346	479
Mitesh Impex; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 85 / 104 DTR 169 / 270 CTR 66 / 225 Taxman 168 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC).	255 1290 2215	104 457 837
Mitesh Nathulal Lavti.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 13 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC.)	933	332
Mithaila Credit Services Ltd. v. ITO (Delhi)(Trib.), www.itatonline.org	1096	393
Mitsu Industries Ltd. v. DCIT(2014) 112 DTR 273(Guj.)(HC)	2441	935
Mitsuba Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 151 ITD 201 / (2015) 168 TTJ 507 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2463	944
Mitsubhai Corporation India Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	815	286
Mitsubishi Corporation India (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 166 TTJ 385 / (2015) 67 SOT 83 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)	779 803 804 1359 1358 1423	273 281 281 485 485 515
Mitsubishi Corporation, Japan, In re (2014) 222 Taxmann 47 / 360 ITR 704/ 264 CTR 113 (AAR)	2208	834
MKJ Enterprises Ltd.; ITO v. * (2014) 62 SOT 71(URO) (Kol.)(Trib.)	1989	747
ML Outsourcing Services (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 271 CTR 553 / (2015) 228 Taxman 54 (Mag.) / 110 DTR 105 (Delhi)(HC)	229	95

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Model Exims; ACIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 4 (URO) 140 (Luck.)(Trib.)	2051	774
Model Exims; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 66 / 222 Taxmann 94 / 267 CTR 177 (All.)(HC)	2044	770
Modern Construction Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 71 (Ahd.)(Trib.)	1267	448
Modern Insulators Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 138 / (2015) 230 Taxman 67 (Raj.)(HC)	786	276
Modi Olivetti Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 388 (All)(HC)	713 771	253 270
Modi Xerox Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 200/ 226 Taxmann 152 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	643 1181	233 421
Mohammed Mohsin Rajabali Dosani; ACIT v. * (2014) 34 ITR 271 / (2015) 67 SOT 130 (URO) (Ahd.)(Trib.)	1135	405
Mohan Gupta (HUF) v. CIT(2014)366 ITR 115 / 104 DTR 186/225 Taxmann 216 (Delhi)(HC)	1716	628
Mohan Kant Bansal v. ITO (Kol.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1888	702
Mohan Manoj Dhupelia v. DCIT (2014) 166 TTJ 584 / (2015) 67 SOT 12 (Mum.)(Trib.)	94	38
Mohan Rao v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 189/ (2015) 57 taxmann.com 18 (T&AP)(HC)	1899	707
Mohd. Khasim v. ACIT (Bang.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1953	729
Mohit Agrawal v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 526 / (2015) 121 DTR 227 (All.)(HC)	1764	649
Montecarlo Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 145((Guj.)(HC)	2108	797
Montedison of Italy; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 179 / 226 Taxman 128 / 109 DTR 105 / 272 CTR 306 (Bom.)(HC)	172	71
Moody's Analytics ; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 226 Taxman 226 / 270 CTR 223 / (2015) 371 ITR 114 (Delhi)(HC)	121 2206	48 833
Moody's Group Ltd.; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 226 Taxman 226 / 270 CTR 223/ (2015) 371 ITR 114 (Delhi)(HC)	121 2206	48 833
Moon Star Developers; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 621 / 103 DTR 278 / 269 CTR 259/225 Taxmann 156 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1310	465
Moongipa Securities Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 228 Taxmann 124 / (2014) 97 DTR 241 (Delhi) (HC)	2562 1965	984 737
Morani Automotives (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 264 CTR 86 / 224 Taxmann 177 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)	1062	382
Mordadbad Toll Road Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 403 / 272 CTR 209 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 17 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	456	180

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Moti Ram Gopi Chand Charitable Trust; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 68 / 360 ITR 598 / (2015) 230 Taxman 153(All.)(HC)	276	111
Motorola India Electronics (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 81 / 265 CTR 94 / 225 Taxman 11 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	235	96
Motorola Solutions India (P.) (Ltd.) v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 663 / 220 Taxmann 164 (P&H)(HC)	2144	811
Motorola Solutions India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 158 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1367	488
MRS Roadways v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 62 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 322 (Mag.) / 276 CTR 94 (Ker.)(HC)	839	294
MsourceE (India) (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 152 ITD 153 (Bang.)(Trib.)	2378	907
Mukand Cold Storage v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 281 / 104 DTR 241 / 225 Taxmann 113 (P&H)(HC)	1055	379
Mukand Cold Storage v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 281 / 225 Taxmann 113 (Mag.) / 274 CTR 182 (P&H)(HC)	1045	375
Mukesh Kumar Agarwal, (HUF); Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 146 ITD 562 (Agra) (Trib.)	2493 2497	955 957
Mukesh Modi v. Dy. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 418 / 102 DTR 273 / 267 CTR 409 / 224 Taxmann 362 (Raj.)(HC)	1730	635
Mukesh Oil Mills (P) Ltd. v. ITAT (2014) 264 CTR 196 / 49 taxmann.com 410(Raj.)(HC)	1647	605
Mukesh Travels Co.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 706 / 224 Taxmann 174 / 270 CTR 618 (Guj.)(HC)	1995	751
Mulay Constructions (P) Ltd.; ACIT .v. * (2014) 64 SOT 142 (URO) (Pune) (Trib.)	2475 2483	947 951
Mulla Associates v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	2488	953
Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority v. Dy. DIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 104 (Mag.) / 112 DTR 210 / (2015) 273 CTR 317 (Bom.)(HC)	2105	796
Mundra Port and Sez Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 150 (Guj.)(HC)	627	228
Municipal Corporation, Visakhapatnam; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 254/(2015) 228 Taxmann 208 (Mag) (AP)(HC)	1997	751
Munjel Gases; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 124 (Mag.) (P&H)(HC.)	76	33
Munshi Mini Rice Mill v. ITO (Kol.) (Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1836 1846	680 684
Muppa Homes (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 91 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)	735	259
Murli Agro Products Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 49 taxmann.com 172 (Bom.) (HC) www.itatonline.org	1857	689

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Murudeshwar Decor Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 29 (Mag.) / (2015) 122 DTR 24 / 278 CTR 356 (Karn.)(HC)	1245	441
MWP Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 395 / 264 CTR 502 (Karn.)(HC)	2449	939
My Home Power Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 82 /225 Taxman 8 (Mag.) / (2015) 276 CTR 92 / 117 DTR 63 (AP.)(HC)	72	31
Mysore Wine Products Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 226 Taxmann 132(Mag.) / (2015) 370 ITR 102 (Karn.)(HC)	1741	640
N		
N. C. Cable Ltd.; ITO v. * (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1851	686
N. Jagadeesan v. ACIT (2014) 363 ITR 140 / 224 Taxman 33 (Mad.)(HC)	1027	369
N. K. Industries Ltd. v. ITO(OSD) 362 ITR 502 / 226 Taxmann 64 (Mag) (Guj.)(HC)	1727	633
N. K. Laminates P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 211 / 45 taxmann.com 544(All.)(HC)	1903	709
N. K. Leasing and Construction P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 720/51 taxmann.com 18/(2015) 231 Taxmann 371 (T&AP)(HC)	2547	977
N. K. Unnikrishna Panicker v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 187 / 102 DTR 380 / 267 CTR 566 / 222 Taxmann 237 (Ker.)(HC)	418	167
N. R. Palanivel by L. H. P. Kailasam v. CIT (2014) 112 DTR 375 / (2015) 273 CTR 224/ 232 Taxmann 478 (Mad.)(HC)	2412	924
N. S. S. Karayogam v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 81 (Ker.)(HC)	2514	963
N. Tarika Properties Investment (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 264 CTR 472 / 221 Taxmann 14 (Delhi)(HC)	1061	381
N.G.C. Network (India) P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 738 / 110 DTR 169 / (2015) 273 CTR 483 / 228 Taxman 176 (Bom.)(HC)	638	231
N.K. Roadways P. Ltd. v. ITO (OSD) (2014) 362 ITR 522 / 226 Taxmann 64(Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1799	663
N.R. Portfolio (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 157 (Mag.) / 264 CTR 258 (Delhi)(HC)	1047	377
Nagesh Chundur v. CIT (2013) 358 ITR 521 / (2014) 220 Taxman 47 (Mad.) (HC)	231	95
Nahalchand Laloochand (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 228 Taxman 1 / 114 DTR 375 / 274 CTR 246 (SC)	401	161
Nahar Spinning Mills Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 467 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 538 (P&H)(HC)	1195	426
Nalin Pravin Shah v. ACIT (2014) 98 DTR 420 / 66 SOT 58 (Mum.)(Trib.)	950 951	337 337

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Naman Kumar v. CIT (2014) 221 Taxman 269 (P&H)(HC)	399	160
Namdhari Seeds; CIT v. * (2014) 224 Taxman 194 (Mag.)(Karn)(HC)	34	13
Nandadevi Sales Agency; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 5 / 224 Taxmann 11 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)	866	306
Nanded District Central Co-op Bank Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 37 ITR 532 / 68 SOT 329 (URO) (Pune)(Trib.)	96	39
Nandini Delux v. CIT (2015) 37 ITR 52 / 167 TTJ 746 / 68 SOT 5 (URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)	739	260
Nandini Delux v. CIT(2015) 37 ITR 52 / 68 SOT 5 (URO) (2015) 167 TTJ 746 (Bang.)(Trib.)	1865 2158	691 816
Nangalia Fabrics Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 17 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	665 1065 1070	240 383 384
Nanubahi D. Desai v. ACIT (2014) 104 DTR 1/162 TTJ 673/149 ITD 16 (SB)(Ahd.)(Trib)	2280 2536	866 972
Narain Prasad Dalamia; ITO v. * (2014) 30 ITR 619 / 152 ITD 276 (Kol.)(Trib.)	384	151
Narendra Kumar Sekhri; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 225 / (2015) 228 Taxman 345 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	1031	370
Narendra Mohan Mathur; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 428 (Raj.)(HC)	865	305
Naresh Kumar Agarwal; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 171 / (2015) 53 taxmann. com 306 / 122 DTR 339 (T&AP)(HC)	1906	711
Naresh Kumar; CIT v. * (2013) 262 CTR 389 / (2014) 362 ITR 256 / 221 Taxmann 59 (Delhi)(HC)	795	279
Naresh T. Wadhawani v. DCIT(2015) 37 ITR 179/ 68 SOT 235 (URO) (Pune)(Trib.)	1315	468
Narinder Kaur Bhatia; ITO v. * (Mum)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	993	356
Narinder Kr. Budhiraja; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 709 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 592 (Delhi)(HC)	1140 2427	407 930
Narinder Kumar v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 49 / 52 Taxmann.127 (Delhi)(HC)	2393	916
Narvirsinh Parmar L/H of Late Ramaben D. Zala v. ACIT (2014) 102 DTR 403 / 45 taxmann.com 466 (Guj.)(HC)	1937	723
Nath Developers v. ACIT(2013) 157 TTJ 224 / (2014) 61 SOT 8(URO) (Pune)(Trib.)	1837 2266	680 859
National Dairy Development Board v. DCIT (2013) 356 ITR 413 / 215 Taxmann 392 / (2014) 362 ITR 79 (Guj.)(HC)	1712	627

Name	Case No.	Page No.
National Federation of Insurance Field workers of India & Anr. v. UOI & Ors. (2014) 360 ITR 175 / 267 CTR 78 / 219 Taxmann 155 (All.)(HC)	1974	741
Natrip Implementation Society; ADIT(E) v. * (2013) 26 ITR 333 / (2014) 61 SOT 43 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)	285	114
Natural Stones Exports Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxman 35 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	249	102
Natwarlal C. Bhandari; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 57 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	935	332
Navinchandra & Co.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 156 (Guj.)(HC)	2434	932
Navodaya Castles P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 306 / 226 Taxmann 190 (Mag.)(Delhi.)(HC)	1037	372
Nawanshahar Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 523 (Asr.)(Trib.)	2090	791
Naya Raipur Development Authority v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 244 (Bilaspur)(Trib.)	2039	768
Nayan Builders and Develpers; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 722/ (2015) 231 Taxmann 665 (Bom.)(HC)	2455	941
Neel Metal Products Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 203 (Delhi)(HC)	465	182
Neelkamal Realtors & Erectors India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 145 ITD 217 / (2014) 159 TTJ 471 (Mum.)(Trib.)	988	353
Neerat Singal v. ACIT (2013) 161 TTJ 483 / 101 DTR 238 / (2014) 146 ITD 152 (Delhi)(Trib.)	2411	924
Neeru Aggarwal (Smt.); CIT v. * (2013) 356 ITR 320 / (2014) 220 Taxman 329 (P&H)(HC)	6	3
Nehru Prasutika Aspatal Samiti v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 68 / 100 DTR 172 / 221 Taxman 300 / 266 CTR 452 (All.)(HC)	207	87
Nehru Prasutika Asptal Samiti; Dy. CIT v. * (2013) 26 ITR 376 / 145 ITD 8 (2014) 159 TTJ 813 / 97 DTR 357 (Agra)(Trib.)	284	113
Nepa Limited; DCIT v. * (2014) 112 DTR 212 / (2015) 167 TTJ 124 / 58 taxmann.com 137 (Indore.)(Trib.)	2477	948
Neptune Textile Mills (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014)222 Taxmann 74 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1697	621
Nerka Chemicals (P) Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 103 DTR 249/272 CTR 143 / 226 Taxmann 272/(2015) 371 ITR 280 (Bom.)(HC)	2104	795
Net freight (India) P. Ltd.; ITO v. * (2014) 30 ITR 441 / 63 SOT 67 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1479	539
Networks India (P) Ltd. v. Add. CIT (2013) 33 ITR 97 / (2014) 146 ITD 463 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1490	545

Name	Case No.	Page No.
New Bombay Park Hotel (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 105 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2062	778
New Delhi Television Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 262 CTR 604 / (2014) 360 ITR 44 / 220 Taxmann 43 (Mag.) (Delhi) (HC.)	2363	902
New Era Shipping Ltd. v. ACIT (2014)222 Taxmann 215 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	2251	854
New Holland Tractors (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2015) 228 Taxmann 66 / 115 DTR 32 / 275 CTR 291 (Delhi)(HC)	2443	936
New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 156 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)	1325	471
Nickunj Eximp Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2015)228 Taxmann 95(Mag) (Bom)(HC)	1704	624
Nickunj Eximp Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 107 DTR 69/270 CTR 494/ 229 Taxmann 99 (Bom.)(HC)	1704	624
Nikhil Kelkar v. ITO (2014) 225 Taxmann 196 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	2134	807
Nilay Masukhlal Doshi v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 628 (Rajkot)(Trib.)	989	353
Nilesh Mansukhlal Doshi v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 628 (Rajkot)(Trib.)	989	353
Nilofar Currimbhoy; ACIT v. * (2013) 219 Taxmann 102 (Mag.) (Delhi) (HC)	2529	969
Nimbus Communications Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2013) 145 ITD 582 / (2014) 100 DTR 259 / 30 ITR 349 / 160 TTJ 717 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1477	538
Nimbus Communications Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 100 DTR 259 / 30 ITR 349 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1341	477
Nina Devaiah (Smt); CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 81 (Karn.)(HC)	962	342
Nipuan Auto P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 155 / 227 Taxmann 147 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	1080	388
Nirma Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 49 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1765	649
Nirma Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 12/52 taxmann.com 88 (Guj.)(HC)	539 1179 1240	204 421 439
Nirmala Sahu (Late) (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 98 DTR 55 (All.)(HC)	424	169
Nirman Syntex (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 63 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1241	440
Nishan Indo Commerce Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 101 DTR 413 (Cal.)(HC)	1076	387
Nishith Madanlal Desai v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 649 / 227 Taxmann 41 (Bom.)(HC)	1680	616
Nisso Lwai Corporation, Japan; DIT v. * (2014) 88 CCH 46 (AP)(HC), www.itatonline.org	173	72
Nisuki Farms; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 17 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC.)	1067	383

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Nita Kamlesh Tanna (Smt); CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 165 (Mag.) (Bom.) (HC.)	963	342
Nita M. Patel; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 416 (Guj.)(HC)	929	330
Nitco Logistics Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) 66 SOT 116 (URO)(Amritsar)(Trib.)	93	36
Nitco Logistics Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT (Amritsar)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	984	351
Niti Wadhawan v. Dy. CIT (2014) 105 DTR 286/(2015) 231 Taxmann 879 (Delhi)(HC)	1929	720
Noble Resources & Trading India (P) Ltd v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 4 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)	1378	492
Noida Toll Bridge Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 06 (Mag.)(All.) (HC.)	481	187
Nokia India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 266 CTR 353(SC).	2533	971
Nokia India (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 167 TTJ 243/115 DTR 179 (Delhi) (Trib.)	1419	510
North Karnataka Expressway Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 272 CTR 225 / 111 DTR 297 (2015) 372 ITR 145 (Bom.)(HC)	471	185
North Western Karnataka Road Transport Corporation; CIT v. * (2014)222 Taxmann 213(Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	2253	854
Northern Tannery; ACIT v. * (Luck.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1834	678
Novartis India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 182 (URO) / 45 taxmann. com 341 (Mum.)(Trib.)	92 976	36 348
Nuchem Ltd. v. ITAT (2014) 220 Taxmann 110 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	900	319
Nuwave E Solutions (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 360 ITR 351/226 Taxmann 181 (Mag) (Delhi.)(HC)	1803	665
O		
O. P. Srivastava; CIT. v. * (2013) 357 ITR 1 / 263 CTR 693/(2014)222 Taxmann 55(Mag.) (All.)(HC)	2539	974
Oberon Trading Corpn. v. ITO (2014) 360 ITR 19 / 220 Taxmann 350 (Ker.) (HC)	714	254
Object Connect India Pvt. Ltd.; ITO v. * (2014) 29 ITR 518 / 65 SOT 132 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)	1839	681
Odedara Construction; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 338 / 223 Taxmann 42 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1082	388
Oil & Natural Gas Corporation (India) Ltd. ; CIT(TDS) v. * (2013) 358 ITR 131 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 187 / 267 CTR 498 / 101 DTR 278 (Guj.)(HC)	1976	742
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.; ACIT v. * (Mum.)(Trib.); www. itatonline.org	2025	761

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Om Prakash Arora; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 73 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	924	327
Om Prakash Dhoot v. UOI (Raj)(HC); www.itatonline.org	2172	820
Om Prakash Jain; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 103 (Raj.)(HC)	1275	451
Om Prakash Lohiya v. Dy. CIT (2013) 157 TTJ 65 (2014) 61 SOT 15 (URO) (Jodh.)(Trib.)	2489	953
Om Prakash Lohiya; ACIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 186 (URO)(Jodh.)(Trib.)	1121	400
Om Prakash Shiksha Prasar Samiti v. Chief CIT (2014) 364 ITR 329 / 222 Taxman 40 (Mag.) / 267 CTR 181(SC)	217	90
Omaxe Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 423/270 CTR 390/ 46 taxmann. com 14 (Delhi)(HC)	1875	697
Omnibus Industrial Development Corporation of Daman & Diu & Dadra Nagar Haveli Ltd Nani Daman; ACIT v. * (2014) ACAJ-September-P. 351 (Ahd.)(Trib.)	741	262
Omniglobe Information Tech India P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 1 (Delhi) (HC)	581	215
Onassis Axles (P) v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 53 / 101 DTR 49 / 224 Taxmann 80 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	1077	387
Onkarnal Kajaria Family Trust; ITO v. * (Kol.)(Trib.) (www.itat.nic.in)	986	352
Oracle India (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 61 SOT 222 (Bang.)(Trib.)	1982	744
Oracle India (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2013) 221 Taxmann 249 / 264 CTR 144 / 96 DTR 249 (Delhi)(HC)	689	247
Orchid marine v. ITO (Cochin)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	817	287
Orient Abrassive Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 240 (Mag.) / 271 CTR 626 (Delhi)(HC)	1246	442
Orient Instrument P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 182/(2015) 228 Taxmann 136(Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	1169	417
Orient Longman Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 559 / (2015) 55 taxmann. com 393 (T&AP)(HC)	2245	852
Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Addl. CIT (2014) 272 CTR 56 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 25 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	1758	647
Oshwal Education Trust; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 91 (Guj.) (HC)	2417	927
Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 363 ITR 486 / 222 Taxmann 10 / 268 CTR 181 (Delhi)(HC)	888	315
Oswal Exports; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 630 (All.)(HC)	1196 2148	427 813
Owens Corning Industries (India) (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2015) 67 SOT 61 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1354	483

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Oxford University Press In re (2014) 364 ITR 251 / 45 taxmann.com 282 / 268 CTR 393 / 103 DTR 225 (AAR)	187	79
Oy Sisu AB; ADIT (IT) v. * (2014) 146 ITD 572 (Mum.)(Trib.)	147	60
P		
P AND O Nedlloyd Ltd. v. ADIT (2014) 369 ITR 282/ (2015) 228 Taxmann 90 / 274 CTR 50 (Cal.)(HC)	1819	672
P. A. Chako Muthalaly v. ACIT (2014) 151 ITD 166 / (2015) 168 TTJ 640 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1601	587
P. G. Foils Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 356 ITR 594 / 215 Taxmann 104 (Mag.) / (2014) 102 DTR 26(Guj.)(HC)	1726	633
P. Jayanandan, ITO v. Sri Ramakrishna Steel Industries Ltd. (2013) 355 ITR 528 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 92(Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)	2527	968
P. K. Ramasamy Nadar & Bros. v. ITO (2014) 221 Taxman 362 / 272 CTR 357 (Mad.)(HC)	843	296
P. M. Aboobacker; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 447 / 270 CTR 217 / 225 Taxman 178 (Mag.) / 107 DTR 383 (Ker.)(HC)	1150	411
P. N. Sanyal; ACIT v. * (2014) 101 DTR 385 / 225 Taxmann 193 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	2235	845
P. Venkateswara Rao; ACIT v. * (Hyd.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	947	336
P.N. Sharma; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 178 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	1777	654
P.V. Ashar Development Officer v. B.C. Goel (2014) 222 Taxman 219 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	191	81
Padinjarekara Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (Cochin)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1525	559
Padmini Mishra; CIT v. * (Delhi)(HC) (Unreported) www.delhihighcourt.nic.in	2448	938
Palam Gas service v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 44 (Mag.) / 271 CTR 70 / (2015) 370 ITR 740 (HP)(HC)	788 1996	276 751
Paliwal Industries (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014)222 Taxmann 61 (Mag.) (P&H) (HC)	1208	431
Paliwal Overseas Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 103 (P&H) (HC)	1208	431
Pallava Granite Industries (I) (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxman 107 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	250	102
Panachayil Industries; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 261/(2015) 228 Taxmann 209 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)	1183	422
Panalfa Autoelektrik Ltd.; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 227 Taxman 351 / 272 CTR 117 (Delhi) (HC)	170	70

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Pan-Asia iGate Solutions, Mauritius, (2014) 364 ITR 331 / 268 CTR 413 / 225 Taxmann 3 (AAR)	1502	550
Panasonic AVC Networks India Co.Ltd. ; DCIT v. * (2014) 63 SOT 121 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib)	1483	542
Panasonic Energy India Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 245 / 225 Taxmann 148 (Mag.) /(2015) 274 CTR 250 / 114 DTR 379 (Guj.)(HC)	1274 2312	451 881
Pancard Clubs Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 226 Taxman 141 / 272 CTR 257 / (2015) 370 ITR 45 (Bom.)(HC)	104	42
Panchvati Motors (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 39 (Mag.) (P&H) (HC)	1613	592
Paranjay Mercantile Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 462 / 105 DTR 116 / 223 Taxmann 10 (Guj.)(HC)	1167	417
Paras Agro Products; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 60 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1153	412
Pardesi Developers Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2013) 351 ITR 8 / 258 CTR 411 (2014) 220 Taxmann 18 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	1737	639
Parkar Medical Foundation v. DCIT (2014) 34 ITR 286 / (2015) 153 ITD 297 / 67 SOT 169 (Pune)(Trib.)	331 2308	130 880
Parmanand Tiwari v. ITO (2015) 67 SOT 383 (Kol.)(Trib.)	2076	784
Partha Ghosh v. ICAI (2014) 220 Taxmann 50 (Bom.)(HC)	2584	994
Parvez Poonawala; CIT v. * (Bom.)(HC)(Un reported) www.bombay highcourt.nic.in	2325	886
Patel Alloy Steel (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 84 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1691	619
Patel KNR JV v. CIT (2014) 362 ITR 351 / 102 DTR 172 / 267 CTR 514 / 227 Taxmann 62 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	1559	570
Patel Maheshbhai Dahyabhai; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 153 (Guj.)(HC)	2254	855
Patel Natverlal Chinubhai & Co.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 168 (Mag.) (Guj)(HC.)	1134	405
Patel Ramniklal Hirji; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 15 (Mag.)(Guj)(HC)	609 792 1051	222 278 378
Pawan Kumar Aggrawal v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 787 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1889	703
Pawan Sharma; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 8 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC.)	663	239
Pawanraj B. Bokadia; ACIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 77 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	668	240
Peerless Hotels Ltd. v. Dy. CIT/ (2013) 26 ITR 151 / 39 taxmann.com 171/ (2014) 61 SOT 24 (URO) (Kol.)(Trib.).	1533	561
Penfort (Israel) Ltd. v. Dy. DIT (IT) (2013) 99 DTR 121 / 163 TTJ 124 / (2014) 146 ITD 14 / (Mum.)(Trib.)	1484	542

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Peninsular Investment Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 95 DTR 19 / 213 Taxman 327 (2014) 265 CTR 601 (AP)(HC)	548	206
Peninsular Plantations Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 363 ITR 441 / 223 Taxmann 258 (Mag.)(Ker)(HC)	561	209
Penta Medi Graphica Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 264 CTR 543 (Mad.)(HC)	251	103
Pentasoftware Technologies Ltd. v. DCIT (2013) 96 DTR 233 / (2014) 222 Taxmann 209 / 264 CTR 187 (Mad.)(HC)	466	183
Peoples Education Society; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 98 (Karn.)(HC)	201	85
Pepsi Foods P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 112(2015) 231 Taxmann 58 (Delhi)(HC)	1874	696
Pepsico India Holdings (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 270 CTR 467 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 116(Mag.) / 370 ITR 295 (Delhi)(HC)	1873	695
Perinthalmanna Service Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 363 ITR 268 (Ker.)(HC)	2349	896
Petals Engineers (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 15(Mag.) / 264 CTR 577 / 97 DTR 251(Bom.)(HC)	2462	943
Peterplast Synthetics (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 364 3ITR 16 / 101 DTR 83 (Guj.)(HC)	2288 2294	871 874
Petrofac Engineering Services India (P.) Ltd v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 147 (Chennai)(Trib.)	1382	494
Petroleum India International; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 11 (Mag.)(Bom)(HC.)	1707	625
Petroleum Sports Promotion Board; DDIT(E) v. * (2014) 362 ITR 235 / 111 DTR 55 (Delhi)(HC)	275	111
PGS Geophysical AS v. Addl. DIT (2014) 369 ITR 27 / 269 CTR 433 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 394 (Delhi)(HC)	915	325
PGS Geophysical v. ADIT (2014) 50 taxmann.com 392 (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1631	599
Phelix Appliances Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 366 ITR 574 / 227 Taxman 36 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1160	414
Piara Lal Kashmiri Lal; CIT v. * (2013) 219 Taxmann 160 (Mag) (2014) 360 ITR 190 (P&H)(HC)	1804	666
Pinarayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. ITO (2014) (2015) 152 ITD 90 (Cochin)(Trib.)	573	212
Pinarayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. ITO (2015) 152 ITD 90 (Cochin)(Trib.)	1330	473
Pinarayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. ITO (2015) 152 ITD 90 (Cochin)(Trib.)	1986	746

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Piruz A. Khambhatta v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 33 (Mag)(Guj.)(HC)	2136	807
Platinum Asset Management Ltd. v. Dy. DIT(IT) (2014) 61 SOT 119 / (Mum.)(Trib.)	1170	418
Platinum Asset Management Ltd. v. Dy. DIT(IT) (2014) 65 SOT 66 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)	948	336
PNR Society For Relief & Rehabilitation of Disabled Trust v. Dy. DIT (2014) 34 ITR 465 /(2015) 67 SOT 171 (URO)(Ahd.)(Trib.)	339	134
Poabs Rock Products (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 61 SOT 143 (Cochin)(Trib.)	1294	458
Poddar & Ashish Developers v. ITO (2015) 152 ITD 117 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1312	466
Poddar Sons Ex. L (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 476 / 223 Taxmann 94 / 271 CTR 165 (Cal.)(HC)	2042	770
Polestar Industries; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 423 (Guj.)(HC)	999	358
Polyfex (India) (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 224 / 224 Taxmann 74 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	1282	454
Pooja Investment Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 106 DTR 269 / 223 Taxmann 241 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	411 422	164 168
Poonam Chand Surana; CIT v. * (2014) 105 DTR 332 / 221 Taxmann 151 (Raj.)(HC)	1762	649
Poonam Marble (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 62 SOT 137 (URO)/157 TTJ 59 (Jaipur)(Trib.)	2498	957
Popular Mini Finance v. CIT (2014) 97 DTR 407(Ker.)(HC)	2362	901
POSCO Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. ADIT(2014) 148 ITD 527 / 31 ITR 255 / 162 TTJ 689 / 102 DTR 257 (Delhi)(Trib.)	151 1445	61 526
Pothina Venkata Rama Rao v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 639/(2015) 53 taxmann.com 36 (T&AP)(HC)	2282	867
Pothina Venkateswara Swamy v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 639 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 249 (T&AP)(HC)	2282	867
Potla Nageswara Rao v. DCIT (2014) 365 ITR 249 / 269 CTR 325 / 106 DTR 96 / 226 Taxman 173 (AP)(HC)	59	23
Povsha Goyal v. ACIT (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	2478	949
Powerdeal Energy Systems (I) (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 112 DTR 409 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 227 (Bom.)(HC)	1748	643
PP Engineering Work; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 433 / 271 CTR 221 / 49 taxmann.com 321 (Delhi)(HC)	1852	686
Prabodhan Prakashan v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 167 (Mum.)(Trib.)	283	113
Pradeep Iron Industries (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 46 (Jharkhand)(HC)	1824	673

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Pradeep Kumar Chowdhry v. Dy. CIT (2015) 115 DTR 208 / 168 TTJ 552 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1009	361
Pradeep Steel Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd.; ITO v. * (2013) 155 TTJ 294 / (2014) 61 SOT 104 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)	983	351
Pradyot K. Misra v. ACIT (2014) 101 DTR 59 / 362 ITR 24/ (2015) 231 Taxmann 885 (Delhi)(HC)	1814	669
Pragathi Gramin Bank v. ACIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 125(Mag.) (Karn.) (HC)	2112	799
Pragati Engineering Corpn. v. ITO (2014) 225 Taxmann 231 (Mag.)(All.) (HC)	1621	595
Prakash Ladhani; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 213 (Karn.)(HC)	442	175
Prakash S. Vyas; CIT v. * (2014) 272 CTR 353 (2015) 232 taxmann 352 (Guj.)(HC)	2421	928
Pramila D. Astekar v. ITO (2013) 154 TTJ 46 /(2014) 61 SOT 113 / (Pune) (Trib.)	2490	954
Pramod Kumar Dang; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 137 / 98 DTR 33 / 265 CTR 1 (Delhi)(HC)	2217	837
Pramod Kumar v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 237 / (2015) 58 taxmann.com 41 (P&H)(HC)	1637	602
Pramod Kumari Singal v. ITO (2014) 99 DTR 386 (MP)(HC)	1812	668
Pratapbhai K. Soni; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 201 / 222 Taxmann 136(Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1921	717
Prateek Kumar v. UOI (2014) 362 ITR 444 / 98 DTR 128 (All.)(HC)	2088	790
Prathima Educational Society; ACIT v. * (2014) 159 TTJ 483 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	296	118
Pratibha Garg (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 97 DTR 116/ 227 Taxmann 76 (Mag.) / 264 CTR 520(All.)(HC)	1971	740
Praveen Saxena v. JCIT (2015) 67 SOT 148 (Delhi)(Trib.)	747	263
Prayag Wines; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 660 / 49 taxmann.com 528 (All) (HC)	1643	603
Preet Forgings (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 163 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	1221	434
Preeti Elhence v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 268 / 49 taxmann.com 59 (All.)(HC)	1553	569
Prefab Gratings Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 366 ITR 550 / 52 taxmann.com 488 (T & AP)(HC)	1890	704
Prem Lata Sethi (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 333 (All.)(HC)	1090	391
Prem Prakash Nagpal; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 168 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC.)	1107	396
Prem Tailor v. ITO (2014) 223 Taxmann 132 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	2439	934

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Premier Exploration Services (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 29 ITR 427 / 162 TTJ 125/146 ITD 580/102 DTR 240 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1465 1466 1467	535 536 536
Premier Vegetable Products Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 464 / 97 DTR 230 / 227 Taxman 259 (Mag.) / 264 CTR 417 (Raj.)(HC)	420 694	168 249
Pride Foramer SAS; DIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxman 305 /103 DTR 275 /268 CTR 467 /(Uttarakhand)(HC)	127	51
Prima Paper and Engineering Industry; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 222 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 677 (Bom.)(HC)	1724	632
Principal Officer, L.G. Electronics Inc. v. ADIT (IT)(2014) 368 ITR 401/226 Taxmann 204/271 CTR 663 (All.)(HC)	1761	648
Printers (Mysore) (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 80 (Mag.) / (Karn.)(HC)	2011	756
Prisma Electronics; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 237 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	1272	450
Priyadarshini Spinning Mills Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 563 / 52 taxmann.com 65 (T&AP)(HC)	883	314
Priyanka Gems; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 575 / 102 DTR 193 / 267 CTR 480 (Guj.)(HC)	1220	434
Prudent Finance (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 125 (Guj.)(HC)	432	172
Prudential Logistics and Transports v. ITO (2014) 364 ITR 689 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 320 (Mag.) / 101 DTR 332 (Ker.)(HC)	793	278
Puja Prints; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 177 / 360 ITR 697 / 265 CTR 124 / 224 Taxmann 22 (Bom.)(HC)	1015	364
Punjab Agro Industries Corporation Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 419 / 103 DTR 332 (P&H)(HC)	930	331
Punjab Crockery House v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 614 / 52 taxmann.com 71(AP)(HC)	2550	979
Punjab Mandi Board; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 267 (P&H)(HC)	277	111
Punjab Stainless and steel Industries; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 144/ 103 DTR 49 (SC)	1193	426
Punjab Stainless Steel Industries; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 144 / 103 DTR 49 / 268 CTR 113 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 423 (SC)	1193 2573	426 988
Punjab Urban Development Authority, Mohali; ACIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 65 (URO) / 32 ITR 481 / 161 TTJ 553 (Chd.)(Trib.)	732 733 1666 1544	259 259 610 565
Punjab Urban Planning & Development Authority; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 32 ITR 668 / (2015) 152 ITD 305 (Chd.)(Trib.)	2465	944

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Punsumi Engineers Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 150 / 110 DTR 231 / (2015) 273 CTR 76 / 231 Taxmann 800 (Raj.)(HC)	2413	925
Puridevi Mahendrakumar Chaudhary; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxman 375 (Guj.)(HC)	864	305
Purvash Mansukhbhai Shah v. Addl.CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 154 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1576	577
Pushpa Devi Singla (Smt.) v. JCIT (2014) 161 TTJ 26 / 47 taxmann.com 388 / (2015) 67 SOT 129(URO) (Jodhpur)(Trib.)	2262	858
Pushparthy Packs (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 65 / 221 Taxman 403 (Bom.)(HC)	30	11
Puspendra Surana; CIT v. * (2014) 264 CTR 204 / 227 Taxmann 151(Mag) (Raj.)(HC)	2446	938
Puttur Petro Products (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 290/ 221 Taxmann 43 / 264 CTR 307 (Karn.)(HC)	1283 1287	454 456
PVP Ventures Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2012) 211 Taxman 554 / (2014) 101 DTR 161 (Mad.)(HC)	673	241
PyareLal Jaiswal v. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 555 (All.)(Trib.)	2388	913
R		
R Romi v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 311 (Ker)(HC)	1599	586
R& B Offshore Ltd.; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 223 Taxman 266/ 271 CTR 111 (Uttarakhand)(HC)	122	49
R&B Falcom Offshore Ltd.; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 266 (Uttarakhand)(HC)	1334	474
R. Balaji (Dr.); CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 305 / 272 CTR 189 (Karn.)(HC)	1005	360
R. C. Jewellers v. CIT (2014) 97 DTR 276 / 223 Taxmann 53 (Mag) (All) (HC)	1919 1949	716 727
R. J. Traders; CIT v. * (2013) 219 Taxmann 160 (Mag) / (2014) 360 ITR 190 (P&H)(HC)	1804	666
R. Jayavelu; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 83(Mag) (Karn.)(HC)	1821	672
R. K. Deivendra Nadar Trust; CIT v. * (2014) 271 CTR 694 / 110 DTR 203 / (2015) 228 Taxman 173 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	288	115
R. K. Jain v. Chairman, Settlement Commission (2015) 370 ITR 1 (Delhi.) (HC)	2590	1002
R. Krishnaswamy v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxman 270 / 108 DTR 71 (Mad.)(HC)	53	20
R. Liners Ltd.; Addl. DIT v. * (2014) 61 SOT 3 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2466	945
R. M. Exports v. CIT (2014) 264 CTR 206 / 226 Taxman 55(Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	2293	874

Name	Case No.	Page No.
R. N. Dobaria; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 24 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	606	221
R. P. Tolaniv. UOI (2014) 226 Taxmann 437(Delhi) (HC) Sunil Kumar Yadav v. UOI (Delhi)(HC), www.itatonline.org	2231	844
R. Prakash v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 10 (Bang.)(Trib.)	2053	775
R. R. Holdings P. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 445 /(2015) 231 Taxmann 659 (Delhi)(HC)	2096	793
R. Rangasamy v. DCIT (2014) 264 CTR 410 / 221 Taxmann 206(Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)	1939	723
R. Surendran v. UOI (2014) 369 ITR 536 / (2015) 274 CTR 49 / 114 DTR 34 / 230 Taxmann 590 (Ker.)(HC)	455	180
R. Surendran v. UOI(2014) 369 ITR 536 / (2015) 114 DTR 34 (Ker) (HC)	2537	973
R.C. Auto Centre (S.I.) v. ITO (2014) 366 ITR 305 / 224 Taxmann 354 / (2015) 115 DTR 196 / 275 CTR 104 (Mad.)(HC)	1035	371
R.J.B.V. Vasudevan Educational and Charitable Trust; DIT(E) v. * (2014) 226 Taxman 128 (Mag.) / 271 CTR 688 / (2015) 370 ITR 517 (Mad.)(HC)	300	120
R.S. Bajaj Society; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 111 / 111 DTR 166 (All.) (HC)	308	123
R.V. Chakrapani v. ACIT (2015) 67 SOT 30 / (2014) 29 ITR 342 (Hyd.) (Trib.)	821	288
Raajratna Metal Industries Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 371 ITR 222 / 227 Taxmann 133 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1784	656
Rabo India Finance Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 356 ITR 200/ (2014)225 Taxmann 92 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	1772	652
Radha Vinyl P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 199 (AP)(HC)	2549	978
Radials International v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 1 / 103 DTR 316 (Delhi)(HC)	956 2575	339 988
Ragavendra Prasad Mishra v. UOI (2014) 362 ITR 444 / 98 DTR 128 (All.) (HC)	2088	790
Raghav Bahl v. CIT (2014)369 ITR 447 / 101 DTR 239/225 Taxmann 195 (Mag.) / 267 CTR 122 (Delhi)(HC)	1940	724
Raj & Companyv. UOI (2014) 264 CTR 209 / 42 taxmann.com 184 (Gau.) (HC)	2186	825
Raj Jain; ACIT v. * (2014) 146 ITD 651 (Delhi)(Trib.)	118	47
Raj Kumar Arora; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 517/52 taxmann.com 172/(2015) 120 DTR 417 (All.)(HC)	1855	687
Raj Kumari Agarwal v. Dy. CIT 150 ITD 597 (Agra)(Trib.)	1025	368

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Raj Ratan Palace Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 1(St.)(SC)	39	14
Raja & Co. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 12 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)	734 830 850 2003 2236	259 291 298 753 846
Raja Housing Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 15 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	614	225
Rajarshi Rananjai Singh Shiksha Sansthan, Amethi; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 2 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	313	124
Rajasthan Cricket Association v. ITO (2014) 99 DTR 5 / 221 Taxmann 483 / 265 CTR 420(Raj)(HC)	2119	801
Rajasthan Fasteners (P) Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 271 / 222 Taxman 100 (Mag.) / 266 CTR 401 (Raj.)(HC)	252	103
Rajasthan R. S. S. & Ginning Mills Fed. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 564 / 223 Taxmann 259 /268 CTR 225 (SC)	1165	416
Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 307 / 265 CTR 471 (Raj.)(HC)	902	319
Rajeev G. Kalathi* Dy. CIT v. * (2015) 67 SOT 52 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)	1094	392
Rajeev Kumar Agarwal v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 363 / 109 DTR 33 (Agra) (Trib.)	819	287
Rajendra Kantibhai Patel (HUF) v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 232 / 226 Taxmann 13(Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1682	616
Rajendra Singh Nayak v. DCIT (2014) 268 CTR 484 / 227 Taxmann 13 (Mag.)(MP)(HC)	1561	571
Rajesh Rajora v. UOI(2014) 220 Taxmann 146 (Mag.)(MP)(HC)	1563	572
Rajinder Kumar; CIT v. * (2013) 260 CTR 113 / (2014) 362 ITR 241 / 220 Taxmann 3 (Delhi)(HC)	798	279
Rajiv Bhataria; CIT v. * (2013) 263 CTR 707 / (2014) 360 ITR 121 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 205 (P&H)(HC)	2461	943
Rajiv Gupta v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 257 / 227 Taxmann 242 (Mag.)(P&H) (HC)	1882	699
Rajkot District Co-op Bank Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 240 (Guj.) (HC)	433	172
Rajkotia Securities Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 98 DTR 275 / 65 SOT 178 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1320	469
Rajmoti Industries v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 392 / 223 Taxmann 428 / 268 CTR 130 / 103 DTR 113 (Guj.)(HC)	846	297

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Rajmoti Industries v. JCIT (2014) 363 ITR 467 / 44 taxmann.com 491 (Guj.) (HC)	1639	602
Rajnandini Entertainment Ltd; ITO v. * . (2014) 35 ITR 348 / (2015) 152 ITD 217 (Mum.)(Trib.)	726	257
Rajni Gugnani v. CIT (2014) 99 DTR 166/266 CTR 300 / 225 Taxmann 188 (P&H)(HC)	1829	677
Rajshibhai Meramanbhai Odedra; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 72 (Guj.) (HC)	5	2
Raju and Prasad v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 593 (T&AP) (HC)	2392	915
Rajwant Singh Gulati v. UOI(2014) 364 ITR 190 (AP)(HC)	2548	978
Rakam Money Matters P. Ltd. ; ITO v. * (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1093	392
Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. UOI (2014) 365 ITR 143 / 225 Taxmann 198 (Mag.) / (2015) 276 CTR 379/ 117 DTR 52 (All.)(HC)	2074 2075	783 784
Rakesh Sarin; Dy. CIT v.* (2014) 362 ITR 619/97 DTR 216 / 264 CTR 68 / 222 Taxmann 84(Mag.) ((Mad.)(HC)	1947	727
Raksha Chhadwa (Mrs.) v. ACIT (Mum.) (Trib.); www.itat.nic.in	1867	692
Rakshit Transport; CIT. v. * (2014)227 Taxman 79(Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)	2347	896
Ralson India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 103/ 102 DTR 234 / 231 Taxmann 884 (Delhi)(HC)	1787	657
Ram Gopal Varma v. Dy. CIT (2013) 357 ITR 493 / (2014) 265 CTR 79 / 220 Taxmann 84 (Mag.)(AP)(HC)	1154	412
Ram Kishan Gupta; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 164 (All.)(HC)	879	311
Ram Prakash; ITO v. * (2014) 164 TTJ 7 (UO) / (2015) 67 SOT 126 (URO) (Agra)(UO)(Trib.)	849 1577	298 577
Ram Singh and others; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 417 / 266 CTR 122/99 DTR 217 / 43 taxmann.com 21 (Raj.)(HC)	1661 2271	609 861
Rama Krishna Jewellers; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 588 / (2015) 229 Taxman 362 (Delhi)(HC)	2322 2314	884 882
Rama Rani Kalia (Smt.); CIT v. * (2013) 358 ITR 499 / (2014) 221 Taxmann 72 (All.)(HC)	936	333
Ramesh D. Patel; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 492 / 102 DTR 65 / 225 Taxmann 411 / 269 CTR 285 / 225 Taxmann 411 (Guj.)(HC)	1860	690
Ramesh Gunshi Dedhia v. ITO (2014) 148 ITD 356 / 107 DTR 357 / 164 TTJ 822 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1318	469
Ramesh M. Mehta v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 142 (Mad.)(HC)	1957	731

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Ramesh Prasad Dhahayat v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 191 (Mag.)(MP)(HC)	1128 2151	403 814
Rameshwar Sharma; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 30 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)	1222	435
Ramoji Foundation; DIT(E) v. * (2014) 364 ITR 85 (AP)(HC)	311	124
Rampur Distillery and Chemical Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 551 (All.)(HC)	63	25
Rane Brake Linings Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 401 / 269 CTR 423 / 226 Taxman 355 / 106 DTR 296 (Mad.)(HC)	641	232
Rangoli Projects P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 192 / 223 Taxmann 6 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	603	221
Ranjit Projects (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 176 (Mag.) / (2015) 115 DTR 217(Guj.)(HC)	1722	631
Ranjit Projects P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 223 Taxmann 227 (Mag) / (2015) 372 ITR 529 (Guj.)(HC)	1692	620
Rasalika Trading & Investment Co. (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014)365 ITR 447 / 101 DTR 28 /(2015) 229 Taxmann 60(Delhi)(HC)	1795	661
Rashi Injection Moulders; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 527 (Mad.)(HC)	2513	963
Rashmikanth Kundalia v. UOI (2015) 373 ITR 268/ 229 Taxmann 596 (Bom.)(HC)	2171	819
Rasiklal Mardia; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 127 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	926	328
Ratio in, CIT v. Sahara India Savings and Investment Corporation Ltd. [2010] 321 ITR 371 (SC), applied. (AY. 1993-94, 1994-95)	2543	976
Ravinder Pal Singh v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 65 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 58 (P&H)(HC)	1039	372
Raviraj Relempaadu; ACIT v. * (2014) 29 ITR 387 (Mum.)(Trib.)	822	288
Rayala Corporation P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 95 DTR 321 / (2014) 363 ITR 630 / 264 CTR 282 / 228 Taxmann 250 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	392	156
Rayala Corporation P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 363 ITR 630 / 264 CTR 282 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 250 (Mag) (Mad.)(HC)	1719	629
Razakbhai R. Arabiani v. ITO (2014) 220 Taxman 82 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1147	409
Red Hat India (P) Ltd., In re (2014) 223 Taxmann 274 (AAR)(HC)	2207	834
Redico Khaitan Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 424 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 570 (All.)(HC)	1879	698
Reebok India Co. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 469 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1342	477

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Regional Kisan Gramin Bank; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 134 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	1654	607
REI Agro Ltd. ; CIT v. * (Cal.)(HC), www.itatonline.org	362	141
REI Agro Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 144 ITD 141 / (2014) 98 DTR 339 / 160 TTJ 107 (Kol.)(Trib.)	381	150
Reis Magos Estates (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 169 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)	1133	405
Reliable Finhold Ltd. v. UOI(2014) 369 ITR 419 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 446(All.)(HC)	1847	684
Reliance Energy Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 358 ITR 371 / 262 CTR 272 (2014) 220 Taxmann 89 (Mag.)(SC)	2167	818
Reliance Footprint Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 82 / 63 SOT 124 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)	760	267
Reliance Industries v. Addl. ACIT (2012) 79 DTR 315 / (2013) 55 SOT 8 / (2014) 159 TTJ 349 (Mum.)(Trib.)	375 444 559 515 1230 1442 1527	148 175 209 196 437 524 559
Reliance Infocom Ltd.; DIT v. * (2014) 363 TTR 658 / 267 CTR 89 / 101 DTR 193 (SC)	2181 2572	823 987
Reliance Infocom Ltd.; Dy. DIC v. * (2014) 159 TTJ 589 / 29 ITR 132 / 98 DTR 66 / 64 SOT 137 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)	148 2063 2163	60 779 817
Reliance Infocom Ltd.; UOI v. * (2014)267 CTR 89 / 101 DTR 193(SC)	2572	987
Reliance Infrastructure Ltd.; CIT v. * (Bom.) (HC); www.itatonline.org	2323	885
Reliance International v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 86 (URO) (Luck.)(Trib.)	751 2061	264 778
Reliance Share and Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. ; ITO v. * (2015) 67 SOT 73 (Mum.)(Trib.)	369	145
Reliance Share and Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. ; ITO v. * (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	746	263
Renoir Consulting Ltd. v. Dy. DIT (2014) 64 SOT 28 (Mum.)(Trib.)	132	54
Resistoflex Dynamics (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 616 / 159 TTJ 425 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1324	470
Reuters Transaction Services Ltd. v. DDIT (2014) 151 ITD 510 / 108 DTR 1 / 165 TTJ 320 (Mum.)(Trib.)	166	68

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Rewade Precision Tools (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014)222 Taxmann 229 (Karn.) (HC)	2351	897
Rhone-Poulenc (India) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 513 / 271 CTR 636 / (2015) 228 Taxman 57 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	876	310
Ricoh India Ltd. ; ITO v. * (2013) 143 ITD 242 / (2014) 98 DTR 435 / 165 TTJ 211 (Mum.)(Trib.)	429	170
Ricoh India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 798 (Mum.)(Trib.)	754 828 2275	265 291 864
Ricoh India Ltd.; ITO v. * (2013) 143 ITD 242 / (2014) 98 DTR 435 / 165 TTJ 211 (Mum.)(Trib.)	114 560	45 209
Riddhi Steel and Tubes Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 148 (Guj.) (HC)	1151	411
Right Tunnelling Co. Ltd. v. ADIT (2014) 64 SOT 109 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)	2056 2057	776 776
Rikhab Chand Jain v. ITO (2014) 164 TTJ 4(UO)/(2015) 67 SOT 468 (Jodh.) (Trib.)	1887	701
Rippen Ahuja; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 150 / 226 Taxmann 43 (Mag.)/(2015) 116 DTR 277 / 275 CTR 577 (P&H)(HC)	2358	900
Rishiti Stock & Shares (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 159 TTJ 300 / 97 DTR 92 / 29 ITR 61 (Mum.)(Trib.)	571 824	212 289
Rita Diwan (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 39 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	923	327
Rita Mathur (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 428 (Raj.)(HC)	865	305
RK BK Fiscal Services (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 270 CTR 555 / 223 Taxman 258 (SC)	342	135
RKM Educational and Charitable Trust; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 25(Mag.) (P&H)(HC)	1173	419
Robert Bosch (India) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 18 (Karn.)(HC)	1238	439
Robin Nanabhai Bhatt v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 531 / 65 SOT 167 (Mum.) (Trib.)	1672	613
Rohan & Rajdeep Infrastructure v. ACIT (2013) 92 DTR 402 / 157 TTJ 333 / (2014) 61 SOT 9 (URO)(Pune)(Trib.)	1264	447
Rohilkhand Educational Charitable Trust v. Chief CIT (2014) 365 ITR 233 / 99 DTR 115 / 222 Taxmann 243 (All.)(HC)	1805	666
Rosy Blue (India) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 89 (Bom.)(HC)	1690	619
Roto Pumps Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 51 (All) (HC)	1216	433

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Royal Bank of Scotland (2014) 364 ITR 337 / 268 CTR 406 / 225 Taxmann 51 (AAR)	1983 1984	744 744
Royal Builders; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 108 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	794	278
Royal Star Jewellery (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 1 / 161 TTJ 503/99 DTR 396 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1485	543
RPG Transmissions Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 359 ITR 673 / (2014) 266 CTR 533 / 100 DTR 338 / 48 taxmann.com 57 (Mad.)(HC)	545 620 1699	205 226 622
Rupakula Srinivas v. ITO (2014) 35 ITR 245 / (2015) 67 SOT 58(URO) (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1831	677
Rushabh Vatika; ACIT v. * (2014) 149 ITD 46 (Rajkot)(Trib.)	1669	612
RW Promotions Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.), www.itatonline.org	2301	876
S		
S. Govindaraj v. ITO (2014) 35 ITR 160 / (2015) 152 ITD 303 (Chennai) (Trib.)	1092	391
S. J. Investment Agencies (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v.* (2014) 146 ITD 691 (Mum.) (Trib.)	2020	760
S. K. Transformer P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 394 / 223 Taxmann 231 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	1253	444
S. M. Dayanand v. Dy. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 104 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	662	239
S. M. Haq v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 125 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	834	293
S. Muthukumars Stanley Rajan v. ITO (2014) 222 Taxmann 113 (Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)	1053	379
S. Prasad Reddy v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 430/226 Taxmann 265 (T&AP)(HC)	2551	979
S. Premalata (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 298 / 52 taxmann.com 58 / 271 CTR 249 (T&AP)(HC)	591	217
S. Premalata (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 298 / 271 CTR 249 / 52 taxmann.com 58 (T&AP)(HC)	403	162
S. S Ahluwalia; CIT v. * (2014) 267 CTR 185 (Delhi)(HC)	1539 1547	564 567
S. S. Ahluwalia; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 131 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	1538 1548	563 567
S. S. Ahluwalia; CWT v. * (2014) 267 CTR 185 (Delhi)(HC)	1547	567
S. S. Crop Care Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 221 Taxman 399 (MP)(HC)	645	234
S.I.Group India Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 717 (Bom.)(HC)	861	303
S.J. Investment Agencies (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 146 ITD 691 (Mum.) (Trib.)	2021	760

Case Laws Index

Name	Case No.	Page No.
S.P. Real Estate Developers (P) Ltd. ; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 149 ITD 617 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	112 745 813	45 263 284
S.S. Ahluwalia; ACIT v. * (2014) 101 DTR 292 (Delhi)(HC)	1540	564
Sabarmati Ashram Gaushala Trust; DIT(E) v. * (2014) 362 ITR 539 / 223 Taxman 43 (Guj.)(HC)	15	7
Sachin Joshi v. CIT (2014) 224 Taxmann 331(2015) 370 ITR 598 (Bom.) (HC)	1554	569
Sachitel Communications P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxman 219 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	601 1042	220 374
Sadananda Singh v. ITO (2014) 151 ITD 714 (Kol.)(Trib.)	851	298
Sadbhav Engineering Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 223 Taxmann 229(Mag.) / 105 DTR 33(Guj) (HC)	1721	630
Sadhana Jain (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 1 / 224 Taxmann 28 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	1132	404
Sadhna Nitro Chem Ltd. v. A.B. Koli, ACIT (2014) 368 ITR 505 / 52 taxmann.com 170 (Bom.)(HC)	1715	628
Sadia Shaikh; CIT v. * (2013) 87 CCH 59 (Bom.)(HC) www.itatonline.org	60	23
Safmarine Container Lines NV; DIT(IT) v.* (2014) 367 ITR 209 / 225 Taxmann 299 / 108 DTR 251 (Bom.)(HC)	913	324
Sahajanand Associates; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 645 (Guj.)(HC)	1298	459
Sahara India Firms, Lucknow; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxman 68 (All.)(HC)	78	33
Sahara India Mutual Benefit Co. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 101 DTR 265 / 220 Taxman 16 (All.)(HC)	77 715 610 102	33 254 223 41
Sahara India Savings & Investment Corn Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014)101 DTR 93 (All.)(HC)	2187	825
Sahasra Electronics (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 146 ITD 565 (Delhi)(Trib.)	180	77
Sahkari Khand Udyog Mandal Ltd. v. ACIT(2014) 106 DTR 182/ 225 Taxmann 51 (Mag.)(2015) 370 ITR 107 (Guj.)(HC)	1728	634
Sahu Construction (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 609 / 222 Taxmann 167 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	910 1658	323 608
Sai Infosystem India P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 433 / (2015) 114 DTR 239 / 274 CTR 414 (Guj.)(HC)	1276	451
Saipem Triune Engineering P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 364 ITR 154 (Delhi)(HC)	2137	808

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Sairang Developers and Promoters Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 593 / 108 DTR 400/ (2015) 53 taxmann.com 291 (Bom.)(HC)	1923 2331	717 889
Saiyad Saukatali Saiydamiya v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 110 (URO) (Ahd.)(Trib.)	2007	755
Sajjankumar Didwani; ITO v. * (Mum)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	870	308
Sakunthala Vedachalam (Mrs.) v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 558 / 114 DTR 241 / (2015) 53 taxmann.com 62 (Mad.)(HC)	12	6
Salman Khan v. ACIT (2014) 40 CCH 594 (Mum.)(Trib.), www.itatonline.org	2494	956
Sam Global Securities Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 38 taxmann.com 129 / (2014) 360 ITR 682 / 105 DTR 41 / 272 CTR 290(Delhi)(HC)	1616	593
Sambhaji Nagar Co-op Hsg. Society Ltd.; CIT v. * (2015) 370 ITR 325 / 113 DTR 89 / 273 CTR 430 / 229 Taxmann 226 (Bom.)(HC)	925	328
Samraj Krishan Chaudhary; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 638 / (2015) 57 taxmann.com 224 (All.)(HC)	1759	647
Samsung Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. v. DIT (IT) & Anr. (2014) 221 Taxman 315 / 265 CTR 109/98 DTR 89 (Uttarakhand)(HC)	125	50
Samsung India Electronics Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 158 (Delhi) (HC)	664	239
Samsung India Electronics Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 21 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	684 685 878 1516 1653	245 246 311 556 607
Samsung India Electronics P. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 362 ITR 460 /(2015) 228 Taxmann 32 (Mag)(Delhi)(HC)	1798	663
Samsung India Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. DDIT (2014) 364 ITR 103 / 105 DTR 106 / 226 Taxmann 196 / 272 CTR 297(Delhi)(HC).	1826	675
Samta Chavigarh; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 205 (Mag.) / 268 CTR 199 / 103 DTR 18 (Raj.)(HC)	69	30
Samtel Glass Ltd.; CIT (TDS) v. * (2014) 369 ITR 392/271 CTR 581 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 183 (Raj.)(HC)	1993	750
Samtel India Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2013) 359 ITR 62 / (2014) 222 Taxmann 18 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	611	224
Samudra Institute of Maritime Studies Trust; DIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 645 / (2015) 117 DTR 342 (Bom.)(HC)	263	107
Sandeep Goyal; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 471 (P&H) (HC)	1030	370

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 160 / 226 Taxmann 109 (Mag) (Karn.)(HC)	2457	941
Sandvik Asia Ltd. v. CIT (2015) 231 Taxmann 46 (Bom.)(HC)	772 1332	271 473
Sangam Builders; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 149 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	1593	584
Sangeeta Wig; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 159 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	974	347
Sanghamitra Bharali (Smt.) ; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 481 / 97 DTR 345 / 227 Taxmann 65 (Mag.)(Gauhati)(HC)	1083 1111	389 398
Sanjay Badani v. DCIT (2014) 35 ITR 536/50 taxmann.com 457 (Mum.) (Trib.)	2535	972
Sanjay Kumar Sahu v. ITO(2013) 354 ITR 177 / (2014) 222 Taxmann 140 (Mag.) (MP)(HC)	2116	800
Sanjay Kumath; ACIT v. * (2014) 63 SOT 90/ The Chamber's Journal – April P, 81 (Indore)(Trib.)	44	16
Sanjay Rungta v. CIT(A) & Anr. (2014) 99 DTR 18 / 266 CTR 181 / 45 taxmann.com 70(Jharkhand)(HC)	1925	718
Sanjay Rungta v. CIT(A) (2014) 266 CTR 181 / 99 DTR 18 / 45 taxmann.com 70 (Jharkhd)(HC)	1914	714
Sanjaya Gupta v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 18 / 269 CTR 339 / 49 taxmann.com 179 (Delhi)(HC)	1894	705
Sanjeev Lal v. CIT (2014) 105 DTR 305 / 365 ITR 389 / 269 CTR 1 / 225 Taxmann 239 (SC)	52 990 2570	19 354 987
Sankata Inx (India) Ltd v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 137 (Jaipur)(Trib.)	1365	487
Sankatha Shukla v. UOI (2014) 362 ITR 444 / 98 DTR 128 (All.)(HC)	2088	790
Sannidhi C. Patel v. ITO (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1020	366
Sanspareils Greenlands (P) Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 193 (All.) (HC)	1655	608
SAP India (P) Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2014) 29 ITR 469 / 104 DTR 82 (Bang.)(Trib.)	764 765 2166	269 269 817
SAP Labs India Pvt. Ltd.; DCIT v. * (2011) 130 ITD 471 / 136 TTJ 503 (Bang.)(Trib.)	1619	594
SAP Labs Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 109 DTR 175 / 271 CTR 612 (Karn.) (HC)	2359	900
Sapthagiri Distilleries Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 270 / 224 Taxman 229 (Mag.) / (2015) 276 CTR 532 / 108 DTR 258 (Karn.)(HC)	67	28

Name	Case No.	Page No.
SAR Infracon P. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 294 (Guj.)(HC)	1018	365
Sarala Rajkumar Varma v. ACIT (2014) 43 taxmann.com 372 (Guj.)(HC)	1738	639
Saraswati Gyan Mandir Shiksha Sansthan; ACIT v. * (2014) 163 TTJ 29 (UO)(Luck.)(Trib.)	281	112
Sarjan Realities Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 112 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	977	349
Sarkar Jewellers (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 33 ITR 16 / (2015) 53 taxmann.com 112 / 67 SOT 125 (URO) (Ahd.)(Trib.)	940 717 718	334 255 255
Sarwan Kumar v. ITO (2014) 150 ITD 289 / (2015) 167 TTJ 794 (Delhi) (Trib.)	981 982	350 350
Sasi Enterprises v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 163 / 98 DTR 329/222 Taxmann 78 / 265 CTR 225 (SC)	2528	969
Sasken Communication Technologies Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 265 CTR 540 / 98 DTR 194 / 227 Taxmann 23 (Karn.)(HC)	1236 1237	438 439
Satadhar Enterprises ; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 105 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1301	460
Satish Estate P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 451 / 106 DTR 100 / 226 Taxmann 11(Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	1657	608
Satish Kumar; ITO v. * (2014) 163 TTJ 33 (UO) (2015) 67 SOT 49 (URO) (Jodh.)(Trib.)	1120	399
Satpal Singh v. ACIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 204 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	1898	706
Satvara Education Foundation; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxman 32 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	307	123
Satya Narain Patni; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 325 / 269 CTR 466 / 214 Taxmann 312 (Raj.)(HC)	1130	404
Saurabh Enterprises; CIT v. * (2014) 269 CTR 451(All.)(HC)	2403	920
Saurah Rameshchandra Lavti ; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 14 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	931	331
Savy L. Purayidam v. Agrl IT and CTO (2014) 360 ITR 551 (Ker.)(HC)	2589	1001
SB Properties and Enterprises Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 483 / 100 DTR 33 / (2015) 232 Taxmann 398 (Raj.)(HC)	523	198
School of Management Sciences; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 114 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	314	125
Schrader Duncan limited v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	2473	947
Seema Anil Modani v. ITO (2014) 220 Taxman 167 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1072	385
Seervi Samaj Tambaram Trust; DIT(E) v. * (2014) 362 ITR 199 / 110 DTR 193 / 222 Taxman 252 / 271 CTR 684 (Mad.)(HC)	315	125
Sekhar Kumar Goenka v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 170 (URO)(Cuttack)(Trib.)	1545	566

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Seksaria Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 36 ITR 409 (Mum.)(Trib.)	987	352
Select Vacations (P) Ltd v. ITO & Anr. (2014) 98 DTR 137 / 221 Taxmann 159(Delhi)(HC)	1807	667
Serco BPO (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 146 ITD 453 (Delhi)(Trib.)	2028	762
Sesa Goa Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 81 (URO) (Panaji)(Trib.)	2300	876
Seshasayee Paper and Boards Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 360 ITR 483 / 97 DTR 416 / 265 CTR 405 (Mad.)(HC)	2373	905
Set Satellite (Singapore) Pte Ltd.; DIT v. * (2014) 267 CTR 89 / 101 DTR 193 (SC)	2181	823
Set Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.; UOI v. * (2014) 267 CTR 89 / 101 DTR 193(SC)	2572	987
Set Statellite (Singapore) Pte Ltd. ; DIT(IT) v. * (2014) 225 Taxman 1 / 269 CTR 197 / 105 DTR 153 (Bom.)(HC)	159	65
Seven Arts Films; ACIT v. * (2014) 33 ITR 694 / (2015) 67 SOT 74 (URO) (Chennai)(Trib.)	725	257
Sew Precision Joint Venture; ITO v . * (2014) 64 SOT 83 (URO) (Pune) (Trib.)	2264	858
Sewa Education Trust; Jt. CIT v. * (2013) 27 ITR 292 / (2014) 61 SOT 4 (URO.)(Agra)(Trib.)	282	112
Sewak Ice and Cold Storage P. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 316 (All.) (HC)	2416	927
Shabbir Hussain Pithawala; CIT v. * (2014) 265 CTR 606 / 226 Taxman 174 (MP)(HC)	997	357
Shabir Hussain Pithawala; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 62 (MP)(HC)	8	3
Shah Investments Financials Developments & Consultants Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 270 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1326	471
Shah Ravindra Derogarh; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 223 / 52 taxmann.com 64 / (2015) 116 DTR 210 (Guj.)(HC)	2248 2284	853 869
Shail Motilal (Smt) v. CIT (2014) 105 DTR 305 / 365 ITR 389 (SC)	990 2570	354 987
Shail Motilal (Smt) v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 389 / 105 DTR 305 / (SC)	52	19
Shakti LPG Ltd v. ITO (2014) 369 ITR 167 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 164 (T & AP) (HC)	2040	769
Shakuntla Thukral (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 644 (2015) 230 Taxmann 166 (P&H)(HC)	1638	602
Shalimar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 138 (All.)(HC)	1089	390
Shalini Bhupal (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 600 (AP)(HC)	2423	929

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Shambhubhai Mahadev Ahir; CIT v. * (2014) 363 TTR 572 / 102 DTR 321 / 224 Taxman 184 / 268 CTR 21 (FB)(Guj.)(HC)	2332	889
Shamlal Bajaj ; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 173 (Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)	1718	629
Shanta Education Academy v. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 168 (URO) / 33 ITR 154 (Agra)(Trib.)	328	129
Shanthi Logistics (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 141 (URO) (Chennai) (Trib.)	809	283
Shanti Enterprise; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 170 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	415	166
Shanti Enterprises v. ACIT (2014) 111 DTR 89 / 272 CTR 105(Guj.)(HC)	2525	967
Sharavathy Conductors (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 187 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)	2395	917
Sharda Educational Trust v. CIT (2014) 164 TTJ 762 / 147 ITD 271 (Agra) (Trib.)	321	127
Shardaben K. Modi ; CIT v. * (2013) 217 Taxmann 89 (Mag.) (2014) 365 ITR 169 (Guj.)(HC)	1783	656
Shardaben Kishorebhai Patel; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 375 / (2015) 117 DTR 445(Guj.)(HC)	1026	368
Sharekhan Financial Services (P.) Ltd v. ACIT (2014) The Chamber's Journal-September-P. 84 (Mum.)(Trib.)	367	143
Shashi Nursing Home Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 216 Taxmann 97 / (2014) 269 CTR 99 / 105 DTR 25 (All.)(HC)	472	185
Sheela Bhagwandas Nichlani (Mrs.) v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 244 / 161 TTJ 496 / 100 DTR 370 (Mum.)(Trib.)	996	357
Shelcon Properties (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 165 (Mag.) / (2015) 273 CTR 106 (Cal.)(HC)	1300	460
Shell India Markets (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 516/ 112 DTR 169 / (2015) 273 CTR 161 / 228 Taxmann 99 (Bom)(HC)	1343	478
Shia Dawoodi Bohra Jamaat Waqf v. DIT(E) (2014) 64 SOT 173 (Kol.)(Trib.)	326	128
Shilp Gravures Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 382 (Guj.)(HC)	1811	668
Shital Corporation; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 476 / 223 Taxmann 18 (Guj.) (HC)	1296	458
Shiv Kumar Daga; ITO v. * (2014) 159 TTJ 415 / 97 DTR 175 / 151 ITD 481 (Mum.)(Trib.)	427	170
Shivalik Buildwell (P) Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 3 (Mag.)(Guj.) (HC)	106	43
Shivam Motors (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 111 DTR 153 / 272 CTR 277 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 63 (All.)(HC)	359 618	140 225

Case Laws Index

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Shivangi Steel Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 164 TTJ 134 / 147 ITD 166 (Agra) (Trib.)	1624 2263	596 858
Shobha Developers P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 66(Karn.)(HC)	2242	850
Shree Aashrayar Souhard Credit Society Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 269 CTR 82 / 51 taxmann.com 420 (Karn.)(HC)	2139	809
Shree Builder v. UOI (MP)(HC) www.itatonline.org	2170	819
Shree Cement Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 100 DTR 33 / 160 TTJ 529 / 31 ITR 513 / 2015) 152 ITD 561 (Jaipur)(Trib.)	40 1269 1528 2188	15 449 559 825
Shree Dhain Auto Transport Corporation; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 179 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	647	234
Shree Govindbhai Jethalal Nathavani Charitable Trust; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 27 (Mag.) (2015) 373 ITR 6195 (Guj.)(HC)	1172	419
Shree Kanya Pathshala Trust v. UOI (2014) 360 ITR 60 / 267 CTR 283 / 110 DTR 361 (Gauh.)(HC)	204	87
Shree Narayan Built Up (I) (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 61 SOT 79 (URO) (Agra) (Trib.)	2386	912
Shree Nirman Foundation Charitable Trust; DIT(E) v. * (2014) 33 ITR 56 / (2015) 152 ITD 33 (Ahd.)(Trib.)	278	111
Shree Palani Transport Co. v. AO (2014) 368 ITR 524 / 225 Taxmann 1 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1771	651
Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 158 TTJ 4 / (2015) 67 SOT 26 (URO)(Jodh.)(Trib.)	721 722 2050	256 256 774
Shree Ram Multi Tech Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 76 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	479 669 1069	187 241 384
Shree Salasar Overseas P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 164 TTJ 215 (2015) 67 SOT 68 (URO) (Jaipur)(Trib.)	731 848 1832	259 297 677
Shreenath Motors Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 536 / 107 DTR 28 / 269 CTR 456 (Bom.)(HC)	691	248
Shreenathji Construction; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 154 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1306	462
Shreyans Industries Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 329 (P&H)(HC)	652	236
Shri Renuga Textiles Mills Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2012) 254 CTR 423 / 77 DTR 355 / (2014) 366 ITR 649 (Mad.)(HC)	248 587	101 216

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Shri. Girija Smelters (P) Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2015) 230 Taxmann 322 (AP)(HC)	1936	722
Shriniwas Machine Craft (P) Ltd. v. ITSC & Ors. (2014) 361 ITR 313 / 98 DTR 161 / 265 CTR 113 / 43 taxmann.com 326 (Bom.)(HC)	1808	667
Shriniwas Machine Craft P. Ltd. v. ITSC (2014) 361 ITR 313 /98 DTR 161/265 CTR 113(Bom.)(HC)	2189	825
SHV Energy (P) Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 432 / 98 DTR 177 / 160 TTJ 737 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1476	538
Shyam Biri Works v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 511 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 188 (All.)(HC)	1607	589
Shyam Raj Singh; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 74/ 52 taxmann.com 63 (P&H) (HC)	2424	929
Siddharth Pratap Chand v. CWT (2014) 360 ITR 30/102 DTR 140 (Delhi) (HC)	2558	983
Siddhivinayak Kohinoor Venture v. Addl. CIT (2014) 159 TTJ 390 / (2015) 67 SOT 284 (URO)(Pune)(Trib.)	1317	468
Siel Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 730 (Delhi)(Trib.)	2175	821
Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 155 (Ahd.) (Trib.)	1363	487
Siemens Public Communication Networks Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 405 / 265 CTR 532 / 98 DTR 151 (Karn.)(HC)	417	167
Siemens Public Communication Networks Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 151 / 265 CTR 532 (Karn.)(HC)	86	35
Sikhwal Chemicals v. ITO (2014) 164 TTJ 1 (UO) / (2015) 68 SOT 39 (URO)(Jodh.)(Trib.)	557	208
Sikkim Manipal University v. State of Sikkim (2014) 369 ITR 567 (2015) 273 CTR 25 / 232 Taxman 360 (Sikkim)(HC)	64	26
Silicon Institute of Technology; CIT v. * (2014) 272 CTR 319 / 112 DTR 233 (Orissa)(HC)	262	107
Siliguri Regulated Market Committee; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 51 / (2015) 230 Taxman 159 / 112 DTR 356 (Cal.)(HC)	260	106
Silver Line; DCIT v. * (Delhi) (Trib.);www.itatonline.org	1835 2265 2578	679 859 989
Silver Oak Laboratories P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (AY. 2003-2004 to 2005-2006)	1994	750
Simatech Shipping Forwarding LLC; ADIT(IT) v. * (2014) 146 ITD 48 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1339	476
Simbhaoli Industries P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 173 / 225 Taxmann 61 (All.)(HC)	894	317

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Simpkins School v. DIT (Inv.) (2014) 367 ITR 335 / 226 Taxman 160 (Mag.) / (2015) 274 CTR 290 / 114 DTR 143 (All.)(HC)	219	91
Simpson and General Finance Co. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 328 / 223 Taxman 154 / 106 DTR 146 (Mad.)(HC)	71	31
Sin Oceanic Shipping ASA Norway v. AAR (2014)104 DTR 281 / 223 Taxmann 102 / 269 CTR 15 (SC)	2205	832
Singamsetty Subba Rao ; CIT v. * (2014) 357 ITR 529 / 220 Taxman 81 (Mag.)(AP)(HC)	845	296
Singh K. P. (Dr.); CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 289(All) (HC)	1648	605
Singla Enclave Developers (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2013) 156 TTJ 1 / (2014) 149 ITD 177 (Chs.)(Trib.)	1122	400
SIRO Clinpharm (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 98 DTR1 / 65 SOT 149 (URO) / 160 TTJ 70 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1840 1295	681 458
Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 598 / 270 CTR 371 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 362 (AP)(HC)	2093	792
Sirpur Paper Mills; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 206(Mag.) / (2015) 118 DTR 326 (AP)(HC)	2094	792
Sisters of Our Lady of Providence Education Society; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 662 / (2015) 122 DTR 194 (All.)(HC)	304	121
Sivagami Holdings (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 75 (Chennai)(Trib.)	134	54
SKM Shree Shivkumar v. ACIT (2014) 65 SOT 232 (Chennai)(Trib.)	36	13
SKS Microfinance Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 145 ITD 111 / (2014) 98 DTR 321 / 160 TTJ 364 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	520	197
Skyline Advertising (P) Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 104 DTR 98 / 225 Taxmann 220 / 269 CTR 289 (Karn.)(HC)	1268	448
Skyline Advertising (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 269 CTR 289 / 225 Taxmann 220 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	1248	442
Slum Rehabilitation Authority v. DIT (E) (2014) 112 DTR 209 / (2015) 275 CTR 40 (Bom.)(HC)	2103	795
SMCC Construction India Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 354 (Delhi) (HC)	1810	668
Smita Anand (Mrs.) In re (2014) 362 ITR 38 / 266 CTR 146 / 223 Taxman 322/ 99 DTR 389 (AAR)	119	47
Smita Conductors Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (Mum.)(Trib.),www.itatonline.org	972	346
Smita P. Patil (Smt.)v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 182/(2015) 55 taxmann.com 346 (Pune)(Trib.)	1871	694

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Society for Integrated Development in Urban and Rural Areas; DDIT(E) v.* (2014) 29 ITR 506 / 151 ITD 772 / (2015) 170 TTJ 646 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	286	114
Solapur Siddheshwar Sahakari Bank Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 36 ITR 290 (Pune)(Trib.)	95	39
Som Tobacco India Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 58 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	1052	379
Somanadari Bhupal; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 600 / 52 Taxmann.com 91 (AP)(HC)	2423	929
Sonia Uppal (Smt.) ; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 70 / 52 taxmann.com 62 (P&H)(HC)	922	327
Sony India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014)363 ITR 330 / 266 CTR 225 (Delhi)(HC)	2120	801
Sony Mobile Communications (India) P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 363 ITR 330 (Delhi)(HC)	2120	801
Soundarya Textiles v. ACIT (2014) 362 ITR 488 (Ker.)(HC)	2405	921
Source Hub India (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2013) 27 ITR 470 / (2014) 61 SOT 111 (Bang.)(Trib.)	37	14
South India Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 95 DTR 446 / (2014) 360 ITR 39 / 266 CTR 105(Ker.)(HC)	2297	875
South Indian Bank Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 111 / 226 Taxman 130 (Mag.) / 105 DTR 299 (Ker.)(HC)	347 407 889 604 2152	136 163 316 221 814
Spank Hotels Limited; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 171 (Mag.)(Delhi) (HC)	831	292
Spaze Tower Pvt. Ltd. ; DCIT v. * (Delhi) (Trib.) : www.itatonline.org	1570	575
Spectrum Consultants India (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 100 DTR 129 / 266 CTR 241 / 227 Taxmann 164 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	905	320
Speedways Tyre Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 401 / 271 CTR 614 / 226 Taxman 172 (P&H)(HC)	862	304
Spencers & Co. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2013) 359 ITR 644 / (2014) 266 CTR 564 / 100 DTR 314 (Mad.)(HC)	70	30
Spice Telecommunications P. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 72/224 Taxmann 180 (Karn.)(HC)	1994	750
Spicer India Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 146 ITD 272 / (2013) 38 taxmann.com 317(Pune)(Trib.)	871 1529	308 559
Spunpipe and Construction Co. v. ACIT (2014) 362 ITR 559 / 224 Taxmann 25 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1729	635

Case Laws Index

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Sree Kanya Pathsala Trust v. UOI (2014) 360 ITR 60 / 101 DTR 361 / 267 CTR 283 (Guwahati)(HC)	210	88
Sreevatsa Real Estates (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 105 (Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)	1303	461
Sri ASL Finvest Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 150 ITD 82 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	943	335
Sri Basaveshwara Credit Co-op. Society Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 785 / (2015) 168 TTJ 668 (Bang.)(Trib.)	2377	906
Sri Biluru Gurubasava Pattina Sahakari Sangha Niyamitha Bagalkot; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 86 / 230 Taxman 557 (Karn.)(HC)	2337	892
Sri D. S. Srinivasan Rao & Brothers; CIT v. * (2014)222 Taxmann 80 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	1955	730
Sri Jain Educational Social Cultural Welfare Charitable Trust; DIT(E) v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 24 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	1171	419
Sri Kamakshi Food Products P. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 184/52 taxmann.com 57 (T&AP)(HC)	2425	930
Sri Krishna Drugs Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 365 / 52 taxmnn.com 442 (T&AP)(HC)	1194	426
Sri Krishna Educational & Social Trust v. ITO (2013) 351 ITR 178 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 16 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	1073	385
Sri Lakshmi Narasimha Distilleries (P) Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 573 / 225 Taxmann 343 (Karn.)(HC)	1915	714
Sri Lakshmi Narasimha Distilleries P. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 573 / 225 Taxmann 343 (Karn.)(HC)	1922	717
Sri Ram Kishan Gupta; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 387 / 100 DTR 1 (All.) (HC)	881	312
Sri Saytasai Properties and Investment P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 641 / 106 DTR 420 / 270 CTR 210 (Cal.)(HC)	775 1024	272 367
Srinivasa Builders; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 69/(2015) 231 Taxmann 906 / 122 DTR 302 (Karn.) (HC)	1878	698
Srinivasa Ferro Alloys Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 368 ITR 424 / 231 Taxmann 60 / 272 CTR 192 (T&AP)(HC)	1152 1901	412 708
Sriram Indubai; CIT v. * (2015) 370 ITR 579 (Mad.)(HC)	998	358
Sriram Refregeration Industries v. ITO (2014) 361 ITR 119 / 226 Taxmann 180 (AP)(HC)	192 2045	82 771
Srivastava, O. P.; CIT v. * (2013) 212 Taxmann 505 / (2014) 265 CTR 505 (Delhi)(HC)	1023	367
Srivastava, O.P. ; CIT v. * (2014) 265 CTR 481 (All.)(HC)	1023	366

Name	Case No.	Page No.
SRO, Meppayur-Kozhikode v. DIT (2014) 64 SOT 10 (URO) / (2013) 26 ITR 341 (Cochin)(Trib.)	2517	964
St. Jude Medical India Pvt. Ltd.; DCIT v. * (2015) 152 ITD 572 (Hyd.) (Trib.)	1435	522
St. Kabir Educational Society v. CBDT (2014) 366 ITR 378 (P&H)(HC)	220	91
St. Mary's Malankara Seminary; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxman 124 (Mag) (Ker.)(HC)	291	116
Standard Pesticides (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 282 (Ahd.)(Trib.)	2512	962
Stanley Industries v. ACIT (2013) 156 TTJ 25(UO) / (2014) 61 SOT 7(URO) (Chandigarh) (Trib.)	1886	701
Starwood Asia Pacific Hotel and Resorts (P) Ltd. v. Addl.CIT (2014) 146 ITD 790 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1633	600
State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. CIT (2015) 115 DTR 184 (Raj.)(HC)	2542	976
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 70 / 265 CTR 471 / 225 Taxman 6 (Mag.) (Raj.)(HC)	902	319
State Bank of Hyderabad; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 128 / (2015) 232 Taxmann 358 / 115 DTR 181 ((T&AP)(HC)	2544	977
State Bank of India v. DCIT (2015) 370 ITR 438 / 113 DTR 417 (Bom.)(HC)	2286 2283	870 868
State Bank of India; Dy. CIT v.* (2014) 164 TTJ 1/35 ITR 410 / 49 taxmann.com 293 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1987	746
State Bank of Patiala; ITO v. * (2014) 146 ITD 497 (Chand.) (Trib.)	1988	746
State Innovations in Family Planning Services Project Agency v. UOI (2014) 365 ITR 359 / 226 Taxman 164 (All.)(HC)	212	89
State of Himachal Pradesh v. CCIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 197 (Mag.)(HP) (HC)	2135	807
State of U. P. v. S. K. Garg (2014) 89 CCH 115 (All.)(HC), www.itatonline.org	2586	998
Steria (India) Ltd. In re (2014) 364 ITR 381 / 268 CTR 399 / 225 Taxman 90 (AAR)	183	78
Stock Exchange of Bombay v. V. S. Kandalgaonkar & Ors. (2014) / 368 ITR 296 / 271 CTR 192/109 DTR 225 / 187 Com cas 143(2015) 230 Taxmann 365 (SC)	2128	804
Stock Home India Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 250/(2015) 275 CTR 229 (P&H) (HC)	2415	927
Subhas Brothers Jewellers (P) Ltd. ; ITO v. * (2014) 33 ITR 66 / (2015) 67 SOT 50 (URO)(Kol.)(Trib.)	1137	406

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Subhash Chander ; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 225 (P&H)(HC)	1031	370
Subhash Kabini Power Corpn. Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2015) 152 ITD 150 (Bang.) (Trib.)	1260	446
Subodhchandra and Co. v. CIT (2014) 362 ITR 387 / 224 Taxmann 59 / (2015) 120 DTR 248 (Guj.)(HC)	1112	398
Subrata Roy; CIT v. * (2014) 265 CTR 481 (All.)(HC)	1022	366
Sudha Singh (Dr.)(Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 97 DTR 289 (All) (HC)	1648 1956	605 730
Sudhir Menon HUF v. ACIT (2014) 148 ITD 260 / 103 DTR 145 / 162 TTJ 425 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1021	366
Sujata Grover v. CIT (2014) 223 Taxmann 44(Mag.) (P&H)(HC)	1780	655
Sukhini P. Modi ; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 682/52 taxmann.com 50 (Guj.) (HC)	1754	646
Sulzer India Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 717 / (2015) 273 CTR 400 / 229 Taxman 264 / 113 DTR 267 (Bom.) (HC)	861	303
Sumeet Taneja v. CIT (2013) 261 CTR 494 / (2014) 220 taxman 368 (P&H) (HC)	443	175
Sumermal Jain v. DCIT (2014) 360 ITR 553 / 225 Taxmann 282 / 108 DTR 150 / 270 CTR 625 (Cal.)(HC)	1565	573
Sumi Motherson Innovative Engineering Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 57 (URO) / 30 ITR 367 / 150 ITD 195 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1375	491
Sumit Aggarwal v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 265 / 163 TTJ 509 (Chd.)(Trib.)	400	161
Sumit Devendra Rajani v. ACIT (2014)369 ITR 673 / 108 DTR 51 / 271 CTR 89 / 227 Taxmann 204 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	2087	789
Sumitra Devi (Smt.); CIT v. * (2014) 102 DTR 342 / 229 Taxmann 67 (Raj.)(HC)	1060	381
Sun Microsystems India. (P) Ltd.; DIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 63 / 227 Taxman 117 (Mag.)(Karn) (HC)	171	71
Sun Pharmaceuticals Ltd. ; DCIT v. * (2015) 122 DTR 223 (Guj.)(HC)	1197	427
Sun Polytron Industries Ltd. v. CIT (2015) 228 Taxmann 41(Mag.)(Bom.) (HC)	2313	881
Sunbeam Academy Educational Society v. CCIT (2014) 365 ITR 378 / 225 Taxman 15 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	205	87
Sunbeam English School; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 325 / 100 DTR 123 / 217 Taxman 331 (All.)(HC)	206	87
Sunil Kumar Agarwal v. CIT (2015) 372 IT 83 / (2014) 225 Taxmann 211 / 272 CTR 332 (Cal.)(HC)	979	350

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Sunil Kumar Gupta; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 14 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	932	331
Sunil Kumar Jain; ACIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 370 / 266 CTR 354 / 42 taxmann.com 376 (Chhattisgarh)(HC)	1755	646
Sunilbhai S. Kakad; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 427 (2015) 228 Taxmann 97 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1276	451
Sunisha Impex (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 220 / 270 CTR 63 / 221 taxman 454 (Bom.)(HC)	1556	569
Sunland Metal Recycling; ACIT v. * (Mum.) (Trib.) www.itatonline.org	2464	944
Sunny Jacob Jewellers and Wedding Centre v. DCIT (2014) 362 ITR 664/102 DTR 68/ 267 CTR 361/48 taxmann.com 347 (Ker.)(HC)	1859	690
Sunrise Tooling System P. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 206 / 225 Taxmann 124 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	692	248
Super Auto Forge Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 365 ITR 318 / 105 DTR 322 (Mad.)(HC)	250	102
Supreet Chemicals (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 104 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1207 1211	431 432
Supreme Industries Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 758 / (2015) 229 taxmann 387 (Bom.)(HC)	2290	872
Supriya Kanwar (Smt.) v. ITO (2014) 104 DTR 166 / 163 TTJ 1 / 149 ITD 1 (TM)(Jodh.)(Trib.)	9	4
Suraj Dev Dada; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 78 / 224 Taxman 189 (Mag.) (P&H)(HC)	18 540	8 204
Suraj outsource (Puto) was withdrawn (2015) 144 ISD	956	339
Suram Holding (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 327 (Raj.)(HC)	33	12
Surat Vankar Sahakari Sangh Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 162 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1328	472
Suresh Nanda v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 121 (URO) / 31 ITR 620 / 165 TTJ 804 (Delhi)(Trib.)	116	46
Suresh Narain Bhatnagar v. ITO (2014) 367 ITR 254 / 227 Taxmann 193 (Mag.) (Guj.) (HC)	1969	739
Sureshchandra Durgaprasad Khatod (HUF) ; CIT v. * (2014) / (2013) 214 Taxmann 59 / 253 CTR 492 / 363 ITR 556 (Guj.)(HC)	2315	882
Surinder Madan v. ACIT (2013) 218 Taxmann 461/ 94 DTR 185 / (2014) 364 ITR 461 / 268 CTR 59 (Delhi)(HC)	447	176
Suvarna Rahul Musale v. Rahul Prabhakar Musale (Bom.)(HC);www.itatonline.org	2588	1000
Swan Mills; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 10 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	666	240

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Swar Sangam v. CCIT (2014) 368 ITR 395 / (2015) 230 Taxman 274 (Cal.) (HC)	221	92
Swarna Tollway (P) Ltd. ; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 150 ITD 26 / 30 ITR 171 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	509	195
Swarovski India P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 601 / 226 Taxmann 162(Mag.) (Delhi.)(HC)	1683	616
Swastik Roadlines (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 61 SOT 74 (URO)(Agra)(Trib.)	1665	610
Syscom Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 98 DTR 45 (Mum)(Trib.)	1468 1469 1470 1471	536 536 537 537
T		
T. Gayathri (Smt.) v. ITO (2014) 150 ITD 48 / 166 TTJ 740 (Bang.)(Trib.)	58	23
T. S. Kishan & Co. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxman 250 (Mag.) / 114 DTR 422 / (2015) 370 ITR 163 (Delhi)(HC)	1043	375
T. Senthila Kumar v. ITO (2014) 369 ITR 101 (Mad.)(HC)	2534	971
Talati & Panthaky Associated (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 102 DTR 259 / 362 ITR 362 / 227 Taxmann 257 (Mag.) / 268 CTR 94 (Bom.)(HC)	1714	627
Tamil Nadu Cricket Association v. DIT (2014) 360 ITR 633 / 221 Taxman 275 / 265 CTR 277 / 98 DTR 299 (Mad.)(HC)	294	118
Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 545/ (2015) 231 Taxmann 368/120 DTR 410 (Mad.)(HC)	2541	976
Tamil Nadu Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 533 / 227 Taxmann 179 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	404	162
Tamilnadu Warehousing Corporation v. ITO (OSD) (2014) 363 ITR 1 / (2015) 228 Taxman 331 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	225	93
Tandon and Mahendra; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 454 / 224 Taxmann 153/ (2015) 276 CTR 50 (All)(HC)	2012	756
Tao Publishing (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 370 ITR 135 / 228 Taxmann 371 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	1681	616
Tarnetar Corporation; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 174 / 210 Taxmann 206 (Mag)(Guj.)(HC)	1308	463
Tata Chemicals Ltd.; UOI v. * (2014) 363 TTR 658 / 267 CTR 89 / 101 DTR 193 / 222 Taxmann 225 (Mag.) (SC)	2181	823
Tata Chemicals Ltd.; UOI v. * (2014) 363 ITR 658 / (2014) 267 CTR 89 / 101 DTR 193 / 222 Taxmann 225 (Mag.) (SC)	2572	987
Tata Communication Limited v. DCIT (Mum.)(Trib.), www.itatonline.org	2390	914

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Tata Metaliks Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 643 /(2015) 231 Taxmann 655 / 121 DTR 235 (Cal.)(HC)	1597	585
Tata Power Co. ; CIT v. * (Bom.)(HC)(Unreported) www.bombayhighcourt.nic.in	73	32
Tata Power Solar Systems Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2014) 98 DTR 250 / 30 ITR 1 / 62 SOT 93 / 159 TTJ 713 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1472 1473 1474	537 537 537
Tata Teleservice (Maharashtra) Ltd. v. Ministry of Finance (2014) 43 taxmann.com 410/44 GST 548/307 ELT 90(Bom.) (HC)	2579	990
Tata Teleservices (Mah.) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 5 (Bom.)(HC)	2360	901
Tax Lawyers Association v. State of U.P. (2014) 49 taxmann.com 307 / 48 GST 92 (All.)(HC)	2583	993
TCI Industries Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 425 / 51 taxmann.com 500 (T& AP)(HC)	1883	700
Tecnimont ICB Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 30 ITR 199 /(2014) 146 ITD 219 (Mum) (Trib.)	1486 1487 2278	543 543 866
Tecumseh Products India P Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 429 / 47 taxmann.com 121 (AP)(HC)	1710	626
TEI Technologies Pvt. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2012) 78 DTR 225 / (2013) 259 CTR 186 / (2014) 361 ITR 36 (Delhi)(HC)	232	95
Tejram Omprakash (HUF) v. DIT (2013) 262 CTR 82 /(2014) 220 Taxmann 85 (Mag.) (MP)(HC)	1564	573
Tektronics Engineering Development (India) (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 221 Taxman 134 (Karn.)(HC)	393 395	156 157
Teletronics Dealing Systems P. Ltd. ; CIT v.* (2015) 228 Taxman 194 (Bom.)(HC)	343 1645	135 604
Television Eighteen India Ltd. (No.1); CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 597 / 109 DTR 223 (Delhi)(HC)	623	226
Television Eighteen India Ltd. (No.2); CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 605 / 224 Taxman 130 / 109 DTR 254 (Delhi)(HC)	623 624	226 227
Tellabs India (P) Ltd v. ACIT (2014) 150 ITD 97 / 159 TTJ 215 / 61 SOT 200 (Bang.)(Trib.)	1441	524
Tellicherry Minority Welfare Trust v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 472 / 105 DTR 147 (Ker.)(HC)	293	117
Tesco International Sourcing Ltd. v. DDIT(IT) (2014) 98 DTR 33 / 62 SOT 41 / 159 TTJ 569 (Bang.)(Trib.)	150	61

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Tetra Pak India (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 175 / 164 TTJ 356 (Pune)(Trib.)	1532	561
Thakur Dwara Shri Krishnaji Maharaj Handiyaya, Barnala v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 381 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 1 (P&H)(HC)	1011	362
Thankamma Oommen (Smt.) v. ACIT (2014) 366 ITR 542 / 103 DTR 348 (Ker.)(HC)	19	8
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd. v. ADIT (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1526	559
The Chamber of Tax Consultants v. UOI(2014) 271 CTR 155/109 DTR 219 / 227 Taxmann 143 (Mag)(Bom.)(HC)	1581	579
The Drs. X-Ray & Pathology Institute Pvt. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2013) 358 ITR 27 / (2014) 268 CTR 85/ 220 Taxmann 88 (Mag)(All)(HC)	1942	725
The Solapur District Central Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 335 (Pune)(Trib.)	98	40
The Upper India Chamber of Commerce; ACIT v. * (Luck.) (Trib.); www.itatonline.org	985	351
Thermax Babcock & Wilcox Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 88 CCH 149 (Bom.)(HC), www.itatonline.org	2333	890
Think Soft Global Services (P) Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 34 ITR 633 / (2015) 152 ITD 246 (Chennai)(Trib.)	237	96
Thomas George Muthoot v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 525 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 502 (Ker.)(HC)	2281	867
Three Star Granites (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 98 DTR 9 / 266 CTR 326 / 227 Taxmann 82 (Mag.) (Ker.)(HC)	2023	760
ThyssenKrupp Elevator (India) (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 66 SOT 103 (URO) / (2015)167 TTJ 131 (Delhi)(Trib.)	496	192
Tikaula Sugar Mills Ltd. v. (2014) 223 Taxmann 117 (Mag.) (All) (HC)	1591 1781	583 655
Tilak Raj Kumar; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 180 (2015) 230 Taxmann 640 (T&AP)(HC)	1040	373
Tilak Raj Sharma v. Dy. CIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 123(Mag.)(All.)(HC)	1562	572
Tilda Riceland Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 101 DTR 89/ 161 TTJ 213/64 SOT 61 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1481	540
Time Ads & Publicity v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 356 (Ker.)(HC)	790 2566	277 986
Times Guaranty Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 41 CCH 147 (Mum.)(Trib.). www.itatonline.org	2487	952

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Tip Top Typography; CIT v. * (2014)368 ITR 330 / 107 DTR 282 / 270 CTR 262 / (2015) 228 taxmann 244 (Bom.)(HC)	398	160
TNS India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 163 TTJ 576/ 32 ITR 44/(2015) 152 ITD 123 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1239 1425 2485	439 516 952
TNS India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 32 ITR 44/ 164 TTJ 576 (2015) 152 ITD 123 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1366	488
Toll global forwarding India Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 152 ITD 283/ 37 ITR 391 / 167 TTJ 67 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1394	501
Torrent Power Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 363 TTR 474 / 222 Taxman 367 / 272 CTR 270 / 108 DTR 418 (Guj.)(HC)	355	139
Torrent Power SEC Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 78(Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)	1820	672
Torrent Power Sec. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 276/(2015) 55 taxmann. com 90 (Guj.)(HC)	1757	646
Toscana Lasts Limited v. ITO (2014) 164 TTJ 145 / (2015) 67 SOT 267 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)	2499	958
Toyota Kirloskar Auto Parts (P) Ltd v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 148 (Bang.) (Trib.)	1361	486
Tractor & Farm Equipment Ltd., ACIT v. * (2014) 61 SOT 190 / 28 ITR 26 (Chennai)(Trib.)	178	76
Trade Circle Enterprises LLC, In re (2014) 361 ITR 673/ 266 CTR 65/ 222 Taxmann 52 98 DTR 44 (AAR)	2203 2204	832 832
Transport Corporation of India; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 728 / 272 CTR 97 / 110 DTR 44 (2015) 229 Taxmann 624 (T&AP)(HC)	594	218
Transwind Infrastructure P. Ltd. v. ITO (2013) 215 Taxmann 111 (Mag.) / (2014) 362 ITR 67 (Guj.)(HC)	1731	635
Travancore Education Society v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 534 (Ker.)(HC)	301	120
Trilogy E-Business Software India v. DCIT(2013) 140 ITD 540 / 23 ITR 464 (Bang.)(Trib.)	1428	518
Trilok Chand Girdharilal and Party v. ITO (2014) 369 ITR 751/226 Taxmann 30 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)	1636	602
Trimline Vyapaar P. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 224 Taxmann 324 / (2015) 370 ITR 373 / 274 CTR 156 / 114 DTR 171 (Cal.)(HC)	2222	839
Tripal Singh v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 511 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 54 (SC)	1620	595
Trishul Hi-Tech Industries v. DCIT (Kol.) (Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1869	693
Triveni Engineering & Industries Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 660 (All.) (HC)	2460	942

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Truetzschler India (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. SCIT (2014) 146 ITD 679 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1632	600
Trustees of H. E. H. Nizam' wedding Gifts Trust and others v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 147 / 52 taxmann.com 59 (T&AP)(HC)	2563	985
Trustees of H. E. H. the Nizam's Jewellery Trust ; CWT v. * (2014) 361 ITR 668/225 Taxmann 118 (AP)(HC)	2556 2565	982 986
Trustees of HEH the Nizam's Mukarramjah Trust for Education & Learnings; CIT v. * (2013) 359 ITR 419 / (2014) 222 Taxman 256 (AP)(HC)	335	133
Trustees of Prince Moazam Trust, Trustees of H. E. H. the Nizams Trust ; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 416 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 323 (AP)(HC)	2564	985
TTG Industries Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 44 (Mad.)(HC)	462 2287	182 870
Tudor Knitting Works P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 360 ITR 453/225 Taxmann 31/108 DTR 180 / (2015) 275 CTR 415 (P&H)(HC)	1289	456
Tudor Knitting Works P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 236 / 270 CTR 327 / 223 Taxmann 131(Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	2422	929
Tulsiani Constructions & Developers Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014)222 Taxmann 133 (Mag.)(All)(HC)	1589	583
TVS Finance and Services Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 487 / 226 Taxmann 134 (Mad.)(HC)	453	179
TVS Motors Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 1 / 223 Taxmann 197 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	446 469 525 890 1214	176 183 199 316 432
Twilight Jewellery (P.) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 296 / 147 ITD 89 / 106 DTR 367 / 164 TTJ 814 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1456	532
Twin Cities Steel Re-Rolling Mills P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 190 (AP)(HC)	2548	978
U		
U. P. Chalchitra Nigam Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 223 Taxman 139 / (2015) 370 ITR 379 / 274 CTR 130 (All.)(HC)	103	42
U. P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 13 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	2366	903
U. P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. ITAT (2014) 220 Taxmann 109 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	659 885	238 314
U. P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 142 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	2232	845

Name	Case No.	Page No.
U.P. Co-operative Federation Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 179 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	1641	603
U.P. Housing & Development Board; CIT v. * (2014) 98 DTR 183 / 265 CTR 433 (All.)(HC)	318	126
U.P. State Industrial Development Corp.(UPSIDC) v. DCIT (Lucknow)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org	1605	589
UCO Bank v. CIT (2014) 360 ITR 567 / 225 Taxmann 136 (Cal.)(HC)	2546	977
UCO Bank v. UOI (2014) 369 ITR 335/272 CTR 339/112 DTR 242 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 141 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	1985	746
Udham Singh & Sons ; CIT v. * (2104) 365 ITR 137 / 98 DTR 273 / 222 Taxmann 155 (Mag.)/ 266 CTR 218 (P&H)(HC)	1087	390
Ultra Modern Exports (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 165 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	1071	385
Umakant B. Agarwal v. Dy. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 220 / 224 Taxmann 264 / 108 DTR 428 (Bom.)(HC)	598	219
Umang Agarwal; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 164 / 226 Taxmann 95 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	1904	709
Umesh Chandra Gupta; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 1 (Delhi)(HC)	1946	726
Unique Art Age v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 547 (2015) 152 ITD 600 (Jaipur) (Trib.)	1578	578
Unique Artagev. UOI (2014) 360 ITR 467 / 102 DTR 350 / 267 CTR 456 / 226 Taxmann 55 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)	2141 2260	810 857
United Paper Industries; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 158 (Bom)(HC)	1001	359
UP Forest Corporation; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 15 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)	1019	365
UP State Agro Industrial Corp. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 119 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	549	206
Upasana Finance Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 6 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	477	187
Upper India Steel Mfg. & Engg. Co. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 173 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)	599 600	219 220
Urban Mass Transit Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 442 (Delhi)(HC)	640	232
US Technology Resources(P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 61 SOT 19 / 28 ITR 26 (Cochin)(Trib.)	181	77
Usha Agrawal (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 526 /(2015) 121 DTR 227 (All.)(HC)	1764	649
Usha Chandresh Shah v. ITO (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org	1124	402
Usha Kiran Movies Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 165 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 62 (Mag) (AP)(HC)	2348	896

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms P. Ltd. ; DCIT v. * (2014) 29 ITR 279 / 55 taxmann.com 332 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1844	682
UT Star Com.Inc. CIT v. * (2104) 98 DTR 107 (P&H)(HC)	904	320
UTI Bank Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 154 / 51 taxmann.com 544 (Guj.) (HC)	2342	894
Uttam Modern Rice & Oil Mill v. UOI (2013) 357 ITR 692/(2014) 269 CTR 103 (All.)(HC)	2397	917
Uttar Pradesh Carbon and Chemicals Ltd. v. TRO (2014) 368 ITR 384/ (2015) 230 Taxmann 639 / 119 DTR 158 / 278 CTR 82 (All.)(HC)	2145	812
Uttaranchal Welfare Society; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 398 / 222 Taxman 34 (Mag.) All.)(HC)	269	109
V		
V. G. P. Housing (P) Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 565 (Mad.)(HC)	542 454	204 179
V. H. Yahiya v. Dy. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 194/(2015) 231 Taxmann 43 (Ker.) (HC)	1907	711
V. K. Bhatnagar; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 37 / 47 taxmann.com 366 (Delhi) (HC)	1909	712
V. M. Salgaonkar & Brothers (P) Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxmann 27 / 272 CTR 25 / 109 DTR 142 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)	474 1219	186 434
V. N. Parameswaran v. ITO(2013) 356 ITR 348 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 85 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)	1535	562
V. P. Singh ; CIT v. * (2013) 357 ITR 681 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 87 (Mag.) (P&H)(HC)	1896	706
V. R. Karpagam (Smt) ; CIT v. * (2014) 109 DTR 504 / 272 CTR 184 / 226 Taxmann 197 (2015) 373 ITR 127 (Mad.) (Ttc)	1004	360
V. R. Rathish; ITO v. * (2014) 65 SOT 79(URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)	2491	954
V. Rajkumar v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 21 / 272 CTR 178 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 242 (Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)	406	163
V.G.P. Housing (P) Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 565 (Mad.)(HC)	595 596	219 219
V.P. Singh; CIT v. * (2013) 357 ITR 681 / (2014)220 Taxmann 87 (Mag.) (P&H)(HC)	1897	706
VA Tech Escher Wyss Flovel (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 67 SOT 61 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)	1352	482
Vacment India; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 304 / (2015) 116 DTR 62 / 230 Taxmann 18/ 275 CTR 413(All.) (HC)	1519	557

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Vacmet Packaging (India) P. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 217 /224 Taxmann 217 (Mag.)(All)(HC)	1038	372
Vaishali Avenue; CIT v. * (2014) 268 CTR 207 / 226 Taxmann 78 (Mag) /103 DTR 13 (Raj)(HC)	1739	639
Valentine Maritime (Gulf) LLC; Addl. DIT v. * (2014) 159 TTJ 706 / 66 SOT 6 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2162 916	816 325
Valiant Glass Works Pvt. Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 110 DTR 281 (Bom.)(HC)	1218	434
Valibhai Khanbhai Mankad ; CIT v. * (2013) 216 Taxman 18 / 261 CTR 538 (Guj.)(HC)	785	275
Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxman 129 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	416 655	167 237
Vallabh Yarns (P) Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 221 Taxmann 146 (P&H)(HC)	1285	455
Vanitha Manickavasagam (Mrs) v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 558 / 114 DTR 241 / (2015) 53 taxmann.com 62 (Mad.)(HC)	12	6
Vapi Product Industries; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 62 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)	1212	432
Varanasi Catholic Education Society ; CIT v. * (2014) 225 Taxman 81 (All.)(HC)	305 310	122 124
Vardhman Industries.; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 625 / 224 Taxmann 68 (Mag.) / 264 CTR 580 (Raj.)(HC)	1742	640
Varian India Pvt. Ltd v. Addl. DIT (2015) 67 SOT 17 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)	1434	522
Varinder Rawlley; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 232 / 51 taxmann.com 524 (P&H)(HC)	1034	371
Varroc Engineering Pvt Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 168 TTJ 514 / 54 taxmann.com 384 (Pune)(Trib.)	1386	496
Varun Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 308 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1530	560
Vasco Sales and Marketing Corporation v. DCIT (2013) 216 Taxmann 250 / (2014) 360 ITR 578 / (Ker.)(HC)	2174	820
Vasudev Construction ; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 247/ 44 taxmann.com 30 (Karn.)(HC)	1916	715
Vatika Township; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 466 / 271 CTR 1 / 109 DTR 33 / 227 Taxmann 121 (FB)(SC)	1503 2569	552 987
Vector Shipping Service (P) Ltd.; CIT v. * (SC); www.itatonline.org	783	275
Veena (Miss) v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 242 (P&H)(HC)	1100	394
Veena Developers; ACIT v. * (Mum.)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org.	2237	847
Velentine Developers; ITO v. * (2014) 31 ITR 452 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1319	469
Velti India (P) Ltd.; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 105 DTR 213 / 163 TTJ 691 / (2015) 153 ITD 244 (Chennai)(Trib.)	115 782	46 274

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Venkatesh V. Kabade; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxman 116 (Karn.)(HC)	841	295
Venture Metal Products P. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 362 ITR 122 / (2014) 101 DTR 403 / 222 Taxmann 209 / 267 CTR 342 (Mad.)(HC)	2228	841
Venus Arts and Gems v. ITO (2014) 369 ITR 161/(2015) 274 CTR 177/ 58 taxmann.com 19 (Raj.) (HC)	1635	601
Verizon Communications Singapore Pte Ltd. v. ITO (IT) (2013) 263 CTR 497 / 96 DTR 57 / (2014) 361 ITR 575 (Mad.)(HC)	161	66
Vidya Investment and Trading Co. P. Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 367 ITR 33 / 223 Taxman 199 /(2015) 277 CTR 18 (Karn.)(HC)	188	80
Vidyananda Educational Society ; Dy. DIT v.* (2014) 64 SOT 176 (URO) (Hyd.)(Trib.)	280 341 508	112 134 194
Vihangam Yoga Prachar and Social Welfare Trust ; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 16 (All.)(HC)	1175	420
Vijay Bank v. ITO (2014) BCAJ-July-P32(Delhi)(Trib.)	2070	781
Vijay Electricals limited v. ACIT (2015) 54 taxmann.com 19 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	1426	517
Vijay Kumar Sarda v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 553 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2229	842
Vijay Sales; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 33 ITR 546 / (2015) 67 SOT 99 (Mum.)(Trib.)	108 724	43 256
Vijay Shree Ltd. ; CIT v. * (Cal.)(HC), www.itatonline.org	906	321
Vijay Solvex Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367ITR 382 / 266 CTR 113 / 223 Taxmann 192 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)	1180	421
Vijay Television (P.) Ltd. v. DRP (2014) 369 ITR 113 / 270 CTR 505 / 225 Taxmann 35 / 107 DTR 96 (Mad.)(HC)	1626 1628	597 598
Vijay v. Meghani v. DCIT (2014) 109 DTR 57 / 165 TTJ 289 / 35 ITR 320 (2015) 153 ITD 687 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2240	849
Vijay Vargiya Vani Charitable Trust; CIT v. * (2014) 369 ITR 360 / 271 CTR 698 / 110 DTR 207 / (2015) 232 Taxman 340 (Raj.)(HC)	303	121
Vijay Veer Singh v. ITO(2015) 153 ITD 506 (Agra)(Trib.)	1625	597
Vijaya Bank v. JCIT (2014) 367 ITR 441 (T & AP)(HC)	2146	812
Vijayanand Road lines Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 125 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	1105	396
Vijaykumar D. Gupta ; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 353 / 227 Taxmann 21 (Guj.)(HC)	1145	408
Vijaywada Bottling Co. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2013) 356 ITR 625 / (2014) 266 CTR 307 / 220 Taxmann 51(Mag.) (AP)(HC)	2309	880

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Vikas Sharma ; Dy. CIT v. * (2014) 34 ITR 617 / 165 TTJ 1(UO) / (2015) 152 ITD 181 (Chd.)(Trib.)	1999	752
Vimal Chand Jain ; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 290/52 taxmann.com 156 (T & AP) (HC)	1911	713
Vinay A. Joneja; ACIT v. * (2014) 163 TTJ 652/(2015) 153 ITD 109 (Pune) (Trib.)	2486	952
Vinay P. Karve; ITO v. * (2015) 152 ITD 58 / 118 DTR 227 / 170 TTJ 238 (Mum.)(Trib.)	89 130	35 53
Vinay V. Kulkarni; Addl. CIT v. * (2014) 64 SOT 131 (Pune)(Trib.)	109	44
Vinay Vasudeo Kulkarni; ACIT v. * (2014) BCAJ–June P 26 (Pune)(Trib.)	1671	612
Vinayak Plasto Chem P. Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 363 ITR 596 / 221 Taxmann 439 / 264 CTR 313 (Raj.)(HC)	1103 1931	395 720
Vinayak Traders & Transporters (P.) Ltd. ; CIT v.* (2014) 222 Taxmann 19 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	612	224
Vineeta Gupta ; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 440 / 270 CTR 122 / 225 Taxmann 180 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	2200	831
Vinod Bhargava v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 122 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 302 (T&AP)(HC)	2426	930
Vinod Dhudalal Shah v. ACIT (2014) 362 ITR 345/229 Taxmann 23 (Guj.) (HC)	1711	627
Vinod Kumar ; CIT v. * (2014) 222 Taxmann 68 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)	1943	725
Vinod Kumar Gupta; CIT v. * (2013) 351 ITR 253 / (2014) 222 Taxmann 87 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	1934	721
Vipan Kumar Sudesh Kumar, HUF v. ITO (2014) 225 Taxmann 200 (Mag.) (P&H)(HC)	2178	821
Vir Vikram Vaid; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 365 / 111 DTR 196 / (2015) 230 Taxman 212 (Bom.)(HC)	25	10
Virola International; DCIT v. * (2014) 162 TTJ 112 / 147 ITD 519(Agra) (Trib.)	2066	780
Virtusa (India) (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 278 (Hyd.)(Trib.)	238	97
Visakhapatnam Stevedores Association v. UOI(2014) 369 ITR 371/ 230 Taxmann 172 (T&AP) (HC)	1531	561
Vishal Kumar v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 203 / (2015) 121 DTR 345 (Delhi)(HC)	1549	567
Vishinda Diamonds; ITO v. * (2014) 146 ITD 745 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2034	765
Vishwa Jagriti Mission; DIT v. * (2012) 73 DTR 195 / (2013) 262 CTR 558 / (2014) 227 Taxman 144 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)	264	107

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Visvesvaraya technological University v. ACIT (2014) 362 ITR 279 / 100 DTR 89 / 224 Taxman 89 / 267 CTR 40 (Karn.)(HC)	211	89
Vivel Exports P. Ltd v. ITO (2014) The Chamber's Journal-April-P. 82 (Mum.)(Trib.)	818	287
Vodafone Cellular Ltd v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 137 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)	2068	781
Vodafone India Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 97 DTR 441/ 221 Taxmann 88 / 265 CTR 42 (Bom.)(HC)	1612	591
Vodafone India Service Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI(2014) 368 ITR 1 / 271 CTR 56 (2015) 228 Taxmann 25 (Bom.)(HC)	1347	481
Vodafone India Services (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 294 /30 ITR 218(Mum.)(Trib.)	2277	866
Vodafone India Services P. Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 369 ITR 511 / 272 CTR 17 (2015) / 231 Taxmann 645 (Bom.)(HC)	1344	478
Vodafone South Ltd. v. Dy.DIT (2014) 267 CTR 544 / 223 Taxmann 281 / 102 DTR 145 (Karn.) (HC)	2250 2125	854 803
Vodafone South Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 363 ITR 388 / 225 Taxmann 46 (Mag.) / 112 DTR 227 (Delhi)(HC)	1766	650
Vrajlal T. Gala (HUF) v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 742 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2496	957
W		
W. Refoil Earth (P.) Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 220 Taxmann 155 (Mag.)(Guj.) (HC)	1279	453
Wadhwa & Associates Realtors (P.) Ltd.; ITO v. * (2014) 146 ITD 694 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2027	762
Warner Hindustan Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 208 / 112 DTR 281 / (2015) 274 CTR 300/ 231 Taxmann 373 (AP)(HC)	470 625	184 227
Weizmann Homes Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 223 Taxmann 147 (Karn.)(HC)	575	213
WEP Peripherals Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 508 / 102 DTR 219 / 268 CTR 88 (Karn.)(HC)	484	188
WEP Peripherals Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 362 ITR 508 / 268 CTR 88/ 44 taxmann.com 273 (Karn.)(HC)	1288	456
Wheels India Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 368 ITR 554 (Mad.)(HC)	597	219
Whirlpool of India Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 30 ITR 29 / 162 TTJ 328 / 102 DTR 369 / (2015) 153 ITD 341 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1451	529
Williamson Tea (Assam) Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2013) 355 ITR 323 / 263 CTR 96 / (2014) 220 Taxman 102 (Mag.)(Gau.)(HC)	654 656	236 237
Wintac Ltd.; CIT v. * (2013) 95 DTR 289 (2014) 360 ITR 614 / 221 Taxman 87 (Karn.)(HC)	82 83	34 34

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Wintac Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 614 / 221 Taxmann 87 (Karn.)(HC)	938 954 1660	333 338 609
Wipro Ltd. (No. 2); CIT v. * (2013) 95 DTR 425 / (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxmann 181 (Karn.)(HC)	486	188
Wipro Ltd. (No.1) ; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 606/224 Taxmann 220(Mag) (Karn.)(HC)	1186	423
Wipro Ltd. (No.2) ; CIT v. * (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxman 181 (Karn.) (HC)	698 699 854 700 1187	249 249 299 250 423
Wipro Ltd. ; CIT v. * (2013) 95 DTR 425 / (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxman 181 (Karn.)(HC)	564 679 680 853 681 877	210 244 244 299 244 311
Witness Systems Software India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 61 SOT 64 (URO) (Bang.) (Trib.)	1436 241	522 99
Wizcraft International Entertainment Pvt. Ltd.; DIT v. * (2014) 364 ITR 227 / 223 Taxmann 250 / 104 DTR 68 / 269 CTR 108 (Bom.)(HC)	2048	774
WNS North America Inc; ADIT v. * (2014) 146 ITD 435 / 30 ITR 346 (Mum.)(Trib.).	152	61
Wooward Governor India Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 126 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)	657	237
Working Women's Forum; CIT v. * (2014) 365 ITR 353 (Mad.)(HC)	270	109
Worldwide Township Project Ltd.; CIT v. * (2014) 367 ITR 433/106 DTR 139 / 269 CTR 444/ (2015) 229 Taxmann 560 (Delhi)(HC)	2404	920
Wrigley India Ltd. v. ACIT (TP) (2015) 114 DTR 1 / 167 TTJ 561 / 67 SOT 205 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)	1497	548
X		
Xander Advisors India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 36 ITR 499 / (2015) 153 ITD 528 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1393	499
Y		
Y. M. Singla; CIT v. * (2014) 366 ITR 242 / (2015) 228 Taxman 90 (Mag.) (P&H)(HC)	1033	371
Y. V. Chander v. UOI (2014) 364 ITR 190 (AP.)(HC)	2548	978

Name	Case No.	Page No.
Yahoo Software Development India P. Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 54 taxmann.com 362 (Bang.) (Trib.)	1387	496
Yamaha Motor India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 151 ITD 731 / (2015) 37 ITR 208 / 117 DTR 305 (Delhi)(Trib.)	1420	511
Yash Developers; ITO v.* (Mum.)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org	1321	470
Yash Pal Khanna v. CIT (2014) 223 Taxmann 19 (P&H)(HC)	2521	965
Yashoda Super Speciality Hospital; CIT (TDS) v. * (2014) 365 ITR 356 / 226 Taxmann 168 / 270 CTR 457(AP)(HC)	1975	741
Yogendrakumar Gupta v. ITO (2014) 366 ITR 186 / 46 taxmann.com 56 (Guj.)(HC)	1678 1685	615 617
Young Men Christian Association; DIT(E) v. * (2014) 227 Taxmann 31(Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)	2400	919
Z		
Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. v. ACWT (2014) 61 SOT 34 (URO)/ (2013) 40 taxmann.com 533 (Mum.)(Trib.)	2557	983
Zee News Ltd.; ACIT v. * (2014) 61 SOT 59 (Mum.)(Trib.)	825	289
Zigma Commodities P. Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 365 ITR 276 (Cal.)(HC)	2357	900
Zinser Textile Systems (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 30 ITR 675/ (2014) 146 ITD 222 (Mum.)(Trib.)	1488	544

Section wise Index

Income-tax Act, 1961

Arrangement of Section

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
	CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY		
2	Definitions	1–25	1-62
3	Previous Year	25	63
	CHAPTER II BASIS OF CHARGE		
4	Charge of income-tax	25–41	64–100
5	Scope of total income	41–46	101–115
6	Residence in India	46–47	116 -119
9	Income deemed to accrue or arise in India	48–79	120–187
	CHAPTER III INCOMES WHICH DO NOT FORM PART OF TOTAL INCOME		
10	Incomes not included in total income	80–93	188–227
10A	Special provision in respect of newly established undertakings in free trade zone, etc.	94–99	228–242
10B	Special provisions in respect of newly established hundred per cent export-oriented undertakings	99–105	243–258
11	Income from property held for charitable or religious purposes	105–114	259–286
12	Income of trusts or institutions from contributions	114–115	287
12A	Conditions for applicability of sections 11 and 12	115–119	288–298
12AA	Procedure for registration	119–130	299–332
13	Section 11 not to apply in certain cases	131–134	333–341

Section wise Index

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
	CHAPTER IV COMPUTATION OF TOTAL INCOME Heads of income		
14A	Expenditure incurred in relation to income not includible in total income	135–152	342–386
	A—Salaries		
15	Salaries	153	387–388
17	“Salary”, “perquisite” and “profits in lieu of salary” defined	154–155	389–390
	C—Income from house property		
22	Income from house property	155–157	391–395
23	Annual value how determined	157–160	396–398
24	Deductions from income from house property	160–161	399–400
27	“Owner of house property”, “annual charge”, etc., defined	161	401
	D—Profits and gains of business or profession		
28	Profits and gains of business or profession	161–175	402–444
31	Repairs and insurance of machinery, plant and furniture	176–177	445–448
32	Depreciation	177–197	449–520
32A	Investment allowance	198	521–523
32AB	Investment deposit account	199	524
35	Expenditure on scientific research	199–200	525–527
35ABB	Expenditure for obtaining licence to operate telecommunication services	200	528
35D	Amortisation of certain preliminary expenses	201–202	529–532
35DDA	Amortisation of expenditure incurred under voluntary retirement scheme	202	533
36	Other deductions	202–213	534–575
37	General–Business Expenditure	213–271	576–774
38	Building etc., partly used for business, etc, or not exclusively so used	272	775
40	Amounts not deductible	272–291	776–830

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
40A	Expenses or payments not deductible in certain circumstances	292–299	831–854
41	Profits chargeable to tax	299–309	855–873
42	Special provision for deductions in the case of business for prospecting, etc., for mineral oil	309	874
43	Definitions of certain terms relevant to income from profits and gains of business or profession	310–314	875–884
43A	Special provisions consequential to changes in rate of exchange of currency	314	885
43B	Certain deductions to be only on actual payment	315–321	886–908
43D	Special provision in case of income of public financial institutions, public companies etc.	321–322	909
44AD	Special provision for computing profits and gains of business of civil construction, etc.	322–323	910–912
44B	Special provision for computing profits and gains of shipping business in the case of non-residents	323–324	913–914
44BB	Special provision for computing profits and gains in connection with the business of exploration, etc., of mineral oils	324–325	915–916
44C	Deduction of head office expenditure in the case of nonresidents	325–326	917–918
	E—Capital gains		
45	Capital gains	326–341	919–960
47A	Withdrawal of exemption in certain cases	341–342	961
48	Mode of computation	342–344	962–966
49	Cost with reference to certain modes of acquisition	344–345	967–969
50	Special provision for computation of capital gains in case of depreciable assets	345–346	970 –972
50B	Special provision for computation of capital gains in case of slump sale	346–348	973–976
50C	Special provision for full value of consideration in certain cases	348–353	977–989
54	Profit on sale of property used for residence	353–357	990–996

Section wise Index

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
54B	Capital gain on transfer of land used for agricultural purposes not to be charged in certain cases	357	997
54EC	Capital gain not to be charged on investment in certain bonds	358–360	998–1003
54F	Capital gain on transfer of certain capital assets not to be charged in case of investment in residential house	360–361	1004–1009
54G	Exemption of capital gains on transfer of assets in cases of shifting of industrial undertaking from urban area	362	1010
55	Meaning of “adjusted”, “cost of improvement” and “cost of acquisition”	362–363	1011–1013
55A	Reference to Valuation Officer	363–364	1014–1017
	F—Income from other sources		
56	Income from other sources	364–366	1018–1021
57	Deductions	366–368	1022–1025
	CHAPTER V INCOME OF OTHER PERSONS, INCLUDED IN ASSEESSEE’S TOTAL INCOME		
64	Income of individual to include income of spouse, minor child, etc.	368	1026
	CHAPTER VI AGGREGATION OF INCOME AND SET OFF OR CARRY FORWARD OF LOSS Aggregation of income		
67A	Method of computing a member’s share in income of association of persons or body of individuals	368–369	1027
68	Cash credits	369–393	1028–1098
69	Unexplained investments	394–403	1099–1126
69A	Unexplained money, etc.	403–407	1127–1139
69B	Amount of investments, etc., not fully disclosed in books of account	407–411	1140–1151
69C	Unexplained expenditure, etc.	411–414	1152–1158

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
70	Set-off of loss from one source against income from another source under the same head of income	414	1159
71	Set-off of loss from one head against income from another	414–415	1160–1161
72	Carry forward and set off of business losses	415–416	1162–1164
72A	Provisions relating to carry forward and set-off of accumulated loss and unabsorbed depreciation allowance in amalgamation or demerger, etc.	416	1165
73	Losses in speculation business	416–417	1166–1169
74	Losses under the head “Capital gains”	418	1170
	CHAPTER VI-A DEDUCTIONS TO BE MADE IN COMPUTING TOTAL INCOME		
	B—Deductions in respect of certain payments		
80G	Deduction in respect of donations to certain funds, charitable institutions, etc.	418–421	1171–1178
	C—Deductions in respect of certain incomes		
80HH	Deduction in respect of profits and gains from newly established industrial undertakings or hotel business in backward areas	421–423	1179–1187
80HHA	Deduction in respect of profits and gains from newly established small-scale industrial undertakings in certain areas	423	1188
80HHB	Deduction in respect of profits and gains from projects outside India	424–425	1189–1191
80HHC	Deduction in respect of profits retained for export business	425–437	1192–1230
80HHD	Deduction in respect of earnings in convertible foreign exchange	437–438	1231–1234
80HHE	Deduction in respect of profits from export of computer software, etc.	438–439	1235–1239
80-I	Deduction in respect of profits and gains from industrial undertakings after a certain date, etc.	439–440	1240–1244
80-IA	Deduction in respect of profits and gains of new industrial undertakings	440–449	1245–1269

Section wise Index

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
80-IAB	Deductions in respect of profits and gains by an undertaking or enterprise engaged in development of Special Economic Zone.	449	1270
80-IB	Deduction in respect of profits and gains from certain industrial undertakings other than infrastructure development undertakings	450–470	1271–1321
80-IC	Special provisions in respect of certain undertakings or enterprises in certain special category States	470	1322–1324
80M	Deductions in respect of certain incorporate dividends	471	1325–1326
80-O	Deduction in respect of royalties, etc. from certain foreign enterprises	472	1327
80P	Deduction in respect of income of co-operative societies	472–473	1328–1330
	D—Other deductions		
80V	Deduction of interest on moneys borrowed to pay taxes	473	1331–1332
	CHAPTER IX DOUBLE TAXATION RELIEF		
90	Agreement with foreign countries or specified territories	473–476	1333–1339
	CHAPTER X SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO AVOIDANCE OF TAX		
92B	Meaning of international transaction	476–477	1340–1342
92C	Computation of arm's length price	477–545	1343–1493
92CA	Reference to Transfer Pricing Officer	546–548	1494–1497
93	Avoidance of income-tax by transactions resulting in transfer of income to non-residents	549	1498
94	Avoidance of tax by certain transactions in securities	549	1499–1500
	CHAPTER XII DETERMINATION OF TAX IN CERTAIN SPECIAL CASES		
111A	Tax on short-term capital gains in certain cases	550	1501

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
112	Tax on long-term capital gains	550	1502
113	Tax in the case of block assessment of search cases	551–553	1503–1507
115A	Tax on dividends, royalty and technical service fees in the case of foreign companies	553	1508
	CHAPTER XII-B SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO CERTAIN COMPANIES		
115J	Special provisions relating to certain companies Minimum Alternative tax (MAT)	553–555	1509–1513
115JA	Deemed income relating to certain companies	555–556	1514–1518
115JAA	Tax credit in respect of tax paid on deemed income relating to certain companies	557	1519
115JB	Special provision for payment of tax by certain companies	557–559	1520–1529
	CHAPTER XII-F SPECIAL PROVISION RELATING TO TAX ON INCOME RECEIVED FROM VENTURE CAPITAL COMPANIES AND VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS		
115U	Tax on income in certain cases	698-699	2242
	CHAPTER XII-G SPECIAL PROVISION RELATING TO INCOME OF SHIPPING COMPANIES		
115V-I	Relevant shipping income	560	1530
	CHAPTER XII-H INCOME-TAX ON FRINGE BENEFITS A—Meaning of certain expressions		
	B—Basis of charge		
115W	Definitions	560–561	1531
115WB	Fringe benefits	561	1532–1533
	CHAPTER XIII INCOME-TAX AUTHORITIES A—Appointment and control		
119	Instructions to subordinate authorities	562–563	1534–1537

Section wise Index

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
	B—Jurisdiction		
124	Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers	563–566	1538–1545
127	Power to transfer cases	566 –570	1546–1559
	C—Powers		
132	Search and seizure	570–574	1560–1567
132B	Application of seized or requisitioned assets	574–575	1568–1570
133	Power to call for information	575–576	1571–1573
133A	Power of survey	576–578	1574–1578
	CHAPTER XIV PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSMENT		
139	Return of income	578–580	1579–1583
142	Inquiry before assessment	580–582	1584–1587
142A	Estimate by Valuation Officer in certain cases	582–585	1588–1596
143	Assessment	585–594	1597–1619
144	Best judgment assessment	595–597	1620–1625
144C	Reference to dispute resolution panel	597–601	1626–1634
145	Method of accounting	601–613	1635–1674
145A	Method of accounting in certain cases	614	1675–1677
147	Income escaping assessment	615–684	1678–1846
151	Sanction for issue of notice	684–686	1847–1851
153	Time limit for completion of assessments and reassessments	686–687	1852–1854
153A	Assessment in case of search or requisition	687–694	1855–1872
153C	Assessment of income of any other person	695–698	1873–1877
154	Rectification of mistake	698–704	1878–1890
156	Notice of demand	704	1891
	CHAPTER XIV-B SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSMENT OF SEARCH CASES		
158B	Definitions	704–706	1892–1897

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
158BA	Assessment of undisclosed income as a result of search	706	1898
158BB	Computation of undisclosed income as a result of search	707–709	1899–1904
158BC	Procedure for block assessment	709–719	1905–1927
158BD	Undisclosed income of any other person	719–724	1928–1941
158BE	Time limit for completion of block assessment	724–727	1942–1948
158BFA	Levy of interest and penalty in certain cases	727–729	1949–1954
158BG	Authority competent to make the block assessment	729–730	1955–1956
	CHAPTER XV LIABILITY IN SPECIAL CASES		
	A—Legal representatives		
159	Legal representatives	731	1957
	B—Representatives assessees—General provisions		
161	Liability of representative assessee	731–733	1958
	C—Representatives assessees—Special cases		
163	Who may be regarded as agent	733	1959–1960
164	Charge of tax where share of beneficiaries unknown	734–736	1961–1964
	F—Succession to business or profession		
170	Succession to business otherwise than on death	736–737	1965
	H—Profits of non-residents from occasional shipping business		
172	Shipping business of non-residents	737	1966–1967
	M—Private companies		
179	Liability of directors of private company in liquidation	738–740	1968–1972
	CHAPTER XVI SPECIAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO FIRMS A—Assessment of firms		
184	Assessment as a firm	740–741	1973

Section wise Index

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
	CHAPTER XVII		
	COLLECTION AND RECOVERY OF TAX		
	A—General		
	B—Deduction at source		
192	Salary	741–744	1974–1984
194A	Interest other than “Interest on securities”	744–747	1985–1989
194B	Winnings from lottery or crossword puzzle	747–748	1990–1991
194C	Payments to contractors	748–756	1992–2010
194H	Commission or brokerage	756–760	2011–2021
194-I	Rent	760–762	2022–2028
194J	Fees for professional or technical services	763–765	2029–2035
194L	Payment of compensation on acquisition of capital asset	765–766	2036
194LA	Payment of compensation on acquisition of certain immovable property	766–768	2037–2039
195	Other sums	769–780	2040–2067
197	Certificate for deduction at lower rate	780–781	2068–2069
197A	No deduction to be made in certain cases	781	2070
199	Credit for tax deducted	781–786	2071–2078
201	Consequences of failure to deduct or pay	786–789	2079–2086
204	Meaning of “person responsible for paying”	790	2087
	BB—Collection at source		
206C	Profits and gains from the business of trading in alcoholic liquor, forest produce, scrap, etc.	790–791	2088–2090
209	Computation of advance tax	791	2091
214	Interest payable by Government	792	2092–2094
	C—Advance payment of tax		
215	Interest payable by assessee	793	2095
217	Interest payable by assessee when no estimate made	793	2096–2097
	D—Collection and recovery		
220	When tax payable and when assessee deemed in default	794–804	2098–2127

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
222	Certificate to Tax Recovery Officer	804–806	2128–2131
225	Stay of proceedings in pursuance of certificate and amendment or cancellation thereof	806–807	2132
226	Other modes of recovery	807–813	2133–2147
	F—Interest chargeable in certain cases		
234A	Interest for defaults in furnishing return of income	813–814	2148–2150
234B	Interest for defaults in payment of advance tax	814–817	2151–2164
234C	Interest for deferment of advance tax	817	2165–2166
234D	Interest on excess refund	818–819	2167 2169
	G—Levy of fee in certain cases		
234E	Fee for default in furnishing statements	819–820	2170–2173
	CHAPTER XIX REFUNDS		
237	Refunds	820–821	2174–2175
239	Form of claim for refund and limitation	821	2176
244	Interest on refund where no claim is needed	821–822	2177–2180
244A	Interest on refunds	822–825	2181–2188
	CHAPTER XIX-A SETTLEMENT OF CASES		
245A	Definitions	825	2189
245BA	Jurisdiction and powers of Settlement Commission	826	2190
245C	Application for settlement of cases	826–827	2191–2192
245D	Procedure on receipt of an application under section 245C	827–831	2193–2201
245F	Powers and procedure of Settlement Commission	831	2202
	CHAPTER XIX-B ADVANCE RULINGS		
245N	Definitions	831–832	2203–2204
245R	Procedure on receipt of application	832–836	2205–2213

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
	CHAPTER XX APPEALS AND REVISION		
	A—Appeals to Commissioner (Appeals)		
246	Appealable orders	836–837	2214–2215
246A	Appealable orders before Commissioner (Appeals)	837	2216
249	Form of appeal and limitation	837–838	2217–2219
250	Procedure in appeal	838	2220–2221
251	Powers of the Commissioner (Appeals)	839–842	2222–2229
	B—Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal		
252	Appellate Tribunal	842–844	2230–2231
253	Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal	845–849	2232–2240
254	Orders of Appellate Tribunal	850–880	2241–2308
	C—Reference of case to the High Court		
256	Reference to the High Court	880	2309
	CC—Appeals to High Court		
260A	Appeal to High Court	880–891	2310–2336
	E—Revision by the Commissioner		
263	Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue	891–914	2337–2391
264	Revision of other orders	915–917	2392–2397
	F—General		
267	Amendment of assessment on appeal	917–918	2398
268A	Filing of appeal or application for reference by income-tax authority	918	2399
	CHAPTER XX-B REQUIREMENT AS TO MODE OF ACCEPTANCE, PAYMENT OR REPAYMENT IN CERTAIN CASES TO COUNTERACT EVASION OF TAX		
269SS	Mode of taking or accepting certain loans and deposits	919–922	2400–2408

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
	CHAPTER XX-C PURCHASE BY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTIES IN CERTAIN CASES OF TRANSFER		
269UD	Order by appropriate authority for purchase by Central Government of immovable property	923	2409
	CHAPTER XXI PENALTIES IMPOSABLE		
271	Failure to furnish returns, comply with notices, concealment of income, etc.	923 -957	2410–2501
271AAA	Penalty where search has been initiated	958–960	2502–2504
271B	Failure to get accounts audited	960–961	2505–2509
271BA	Penalty for failure to furnish report under section 92E	962	2510
271C	Penalty for failure to deduct tax at source	962	2511–2512
271D	Penalty for failure to comply with the provisions of section 269SS	963	2513–2516
271FA	Penalty for failure to furnish annual information return	964	2517
271G	Penalty for failure to furnish information or document under section 92D	964	2518
272A	Penalty for failure to answer questions, sign statements, furnish information, returns or statements, allow inspections, etc.	964	2519
272B	Penalty for failure to comply with the provisions of section 139A	965	2520
273A	Power to reduce or waive penalty, etc., in certain cases	965–966	2521–2524
275	Bar of limitation for imposing penalties	967–968	2525–2526
	CHAPTER XXII OFFENCES AND PROSECUTIONS		
276B	Failure to pay tax to the credit of Central Government under Chapter XII-D or XVII-B	968	2527
276CC	Failure to furnish returns of income	968–969	2528–2529

Section wise Index

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
279	Prosecution to be at instance of Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner of Principal Commissioner or Commissioner	969	2530
	CHAPTER XXIII MISCELLANEOUS		
281	Certain transfers to be void	970	2531–2532
281B	Provisional attachment to protect revenue in certain cases	970–971	2533–2534
282	Service of notice generally	971–972	2535
288	Appearance by authorised representative	972	2536
292B	Return of income, etc., not to be invalid on certain grounds	1109	3511
295	Power to make rules	973	2537
II.	Gift–tax Act, 1958		
2.	Definitions	974	2538
4.	Gifts Includes certain transfer	974	2539
III.	Interest–tax Act, 1974		
2	Definition	975–977	2540–2545
8	Assessment	977	2547
IV.	Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1988		
88	Declaration	978	2548–2549
90	Certificate determining tax arrears	979	2550–2551
V.	National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005	980–981	2552
VI.	Wealth-Tax Act, 1970		
2	Definitions-Assets	982	2553
7	Value of assets	982–983	2554–2558
16	Assessment	983	2559
18(1)(c)	Penalty for concealment of assets etc.	983–984	2560
18B	Power to reduce or waive penalty in certain cases	984	2561–2562
21(1)	Assessment–Assets are held by courts of wards, administrators–general–etc.	985	2563–2565

Sections	Chapters	Page Nos.	Case Nos.
27	References to High Court	985	2565
VII	Interpretation of taxing statutes	986–989	2566–2578
VIII	Central excise Act, 1944	990	2579
V	Service tax–Finance Act, 1994		
65	Definitions	991–992	2580–2582
VII	Allied Laws	993	2583
VIII	Chartered Accountants Act, 1949	994	2584
IX	Constitution of India	995–998	2585–2586
X	Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973	999–1000	2587
XI	Evidence Act, 1872	1000	2588
XII	Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act 1991	1001	2589
XIII	Right to Information Act, 2005	1002	2590
XIV	Circulars / Notifications / Articles etc.		
	Circulars	1003–1005	
	Finance Bill, 2014	1005	
	Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2014	1005	
	Notifications	1005	
	Other Acts	1006	
	Articles–Section wise	1006–1017	
	Articles–Subject wise	1017–1030	
	Tax world–AIFTP Journal	1030–1031	
	Opinion	1031	

Income-tax Act, 1961

Section 2 : Definitions

S.2(1A) : Agricultural income – Income from other sources – Onus on assessee to prove the receipt as agricultural income – Restricting the income was held to be justified. [S.56]

1

The assessee an individual, had shown an agricultural income. Since the assessee did not disclose any evidence to prove the receipt of the income as agricultural income and the nature of the operations done therein to earn the income, the said income was assessed under the head of 'income from other sources'. CIT(A) after getting the remand report accepted the claim of assessee. On appeal by revenue the Tribunal partly accepted as agricultural income restricting the income on estimate basis. On appeal High Court also affirmed the view of Tribunal. (AY. 2001-02)

B. Ramachandhiran v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxman 22 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

S.2(1A) : Agricultural income – Assessee failed to explain source of agricultural income – Exemption denied

2

Assessee was required to prove the agricultural income by documentary evidence and to produce the concerned owner of the land. Being not satisfied with the explanation provided by the assessee, Assessing Officer made addition by denying the exemption claimed by the assessee on agricultural income. CIT (Appeals) and Tribunal upheld the order passed by Assessing Officer. On appeal by the assessee to the High Court, held dismissing the appeal, that the assessee failed to provide adequate material on the points raised by the Assessing Officer as well as the Commissioner (Appeals) and even before the Tribunal no material was placed except reiterating the facts pleaded before. When the assessee was not owner of the land and the agreements were full of discrepancies pointed out by the Assessing Officer, it was for the assessee to produce the owner to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer for examining or by acceptable evidences or otherwise as also in meeting with the various defects/discrepancies pointed, which the assessee failed to do. (AY. 1994-95)

Bhairavnath Agrofin (P.) Ltd. v. CIT (2013) 354 ITR 276 / 259 CTR 51 / 85 DTR 403 / (2014) 220 Taxman 1 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)

S.2(13) : Business – Solitary transaction of selling a property – Not in the nature of trade or adventure. [S.28(i)]

3

The assessee and others entered into an agreement to purchase the property from its owners. Thereafter, the very same property, the possession of which was taken by them along with others after paying the entire sale consideration to the owner, was sold. The transaction in question being a solitary transaction entered into by the assessee and in the absence of any material to show that they were in the same business and they have entered into such agreement and that they have sold such properties, it is not possible

to accept the contention of the revenue that the transaction in question is in the nature of trade or adventure and therefore, the said contention was rejected. (AY. 2001-02)
CIT v. Irfan Razack Director of Prestige Estate Projects (P) Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxman 121 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

4 **S.2(14)(iii) : Capital asset – Agricultural land – Land within 5 Kms of Local Municipal committee – Assessable as capital gains. [S.45]**

During relevant year assessee sold certain land situated in village which is situated within 5 Kms. of limits of Local Municipal Committee, hence liable to be assessed as capital gain. Order of Tribunal was to be set aside and that of AO was restored (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Khazan Singh (2014) 225 Taxman 22 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

5 **S.2(14)(iii) : Capital asset – Agricultural land – Capital gains – Beyond 8 kms of local limits of the Municipality – Land sold to non-agriculturalist – It would not loose its character as agricultural land – Not liable to be taxed as short term capital gains. [S. 2(IA), 45]**

The Assessing Officer made addition of ₹ 4,56,83,750 on account of short-term capital gain on the ground that assessee had sold agricultural land to one SICC which was non-agriculturist and as per the existing State law, the assessee could not sell the agricultural land in favour of a non-agriculturist. Therefore, the land which was sold was a capital asset and its transfer was chargeable to tax under capital gain. The High Court held that, it was not in dispute that what was sold by the assessee was an agricultural land which was situated beyond 8 Kms. of local limits of the Municipality. Merely because the said land came to be sold to a non-agriculturist, may be in breach of law prevailing in the State, character of the land would not be changed and the land still would continue as an agricultural land. At the most the sale in favour of non-agriculturist can be declared as illegal and/or invalid. There was no provision that if the agricultural land is sold in favour of non-agriculturist in breach of law prevailing in the State, it would lose its character as agricultural land and would be treated as non-agricultural land. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said that the Tribunal had committed any error in holding the land in question not as capital asset and not liable to be taxed. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Rajshibhai Meramanbhai Odedra (2014) 222 Taxman 72 (Guj.)(HC)

6 **S.2(14)(iii) : Capital asset – Agricultural land – Capital gains – Land situated within limits of 8 Kms from any municipality would be a capital asset, sale of which would attract capital gain. [S.2(IA), 45]**

The assessee owned a piece of land which was situated at Village Islampur, District Pathankot. The same was sold on 29-8-2005. She claimed that since the land is an agricultural land, therefore, it does not attract any capital gain. Before the Assessing Officer, a certificate issued by the Tahsildar, Pathankot was filed to the effect that the land is at a distance of 9 KMs from Pathankot and thus not a capital asset. The Assessing Officer took a note of the fact that Government of Punjab *vide* notification dated 31-11-2004 extended the Municipal Limits of Municipal Council, Sujampur up to

Malikpur and that the said Municipal Council has established Octroi post at Malikpur and the land sold was situated inside the Octroi post. Thus, it was said to be a capital asset. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal set aside the order passed by the Assessing Officer. On an appeal by the department, the High Court decided the issue in favour of the revenue by relying on the judgment of *CIT v. Smt. Anjana Sehgal* (ITA No. 276/2004) (P&H) and held that since the land is situated within the Municipal limits of Municipal Council, Sujampur, it is a capital asset and hence subject to capital gains.
CIT v. Neeru Aggarwal (Smt.) (2013) 356 ITR 320 / (2014) 220 Taxman 329 (P&H)(HC)

S.2(14)(iii) : Capital asset – Agricultural land – Land was situated beyond 9 Kms from the municipal limit and the land is situated in the Revenue record of village Lasudia Parmar whose population was about 2,000 people – Capital gains on the sale of land were not chargeable to tax. [S.45]

7

Assessee declared income and claimed exemption from capital gains on sale of land by claiming the same to be agricultural land situated in the revenue record of village. The AO held that said agricultural land was situated within 8 kms from the limits of the municipal limits and refused to grant exemption being an agriculture land. CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee by supporting the contention of the assessee that the land was situated more than 8 kms by road from the municipal limit by Straight Distance Method. Tribunal held against the assessee by holding that agricultural land was situated beyond 9 kms from the municipal limit of village and also relied on the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of *Balkrishna Harivallabhdas v. CIT (1982) 138 ITR 245 (Guj)* & decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of *CIT v. Satinder PalSingh (2010) 33 DTR (P&H) 281*. On further appeal in HC, HC held in favour of assessee and said that certificate of Tahsildar and land Survey say that the impugned land was situated beyond 9 Kms from the municipal limit and the land is situated in the Revenue record of village Lasudia Parmar whose population was about 2,000 people. Therefore capital gains on the sale of land were not chargeable to tax. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Ashok Shukla (2014) 99 DTR 250 (MP)(HC)

S.2(14)(iii) : Capital asset – Agricultural land – Capital gains – Distance from municipal limits. [S.2(IA), 45, 54B]

8

As the land in question was not situated within 8 kms from the municipal limit in terms of the approach by road, assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 54B. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Shabir Hussain Pithawala (2014) 98 DTR 62 (MP)(HC)

S.2(14)(iii) : Capital asset – Agricultural land – Capital gains – Beyond municipal limit – Law laid down on when an isolated transaction can be regarded as an “adventure in the nature of trade” and the taxability of agricultural land situate beyond municipal limits. [S.2(IA), 2(13), 10(1), 28(i), 45]

9

The assessee purchased the land with standing crops thereon and it was shown in the records as land cultivated throughout the period of holding by the assessee. No efforts have been taken by the assessee to change the nature of land. Income from standing

crops was offered for rate purpose as agricultural income. The transaction of purchase and sale of agricultural land is not part of a regular business activity of the assessee. It was an isolated transaction of purchase of agricultural land and sale thereof within a period of 13 months. Though the land is situated in the National Capital Region and there was a plan to develop the area of Alwer district as a global city, the fact remains that the master plan was finalised in the year 2010 and as per the master plan the area will be developed by the year 2013. If the assessee's intention was to carry on an adventure in the nature of trade she has to wait at least till the master plan is finalised as otherwise she cannot expect substantial profit. On the contrary, the land was sold within a short span, seizing the opportunity of offer of better price which shows that the assessee intended to purchase the land as an investment only. Merely because a property was sold for a profit it cannot be assumed that it is an adventure in the nature of trade. Also, whether the land was sold out of free will or compulsion will not alter the character of the transaction. Every assessee would like to make profit on a transaction, given an opportunity. Taking a holistic view of the matter, the transaction was not an adventure in the nature of trade;

The land cannot be treated as capital asset since it is situated beyond eight kilometres from the municipal limits and it was purchased as agricultural land and sold accordingly without making any changes such as conversion in the land records, plotting of land, etc. The assessee earned agricultural income in the immediately preceding year on sale of standing crop and the same was offered as agricultural income and accepted by the AO for rate purposes. It is thus clear that it is a case of sale of agricultural land and the land being situated beyond eight kilometres from the municipal limit, it cannot be subjected to tax under the Income-tax Act either as business income or capital gains. The land situated outside the municipal limits stands excluded from the expression 'capital asset' from the inception and the sale proceeds have to be treated as revenue received from agricultural land. When two views are possible a view which is in favour of the assessee has to be taken. Consequently, the surplus arising on sale of the impugned agricultural land gives rise to agricultural income and not assessable to tax. (AY. 2007-08)

Supriya Kanwar (Smt.) v. ITO (2014) 104 DTR 166 / 163 TTJ 1 / 149 ITD 1 (TM)(Jodh.) (Trib.)

10 **S.2(14(iii)) : Capital asset – Agricultural land – Transfer of land on as it is and where it is basis to a developer – Neither assessable as capital gains nor business income. [S.2(IA), 10(1), 28(i), 45]**

The assessee is engaged in agricultural operations on land classified as agricultural land in revenue records. The land was situated in rural area outside municipal limits. Assessee transferred the said land to developer on "as is and where is" basis to a developer. Tribunal held that profit earned on sale of land was agricultural income. Hence, it is exempt from tax. It is neither assessable as capital gains nor business income. (AY. 2006-07)

Harniks Park (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 62 SOT 15 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.2(14)(iii) : Capital asset – Agricultural land – Capital gains – Gains from sale of agricultural land is exempt even though purchaser intends to use the land for commercial purposes. [S.2(1A), 45]

11

The only reason the A.O. treated the land as non-agricultural land was that 'agreement of sale' read with 'Irrevocable GPA' does not indicate that land retained the character of agriculture at the time of transfer. This was also the ground raised by Revenue in the appeal that M/s. Ramky Estates and Farms P. Ltd., may put the property to commercial use, therefore, the land was meant for commercial exploitation and did not have the character of agricultural land at the time of his transfer. There is no dispute that assessee has purchased agricultural land and put to agricultural use as such earlier. The facts indicate that assessee has sold only agricultural land which was also used and put to agricultural use earlier and the purpose for which the purchaser utilized the land cannot be considered as an evidence of change of nature of land as was considered by Assessing Officer. The chargeability to tax under s. 45 arises only if on the date of sale, the land in question retained its character as a capital asset, which means, an asset, which does not answer the definition of a capital asset and which is an agricultural land would automatically be outside the scope of s. 45. It is no doubt true that the purpose for which the purchaser had purchased was totally different from what the transferor had intended to use the land in question but with the admitted finding that the lands in question were under agricultural operation on the date of sale for the purpose of considering the meaning of capital assets, it matters very little how the subsequent purchaser intended the land in question to be put to use. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of *Hindustan Industrial Resources Ltd. v. ACIT* has taken a similar view. The CIT(A) in his order has followed the decision of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of *CIT v. Debbi Almas and Joaqyam Almas reported in 339 ITR 59 (Bom.)(HC)* which also considered similar facts and accepted the contention that no capital gains arises on the sale of agricultural land even though purchaser purchased the property with an intention of selling it for non-agricultural purposes. (AY.2008-09)

DCIT v. M. Kalyan Chakravarthy (Hyd.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.2(14)(iii)(b) : Capital gains – Agricultural land – Classification of lands in revenue records as agricultural lands – Adangal and letter of tahsildar satisfying other conditions of section 2(14) – Adjacent lands divided into plots for sale not a reason that lands sold by assessee were for purposes of development of plots – Record showing lands are agricultural lands classified as dry lands for which kist has been paid – Entitled to exemption. [S.2(29B), 45, 50C]

12

Held, the assessee had also produced a copy of the adangal and the letter from the tahsildar, which showed that the lands were agricultural in nature and the Revenue had also accepted that the lands were falling within the restricted zone in terms of section 2(14). The assessee has qualified under clause 11(1) since as per the adangal records, these lands were classified as agricultural lands and the assessee has also paid revenue kist, namely, revenue payment. The tests laid down by the Gujarat High Court relied on by the Tribunal clearly stated that any one of the factors can be present in a case to qualify for the benefit of classification as agricultural lands. The reason

given by the Tribunal was that the adjacent lands were put to commercial use by way of plots and, therefore, the very character of the lands of the assesseees was doubted as agricultural in nature. The manner in which the adjacent lands were used by the owner therein was not a ground for the Tribunal to come to a conclusion that the assesseees lands were not agricultural in nature. The reason given by the Tribunal that the adjacent lands have been divided into plots for sale would not mean that the lands sold by the assesseees were for the purpose of development of plots. Also the reasoning given by the Tribunal “No agriculturists would have purchased the land sold by the assessee for pursuing any agricultural activity” was based on mere conjectures and surmises. Therefore, the assesseees were entitled to exemption.

Sakunthala Vedachalam (Mrs.) v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 558 / 114 DTR 241 / (2015) 53 taxmann.com 62 (Mad.)(HC)

Vanitha Manickavasagam (Mrs) v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 558 / 114 DTR 241 / (2015) 53 taxmann.com 62 (Mad.)(HC)

13 S.2(15) : Charitable purpose – Objects of general public utility – Ports Trust – Charitable as no profit motive

Assessee trust was constituted under Major Ports Trusts Act, 1963. Assessee filed an application seeking registration under section 12A contending that activities of port trust were for benefit of general public and were covered under definition of charitable purpose under section 2(15). Commissioner rejected assessee’s application holding that activities carried on by assessee were in nature of commercial activities and not for charitable purpose. Tribunal, however, granted registration to assessee trust. It was noted that assessee trust was constituted for administration, control and management of various port activities which was an activity of general public utility. Further, fact that there was no profit making was equally clear from provisions of Act of 1963. It was held that in view of aforesaid, Tribunal was justified in granting registration to assessee trust. *CIT v. Kandla Port Trust (2014) 364 ITR 164 / 107 DTR 349 / 225 Taxman 145 (Guj.)(HC)*

14 S.2(15) : Charitable purpose – Proviso to S. 2(15) which denies exemption to a charitable institution carrying on commercial activities does not apply to institutions carrying out relief to the poor, education or medical relief but applies only to those carrying out “advancement of any other object of general public utility” – Eligible for exemption. [S.10(23C), 11]

Though the assessee, carrying on activities in the field of education, was held eligible for exemption in earlier years, in AY 2009-10, the AO denied exemption on the ground that the case was hit by the Proviso to s. 2(15) inserted by the Finance Act, 2008 which provides that the ‘advancement of any other object of general public utility’ shall not be a charitable purpose if it involves the carrying on of (a) any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business; or (b) any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business for cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application, or retention of the income from such activity. The AO’s stand was upheld by the CIT(A) though reversed by the Tribunal. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal;

- (i) On the issue as to whether the activities of the assessee are for “education” and “charitable” in nature, the sense in which the word ‘education’ has been used in

s. 2(15) of the Act in the systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the young is preparation for the work of life. It also connotes the whole course of scholastic instruction which a person has received. Though the word “education” is not used in a loose sense so as to include acquisition of all sorts of knowledge, it should also not be interpreted in a narrow or pedantic sense. It encompasses systematic dissemination of knowledge and training in specialized subjects. The changing times and the ever widening horizons of knowledge may bring in changes in the methodology of teaching and a shift of the better in the institutional set up. Advancement of knowledge brings within its fold suitable methods of its dissemination and though the primary method of sitting in a classroom may remain ideal for most of the initial education, it may become necessary to have a different outlook for further education. It is not necessary to nail down the concept of education to a particular formula or to flow it only through a defined channel. Its progress lies in the acceptance of new ideas and development of appropriate means to reach them to recipients. On facts, activities such as Continuing Education Diploma and Certificate Programme; Management Development Programme; Public Talks and Seminars and Workshops and Conferences etc. constitute “education” so as to qualify as a “charitable purpose” u/s. 2(15).

- (ii) The mere existence of profit will not disqualify an institution for exemption u/s. 10(22) if the sole purpose of its existence is not profit making but is educational activities;
- (iii) On the issue of the Proviso to s. 2(15), the same has been explained in Circular No.11/2008 dated 19-12-2008. From the said Circular it appears that the newly inserted proviso to s. 2(15) of the Act will apply to entities whose purpose is advancement of any other object of general public utility i.e. fourth limb of definition of ‘charitable purpose’ contained in s. 2(15) and hence such entities will not be eligible for exemption u/s. 11 or u/s. 10(23C) of the Act if they carry on commercial activities. The Proviso will not apply in respect of the first three limbs of s. 2(15) i.e. relief to the poor; education or medical relief. Thus, where the purpose of a trust or institution is relief of the poor; education or medical relief, it will constitute ‘charitable purpose’ even if it incidentally involves the carrying on of the commercial activities. Eligible for exemption. (AY. 2009-10)

DIT(E) v. Ahmedabad Management Association (2014) 366 ITR 85 / 225 Taxman 223 (Guj.)(HC)

S.2(15) : Charitable purpose – Breeding of cattle – Incidental profit – Trust entitled to exemption. [S.11, 12]

15

The main objectives of the trust were to breed cattle and endeavour to improve the quality of the cows and oxen in view of the need for good oxen as India is prominently an agricultural country. All these were objects of general public utility and would squarely fall under section 2(15) of the Act. Profit making was neither the aim nor object of the trust. It was not the principal activity. Merely because while carrying out the activities for the purpose of achieving the object of the trust, certain incidental surpluses were generated, that would not render the activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business. The assessee was entitled to exemption under section 11. (AY. 2009-10)

DIT(E) v. Sabarmati Ashram Gaushala Trust (2014) 362 ITR 539 / 223 Taxman 43 (Guj.)(HC)

- 16 **S.2(15) : Charitable purpose – Construction of toilets – Carrying on an activity for consideration and not within ambit of definition of ‘charitable purpose’ – Rejection of registration u/s. 12A was justified. [S. 12A, 12AA]**

Assessee-society constructed dry latrines in villages under contract awarded by DUDA, i.e., District Urban Development Authority. It applied for registration under section 12A which was rejected by Commissioner. Tribunal held that since the assessee had not constructed dry latrines (shushk shauchalya) as a part of a social service but it only executed contract awarded by DUDA, its case fell within ambit of carrying on an activity for consideration and not within ambit of definition of ‘charitable purpose’, therefore rejection of registration u/s. 12A was justified.

Bahara Shiksha Vikas Evam Sudhar Samiti v. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 747 / 105 DTR 169 / 164 TTJ 586 (Delhi)(Trib.)

- 17 **S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Subsidiary company – Advance to purchase of raw materials – Could not be considered as deemed dividend**

Where subsidiary company was advancing money to assessee company for purchase of raw material and to make payments to a company to meet their business liabilities, said amount could not be considered as deemed dividend income of assessee company within purview of section 2(22)(e). (AY. 1993-94)

CIT v. India Fruits Ltd. (2014) 274 CTR 67 / 228 Taxman 243 (Mag.)(AP)(HC)

- 18 **S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Loan to shareholder – Company having running account with shareholder – No evidence of intent to evade tax – Loan could not be treated as dividend**

Dismissing the appeal of revenue the Court held that from the material on record it was clear that the CIT(A) and the Tribunal had concurrently recorded that the assessee had a running account with Dada Motors Pvt. Ltd. and had been advancing money to it. The assessee had in fact advanced money to the company and there was credit for only 55 days for which the provisions of section 2(22)(e) of the Act could not be invoked. Provision could not be invoked when there is a genuine business transaction between the two entities and the funds of the director were in fact lying with the company for most of the time.(AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Suraj Dev Dada (2014) 367 ITR 78 / 224 Taxman 189 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

- 19 **S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Loans or advances to shareholders – Money lending is not business of assessee company – Loan assessable as deemed dividend – Reassessment was held to be valid. [Ss.147, 148]**

Assessee received advance from company in which he was Managing Director. Company was fully engaged in activities other like investing in shares and debentures and earned income by way of interest and dividend. During relevant time, company had not given any loan to any other person than managing director. In subsequent year, certain loans were given to some other persons who were all employees, i.e., connected with company. Money lending was not business of the company. Loan assessable as deemed dividend. Reassessment also held to be valid. (AY. 2003-04)

Thankamma Oommen (Smt.) v. ACIT (2014) 366 ITR 542 / 103 DTR 348 (Ker.)(HC)

S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Only registered shareholder of a company can be said to be shareholder – Not beneficial entitled to shares 20

It is only person whose name is entered in Register of shareholders of company as holder of shares who can be said to be a shareholder *qua* company and not a person beneficially entitled to shares, therefore, it is only where a loan is advanced by company to registered shareholder and other conditions set out in section 2(22)(e) are satisfied, said amount of loan would be liable to be regarded as deemed dividend within meaning of said section. (AY. 2006-07 to 2008-09)

CCIT v. Sarva Equity (P) Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxman 172 (Karn.)(HC)

S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Loan from company – Assessable as deemed dividend 21

Assessee taking substantial part of loan from a company in which he was a director and having substantial interest. Assessee failed to establish that substantial part of business of company was money-lending. Amount includible as income of assessee as deemed dividend. (AY. 2008-09)

Krishna Gopal Maheshwari v. Addl. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 280 / 223 Taxman 33 / 101 DTR 392 (All)(HC)

S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Unsecured loan – Not a shareholder – Unsecured loan could not be treated as deemed dividend in hands of assessee 22

The Assessing Officer noticed that assessee-company had taken unsecured loan from a company. Treating said loan as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e) in hands of assessee, he made addition to assessee's income. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer on the ground that the loans taken would not be covered by the exclusion/exception provided in section 2(22)(e)(iii) and accordingly, were deemed dividend. It was held that the Tribunal had examined all the facts relevant to the case and had correctly reached the conclusion that none of the shareholders of assessee or the assessee itself was a shareholder of said similarly company shareholders are not holding any shares in the assessee. Further, section 2(22)(e) does not provide that having a common director in two companies would make section 2(22)(e) applicable. Consequently, section 2(22)(e) was not applicable in respect of the loan advanced to the assessee. In view of the above, no substantial question of law arose. (AY. 2002-03).

CIT v. Bombay Oil Industries Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxman 38 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Loan to shareholder – Whether lending of money substantial part of business of company not established on facts – Matter remanded 23

Tribunal finding since lender companies did not carry on money-lending business, advances to assessee not in ordinary course of business. Court held that the test laid down by the Tribunal was not proper test. Whether lending of money substantial part of business of company not established on facts. Matter remanded. (AY. 2007-08)

Kishori Lal Agrawal v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 158 (All.)(HC)

S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Advance received in connection with construction work was held not to be taxed as deemed dividend 24

Where the assessee, a builder and managing director of a company in which he was holding 63 per cent shares, received a construction contract from said company, in view

of the fact that the assessee executed the contract in the normal course of his business as a builder, the advance received in connection with construction work was held not to be taxable in the assessee's hands as 'deemed dividend' under section 2(22)(e). (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Madurai Chettiyar Karthikeyan (2014) 223 Taxman 350 (Mad.)(HC)

25 **S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Loan to a shareholder – Expenditure on repair and renovation by the company – No deemed dividend in shareholder's hands**

The assessee had let out the premises to the company. The company incurred expenses towards construction and improvement of the factory premises which it continued to use. The AO held that the amount was paid on behalf of the assessee and alternatively the amount spent was treated as perquisite. On appeal Tribunal held that the payment was not a deemed dividend and the amount was also not a perquisite. On appeal by revenue, dismissing the appeal held that no money had been paid to the assessee by way of advance or loan nor was any payment made for his individual benefit. It was a case where the asset of the assessee may have enhanced in value by virtue of repairs and renovation but this could not be brought within the definition of the advance or loan to the assessee, nor could it be treated as payment by the company on behalf of the assessee share holder or for the individual benefit of such shareholder. Appeal of revenue was dismissed.

CIT v. Vir Vikram Vaid (2014) 367 ITR 365 / 111 DTR 196 / (2015) 230 Taxman 212 (Bom.)(HC)

26 **S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Does not apply to a non-shareholder**

The High Court rejected the contention of the revenue that the definition of deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e) does not contemplate or does not stipulate any requirement of assessee being a shareholder of the assessee like the one in the present case. The view taken in the present case that the recipient/assessee was not a shareholder, thus is in consonance with the legal position noted by us hereinabove. We are of the further view that this Court merely restated this principle and which remains unaltered throughout from the case of *Rameshwarlal Sanwarmal v. CIT(1980) 122 ITR 1 (SC)*. Followed *CIT v. Universal Medicare Pvt. Ltd. (2010) 324 ITR 263 (Bom)(HC)*.

CIT v. Impact Containers Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 346 / 107 DTR 145 / 270 CTR 337 / 225 Taxman 322 (Bom.)(HC)

27 **S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Share application money cannot be treated as loan or deposit – Not assessable as deemed dividend**

When the Tribunal gave a finding that the amount received by the assessee-company was share application money, the sum could not be treated as loan or deposit. Furthermore, share application money was retained for some months and shares were allotted in following year. Therefore, sec. 2(22)(e) was not applicable. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Alpex Exports P. Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 297 / 230 Taxman 140 (Delhi)(HC)

S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Loan to shareholder – Not assessable in hands of person not a shareholder 28

Since the assessee-company was neither a registered nor a beneficial holder of the shares in the company giving loan, the question of including the disputed amount as deemed dividend in terms of s. 2(22)(e) did not arise. (AY. 2003-04)

ACIT v. Britto Amusement P. Ltd. (2013) 263 CTR 578 / 96 DTR 1 / (2014) 360 ITR 544 / 226 Taxman 45 (Mag.) (Bom.) (HC)

S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Assessee was not beneficial owner – Deletion of addition was held to be justified 29

During the search operation carried out by the department, it was noticed that the said company had given loans to various members including the assessee having shareholding and voting powers exceeding 10%. The assessee during the search operation, confronted with such shareholding pattern and the loans advanced. Assessee accepted certain sum u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Act. During the course of assessment proceedings, it was contended by family members that they had settled on aggregate of 5.12 lakhs of equity shares of the said company held by them. It was the case of the assessee that he did not hold any beneficial voting power. AO rejected the contention of the assessee. CIT (A) dismissed the appeal. Tribunal allowed the appeal & held that trust deed was created nearly four years prior to the date of search and notarised. Tribunal also held that the companies' act would not permit transfer of shares in the name of trust and that there was no dividend declared by the company and that the trust did not receive any income so as either to open a bank account or to file a return. On appeal in HC, HC held that Tribunal having found as a fact that shares in question stood settled on genuinely created trust and assessee was no more beneficial owner of the shares, no interference was called for with the order of Tribunal holding that deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e) was not chargeable in the hands of the assessee. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Krupeshbhai N. Patel (2013) 359 ITR 504 / 216 Taxman 61 / (2014) 99 DTR 209 (Guj.) (HC)

Editorial: Krupeshbhai N. Patel v. Dy. CIT (2013) 140 ITD 176 (Ahd)(Trib.) is affirmed.

S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Accumulated profits – Depreciation to be considered as per Income-tax Act and not as Companies Act 30

While assessing income, the assessing authority is required to take into consideration the depreciation as provided under the Income-tax Act and not as provided under the Companies Act.

CIT v. Pushparthy Packs (P) Ltd. (2014) 98 DTR 65 / 221 Taxman 403 (Bom.) (HC)

S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Not a share holder – Loans or advances from another company cannot be treated as deemed dividend merely on the ground that there was common shareholder in both the companies 31

The assessee company had received loan from another company. The assessee was not a shareholder of the other company. However, there was a common shareholder (individual) who held more than 50% in both the companies. In view of the above

facts the AO held that the amount received by the assessee from an another company was a deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Act. The CIT(A) upheld the AO's order. On further appeal, the Tribunal deleted the addition made by AO following the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in *CIT v. Ankitech (P) Ltd.* 340 ITR 14 (Delhi) where it has been held that deemed dividend provisions cannot be invoked merely because there are common shareholders between the two companies. The High Court followed the aforesaid judgment and dismissed revenue's appeal. (AY. 2006-07)
CIT v. AR Magnetix (P) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxman 209 (Delhi)(HC)

32 **S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Not a shareholder – Inter-corporate deposit – Where assessee had received a deposit from a company but did not own any share of that company it could not be treated as a deemed dividend**

The assessee received a deposit of ₹ 25 lakhs from Amigo Brushes Pvt. Ltd. During the assessment, the Assessing Officer treated the deposits as a loan and consequently deemed to be a deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e) of the Act from Amigo Brushes Pvt. Ltd. The assessee contended that it did not hold a share in other company from which it had received deposit and, accordingly, it could not be treated to be a deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e) of the Act. The CIT(A) uphold the order of the AO. On appeal, the Tribunal reversed the order of CIT(A). The High Court decided the issue in favour of the assessee, relying on the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in *CIT v. Ankitech (P) Ltd.* (2012) 340 ITR 14 (Del) wherein it was held that if the assessee-company does not hold a share in other company from which it had received deposit then it cannot be treated to be a deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e) of the Act. (AY. 2000-01)

CIT v. Daisy Packers (P) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxman 331 (Guj.)(HC)

33 **S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Not a registered shareholder – Where assessee – company received share application money from another company, the amount in question could not be taxed as deemed dividend in its hands as the assessee was not a registered shareholder of said company**

The assessee had derived income from trading in shares. During the course of assessment proceedings, it was revealed that the assessee had received a sum of Rs. 23.00 lakhs from M/s. Japanwala Jewellers (P) Ltd., Jaipur as share application money. The assessing authority, after taking note of Section 2(22)(e) and available records, observed that the share application money received by the assessee company was in the nature of an unsecured loan and further treated it to be deemed dividend in the hands of the assessee company under the provisions of Section 2(22)(e). The High Court upholding the order of the CIT(A) and Tribunal hold that liability of tax as deemed dividend would be attracted in the hands of the individuals who were shareholders of the said company and not in the hands of the company.

CIT v. Suram Holding (P) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxman 327 (Raj.)(HC)

S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Deemed dividend was to be taxed in hands of shareholders whose name was entered in Register of Shareholders and not in hands of beneficially/beneficiary firm

34

Dismissing the appeal of revenue the Court held that; Deemed dividend was to be taxed in hands of shareholders whose name was entered in Register of Shareholders and not in hands of beneficially/beneficiary firm. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Namdhari Seeds (2014) 224 Taxman 194 (Mag.)(Karn)(HC)

Editorial : Special Leave Petition of revenue was granted.(SLA (C) No. 17440 of 2014 dt. 10-11-2014) CIT v. Namdhari Seeds (2015) 56 taxmann.com 19 / 230 Taxman 269 (SC)

S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Lease for its director – Released some other company in which directors had substantial interest – Cannot be assessed as deemed dividend

35

Where assessee company having taken a property on lease from its directors, released same to another company in which those directors had substantial interest, security deposits received by assessee from said company in terms of release agreement being an amount received in normal course of its business activity, could not be brought to tax as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e). (AY. 2002-03, 2005-06, 2006-07)

ACIT v. Madras Madurai Properties (P) Ltd. (2011) 9 taxmann.com 93 / (2014) 64 SOT 159 (URO) (Chennai)(Trib.)

S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Family settlement – Amount received in pursuant to family settlement from a company in which he had substantial interest – Not deemed dividend

36

Tribunal held that if the family settlement had not taken place there was a peril for the dissolution of the family owned companies for the sake of partition. In order to prevent such a precarious situation the assets of the family owned companies had to be realigned. Thus there was a commercial exigency for the family owned companies to transfer some of its assets and liquid assets in order to avoid extinction. Thus, as the Transactions were between the family members and their wholly owned companies due to the family settlement the provisions of section 2(22)(e) of the Act were not applicable. (AY. 2008-09)

SKM Shree Shivkumar v. ACIT (2014) 65 SOT 232 (Chennai)(Trib.)

S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Not a share holder – Provision is not applicable

37

In the present case, the assessee company was engaged in the business of providing computer services. Its shares were held by a company 'V' and Three individuals by name 'K', 'R' and 'S' to the extent of 64%, 32%, 2% and 2% respectively. Further the entire shares of company 'V' were held by 'R' & 'S'. During the previous year, the assessee had received a loan from company 'V'. The A.O. treated the amount of loan as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e) of the Act. On appeal C.I.T.(A) held that to invoke the provisions of section 2(22)(e), the assessee must be shareholder in the company which gave loan. Since the assessee was not a shareholder the loan in question could not be treated as deemed dividend in the hands of the assessee under section 2(22)(e) of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the order of the C.I.T.(A) and dismissed the Departments appeal on the ground that since the intention of legislature behind the provisions of section 2(22)(e) is to tax dividend in hands of shareholder and assessee

company was not a shareholder in company 'V' deeming provisions of section 2(22)(e) of the Act were not applicable to the instant case. (AY. 2006-07)
ACIT v. Source Hub India (P) Ltd. (2013) 27 ITR 470 / (2014) 61 SOT 111 (Bang.)(Trib.)

38 **S.2(22)(e) : Deemed dividend – Sister concern transactions of commercial nature – Provision of deemed dividend is not applicable**

The assessee was 100% EOU engaged in the business of conversion of rough granite blocks into polished granite slabs, granite tiles and monuments. During the assessment proceedings, the AO found that 2 individuals S and V held shares in the assessee with voting power of 75% and 25% respectively. S also held 66.8% of the voting rights of a sister concern which had accumulated profits and also had credit balance in the name of the assessee. Therefore, the AO held that there was a loan or advance within the meaning of section 2(22)(e) of the Act and treated the amount of accumulated profit as deemed dividend and disallowed the benefits of deduction u/s. 10B. The CIT(A) deleting the addition made by the AO held that the transactions of the assessee with its sister concern were commercial in nature and that the provisions of section 2(22)(e) of the Act were not applicable.

On appeal by the Department, the Tribunal observed that the assessee had filed additional details before the CIT(A) establishing that the transactions were regular business transactions. These evidences were also sent to the AO in the Remand Proceedings who had in his Remand Report conceded that the transactions were regular business transactions. Accordingly, the Tribunal dismissed the departmental appeal. (AY. 2006-07)

Dy. CIT v. Chariot International P. Ltd. (2014) 29 ITR 36 / 65 SOT 170 (Chennai)(Trib.)

39 **S.2(24) : Income – Transfer of development right (TDR) – Co-operative society – Compensation paid to members – Amount cannot be taxed in the hands of society. [S.2(14), 2(47)]**

Assessee was a housing society consisting of 51 members. It had certain property. Developer has paid certain amount to the society for granting consent to consume TDR purchased by developer from 3rd party. Developer has also paid certain amount of compensation to individual members of society. AO held that compensation received by the society and members of the society also taxable in the hands of society. On appeal Tribunal held that amount of compensation paid by the developer to the members of the society cannot be taxed in the hands of society as individual members have offered the income to tax in their respective assessment. Society has received only ₹ 2.51,000 for granting consent to consume TDR purchased by the developer from third party. The Society continued to be the owner of the land and no change in ownership of the land had taken place. Mere grant of consent would not amount to transfer of land or any rights therein. Tribunal deleted the addition. The revenue has filed an appeal to High Court which was dismissed by Bombay High Court (ITA NO. 2292 of 2011 dt. 27-12-2013. Revenue has filed SLP before Supreme Court, which was also dismissed. (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Raj Ratan Palace Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 1(St.)(SC)

Editorial: Refer Raj Ratan Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (2011) 46 SOT 217 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)

S.2(24) : Income – Capital or revenue – Carbon credit – Receipt on account of carbon credit is capital receipt hence not liable to tax. [S.4, 28(iv), 45] 40

The amount received for carbon credits has no element of profit or gain and it cannot be subjected to tax in any manner under any head of income. (AY. 2007-08 to 2009-10) *Shree Cement Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 100 DTR 33 / 160 TTJ 529 / 31 ITR 513 / 2015) 152 ITD 561 (Jaipur)(Trib.)*

S.2(24) : Income – Capital or revenue – Carbon credit – Income on sale of Certified Emission Reduction/carbon credit – Chargeable to tax. [S. 2(24)(vd), 4, 28(i)] 41

The value of any benefit or perquisite arising from business or profession forms part of the profit and gains of the business. Therefore, the income on sale of the Certified Emission Reduction/carbon credit which is admittedly a benefit arising out of the business of the assessee, would fall within the definition of “income” u/s. 2(24)(vd) of the Act. Therefore, income on sale of Certified Emission Reduction/carbon credit part of the chargeable as income. (AY. 2008-09)

Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 756 / 31 ITR 477 (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.2(24) : Income – Charitable trust – Donation towards building construction was held not taxable – Donations used for the benefit of trustees is held to be taxable – Matter was set aside. [S.2(24)(ia), 12] 42

Donations received by the assessee-society towards building construction cannot be brought to tax and the donations used for the benefit of trustees are taxable as income of the assessee. The matter was sent back to Assessing Officer to segregate the donations which have been diverted for personal benefit of the members of the society.

JB Educational Society v. ACIT (2013) 28 ITR 284 / (2014) 159 TTJ 236 / 98 DTR 347 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 322 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

Joginapally B.R. Education Society v. ACIT (2013) 28 ITR 284 (2014) 159 TTJ 236 / 98 DTR 347 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 322 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.2(29A) : Long-term capital asset – Cancellation of original site and allotment of new site – Period of holding to be considered from date of original site allotment – Entitled to exemption as long term capital gains. [S. 45, 48, 54EC, 54F] 43

The assessee sold a property for consideration of ₹ 1.13 crore. Out of the consideration, he invested an amount of ₹ 28 lakh and ₹ 22 lakh in REC Bonds and National Highway Authority Bonds. He also purchased an apartment and filed a return by offering the balance amount to tax under the head Income from long-term capital gains, after claiming exemption under sections 54EC and 54F. The AO observed that the sale deed executed in favour of the assessee was on 27-2-2008 and he sold property on 29-5-2008, within four months from the date of purchase and, therefore, it was short-term capital gain. Therefore, he disallowed the exemption claimed and thereby raised a demand on the assessee. The CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO. On appeal, the Tribunal observed that the assessee acquired a right to hold the property when the allotment was made for first time on 25-8-1988. Due to some disputes, he could not be conveyed a site without encumbrance and with a clear title. As the sale had taken place beyond the three-year period, capital gains accrued on such transfer constituted a long-term capital

gain and therefore, the assessee was also entitled to exemption as claimed. On an appeal by revenue, the HC held that the original site was allotted to the assessee prior to 36 months after payment of full value, merely because the said allotment was cancelled, and a new site was allotted, in law, would make no difference, admittedly when the original consideration paid was treated as a consideration for the subsequent allotment. Capital gains arising on the sale of new property would be long-term, and assessee was entitled to the benefit of exemption under sections 54EC and 54F. (AY. 2009-10)
CIT v. A. Suresh Rao (2014) 223 Taxman 228 (Karn.)(HC)

44 **S.2(29A) : Long term capital asset – Capital gains – Period of holding – Letter of allotment – Period of holding of flat has to be reckoned from date of allotment letter for the purpose of computing capital gain. [S.45, 54F]**

The Tribunal held that the assessee was allotted a flat in a building *vide* allotment letter dated 22-1-2005, by which the builders agreed to sell the flat to the assessee. After signing the said letter of allotment and paying the booking amount, the assessee acquired the right in the flat. Thus, all the rights in the flat were duly acquired by the assessee on 22-1-2005, the period of holding is to be computed with respect to the date of allotment that is 22-1-2005. Thus when the assessee sold the flat on 5-3-2009, the holding period of the right in flat with the assessee was right in flat with the assessee was more than 36 months, therefore, the assessee was right in claiming exemption under section 54F of the Act. (AY. 2009-10)

ACIT v. Sanjay Kumath (2014)63 SOT 90/ The Chamber's Journal – April P, 81 (Indore) (Trib.)

45 **S.2(29B) : Long-term capital gain – Expiry of tenancy thereafter month to month basis – Capital asset – Amount received on surrender of tenancy assessable as long-term capital gains.[Ss.2(14), 2(42A) 45, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Ss.106, 116]**

The assessee-company had acquired tenancy right in a building, on the basis of an agreement of lease deed for occupation of that property for a period of 3 years, during the financial year 1972-73. After the end of the said term of 3 years, the assessee continued to occupy the premises as a tenant, but no fresh written document was executed. Pursuant to a Memorandum with the third party, the assessee vacated the tenanted area and surrendered the tenancy rights to the owner during the financial year 1996-97 and in return received some amount from the third party which was offered to be taxed as long-term capital gain. The Assessing Officer treated it as short-term capital gain on ground that after initial period of 3 years i.e. after expiry of lease, tenancy turned into on 'month to month' basis. Thus, tenancy rights extinguished on the last day of each month and a fresh or new tenancy was created. The Court held that, in the present case, the assessee had acquired tenancy rights on 15th March, 1973 and since then they had held the said tenancy rights till the surrender was made on 18th February, 1997. The transfer of tenancy had taken place on 18th February, 1997 and not before. The period of holding, therefore, was from 15th March, 1973 till 18th February, 1997. No third person, who had come into possession of the property during the period and it is not a case of the revenue that assessee did not hold the property during the entire period of over 14 years. The word, 'held' as used in section 2(42A) is with reference to

a capital asset and the term, 'capital asset' is not confined and restricted to ownership of a property or an asset. Capital assets can consist of rights other than ownership right in an asset, like leasehold rights, allotment rights, etc. The sequitur, therefore, it was held that the word 'held' or 'hold' is not synonymous with right over the asset as an owner and had to be given a broader and wider meaning. Amount received on surrender of tenancy was held to be assessable as long-term capital gains.

CIT v. Frick India Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 328 / 227 Taxman 128 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.2(29B) : Long-term capital gain – Allotment of flat – Delivery of possession are consequential acts and relate back to and arise from the rights conferred by the allotment letter – Assessable as long-term capital gains. [S. 45]

46

A flat was allotted to assessee on 7-6-1986. She paid first instalment on 4-7-1986. Possession of flat was delivered on a later date. Thereafter she sold flat on 5-7-1989. In return of income for assessment year 1990-91, she disclosed capital gain arising from sale of flat as long-term capital gain. Lower authorities treated capital gain as short-term capital gain. The mere fact that possession was delivered later does not detract from the fact that the allottee was conferred a right to hold property on issuance of an allotment letter. The payment of balance instalments, identification of a particular flat and delivery of possession are consequential acts and relate back to and arise from the rights conferred by the allotment letter. The Court held that capital gain arising from sale of flat was a long-term capital gain. Circular No. 471, dated 15-10-1986. (AY. 1990-91)

Madhu Kaul (Ms.) v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 54 / 271 CTR 107 / 225 Taxman 86 / 108 DTR 91 (P&H)(HC)

S.2(31) : Person – An individual – Association of persons – Land inherited by brothers by operation of law – Assessee to be assessed as individuals and not as an association of persons. [Ss. 2(31)(i), 2(31) (v), 28, 45(5)(b), Land Acquisition Act, 1894, S.28]

47

The assessee were brothers. Their father died leaving land to the assessee and two others who relinquished their rights in the assessee's favour. Bequeathed land was acquired by the State Government and compensation was paid to the assessee. AO brought to tax the compensation in the status of Association of persons and taxed the interest in the year of receipt. On appeal High Court held that assessee were to be assessed as individuals and not an association of persons and that the interest was to be spread over from the year of dispossession of land, that is, the assessment year 1987-88, till the year of actual payment, which was the assessment year 1999-2000. On appeal by the revenue the Court held that land inherited by the brothers by operation of law hence assessable as individuals and not association of persons. Interest is taxable in the year of receipt and not spread over.

CIT v. Govindbhai Mamaiya (2014) 367 ITR 498 / 271 CTR 31 / 109 DTR 65 / (2015) 229 Taxman 138 (SC)

Editorial: Judgment of Gujarat High Court in ITA No. 8103 of 2009 dt 16-11-2006 was partly affirmed and partly reversed.

48 **S.2(31) : Association of persons – Essential features – Association amongst members must be real and substantial – Ruling of AAR was set aside. [S.9(1)(i), 90]**

Court held that before an association can be considered as a separate homogeneous taxable entity (i.e., an association of persons), it must exhibit the following essential features : (i) must be constituted by two or more persons; (ii) the constituent members must have come together for a common purpose; (iii) the association must move by common action and there must be some scheme of common management; and (iv) the co-operation and association amongst the constituent members must not be perfunctory or merely in form. The association amongst members must be real and substantial. Accordingly, that the question as to whether the petitioner and CINDA constituted an association of persons would have to be examined on the basis of the legal principles. *CTCI Overseas Corporation Ltd. v. DIT(IT) (2014) 366 ITR 33 / 224 Taxman 207 (Delhi.) (HC)*

Editorial : Ruling of AAR in CTCI Overseas Corporation Ltd., In re [2012] 342 ITR 217 (AAR) is set aside.

49 **S.2(31) : Person – An association of persons – Linde and Samsung were independent of each other and were responsible for their own deliverables under the Contract, without reference to each other. Consequently, no AOP is formed – DTAA-India – Germany – Business connection – Matter remanded. [S. 2(31)(v), 9(i), (i), 9(1)(vii), 90, 197, Art. 3, 4, 5, 7, 12]**

Before an association can be considered as a separate taxable entity (i.e an Association of Persons), the same must exhibit the following essential features: (i) must be constituted by two or more persons; (ii) the constituent members must have come together for a common purpose; (iii) the association must move by common action and there must be some scheme of common management; (iv) the co-operation and association amongst the constituent members must not be perfunctory and/or merely in form. The association amongst members must be real and substantial which is sufficient to treat the association as a separate homogeneous taxable entity. (b) On facts, as per the terms of the Contract, the scope of work to be executed by Linde and Samsung was separate and was accordingly specified in the Annexures to the Contract. The payments to be made for separate items of work were also specified. The currency in which the payments were to be made was also separately indicated.

Linde and Samsung had joined together to (i) bid for the contract; (ii) present a façade of a consortium to OPAL for execution of the contract and accept joint and several liability towards OPAL for due performance of the contract and completion of the project; and (iii) put in place a management structure for *inter se* co-ordination and execution of the project. However, in all other respects, both Linde and Samsung were independent of each other and were responsible for their own deliverables under the Contract, without reference to each other. Consequently, no AOP is formed.

Linde AG. Linde Engineering Division v. DDIT (2014) 365 ITR 1 / 268 CTR 274 / 103 DTR 137 / 224 Taxman 43 (Mag)(Delhi)(HC)

S.2(42A) : Short-term capital asset – Transfer – Letter of allotment – Period of holding – Booking rights – Capital asset of booking rights accrues to buyer only on signing of agreement and not on date of allotment application. [Ss.2(14), 2(29A), 45]

50

The court held that for computing the period of holding of capital asset to be counted from the date of buyer's agreement and not from the date of booking or date of allotment application. On the facts the allotment or confirmation letter states clearly that no right to provisional or final allotment accrues until the agreement is signed between the buyer and the builder. Thus, in such a case capital asset of booking rights accrues to buyer only on date of signing buyer's agreement and not on date of allotment application or confirmation letter.

Gulshan Malik v. CIT (2014) 223 Taxman 243 / 102 DTR 354 (Delhi)(HC)

S.2(42B) : Short-term capital gain – Right under agreement was acquired in February 2005 – Assessable as short-term capital gains. [S.2(29A), 45]

51

Agreement for purchase of property under attachment to bank in June 2001. Consideration for sale paid in February 2004. Sale of property to third person in February 2005. Rights under agreement acquired only in February 2004 hence gains on sale of property assessable as short-term capital gains. (AY. 2005-06)

Lachmandas and Sons v. Dy. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 315 / 104 DTR 165 (2015) 230 Taxman 145 (Ker.)(HC)

S.2(47) : Transfer – Capital gain – Profit on sale of property used for residence – If an agreement to sell is entered into within the prescribed period, there is a transfer of some rights in favour of the vendee. Fact that sale deed could not be executed within the time limit owing to supervening problem is not a bar for s. 54 exemption. [S.45, 54]

52

Consequences of execution of the agreement to sell are very clear and they are to the effect that the appellants could not have sold the property to someone else. In practical life, there are events when a person, even after executing an agreement to sell an immoveable property in favour of one person, tries to sell the property to another. In our opinion, such an act would not be in accordance with law because once an agreement to sell is executed in favour of one person, the said person gets a right to get the property transferred in his favour by filing a suit for specific performance and therefore, without hesitation we can say that some right, in respect of the said property, belonging to the appellants had been extinguished and some right had been created in favour of the vendee/transferee, when the agreement to sell had been executed. A right in respect of the capital asset, viz. the property in question had been transferred by the appellants in favour of the vendee/transferee on 27-12-2002. The sale deed could not be executed for the reason that the appellants had been prevented from dealing with the residential house by an order of a competent court, which they could not have violated. As held in *Oxford University Press v. CIT* [(2001) 3 SCC 359] a purposive interpretation of the provisions of the Act should be given while considering a claim for exemption from tax and one can very well interpret the provisions of Section 54 read with Section 2(47) of the Act, i.e. definition of "transfer", which would enable the appellants to get the benefit under section 54 of the Act. (AY. 2005-06)

Sanjeev Lal v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 389 / 105 DTR 305 / 269 CTR 1 / 225 Taxman 239 (SC)

Shail Motilal (Smt) v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 389 / 105 DTR 305 / (SC)

53 **S.2(47) : Transfer – Capital gain – Registration of sale deed alone of completes transfer – Capital gains taxable in that year only. [S.45, 54EC]**

Assessee entered into an agreement of sale on 7-12-1999 with a company for sale of his property and received full sale consideration on 21-12-2002. Thereafter, 16 sale deeds were registered in favour of nominees of company on various dates between 27-2-2003 and 23-3-2004. Possession of the above property was handed over to nominees on 25-3-2004. In return of income filed for assessment year 2004-05, the assessee disclosed capital gains arising out of sale of above property. The entire sale consideration was invested in notified bonds on various dates between 13-5-2004 and 10-9-2004 and exemption under section 54EC was claimed. The AO held that the sale transactions, which took place between 27-2-2003 and 7-3-2003, would be liable to capital gains tax for the assessment year 2003-04. The sale transactions, which took place between 27-2-2003 and 7-3-2004, would be liable to capital gains tax during the assessment year 2004-05. The CIT(A), however, reversed the order of the AO and held that the entire capital gains tax would be chargeable in assessment year 2004-05. On Second Appeal, the Tribunal held that the transfer as contemplated under section 2(47)(v) took place as early as on 21-12-2002 and accordingly directed the Assessing Officer to tax the entire capital gain in the assessment year 2003-04. The High Court held that, registration of sale deed alone completes transfer, capital gain arising on sale transactions, which took place between 27-2-2003 and 7-3-2003, would be considered for taxation only in assessment year 2003-04 and as regards sale deeds executed between 11-4-2003 and 23-3-2004 liability would be assessed in assessment year 2004-05. (AY. 2003-04 & 2004-05)

R. Krishnaswamy v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxman 270 / 108 DTR 71 (Mad.)(HC)

54 **S.2(47) : Transfer – Capital gain – Immovable property – Agreement to sell – Purchaser has sold two shops – Liable to capital gain. [S.45]**

Assessee were co-owners of a property. They entered into an agreement to sell said property on 7-9-1991. Assessee claimed that since by aforesaid agreement, they had not transferred possession, there was no transfer of capital asset within the meaning of section 2(47). Assessing Officer rejected assessee's explanation holding that execution of agreement to sell resulted in transfer of property under section 2(47)(v). Tribunal found that assessee were full owners of property and by entering into agreement to sell, they had transferred their right of ownership in favour of purchasers. It was also undisputed that on basis of said agreement, purchasers further sold two shops and carried out development work on property in question. Tribunal thus confirmed order passed by Assessing Officer. It was held that impugned order of Tribunal did not require any interference. (AY.1991-92)

Chandra Prakash Jain v. ACIT (Inv.) Circle (2014) 107 DTR 81 / 270 CTR 192 / 224 Taxman 290 (All.)(HC)

55 **S. 2(47) : Transfer – Capital gain – Power of attorney – A Power of Attorney which does not enable enjoyment of property does not result in a “transfer”. CBDT Circular No.495 dated 22-9-1987 reads more into s. 2(47)(vi) than warranted – Not liable to capital gains. [S.45, Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S.53A, Registration Act, 1908]**

The Court held that by a power of attorney (i) There is no transfer to or enabling enjoyment of property in favour of the assessee in any manner and therefore, sub-clause

(vi) of Section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act does not get attracted. Clause 21 of the power of attorney clearly reveals that no consideration was received from the power agent for appointing him as power of attorney. It also emphasised therein that the property right has not been handed over to the power agent. We are, therefore, unable to accept the plea of the Revenue that there was an element of transfer or enabling enjoyment in favour of the assessee.

We, therefore, now proceed to analyze the meaning behind circular No.495 dated 22-9-1987. The interpretation of the circular as put forward by the Revenue, we are not in agreement. The provisions of sub-clause (vi) of Section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act make it clear that the transaction, which has the effect of transferring or enabling the enjoyment of immovable property alone would come within the ambit of transfer. The circular reads something more into the provision. We are not inclined to accept such an interpretation. The circular also states that the legal ownership would continue with the transferor; but the property rights if transferred by way of power of attorney would come within the ambit of sub-clause (vi) of Section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act. Assuming we accept the intention behind the circular, then there should be an element of transfer or enabling enjoyment of property right as stated in paragraph 11.2 of the circular by the power of attorney holder.

(iii) We find no such recital in the power of attorney as extracted by the Tribunal and referred to by us. On the contrary, the terms of the power of attorney clearly show that property rights has not been transferred to the power of attorney holder and there is also no provision for enabling enjoyment. It is not the case of the Department that the power of attorney is sham. If they accept the power of attorney is valid, then the plea of capital gains at the hands of the assessee has no legs to stand.

CIT v. C. Sugumaran (2015) 113 DTR 35 / 231 Taxman 468 (Mad.)(HC)

S.2(47) : Transfer – Capital gain – Power of attorney – Possession was handed over – Execution of a Power of Attorney in favour of the builder constitutes part performance u/s. 53A of Transfer of Property Act, hence liable to capital gains. [Ss. 11, 45, Transfer of Property Act, 1953, S.53A]

56

- (i) On a reading of the above provision itself, it is clear that possession of the property has been handed over to the builder immediately on receipt of the first installment of the payment from the builder. As per clause (3), the total consideration is mentioned as ₹ 8,83,50,400/- and ₹ 3,00,00,000/- was to be paid as advance on the date of the agreement. The balance amounts were to be paid in instalments. These provisions categorically indicate the existence of an agreement by which the substantial portion of sale consideration is paid and possession of the property is handed over to the builder.
- (ii) It is argued on behalf of the respondent that this is not a sale agreement at all. It is an agreement between owner of the land and the builder. It is argued that Clause (1) itself would show that if the project is not viable the property has to be returned back and the assessee will return all the money till then received. That apart, when a power of attorney is executed, the factum of sale arises only when the property is sold by the builder in favour of third parties. Only at that stage,

that is when the sale deeds are executed, transfer as defined under section 2(47) takes place.

- (iii) On going through the materials on record and the documents made available, we do not think that the Tribunal has correctly appreciated the question on hand. When transfer is defined under the Income-tax Act and it includes a transaction involving possession to be handed over in part performance of a contract in the nature referred to in Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act, it amounts to transfer. Section 53A clearly explains the concept of part performance of a contract of sale of immovable property. If a buyer is put in possession of a property in part performance of the obligations under the agreement on the buyer paying a substantial portion of the sale consideration, the contract of sale is treated to be in part performance. Perusal of the agreement in the case clearly indicates such a contract of part performance. The assessee cannot take a contention that the builder is not the buyer. In fact, the terms and conditions of the agreement clearly indicates that the intention of the parties is to sell the property as such to the buyer, or their nominees and a power of attorney is given to enable the buyer to sell the undivided share of land in favour of purchasers of apartments to be constructed by the buyer of the land. The execution of the sale deed is deferred as at the time when the possession of the property is transferred to the builder, there is no purchaser for the property. In other words, the builder himself has crept into the shoes of the purchaser of the property and the registered instruments were created subsequently and the idea of keeping alive the agreement and execution of power of attorney in favour of the builder is only for the purpose of avoiding duplication of registered instruments and payment of stamp duty. In this case, the assessee itself executes the sale deed after several years on the request of the builder. Therefore, in principle, the actual transfer takes place between the assessee and the builder and it is thereafter the builder transfers possession to the purchaser of the apartments.
- (iv) In the said circumstances, we are of the opinion, capital gains is to be computed at the time when the transfer takes place which has to be during the assessment year when a substantial portion of the amount was received by the assessee, that is when Rs.3.81 crores was received by the assessee during the assessment year 2004-05. Hence the said question is to be answered in favour of the department. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Cochin Stock Exchanges Ltd., v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 382 / 103 DTR 219 / 269 CTR 93 (Ker.)(HC)

57 **S.2(47) : Transfer – Capital gain – Possession of property before date of sale deed – Transfer could not be treated as taking place before date of sale deed – Denial of exemption under section 54F was held to be justified. [S.45, 54F]**

The word “transfer” under s. 2(47) includes a situation where a transaction has been made allowing possession of any immovable property in part performance of the contract. But that should be made good on material placed on record and through cogent evidence. Held, the claim of the assessee that there was transfer of possession to her under the agreement dated September 15, 2004, had not been made out on acceptable

material facts before the three authorities. In view of the finding of fact, the order of the Tribunal could not be interfered with. Denial of exemption under section 54F was held to be justified. (AY. 2008-09)

Latha Ramachandra Inamdar (Ms) v. DCIT (2013) 218 Taxman 277 / (2014) 360 ITR 367 / 103 DTR 132(Karn.)(HC)

S.2(47) : Transfer – Capital gain – Family arrangement – Court decree – Amount received held to be not liable to capital gains. [S. 45, 47(1), 55(2)(b)] 58

Amount received by assessee pursuant to a Court decree in lieu of her share in self-acquired property of father who died intestate, could not be said to result in ‘transfer’ attracting provisions of s. 2(47)(i) or (ii), hence not liable to capital gains tax. (AY. 2009-10) *T. Gayathri (Smt.) v. ITO (2014) 150 ITD 48 / 166 TTJ 740 (Bang.)(Trib.)*

S.2(47)(v) : Transfer – Capital gain – Transfer under a development agreement takes place on handing over possession – Capital gains are chargeable to tax even if no consideration is received by assessee. [S.45, Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 53A] 59

S. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which is engrafted in the definition of “transfer” in S. 2(47) of the Income-tax Act does not contemplate any payment of consideration. Payment of consideration on the date of agreement of sale is not required. It may be deferred for a future date. The element of factual possession and agreement are contemplated as transfer within the meaning of the aforesaid section. When the transfer is complete, automatically, consideration mentioned in the agreement for sale has to be taken into consideration for the purpose of assessment of income for the assessment year when the agreement was entered into and possession was given. Here, factually it was found that both the aforesaid aspects took place in the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2003-04. Hence, the Tribunal has rightly held that the appellant is liable to pay tax on the capital gain for the assessment year. (AY.2003-04)

Potla Nageswara Rao v. DCIT (2014) 365 ITR 249 / 269 CTR 325 / 106 DTR 96 / 226 Taxman 173 (AP)(HC)

S.2(47)(v) : Transfer – Capital gain – Mere execution of a development agreement is not a “transfer” if possession as per s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is not given. [S.45, Transfer of Property Act, 53A]] 60

Though the development agreement was executed in AY 2003-04, the possession as contemplated in Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was in fact not handed over by the assessee to the developer. The agreement only permitted the development to be carried out by the said developer. The entire control over the property was in fact with the assessee inasmuch as the licence to construct the property was also in the name of the assessee and the occupancy certificate was also given to the assessee. Therefore, the execution of the agreement could not amount to transfer as contemplated under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The agreement was subsequently specifically modified and the assessee was liable to pay the capital gain as per the last agreement i.e. for assessment year 2008-09.(AY.2008-09)

CIT v. Sadia Shaikh (2013) 87 CCH 59 (Bom.)(HC) www.itatonline.org

- 61 **S.2(47)(v) : Transfer – Capital gain – Development rights – Mere execution of a development agreement does not result in a “transfer” if the approval of the municipal corporation is delayed and the developer has not started work – Complete control over the property was not given and only licence was given. [S.45]**

The assessee had received advance amounts much earlier to the execution of development agreement, probably on the strength of the MOU. The property was encumbered with tenancy rights of many persons and the release of tenancy right was completed only in January, 2005. Further, the approval from municipal corporation was also got delayed and the plans were revised subsequent to AY 2000-01. The surrounding circumstances show that the developer did not start the work of development in the year relevant to AY 2001-02. As per the terms of development agreement, the assessee has given only licence to enter into the property, meaning thereby the possession was not given in the year relevant to AY 2001-02. In view of the peculiar facts narrated above, the assessee has contended that the tax authorities are not correct in holding that the transfer of property took place in the year relevant to AY 2001-02. Held that the transfer of property did not take place on the date of execution of development agreement and accordingly the tax authorities are not justified in assessing the capital gain in AY 2001-02. The capital gain was rightly assessed in the assessment year 2004-05). (AY. 2001-02)

Dilip Annand Vazirani v. ITO (2015) 167 TTJ 194 / 113 DTR 26 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 62 **S.2(47)(v) : Transfer – Capital gain – Possession – Development agreement – Despite handing over possession & receiving advance, development agreement is not a “transfer” for capital gains purposes if developer has not performed his part of the contract – Capital gains are liable to be taxed only in the year in which the development area coming to the share of the assessee is handed over it. [S.45 Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 53A]**

A transaction is deemed to be a “transfer” u/s. 2(47)(v) of the Act if the conditions of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act are satisfied. For s. 53A, ‘willingness to perform’ of the transferee is something more than a statement of intent; it is the unqualified and unconditional willingness on the part of the vendee to perform its obligations. Unless the party has performed or is willing to perform its obligations under the contract, and in the same sequence in which these are to be performed, it cannot be said that the provisions of s. 53A of the TOP Act will come into play. On facts, a reading of the ‘Development Agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney’ indicates that what was handed over by the assessee to the developer is only ‘permissive possession’. The agreement specifically provides that the assessee has permitted the developer to develop the land and that the consideration receivable by the assessee from the developer is ‘38% of the residential part of the developed area’. That being so, it is only upon receipt of such consideration in the form of developed area by the assessee in terms of the development agreement, the capital gains becomes assessable in the hands of the assessee. Further, the facts show that even as on date, there was no developmental activity on the land. The process of construction has not been even initiated and no approval for the construction of the building is obtained. This is due to lapse on the part of the transferee. While the assessee has fulfilled its part of the obligation under the development agreement, the developer has not done anything to discharge the

obligations cast on it under the develop agreement. Mere receipt of refundable deposit cannot be termed as receipt of consideration. Consequently, S. 53A does not apply. As a result, there is no “transfer” u/s. 2(47)(v) of the Act. (AY. 2006-07)

Binjusaria Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 169 / 106 DTR 321 / 164 TTJ 417 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

Section 3 : “Previous year” defined

S.3 : Previous year – Assessing authority according permission to change previous year to year ending June 30 instead of calendar year – No ambiguity in adopting the period of assessment from 1-1-1987 to 31-3-1989. [S.154]

63

The assessee adopted the calendar year as its previous year and accordingly the assessment for the year 1987-88 was completed. The assessee was accorded permission to change the previous year from the calendar year to the previous year ending on June 30 of every year. However, in view of the amendment, instead of ending the previous year on June 30, 1988, relevant to the assessment year 1989-90, the assessee had to adopt the previous year ending on March 31, 1989, relevant to the assessment year 1989-90 and, accordingly, the assessee filed the return for the period January 1, 1987, to March 31, 1989. The assessing authority cancelled the permission granted to the assessee for adopting the previous year ending on June 30 every year under section 154. The Commissioner (Appeals) set aside the order under section 154 and that order attained finality Tribunal confirmed the order of CIT(A). On appeal by revenue dismissing the appeal the Court held that passing two assessment orders did not survive, there was no error in the order of the Tribunal. The result was that the order of the assessing authority, granting permission to adopt the previous year, ending on June 30 every year, was valid. The assessment made for the assessment year 1989-90 for the period, namely, January 1, 1987 to March 31, 1989, was in consonance with the amended section 3. The amendment was applicable to the assessment year 1989-90. Therefore, there was no ambiguity in adopting the period of assessment from January 1, 1987, to March 31, 1989. [AY.1988-89, 1989-90]

CIT v. Rampur Distillery and Chemical Co. Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 551 (All.)(HC)

Section 4 : Charge of income-tax

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Sikkim – Application of Act with effect from 1-4-1990 – Effect – Repeal of Sikkim State Tax Manual by necessary implication – Assessments made under Sikkim Tax Manual for assessment years 1997-98 to 2005-06 not valid – State directed to refund amount. [Constitution of India, Art. 371F(n), Sikkim State Income-tax Manual, 1948]

64

Held, the 1961 Act was already in force, and was extended to the State of Sikkim on April 1, 1990. Thus, it was not an instance of enacting a new taxation law for the State of Sikkim after it became a part of India. Therefore, the principle that the Legislature, while enacting a law, has complete knowledge of the existing laws on the same subject-matter and the possible consequence thereof would not be applicable. In

such a situation, merely because it does not provide a repealing provision, it could not be held that the intention was not to repeal the existing legislation. The provisions of the two enactments are quite different and the enactments cannot stand together. The 1961 Act is more exhaustive than the 1948 Sikkim Manual and they occupy the same field relating to levy of income-tax and its recovery. If both the statutes are held to be operating in the same field, there would be a situation of existing two laws relating to income-tax and in the absence of any protection coming forward, the assessee may be subjected to double taxation. It is, thus, clear that on account of the inconsistencies, the two enactments could not stand together and on extension of the 1961 Act, the 1948 Sikkim Manual was repealed by necessary implication. The assessee claimed its rights as an assessee under the 1961 Act. Therefore, any adverse plea like it was not an assessee under the 1961 Act or that the 1961 Act was not applicable to the assessee, being a plea relating to the statute would not operate as estoppel against it. After extension of the 1961 Act to the State of Sikkim with effect from April 1, 1990, the 1948 Sikkim Manual stood repealed and the assessments made thereunder for the assessment years 1997-98 to 2005-06 were without authority of law, non est and nullity. Consequently, the order of assessment, the demand notice and the other consequential orders were quashed. The State was directed to refund a sum of ₹ 76,53,655 to the assessee within a period of 90 days from today, failing which the amount shall carry interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date commencing after completion of 90 days till realisation. (AY. 1997-98 to 2005-06)

Sikkim Manipal University v. State of Sikkim (2014) 369 ITR 567 (2015) 273 CTR 25 / 232 Taxman 360 (Sikkim)(HC)

65 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Accrual of income – Ten per cent of cost of conductor to be paid only upon certification of quality conforming to specifications – No accrual of income till such stage. [S.145]**

The assessee was a manufacturer of electrical conductors. It supplied an item of conductor to a purchaser. Under the agreement, 10 per cent of the cost of the goods was to be paid only after final certification of the conductor after erection and charging. For the assessment year 1998-99, the AO added a sum of ₹ 64,58,606, representing 10 per cent of the cost of the conductor sold by the assessee on the ground that though the amount would be paid at a later stage, the assessee had acquired the right to receive the amount. The Tribunal set aside the order of assessment made by the AO. On appeal High Court also affirmed the view of Tribunal. Followed the ratio in, *CIT v. Excel Industries Ltd.* [2013] 358 ITR 295 (SC) applied. (AY. 1998-99)
CIT v. India Fruits Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 586 (T & AP)(HC)

66 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Mutuality – Transfer Fees received by Co-op. Hsg. Soc. from incoming & outgoing members (even in excess of limits) is exempt on the ground of mutuality – Contribution to building repair fund is not transfer fee.[Constitution of India, Art. 43A]**

The assessee, a Co-operative Housing Society, received a sum of ₹ 39,68,000 on account of transfer of flat and garage and credited it to 'general amenities fund' as well as 'repair fund'. The assessee claimed that the said receipt is exempted from tax on the ground

of mutuality. However, the AO held that the principles of mutuality will not apply. However, the CIT(A) and Tribunal allowed the assessee's claim by relying on *Sind Co-operative Housing Society v. ITO (2009) 317 ITR 47*. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal :

The very issue and the very question was raised repeatedly in the case of the assessee society. Repeatedly the Revenue has failed in convincing the Tribunal that Sind Co-operative Housing Society will not cover the Society's case. The contribution is made to the repair fund or to the general fund and credited as such. While it may be true that it is occasioned by transfer of a flat and garage, yet, we do not see how merely because there was cap or restriction placed on the transfer fees or the quantum thereof, in this case the principle of mutuality cannot be applied. The underlying principle and of a co-operative movement has been completely overlooked by the Revenue. The Revenue seems to be of the view that a Co-operative Housing Society makes profit, if it receives something beyond this amount of ₹ 25,000. There has to be material brought and which will have a definite bearing on this issue. If the amount is received on account of transfer of a flat and which is not restricted to ₹ 25,000/- but much more, then different consideration may apply. However, in the present case, what has been argued and vehemently is the amount was received by the Society when the flat and the garage were transferred. Therefore, it must be presumed to be nothing but transfer fees. It may have been credited to the fund and with a view to demonstrate that it is nothing but a voluntarily contribution or donation to the Society, but still it constitutes its income. However, for rendering such a conclusive finding there has to be material brought by the Revenue on record. Beyond urging that it has been received at the time of a transfer of the flat and credited to such a fund will not be enough to displace the principle laid down in the decision of *Sind Co-operative Housing Society*. The attempt of the Revenue therefore is nothing but overcoming the binding judgment of this Court. In the present case, the Commissioner and the Tribunal both have held that the receipt may have been occasioned by the transfer but the principle of mutuality will still apply. It is a typical relationship between the member of the Co-operative Society and particularly a Housing Society and the Society which is a body Corporate and a legal entity by itself that is forming the basis of the principle laid down by the Division Bench. Co-operative movement is a socio-economic and a moral movement. It has now been recognized by Article 43A of the Constitution of India. It is to foster and encourage the spirit of brotherhood and co-operation that the Government encourages formation of Co-operative Societies. The members may be owning individually the flats or immovable properties but enjoying, in common, the amenities, advantages and benefits. The Society as a legal entity owns the building but the amenities are provided and that is how the terms "flat" and the "housing society" are defined in the statute in question. We do not therefore find any reason to deviate from the principle laid down in *Sind Co-operative Housing Society's* case and which followed a Supreme Court judgment. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Darbhanga Mansion CHS Ltd. (2015) 370 ITR 443 / 273 CTR 473 / 113 DTR 307 (Bom.)(HC)

67 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Termination of lease of business asset – Compensation towards loss of revenue and non-compete fee under agreement in March 1993 – Capital receipt. [S.28(va), 28(ii), 55]**

Dismissing the appeal of revenue the Court held that the amount in question being compensation towards the loss of source of income and also towards non-competition fee to prevent the assessee from carrying on the similar business using the know-how possessed by the assessee as a competitor, the amount of ₹ 5.31 crores paid was capital in nature. There being no cost of acquisition, the capital gains were not computable. In view of the amendment to the Finance Act, 2002, with effect from April 1, 2003, the capital receipt was made taxable under section 28(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The amendment was not applicable to the case of the assessee. (AY.1999-2000)

CIT v. Sapthagiri Distilleries Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 270 / 224 Taxman 229 (Mag.) / (2015) 276 CTR 532 / 108 DTR 258 (Karn.)(HC)

Editorial: Special Leave Petition of revenue was dismissed. SPA(C) 1809 of 2014 DT 17-11-2014) CIT v. Sapthagiri Distilleries Ltd. (2015) 229 Taxman 487 (SC)

68 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Mutuality – Transfer Fees received by Co-op. Housing Society from incoming & outgoing members (even in excess of limits) is exempt on the ground of mutuality. [Constitution of India, Art. 43A]**

The assessee, a Co-operative Housing Society, received a sum of ₹ 39,68,000 on account of transfer of flat and garage and credited it to 'general amenities fund' as well as 'repair fund'. The assessee claimed that the said receipt is exempted from tax on the ground of mutuality. However, the AO held that the principles of mutuality will not apply. However, the CIT(A) and Tribunal allowed the assessee's claim by relying on *Sind Co-operative Housing Society v. ITO (2009) 317 ITR 47 (Bom.)(HC)*. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal:

The very issue and the very question was raised repeatedly in the case of the assessee society. Repeatedly the Revenue has failed in convincing the Tribunal that Sind Co-operative Housing Society will not cover the Society's case. The contribution is made to the repair fund or to the general fund and credited as such. While it may be true that it is occasioned by transfer of a flat and garage, yet, we do not see how merely because there was cap or restriction placed on the transfer fees or the quantum thereof, in this case the principle of mutuality cannot be applied. The underlying principle and of a co-operative movement has been completely overlooked by the Revenue. The Revenue seems to be of the view that a Co-operative Housing Society makes profit, if it receives something beyond this amount of ₹ 25,000. There has to be material brought and which will have a definite bearing on this issue. If the amount is received on account of transfer of a flat and which is not restricted to ₹ 25,000/- but much more, then different consideration may apply. However, in the present case, what has been argued and vehemently is the amount was received by the Society when the flat and the garage were transferred. Therefore, it must be presumed to be nothing but transferfees. It may have been credited to the fund and with a view to demonstrate that it is nothing but a voluntarily contribution or donation to the Society, but still it constitutes its income. However, for rendering such a conclusive finding there has to be material brought by the Revenue on record. Beyond urging that it has been received at the time of a transfer

of the flat and credited to such a fund will not be enough to displace the principle laid down in the decision of Sind Co-operative Housing Society. The attempt of the Revenue therefore is nothing but overcoming the binding judgment of this Court. In the present case, the Commissioner and the Tribunal both have held that the receipt may have been occasioned by the transfer but the principle of mutuality will still apply. It is a typical relationship between the member of the Co-operative Society and particularly a Housing Society and the Society which is a body Corporate and a legal entity by itself that is forming the basis of the principle laid down by the Division Bench. Co-operative movement is a socio-economic and a moral movement. It has now been recognized by Article 43A of the Constitution of India. It is to foster and encourage the spirit of brotherhood and co-operation that the Government encourages formation of Co-operative Societies. The members may be owning individually the flats or immovable properties but enjoying, in common, the amenities, advantages and benefits. The Society as a legal entity owns the building but the amenities are provided and that is how the terms “flat” and the “housing society” are defined in the statute in question. We do not therefore find any reason to deviate from the principle laid down in Sind Co-operative Housing Society’s case and which followed a Supreme Court judgment.

CIT v. Darbhanga Mansion CHS Ltd. (2015) 273 CTR 532 / 113 DTR 217 (Bom.)(HC)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Subsidy – As per the scheme the subsidy being in nature of capital receipt, was not liable to tax

69

The assessee firm was running a cinema hall. It had shown certain receipts, which included entertainment tax. In the profit and loss account, the assessee had transferred a part of receipts to entertainment subsidy account and claimed same to be exempt from tax being in the nature of capital receipts. The assessee explained that there was a scheme of the Government of Rajasthan to encourage construction of new cinema halls by providing such a subsidy in the form of entertainment tax for a particular period. The AO did not agree with the assessee and treated said amount as its income. The CIT (A) however, accepted the plea of the assessee. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A). The HC observed that the State Government proceeded to exempt entertainment tax for a period of 5 years payable by a “new” cinema hall constructed, subject to the condition that commercial exhibition of films in such cinema hall was required to be started by 31-3-2000. The State Government had exempted such proprietor of new cinema hall from payment of entertainment tax on the given conditions, the object was clearly to promote the construction of new cinema halls. Merely because the amount was not directly meant for repaying the amount taken for construction of the cinema hall, its purpose could not be considered to be other than that of promoting construction of new cinema hall. In the totality of the circumstances; and particularly looking to the scheme of the Act of 1957 as also the object and purport of the exemption notification, the assistance in question cannot be said to be an operational subsidy so as to be taken as a revenue receipt. HC also observed that remission by the Government had been to the proprietor of the entertainment and not to the person admitted to the entertainment. The remission had been the methodology adopted by the State Government to provide assistance to the new cinema hall; and had been essentially in the nature of a subsidy,

i.e., the assistance from the Government to the new cinema hall. Accordingly, it was held that the Tribunal was justified in affirming the deletion of addition, being the amount of entertainment tax capitalized as subsidy. (AY. 2000-01)

CIT v. Samta Chavigarh (2014) 222 Taxman 205 (Mag.) / 268 CTR 199 / 103 DTR 18 (Raj.)(HC)

70 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Notional income – Car parking space – Refundable deposit – Additions deleted by the Tribunal was confirmed**

The assessee entered into an agreement for the development of its property under which the developer was to construct for the assessee, 150,000 sq.ft. of area of cost and 20% of the sale value subject to the minimum of ₹ 200 sq.ft. of the balance constructed area on the land. The High Court dismissed the appeal and held that in absence of any sale or transfer of car parking areas to the assessee by the developer, no chargeable income accrued to the assessee for being allowed to park the cars in open space against refundable security deposit. Further developer having provided free of cost air – conditioning facility to the assessee till property was transferred to the assessee, no notional income could be added in the hands of the assessee on that account. Further court also held that tax could be levied only on real income and not on hypothetical income. The order of Tribunal deleting the addition of ₹ 35 lakhs was confirmed. (AY.2003-04)

CIT v. Spencers & Co. Ltd. (2013) 359 ITR 644 / (2014) 266 CTR 564 / 100 DTR 314 (Mad.)(HC)

71 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Lease rentals – Lease or finance – Agreement of lease – Entire lease rent assessable – Lessor was entitle to depreciation. [S.32]**

The assessee was engaged in the business of bill discounting, hire purchase and leasing, mutual funds and insurance agency. In the returns, it offered the interest portion in the leasing transaction alone as its income. It stated that according to the amended Accounting Standards 19 dated April 1, 2001, only the income portion of the lease rental shall be offered as income and the lessor cannot claim depreciation. Accordingly, the assessee treated the lease transaction as a financial lease transaction. The Assessing Officer held that the entire lease rent was taxable as income of the lessor and the lessor was entitled to depreciation on the equipment. The Tribunal found on reading a sample lease agreement that in respect of lease of a car, the term of the lease was stated to be three years, with monthly rentals and total rentals payable. During the currency of the lease, the lessee shall insure the subject of lease and protect if from any risk. Clause 10 of the agreement stated that without the prior written consent of the lessor, the lessee shall not make any alterations, additions, or improvements to the equipment and all additions, replacements, attachments and improvements of whatever kind or nature made to the equipment shall be deemed to be parts of the property of the lessor and shall be subject to all the terms and conditions of the agreement. Clause 13 spoke about the surrender of the lease equipment upon the expiration or earlier termination of the lease agreement. It also gave the option for renewal on year to year basis on mutually agreed terms and conditions. Clause 15 dealt with payment by the lessor and clause 20 stipulated that on expiration of the lease term, if the lessee failed to deliver

the equipment to the lessor in accordance with any direction given by the lessor, the lessee would be deemed to be the monthly tenant of the equipment and upon the same terms expressed in the agreement and the tenancy should be terminated by the lessor immediately upon default committed by the lessee by serving seven days' notice. Upon termination of the lease period the lessee had to immediately return the property to the lessor in as good condition as received less normal wear, tear and depreciation. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer. On appeal to the High Court: Held, dismissing the appeals that on examination of the terms of the agreement showed that it was a simple lease agreement. If in effect the agreement was a finance agreement, the question of returning the leased item to the assessee would not arise at all. Further, the question of again affixing the name of the assessee on the property also would not arise. The monthly payment of the rent and the number of months of the lease rent payment was also clearly stated in the agreement. The entire lease rent was assessable (AY. 2002-03 to 2008-09)

Simpson and General Finance Co. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 328 / 223 Taxman 154 / 106 DTR 146 (Mad.)(HC)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Business income – Sale of carbon credits – No cost of acquisition – Capital receipt. [S.28(i)]

72

Carbon credits not being an offshoot of business but an offshoot of environmental concern, amount received on their transfer had no element of profit or gain. Since carbon credit was not even linked with power generation, which was the business of the assessee, Tribunal was justified in its decision. There was no cost of acquisition or cost of production to get entitlement for carbon credit. Income from sale of carbon credits was to be considered as capital receipts and not liable to tax under any head under the Income-tax Act. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. My Home Power Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 82 /225 Taxman 8 (Mag.) / (2015) 276 CTR 92 / 117 DTR 63 (AP.)(HC)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Profit on repatriation of foreign exchange on account of variation in forex rate – Capital receipt

73

The assessee had issued Euro Notes in 1997 for raising funds for capital expenditure programmes. The entire proceeds raised abroad were held in interest for a period of three years pending deployment and utilization. During the year ending 31st March 2011, the funds were repatriated to India as per the requirement of Reserve Bank of India. As a result of fall in value of the Indian Rupee, a gain in terms of the repatriation of funds has arisen. Assessee credited the said in to P&L account however for taxation the said gain was treated as capital in nature. The AO treated the said gain as revenue in nature. On appeal Tribunal decided the issue in favour of assessee. On appeal by revenue the Court held that the purpose for which the notes were raised was "capital". The gain arose not in the course of trading activities but due to conversion of the currency of one country in to the currency of another country. The gain is therefore on account of capital and not in the nature of income. Further the gain has arisen at that point of time when the funds were repatriated to India. If the Notes were issued for meeting capital expenditure, and remained outside India, the taxability has to be

determined at the point of time when the profit arose. The subsequent utilisation was irrelevant. (AY.2001-02)

CIT v. Tata Power Co. (Bom.)(HC)(Unreported) www.bombayhighcourt.nic.in

74 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Grant of subsidy for facilitating business operations is a revenue receipt. [S. 28(i)]**

Where power tariff concession was not contingent upon establishment of the unit but for the purpose of assisting the assessee in carrying out business operations same had to be treated as revenue receipt.(AY.1998-99)

Brakes India Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) 363 ITR 13 / 222 Taxman 359 / 270 CTR 98 / 104 DTR 122 (Mad.)(HC)

75 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Tax Planning – Sale of shares to one of the group companies – Set off of loss against long-term gains was allowed**

The assessee had purchased shares of Hindustan Development Corporation Ltd. from two sellers, one of them was a scam tainted company. The assessee sold the shares at a loss of ₹ 4,50,04,414 to one of its group companies. The aforesaid loss was sought to be set off against the long-term capital gains. The AO disallowed the claim of setting off. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that the purchase of the shares was genuine, but the sale was a colourable transaction considering the fact that the assessee purchased the same scrip after sometime and the sale to the group company was financed by the assessee himself. He therefore upheld the order of the AO. On Second Appeal, the Tribunal had given the findings of fact that the transaction of purchase and sale was supported by contract notes and bills. Both the sale and purchase took place at the prevalent market rate and payments were made by account payee cheques. These transactions were duly confirmed not only by the brokers, but also by the Inspector appointed by the AO. Furthermore, the alleged financing by the seller for purchase of the shares was an insignificant part of the total purchase price. The total purchase price was ₹ 18.99 crore, whereas the financing was restricted to ₹ 2.60 crore on interest on commercial rates. The Tribunal held that both the sale and purchase of shares were genuine transactions. The High Court held that basis of suspicion, howsoever strong, it is not possible to record any finding of fact. As a matter of fact, suspicion can never take the place of proof. The finding arrived at by the Tribunal that both the sale and purchase were genuine transactions was not even alleged by the revenue to have not been based on evidence. Since the finding of the Tribunal was factually correct, the Tribunal had no option but to direct the AO to give the benefit of the losses suffered by the assessee, which he had disallowed. The appeal did not raise any question of law and was therefore not to be admitted. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT. v. Lakshmangarh Estate & Trading Co. Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxman 122 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)

76 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Security deposit received by assessee for supply of cylinder – Not a trading receipt**

Assessee was a manufacturer and supplier of gas to customers in cylinders. It received security deposit from customers for supply of cylinders. Assessing Officer took a view that security deposit received by assessee from customers was part of trading receipt.

Tribunal finding that money received as security was never part of sale price and that security money was refundable to customers, concluded that said amount could not be brought to tax as trading receipt. The High Court held that the security for gas cylinders received by the assessee could not be treated as trading receipt and consequently, the substantial question of law was answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Munjal Gases (2014) 220 Taxman 124 (Mag.) (P&H)(HC.)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Accrual – Charge of notional interest for free period was held to be not justified

77

Assessee entered into MOU with its collecting agent not to charge interest on unremitted collections for a period of two months. It was held that AO was not justified in making addition towards notional interest relatable to such interest free period.

CIT v. Sahara India Mutual Benefit Co. Ltd. (2014) 101 DTR 265 / 220 Taxman 16 (All.) (HC)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Deposit – Where assessee was merely a custodian of deposit and income arose from deposits in form of dividend, interest etc., the Tribunal was justified in holding that deposits themselves could not amount to income chargeable to tax

78

The assessee-firm ran some financial schemes in which deposits were collected from the public. During assessment proceedings, the AO held that deposits received represented revenue receipts liable to tax. On appeal before Tribunal, it held that deposits in question amounted to capital receipt which could not be brought to tax. On appeal by the Revenue before High Court, the latter held that since the assessee was merely a custodian of deposit and income arose from deposits in form of dividend, interest etc., the Tribunal was justified in holding that deposits themselves could not amount to income chargeable to tax. (AY. 1983-84)

CIT v. Sahara India Firms, Lucknow (2014) 221 Taxman 68 (All.) (HC)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Accrual – Excise credit – Credit of proforma excise rebate – Though credited by assessee to P & Loss account but not received by assessee, is illusory receipt and not real income, hence not chargeable to tax.[S.5]

79

Credit of proforma excise rebate taken into account was illusory and no real income had accrued. The assessee had communicated its reasons why it resorted to such an illusory entry which included that the company had sustained losses and in order to impress the bankers and to please the shareholders the entry was passed into the profit and loss account. The Tribunal on the facts was satisfied with the explanation. This was a finding of fact which had not been challenged by the Revenue as perverse nor was the finding of the Tribunal demonstrated to be erroneous either in fact or in law. When the Tribunal was satisfied that the entry did not represent any real income or any real receipt of money, there was no question of its being taxable.

CIT v. Kusum Products Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 632 / 106 DTR 372 / (2015) 230 Taxman 149 (Cal.) (HC)

- 80 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Special capital incentive – Object of assistance under subsidy scheme to enable assessee to set up unit – Capital receipt**
 Character of a receipt in the hands of assessee has to be determined with respect to the purpose for which the subsidy is given. The purpose test to be applied. The point of time subsidy is given is not relevant. The source is immaterial. The form of subsidy is immaterial. The main condition and with which the court should be concerned is the incentive must be utilised by the assessee to set up a new unit or for substantial expansion of the existing unit. If the object of the subsidy scheme is to enable the assessee to run the business more profitably the receipt is on revenue account. On the other hand, if the object of the assistance under the subsidy scheme is to enable the assessee to set up a new unit the receipt of subsidy would be on capital account. On facts the subsidy given by the State of Maharashtra through SICOM to set of new unit is capital receipt. Order of Tribunal is up held. (AY. 1997-98)
CIT v. Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 88 (Bom.)(HC)
- 81 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Subsidy – Protection of capital investment of parent company**
 Subsidy received by subsidiary of Government company from its holding company to protect capital investment of parent company is capital receipt. (AY. 1985-86)
CIT v. Handicrafts and Handlooms Export Corporation of India Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 130 / 268 CTR 341 / 102 DTR 211 (Delhi)(HC)
- 82 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Non-compete fees – Capital receipt. [S.28(va), 45]**
 Non-compete fees received prior to insertion of S. 28(va) is capital receipt. (AY. 2001-02)
CIT v. Wintac Ltd. (2013) 95 DTR 289 (2014) 360 ITR 614 / 221 Taxman 87 (Karn.)(HC)
- 83 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Forfeiture – Termination of agreement – Revenue receipt**
 Assessee had entered into agreement for sale of property to lessee. Sale agreement provided for forfeiture of thirty lakh rupees. Amount forfeited upon termination of agreement for sale of property to lessee is revenue receipt. (AY. 2001-02)
CIT v. Wintac Ltd. (2013) 95 DTR 289 / (2014) 360 ITR 614 / 221 Taxman 87 (Karn.)(HC)
- 84 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Setting up new unit or expanding existing unit – Sugar incentive scheme – Capital receipt**
 Amount received under sugar incentive scheme for setting up new unit or expanding existing unit was capital receipt. (AY. 1998-99)
CIT v. Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 82 / 222 Taxman 24 (Mag.)(All)(HC)
- 85 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Subvention assistance from holding company – Capital receipt. [S.2(24)]**
 Subvention assistance from holding company to recoup anticipated losses of the assessee constituted capital receipt not chargeable to tax.
CIT v. Deutsche Post Bank Home Finance Ltd. (2012) 209 Taxman 313 / (2014) 98 DTR 144 / 265 CTR 525 (Delhi)(HC)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Subvention payment received from parent company – Revenue receipt chargeable to tax.[S.2(24)] 86

Subvention payment received by the assessee from parent company to make good the loss and to see that company is run more profitably constituted revenue receipt. (AY. 1999-2000 to 2001-02)

CIT v. Siemens Public Communication Networks Ltd. (2014) 98 DTR 151 / 265 CTR 532 (Karn.)(HC)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Interest subsidy received under Technology Upgradation Fund Scheme is treated as capital receipt 87

It has been held by the Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal that to sustain competitiveness in the domestic as well as international markets and overall long-term viability of the industry, the concerned Ministry adopted the TUFs envisaging Technology Upgradation of the Industry. Hence, the interest subsidies received under Technology Upgradation Fund Scheme (TUFs) falls under the category of Capital receipt. (AY. 2005-06)

DCIT v. Gloster Jute Mills Ltd. (2014) 33 ITR 322 (2015) 67 SOT 21 (Kol.)(Trib.)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Amount received on account of clean development mechanism (Carbon credit) is capital in nature 88

It has been held by the Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal that a sum received by the Assessee on account of Clean Development mechanism (CDM) is to be treated as capital in nature. (AY. 2009-10)

Adisankara Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 35 ITR 283 / (2015) 67 SOT 175 (URO) (Chennai)(Trib.)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Damages – Compensation under settlement for withdrawing criminal complaint for fraud – Capital receipt. [S.45, 56] 89

Assessee, a non-resident, received certain amount of compensation from his power of attorney holder towards damages for breach of trust in respect of sale of shares of Indian companies, said amount being in nature of capital receipt, could not be brought to tax. Compensation received under settlement for withdrawing criminal complaint for fraud having no reaction with any business transaction constituted capital receipt not chargeable to tax.(AY. 2005-06)

ITO v. Vinay P. Karve (2015) 152 ITD 58 / 118 DTR 227 / 170 TTJ 238 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Method of accounting – Amount – Wrongly shown in P&L account as income – Claim made in the course of assessment – Claim not made in the revised return – Claim was assessee was rightly rejected. [S.139(5), 143(3) 145] 90

It is during course of assessment, assessee pleaded to exclude income shown in the P & L A/c. on ground that (i) such sum was shown in books of account only as provision and nothing was in fact received, (ii) Malaysian company was liable to deduct withholding tax and (iii) as per Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Malaysia, such sum could not be considered as a part of income in India. Tribunal held that since these were all new pleadings made during course of assessment proceedings and

claim having not been made through a revised return, same could not be accepted and, therefore, same was rightly rejected. (AY. 2002-03, 2008-09)

Metal Powder Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 759 / (2015) 152 ITD 144 (Chennai)(Trib.)

- 91 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Diversion of income by overriding title – Application of income’ – Contribution of 1% of net profit to the Cooperative Education Fund maintained by National Cooperative Union is an application of income – Cannot be allowed as deduction.[S.37(1)]**

The amount contributed by assessee to the National Co-operative Union, New Delhi is appropriation from the net profits. There is a right to receive the income independent of accrual and receipt of income by the assessee before third party could lay claim to any part of it. Since income reached assessee before it reached to a third party, there is no diversion. There is no payment in the year of losses. Therefore, payment under section 63(1)(b) is only an appropriation of profit. Moreover, this amount paid during the year is also not out of the profits of this year but profits of earlier year. Therefore, on that count also amount cannot be allowed as deduction during the year. (AY. 2010-11) *A.P. Mahesh Co-op. Urban Bank Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 55 taxmann.com 429 (Hyd.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org*

- 92 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Compensation – Restrictive covenant – Non compete fee – For five years – Part of business – Not deprived the source of business activity – Assessable as revenue receipt. [S. 28(i)]**

Assessee was engaged in manufacture of dyestuffs and chemicals, pharmaceuticals and pesticides, pigments and composites, etc. During relevant year, assessee sold its Oral Hygiene Business (OHB) to another concern namely CPL. Assessee also entered into a non-compete agreement in terms of which it agreed to refrain from competing with CPL for a period of five years. In return of income, assessee declared amount of non-compete fee as a capital receipt. AO, however, treated amount of non-compete fee as a revenue receipt and, accordingly, brought same to tax. It was noted that OHB sold by assessee was not a part of its core business. Further, by agreeing to a restrictive covenant, assessee was not deprived of a source of business activity rather assessee transferred a particular activity under scheme of business restructuring and to avoid adverse and tough situation in future. Even otherwise, restriction under agreement was only for limited period of five years and not for permanent or indefinite period. (AY. 1995-96) *Novartis India Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 64 SOT 182 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)*

- 93 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Dharmada collections are not taxable as income**

Dharmada receipts are not taxable. (AY. 2009-10)

Nitco Logistics Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) 66 SOT 116 (URO)(Amritsar)(Trib.)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Reassessment – Income from undisclosed source – Information received by the AO that the assessee is a beneficiary in a “discretionary” trust set up in Liechtenstein can form the basis of assessment of undisclosed income in the assessee’s hands. Argument that the trust is “discretionary” and that the amount has not “accrued” to him or that the documents are “not corroborated” is not acceptable. [S.69, 147, 164]

The assessment was reopened because a tax-evasion petition (TEP) has been received from CBDT that the assessee is a beneficiary of Ambrunova Trust and Merlyn Management SA. In the return of income the assessee neither offered any income with reference to the trust nor disclosed any details to the effect that the appellant was a beneficiary of the said trust. The AO, from the, summary of the trust account in LTG Bank found credit balance of US \$ 24,06,604 (₹ 11,60,99,390) was credited to the said account. As the same was not reflected in the return of income thus, the AO correctly presumed that income has escaped assessment.

As regards the addition of ₹ 2,34,64,398 on account of alleged undisclosed income, the argument of the assessee that the alleged trust was a discretionary trust and neither the amount was accrued/credited nor the name of the assessee appeared as beneficiary of Ambrunova Trust is not acceptable because the learned Special Counsel brought to our notice certain documents evidencing that the names of all the assessees were appearing as beneficiaries of the said trust. Liechtenstein joined India as important partner in fighting overseas tax abuse and black money and shed its secrecy cloak and joined the league of a host of other countries for automatic exchange of information and mutual assistance in tax matters. Thus, became 62nd signatory to a worldwide convention, accepted by almost by all economic super powers and formulated by Paris based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an international policy advisory body which formulates global tax standard to fight tax evasion and concealment of illicit funds. Switzerland joined the same convention in October, 2013. The learned Spl. Counsel showed the bench a confidential list containing the names of the present assessee as trustee/beneficiaries of the trust. It was requested that since the investigation is in progress, therefore, at this stage it will hamper the investigation if the document is made public as the same list is containing the names of other beneficiaries also. On going through the bank summary in respect of Ambrunova’s trust account in LTG Bank Liechtenstein, we find that there is a credit balance of USD 24,06,605 (equivalent to ₹ 11,60,99,390/-).

The contention of the assessee that such documents were not provided to him is also incorrect. The assertion that the information was unvouched and not corroborated with any evidence is also not accepted because the said documents were received officially by the Government pursuant to an investigation made by permanent sub-committee on investigation of United States Senate. Liechtenstein jurisdiction qualifies as an off shore financial centre due to a very modest tax regime, high standard of secrecy laws and further foreign investors had the opportunity to establish companies or trust with “HOST trust reg.” in the principality of Liechtenstein to enjoy the advantages of off-shore financial centre. As per the report Indian Investigating Agencies came across a number of cases where individual or entities from India were detected using banking channels of Liechtenstein to hide their illegal income or stash funds and it was only

possible when India became signatory to a world-wide convention formulated by OECD an international policy advisory body which formulated global tax standards to fight tax evasion and concealment of illicit funds. It also provided option to undertake automatic exchange of information. It is a common knowledge that discretionary trusts are created for the benefit of particular persons and those persons need not necessarily control the affairs of the trust. Still the fact remains that they are the sole beneficiaries of the trust. Thus totality of facts clearly indicate that the deposit made in the bank account of the trust represents unaccounted income of the assessee, as the same was not disclosed by the these assesseees in their respective returns in India, consequently, the addition was rightly made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A). (AY. 2002-03),

Mohan Manoj Dhupelia v. DCIT (2014) 166 TTJ 584 / (2015) 67 SOT 12 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Ambrish Manno Dhupalia v. DCIT (2014) 166 TTJ 584 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Bhavya Manno Dhupalia (Ms.) v. DCIT (2014) 166 TTJ 584 (Mum.)(Trib.)

95 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Public financial institutions – Interest on NPAs is not taxable – As there is a conflict on the point between two decisions, the view in favour of the assessee has to be followed. [S.43D]**

Based on the prudential norms, the assessee herein did not admit the interest relatable to NPA advances in its total income. The Delhi High Court in *Vasisth Chay Vyapar Ltd.* 330 ITR 440 (Del) has held that the interest on NPA assets cannot be said to have accrued to the assessee on the basis that “What to talk of interest, even the principle amount itself had become doubtful to recover. In this scenario it was legitimate move to infer that interest income thereupon has not “accrued”“. However, the Madras High Court in the case of *CIT v. Sakthi Finance Ltd., (2013) 31 taxmann.com 305 (Madras)* has differed with the judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of *M/s Vasisth Chay Vyapar Ltd.* (supra) on a similar issue, i.e. relating to interest income on NPAs. The Madras High Court followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *Southern Technologies Ltd.* (supra) in holding that interest on NPAs was assessable to tax on accrual basis.

We have carefully considered the submissions putforth by the learned Departmental Representative based on the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of *Sakthi Finance Ltd.* (supra). The controversy before the Hon’ble Madras High Court related to non-recognition of interest income on NPAs by the assessee following the RBI guidelines. The Madras High Court took the view that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of *Southern Technologies Ltd.* also applied to the Income Recognition Norms provided by RBI and therefore it held the interest income on NPAs is liable to be taxed on accrual basis and not in terms of RBI’s guidelines. But the Delhi High Court in *M/s Vasisth Chay Vyapar Ltd.* has taken a view that *Southern Technologies Ltd.* (supra) case did not apply to the Income Recognition Norms prescribed by RBI. Ostensibly, there is divergence of opinion between the Hon’ble Delhi High Court and the Madras High Court as noted by the Madras High Court in its order. As there is no judgment of the Jurisdictional High Court. We are faced with two contrary judgments of the non-jurisdictional High Court. In such a situation, we are inclined to prefer a view which is

favourable of the assessee following the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of *CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd. (1973) 88 ITR 192 (SC)*.

ACIT v. Solapur Siddheshwar Sahakari Bank Ltd. (2014) 36 ITR 290 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Grant given to safeguard the interests of depositors, though used for meeting SLR requirements of RBI relating to its banking activity, is still capital in nature. [Banking Regulation Act, S.35A]

96

The objective of the Government of Maharashtra to give grant to the assessee was to protect the interests of farmers and depositors from the Nanded district and for the said purpose the Government deemed it fit to provide financial assistance to the assessee-bank to enable it to regularize its functioning. Pertinently, the functioning of the bank was restrained by the RBI in the face of the restrictions imposed u/s. 35A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The objective and purpose of the Government was sought to be achieved by providing ₹ 110 crores as a grant. The case made out by the Revenue is that the financial assistance given to the assessee-bank is for smooth running of its business and therefore it is to be regarded as a trading receipt. No doubt, the aforesaid sum has been used by the assessee for the purpose of maintaining the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) as per the requirements of RBI, which enabled the assessee-bank to regularize its banking operations. So, however, the form or mechanism of subsidy is not important, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. (supra)*. The nature of subsidy has to be determined by the object for which the subsidy is given. The underlying object of the Government was to safeguard the interest of farmers and small depositors, and this object was sought to be achieved by the mechanism of providing financial grant to the assessee-bank and regularizing its normal banking activity. In this manner, it has to be deduced that the subsidy/grant in question has not been received by the assessee-bank in the course of a trade but it is of capital nature. (AY. 2010-11)

Nanded District Central Co-op Bank Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 37 ITR 532 / 68 SOT 329 (URO) (Pune)(Trib.)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Lease rent – Principal component received cannot be treated as income

97

The Tribunal held that the capital component included in the lease rent being return of capital investment cannot be treated as income. (AY. 1996-97)

Hathway Industries (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 163 TTJ 141 / 146 ITD 605 / 104 DTR 217 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Interest on NPAs, even if credited to the Profit & Loss Account, is not chargeable to tax. [S.145, Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960]

98

While constructing its Profit & Loss Account to arrive at its net Profit or Loss, a Co-operative Society is required to show interest accrued/accruing on amounts of Overdue Loans separately. This is precisely what has been done by the assessee in the present case. The aforesaid requirement of the manner of construction of Profit & Loss Account, prescribed under the Rules of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, has prompted the assessee to draw up its Profit & Loss Account in the manner we have

noted above *qua* the interest on NPAs. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the manner or presentation of account which ostensibly is in compliance with the statutory provisions governing the assessee, can be a factor to evaluate assess ability or otherwise of an income. In our considered opinion, it would inappropriate to be merely guided by a presentation in the annual financial statements to infer assessee's perception that an income had accrued, without considering the entries made in the financial statements in toto. In the present case, it is quite clear that assessee has drawn up its annual financial statement in compliance with the requirements of the statutes under which it functions and/or is incorporated. Therefore, the issue with regard to non-recognition of income on NPAs is required to be adjudicated having regard to the relevant legal position and not on the basis of the presentation in the annual financial statements. At this stage, we may also refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *CIT v. Shoorji Vallabhdas & Co., (1962) 46 ITR 144 (SC)* for the proposition that a mere book keeping entry cannot be assessed as income unless it can be shown that income has actually resulted. In the present case, the crediting of gross interest in the Profit & Loss Account, which includes interest on NPAs cannot be taken as a proof that such income has accrued to the assessee unless the statutory guidelines applicable on the said subject are ignored. Obviously, when the banking institutions following mercantile system accounting are permitted to treat the income on NPAs as assessable on receipt basis, such a position cannot be ignored in the case of present assessee merely because of a presentation in the annual financial statements. Even otherwise, we notice that the RBI guidelines permit that interest income on NPAs be parked in a suspense account and it is not necessary that it has to be brought to the Profit & Loss Account by the assessee. However, in the present case, as seen earlier, assessee has credited the gross amount of interest on credit side of the Profit & Loss Account and simultaneously shown on the debit side of the Profit & Loss Account, the amount of interest on NPAs. In other words, instead of netting of the interest the two amounts have been shown separately one on the credit side and other on the debit side. The net effect of the said presentation is the same. Therefore, in our view, the lower authorities have misguided themselves in rejecting the claim of the assessee for non-recognition of interest income on NPAs. (AY. 2008-09)

The Solapur District Central Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 335 (Pune)(Trib.)

99 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Forfeiture of warrants is capital receipt [S. 28(iv)]**

While confirming the order of CIT(A), the Tribunal held that amount received on account of forfeiture of amount due to non-payment towards warrants issue has to be treated as capital receipt and since the assessee has also transferred it to the capital reserve account in the balance sheet the amount cannot be taxed as income of relevant financial year. (AY. 2006-07)

Dy. CIT v. CNB Finwiz Ltd. (2014) 159 TTJ 146 / 65 SOT 134 / 97 DTR 97 (Delhi)(Trib.)

100 **S.4 : Charge of income-tax – Capital or revenue – Termination of Agreement – Compensation so received was capital receipt and hence, not taxable. [S.28(i)]**

Compensation was received by assessee for termination of agreement for providing back office support services to bank. Assessee had parted with personnel who were handling

this activity of assessee company to give them on role of bank and bank handled such activity itself. Compensation so received was capital receipt and hence not taxable. (AY. 2003-04 to 2006-07)

3i Infotech Ltd. v. Add. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 405 / (2014) 162 TTJ 184 / 102 DTR 151 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 5 : Scope of total income

S.5 : Scope of total income – Accrual of income – Civil suit pending – Income has not accrued hence deletion of addition was held to be justified 101

Assessee state warehousing-corporation was engaged in business of warehousing and incidental activity. Assessee had raised higher warehousing bills to Circle Stamp Depot than that reflected in its books. AO made addition as income. Tribunal has deleted the addition. On appeal Court held that the said income had not accrued to assessee as circle stamp depot had resisted said demand and filed a civil suit, hence deletion of addition was held to be justified. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Gujarat State Warehousing Co. (2014) 225 Taxman 182 (Guj.)(HC)

S.5 : Scope of total income – Real income – Notional interest – Parties were agreed on not to charge interest as per the conditions laid down in MOU, than the AO cannot compel them to do so – Yardstick will have to applied from the businessman's point of view – Deletion of addition by Tribunal was affirmed 102

In terms of MOU, the assessee had not charged interest from its collection agent Sahara India where delay in transmission of fund did not exceed two months. The AO observed that the assessee had given a loan to Sahara India in the form of working capital on which no interest was charged. Accordingly, the AO disallowed interest on the borrowings to the extent of interest not charged on the interest-free loan given to Sahara India. On appeal, the CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO. On appeal, the HC observed that Sahara India was the collecting agent not only for the assessee but also for various other companies. As per MOU, the assessee charged interest from Sahara India where delay in transmission of funds exceeded two months. When the parties had agreed not to charge the interest, as per the condition laid down in the MOU i.e. 'if the remittance is within the less than two months', then the AO could not compel it to do so. The HC held that yardstick will have to applied from the businessman's point of view and certainly not according to the AO. Hence upheld the order of tribunal. (AY. 1992-93 – 1994-95)

CIT v. Sahara India Mutual Benefit Co. Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxman 16 (All.)(HC)

S.5 : Scope of total income – Interest Suspense Account – Income accrued – Liable to be taxed in the absence of any notification or instructions from CBDT. [S 36(1)(vii), 119] 103

The assessee was a state owned corporation constituted to promote the cinematic activities and exhibition of popular cinemas throughout the State. The State Government directed the assessee-corporation to sell off the non-workable, non-functional cinemas. Accordingly, three properties were sold through a scheme known as 'Deferred Payment Plan'. In the terms of the plan, the purchaser was under the obligation to pay the

interest on unpaid amounts in accordance with the schedule of payment. During relevant year, the revenue authorities brought such interest income to tax on that basis. The Tribunal upheld the order of the authorities. On appeal, the HC held:

The placing of interest income in an 'Interest Suspense Account' was not sufficient to absolve the assessee from taxability of such interest income in absence of any provision of the Act. Therefore, in absence of any notification or instructions issued by the CBDT under section 119, the income in the present case shall become due for the relevant assessment year ('AY') and as such the same accrued to the assessee. This income was based on a contractual corresponding obligation and liability to pay the interest accrued on unpaid amounts of sale consideration by the purchaser to the appellant. The rate of interest is fixed. The realization/recovery of income of interest is not time barred in the relevant AY. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the amount of interest was not recoverable due to any legal impediment or statutory provision. The amount has not been declared to be bad debt within the meaning of section 36(1)(vii) nor has it been written off.

Moreover, the ground taken for the non-realization of the amount of interest that the persons sitting in Government were interested in settling the property for petty amounts to their near and dear and that virtually the State Government is not dealing fairly in discharging its sovereign functions, was held to be not sustainable. (AY. 2003-04)

U. P. Chalchitra Nigam Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 223 Taxman 139 / (2015) 370 ITR 379 / 274 CTR 130 (All.)(HC)

104 **S.5 : Scope of total income – Accrual – Advance business receipts – No income could be said to have accrued to assessee on receipt of advance. [S.4, 260A, 263]**

Assessee which is engaged in the business of hotels, resorts, and clubs offered holiday schemes for its card members to utilize 'rooms nights' by payment of some advance . In case of non-utilisation of said facility, assessee would refund back said some to card members along with surrender value. Assessee was required to refund advances more than 99 per cent in cash. Assessee has the said advances as liability in the balance sheet. AO accepted the method of accounting followed by assessee. CIT revised the order and directed the AO to pass fresh order assessing the advance as income. Tribunal allowed the appeal of assessee. On appeal by revenue the dismissing the appeal the Court held that since the assessee was required to refund advance is more than 99 per cent in cash, assessee incurred liability and no income could be said to have accrued to assessee on receipt of advance.(AY.2005-06)

CIT v. Pancard Clubs Ltd. (2014) 226 Taxman 141 / 272 CTR 257 / (2015) 370 ITR 45 (Bom.)(HC)

105 **S.5 : Scope of total income – Accrual – Retention money under contract released on furnishing of bank guarantee – Retains its character as retention money and cannot be equated with the right to receive such amount the dominant control over the amount remained with the contractee – Amount retained did not accrue to assessee. [S. 4,145]**

Money retained under the contract for satisfactory completion of the work which was released only upon the satisfactory completion of the contract and would be adjusted against the amount due if it was found that execution of work was not satisfactory,

did not accrued to the assessee, even though the amount was received by assessee by furnishing bank guarantee. (AY. 1992-93)

Amarshiv Construction (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 659 / 102 DTR 33 / 223 Taxman 171 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.5 : Scope of total income – Accrual – Builder and developer – Advances received from different parties – Advance receipt could not be taken as trading receipt of the year under consideration 106

The assessee company was a builder and developer and received certain amount as advance from different parties. The AO added the said amount in the total income. The Tribunal deleted the addition on the ground that assessee being the developer, the profit will arise on the transfer of the title of property and any advances received cannot be treated as trading receipt of the year under consideration and the same was accepted in the earlier years by the revenue. On appeal the High Court affirmed the view of the Tribunal

CIT v. Shivalik Buildwell (P) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxman 3 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.5 : Scope of total income – Accrual – Method of accounting – Mercantile system of accounting – Profit and loss account credited with a sum representing estimated amount of difference on outstanding bills. [S.145] 107

The assessee, an exporter, credited to its profit and loss account a sum of ₹ 5,37,909 representing the estimated difference on account of fluctuation in foreign exchange rates. According to the assessee, the amount did not represent any income received or accrued as on the date of the balance-sheet and, therefore, should be excluded in the determination of income.

Held, the assessee had credited its own accounts with ₹ 5,37,909 being the difference arising on account of foreign exchange rate fluctuation. The assessee may have received the amount much later. But the time of receipt was relevant only when the accounts were being maintained on the basis of the receipt system. The fact that foreign exchange was received much later was completely irrelevant having regard to the system of accounting followed. In fact the finding was that the payments were received much later and this was not a case where the payments were not received. There may be difficulties in actual realisation of amounts. But that could not detract from the accrual of income.

CIT v. Mahavir Plantations Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 22 / (2015) 229 Taxman 160 (Ker.)(HC)

S.5 : Scope of total income – Method of accounting – Incentives – After expiry of accounting period – Cannot be brought to tax. [S.145] 108

The assessee-firm was engaged in the business of reselling of the electrical goods. Tribunal held that sales performance based incentives received by assessee from its suppliers after expiry of relevant accounting year could not be brought to tax in assessment year in question even though assessee was following mercantile system of accounting. (AY. 2007-08, to 2009-10)

Dy. CIT v. Vijay Sales (2014) 33 ITR 546 / (2015) 67 SOT 99 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 109 **S.5 : Scope of total income – Method of accounting – TDS credit – Real income has materialized, has to be examined in context of commercial and business realities of situation in which assessee is placed and not with reference to system of accounting. [S.145, 199]**

Assessee-individual was working as consulting engineer and commission agent/dealer in air-conditioning. During assessment proceeding, AO observed that in balance sheet certain amount was shown under heading 'contingent Income'. AO further observed that credit for TDS for said income had been claimed though receipt was not offered for taxation and, therefore, he treated said amount as income for current assessment year. It was found that commission earned from Dealer had been offered for taxation on basis of completion of service and installation contract in respective year and this method had been consistently followed year to year by assessee. This method was also seen in consonance with accounting method AS-9 in respect of service contract and installation fee which states that revenue be recognized only when equipment is installed and accepted by customer. Since work related to installation and erection of equipment had been completed in subsequent assessment years, accrual of income happened only in subsequent years and, when assessee got an enforceable right to receive same. In view of above, addition made by AO was rightly deleted by CIT(A). (AY. 2009-10)

Addl. CIT v. Vinay V. Kulkarni (2014) 64 SOT 131 (Pune)(Trib.)

- 110 **S.5 : Scope of total income – Income – Accrual – Interest on grants – Short term deposit in bank – interest earned on short-term deposits could not be said to have accrued as income to assessee**

Assessee-company was a Special Purpose Vehicle created for purpose of implementing projects funded under Industrial Infrastructure Upgradation Scheme by Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. During year it received grant from Central Government and kept amount in short-term deposits in bank, as same was not immediately utilized. It earned interest income on such deposits and claimed that interest income had overriding charge on it and hence could not be treated as its income. Central Government had given a clear instruction that interest on short-term deposits either had to be refunded back to Government or to be adjusted against future grants to be released for implementing project. In view of aforesaid instruction interest earned on short-term deposits could not be said to have accrued as income to assessee. Matter remanded. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)

Hyderabad Pharma Infrastructure & Technologies Ltd. v. Addl.DIT (2014) 64 SOT 179 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 111 **S.5 : Scope of total income – Income – Accrual – 2 per cent grant towards administrative purposes – Matter remanded**

Assessee-company was a Special Purpose Vehicle conceived by Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion [DIPP]. During a meeting held on 9-12-2004, DIPP pointed out that 2 per cent of amount calculated from central grant shall be made available for incurring administrative expenses by assessee. CIT(A) treated 2 per cent of grant towards administrative expenses as income of assessee. Tribunal held that before treating 2 per

cent of grant to be income of assessee had to factually ascertain whether such grant had actually been sanctioned to assessee. Matter remanded. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)
Hyderabad Pharma Infrastructure & Technologies Ltd. v. Addl. DIT (2014) 64 SOT 179 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.5 : Scope of total income – Accrual – Real income – Development agreement – Consideration was not determinable with reasonable certainty, postponing recognition of income was held to be justified. [S.145] 112

AO treated development agreement as a transaction giving rise to accrued income of sale of future property. Tribunal held that neither possession of property had been given to ultimate buyer, nor assessee had received any substantial consideration. Agreement entered into by assessee herein was only for sale of piece of property and sale would take place only after completion of construction and after assessee's share of property was identified. When consideration was not determinable with reasonable certainty, assessee was justified in postponing recognition of income and it was appropriate to recognize income only when it was reasonably certain that ultimate realization was possible. (AY. 2008-09)

Dy. CIT v. S.P. Real Estate Developers (P) Ltd. (2014) 149 ITD 617 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.5 : Scope of total income – Accrual – Fees received from students for entire course in one year should be apportioned proportionately for each year – Matter remitted to AO for proper quantification 113

The Tribunal sent the matter back to Assessing Officer for proper quantification of the income on accrual basis as the fees received for full course from a student in one assessment year should be appropriated proportionately for each year under consideration during the course period.

JB Educational Society v. ACIT (2013) 28 ITR 284 / (2014) 159 TTJ 236 / 98 DTR 347 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

Joginapally B. R. Education Society v. ACIT (2013) 28 ITR 284 / (2014) 159 TTJ 236 / 98 DTR 347 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.5 : Scope of total income – Accrual – Interest receivable on advances – Waiver of interest – No evidence was produced – Income accrued 114

Assessee brought nothing on record to show that interest chargeable by it on advance to C as per the agreement was actually waived in the year under consideration. Such interest income had accrued to assessee and was liable to tax. (AY. 2002-03 & 2004-05)
ITO v. Ricoh India Ltd. (2013) 143 ITD 242 / (2014) 98 DTR 435 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.5 : Scope of total income – Accrual – Service charges received in advance from customers – Not taxable in the year of receipt 115

Assessee is in the business of transmitting the bulk MS data. Assessee received advances from its customers and whenever services are provided by the assessee it adjusts the advances received from the customers and recognizes the income in the year in which the services are rendered. AO taxed the entire advances. Court held that assessee having maintained its books of account on accrual basis, service charges received in advance

for the services to be rendered in future years are not liable to be taxed in the year of receipt. Appeal of revenue was dismissed.(AY. 2009-10)
Dy. CIT v. Velti India (P) Ltd. (2014) 105 DTR 213 / 163 TTJ 691 / (2015) 153 ITD 244 (Chennai)(Trib.)

Section 6 : Residence in India

116 S.6(1) : Residence in India – Individual – Forced stay – *Force majeure* – Reading down – Impossibility of performance – Due to untenable impounding of passport were to be excluded while computing days of his stay in India

According to assessee, his stay in India during the years under consideration had exceeded 182 days because of reasons beyond his control as his passport was illegally impounded by the Govt. agencies and he was unable to travel from India. The CIT(A), however, confirmed the order of AO on this issue and held him to be a resident as per literal meaning of the provisions. He, however, partly deleted the additions made by the AO on merits.

The Tribunal held that the assessee's overstay in India was neither attributable to his volition nor free will and was a result of untenable actions of impounding his passport by executive orders which were quashed by the highest Court. In these circumstances, the literal meaning of the provisions leads to a manifest absurdity in as much as by untenable actions of executive, a taxpayer is exposed to the peril of losing his valuable right under taxation law, i.e., retaining his NRI status.

In the entire episode no fault can be attributed to assessee who has shown active diligence in defending his legal rights. The legislature cannot have enacted this provision with an intention to forfeit the NRI status by unlawfully compelling the assessee not to leave India even if he has found not to have violated the alleged law. In the given facts and circumstances, the strict and literal interpretation applied by lower authorities to the provisions leads to manifest absurdity resulting in a meaning which cannot be intended by the legislature. The legislature in its wisdom might not have envisaged such a situation wherein a person is forced to become a resident due to wrongful restraint of subject in absence of eligibility to travel outside India. Therefore, assessee's case becomes fit where doctrine of *force majeure* may be applicable as it was impossible for the assessee to move out of country and therefore doctrine of impossibility of performance is also applicable. This is a fit case where strict legal reading of the provisions regarding residence in India should not be applied. An interpretation or construction should be applied which results in harmonious meaning, equity rather than injustice. Thus, application of rule of interpretation of 'reading down' and 'harmonious construction' automatically take care of assessee's arguments on doctrines of impossibility of performance and '*force majeure*'. In view of the above facts and circumstances it is held that for calculation of stay in India for these years the same should be calculated after exclusion of days of wrongful impounding of passport which constitutes forced stay in India. Consequently assessee's residential status is held to be as 'non resident'. In view of above, impugned addition is set aside and matter is remanded back to AO to examine the taxability of amount in question keeping the NRI status in mind and after affording a reasonable opportunity. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)

Suresh Nanda v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 121 (URO) / 31 ITR 620 / 165 TTJ 804 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.6(1) : Residence in India – Individual – Not-resident in India – Professional – Self employment like business or profession stays in India less than 182 days considered as non-resident – Receipts from outside India is not taxable. [OECD Model tax convention, Art. 17]

117

Assessee, a world known professional golfer, pursued vocation of sportsman. During current and earlier years, he participated in Gold Tournament in various countries and remained outside India for considerable period in these years. Assessee being a professional golfer is a self employed professional, and requirement for being treated as resident of India his stay of 182 days in India in previous year as per Explanation (a) to section 6(1)(c). Since assessee had stayed in India less than 182 days, he was not resident of India for assessment purpose, hence, receipt from his outside employment was held to be not taxable. (AY. 2009-10)

ACIT v. Jyotinder Singh Randhawa (2014) 64 SOT 323 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.6(1) : Residence in India – Individual – Stay less than 182 days in India – Employed prior to leaving India should not affect his residential status – Salary income of assessee accrued or arose during employment in China was not taxable in India. [S.5]

118

Assessee contended that he was working in Whirlpool, China and salary accrued and arose in China only and that he was non-resident during the relevant financial year. Therefore, he was not liable to be taxed in India. Tribunal held that the assessee was not resident during the relevant period as he has left India for the purpose of employment outside India. His stay during the relevant financial year was less than 182 days in India. Therefore, his status was non-resident during the relevant financial year. He was already employed in Whirlpool India prior to the leaving India for working with Whirlpool China shall not effects the residential status of the assessee. Held, all this fact clearly shows that salary income of the assessee accrued and arose during the employment in China is not taxable in India. Where status of assessee was a non-resident, fact that assessee was already employed before leaving India should not effect his residential status.(AY.2006-07)

ACIT v. Raj Jain (2014) 146 ITD 651 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.6(1) : Residence in India – Non-resident – Individual – Period of stay – Resident and receipts taxable

119

Assessee, an Indian citizen, employed outside India returned to India in financial year 2010-11 after resigning employment. His total stay in India in preceding four years was more than 365 days and total stay in India for financial year 2010-11 was 119 days. Held, he is resident in FY 2010-11 and receipts taxable. (AY. 2011-12)

Smita Anand (Mrs.) In re (2014) 362 ITR 38 / 266 CTR 146 / 223 Taxman 322/ 99 DTR 389 (AAR)

Section 9 : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India

- 120 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Procurement fees – Deduction at source – Substantial question of law – Matter remanded back to High Court to decide the issue by taking in to consideration of section 260A. [S.9(1)(vii), 40(a)(ia), 260A]**

The court observed that the High Court merely quoted the decision of the Tribunal *in extensor* in its judgment without deciding the substantial questions of law raised by the Revenue as to whether the Tribunal erred in holding that the procurement fees received by the assessee is taxable under section 9(1)(i) or 9(1)(vii) and deleting the disallowances under section 40(a)(i). Apex Court set aside the matter to High Court and decide the questions of law keeping in to consideration of the provisions of section 260A.

DIT(IT) v. Black & Veatch (I) (P) Ltd. (2014) 101 DTR 289 / 222 Taxman 1 / 267 CTR 183 (SC)

Editorial: Judgment of Bombay High Court in ITA no 927 of 2010 dt 17-1-2011 was set aside.

- 121 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Capital gains – Non-resident – Effect of Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i) – Sale in Mauritius of shares in Indian company to a foreign company – Value of shares derived only fractionally from assets in India – Capital gains not assessable in India.[S.45, 90(2) 195, 245R]**

Revenue has challenged the common ruling dated July 31, 2012 in Moody's Analytics Inc, USA in re (2012) 348 ITR 205 (AAR) passed by the Authority for Advance Rulings. Dismissing the writ petitions the Court held; that only a fraction of the value of shares of Copal-Jersey was derived indirectly from the value of the shares of CRIL and Exevo-India. Even if the transaction had been structured in the manner as suggested on behalf of the Revenue, the gains arising to the shareholders of Copal-Jersey from sale of their shares in Copal-Jersey to Moody-UK would not be taxable under section 9(1)(i) of the Act, as the value could not be stated to be derived substantially from assets in India. Ruling of the AAR in Moody's Analytics Inc., USA, In re [2012] 348 ITR 205 (AAR) is affirmed.

DIT(IT) v. Gopal Research Ltd. (2014) 226 Taxman 226 / 270 CTR 223 / (2015) 371 ITR 114 (Delhi)(HC)

DIT(IT) v. Copal Market Research Ltd. (2014) 226 Taxman 226 / 270 CTR 223 / (2015) 371 ITR 114 (Delhi)(HC)

DIT(IT) v. Moody's Group Ltd. (2014) 226 Taxman 226 / 270 CTR 223/ (2015) 371 ITR 114 (Delhi)(HC)

DIT(IT) v. Moody's Analytics (2014) 226 Taxman 226 / 270 CTR 223 / (2015) 371 ITR 114 (Delhi)(HC)

- 122 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – DTAA-India-USA [S.90, Art. 5]**

High court held that word 'used' as specified in article 5 of Indo-USA DTAA clarifies usage of an installation or structure for exploration of natural resources and if it was so

used for a period of 120 days in 12 months, only then it could be considered as PE in India and not merely on being ready for use.

DIT(IT) v. R& B Offshore Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxman 266/ 271 CTR 111 (Uttarakhand)(HC)

Editorial : Revenue sought leave to withdraw special leave petition to file review petition before High Court. Permission to withdraw the Special Leave petition was granted. SLP nos 14430, 14702&14861 of 2014 dt 12-09-2014 (2014) 227 Taxman 367 (SC)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Determination of quantum of income attributable to India in case of assessee followed by High Court in earlier years – In absence of new data and facts on issue of profits attributable to India operations – Tribunal not justified in remitting matter to Assessing Officer by adopting globalisation and commercial test-DTAA-India-Netherland [Art. 7]
The assessee, a company incorporated in the Netherlands, was engaged in the business of providing electronic distribution services to the travel industry through computerised reservation system. It appointed an exclusive distributor in India under an agreement. For determination of quantum of income attributable to India in case of assessee followed by High Court in earlier years. Tribunal set aside the matter to the AO to determine the income by adopting globalisation and commercial test. On appeal the Court held that in absence of new data and facts on issue of profits attributable to India operations, Tribunal was not justified in remitting matter to AO by adopting globalisation and commercial test. (AY. 2003-2004 to 2006-2007)

123

Galileo Nederland BV v. ADIT (IT) (2014) 367 ITR 319 / 271 CTR 568/ (2015) 228 Taxman 81 (Delhi)(HC)

Editorial: SLP was granted (SLA(C) No 128 of 2015 dt 12-1-2015) ADIT v. Galileo Nederland BV (2015) 230 Taxman 361 (SC)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Liaison office – Promoting sales – Taxable in India on business income – DTAA-India-USA-Matter remanded. [S.90, Art.5(3)(e), 6, 7]

124

The assessee, a company incorporated in the USA, claimed that it was maintaining a liaison office and the receipts were on account of a remittance of expenses incurred. The assessee stated that the expenses included the salary of its consultants and the chief representative officer. The assessee disclosed that besides the fixed remuneration, it had a sales incentive plan under which the employees were entitled to receive up to 25 per cent of their annual remuneration as an incentive. When called upon to disclose the details of the targets which were fixed and the payments under the sales incentive plan, the assessee submitted that during the assessment year no incentive had been paid. The AO recorded the statement of the chief representative officer of the assessee and came to the conclusion that the activities of the assessee were not restricted only to providing a channel of communication between the buyers of the products sold by the parent company but the activities were extended to searching for prospective buyers, providing required information and persuading them of the worth of the brand of the assessee in the US, which was, in turn, a subsidiary of a Swedish company. The Assessing Officer held that the activities of the assessee involved marketing activities in India and that the

assessee was, in fact, carrying on business activities. On this basis, the income of the assessee was computed at ₹ 24.86 lakhs, comprising the receipts of ₹ 63.72 lakhs less the expenses of ₹ 38.86 lakhs, which was taken as the profit from business activities carried on in India. CIT(A) and Tribunal confirmed the order of AO. On appeal the Court held that; Liaison office maintained by the assessee was for promoting sales of goods of assessee through its employees. Sales incentive for achieving sales target. Performance of employees judged by orders secured hence the Liaison office's activity not of a preliminary or preparatory nature therefore exclusionary clause in Agreement not applicable. Income is taxable in India on business income. The AO did not apply his mind to the crucial requirement which defines the extent of taxability. The AO was directed for a fresh determination of the extent of the taxable income having regard to the provisions of article 7 of the DTAA. (AY. 2003-04)

Brown and Sharpe Inc. v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 704 / (2015) 230 Taxman 69 / 120 DTR 134 (All.) (HC)

125 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – In absence of any material on record amount received for performing activities outside India cannot be brought to tax in India through PE-DTAA-India-Korea. [Art. 5, 7]**

The assessee, a Korea based company, entered into a contract with O.N.G.C. and L&T as consortium partners. The assessee's received certain amount under said contract a part of which was attributable to activities carried out within India. The AO found that in addition to the sum of money shown to have been received, assessee had received some other amount under the contract which were in respect of outside India activities and held that 25% of the revenues so received allegedly for outside India activities would be taxed in India. The Tribunal upheld the order of AO.

The High Court observed that the assessee has a tax identity in India and a tax identity outside India and, accordingly, its tax liability in India is required to be apportioned and in terms of Article 7(1), of DTAA, assessee will acquire its tax identity in India only when it carries on business in India through a permanent establishment situate in India. Accordingly, allowing the appeal of the assessee, the High Court held that neither the AO or the Tribunal had made any effort to bring on record any evidence to tax 25% of the gross receipt is attributable to the said business (AY. 2007-08)

Samsung Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. v. DIT (IT) & Anr. (2014) 221 Taxman 315 / 265 CTR 109/98 DTR 89 (Uttarakhand) (HC)

126 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – No question of law arose from Tribunal's order remitting matter back to AO to ascertain truth of assessee's assertion**

The assessee had only an assembly project in India for a period less than 9 months and claimed before the Tribunal that its income was not taxable in India. The Tribunal remitted the matter back to the AO for the purpose of ascertaining, whether, in fact, such assertion on the part of the assessee is true or not.

On appeal by the department, the High Court found that no question of law requiring determination of this Court arose, except for clarifying that, in the event, it is held that the assessee had a permanent establishment during the relevant assessment year

in India, the Assessing Authority would be entitled to take such recourse to law as is permissible against such an assessee under the Act.

ADIT v. GIL Mauritius Holdings Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxman 107 (Mag.)(Uttarakhand)(HC)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – DTAA would apply when a recipient of interest does not have a PE in a country where he has received interest – DTAA-India-France [Art. 12]

127

The assessee, a French company, having a PE in India, earned interest on refund of income tax in India. The issue that arose before the High Court was whether the same is covered by sub-articles (1) and (2) of Article 12 of India-France DTAA. The High Court held that a plain reading of these provisions make it absolutely clear that Sub-Articles (1) & (2) apply *inter alia* when the recipient of interest does not have a PE in the country, where he has received interest. There is no dispute that the respondent assessee had a permanent place of business in India and, accordingly, the interest earned in India on the refund of income tax is not covered by sub-Articles (1) & (2) of Article 12 of the said Treaty.

DIT v. Pride Foramer SAS (2014) 221 Taxman 305 /103 DTR 275 /268 CTR 467 / (Uttarakhand)(HC)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – AOP – Fees for technical services off-shore supply & services. [S.2(31)(v), (9(1)(vii))]

128

Merely because a project is a turnkey project would not necessarily imply that for the purposes of taxability, the entire contract be considered as an integrated one. Where the equipment and material is manufactured and procured outside India, the income attributable to the supply thereof could only be brought to tax if it is found that the said income therefrom arises through or from a business connection in India. It cannot be concluded that the Contract provides a “business connection” in India and accordingly, the Offshore Supplies cannot be brought to tax under the Act.

In order to fall outside the scope of Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, the link between the supply of equipment and services must be so strong and interlinked that the services in question are not capable of being considered as services on a standalone basis and are therefore subsumed as a part of the supplies. In view of the Explanation to Section 9(2) as substituted by Finance Act 2010 with retrospective effect from 1-6-1976, the decision of the Supreme Court in *Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries*, in so far as it holds that in order to tax fees for technical services under the Act the services must be rendered in India, is no longer applicable. Therefore, in the event the services in question are not considered as an integral and inextricable part of equipment and material supplied, it would be necessary to examine whether any relief in respect of such income would be available to the assessee by virtue of the DTAA between Germany and India;

(f) The AAR exercises judicial power and necessarily has to follow the principle of law already accepted by it. This is also a necessary facet of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The equal protection clause in the Constitution would necessarily imply that the judicial authorities interpreting the law must also follow a consistent view. Thus, in the event the Authority was of the opinion that the earlier view was erroneous, it was incumbent upon the Authority to refer the matter to a Larger Bench. In the present

case, the Authority has sought to distinguish its earlier decision in the case of Hyundai Rotem, without pointing out any material dissimilarity in facts which would render the earlier decision inapplicable. We are also unable to find any material dissimilarity in facts that would warrant such a conclusion.

Linde A. G. v. DDIT (2014) 365 ITR 1 / 268 ITR 274 / 103 DTR 137 / 224 Taxman 43 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

129 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Permanent Establishment – DTAA-India-USA. [S.90, Art.5]**

Re. Whether a subsidiary can be a Permanent Establishment: While under Article 5(6), a holding or a subsidiary company by themselves would not become PE of each other, a subsidiary can become a PE of the holding company if it satisfies the requirements of Article 5. Accordingly, any premises belonging to the subsidiary that is at the disposal of the parent (the “right-to-use test”) and that constitutes a fixed place of business (the “location test” and the “duration test”) through which the parent carries on its own business (the “business activity test”), gives rise to a PE of the parent under Art. 5(1). Re. Location or fixed place PE under Article 5(1) and (2) of DTAA: The word “permanent” refers to some degree of permanency and not a mere transitory nature of the business in the other State. The expression “fixed place of business” refers not only to physical location in the form of immovable property or premises but in certain instances can mean machinery and equipment. The word “fixed” refers to a distinct place with some or certain degree of permanence. The carrying on of “business” should be “through” the fixed place of business.

Re. What constitutes a “Service PE” under Article 5(2)(l) of the DTAA: Article 5(2)(l) and (k) defines what can be called service PE. Sub-clause (l) requires furnishing of services within the second contracting State by a foreign enterprise through its employees or other personnel. But a PE is created only if activities of that nature continue for a period or periods aggregating more than 90 days in 12 months period or under clause (ii) services are performed within that State for a related enterprise as defined in Article 9 paragraph 1.

Re. Impact of Article 5(3) and its over-riding effect and consequences: Article 5(3) contains a list of negative activities which are deemed not to create PE. First and foremost, Article 5(1)/(2) should be applicable but then if the activities fall within parameters of paragraph 3, PE is not created for imposing tax in the second state. It does not follow that if activities are not covered in the negative or exclusions set out in paragraph 3, a PE is established or deemed to be established under paragraphs 1 or 2 of Article 5;

Re. What is “Agency PE” under Articles 5(4) and (5) of DTAA: A dependent agency is one which is bound to follow instructions and is personally dependent on the enterprise he represents. Such dependency must not be isolated or once in a while transaction but should be of comprehensive nature.

The MAP procedure and agreement is no doubt relevant but cannot be determinative or the primary basis to decide whether the assessee had PE in India. (AY. 2000-01 to 2007-08)

DIT v. eFunds IT Solution(2014) 364 ITR 256 / 99 DTR 257 / 266 CTR 1 (Delhi)(HC)

DIT(IT) v. eFunds Corporation & Ors. (2014) 364 ITR 256 / 99 DTR 257 / 266 CTR 1 (Delhi)(HC).

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Sale of shares – Cannot be assessed as capital gains – DTAA-India-France [S.45,90, Art. 14(6)] 130

Income earned by assessee, a French resident, from sale of shares of Indian companies, could not be taxed under head ‘capital gain’ due to benefit conferred in terms of article 14(6) of India-France DTAA. (AY. 2005-06)

ITO v. Vinay P. Karve (2015) 152 ITD 58 / 118 DTR 227 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Shipping and air transport – Operation of ships – Benefit of DTAA cannot be denied – India-Malaysia [Art.8] 131

The assessee was a company incorporated under the laws of Malaysia and was also a tax resident of Malaysia, engaged in the business of shipping in international traffic and was also the owner of ships either owned by it or taken on lease. The assessee had appointed an agent for booking of freights of cargo for transportation from one destination to other in international traffic. The assessee sought for double tax relief as per Article-8 of India-Malaysia DTAA. Para 2 of article 8 of DTAA categorically envisages that for the purpose of said Article of DTAA profits from the operation of ships in the international traffic means, profit derived by an enterprise from the transportation by sea of goods carried on by the “owner” or “lessee” or “charterer” of ships. Thus, the profits from the “operation of ships” have been qualified by the words carried on by the “owner” or “lessees” or “charterer”. This meaning assigned to operation of ships in the India-Malaysia treaty is in contra-distinction with OECD model convention, where the operation of ships has not been defined.

Therefore, where in case of assessee, a Malaysian Company, voyage between Indian port to hub port through feeder vessel and from hub port to final destination port through mother vessel owned/leased by assessee were inextricably linked, entire profits derived from transportation of goods was to be treated as profits from operation of ships and, therefore, benefit of Article 8 of DTAA, could not be denied to assessee on part of freight received in respect of voyage by feeder vessels.(AY. 2004-05 to 2007-08, 2009-10)

MISC Berhad v. ADIT(IT) (2014) 150 ITD 213 / 165 TTJ 185 / 108 DTR 313 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Contract executed in India – Assessable as business income in India-DTAA-India-Mauritius [Art. 5] 132

Assessee was a non-resident company registered in Mauritius. AO included income received from, an Indian company, on contract/s executed in India, as business income. Assessee contended that it did not have a permanent establishment in India so income qua said business with Indian Company, though admittedly carried on by it, could not be brought to tax in India. Tribunal held that regular interaction between parties requiring assessee’s continued presence in India over indefinite contract period was needed for implementation of project. Execution of project appeared to be a regular business function, carried out in ordinary course, requiring little intervention by top management. A fixed place of business, would not be confined to a place where top management of company was located and branch of an enterprises may well be its PE; only profit attributable to same being liable to be taxed in source State. It was for

assessee to specify place/s from where they had functioned over their continued stay in India. Some place at disposal of assessee or its employees during entire period of stay in India, was manifest and eminent and followed unmistakably from work nature/profile and *modus operandi* followed. In view of above facts it would be clear that assessee had a PE in India during relevant years. Order of AO was upheld. (AY. 1997-98, 1999-2000) *Renoir Consulting Ltd. v. Dy. DIT (2014) 64 SOT 28 (Mum.)(Trib.)*

133 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Profit – Technical fees – Cost recovered directly connected with shipping business – Receipts is not taxable in India-DTAA-India-Denmark. [S.9(1)(vii), Art. 9, 13]**

Assessee, a Danish company, was mainly engaged in business of operation of ships, chartering and other related activities of shipping in international traffic. Assessee's shipping operations were carried out in India by an agent namely MIPL Denmark DTAA, has to be construed broadly so as to include not only activities directly connected with shipping operations but also to include income from activities which facilitate or support such operation as well as any ancillary activities of assessee. AO held that amount so received was taxable as royalty and fee for technical services under Article 13 of India. Tribunal held that cost recovered by assessee from its various agents including MIPL towards usage of software was directly connected with its shipping operations and same had to be treated as covered under Article 9(1) of India-Denmark DTAA and, thus, receipt in question could not be taxed in India. (AY. 2008-09) *Dy. DIT v. A. P. Moller Maersk (2014) 64 SOT 50 (Mum.)(Trib.)*

134 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Malaysian branch – DTAA-India-Malaysia [Art.5]**

Following order passed by assessee's own case relating to earlier assessment years, it was to be concluded that Malaysian branch of assessee was having permanent establishment in Malaysia and, thus, income arising therefrom was not taxable in India, in view of DTAA between India and Malaysia. (AY. 2006-07, 2008-09, 2009-10) *ACIT v. Sivagami Holdings (P) Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 75 (Chennai)(Trib.)*

135 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Support services – Not taxable in India – DTAA-India-German. [Art.7]**

Assessee German company was engaged in business of designing, manufacturing and marketing of passive electronic components. It had two subsidiaries in India. Assessee provided support services to these subsidiaries to which assessee was providing support services in field of product marketing, sales and information. Reasoning given by Tribunal in assessee's own case in *Asstt. CIT v. EPCOS AG, Germany [2009] 28 SOT 412 (Pune)*, it was held that, where assessee did not have any PE in India, much less a PE to which subject royalties and fees for technical services could be attributed; and that in terms of India-German DTAA, India did not have right to tax these receipts as business profit under article 7. In light of finding, that no revenue earned by assessee could be said to be attributable to PE, even if one was to come to conclusion that a PE existed, no taxability could arise under article 7. (AY. 2008-09) *EPCOS AG v. Dy. DIT (2014) 64 SOT 257 (Pune)(Trib.)*

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Shipping business – Merely managing affairs of said companies on remuneration basis – Cannot be held to be shipping income – Not taxable – DTAA-India-Denmark [Art. 9]

136

Assessee was a partnership firm existing under laws of Denmark. Assessee was appointed as managing agent by two Danish companies. Activities of those companies were shipping operations in international traffic at global level and effective place of management was in Denmark. Assessee firm had been filing return of income on behalf of Danish companies wherein benefit of non-taxation was claimed in respect of shipping income under article 9 of India-Denmark DTAA. AO held that shipping income was liable to tax in India in hands of assessee. Tribunal held that the entire infrastructure including vessels deployed in international traffic belonged to two Danish companies, and assessee-firm was merely managing affairs of said companies on remuneration basis. Even otherwise, assessee firm was separate and distinct from two Danish companies and any income accruing on account of shipping operations did not belong to assessee, but to those two companies only. In view of above, AO was not justified in holding that shipping income in question was taxable in hands of assessee-firm. (AY. 1997-98 to 2003-04)

Dy. DIT v. A. P. Moller (2013)158 TTJ 537 / (2014) 64 SOT 147 (URO) / 96 DTR 1 (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Charge of fees – Shared contract – Not taxable as fees for technical services or royalty. [S.9(1)(v), 9(1)(vi)]

137

Assessee-firm, a resident of Denmark, was managing shipping business of two Danish companies in international traffic at global level. For rendering said services, assessee-firm was entitled to charge fee which was calculated on basis of Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) of ships per annum. In course of assessment, AO held that management fees received/receivable by assessee from two Danish companies was chargeable to tax in India. Since payment had been made from one non-resident to another non-resident in connection with entire global business in Denmark, such a payment could not be taxed in India either as fees for technical services or as royalty, addition was deleted. Similarly where assessee-firm shared cost of Global Online System and software developed by Danish companies to be used in their international shipping business, payment so made to non-resident companies could not be taxed in India as fees for technical services or royalty (AY. 1997-98 to 2003-04)

Dy. DIT v. A. P. Moller (2013) 158 TTJ 537 / (2014) 64 SOT 147 (URO) / 96 DTR 1 (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Liaison Office in India – Income of Liaison Office attributable to business activities would be taxable in India – Amount received by Liaison Office over and above expenses incurred by it, was also to be treated as its income taxable in India

138

Assessee US-company started a Liaison Office in India and was registered with Registrar of Companies for carrying on business in India, for which permission of the RBI was taken. Liaison Office apart from having Chief Representative Officer and other staff, was

also having a Technical Expert. Employees of assessee-company were promoting sale of goods of assessee-company as per service conditions. There was a sales incentive plan by which employees were provided incentive for achieving sales target and performance of employees was being judged by orders secured by Liaison Office of assessee-company. The AO as well as the CIT(A) held that since Liaison office was promoting sales of assessee's product, income attributable to Liaison Office in India activities was taxable in India. On appeal, the assessee-company contended that Liaison Office was not taxable in India as it had not rendered any services for procurement of order or sale of its products and it had not earned any income in Indian and was only receiving reimbursement of expenditure from Head Office. Tribunal held that various activities clearly established that Liaison Office of assessee was promoting sales of assessee-company in India. Income of Liaison Office attributable to these activities would be taxable in India. Amount received by Liaison Office over and above expenses incurred by it, was also to be treated as its income taxable in India. (AY. 2003-04 to 2005-06)

Brown & Sharpe Inc. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 126 (URO) / 160 TTJ 1 (Delhi)(Trib.)

139 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Cost for setting up global telecommunication facility Not assessable as royalty or fees for technical services – DTAA-India-Denmark. [S.9(1)(vi), 9(1)(vii), Art 13]**

Assessee maintained a global telecommunication facility capable of supporting communication facility between itself and its agents in various countries on a combination of mainframe and non-mainframe servers located at Denmark. Cost for setting up global telecommunication facility was shared between assessee and its agents. AO made addition treating the amount received by assessee towards shared IT Global Portfolio Tracking System from its agents by treating same as fees for technical services. Tribunal had deleted a similar addition made by AO in earlier year and following earlier year addition of the same was deleted. (AY. 2003-04)

ADIT v. Aktieselskabet Dampskibsselskabet Svendborg (2014) 64 SOT 181 (URO)(Mum.) (Trib.)

140 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Royalty – Fees for technical services – Benefit of lower rate of tax under article 13(2) of India-UK DTAA was available because beneficial owner of royalty being JCBE, was also a resident of UK - DTAA-India-UK. [S.9(1)(vi), 9(1)(vii), 90(2), 115A(1)(b), 195A, Art.5(2)(K), 7, 13]**

Assessee company was incorporated and was tax resident of UK. There was another group company namely JCBE, which was also incorporated under laws of UK. JCBE entered into an agreement with Indian group company, namely JCBI, to license know-how and related technical documents consisting of all drawings and designs with an exclusive right to manufacture and market Excavator Loader in territory of India. In terms of agreement, JCBE seconded its employees to JCBI on assignment basis. Subsequently, JCBE entered into sub-license agreement with assessee whereby license was to be commercially exploited by JCBI as was done earlier, but royalty for such user was to be paid by JCBI to assessee, who in turn was to pass on 99.5 per cent of same to JCBE. AO opined that employees of JCBE as seconded to JCBI constituted a service PE

of assessee as they were covered under expression 'or other personnel' in Article 5(2)(k) of India-UK DTAA. Since seconded employees furnished services including managerial services for a period of more than 90 days during relevant assessment year, AO rightly concluded that service PE of assessee was established in India, in such a situation, amount paid to employees of JCBE sent to India on deputation on assignment basis was covered within para 6 of article 13 of India-UK DTAA and, thus, same was chargeable to tax under article 7 of India-UK DTAA, however, fees for services rendered by employees of JCBE falling in second category doing stewardship activities and inspection and testing only, did not fall in para 6 of article 13 and, was, thus, chargeable to tax as per para 2 of article 13 of India-UK DTAA. Finally, even though while accepting revenue's stand that assessee, a resident of UK was not a beneficial owner, still benefit of lower rate of tax under article 13(2) of India-UK DTAA was available to it because beneficial owner of royalty being JCBE, was also a resident of UK. Partly in favour of assessee. (AY. 2008-09)

JC Bamford Investments Rocester v. DDIT (2014) 64 SOT 311 / 33 ITR 493 / 150 ITD 209/ 164 TTJ 433 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Expenses incurred in India attributable to business carried on in India through PE, had to be allowed subject to limitations provided in Act – DTAA-India-USA). [Art.7] 141

Expenses incurred by assessee in India Attributable to business carried on in India through Permanent establishment was held to be allowable, subject to limitations provided in the Act. (AY.1997-98)

Bank of America v. Jt. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 145 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Interest paid to its Singapore branch – Held to be allowable – DTAA-India-USA.[Art.7] 142

Indian branch of assessee's bank borrowed funds from Head Office/overseas branches on which assessee paid interest to its Singapore branch and claimed same as deduction in computation of income. Interest paid to the overseas branch head office is an allowable deduction by virtue of provisions of DTAA and at the same time the said interest paid by the India PE is not chargeable to tax under the provisions of IT Act being income to self. Interest paid to overseas head office branch was to be allowed as deduction. (AY.1997-98)

Bank of America v. Jt. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 145 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Royalty – Contract for supply of equipment which included hardware and software both, entire income from supply of equipment was to be assessed as business income arising from assessee's business connection/PE in India – DTAA-India-China. [S.9(1)(vii), Art. 5,7,12] 143

Assessee Company incorporated in China and was engaged in business of supplying telecommunications network equipment. Assessee had its branch office in India, In respect of supply of hardware, AO estimated operating profit and then attributed 20 per cent towards PE in India. In respect of software portion, he treated receipt from software as income from royalty and held that same was to be charged to tax at rate of 10 per

cent. The ITAT held that if there was only one contract for supply of equipment which included hardware and software both, entire income from supply of equipment was to be assessed as business income arising from assessee's business connection/PE in India. (AY. 2005-06 to 2008-09)

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 323 / 163 TTJ 549 / 105 DTR 150 (Delhi)(Trib.)

144 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Shipping business – Amount received by shipping company for providing cargo tracking service to its customers would not be taxed as fees for technical services – DTAA-India-Denmark. [S.9(1)(vii), 44B, 90, Art. 9]**

Assessee was doing shipping business on global basis and to keep track of ships/vessels and its cargo, it provided tracking service to its customers, whose cargo assessee was handling. The payment received is nothing but a payment by way of reimbursement of the cost for providing a particular facility. The business of shipping and not in the business of providing any technical service. The payment was for fee for technical services, there has been use of sophisticated equipments, due to improved technology does not mean that the Assessee is providing technical services. The assessee as well as its agents are the beneficiaries of such improved technology. The assessee is not the owner of any technology to provide them for a fee to prospective user. They are themselves consumers of the technology". such payments received from assessee's agents were not in nature of Fees for technical services, but reimbursements, not amounting to generation of income. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

A.P. Moller Maersk v. Dy. DIT (2014) 149 ITD 434 (Mum.)(Trib.)

145 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – As the work done by the branch in India required high technical and managerial skill, it is not preparatory and auxiliary work of a back office but constitutes a permanent establishment (ii) Attribution of profits under Rule 10B(2) on the basis of the H.O's profits in the absence of data on uncontrolled transactions is proper, (iii) As risks were shared by the H.O. and the PE, 50% of the profits determined as per rule 10 are attributable to operations carried out by the PE in India-DTAA-India-USA. [Art. 5(2), 7]**

(i) The benefit of the ratio of first part of Morgan Stanley and Co. Inc. (2007) 292 ITR 416 (SC) is not available for the assessee as on careful examination of activities and modus operandi of the assessee, we have reached to a conclusion that the important work assigned to Indian branch office was preparation of drawing, designs and doing structural calculations which require high technical and managerial skill, therefore, this important facet of the Indian Branch cannot be said to be a preparatory and auxiliary work of a back office but at the same time, we note that the US office minimise their cost of services and other expenses by assigning and appointing highly technical and materially skilled professional to discharge main function of US Head office in India at low cost. The Apex Court in Morgan Stanley (supra) in 'para 15' held that even employees which are highly experienced in their specialized fields lends their expertise to Indian entity in that that sense there is a service PE under Article 5(2)(1) of Indo-US DTAA.

Consequently, the assessee is a PE in India as per provisions of Articles 5(2)(b) and (c) of Indo-US DTAA;

- (ii) Coming to the issue of attribution of profits to PE in India, the transfer pricing analysis report shows that the assessee itself has adopted the mark up to the cost at 1.83% and at the same time, the AO found that the net profit earned by the Head Office of the assessee in US tax return was 8.5% which was based on sales. The revenue authorities have observed that the assessee has not submitted record of uncontrolled transactions and the record of analysis, how the uncontrolled transactions are comparable to the case of the assessee as per requirement of Rule 10B(2) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. In this situation, the AO was right in adopting the profit of 8.5% for AY 2003-04 and 10.6% for AY 2004-05 to calculate attributable profit;
- (iii) The AO has not brought out any fact or material into existence that the risk of marketing and quality control activity have taken place and all developmental activities have taken place in India. In this situation, it cannot be said that risk is involved exclusively either on the Head office or on the PE branch office in India. Obviously, from stage of discussion and obtaining the contract till its final marketing to the respective client have been undertaken by the US Head office but at the same time this fact cannot be ignored that the PE branch office in India contributed towards all development activities at the cheaper cost of service and human resources in comparison to USA, therefore, we are of the view that for earning higher profit in comparison to USA, comparable companies as adopted in transfer pricing study, the US Head office earned higher profit due to low cost of services and human input by Indian PE. At the same time, although we note that the risk factor was also borne by the Indian PE branch, we also note this fact that certain risk in regard to capital investment, bad debts and other legal obligations were borne by the US Head office, therefore, the AO rightly adopted the global profit of the US Head office for benchmarking the percentage of profit and the AO attributed 100% profit to the Indian PE. The CIT(A) has taken into account this very fact that the Indian branch takes some risk as the important drawing and designing calculations are carried out by the Indian company and impliedly other risks as stated above were taken by the US Head office and, therefore, in the totality of these facts and circumstances, the CIT(A) was justified in holding that 50% of the profits determined by the AO after applying Rule 10 were to be attributable to the operations carried out by the PE in India. (AY. 2004-05.)

Consulting Engineering Corporation v. JDIT (2014) 166 TTJ 341 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(i) : Income Deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Commission foreign agent – Not liable to deduct tax at source.[S. 40(a)(ia), 195]

146

In the present case assessee exporter claimed deduction on commission paid to agents abroad who were canvassing for assessee in overseas market. During the relevant assessment year when assessee had affected payments to foreign agents, such payments were not income of non-residents eligible for tax in India. The Tribunal held that subsequent circular allegedly withdrawing benefits given to assessee, nor addition of

explanation to section 9(2) through Finance Act, w.e.f. 1-6-1976 would have no effect on the taxability of such income earned by non-residents agents outside India during relevant year in course of his business or profession carried out outside India.(AY. 2008-09)

ACIT v. Capricorn Food Products India Ltd. (2014) 61 SOT 196 (Chennai)(Trib.)

147 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Permanent Establishment – Commission is taxable in India – DTAA-India-Finland [Art.5]**

Assessee Finland company executed a contract with Nhava Sheva Port Trust (NSPT) for supply of tractors and trailers. It engaged an Indian company Usha Sales for rendering certain specific services in India. Assessee paid an agreed commission to Usha Sales. Assessee had PE in India in form of Usha Sales and that certain percentage of sale of trailers was also taxable in India. Assessee had not been able to convince on fact that Usha Sales was not a PE of assessee and it was an independent branch by itself. Indian company should be treated as a PE, and not as an agent of independent status.(AY. 1989-90)

ADIT (IT) v. Oy Sisu AB (2014) 146 ITD 572 (Mum.)(Trib.)

148 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Permanent Establishment – DTAA-India-USA. [S.90]**

The Tribunal held that the agreement entered is an independent agreement on principal to principal basis and held that there is no PE of the assessee company in India as there is neither any office in India nor it has any business connection in India nor has carried out any business activities in India. Assessee company is a standalone legal independent entity. As there is no PE, the question of attribution of profits does not arise.

Addl. DIT v. Lucent Technologies GRL LLC (2014) 159 TTJ 589 / 29 ITR 132/ 98 DTR 66/ 64 SOT 137 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)

Dy. DIC v. Reliance Infocom Ltd. (2014) 159 TTJ 589 / 29 ITR 132 / 98 DTR 66 / 64 SOT 137 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)

149 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Liaison office of foreign company in India – Over and above the reimbursement of expenses – Taxable as income. [S.5(2)]**

In the employment contract between the assessee, a US company and its employees at liaison office, there was a sales incentive plan whereby the employees were to be provided with the remuneration based upon the achievement of the target for sale of goods of the assessee company in India. The assessee company had also got itself registered with the ROC for carrying on business in India and filed its return declaring loss under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”. These clearly established that the liaison office was promoting sales of the assessee company in India. Therefore, the income attributable to the liaison office was taxable in India. Amount received by the liaison office from the head office over and above the reimbursement of expenses was rightly treated as income. (AY. 2003-04 to 2005-06)

Brown & Sharpe Inc v. ACIT (2014) 98 DTR 405 / 64 SOT 126 (URO) / 160 TTJ 1 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Purchase of goods in India through liaison office for exports – No income was derived in India
 Assessee, a Hong Kong company acted as buying agent for group companies. It established a liaison office in India which acted as communication channel between the company and the manufacturers for sourcing apparels from India. Liaison office's activities were prior to purchase of goods by the company and, therefore, Explan. 1(b) to s. 9(1)(i) was clearly applicable and no income was derived in India. (AY. 2003-04 to 2007-08)

150

Tesco International Sourcing Ltd. v. DDIT(IT) (2014) 98 DTR 33 / 62 SOT 41 / 159 TTJ 569 (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection- “composite” contracts for supply of offshore & onshore supply & services under Act & DTAA – DTAA-India-Korea. [S.5(2), 90, Art.7, 12]

151

It is wide off the mark to categorize the present contract agreement as a composite one since all its major four components are distinctly identifiable with separate consideration for each. There is a separate mention of consideration for supply of equipments and for rendition of services. Simply because the supply of equipment and the rendition of services is to one party and for a common purpose, we are unable to find any logic in treating the entire amount as one composite payment attributable commonly both to the supply of equipment and rendering of services, more so when there is a specific identifiable amount relatable to these segments;

Title to goods shall be considered to have passed outside India when delivery was made on high sea and the payment was also received outside India. Merely because the risk passed in India, it cannot be said that the sale took place in India. Therefore, no income can be said to have arisen in India;

In so far as the price for offshore supply of equipment simplicitor is concerned, profit from the same cannot be charged to tax as the assessee is a non-resident and there is absence of territorial nexus of such income with India. (AY. 2008-09)

POSCO Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. ADIT (2014) 148 ITD 527 / 31 ITR 255 / 162 TTJ 689 / 102 DTR 257 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Permanent establishment – Business profits – Force of Attraction (FOA) – Similar business activities carried on by an enterprise of contracting State – Marketing and management services were provided outside India – Income would not be taxable under Art 7. DTAA-India-USA DTAA. [Art.5,7]

152

Marketing and management services in question were rendered outside India and income of such services cannot be said to have accrued or arisen to the assessee or deemed to have accrued or arisen to assessee in India, the existence of service PE in India would not make it taxable under article 7 of Indo-US DTAA. (AY.2007-08)

ADIT v. WNS North America Inc (2014) 146 ITD 435 / 30 ITR 346 (Mum.)(Trib.).

153 **S.9(1)(i) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Profit on services rendered by company – Not taxable in India if non-resident company does not have PE in India-DTAA-India-Singapore. [Art.7].**

The applicant is a resident company engaged in the business of producing and distributing television programmes. It mainly produces reality shows and has also ventured into soap operas. For one of its productions, for the purpose of shooting the show outside India, the applicant engaged NAPL, a Singapore based Company, to procure the services of one CPH as an executive producer for the show. As per the terms of the agreement, NAPL was responsible for the overall production and also for handling business issues. The agreement also provided that NAPL will provide specialized services to aid in the production of programmes for which NAPL agreed to commission its representative to CPH who was an executive producer. As per the agreement the applicant was to pay a total consideration of US Dollar 49,000 to NAPL for their services for the show. The applicant sought advance ruling on whether the payments made by the applicant to NAPL will be treated as business income, and since it does not have a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India, whether the payments made by the Applicant to NAPL would be chargeable to tax in India.

The Authority for Advance Ruling held that the Article 7 of the India-Singapore Tax Treaty provides that “the profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in the State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State but only so much of them as is directly or indirectly attributable to that permanent establishment. The Authority, on the facts of the case, further held that NAPL is a resident company of Singapore. The applicant is an Indian enterprise and for its business activities outside India the services of NAPL were utilized and payment for the services were also received outside India. There was nothing on record to show that NAPL had PE in India. In the absence of any PE in India, the profits arising out of the transactions for services rendered by NAPL were not taxable in India.

Endemol India (P) Ltd., In re (2014) 361 ITR 353 / 222 Taxman 59 / 264 CTR 128/ 97 DTR 44 (AAR)

154 **S.9(1)(ii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Salaries – Pension – Cannot be taxed in India – DTAA-India-UK. [Art. 20, 23]**

Assessee's wife was working with Royal Bank of Scotland. After her death as per commitment of UK employer of deceased wife, they would continue, as paying her husband i.e. assessee, family pension until his death. The relevant TDS was deducted by UK employer at the time of this payment. In view of Article 23(3) of the India UK DTAA treaty, it was held that pension could not be taxed in India again too. (AY. 2000-01, to 2006-07, 2009-10)

ACIT v. Karan Thapar (2014) 64 SOT 334 / 163 TTJ 405 / 105 DTR 257 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Payment made for licence to use intranet facilities provided by a non-resident company amounts to ‘royalty’ – Liable to deduct tax at source. [S. 195]

The assessee was engaged in the business of design, development, implementation and support systems for the information technology sector. The assessee entered into an agreement with CGI Group Inc., a company incorporated in Canada, by which the Canada Company would procure licences from Microsoft and also the communication tool developed by CGI Group Inc., and the costs relating to that would be subsequently invoiced to the assessee. The assessee claimed that since it was a cost sharing agreement and payments were made by the assessee for reimbursement of cost/expenses, no income was embedded therein. Therefore, the assessee was not liable to deduct tax under section 195(1).

The Revenue Authorities held that the payment made by the assessee was towards Royalty as defined u/s. 9(1)(vi) and, therefore, the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source. The Tribunal, however, held that the payments made by the assessee were reimbursement of expenses and no income element was embedded therein; therefore, the assessee was not liable to deduct tax under section 195(1).

On Revenue’s appeal the Court held that it is clear from the agreement that some right is assigned to the assessee under the agreement on payment of cost. That right is a right to use the facility, notwithstanding the fact that the cost is paid. Clause 5 declares the rights of such facility vest with the Canadian company only. Therefore, it is clear that the cost is paid for using the computer software. When the assessee is allowed to use the said facility, it is nothing but a licence to use the said facility. If really the cost paid represents the assessee’s share of the cost for developing the internal telecommunication and communication tool, on such payment, the Canadian company can never claim to be the absolute owner of the said intellectual property. If the CGI Group companies were to pay costs for using the said facility, then the title of the said facility i.e. intellectual property should equally vest proportionate to the cost share by these Group companies. That is not the intention behind this agreement. Therefore, there is no hesitation to hold that this cost sharing agreement is only a device to avoid payment of tax as contemplated under the aforesaid provision. It is nothing but a royalty. Furthermore, Explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 has put at rest all the controversies and doubts. It expressly states that transfer of all or any rights in respect of any right, property or information includes and has always included transfer of all or any right for use or right to use a computer software including granting of a licence irrespective of the medium through which such right is transferred. The terms of the cost sharing agreement explicitly mention that the Canadian company has developed an internal telecommunication and communication tool which is accessible only to the members of CGI worldwide. Therefore, the payment made is nothing but a licence to use the said facility, which amounts to royalty.

CIT v. CGI Information Systems & Management Consultants (P) Ltd. (2014) 226 Taxman 319 / 275 CTR 72 / 115 DTR 115 (Karn.)(HC)

156 **S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Income received was held to be not taxable in India – DTAA-India-Germany. [Art 7, 12]**

Tribunal held that consideration received as fee would be chargeable as royalty and 80 per cent would be taxable. On reference the assessee contended that Tribunal ought to have held that such consideration receivable were industrial or commercial profits within the meaning of DTAA and impugned consideration would not be taxable in India as the assessee company had no PE in India. Following the decision of earlier year in assessee's own case the question was answered in favour of assessee. (AY. 1981-82)

Fag Kugelfischer Georg Schafer KCAA v. CIT (2014) 227 Taxman 256(Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

157 **S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Supply of equipment – Principal to principal – Not assessable as royalty – DTAA-India-Danish. [Art. 13]**

The assessee claimed that certain receipts constituting fees for technical services was not taxable as per Article III(3) of the Old Indo-Danish Tax Treaty based on the argument that it does not have a permanent establishment in India. However, the revenue had taxed these particular receipts either as royalty or something other than technical fees along with royalty and management charges at the rate of 20 per cent of the gross amount. Tribunal deleted the addition. On appeal the Court held that; Payment was made to Danish Company for supply of equipments. Relevant contract included stipulations for giving all information so as to guide Indian party to install equipment at site and thereafter to use it. Technical information that was provided was related to data and plant specification flow sheet issued for installation of plant hence the impugned payment was not a receipt or income accruing or arising to assessee by virtue of section 9(1)(vi). Since payment was made to Danish company towards supply of equipments on 'principal to principal' basis, such payment could not be considered as royalty. Since patent, invention, model, design, secret formula or process of trade mark or similar property was not transferred and only basic information to guide Indian resident with regard to installation and use of equipment at site was provided, any sum paid would not fall within definition of royalty. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 1991-92)

DIT v. Haldor Topsoe (2014) 369 ITR 453 / 225 Taxman 105 / 106 DTR 305 (Bom.)(HC)

158 **S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Amount received under the licence agreement for allowing the use of software is not royalty – DTAA-India-USA. [S.90, Art. 7, 12]**

License Agreement was entered between India & USA. According to which the license was non-exclusive, non transferable and the software were to be used in accordance with the agreement. The revenue treated the amount received by the assessee under the licence agreement for allowing the use of software as Royalty under DTAA between India & USA. On appeal, the court held in favour of assessee and held that right to use a copyright in a programme is totally different from the right to use a programme embedded in a cassette or a CD which may be a software and the payment made for the same cannot be said to be received as consideration for the use of or right to use of any copyright to bring it within the definition of royalty as given in the DTAA. Amount received under the licence agreement for allowing the use of software is not Royalty under DTAA between India & USA. What was transferred was neither the copyright in

the software nor the use of the copyright in the software, but what is transferred is the right to use the copyrighted material or article which is clearly distinct from the rights in a copyright. Right that is transferred is not a right to use the copyright but is only limited to the right to use the copyrighted material and the same did not give rise to any royalty income and would be business income.

DIT v. Infrasoft Ltd. (2013) 96 DTR 113 / (2014) 264 CTR 329 / 220 Taxman 273 (Delhi) (HC)

S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Permanent establishment – Rights in television programmes, motion pictures and sports events and exhibiting same on its television channels from Singapore – Not taxable in India – Not liable to deduct tax at source – DTAA-India-Singapore. [S.195, Art. 12]

159

The assessee is a Singapore based company engaged in business of acquiring rights in television programmes motion pictures and sports events and exhibiting same on television channels from Singapore. It entered in to an agreement with Global Cricket Corporation (GCC) also tax resident of Singapore, under which GCC granted telecast rights to assessee through out licence territory which included India. AO held that payment made by assessee to GCC for acquisition of telecast rights was royalty and was chargeable to tax in India. In appeal CIT(A) and Tribunal held that payment was not taxable in India in as much as liability for payment was incurred by assessee in connection with broadcasting operations in Singapore and that had no connection with marketing activities carried out through its alleged permanent establishment in India. On appeal by revenue, dismissing the appeal the Court observed that the alleged permanent establishment of assessee in India, the Tribunal's finding of fact is that the economic links entirely with the assessee's head office in Singapore. The payment to GCC cannot be said to have been incurred in connection with the appellant's permanent establishment in India. The Court affirmed the view of Tribunal and held that no substantial question of law arise out of order of Tribunal. Order of Tribunal was affirmed.

DIT(IT) v. Set Statellite (Singapore) Pte Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxman 1 / 269 CTR 197 / 105 DTR 153 (Bom.)(HC)

S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Consideration paid for transfer of right to use software/computer programme in respect of copyright is 'royalty'

160

The High Court following the decisions of the Karnataka High Court in the case of *CIT v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (2012) 345 ITR 494* and *CIT v. Synopsis International Old Ltd. (2012) 28 taxmann.com 162* held that consideration paid by the Indian customers or end users to the assessee, a foreign supplier, for transfer of the right to use the software/computer programme in respect of the copyrights falls within the meaning of 'royalty' as defined in section 9(1)(vi) of the Act. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Customer Asset India (P) Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxman 37 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

- 161 **S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Use of equipment or use of process – Brand width services or Telecom services – Taxable as Royalty-DTAA-India-Singapore. [Art. 12(3)(b), (4)]**

Payment received by assessee for providing international private leased circuit amounts to use of equipment or use of process and was taxable as royalty. (AY. 2002-03, 2008-09)

Verizon Communications Singapore Pte Ltd. v. ITO (IT) (2013) 263 CTR 497 / 96 DTR 57 / (2014) 361 ITR 575 (Mad.)(HC)

- 162 **S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Amount received by assessee, a non-resident company, for granting license to use its copyrighted software for licensee’s own business purpose only, could not be brought to tax as ‘royalty’ under article 12(3) of India-US DTAA – In absence of any amendment in DTAA, there was no need to examine effect of subsequent amendment to section 9(1)(vi)-DTAA-India-USA. [S.90, Art 5, 12]**

The assessee, an international software marketing and development company developed customized software which was licensed to an Indian customer and the branch office of the assessee in India. In the course of assessment, the AO taxed the receipts on licensing the software as ‘royalty’ as per article 12 of Indo-US DTAA. The CIT (A) upheld the order of AO. The Tribunal, however, held that the amount received by the assessee under the license agreement for allowing the use of the software was not royalty either under the Act or under the DTAA. On revenue’s appeal, the High Court observed that in order to qualify as royalty payment, it is necessary to establish that there is transfer of all or any rights (including the granting of any licence) in respect of copyright of a literary, artistic or scientific work. In order to treat the consideration paid by the Licensee as royalty, it is to be established that the licensee, by making such payment, obtains all or any of the copyright rights of such literary work. Distinction has to be made between the acquisition of a “copyright right” and a “copyrighted article”. Copyright is distinct from the material object, copyrighted. Just because one has the copyrighted article, it does not follow that one has also the copyright in it. Viewed from this angle, a non-exclusive and non-transferable license enabling the use of a copyrighted product cannot be construed as an authority to enjoy any or all of the enumerated rights ingrained in Article 12 of DTAA. There is no transfer of any right in respect of copyright by the assessee and it is a case of mere transfer of a copyrighted article. The payment is for a copyrighted article and represents the purchase price of an article and cannot be considered as royalty either under the Act or under the DTAA. Further the High Court observed that it was not necessary to examine the effect of subsequent amendment to section 9(1)(vi) and also whether amount received for use of software would be royalty in terms thereof for the reason that the assessee was covered by the DTAA, the provisions of which are more beneficial. In view of the above the appeal was dismissed.

DIT v. Infrasoftware Ltd. (2013) 96 DTR 113 / (2014) 220 Taxman 273 / 264 CTR 324 (Delhi) (HC)

S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Sums received by international news agency on distribution of news & related photos in India is royalty – Liable to deduct tax at sources – DTAA-India-France (Art. 13) 163

Assessee, an international news agency having its headquarters in France, distributed its text news and related photos in India through various Indian newspapers comprising of daily reports related to international events in politics, sports and economics. Payments for transmission of news as well as photos were received by the assessee in India. The Tribunal agreed with the view of the A.O and CIT (A) that the copy-right subsisted in news - reports as 'original literary works' as well as in photographs as 'artistic works' distributed by the assessee in terms of provisions under Copyright Act, 1957. Therefore, the payments received by the assessee would qualify as 'royalties' in terms of definition contained in S.9(i)(iv) Explanation 2 read with Article 13 (3) of Indo - France DTAA. (AY. 2002-03 to 2005-06, 2008-09)

Agence France Presse v. ADIT(IT) (2014) 66 SOT 183 / (2015) 167 TTJ 149 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Design engineering services and technical know-how for erection of plant – Not royalty – Technical and process-know how services – DTAA-India-Israel. [S.9(1)(i), 195(2), Art. 12, 13] 164

Assessee entered into a Technology License agreement with a foreign company. Agreement envisaged payment to said company for providing design engineering services and technical know-how for erection of plant, providing of commercial services, and providing of technical and process know-how to enable assessee to manufacture products. Since assessee was granted a permanent right to use and exploit design engineering, to extent agreement envisaged payment for obtaining plant know-how, i.e., designing, characterization of plant and machinery, etc. same could not be considered as payments falling within purview of 'royalty', whereas technical and process-know how services provided under agreement were clearly covered by definition of 'Royalty'. (AY. 1996-97)

Finoram Sheets Ltd. v. ITO (2015) 152 ITD 77 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Taxable at 10% and not at 20% – DTAA-India-German. [S.44D, 115JA. Art.12(2)]. 165

Tribunal following reasoning in assessee's own case in assessment year 2003-04 in *Asstt. CIT v. EPCOS AG, Germany [2009] 28 SOT 412 (Pune)* taxation of royalty receipts on gross basis at higher rate of 20 per cent under section 115A, read with section 44D, was unwarranted and taxation has to be at 10 per cent on gross basis under article 12(2) of Tax Treaty as offered in return of income. (AY. 2008-09)

EPCOS AG v. Dy. DIT (2014) 64 SOT 257 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Fee received for “foreign exchange deal matching system services” constitutes “royalty” – DTAA-India-UK. [S.90, Art. 12, 13] 166

The Tribunal had to consider whether the consideration for services offered by the assessee of “foreign exchange deal matching system” was assessable as “royalty” under

Article 12(3) of the India-USA DTAA. The “foreign exchange deal matching system” facilitates the Indian subscribers i.e. Banks to deal in the foreign exchange with the other counterparts who are ready for the transaction of purchase and sale of foreign currency. The role of the deal matching system is to provide a platform where both purchaser and seller find the respective match for the intended transaction of purchase and sale. HELD by the Tribunal:

The assessee is facilitating its clients to use its system and application programming interface which is subscriber interface for use with the related services including Auto quote service. The assessee is also providing the equipment with pre-loaded software to its subscribers and network used for provision of the services. The assessee grants subscribers limited license of software to install and use at the site. The said license can be sub-licensed by the subscriber. The subscriber/user can also view, manipulate and create the derived data from information for their individual use. Further the subscriber can Store information, manipulate information for its use and also distribute or redistribute information and drive data to anyone to a limited extent so far as it is not done in a systematic manner. The subscribers are allowed to use the information and even to manipulate and drive the data to anyone for their individual use. Thus it is clear that it is subscribers who are using the information and system of the assessee for their commercial/business purposes. The information is made available by the assessee through its system and other equipments installed at the site of the subscriber to facilitate the connectivity with the assessee’s system / router located in Geneva. The platform of transacting the purchase and sale is commercial equipment allowed to be used by clients / subscribers for commercial purposes. The nature of service rendered by the assessee includes the information concerning commercial use by the subscriber. Further the entire system of the assessee including the equipments and connectivity facility is provided at the site of the subscriber. Therefore, the assessee is providing the service in the form of information and solution to the need of the subscribers by providing the matching party. Also, the Indian subscribers have been granted a license to use the software for their internal business, which can be sub-licensed by them. The Indian clients are paying for use and right to use of equipment (scientific, commercial) along with software for which license was granted by assessee. It is not a case of simplicitor payment for access to the portal by use of normal computer and internal facility but the access is given only by use of computer system and software system provided by the Assessee under license. Accordingly, by allowing the use of software and computer system to have access to the portal of the assessee for finding relevant information and matching their request for purchase and sale of foreign exchange amount to imparting of information concerning technical, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment work and payment made in this respect constitutes royalty.) (AY.2008-09, 2009-10)

Reuters Transaction Services Ltd. v. DDIT (2014) 151 ITD 510 / 108 DTR 1 / 165 TTJ 320 (Mum.)(Trib.)

167 **S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Reimbursement of expenses – DTAA-India-Netherland. [S.90, Art.7, 12]**

The amount received by the assessee Dutch Company from an Indian company for providing marketing services outside India is not taxable as royalty u/art. 12(4) of the

Indo-Netherlands DTAA. The said amount would be taxable in India u/s. art. 7 if the assessee carries on business in India through a PE situated in India. Impugned order was set aside and the matter was restored to the AO for considering the facts in the light of art. 7 of the DTAA. (AY.2007-08)

Marriott International Licensing Co. BV v. DDIT(IT) (2014) 98 DTR 27 / 151 ITD 653 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – non-exclusive user right of a software owned by said company – Two subsidiaries in India – Taxable as royalty-DTAA-India-USA.[Art.7, 12]

168

The assessee was a company incorporated in USA. It entered in to an agreement with a software company, oracle and obtained nonexclusive user right of a software owned by said company. The assessee granted user right to its subsidiaries. The assessee treated the said income as business profits under Art 7 of the DTAA between India and USA and since it did not have PE in India income was claimed as exempt. AO held that the payment received were royalty covered under section 9(1)(vi). and the same is taxable in India. DRP confirmed the order of AO. On appeal to the Tribunal the tribunal held that the payment received by assessee from its two affiliates for granting right of software was royalty and rightly been brought to tax in India. (AY. 2004-05, 2006-07)

Cummins Inc v. DIT (2014) 146 ITD 460 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(vi) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Deduction at source – Production and distribution of television programmes – Shooting of film outside India-Services specially characterized as work under section 194C would not be taxable without a permanent establishment in India-Not liable to deduct tax at source under S. 195.[S. 194C,195]

169

The applicant was a resident company engaged in the business of producing and distributing television programs. For shooting a program outside India, the applicant engaged U, company incorporated in, and a tax resident of, Brazil, for providing line production services and for providing a line producer, local crew for providing stunt services, transport necessary for stunts for production of the show in Brazil. Under the agreement, U was responsible for arranging for crew and support personnel as may be requisitioned; props and other set production materials; safety, security and transportation; and filming and other equipment as may be requisitioned. The anchor and the participants of the show were engaged and paid separately by the broadcaster and were not the responsibility of U. Held, the services were specifically characterised as work for the purpose of s. 194C by the Explanation to that section. Therefore, the payments made by the applicant to the non-resident company specifically fell under the definition of work u/s. 194C of the Act and would not be taxable without a permanent establishment in India. Consequently, the payment would not suffer withholding of tax u/s 195 of the Act. (AAR Nos. 1081 /1082 of 2011 dt 19-02-2014)

Endemol India P. Ltd. In re (No.4) (2014) 361 ITR 658 / 99 DTR 397 / 222 Taxman 67 / 266 CTR 142 (AAR)

170

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Commission paid by resident assessee to its foreign agent for arranging of export sales and recovery of payments cannot be treated as fee for technical services u/s. 9(1)(vii)

The assessee paid a certain amount as commission for arranging export sales and realising payments to a non-resident company registered in Liechtenstein. The AO held that the commission payment was taxable as a 'fee for technical service' under sub-clause (b) to S. 9(1)(vii) and, thus, the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source while making the said payments. The CIT(A), however, reversed this finding, which was upheld by the Tribunal.

On the Revenue's appeal, the High Court specifically dealt with three categories of technical services in accordance with Explanation 2 to S. 9(1)(vii), i.e. managerial services, technical services and consultancy services on the facts of the assessee's case. As regards the 'managerial service' the High Court held that the procurement of export orders, etc., cannot be treated as management services provided by the non-resident to the respondent-assessee since the non-resident was not acting as a manager or dealing with administration. It was not controlling the policies or scrutinizing the effectiveness of the policies. It did not perform, as a primary executor, any supervisory function whatsoever. The non-resident was appointed as a commission agent for sale of products within the territories specified and subject to and in accordance with the terms set out, which the non-resident accepted. The non-resident, therefore, was acting as an agent for procuring orders and not rendering managerial advice or management services.

As regards the 'technical service', the High Court held that in the facts of the instant case the non-resident had not undertaken or performed 'technical services'.

As regards 'consultancy service' the High Court held that the non-resident had not rendered any consultation or advice to the respondent-assessee, thus the commission paid for arranging of export sales and recovery of payments cannot be regarded as a consultancy service rendered by the non-resident. The non-resident no doubt had acquired skill and expertise in the field of marketing and sale of automobile products, but, on the facts, as noticed by the Tribunal and the CIT(A), the non-resident did not act as a consultant, who advised or rendered any counselling services. It was a case of self-use and benefit, and not giving advice or consultation to the assessee on any field, including how to procure export orders, how to market their products, procure payments, etc. The assessee upon receipt of export orders manufactured the required articles/goods and then the goods produced were exported. There was no element of consultation or advice rendered by the non-resident to the respondent-assessee. In view of the above, it was held that the commission paid to the non-resident for procuring export orders was not a fee for technical services u/s.9(1)(vii). (AY. 2010-11)

DIT(IT) v. Panalfa Autoelektrik Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxman 351 / 272 CTR 117 (Delhi) (HC)

171

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Where a Singapore company rendered services to the assessee, without making available to the assessee its technical knowledge, experience or skill, there was no liability to deduct tax at source from payments made for the services in question – DTAA-India-Singapore. [S.195, Art. 7, 12]

The assessee entered into a logistics services agreement with its associated enterprise, namely 'S' Singapore. Under the terms of the agreement, 'S' Singapore was required

to provide distribution management and logistics services to the assessee-company 'S' India, and such services included providing spare management services, provision of buffer stock, defective repair services, managing local repair centres, business planning to address service levels, etc. 'S' Singapore did not have any place of business or permanent establishment in India. The entire services were rendered by 'S' Singapore from outside India. 'S' Singapore was not engaged in the business of providing logistic services in India. The material on record did not disclose that 'S' Singapore had made available to the assessee its technical knowledge, experience or skill. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal held 'S' Singapore was not taxable in view of articles 7 and 12 of the DTAA between India and Singapore.

On appeal, the High Court held that 'S' Singapore has not made available to the assessee the technology or the technological services required to provide the distribution, management and logistic services. That is a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal on appreciation of the entire material on record. When once factually it is held technical services have not been made available, then in view of the law declared in *CIT v. De Beers India Minerals (P) Ltd.* [2012] 346 ITR 467/208 Taxman 406 / 21 taxmann.com 214 (Kar.), there is no liability to deduct tax at source and therefore the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority cannot be found fault with. Given that view of the matter, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. (AY. 2005-06)

DIT v. Sun Microsystems India. (P) Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 63 / 227 Taxman 117 (Mag.)(Karn) (HC)

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Agreements prior to 1-4-1976 and approved by Government – Payments received under contracts is in the nature of fees for technical services – Not taxable.[Art. 12, OECD Convention]

172

The assessee a non-resident company received in terms of various agreements from various public sector undertakings. The AO held that the payment received fell within the definition of “royalty” given in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi). On appeal the CIT (A) accepted the claim of the assessee by holding the payment received by the assessee were in the nature of technical service fee covered under section 9(1)(vii) and ought to be excluded from taxation in view of the proviso there to which took away the applicability of section in respect of agreements entered in to prior to April 1, 1976 and approved by Government. Tribunal also confirmed the order of CIT(A). On reference by revenue the affirming the view of Tribunal held that as the agreements were entered in to prior to 1-4-1976 and approved by Government, payments received under contracts is in the nature of fees for technical services hence not taxable.(AY.1979-80)

CIT v. Montedison of Italy (2014) 367 ITR 179 / 226 Taxman 128 / 109 DTR 105 / 272 CTR 306 (Bom.)(HC)

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Design & Engineering drawings are in the nature of “plant” and consideration thereof is not assessable as “fees for technical services” if delivered outside India

173

The assessee company provided design and engineering services, manufacture, delivery, technical assistance through supervision of erection and commissioning etc., to establish

compressor house-I for RINL. The payments were made by RINL separately for each of the services/equipments provided/supplied by the assessee. It, *inter alia*, included payment made towards supply of design and engineering drawings. The assessee company claimed the said payment is not taxable under the Income Tax Act as it was a transaction of sale of goods that has taken place outside India. In our view the decision of Delhi ITAT Bench in the case of *Mannesman Demag Sack AG v. Add. CIT reported in (2008), 119 TTJ 543 (Del)*, on which reliance was placed by Ld DR, is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. In the case of *Mannesman Demag Sack*, supra, the decision was rendered on the basis of the terms of the contract which provided that technical services shall include supply of design and drawings. Hence on the facts of the case, the Tribunal held that design and drawing charges are in the nature of fee for technical services. However, it may be pertinent to note that the Tribunal in that case, accepted the alternative contention of the assessee that the said fee cannot be assessed in India, unless it is shown that some part of work has emanated from Indian territories. Hence on a conspectus of the matter, we are of the view that the amount received by the assessee for supply of design and engineering drawings is in the nature of plant and since the preparation and delivery has taken place outside Indian territories, the same cannot be subjected to tax in India.

DIT v. Nisso Lwai Corporation, Japan (2014) 88 CCH 46 (AP)(HC), www.itatonline.org

174

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Construction, installation and assembly activities are *de facto* in the nature of technical services, the consideration thereof will not be assessable under Article 12 but will only be assessable under Article 7 if an “Installation PE” is created under Article 5. As Article 5 is a specific provision for installation etc, it has to prevail over Article 12-DTAA-India-Belgium-China-Germany-USA [S.4,5(2)(b), 90, 195, Art. 5, 7, 12, 13]

The Tribunal had to consider whether consideration attributable to the installation, commissioning or assembly of the plant and equipment & supervisory activities thereof is assessable to tax in India under section 5(2)(b) & 9(1)(vii) of the Act and Article 5 & 7 and Article 12 of the DTAA. HELD by the Tribunal.

- (i) Under s. 5(2)(b) of the Act, the consideration attributable to the installation, commissioning or assembly of the plant and equipment & supervisory activities thereof is assessable to tax in India as the said income accrues in India. S. 9(1)(vii) does not apply because the definition of ‘fees for technical services’ in Explanation 2 to s. 9 (1)(vii) specifically excludes “consideration for any construction, assembly, mining or like project undertaken by the recipient”. Even though the exclusion clause does not make a categorical mention about ‘installation, commissioning or erection’ of plant and equipment, these expression, belonging to the same genus as the expression ‘assembly’ used in the exclusion clause and the exclusion clause definition being illustrative, rather than exhaustive, covers installation, commissioning and erection of plant and equipment;
- (ii) However, the said receipt is not assessable as business profits under Article 7(1) of the DTAA if the recipient does not have an “installation PE” in India. Under the DTAA, an installation or assembly project or supervisory activities in connection therewith can be regarded as an “Installation PE” only if the activities cross the

specified threshold time limit (or in the case of Belgian & UK, where the charges payable for these services exceeds 10% of the sale value of the related machinery or equipment). The onus is on the revenue authorities to show that the conditions for permanent establishment coming into existence are satisfied. That onus has not been discharged on facts;

- (iii) On the question as to whether the said receipt for installation, commissioning or assembly etc activity can be assessed as “fees for technical services”, it is seen that the DTAA has a general provision in Article 12 for rendering of technical services and a specific provision in Article 5 for rendering of technical services in the nature of construction, installation or project or supervisory services in connection therewith. As there is an overlap between Article 5 and Article 12, the special provision (Article 5) has to prevail over the general provision (Article 12). What is the point of having a PE threshold time limit for construction, installation and assembly projects if such activities, whether cross the threshold time limit or not, are taxable in the source state anyway. If we are to proceed on the basis that the provisions of PE clause as also FTS clause must apply on the same activity, and even when the project fails PE test, the taxability must be held as FTS at least, not only the PE provisions will be rendered meaningless, but for gross versus net basis of taxation, it will also be contrary to the spirit of the UN Model Convention Commentary. Accordingly, though construction, installation and assembly activities are de facto in the nature of technical services, the consideration thereof will not be assessable under Article 12 but will only be assessable under Article 7 if an “Installation PE” is created;
- (iv) In any event, the said consideration cannot be assessed as “fees for technical/ included services” as the “make available” test is not satisfied. The said installation or assembly activities do not involve transfer of technology in the sense that the recipient of these services can perform such services on his own without recourse to the service provider (this is relevant only for the DTAA's that have the “make available” condition). (AY.2010-11, 2011-12)

Birla Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 153 ITD 679/ 168 TTJ 189 (Jab.)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Separate agreements for supply & installation cannot be regarded as one composite contract – Will not constitute “fees for technical services”. Even if such services are FTS u/s. 9(1)(vii) they are excluded from taxation in India by Article 14 of the India-Swiss DTAA as the recipient has no PE in India-DTAA-India-Swiss. [Art.12,14]

The assessee is in the business of printing and publishing newspapers such as Times of India, Economic times, Nav Bharata Times etc. The assessee company has paid certain amount towards installation and commissioning of the various components /units as well as for training of the employees of the assessee. The entire payment was made without deduction of tax at source. AO held that the payment made by the assessee were liable to withholding tax as “Fees for technical services”. Since the assessee has failed to deduct he invoked the provisions of section 201(1), read with section 195 of the Act and also levied the interest under section 201(IA) of the Act. In appeal CIT(A)

175

held that 75% of payment was for assembly and 25% of remittance was towards training of the assessee's staff which was chargeable to tax as FTS. Against the order of CIT (A) giving reliefs, department filed an appeal and assessee filed an appeal against the sustaining estimated 25% of payment made towards training of the employees as FTS. Tribunal held that separate agreements for supply & installation cannot be regarded as one composite contract. However, as the installation is an "assembly" project, it will not constitute "fees for technical services". As regard the training of employees, Even if such services are FTS u/s. 9(1)(vii) they are excluded from taxation in India by Article 14 of the India-Swiss DTAA as the recipient has no PE in India. Tribunal estimated certain amount as reasonable for training of employees. Accordingly the appeal of revenue was dismissed and the appeal of assessee was partly allowed. (AY. 2007-08)

ITO v. Bennet Coleman & Co. Ltd. (2015) 152 ITD 331 (Mum.)(Trib.)

176

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – In view of the finding of the service-tax authorities that services were rendered, argument that amount paid is a reimbursement of actual cost without profit element is not acceptable and it is chargeable as “fee for included services” – DTAA-India-Canada. [S. 195, 201(1), Art. 12]

Having held that the amount in question was remitted by the assessee company to ATI Technologies, Canada for certain benefits received by it in the form of services procured by ATI Technologies, Canada from Soctronics India Private Limited and provided to the assessee company, and it was not a case of either gratuitous payment made by the assessee or mere reimbursement of expenditure incurred by the ATI Technologies, Canada, the question that now arises for our consideration is what exactly is the nature of this payment. As already noted by us, almost similar view, as taken by us on this issue, has been taken by the Commissioner of Service Tax *vide* his order dated 23-7-2012. In their respective orders, the Assessing Officer as well as the learned CIT(A) have observed that if one were to go by the conclusion of the Commissioner of Service Tax, the amount in question paid by the assessee to ATI Technologies, Canada for services procured from Soctronics India Private Limited and made available to the assessee company will be in the nature of 'fee for included services' which is chargeable to tax in the hands of ATI Technologies, Canada as per the domestic law as well as India-Canada DTAA. At the time of hearing before us, when this position was confronted to the learned counsel for the assessee, he has also agreed that if the case of the assessee for reimbursement of actual cost to ATI Technologies, Canada, without any profit element is not found acceptable by the Tribunal, the amount in question is liable to be treated as "fee for included services", which is chargeable to tax in India in the hands of ATI Technologies, Canada as per the domestic law and India Canada DTAA. It accordingly follows that the assessee company was liable to deduct tax at source from this amount as per the provisions of S.195, and having failed to do so, it has to be treated as an assessee in default under S.201(1) to the extent of tax payable by ATI Technologies, Canada in India on the mount in question which is in the nature of "fee for included services". We accordingly modify the order of the learned CIT(A) on this issue and sustain the order of the Assessing Officer in treating the assessee as in default

under S. 201(1) to the extent of tax payable by ATI Technologies, Canada in India on the amount in question which is chargeable as 'fee for included services' alongwith interest payable thereon under S.201(1A). (AY. 2007-08 to 2010-11)

AMD Research & Development Centre India (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 167 TTJ 613 / 67 SOT 230 (URO) / 40 ITR 397 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Tests for distinguishing secondment contract with technical services agreement – Matter set aside. [S.195, Art 12 of OECD Model Tax Convention]

177

No doubt even if we come to a conclusion that there indeed were no secondment agreements and the persons sent were all along the employees of the affiliates abroad, it would not necessarily means that such affiliates were rendering technical services to the assessee. In our opinion, three cases relied on by the learned DR namely IDS Software Solutions India (P) Ltd. 21 DTR 240, Ariba Technologies India (P) Ltd and M/s Abbey Business India (P) Ltd. all had different factual scenarios. In the case of IDS Software Solutions, there was an agreement between the U.S. Co which had sent the persons to India, with its Indian subsidiary. It was from such agreement that the Tribunal came to a conclusion that the concerned employees were employees of the assessee during the relevant time. There was also a minutes of the Board of Directors of the U.S Co which substantiated the contentions of the assessee that the deputed persons were working in India as employees of the assessee in India. Similarly in the case of Ariba Technologies India (P) Ltd. also, there were agreements between M/s Ariba USA and its Indian subsidiary through which Ariba US had provided services of one of its employees to its Indian subsidiary. In the case of M/s Abbey Business India Services also, there was an outsourcing agreement between Abbey U.K. entered with its subsidiary in India. The Tribunal had verified the clauses of this agreement and came to a conclusion that there was a secondment of staff to the assessee. As against this, here, as mentioned by us above, there was no such agreement of secondment, produced by the assessee before us or before any of the lower authorities. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the issue requires a revisit by the AO. Whether the employees of the affiliates abroad were rendering services to the assessee company, as a part of any technical services agreed to be rendered by such affiliates to the assessee, has to be seen based on the verification of actual services rendered by them. Assessee should also be given an opportunity to show that the employees came to India only on a secondment and had not rendered any technical services on behalf of the affiliates abroad. (AY. 2009-10).

Cisco System service B. E. v. ADIT(IT) (2015) 68 SOT 18 (URO) / 120 DTR 72 / 171 TTJ 367 (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Subsidiary – Reimbursement of expenses – Matter remanded. [S.40(a)(i), 195]

178

In the present case, assessee company paid certain sum to its subsidiary, TAFE Inc. USA & others without deducting tax at source on the ground that such payment was purely reimbursement of expenses. A.O. however held, that nature and services, rendered by

‘TAFE’ fell within ambit of ‘fees for technical services’ and he, accordingly, disallowed payment under section 40(a)(i). As the agreement between the assessee and ‘TAFE’ was not examined by the lower authority & also question whether services rendered by ‘TAFE’ fell within ambit of ‘technical services under DTAA was not verified, matter was remanded back. (AY. 2006-07)

ACIT v. Tractor & Farm Equipment Ltd. (2014) 61 SOT 190 / 28 ITR 26 (Chennai)(Trib.)

179 **S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Business profits – Design and Engineering – Since technical supervision was provided by assessee, it could not be said that assessee was doing construction work – Assessee was liable to be taxed at rate of 10% as per section 9(1)(vii), read with section 115A-DTAA-India-Russia. [S.90,115A, Art. 7, 12]**

Assessee a foreign company, was dealing in construction of pipelines. Assessee company was duly registered under laws of Russia. It entered into a consortium agreement with Kalpataru Power Transmission Limited (KPTL). Consortium made a bid for PDPL project of Gas authority of India Ltd (GAIL), and was finally awarded contract by GAIL. Assessee Company further entered into a co-operation agreement with KPTL. As per said agreement, substantial work for executing contract was to be undertaken by KPTL by deploying all required input resources and assessee-company would provide its technical guidance and consultancy for project management and specialized manpower was also to be supplied by assessee-company. Assessee-company would get 3 per cent of contract receipts as full consideration for its contribution in project and KPTL would be entitled to 96 per cent of contract value and remaining 1 per cent would be used to meet expenses of consortium. Assessee-company had offered income arising out of PDPL project at rate of 10 per cent, claiming it to be ‘fees for technical services’, as per Article 12. AO found that all mainline activities required to be performed for construction of said pipeline were to be carried out solely by assessee-company or jointly by it with KPTL, or by KPTL under guidance of assessee-company. He held that income from said project was taxable as business profits at rate of 40 per cent as per article 5(2)(i) read with article 7. CIT(A) following the earlier decision of Tribunal directed the AO to apply the provisions of Sub clause (BB) of clause (b) of sub section (1) of Section 115JA along with Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. On appeal by revenue the Tribunal by following the earlier years identical facts, had treated income of assessee as FTS on grounds that assessee was required to provide design and engineering of various aspects and was also required for preparing welding procedure, review work procedure for pipeline laying and in addition to this, assessee was required to depute experts for site review and implementation by KPTL. It was held that, since technical supervision was provided by assessee, it could not be said that assessee was doing construction work. Income of assessee was liable to be taxed at rate of 10% as per section 9(1)(vii), read with section 115A and not at the rate of 40% as business profits. Matter was set aside to the AO only for verification that whether 96 per cent receipts of contract has been disclosed by assessee in case of KPTL and tax had been paid on it. Order of CIT(A) was affirmed. (AY. 2009-10)

ACIT(IT) v. Joint Stock Company Zangas (2014) 149 ITD 9 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – DTAA – Deduction at source – Sales commission. [S.40(a)(i), 195, Art. 12]

180

Assessee was engaged in business of import and export of electronic goods and components. AO held that as the assessee did not deduct TDS on payment of sales commission made to two foreign companies. According to the AO said payments were in nature of fee for technical service covered under section 9(1)(vii) and disallowed same under section 40(a)(i). CIT(A) held that as there was no element of income involved in said payment or not and held that there being no element of income involved in said commission payment, assessee was not liable to deduct tax at source. On appeal by revenue the Tribunal held that since CIT(A) had decided a question which was not emerging out from assessment order and further relevant question whether recipients had permanent establishment or not matter remanded for fresh adjudication to the AO. (AY. 2007-08)

ACIT v. Sahasra Electronics (P) Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 565 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Providing software development services to its customers based in India – Liable to deduct at source-DTAA-India-USA. [S.195, Art.12]

181

The assessee company was engaged in providing software development services to its customers based in India. During relevant assessment year, assessee company claimed deduction of payment made to a US based company towards management services rendered by it. The Tribunal held that it was undisputed that assessee was making use of advice, input experience, experimentation and assistance rendered by USA based company in its decision making process of financial and risk management etc., Further apart from providing input service and advice, US based company was also providing training to employees of assessee-company. On facts services rendered by non-resident company were technical in nature as provided in clause 4(b) of article 12 of DTAA, and thus, assessee was liable to deduct tax at source while making payments in respect of said services.(AY. 2007-08)

US Technology Resources(P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 61 SOT 19 / 28 ITR 26 (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Services rendered by assessee outside India could not be brought to tax in India – DTAA-India-USA. [Art. 5, 12]

182

For the earlier Assessment Years 2003-04 to 2006-07 an identical issue has been considered and decided by the Tribunal in favour of the assessee. It is further noted that in the Assessment Years 2004-05 and 2005-06 the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court has confirmed the order of this Tribunal. The assessee in the instant case has not made available any technical knowledge, experience; skill etc. to WNS India, the same cannot be subjected to tax by considering the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) on stand-alone basis. It is, held that the marketing and management services rendered by the assessee to WNS India are not chargeable to tax as FIS under article 12 of the DTAA. (AY. 2007-08)

ADIT v. WNS North America Inc (2014) 146 ITD 435 / 30 ITR 646 (Mum.)(Trib.)

183 **S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Management service agreement – Liable to deduct tax at source – DTAA-India-France [S.195, Art.13]**

Applicant an Indian company entered into a Management Services Agreement with a partnership firm, incorporated in France for various management services. It was submitted that 'make available' clause was not satisfied in this case and, hence, services would not fall under technical services as per India-France Treaty. Revenue on other hand submitted that fees for technical services includes fees for managerial, technical or consultancy nature and services rendered by partnership firm fell under broad definition of technical services as per provision of Act and India-France DTAA and hence there was no requirement of 'make available' under article 13 of DTAA between India and France. Protocol or Memorandum of Association could be made use for interpreting provision of Treaty, however, it would not be correct/proper to import words, phrases or clause that were not available into Treaties between two Sovereign nations, on basis of Treaties with other countries. In absence of 'make available' clause in India-France DTAA payments made by applicant for services rendered came under definition of fees for technical services both under Act and Treaty and were liable to tax in India, thus, applicant would be liable to withhold tax as per provision of section 195 from payments made/to be made to partnership firm dt. 2 May, 2014)

Steria (India) Ltd. In re (2014) 364 ITR 381 / 268 CTR 399 / 225 Taxman 90 (AAR)

184 **S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Various Services – No sufficient material to suggest – Not fees for technical services – DTAA-India-Netherland. [S.90, 195, Art. 7, 12]**

Holding Company of the Applicant agreed to provide various services like (a) general management (b) international operations (c) Legal advisory (d) tax advisory (e) Controlling & accounting & reporting (f) Corporate communication (g) Human resources & (h) Corporate development, mergers & acquisitions. The Revenue contended that services availed by the applicant were consultancy services & were covered by the definition of fees for technical services even as per Art.12 of the India-Netherland Tax treaty. Authority for Advance Rulings held in favour of the applicant and held that the transaction was for genuine business purpose for the benefit of both the parties. There was no sufficient materials on facts and circumstances made available which suggest that the transaction was an arrangement solely for the purpose of avoidance of Tax and therefore requirement of the "make available Clause" in the Art 12 (5) of India-Netherlands tax treaty was not satisfied and hence the payment for the services would not come under "Fees for technical services" under the Tax treaty.

Endemol India (P) Ltd. (2014) 264 CTR 117 / 223 Taxman 183 (Mag.) / 361 ITR 340 / 97 DTR 33 (AAR)

185 **S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Payment to a non-resident for production of programmes for broadcasting and telecasting not treated as 'fees for technical service' – DTAA-India-Singapore. [Art.12]**

The applicant is a resident company engaged in the business of producing and distributing television programmes. It mainly produces reality shows and has also

ventured into soap operas. For one of its productions, for the purpose of shooting the show outside India, the applicant engaged NAPL, a Singapore based Company, to procure the services of one CPH as an executive producer for the show. As per the terms of the agreement, NAPL was responsible for the overall production and also for handling business issues. The agreement also provided that NAPL will provide specialized services to aid in the production of programmes for which NAPL agreed to commission its representative to CPH who was an executive producer. As per the agreement the applicant was to pay a total consideration of US Dollar 49,000 to NAPL for their services for the show. The applicant sought advance ruling on whether the payments made by the applicant to NAPL, for services rendered are chargeable to tax in India as 'fees for technical services'.

The Authority for Advance Rulings held that the services were rendered outside India and the non-resident company namely NAPL did not have any presence in India. There was no material to support that the technical knowledge, expertise, skill/ know-how or process was made available to the applicant by enabling it to apply the technology independently. Thus, none of the conditions of the Article 12.4 of the India-Singapore Treaty were fulfilled. Therefore, the consideration paid for services rendered by NAPL to the applicant was not covered by fees for technical services in terms of Article 12.4 of the India-Singapore Tax Treaty.

Endemol India (P) Ltd., In re (2014) 361 ITR 353 / 222 Taxman 59 / 264 CTR 128 (AAR)

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – DTAA-India-Germany-Japan-USA-Netherland-Italy-Australia-China-France. [S.195, Art. 7] Payments received or receivable by non-resident in connection with provision of services of technical and professional personnel to an Indian group company is taxable in India in view of Explanation 2 to sec. 9(1).

186

The incomes received by the applicants from the Indian company were taxable as business profits under article 7 of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and the respective countries (except the applicant in the Cayman Islands with which there was no Agreement, and the applicant in Italy), whose income was to be taxed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Applicants were subject to withholding of tax under section 195.

Booz and Company (Australia) P. Ltd. In re (2014) 362 ITR 134 / 265 CTR 449 / 223 Taxman 302 (AAR)

S.9(1)(vii) : Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Fees for technical services – Sales promotion services – Not taxable – DTAA-India-Sri Lanka. [S.90, Art.14]

187

The applicant appointed an individual resident of Sri Lanka as resident executive for promotion of sale in Sri Lanka of books published by the applicant. The applicant has paid certain remuneration to the resident executive by remitting it to her bank account in Sri Lanka. The applicant approached AAR for its ruling on the taxability of such remuneration. AAR held that payments for sales promotion services rendered by a Sri Lanka resident were not FTS under the Act and were also not taxable in terms of Article 14.

Oxford University Press In re (2014) 364 ITR 251 / 45 taxmann.com 282 / 268 CTR 393 / 103 DTR 225 (AAR)

Section 10 : Incomes not included in total income

188

S.10(2A) : Exemption – Firm – Partner – Share of partner from firm not liable to tax- Concept of “total income” in section 10(2A) different from concept in section 2(45) – Total income of firm does not include incomes which are exempt from tax – Partner entitled to exemption in respect of exempted income allotted to him. [S.2(45), 10(34), 10(35), 10(36)]

The petitioner challenged the assessment order by filing the Writ petition, for not granting exemption under section 10(2A), in respect of share of profit of the firm income which is exempted from tax under clause 34, of section 10, and clause 35 of the section 10 of the Act. In substance, a declaration is sought to the effect that the total income referred in clause (2A) of section 10 of the Act does not include income of the partnership firm which is exempted from tax. Allowing the petition the Court held that: Explanation to clause (2A) of section 10 with respect to its placement in Chapter III, does not envisage taxation of the shares of profits of the firm at the hands of the partners. The expression “total income” as defined in clause (45) of section 2 of the Act is distinct from the expression “total income” used in section 10 of the Act. A perusal of section 10 would make it clear that Parliament intended that certain incomes should not be included in the total income of a person, i.e., gross total income. What section 10 read with the Explanation thereto envisages is the amount to be determined as not includible in the total income of the partner. For this, three factors have to be considered : (a) the total income of the firm; (b) the share of partners’ profit in the firm; (c) the business share profits of the firm. In this context, the total income of the firm is not the taxable income of the firm. The object of clause (2A) of section 10 is to avoid double taxation *vis-a-vis* the profits of the firm, which are distributed in the hands of the partners. It does not mean that income which is taxed in the hands of the firm is taxable in the hands of the partners and on the same principle, when the income is not taxed in the hands of the firm, it becomes taxable in the hands of the partner. The share of the partner in the profits of the firm which is after taxation of the firm, would also include that portion of the income on which the firm would not have paid any tax on account of the firm also having the benefit of certain provisions of Chapter III but which would nevertheless be part of the profits of the firm. Hence, a partner would be entitled to exemption under clause (2A) of section 10 of the Act, on the share of profit of the firm, inclusive of the income, which is exempted under clauses (34), (35) and (38) of section 10 of the Act, as the total income referred to in clause (2A) of section 10 of the Act, includes exempted income of the firm.(AY.2010-11)

Vidya Investment and Trading Co. P. Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 367 ITR 33 / 223 Taxman 199 / (2015) 277 CTR 18 (Karn.)(HC)

189

S.10(4)(ii) : Special allowance or benefit – Non-resident (External) Account – Amount in non-resident (External) Account is exempt from tax. [S.5(2)(a), 6(5)]

Amount in non-resident (External) Account is exempt from tax. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10) *Arvind Singh Chauhan v. ITO (2014) 147 ITD 509 / 101 DTR 79 / 31 ITR 105 / 161 TTJ 791 / (Agra)(Trib.)*

S.10(14) : Special allowance or benefit – Special allowance to meet expenses of office – Conveyance and additional conveyance allowance for Development Officers fixed by formula – Exempt from tax

190

Court held that special allowance to meet expenses of office,-Conveyance and additional conveyance allowance for Development Officers fixed by formula is held to be exempt from tax.(AY. 1998-99, 2000-01)

CIT v. Madan Gopal Bansal (2014) 366 ITR 319 / 223 taxman 169 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)

S.10(14) : Special allowance or benefit – Development Officer in LIC, received incentive bonus in order to reimburse expenses required to be incurred for procuring business – bonus claimed as exempt under section 10(14) – Matter remanded to CIT to decide afresh. [S. 264]

191

The assessee, a Development Officer in LIC, received an incentive bonus in order to reimburse the expenditure required to be incurred for procuring business. For the first time in the assessment year 1982-83, he claimed that part of the incentive bonus was required to be exempted under the provisions of the Act. The Assessing Officer accepted the claim by holding that the assessee was entitled to deduction of 40 per cent of the incentive bonus as expense. Since the assessee had not claimed the said relief in the original returns for the assessment years 1975-76 to 1981-82, he approached the Commissioner by way of a revision application under section 264. The Commissioner rejected the revision application as time barred. On writ petition filed by the assessee, the High Court directed the Commissioner to rehear the assessee's revision application by taking into consideration the decision of the Gujarat High Court rendered in the case of *CIT v. Kiranbhai H. Shelat [1999] 235 ITR 635*. The Commissioner in remand proceedings held that the aforesaid decision of the Gujarat High Court was in contradiction to the decision of the Supreme Court in case of *Gestetner Duplicators (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1979] 117 ITR 1* as well as the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of *CIT v. M.D. Patil [1998] 229 ITR 71*. He accordingly declined to follow the decision of the Gujarat High Court and rejected the application under section 264. On writ, the High Court held that once the jurisdictional High Court had, after taking into consideration the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *Gestetner Duplicators (P.) Ltd.* (supra), held that the assessee is entitled to expenses of 30 per cent against incentive bonus, the Commissioner could not have refused to follow the same. The matter was remanded to the Commissioner for deciding afresh, keeping in view the binding decision of the Gujarat High Court. (AY. 1975-76 to 1981-82)

P.V. Ashar Development Officer v. B.C. Goel (2014) 222 Taxman 219 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.10(14) : Special allowance or benefit – Conveyance expenses – No relevance or bearing on actual expenditure – Taxable as salary – Tax is deductible at source. [S.15, 17, 195, 201]

192

The conveyance allowance paid to defray expenses connected with journeys from residence to office and back could not be treated as an allowance paid for defraying expenses wholly, necessarily and exclusively in the performance of the duty. Held, that the conveyance allowance paid by the assessee without any relevance or bearing on the actual expenditure incurred by the employees, could not come within the purview

of s. 10(14) and for that matter since the standard deduction granted u/s. 16(1) was meant to take care of the expenses of an employee, incidental to his employment, including the journeys from residence to office and back, the conveyance allowance was clearly taxable under the head “Salary” and the assessee could not have excluded the conveyance allowance paid, while computing the tax deductible at source, from the salaries paid by it to its employees. (AY. 1995-96)

Sriram Refrigeration Industries v. ITO (2014) 361 ITR 119 (AP)(HC)

- 193 **S.10(15) : Interest payable – Foreign currency – Mining – Repairs of wells by casing leakages and body cement jobs which aided operator i.e. ONGC, who was actually engaged in mining activities, assessee’s claim for exemption was to be allowed. [S.10(15)(iv)(c)]**

The assessee-company was awarded contracts for the deployment of repair work over rigs and other auxiliary operation services in the oil fields. The assessee, with prior approval of Government of India, entered into a loan agreement with ‘S’ bank, Singapore to avail itself of a foreign currency loan. The loan was taken to finance the purchase of three work over rigs for drilling activities in relation to the said contract. The assessee applied for exemption under section 10(15)(iv)(c). The revenue authorities noted that the assessee created conditions favourable to mining operations, which were then performed by the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (‘ONGC’). The revenue authorities further opined that the repair of the wells by casing leakages and body cement jobs and bottom cleaning and finishing operations did not by itself amount to mining activities. Operations undertaken by the assessee were such that they aided the operator i.e. ONGC, who was actually engaged in mining operations. The matter travelled to the HC. The HC held that an industrial undertaking will be regarded as engaged in ‘mining’ if activities undertaken by said undertaking are an integral and an inseparable part and substantial or predominantly devoted to mining, therefore, where the assessee company was engaged in repairs of wells which aided the operator, i.e., ONGC, the assessee’s claim for exemption under section 10(15)(iv)(c) was to be allowed.

Dewan Chand Ram Chandra Industries (P) Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 364 ITR 70 / 223 Taxman 161 / 270 CTR 569 / 108 DTR 170 (Delhi)(HC)

- 194 **S.10(15) : Interest payable – Interest on external commercial borrowings loan being exempted by CBDT under section 10(15)(iv)(c), no TDS liability would arise. [S.10(15)(iv)(c), 40(a)(193, 195)]**

Assessee made a borrowing of US \$ 40 million from abroad in March, 1997 by way of external commercial borrowing (ECB) from a consortium of foreign banks syndicated by Bayerische Landesbank, Singapore. Utilisation of ECB was for purchase outside India raw materials, components or plant and machinery and CBDT had granted approval in respect of ECB. The Assessee paid interest on the said borrowing. As the interest income was not taxable in hands of recipient and was exempted by Government of India, the question of TDS on interest paid by assessee did not arise. (AY. 2001-02)

Dy. CIT v. Essar Steel Ltd. (2013) 26 ITR 623 / (2014) 61 SOT 39 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)

S.10(19A) : Annual value of any one palace in occupation of Ruler – Meaning of “in the occupation” – Not exclusively used not entitled to exemption. [S.2(2), 22, 23, Wealth-tax Act, 1957, 5(1)(iii)]

195

Section 10(19A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, postulates exemption from income-tax on “the annual value of any one palace in the occupation of a Ruler”. There is substantial similarity in the language of section 5(1)(iii) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, and section 10(19A) of the 1961 Act on all relevant aspects except that word “building” has been substituted by “palace” in the latter. The occupation of the Ruler in the palace would, therefore, be a necessary pre-condition for claiming exemption. In a case where the Ruler has not been able to show that the palace declared as his official residence was exclusively in his occupation, he would not be entitled to any exemption.

CIT v. Maharao Bhim Singh of Kota (2014) 365 ITR 485 / 103 DTR 401 / 268 CTR 369 / 45 taxmann.com 350 (FB)(Raj.)(HC)

S.10(20A) : Housing Board – Conditions precedent – Authority constituted in India

196

Assessee was a public company incorporated under the Companies Act 1956. It was set up for purpose of development, granting financial assistance and marketing products of small scale industries and also constructing and managing industrial estates. It was fully controlled by the State Government. It had filed NIL returns for A.Ys. 1998-99 to 2000-2001 claiming exemption under section 10(20A). During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO held that the assessee was not an authority constituted in India by or under any law but a Corporation incorporated under the Companies Act. He concluded that the assessee had not fulfilled the provisions contained under section 10(20A) to avail exemption and was not dealing in housing accommodations for the purpose of planning, development and improvement of cities, towns, villages or both. Both the CIT(A) and the ITAT upheld the order of the AO. On further appeal, the High Court upholding the orders held that to claim exemption, the person must be an authority and the said authority should be constituted in India by order under any law, such law should be enacted either for the purpose of dealing with and satisfying the need for housing accommodation or for the purpose of planning, development or improvement of cities, towns and villages or for both. The assessee was incorporated pursuant to the resolution of the Government of Karnataka, but not constituted under any law. It was incorporated for the purpose of achieving certain objects and cannot be equated with the authority constituted in India by or under any law enacted. From the object of the assessee, it cannot be treated as an authority under article 12 of the Constitution of India. Since the assessee is not discharging the functions of housing accommodation and for the purpose of planning and development of the Cities, towns and villages, the assessee does not fall under the purview of Section 10(20A) of the Act. (AY. 1998-99 to 2000-01)

Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 220 Taxman 4 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

S.10(21) : Scientific research association – Royalty and service charges – Factors to be considered – Matter remanded. [S.35(1)(ii), R.5D]

197

The fact that the association was receiving payments towards royalty and service charges was not by itself ground to hold that the association is not a scientific research

association. Whether and, if so, to what extent any activity constitutes scientific research, is a question which the Board is required to refer to the Central Government and the decision of the Central Government would be final. According to the petitioner, the Board in its case had not made any such reference to the Central Government and the Central Government had also not taken a definitive decision as to why the petitioner did not fall within the category of “scientific research association”. Therefore, matter was directed to be decided afresh. The Court also observed that the Central Government will examine the observations made as also requirement of Rule 5D of the Income tax Rules, 1962 and directed the Central Government to decide the issue within three months.

Centre for Development of Telematics v. UOI (2013) 214 Taxman 653 / (2014) 360 ITR 184 (Delhi)(HC)

198 **S.10(23AAA) : Employee welfare fund – Approval by Commissioner – Contravention of s.11(5) – Exemption cannot be denied. [S.11(5)]**

Once the fund is approved by the CIT in accordance with the rules, the contributions made by the employees to the said fund do not form part of the total income and consequently it does not attract tax, notwithstanding the fact that amount was deposited with two financial institutions not falling under purview of section 11(5). (AY. 2000-01, 2001-02)

CIT v. KSRTC Employees Death-cum-Retirement Benefit Fund (2014) 98 DTR 133 / 225 Taxman 113 (Karn.)(HC)

199 **S.10(23B) : Khadi or Village Industries – Benefit of exemption cannot be granted for a particular year, if the assessee does not obtain exemption certificate for that particular assessment year.**

Assessee was engaged in the manufacturing and processing of spices and exemption u/s. 10 (23B) was sought on the pretext that its unit was duly registered with the Khadi and Village Industries Commission. The A.O and CIT (A) denied the exemption as the assessee could not furnish exemption certificate. Tribunal held that the exemption certificate u/s 10 (23B) cannot be granted for more than three years and therefore, hence the assessee is required to obtain the same from time to time. If the assessee does not have the exemption certificate for a particular assessment year, then the benefit of the exemption for that year is not available to the assessee. (AY. 2008-09)

Ashoka Foods & Dehydrates Sansthan v. ACIT (2014) 151 ITD 46 / (2015) 167 TTJ 590 (Luck.)(Trib)

200 **S.10(23C) : Exemption – Educational institutions – The word ‘wholly or substantially financed by Government’ cannot be confined only to annual grants as apart from providing annual grants, if the Government grants land, invests money in building and infrastructure and also running educational institutions, all that has to be taken into consideration to decide whether an institution is wholly or substantially financed by the Government in order to become eligible to claim exemption**

The entire property and assets of the assessee-institution had been created out of the funds given by the Government of India. The assessee had been established

entirely with the budgetary support of the Government. It is an institution wholly or substantially financed by the Government. The fact that this institution was granted land by the Government of Karnataka to the extent of 100 acres and the Government of India has funded initially 100 per cent and it has permitted them to retain and spend the revenue so generated for the maintenance and growth of the institution.

Under these circumstances, the contention of the Revenue, that the grant which is given by the Government of India in a particular year is to be taken into consideration to decide whether the institution is wholly or substantially financed by the Government, is without any substance. The facts of this case and the material on record clearly established that the assessee was wholly or substantially financed by the Government and therefore, the assessee is entitled to the benefit of exemption under section 10(23C) (iiiab) of Act.

CIT v. Indian Institute of Management (2014) 226 Taxman 301 (2015) 370 ITR 81 / 115 DTR 251 / 275 CTR 424 (Karn.)(HC)

S.10(23C) : CBDT accorded approval to claim exemption u/s. 10(23C) – Denial of exemption by the Assessing Officer in the course of assessment proceedings was held to be not justified. [S. 143(3)]

201

Assessee, a charitable society, made an application for grant of approval for exemption of income under section 10(23C)(vi). CBDT by an order accorded approval to the assessee for the purpose of section 10(23C)(vi). In the returns of income filed for the assessment years 1999-2000 and 2001-02, the assessee claimed exemption under section 10(23C)(vi). AO denied the exemption on account that it had not complied with the conditions imposed by CBDT. CIT(A) upheld the order of AO. Tribunal allowed the exemption under section 10 (23C)(vi). On appeal by revenue, High Court held that the first proviso to section 143(3) was inserted by the Finance Act, 2002, w.e.f. 1-4-2003. The provision of first proviso to section 143(3) makes it clear that no order making an assessment shall be made by the Assessing Officer without giving effect to the provisions of section 10(23C)(vi) unless the Assessing Officer has intimated the Central Government or the prescribed authority, the contravention of the provisions of section 10(23C)(vi). Only after such approval granted has been withdrawn, he can proceed to pass an order denying the benefit of exemption on the ground of contravention. Having regard to the language employed, the said provision is mandatory. Without complying with the requirement of the said provision, the Assessing Officer gets no jurisdiction to deny the exemption. That is what the Tribunal has held. In the absence of a specific provision, section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is attracted, which provides that whereby any Central Act or Regulations a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions, if any, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued. Therefore, the argument of the revenue that prior to 1-4-2003 when there was no express provision for recession of the approval granted once, the Assessing Authority was vested with the power to deny the exemption without seeking for recession of the approval granted is without any substance. Therefore, the said finding is in accordance with law and do not suffer from any legal infirmity. (AY. 1999-2000, 2001-02)

CIT v. Peoples Education Society (2014) 222 Taxman 98 (Karn.)(HC)

202 **S.10(23C) : Educational institution – Exemption granted by CBDT is binding on department. [S.119]**

The assessee is a registered society running various educational institutions. The Assessing officer has denied the exemption under Section 10(23C)(vi). Held that, in view of above order passed by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, binding on the department, the assessee/respondent is held entitled for exemption under Section 10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act. (AY.2000-01)

CIT v. Arvind Bhartiya Vidhyala Samiti (2014) 222 Taxman 37 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)

203 **S.10(23C) : Educational institution – Nature of activity carried on by organisation would be predominant factor – Surplus generated was utilized for the purpose of education purpose – Entitled exemption**

The assessee society was engaged in ensuring high standards of education imparted through the medium of schools. It had 1750 schools which were affiliated to it and provide education from nursery to twelfth standard. It was reorganized and listed as a body conducting public examinations under the Delhi School Education Act 1973. The Council was registered as a society under the Society Registration Act, 1860 (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1957 as extended to the Union Territory of Delhi. Approval was denied by the prescribed authority on the ground that activities of the assessee were in the nature of business and for the purpose of profit and activities of the assessee was not genuine. On writ allowing the petition the court held that; Nature of activity carried on by organisation would be predominant factor. Surpluses generated for purposes of modernising activities and building of necessary infrastructure to serve object of assessee. Assessee existing solely for educational purposes there was no evidence to show assessee carried on any activity other than for educational purpose. Reasonableness of amount spent and quality of decisions of management of assessee. The expression used in section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, “wholly or exclusively for the purposes of business and profession” is similar in its import to the expression “applied wholly and exclusively to the object for which it is established” as occurring in section 10(23C)(vi). Entitled to exemption. Writ petition of assessee was allowed. ((AY.2008-09 to 2010-11)

Council for the Indian School Certificate Examination v. DGIT (2012) 206 taxmann 466 / (2014) 362 ITR 436 (Delhi)(HC)

204 **S.10(23C) : Educational institution – Surplus receipts from educational Institution – Exemption cannot be denied. [S.10(23C)(vi)]**

Petitioner was a trust wherein the main objects was to carry out educational activities, particularly to impart education to girls and the trust claimed exemption u/s. 10(23)(vi) of the Act. AO on production of approval of chief CIT and its connection, issued notice to the Petitioner. Ultimately chief CIT, shillong passed order rejecting the prayer of the Petitioner by declining to grant approval u/s 10(23)(vi) of the Act. Assessee preferred Writ Petition aggrieved by the order. The Hon'ble High Court allowed WP and held that object clauses of the trust read in a holistic manner showed beyond reasonable doubt that objective of the trust is to establish and maintain educational institutions in the country. Further, if after meeting the expenditure requirements, any surplus receipts are

available incidentally from the activity lawfully carried on by the educational institution, it will not cease to be one existing solely for educational purpose. Therefore order of chief CIT refusing approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was set aside.

Shree Kanya Pathshala Trust v. UOI (2014) 360 ITR 60 / 267 CTR 283 / 110 DTR 361 (Gauh.)(HC)

S.10(23C) : Educational institution – Approval after 1-12-2006 continues to remain in force until withdrawn. (R.2CA, IT Rules, 1962) 205

Where assessee was granted approval after 1-12-2006 by Chief Commissioner under section 10(23C), same would be a one-time affair and continues to remain in force till it is withdrawn; hence, assessee's application for extension of approval would be redundant. (AY. 2008-09 to 2010-11)

Sunbeam Academy Educational Society v. CCIT (2014) 365 ITR 378 / 225 Taxman 15 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

S.10(23C) : Educational institution – Property purchased in name of director of educational institution but transferred subsequently to educational institution – Entitled to exemption. [S. 11] 206

Property was purchased in the name of director of educational institution but was transferred subsequently to the educational institution. Held, there was no violation of provisions of S. 10(23C)(vi) or S. 11, and Assessee was entitled to exemption. (AY.2004-05)

CIT v. Sunbeam English School (2014) 361 ITR 325 / 100 DTR 123 / 217 Taxman 331 (All.)(HC)

S.10(23C) : Maternity hospital – Medical attention – Entitled to exemption – Matter remanded to AO 207

The expression “medical attention” cannot be read to be confined to medical treatment of persons suffering from an illness or a mental disability alone. If that were the intent of the Legislature, the sub-clause would have been framed differently stipulating that the subsequent provisions for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence, rehabilitation or in regard to providing medical attention would be of those suffering from an illness or mental disability. Prevalence of mental disability is not governing requirement of entirety of sub-clause (iii). Assessee being a maternity hospital was entitled to exemption. (AY. 2009-10)

Nehru Prasutika Aspatal Samiti v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 68 / 100 DTR 172 / 221 Taxman 300 / 266 CTR 452 (All.)(HC)

Editorial: Order of Tribunal in CIT v. Nehru Prasutika Aspatal Samiti (2013) 26 ITR 376 / 145 ITD 8/(2014) 159 TTJ 813 (Agra)(Trib.) is reversed.

S.10(23C) : Educational institution – Conducting examinations – Matter remanded 208

One of the activities undertaken by the assessee was to conduct examinations and several candidates participated in the examinations. The results secured helped colleges select students for further studies. Course material, syllabus, contents of papers, question papers, etc., were part and parcel of the education system. Therefore, the assessee

could not be denied the character of “other education institution” because it conducted examination or tests. In depth and proper verification or examination was required to be made before it was held or observed that the activities of the assessee were not genuinely charitable or were not being undertaken in accordance with the provisions of section 10(23C)(vi). This necessarily entailed and required the assessee’s co-operation and furnishing of full details. General observations should not and cannot become the basis of invoking the thirteenth proviso to section 10(23C)(vi). No finding that assessee was carrying on activities which were not solely educational. Matter remanded. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08)

All India Management Association v. DGIT (E) (2014) 362 ITR 451 / 266 CTR 232 / 99 DTR 387 (Delhi)(HC)

209 **S.10(23C) : Educational institution – Not conducting classes but affiliating schools, prescribing syllabus and conducting examination is eligible exemption**

It is not mandatory to hold classes for an institution to qualify and to be treated as an educational institution. If the activity undertaken and engaged is educational, it is sufficient. Held, that the assessee did not conduct classes nor was it directly engaged in teaching students. The assessee affiliated schools, prescribed syllabus and conducted examination for students. The assessee was authorised and permitted to conduct the examinations and the results enabled students to get admission at the graduate level. It was not disputed that the exams conducted by the assessee were recognised. The assessee was an educational institution within the meaning of section. 10(23C)(vi). (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11)

Council for the Indian School Certificate Examinations v. DGIT(E) (2014) 364 ITR 508 / 224 Taxman 210 / 269 CTR 228 / 106 DTR 9 (Delhi)(HC)

210 **S.10(23C) : Educational institution – Imparting education to girls – The object clause of the trust deed were read in a holistic manner – Refusal to grant registration was not justified. [S. 10(22)]**

The main object of the assessee-trust was to impart education to girls. Two factors weighed with the Chief Commissioner while rejecting the claim of the trust. Firstly, a view was taken that all the objectives of the trust were not solely for carrying out educational activities. The second factor was that educational activity of the trust was limited to only a particular district in the State of Assam. Both the factors and the decision of the Chief Commissioner based thereon were fallacious. The trust deed had to be read as a whole. If the object clause of the trust deed were read in a holistic manner, it would show beyond any reasonable doubt that the principal objective of the trust was to establish and maintain educational institution in the country. The order refusing approval was not valid and was liable to be quashed.

Sree Kanya Pathshala Trust v. UOI (2014) 360 ITR 60 / 101 DTR 361 / 267 CTR 283 (Guwahati)(HC)

- S.10(23C) : Educational institution – An institution which regularly makes more than 10% – 15% surplus is existing for profit & is not eligible for exemption – University was not a “State” with in the meaning of article 289(1) of the Constitution of India. [S.4, Constitution of India, Art, 12, 131, 289]** 211
- As long as “surplus” is “reasonable surplus”, there should not be any difficulty in giving exemption u/s. 10(23C) (iiiab) of the Act. “Surplus” cannot be more than 10%-15% so as to meet contingencies or unforeseen expenditure. If University or an educational institution under the guise of “surplus” start making huge profit, in our opinion, it would cease to exist for net making profit and in that event would not be entitled for exemption under this provision. (AY. 2004-05 to 2009-10)
Visvesvaraya technological University v. ACIT (2014) 362 ITR 279 / 100 DTR 89 / 224 Taxman 89 / 267 CTR 40 (Karn.)(HC)
- S.10(23C) : Educational institution – One-time approval where approval granted after 13-7-2006 – No necessity to accord subsequent approval unless approval withdrawn by competent authority – Denial of renewal of approval for 2012-13 – No opportunity of hearing afforded to assessee – Not justified** 212
- Circular No. 7 of 2010, dated October 27, 2010(2010) 328 ITR 43(St), clarified that once the approval has been granted under sub-clause (iv) of clause (23C) of section 10, there is no necessity to accord subsequent approval unless the approval is withdrawn by the competent authority and further the assessee had not been afforded opportunity of hearing and the order was violative of the principles of natural justice. Petition was allowed. (AY. 2012-13)
State Innovations in Family Planning Services Project Agency v. UOI (2014) 365 ITR 359 / 226 Taxman 164 (All.)(HC)
- S.10(23C) : Educational institution – Approval of prescribed authority is necessary for claiming exemption only u/s. 10(23C)(vi) and not u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad). [S.12A]** 213
- Assessee trust was registered u/s. 12A, running educational activities for school students through its institution. Assessee claimed exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad). AO rejected said claim taking a view that assessee had not obtained approval from prescribed authority. Approval of prescribed authority is necessary for claiming exemption only under section 10(23C)(vi) and not under section 10(23C)(iiiad). Assessee existed solely for educational purpose and annual receipts of its institution, namely, ASK BV was less than ₹ one crore, assessee’s claim for exemption was sustainable as per the provisions of the section 10(23C). Claim of assessee was allowed. (AY. 2009-10)
A.S. Kupparaju & Brothers Charitable Foundation Trust v. Dy. DIT (E)(2014) 149 ITD 531 / 112 DTR 246 / 166 TTJ 752 (Bang.)(Trib.)
- S.10(23C) : Educational institution – Provisions of section 10(23C)(vi) as it existed for A.Y. 2004-05 contemplated specific approval of prescribed authority as a condition precedent for grant of exemption – Denial of exemption was held to be justified. [S.12A]** 214
- Assessee-trust Educational institution was running an educational institution namely AIT for engineering students. Claim for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) in respect of said

institution was rejected for not taking approval from prescribed authority. Assessee had applied for grant of approval and failure of prescribed authority to act upon said application resulted in automatic grant of approval. The provisions of s. 10(23C)(vi) as it existed for A.Y. 2004-05 contemplated specific approval of prescribed authority as a condition precedent for grant of exemption. Therefore, in absence of such an approval, assessee's claim for exemption could not be allowed. (AY.2004-05)

A.S. Kupparaju & Brothers Charitable Foundation Trust v. Dy. DIT(E) (2014) 149 ITD 531 / 112 DTR 246 / 166 TTJ 752 (Bang.)(Trib.)

215 S.10(23C) : Hospital – Exemption is automatic for entities which are wholly or substantially funded by Government of India or State Government. [S.11,12AA]

The assessee, an association of persons, was established by the Government of Karnataka for charitable purposes. The assessee had received grant of a sum from State Government. At end of the relevant year the assessee had an unutilized fund which was claimed by the assessee as exempt under section 11. The Assessing officer found that the assessee was not registered under section 12AA, held that the assessee was not entitled for exemption under section 11. The CIT(A) affirmed order of the Assessing Officer. On appeal by the assessee before the tribunal, the tribunal held that the assessee has been recognized as a Government established, exemption under section 10(23C) (iiiic) is automatic for entities which were wholly or substantially funded by the Government of India or State Government as the case may be. Therefore the assessee is entitled for exemption under section 10(23C) (iiiic). (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

District Health & Family Welfare Society v. DCIT (2013) 24 ITR 604 / (2014) 61 SOT 41 (URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)

216 S.10(23C)(iiid) : Educational institution – Others objects – Merely having the other objects – Exemption cannot be denied

It was held that when save and except educational activity the assessee did not carry on any other activity, merely because there exists object which is not related to educational activities, is not sufficient to deny the benefit of s. 10(23C)(iiid). (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

Geetanjali Education Society v. ADIT(E) (2014) 101 DTR 337 / 223 Taxman 167 / 267 CTR 369 (Karn.)(HC)

217 S.10(23C)(vi) : Educational institution – Registration – Object clause amended – Order of High Court set aside with liberty to apply for fresh registration

Rejection of application for certificate on ground entire income not used for educational purposes. Society amended its objects with effect from March 31, 2008. Court held that since society amended the object clause order of High Court set aside and liberty granted to apply for registration afresh for assessment years in question with amended objects. (AY. 2002-03 to 2007-08)

Om Prakash Shiksha Prasara Samiti v. Chief CIT (2014) 364 ITR 329 / 222 Taxman 40 (Mag.) / 267 CTR 181(SC)

S.10(23C)(vi) : Educational institution – Delay in filing application – Condonation of delay – Chief Commissioner is not a court – Order of Principal Chief Commissioner rejecting application did not suffer from any error. [Limitation Act, 1963, S. 5]

218

The assessee filed an application under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the Assessment Year 2013-14 on March 19, 2014. The Principal Chief Commissioner by his order dated April 25, 2014, declined to entertain the application on the ground that it was filed beyond the stipulated date. On a writ petition :

Held, dismissing the petition, that there was no basis or foundation in the submission that the delay in filing the application for an exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) beyond the statutory date of September 30, 2013, should have been condoned. Thus, order of the Principal Chief Commissioner did not suffer from any error. Applied the ratio in *Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India P. Ltd. (2009) 315 ITR 449 (SC) (AY. 2013-14)*

I.D. Education Society v. Principal CCIT (2014) 369 ITR 307 / (2015) 230 Taxman 518 (All.)(HC)

S.10(23C)(vi) : Educational institution – Other objects – Does not mean institution not existing solely for educational purposes – Order refusing approval of exemption not sustainable

219

Held, that the assessee-society was running an educational institution. Merely because there were other objects of the society that did not mean that the educational institution was not existing solely for educational purpose. The emphasis of the word “solely” is in relation to the educational institution, which is running not for the purpose of making profit and is not in relation to the objects of the society. The prescribed authority had misdirected itself in not considering the stipulated conditions mentioned under section 10(23C)(vi) and had digressed from the main issue in considering the irrelevant considerations. He had considered the expenditure depicted by the assessee-society in the previous assessment years. He also considered the findings of the Assessing Officer, which findings had been set aside in appeal by the appellate authority. Consequently, the order refusing approval for exemption could not be sustained, the authority was to consider it and pass appropriate orders. (AY. 2003-04 to 2010-11).

Simpkins School v. DIT (Inv.) (2014) 367 ITR 335 / 226 Taxman 160 (Mag.) / (2015) 274 CTR 290 / 114 DTR 143 (All.)(HC)

S.10(23C)(vi) : Educational institution – Defect in Trust deed was rectified – Rejection of application was held to be not justified

220

Application under section 10(23C)(vi) was rejected on ground trust deed did not provide for distribution of funds on dissolution. Defect in trust deed rectified. Rejection of application not justified. (AY. 2012-13)

St. Kabir Educational Society v. CBDT (2014) 366 ITR 378 (P&H)(HC)

S.10(23C)(vi) : Educational institution – Education – Training – Matter remanded

221

Allowing the petition the Court held that prescribed authority to consider whether some form of information or training regarding a subject imparted by institution, whether such information resulted in intellectual, moral or social benefit in keeping

with education, Whether educational process being carried on in a systematic way by its arrangement into courses, classes, a specific number and length of classes in a day, system of promotion, gradation, granting of diploma certificates also to be gone into. As the Commissioner has not considered all the above facts, matter was remanded for fresh consideration.

Swar Sangam v. CCIT (2014) 368 ITR 395 / (2015) 230 Taxman 274 (Cal.)(HC)

222 **S.10(23C)(vi) : Educational institution – Approval of Chief CIT – Diversion of funds for personal use and therefore application for exemption was correctly rejected**

Application for approval for A.Y. 2007-08 made on 26-12-2008 was barred by limitation in terms of fourteenth proviso to s. 10(23C). Chief CIT found that the assessee institution was existing for profit motive and there was diversion of funds for personal use and therefore application for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was correctly rejected. (AY. 2007-08 to 2009-10)

Bal Bharti Nursery School v. CCIT (2014) 98 DTR 366 / 221 Taxman 77 (All.)(HC)

223 **S.10(23G) : Infrastructure facility – Bonds – Exemption – Notification – Pre-condition of notification in Official Gazette is not applicable to bonds purchased by assessee during financial year 1997-98**

The Court held that once the bonds which had been issued, in respect of which exemption was claimed by assessee were issued on February 18, 1998, the requirement of notification in the Official Gazette as a condition precedent for exemption under section 10(23G) of the Act was inapplicable. Therefore the Tribunal was correct in holding that the pre-condition of notification in the Official Gazette, introduced by the Finance Act, 1997, with effect from April 1, 1988 was not applicable to the bonds purchased by the assessee during the financial year 1997-98 relevant assessment year 1998-99. Appeal of revenue was dismissed.(AY.1998-99)

CIT v. Lord Krishna Bank Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 416 / 107 DTR 138 (Bom.)(HC)

224 **S.10(23G) : Infrastructure undertakings – Amalgamation – Benefit which has accrued to investor / assessee cannot be taken away just because investee company which had originally been approved u/s.10(23G) by Government has amalgamated into another company. [R. 2E]**

Assessee, engaged in business of investment, had claimed exemption u/s. 10(23G) in respect of long term capital gain which arose on account of sale of equity shares of a company named RSPCL. On date of acquisition of shares, RSPCL had been exempted u/s. 10(23G) and also on date of sale of shares, RSPCL had enjoyed the said exemption. AO disallowed the exemption on the ground that RSPCL had ceased to exit from 1-4-2003 due to amalgamation with other company and exemption was not available to the assessee unless the new company was eligible enterprises approved by the competent authority. On appeal the Tribunal held that benefit which has accrued to investor/assessee cannot be taken away just because investee company which had originally been approved u/s. 10(23G) by Government has amalgamated into another company. Approval given u/s. 10(23G) had not been withdrawn as provided in rule 2E. Hence, exemption u/s. 10(23G) was admissible to assessee. (AY. 2004-05)

Goa Trading (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 737 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.10(29) : Warehousing corporation – Derived from – Supervision charges, fumigation services etc are eligible for exemption, however income from house property, interest on loan etc are not eligible

225

Income from house property, bank receipts, income on loans and advances to staff, interest on bank deposits and dividend, not derived from activities enumerated in section 10(29) hence not eligible for exemption. Supervision charges, fumigation service charges, weighbridge receipts, income from sale of tender forms and interest on belated refund of advances are income from activities incidental to warehousing of produce for storage, processing or facilitating the marketing of commodities which are eligible for exemption. (AY. 1989-90 to 2002-03)

Tamilnadu Warehousing Corporation v. ITO (OSD) (2014) 363 ITR 1 / (2015) 228 Taxman 331 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

S.10(37) : Capital gains – Agricultural land – Land not cultivated by him self – With in specified urban limits – Additional compensation – Entitled to exemption. [S.45(5)]

226

Assessee received his share of additional compensation awarded by Court for transfer of agricultural land. AO denied exemption under section 10(37) on such receipt on ground that agricultural land was not cultivated by assessee himself. In case of co-owner of land in question in *CIT v. Amrutbhai Patel in Tax Appeal No. 355/2013* Court held that assessee was entitled to exemption even if agricultural land was not cultivated by assessee himself but by hired labourer or through his family member, hence the exemption was allowed.

CIT v. Jasubhai Somabhai Patel (2014) 225 Taxman 158 (Guj.)(HC)

S.10(38) : Long term capital gains – Securities – Shares sold after two years from their conversion (stock-in-trade to investment) did not mean the conversion was illegal and done with an intention to claim exemption u/s. 10(38) – Income is taxable under the head ‘capital gain’ and eligible for exemption u/s. 10(38). [S. 45]

227

The assessee filed its return of income declaring long-term capital gains arising from sale of shares which was claimed as exempt income u/s. 10(38). The AO took a view that the business of the assessee was not to invest in shares but to deal them as a stockbroker and trader and, consequently, held the income to be business income and not capital gains. Further, he observed that conversion of stock-in-trade into investment was done with the intention not to pay tax. The Tribunal, after considering the facts, held the income to be taxable under the head “capital gains”. The High Court observed that the Assessee had converted and transferred the shares in question under the head “investment” on 1st April 2004 and sold them after two years from the date of conversion, and this was disclosed in the financials. The AO never disputed when the conversion took place. Mere fact that the income is now exempt from tax after the introduction of Section 10(38) w.e.f. April 01, 2005, does not mean that the conversion was illegal. Further, the shares had been sold a considerable amount of time after the conversion. The High Court finally, accepted the assessee’s position of treating the income from sale of shares, taxable as “Capital gain”. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Express Securities (P) Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 488 / 220 taxman 365 / 105 DTR 86 / 272 CTR 294 (Delhi)(HC)

Section 10A : Special provisions in respect of newly established undertakings in free trade zone, etc.

228 S.10A : Free trade zone – Development of computer software – Customs bonding not a condition precedent – Assessee fulfilling conditions laid down in section 10A – Entitled to exemption

The assessee was in the business of computer software development and established in a software technology park. The assessee claimed deduction under section 10A of the Act. The particulars furnished showed the date of commencement of production and the date of initial registration with the Software Technology Parks of India (STPI) were on the same day. While granting permission for setting up of the units, the STPI authorities had laid down some conditions. Condition No. 5 was that the units should be customs bonded. The licence for private bonded warehouse obviously would be a date after the permission granted by the STPI authorities to set up the STPI units. The assessing authority was of the view that the assessee would be entitled to the benefit under section 10 only if production commenced in the customs bonded area after such permission and that as the assessee had commenced production before that date the assessee was not entitled to the benefit. Accordingly, the claim for exemption was denied to the assessee. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the exemption. On appeal to the High Court :

Held, dismissing the appeals, that the assessee commenced production prior to the customs bonding. However, invoices were raised after the customs bonding. The conditions stipulated in the permission granted by the STPI was that the units shall be customs bonded. The benefit of such customs bonding is that the assessee would be entitled to the benefit of customs duty and excise duty. It had nothing to do with the grant of exemption under section 10A of the Act. The assessee was entitled to the exemption.

CIT v. Caritor (India) P. Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 463 / (2015) 230 Taxman 411 (Karn.)(HC)

229 S.10A : Free trade zone – Human resources services – IT enabled services – Entitled to benefit

The assessee was a hundred per cent export oriented unit registered under STPI and was engaged in hiring overseas information technology consultants for a US based company. The services rendered by them to their client included sourcing, screening and interviewing prospective candidates having information technology skills for recruitment for their overseas customers. It claimed deduction under section 10A and, accordingly, declared nil income.

On second appeal, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's claim holding that the assessee-company provides recruitment services by extensively using information technology skills. It was held that the services provided by the assessee were covered by section 10A, read with Notification bearing No. SO 890(E), dated 26-9-2000.

On appeal by the revenue dismissing the appeal of revenue the Court held that, It was found that assessee company provide recruitment services by extensively using information technology. It was using information technology in scanning data, processing it, conducting online tests for short-listed candidate, and analysing their results. Even

list of selected candidate also took place using CATS application software. These activities were covered under Notification bearing No. SO 890(E), dated 26-9-2000, i.e., human resource service. Therefore assessee would be entitled to benefit under section 10A. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. ML Outsourcing Services (P.) Ltd. (2014) 271 CTR 553 / (2015) 228 Taxman 54 (Mag.) / 110 DTR 105 (Delhi)(HC)

S.10A : Free trade zone – Conversion of firm into company – Splitting up or reconstruction – Entitled to exemption 230

All partners of erstwhile firm became shareholders of company and no outsiders were inducted. Also, all assets and liabilities were transferred to the company. Held, there was no transfer of business upon conversion of firm into company. Since the assessee fulfilled all conditions enumerated in s. 10A, deduction was to be allowed. (AY. 2002-03 to 2004-05)

CIT v. Foresee Information Systems P. Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 335 / 226 Taxman 165 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

S.10A : Free trade zone – Initiated production in 1999 – Prior to its registration as STPI in 2002 – Benefit cannot be denied 231

High Court held that in order to claim deduction, under section 10A, twin conditions are that an undertaking in hardware technology park or software technology park must be in existence commencing its production on or after 1-4-1994 and it should not have been formed by splitting up or reconstruction of an existing business. Assessee was in software technology park and registered as STPI in 2002 and further assessee was not formed by splitting up or reconstruction of business already in existence, mere fact that assessee was in existence since 1999, i.e., prior to date of registration on 27-3-2002, would not disentitle assessee from claiming benefit under section 10A (AY. 2003-04 to 2005-06)

Nagesh Chundur v. CIT (2013) 358 ITR 521 / (2014) 220 Taxman 47 (Mad.)(HC)

S.10A : Free trade zone – Set off of losses – Export processing zone unit – Brought forward losses of non export processing zone unit is not to be deducted or reduced from profit /income of export processing unit. [S.10B, 80A] 232

Brought forward losses of non-export processing zone unit cannot be deducted or reduced from profit/income of export processing zone unit. (AY. 2002-03, 2003-04)

CIT v. TEI Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 78 DTR 225 / (2013) 259 CTR 186 / (2014) 361 ITR 36 (Delhi)(HC)

S.10A : Free trade zone – Manufacture – Making of jewellery – Entitled to exemption 233

Process of making jewellery amounts to manufacture and assessee is entitled to exemption under section 10A. (AY. 2003-04, 2005-06)

CIT v. Jayshree Gems and Jewellery (2014) 362 ITR 272 / (2015) 228 Taxman 63 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

234 **S.10A : Free trade zone – Donation for charitable purposes – Benefit can be claimed both under sections 10A and 80G. [S. 80G]**

New industrial undertaking in free trade zone which gave donation for charitable purposes is eligible for benefit can be claimed both under sections 10A and 80G. S. 10A is an exemption section whereas s. 80G is a deduction section and, therefore, there would be no double deduction in respect of the same item, even if a benefit under both sections has been claimed. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 714 / 104 DTR 282 / 270 CTR 523 / 223 Taxman 469 (Karn.)(HC)

235 **S.10A : Free trade zone – Interest income out of surplus funds in Banks and sister concerns & EEFC account is eligible for exemption. [S.10B]**

The question is whether the interest received and the consideration received by sale of import entitlement is to be construed as income of the business of the undertaking. There is a direct nexus between this income and the income of the business of the undertaking. Though it does not partake the character of a profit and gains from the sale of an article, it is the income which is derived from the consideration realized by export of articles. In view of the definition of 'Income from Profits and Gains' incorporated in Subsection (4), the assessee is entitled to the benefit of exemption of the said amount as contemplated under Section 10B of the Act. (AY. 1998-99, 2001-02)

CIT v. Motorola India Electronics (P) Ltd. (2014) 98 DTR 81 / 265 CTR 94 / 225 Taxman 11 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

236 **S.10A : Free trade zone – Certificate was not filed before AO – Quoting wrong provision exemption cannot be denied. [S.10B, Form No. 56G]**

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of medical transcription and it claimed deduction under section 10B by claiming that it was a 100 per cent export-oriented unit. AO rejected claim on ground that assessee failed to obtain required certificate and other evidence to establish claim of deduction. Before CIT(A) assessee claimed exemption under section 10A on ground that all requisite conditions were fulfilled. CIT(A) granted deduction by recording that merely because assessee had quoted a wrong provision of law before AO, same was not good reason to deny relief when otherwise assessee was entitled to deduction. On appeal by revenue the Tribunal held that finding of fact recorded by CIT(A) needed no interference. (AY. 2007-08)

ITO v. Accentia Technologies Ltd. (2014) 34 ITR 505 (2015) 67 SOT 165 (Mum.)(Trib.)

237 **S.10A : Free trade zone – Turn over – Export turn over – Foreign exchange – Excluded from export turnover has also to be reduced from total turnover**

While computing exemption under section 10A, expenditure on telecommunication, insurance and other heads incurred in foreign exchange excluded from export turnover has also to be reduced from total turnover. (AY. 2006-07)

ACIT v. Think Soft Global Services (P) Ltd. (2014) 34 ITR 633 / (2015) 152 ITD 246 (Chennai)(Trib.)

S.10A : Free trade zone – Amounts not deductible – Amount of statutory disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) and 43B has to be considered as business profit eligible for deduction u/s. 10A [S.40(a)(ia), 43B]

238

It is the well-established fact that as per the provisions of s. 10B recomputed profits shall be considered for the purpose of computation of deduction u/s. 10B. The disallowances of expenditure should be computed for the purpose of deduction u/s 10B accordingly if the AO recomputes the profit from eligible business by disallowing certain expenditure and liability u/s. 40(a) (ia) and 43B, such recomputed profit shall be considered for the purpose of deduction u/s. 43B. The amount of statutory disallowance has to be considered as business profit eligible for deduction u/s. 10A. Whether where communication charges, insurance charges and reimbursement of expenses attributable to delivery of computer software outside India, are to be reduced from export turnover then same should as well be reduced from total turnover while computing deduction under section 10A. (AY. 2008-09)

Virtusa (India) (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 278 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.10A : Free trade zone – Opting out of provisions of s. 10A in terms of sub-section (8) will not extend period of benefit beyond 10 years from previous year relevant to assessment year in which assessee begins to manufacture or produce articles or things. [S.10A(3), 10A(8)]

239

The assessee began to manufacture or produce articles or things in the previous year relevant to AY 1995-96. Assessee claimed benefit of section 10A for first time in year 1998-99. By virtue of amendment to section 10A(3) effective from A.Y. 1999-2000, benefit of exemption was granted for ten consecutive years started from assessment year in which assessee began to manufacture article or thing. Since assessee started its manufacturing activities from A.Y. 1995-96, band of 10 years as per amended law would be from A.Y. 1995-96 to A.Y. 2004-05 only. Therefore the assessment year from which the begin to get deduction u/s.10A will be consecutive years commencing from A.Y. 1995-96. The law as it existed prior to Substitution of Sec.10A of the Act w.e.f. 1-4-2001 was deduction was to be allowed for 5 consecutive assessment years falling within a period of 8 years from the Assessment year in which the industrial undertaking begins to manufacture or produce articles or things. From AY 01-02 instead of 5 consecutive assessment years out of 8 assessment years from the Assessment year in which the industrial undertaking begins to manufacture or produce articles or things, deduction u/s.10A of the Act was allowed for a period of 10 consecutive years from the Assessment year in which the industrial undertaking begins to manufacture or produce articles or things. The Assessee for AY 95-96 to 97-98 the could not get the benefit of deduction u/s.10A of the Act, may be due to absence of profits or by exercise of its option to choose the following 5 years to claim deduction u/s. 10A as per the law as it existed then. According to the law as it existed upto AY 00-01 the Assessee could have claimed deduction only upto AY 2002-03 the end of the 8 year period from 95-96. The Assessee claimed deduction u/s.10A for AY 98-99 to 01-02. The Assessee opted out of the provisions of Sec.10A of the Act by virtue of the provisions of Sec.10A(8) of the Act which gives such opting out to an Assessee for AY 02-03 to 04-05. The band of 10 years as per the amended law would be from 1995-96 to 04-05 only. Out of the provisions of

Sec.10A will not have the effect of extending the band period of 10 years. The Assessee could thus get the benefit of the amended law applicable from AY 2001-02 only for 2 more years viz., A.Y. 2003-04 & 04-05. The provision for opting out of the provisions of Sec.10A of the Act is intended to facilitate an Assessee who can get more benefit under any other provisions of the deduction under Chapter VIA of the Act. That provision cannot extend the period of benefit beyond 10 years from the previous year relevant to Assessment year in which the Assessee begins to manufacture or produce articles or things. Claim of assessee was rejected.(AY. 2008-09)

Aditi Technologies (P.) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 149 ITD 515 / 166 TTJ 313 (Bang.)(Trib.)

240 **S.10A : Free trade zone – Claim can be made before CIT(A) – Though approval of Director of STPI to EOU is sufficient for s. 10A, it is not so for s. 10B. For s. 10B, the approval of the Board appointed under I(D&R) Act is necessary. Claim for s. 10A can be made before CIT(A)[S.10B]**

(i) The fact that the assessee is a 100% EOU approved by the Director, STPI does not mean entitle the assessee to deduction u/s. 10B if the undertaking is not been approved by the Board appointed in this behalf by the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred by section 14 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, which is an express requirement for claiming deduction u/s. 10B of the Act because of Explanation 2(iv) below section 10B of the Act as held in Regency Creations 27 taxmann.com 322 (Del). The plea of the assessee that the High Court has not considered the argument that a conjoint reading of the Exim Policy/Foreign Trade Policy entitles the assessee to the benefits of section 10B of the Act, once the unit is approved as per the Exim Policy is not acceptable because, having regard to judicial discipline, the Tribunal cannot disregard the judgment of the High Court in the manner sought to be canvassed. In Technovate E Solutions P. Ltd. 354 ITR 110 (Del) the Delhi High Court held that the approval granted by the Director of STPI is sufficient approval so as to satisfy the condition stipulated in section 10A(2)(i)(b) of the Act in view of the Instruction and communication of the CBDT and it was held that the approval granted by the Director of STPI would be deemed valid for the purposes of compliance with the conditions stipulated u/s 10A(2) of the Act. However, as the aforesaid judgment in Technovate E Solutions P. Ltd deals with section 10A of the Act and not with section 10B, it does not help the assessee in the present case.

(ii) However, the Revenue's contention that the assessee cannot be allowed the benefits of section 10A of the Act merely because the prescribed Audit Report in Form No.56F was not filed in the return of income, is quite erroneous because after denial of deduction u/s. 10B of the Act in the assessment order, the earliest opportunity for the assessee to stake claim for deduction u/s. 10A of the Act was before the CIT(A); and, the assessee made the claim before the CIT(A) along with the prescribed Audit Report in Form No.56F. The Delhi High Court in Valiant Communications (supra) in similar circumstances held that the claim of the assessee for deduction u/s 10A of the Act is required to be examined in accordance with law. (AY. 2009-10)

Clarion Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 167 TTJ 532 / 114 DTR 34 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.10A : Free trade zone – Export turn over – Total turnover

241

AO had reduced telecommunication and travelling expenses from export turnover. Tribunal held same was also to be excluded from total turnover for computing deduction under section 10A. Followed *CIT v. Tata Elxsi Ltd. (2012) 349 ITR 98 (Karn)(HC)(2007-08)* *Witness Systems Software India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 61 SOT 64 (URO)(Bang.)(Trib.)*

S.10A : Free trade zone – Export turnover – Total turnover – Where any expenditure is to be reduced from export turnover, same is to be excluded from total turnover also

242

AO reduced the communication expenses from the export turnover for computation of deduction u/s. 10A. CIT(A) without appreciating the fact that the communication expenses were consisting of telephone charges, and internet charges which were incurred in normal course of business and not specifically for the purpose of delivery of software outside India, should have directed to be excluded from the export turnover for computing the deduction under section 10A. Tribunal held that if these communication expenses are to be excluded from the export turnover, then the same should also be excluded from the total turnover for computing the deduction u/s. 10A. (AY. 2005-06) *Intoto Software India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 35 taxmann.com 421 / (2014) 146 ITD 360 / 30 ITR 504 (Hyd.)(Trib.)*

Section 10B : Special provisions in respect of newly established hundred per cent export-oriented undertakings**S.10B : Export Oriented undertaking – Unabsorbed depreciation – Cannot adjust unabsorbed depreciation against other income. [S.56]**

243

Court held that since section 10B provides 100 per cent exemption for export income and not for other income, unabsorbed depreciation should be adjusted against income of export oriented business only, assessee cannot adjust unabsorbed depreciation against other income so as to take exemption from payment of tax even for other income. (AY. 1994-95)

Himatsingka Seide Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 266 CTR 141 / 100 DTR 37 / (2015) 228 Taxman 63 (Mag.)(SC)

Editorial : Decision in CIT v. Himatasingike Seide Ltd. (2006) 286 ITR 255 / 156 Taxman 151 / 206 CTR 106 (Karn)(HC) is affirmed.

S.10B : Export oriented undertaking – Manufacture of article for export – Export of spare parts – No manufacturing activity – Profit from export of spare parts not entitled to exemption – Profits from sale of scrap – Scrap resulting from manufacturing activity – Profits from sale of scrap entitled to exemption

244

The assessee was a 100 per cent export-oriented undertaking engaged in the manufacturing of x-ray tubes, high voltage tanks, CT detectors used in CT scanners and x-ray equipment. For the assessee claimed exemption under section 10B. The Assessing Officer did not grant exemption on profits from export of spares. The assessee had included a sum representing the sale of scrap in its profits for calculating the deduction under section 10B. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order. The Tribunal held that the income on sale of spare parts

was not eligible profit for the purpose of computing deduction under section 10B. However, the Tribunal granted reliefs under section 10B of the Act in respect of sale of scrap. On appeal to the High Court :

Held, (i) that the income from the sale of spare parts was not eligible for the benefit under section 10B.

(ii) That the assessee was entitled to the benefit of section 10B in respect of the profits earned out of sale of scrap materials within the country. (AY.2002-03, 2003-04)

GEBE P. Ltd. v. A CIT (2014) 226 Taxman 114 (Mag.) (2015) 371 ITR 32 (Karn.)(HC)

- 245 **S.10B : Export oriented unit – Profits derived from export – Interest earned on deposits for opening letters of credit – Attributable to activity of export – Entitled to exemption – Public issue of shares by assessee – Interest on share application moneys deposited by applicants for shares not income derived from export activity – Not entitled to exemption – Interest on deposits made from share application moneys pending issue of shares – Not entitled to exemption**

Obtaining of letters of credit is an essential activity for undertaking exports and the deposit of amounts for that purpose is a condition precedent. The interest yielded on the deposits was attributable to or could be said to be derived from the activity of export. Therefore, the interest earned in respect of the bank deposits kept for opening letters of credit was entitled to exemption.

The interest given by banks in respect of moneys received by them, on behalf of the assessee, against public issue of shares was not entitled to exemption as it was not part of scheme of export. (AY.1995-96)

CIT v. Indo Aquatics Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 589 / (2015) 230 Taxman 412 (T&AP)(HC)

- 246 **S.10B : Export oriented undertaking – Assessee's sister undertaking fulfilling requirements of section 10B(2)(ii) and (iii) at time of formation – Transfer of entire business to assessee – Entitled to exemption**

The assessee was engaged in export of digitised medical transcription. It acquired the entire business relating to medical transcription of its sister concern in relation to the AY 2002-03 and claimed exemption under section 10B for the AY.2004-05. The AO disallowed the claim on the grounds that (i) the assessee did not satisfy the requirement of sub-section (2) of section 10B, The CIT(A) held that the undertaking had not been set up by the assessee but was set up earlier by its sister concern and was transferred to the assessee and, hence, there was no violation of section 10B(2)(ii) or section 10(2)(iii) as the assessee had entered into a business transfer agreement with its sister concern. There was no finding that the sister concern had acquired or previously used machinery or equipment. The Tribunal allowed the appeals of the Revenue in respect of the Assessment Years 2002-03 and 2003-04 relying upon sub-section (9) of section 10B but dismissed the appeal for the assessment year 2004-05 observing that sub-section (9) of section 10B was omitted and was not applicable for the assessment year 2004-05. On appeal by revenue the dismissing the appeal the Court held that the assessee, could not be denied the benefit under S.10B. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Heartland Delhi Transcription Services P. Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 523 / 270 CTR 373 / 107 DTR 401 / (2015) 228 Taxman 326 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.10B : Export oriented undertaking – Requisite approval from Board constituted under Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 not possessed by assessee – Tribunal not entitled to rewrite law or accept anything in lieu of what was required by statute – Matter remanded to AO, with directions. [S. 254(1)]

247

Tribunal, following an earlier decision, allowed the claim of the assessee for exemption under S.10B of the Act, on the basis of a letter of the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Directorate of Cottage and Small Scale Industries. On appeal by revenue, allowing the appeal partly, held (i) that since the assessee did not possess the requisite approval as 100 per cent export oriented undertaking by the Board appointed by the Central Government in exercise of powers by section 14 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 and the Rules made thereunder, the Tribunal could not have rewritten the law nor could have accepted anything in lieu of what was required by the statute. Therefore, the view of the Tribunal was wrong and was, therefore, set aside and the AO was directed to consider whether the assessee was entitled to any other benefit under the Act on the basis that hundred per cent profits were earned from exports.

CIT v. J.E. Enterprises P. Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 571 / 272 CTR 102 / (2015) 228 Taxman 171 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)

S.10B : Export oriented undertaking – Subsidiary merging with assessee – Assessee eligible for benefit of exemption

248

Rejecting the appeal of revenue the Court held that the subsidiary of assessee, a 100 per cent export oriented unit, merging with assessee by order of court is not a case of business formed by splitting up or reconstruction of a business already in existence. Assessee's status as 100 per cent export oriented unit approved by Government of India. Assessee eligible for benefit of exemption. Referred to the Central Board of Direct Taxes Circular No. 378, dated March 3, 1984(1984) 149 ITR (St.)1, and held that the benefit was attached to the undertaking and not to the ownership, thus, allowed the claim. (AY.1994-95)

CIT v. Shri Renuga Textiles Mills Ltd. (2012) 254 CTR 423 / 77 DTR 355 / (2014) 366 ITR 649 (Mad.)(HC)

S.10B : Export oriented undertakings – Export of granites – Matter remanded to Assessing Officer where the Tribunal failed to look into documents and rejected claim under sections 10B & 80HHC. [S.80HHC]

249

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of export of granites. The assessing authority denied the benefit of exemption under section 10B to the assessee. The CIT(A) however, granted relief under section 80HHC. After failing before the Tribunal, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the High Court and the matter was remitted to the Commissioner (Appeals). The Commissioner rejected the claim under section 10B as well as section 80HHC. The Tribunal held that the issue was squarely covered by the judgment of the High Court in assessee's own case for AY 1994-95 wherein the assessee was not entitled to exemption under section 10B and 80HHC as well.

On appeal, the High Court held that the judgment rendered by High Court for assessment year 1994-95 was an ex parte order and further, in absence of certificate

under section 14 of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, it was held that assessee was not entitled for exemption under section 10B. Similarly benefit under section 80HHC was declined for non-filing of audit report. However, subsequently assessee had produced the said documents claiming exemption but authorities declined its claim. Therefore, in view thereof, entire matter was sent to the assessing authority, who would look into all materials produced by assessee in respect of its claim and decide the matter afresh. (AY. 1995-96 & 1996-97)

Natural Stones Exports Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxman 35 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

250 **S.10B : Export oriented undertakings – In absence of specific definition of term ‘manufacture’, it includes every process which ultimately results in production of new article having a different character. [S.2(29B)]**

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and export of cut and polished granite building slabs was a 100 per cent Export Oriented Unit. It claimed exemption u/s. 10B. The AO rejected the assessee's claim on the ground that cutting and polishing of granite slabs did not amount to manufacture or production of an article or thing. He further contented that with the deletion of the definition ‘manufacture’ contained in section 10B from the year 2001, the expression ‘manufacture’ had to be understood in the normal sense and hence polishing of rough granite was not a manufacture or production of an article or thing. The CIT(A) and Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

On appeal by the department, the High Court observed that even though the definition of ‘manufacture’ was omitted from section 10B w.e.f. the year 2001, yet u/s. 2(29BA) inserted w.e.f. the year 2009 under the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, the term ‘manufacture’ was defined. However, during the year under consideration, there was no definition of manufacture existing and hence, in the absence of any specific definition, as per common man's understanding the expression ‘manufacture’ would include every process, which would ultimately result in the production of new article having a different character in view. Accordingly the appeal filed by the department was dismissed. (AY. 2003-04 to 2005-06)

CIT v. Pallava Granite Industries (I) (P) Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxman 107 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

Super Auto Forge Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 365 ITR 318 / 105 DTR 322 (Mad.)(HC)

251 **S.10B : Export oriented undertakings – Training fees – Not profits and gains derived from export oriented undertaking – Deduction is not allowable**

The assessee being 100% export oriented unit claimed exemption u/s.10B of the Act on the income received by them as by way of training fees. The AO disallowed the claim on the view that the relationship between the assessee and the trainees was not that of the employer and employees and training was given to the outsiders. On appeal CIT (A) allowed the appeal as training being recognized as part of software development in the EOU, the receipt from training the programme was exempt u/s 10B of the IT Act. On appeal in Tribunal dismissed assessee's appeal and held that as income falling under 10B was earned as fee received by the assessee for imparting training to outsiders by using some infrastructure which might be lying idle as the assessee had not exported any article or goods or software during the period relevant to the assessment year under

consideration. On an appeal the Court held that on admitted facts, the receipt was related to a fee charged by it, on the training of Professionals who are admittedly not its employees and that the profits and gains not being one rising on account of manufacture or production of an article or thing, the benefit u/s. 10B has no relevance. Further the court held that the assessee shows that the receipts come clearly within the language of the section, it is not possible for the court to give an elastic interpretation to the clear words based on tax treatment under different enactments or the schemes formulated for setting up of industries in a particular area or zone. (AY. 1996-97, 1997-98, 1999-2000) *Penta Medi Graphica Ltd. v. CIT* (2014) 264 CTR 543 (Mad.)(HC)

S.10B : Export oriented undertakings – Mistake in mentioning the section in the return for claiming the exemption – Exemption cannot be denied. [S.80IB, 251] 252

Assessee was eligible for exemption under section 10B and it had been found to be in order except that instead of mentioning exemption under section 10B, while e-filing return, it was wrongly on account of typographical error mentioned section 80-IB, it could not be said to be such a mistake by which exemption could be disallowed out rightly. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Rajasthan Fasteners (P) Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 271 / 222 Taxman 100 (Mag.) / 266 CTR 401 (Raj.)(HC)

S.10B : Export oriented undertakings – Manufacturing – Food items – Outsourcing – Only some follow up action was done by assessee – Not entitled to exemption 253

A part of manufacturing activity of the assessee was outsourced. Raw material for preparation of snack items was not procured and supplied by assessee. Only some follow up action taken by assessee for packing and storing snacks was done by the assessee. Held, this did not amount to manufacture or producing an article or thing. Hence, assessee was not entitled to exemption.(AY. 2008-09)

Deepkiran Foods P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 437 / 269 CTR 281 / 224 Taxman 135 (Mag.) / 105 DTR 29 / (Guj.)(HC) (Guj.)(HC)

S.10B : Export-oriented undertakings – Manufacture – Processing of flowers amounted to manufacture – Three directors of Pvt. company being partners of the firm can be said that the firm was set up by reconstruction – Entitled exemption 254

In the absence of a definition, the word “manufacture” has to be given a meaning as is understood in common parlance. It is to be understood as meaning the production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving such materials new forms, qualities or combinations whether by hand labour or machines. If the change made in the article results in a new and different article then it would amount to manufacturing activity. Thus, if the commodity can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead is recognised as a new and distinct article, then the activity of manufacture can be said to have taken place.

Held, apart from cleaning and grading, the assessee had taken further processing; that what was purchased as raw material and what was exported as a product for export were totally different items i.e. handicraft items of dried flowers and parts of plants. The process that the assessee had undertaken clearly pointed out the irreversible nature

of the final end product from the raw material purchased. Given the admitted fact that what was purchased by the assessee as raw material and exported goods were totally different items and commercially known as different products going by the definition “manufacture”.

The Tribunal had also pointed out that the firm was constituted with the capital contribution by the partners from their personal funds. Neither the presence of the partners nor the products dealt with would be of any guidance to decide the issue raised by the assessee. So too the workmen working in the assessee’s business and in the company. In the absence of any material to substantiate the contention of the Revenue that the firm was constituted by splitting up of the company, the firm was not formed by splitting up of the company. The assessee-firm was entitled to exemption under s. 10B. (AY. 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07, 2008-09)

CIT v. Deco De Trend (2013) 94 DTR 73 / (2014) 360 ITR 1 / 264 CTR 78 (Mad.)(HC)

255 **S.10B : Export-oriented undertakings – Manufacture – Mix cable scrap, mix metal scrap – Old used transformers – All process amounted to manufacturer – Entitled to exemption. [S.2(29BA)]**

The word “manufacture” implies a change but every change in the raw material is not manufacture. There must be such a transformation that a new and different article must emerge having a distinct name, character or use. The assessee would put the imported material to series of manual and mechanical processes and through such exercise so undertaken, bring into existence entirely new, distinct and different commodities which are marketable. Thus, the Tribunal, in our opinion, correctly came to the conclusion that this process amounted to manufacturing. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Mitesh Impex (2014) 367 ITR 85 / 104 DTR 169 / 270 CTR 66 / 225 Taxman 168 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC).

256 **S.10B : Export oriented undertakings – (Customised electronic data) - ‘ready to print books’ exported by assessee in form of a CD or e-mail are customised electronic data eligible for claiming benefit of deduction under section 10B as per the law**

The assessee’s business involved export of ready to print books, which is the ‘customised electronic data’. The nature of activity done by the assessee in the EOU was that of producing designs, drawings, layouts and scanning for the projects of foreign clients on the basis of their parameters and specifications. The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 10B on the receipt from sale of the aforesaid ready to print books. The AO denied the benefit to the assessee for the reason that this does not come under the scope of ‘customised software data’, which was upheld by the AO and Commissioner (Appeals).

On an appeal, the High Court held that in the present case, the assessee after collecting raw data and pictures had utilised its expert designing skills in producing ‘a ready to print e-book’. The final product is intended for use of a particular customer and, therefore, the case under consideration does fit in the category of production of ‘any customised electronic data’ under the definition of ‘computer software’ defined in Explanation 2 to section 10B. Thus, the assessee is correct in claiming benefit of deduction under section 10B as per the law.

Kiran Kapoor v. ITO (2014) 150 ITD 237 / 164 TTJ 157 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.10B : Export oriented undertakings – Customized electronic data – ‘Ready to print books’ exported by assessee in form of a CD or e-mail are customized electronic data eligible for claiming benefit of deduction

257

Applicability of s. 10B(2)(i), which is the subject matter of dispute in the instant case it is admitted by both the parties that all other conditions relevant to applicability of section 10B are being satisfied by the taxpayer. In the instant case, the intention of the Legislature is to provide benefit of deduction to enterprises which are not simply engaged in manufacture or produce any article or thing, but even to those assesseees whose end product is any customized electronic data. Benefit of deduction under section 10B is also available on rendering of any of the services as notified by the Board like the item (ii) in the notification wherein even call centres, animation, etc. which are brought in the sweep of any product or services stated in clause (b) of item (i) of Explanation 2 to section 10B. Therefore, the submissions made by assessee that the restricted scope of the meaning of the phrase ‘manufacture or produce’. Irrespective of form in which input data is, so long as end product is in form of electronic data which is customised by assessee for end use of a particular customer, benefit of deduction u/s. 10B cannot be denied. (AY. 2006-07)

Kiran Kapoor v. ITO (2014) 150 ITD 237 / 164 TTJ 157 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.10B : Export oriented undertakings – Trading – Granite monumental slabs – Eligible for deduction

258

The assessee is a manufacturer and exporter of granite monumental slabs. During the course of the assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee company has purchased granites to the extent of ₹ 42,62,996/- and the same was exported. The only question before us is whether the assessee is eligible for the deduction under section 10B in respect of trading profits or not. The Tribunal held that in the case of *T. Two International (P) Ltd. v. ITO (26 SOT 583) (Mum.)* has observed that to allow deduction u/s. 10A the material consideration is export of eligible goods and not whether those goods are manufactured or purchased by the assessee. Profits from both, the self-manufactured as well as trading in goods have been made eligible for deduction u/s. 10A of the Act. However, this Court is of the opinion that section 10A and section 10B are similar. The Tribunal followed its own order in the case of *T. Two International (P) Ltd.* (supra) and allowed assessee’s Appeal. (AY. 2005-06)

GTP Granites Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 26 ITR 369 / (2014) 61 SOT 36 (URO.) (Chennai)(Trib.)

Section 11 : Income from property held for charitable or religious purposes

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – State Road Corporation – Employees of corporation are public employees working for and on behalf beneficiaries – Corporation is entitled to exemption. [S.11(4A)]

259

The AO in the light of the amendment, refused to the extend the benefit of the exemption under section 11(4A) to the assessee on the ground that it did not satisfy the test under sub-section (4A) of section 11. This view was affirmed by the CIT(A) and Tribunal. All the authorities proceeded on the assumptions that the assessee was being run by paid employees and not the beneficiaries. On reference the Court held

that employees of the assessee in the ultimate analysis were none other than the public employees working for on behalf the beneficiaries. The role played by the Government was nothing but a systematic activity, through which the will of the public was transmitted or translated. Where two views are possible while interpreting a provision of tax law, the one that helps the assessee or beneficiary must be chosen. The assessee was a corporation serving needs of the travelling public in the State and had been enjoying the benefit for the past several decades. Further sub-section (4A) ceased to be force on its being deleted in the year 1991. Therefore the assessee was entitled to exemption. (AY. 1987-88, 1988-89)

A.P.S.R.T.C v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 461 (2015) 120 DTR 386 (T&AP)(HC)

260 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Depreciation – Computation of income – Depreciation is allowable – Prior to 1-4-2015. [S. 32]**

Dismissing the appeal of revenue, the Court held that the object of section 11 of the Act, is to feed public charity. By permitting computation of income in a commercial manner, the object of feeding public charity is achieved. The amount deducted by way of depreciation is in that case ploughed back for user on account of charity. It cannot be disputed that a building used for the purpose of charity diminishes in value over time like any other building. Therefore, providing for such diminution of value would keep the corpus of the trust intact otherwise the corpus of the trust itself in course of time may get dissipated. Depreciation is deductible while computing the income of a charitable trust.

CIT v. Siliguri Regulated Market Committee (2014) 366 ITR 51 / (2015) 230 Taxman 159 / 112 DTR 356 (Cal.)(HC)

261 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Will bequeathing entire property including immovable property and shares to assessee-trust – Will challenged in probate proceedings – Trust acquiring no legal right – No violation of section 11(5). [S.13]**

Dismissing the appeal of revenue the Court held will bequeathing property including immoveable property and shares to assessee Trust the will was challenged in probate proceedings. Till the will was probated and it was affirmed that the will was declared genuine, the assessee trust would not acquire the legal right on the property for the purpose of Income-tax If probate was denied the properties would not devolve on the assessee. The foreign shares had not been transferred in the assessee trust, hence there could be violation of section 11(5). As regards advance the same was paid for raising a memorial for the late Raja Bahadur Singh, however as the project was not completed due to disputes. This being a factual position there was no violation of section 11(5). Appeal of revenue was dismissed.(AY.1991-92)

DIT(E) v. Khetri Trust (2014) 367 ITR 723 / (2015) 228 Taxman 172 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

262 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Impart of education – Capital expenditure – Surplus was utilised for infrastructure development – Eligible for exemption. [S.2(15), 12A]**

Main object of the assessee trust is to impart education, therefore when the surplus is utilised for educational purpose, i.e. for infrastructure development it cannot be said

that the institution was having object to make profit. Surplus used for management and betterment of institution could not be termed as profit. Surplus was used for management and betterment of institution could not be termed as profit. Capital expenditure incurred by an educational institution is the basic necessity if such expenditure promotes the object of the Trust. Accordingly capital expenditure incurred by a trust for acquiring /construction capital asset would be application of money and the assessee would be entitled to exemption under section 11(1)(AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Silicon Institute of Technology (2014) 272 CTR 319 / 112 DTR 233 (Orissa)(HC)

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Pre-Sea and Post-Sea training for ships and maritime industry – Educational – Trust entitle to exemption. [S. 2(15)]

263

The assessee trust was established with the purpose of administering and maintaining technical training institutions at various places in India for pre-sea and post-sea training for ships and maritime industry as a public charitable institution for education for officers, both on the deck and engine side. AO held that the assessee was not entitled exemption but CIT(A) and Tribunal held that it was entitled exemption. On appeal by revenue dismissing the appeal the Court held that the assessee Trust is eligible to exemption.(AY. 2007-08)

DIT v. Samudra Institute of Maritime Studies Trust (2014) 369 ITR 645 / (2015) 117 DTR 342 (Bom.)(HC)

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Depreciation – Income of a trust registered u/s. 12A has to be computed on commercial principles and in doing so depreciation on fixed assets utilised for charitable purposes is allowable. [S. 12A, 32]

264

The assessee was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. While computing its income, the assessee had declared gross receipts on account of donations, profit on sale of land and bank interest. Against the gross receipts, the assessee claimed depreciation based on commercial principles and claimed the balance amount as exempt u/s. 11. The AO denied this allowance of depreciation; however, it was allowed by the CIT(A) as well as by the ITAT. The Revenue preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal of the Revenue after relying on various case laws where it was held that in computing the income of a charitable institution/trust, depreciation of assets owned by the trust/institution is a necessary deduction on commercial principles. (AY. 2006-07)

DIT v. Vishwa Jagriti Mission (2012) 73 DTR 195 / (2013) 262 CTR 558 / (2014) 227 Taxman 144 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Exercise of option – Disallowance cannot be made on the ground that declaration was not made in a prescribed manner

265

Assessee, a charitable trust, being unable to utilise income from property to extent of 85 per cent, wrote letter conveying to department to exercise option available under clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1) so as to allow to spend surplus amount that may remain at end of current previous year during immediately following previous year. Such option was exercised before last date of filing return. Court held that there was no requirement of making declaration in prescribed manner because such requirement

was to be followed only for exercising option available under section 11(2), therefore no disallowance was to be made merely on ground that declaration was not made in a prescribed manner. (AY. 2009-10)

CIT v. Industrial Extension Bureau (2014) 367 ITR 270 / 225 Taxman 160 / 112 DTR 257 (Guj.)(HC)

266 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Voluntary contribution by public with specific direction to building corpus – Exempt from income tax**

Voluntary contributions made by public to assessee-trust with a specific direction to use same for building purpose would form part of corpus of trust and assessee was entitled to benefit under section 11. (AY. 196-97 to 2000-01)

CIT v. Bharatiya Samskriti Vidyapith Trust (2014) 225 Taxman 131 (Karn.)(HC)

267 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Investment in specified securities – Shares of co-operative banks were subscribed only for purposes of obtaining loan for furtherance of objects of trust, section 11/12 exemption could not be denied. [S.12, 13]**

The assessee claimed exemption u/s 11. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was not entitled / eligible to claim exemption under section 11 on the basis that the assessee had purchased shares of certain amount in two co-operative banks which were shown as investments in its balance sheet. Investment in shares of a co-operative bank was not a mode of investment specified in section 11(5) and the assessee had committed breach of the conditions of exemption under section 13(1)(d). Thus, benefit of exemption was not granted. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer. On appeal, the Tribunal held that the lower authorities erred in denying exemption to the assessee under section 11. The court held that the only basis of the revenue seeking to deny the benefit of exemption under section 11 is that the share subscription amount is shown as investments in the balance sheet and investments in shares not being a specified mode, the benefit of exemption cannot be granted. It is well settled that the depiction in Books of Account is not a determinative test but the factual nature of the transaction which has to be considered for the purpose of taxation. In this case, the investment in shares of co-operative banks was a pre-condition for raising of loans and it was therefore not an investment as normally understood. The Tribunal has recorded a finding of fact that the shares were subscribed to only for purposes of obtaining the loan and the amounts so obtained were used for furtherance of the objects of the trust. There is also no dispute about the fact that loans taken from the said two co-operative banks were completely repaid in the Assessment Year 2008- 09 and, therefore, the assessee would be required to hold the shares to continue as member of the co-operative societies running the banking business. Hence, there was no reason to deny benefit to assessee under Section 11 of the Act. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Dr. Vikhe Patil Foundation (2014) 222 Taxman 104 (Bom.)(HC)

Editorial: Dr. Vikhe Patil Foundation v. ITO(2013) 155 TTJ 176 / 39 taxman.com 179/ 89 DTR 2/ (2014) 61 SOT 42 (URO)(Pune)(Trib.) is affirmed.

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Failure to produce donors – Registration cannot be denied. [S.68, 148] 268

Amounts received as donations towards building fund. Amounts was utilized for charitable purposes. Major portion of donations received through cheques. Failure to produce donors before Assessing Officer is not conclusive. Assessee entitled to exemption. (AY.2001-02, 2002-03)

CIT v. MBA Nahata Charitable Trust (2014) 364 ITR 693 / 106 DTR 331 (Karn.)(HC)

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Donation – Donations disclosed as income cannot be added as cash credits.[S.68] 269

Donations disclosed as income cannot be added as cash credits. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Uttaranchal Welfare Society (2014) 364 ITR 398 / 222 Taxman 34 (Mag.) All.)(HC)

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Denial of exemption – Denial of exemption only to extent provision violated and not total denial of exemption. [S. 13(1)(d)] 270

The assessee-trust provided employment to poor women, assisted weaker sections of society for personal development, maintained destitute homes and rehabilitated victim of national calamities. It invested a sum of Rs. 20,000 in the shares in MIOT Hospitals Ltd. Since section 13(1)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, recognises investment only in specified assets, failure to invest in such specified business would disentitle the assessee for exemption. Consequently, the Assessing Officer denied the exemption under sections 11 and 12. Held, denial of exemption should only be to the extent of the income which was violative of section 13(1)(d) and not the total denial of exemption under section 11. (AY. 2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04)

CIT v. Working Women's Forum (2014) 365 ITR 353 (Mad.)(HC)

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Grants received from State Government is not income 271

The assessee was an agency incorporated to regulate blood transfusion in the State of Gujarat. During the year, the assessee received grants from the State Government which was distributed by it to various blood banks in the State of Gujarat in the succeeding month of April, 2009. During the course of the assessment proceeding, the AO noticed that assessee had exercised the option of Explanation 2 to section 11(1) of Rs. 7,68,96,000 and claimed the same in return of income. The AO held that the assessee was not entitled to claim exemption as deemed application and added the amount of grants received to the assessee's income. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO. However, the ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee.

On appeal by the department, the High Court observed that the fact that during the relevant year, the assessee received the amount of Rs. 534.06 lakh as grant from the State Government on the last date of the relevant accounting year, i.e., 31-3-2009 and the grant amounted to Rs. 534.06 lakh was distributed to various blood banks in the State of Gujarat in the succeeding month of April, 2009 and the fact that the aforesaid amount was received by the assessee by way of grant from the State Government is not seriously disputed. Accordingly, following its own decision in the case of *CIT v.*

Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority ITA No. 80 of 2010 it held that the amount received by the assessee by way of grant from the Government of Gujarat could not be said to be an income and dismissed the appeal of the department.

DIT (E) v. Gujarat State Council for Blood Tranfusion (2014) 221 Taxman 126 (Guj.)(HC)

272 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Depreciation – Not allowable in respect of assets – The cost of which was already been allowed as application of income. [S.32]**

Depreciation was not allowable in respect of assets, the cost of which has already been allowed as application of income. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

DIT (E) v. Charanjiv Charitable Trust (2014) 102 DTR 1 / 267 CTR 305 / 223 Taxman 71 (Delhi)(HC)

Editorial: SLP is granted (SLP Nos.11837/18970 & 20380 /20381 of 2014 8-4-2014) Chranjiv Charitable Trust v. DIT (E) (2015) 228 Taxman 58 (SC).

273 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Once certificate of registration is granted – Exemption cannot be denied. [S. 12A]**

Once certificate of registration is issued to a Trust, the requirements of provision 12A stands fulfilled. Hence, exemption u/s. 11 cannot be denied. (AY. 2003-04, 2006-07)

CIT v. Lucknow Development Authority (2013) 219 Taxman 162 (2014) 265 CTR 433 / 98 DTR 183 (All.)(HC)

274 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Activity not in accordance with objects – Major portion of income was spent towards construction of commercial complex – Not entitled to exemption.[S.2(15)]**

Assessee-trust was held not entitled to exemption as major portion of income of trust was spent towards construction of commercial complex. The Object clause of bye-laws of trust did not show construction of commercial complex as object of trust. Also, commercial complex was not used for any of the objects of trust and donations received were considered as normal donation and not as donations towards corpus fund. (AY. 2001-02)

Kamma Sangham v. DIT(E) (2014) 362 ITR 30 / 222 Taxman 264 (AP)(HC)

275 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – On denial of exemption only net income to be taxed.[S.12A, 57(iii)]**

The exemption was denied for the relevant years on the ground that the assessee did not get registered under section 12A. The assessee claimed before the CIT(A) that the entire expenditure should be allowed as deduction as the expenditure incurred by the assessee was only for the purpose of promoting sports events. The claim was accepted by the CIT(A) which was confirmed by Tribunal. On appeal by revenue the Tribunal held that if such expenditure was not allowed, it may amount to taxing the gross receipts of the assessee and not the income, which is not permissible under the Act. Moreover, up to the AY 2002-03 the assessee was exempt from tax under section 10(23C); from the AY 2006-07 it had been granted registration as a charitable institution under section 12A

making it eligible for the exemption under section 11. There was no infirmity or error of law in the decision of the Tribunal. (AY.2003-04 to 2004-05, 2005-06)
DDIT(E) v. Petroleum Sports Promotion Board (2014) 362 ITR 235 / 111 DTR 55 (Delhi) (HC)

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Notice for accumulation – Exemption must be allowed. [Form No 10] 276

A request by letter complying with the requirement and furnishing all the information as required in Form 10 was made and there was sufficient proof before the AO that the amount was not only kept apart but was also spent in the next year, the adherence to the form and not substance, was not valid .The AO should allow exemption. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Moti Ram Gopi Chand Charitable Trust (2014) 98 DTR 68 / 360 ITR 598 / (2015) 230 Taxman 153(All.)(HC)

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Application of income – Set-off of expenses in subsequent year is allowed 277

Expenditure incurred in the earlier year, repaid out of income of the current year amounts to application of income. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Punjab Mandi Board (2014) 98 DTR 267 (P&H)(HC)

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Additional evidence – Giving contract to a company in which the trustee had substantial interest – Matter remanded [S.13] 278

The assessee-trust ran a school. AO disallowed exemption under section 11 on ground that assessee trust had given contract for construction of school building to company in which one trustee was having substantial interest. CIT(A) placing reliance on photocopy of annual report filed with ROC held that said trustee was only holding 4 per cent of equity shares of company and therefore it could not be said that he was holding substantial interest in company and thus allowed deduction. However, no evidence in respect of this document being filed before AO. Since CIT(A) had given relief to assessee by admitting and relying on additional evidence which was not before AO, matter was to be restored back to file of AO. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

DIT(E) v. Shree Nirman Foundation Charitable Trust (2014) 33 ITR 56 / (2015) 152 ITD 33 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Voluntary contribution – No disallowance of depreciation could be made. [S. 32] 279

Where voluntary contributions are made with a specific direction that it shall form part of corpus of trust, said amount cannot be treated as income of trust even if purpose for which such donation is given has not been specified. While working out application of income as prescribed in relation to purposes/objectives of a trust in terms of section 11(1)(a) in computation of taxable income, no disallowance of depreciation could be made.(AY. 2009-10)

Jt. CIT (OSD)(E) v. Bhaktavatsalam Memorial Trust (2014) 30 ITR 264 / (2015) 152 ITD 48 (Chennai)(Trib.)

- 280 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Educational society – Exemption cannot be denied on the ground that requisite approval under section 10(23C) was not obtained – Revenue cannot be thrust upon assessee for particular deduction. [S. 10(23C(vi), 12A]**

Assessee, an educational society, was registered under section 12A. It claimed exemption under section 11. AO denied exemption on ground that it was eligible for exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) and not under section 11. A.O. held that exemption could not be claimed since assessee had not obtained requisite approval under section 10(23C)(vi) provision. ITAT held that, since assessee was registered under section 12A, and was entitled for exemption under section 11, if conditions required under this section was complied with and it was not required to obtain approval under section 10 (23C). AO could not deny exemption on reason that assessee's case was not covered under section 10(23C) and could not thrust upon assessee for particular deduction. (AY. 2010-11)
Dy. DIT v. Vidyananda Educational Society (2014) 64 SOT 176 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 281 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Entire cost was held to be application of income – Depreciation was held to be allowable. [S.32]**

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in directing the Assessing Officer to allow depreciation to the assessee on the assets whose entire cost has been treated as application of income for the purpose of allowing exemption under section 11. (AY. 2010-11)

ACIT v. Saraswati Gyan Mandir Shiksha Sansthan (2014) 163 TTJ 29 (UO)(Luck.)(Trib.)

- 282 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Application of income – Purchase of land – Conditions complied. [S.12]**

Assessee was running a school and declared nil total income. The Assessing officer held that Assessee spent less than 85 per cent of total income and for claiming deduction u/s. 11 & 12. Assessee had to apply 85 per cent of its income for charities as per section 11(1)(a), Further Assessee had not filed Form No. 10 intimating intention of accumulation over and above 15 per cent of its income. Therefore deduction u/s. 11(2) cannot be allowed. AO made addition of shortfall of application of income. The CIT(A) reversed action of AO by applying the judgment of *CIT v. Mayur Foundation reported in 274 ITR 562*. The Tribunal upheld the order of CIT (A) holding that the genuineness of the trust was not in doubt; that the trust had set apart the amount of donation for the purpose of purchasing land and constructing an orphanage thereupon; that the funds received by way of donations had been kept apart in fixed deposits of nationalized banks; and that the trustees or the settlers had not benefited by the failure or delay on the part of the trust to give notice of such accumulation. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the assessee-trust had complied with all the requirements stipulated by the provisions of section 11(2). (AY. 2006-07)

Jt. CIT v. Sewa Education Trust (2013) 27 ITR 292 / (2014) 61 SOT 4 (URO)(Agra)(Trib.)

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Publishing activity – Running its business on commercial lines with an object to establish a large publishing house, order denying exemption of income was upheld [S.2(15), 12A]

283

Assessee-trust was registered with Director (E) under section 12A. Activity being carried out by trust was publishing of a daily newspaper. Assessee claimed that its publishing activity was in national interest and, therefore, must be considered as towards a charitable object. Revenue authorities, however, opined that assessee was engaged only in publication activity, undertaken on commercial lines in an organized and systematic manner, so that it constituted a business activity. Accordingly, assessee's claim for exemption of income under section 11 was rejected. On appeal Tribunal held that the income to be applied for charitable purposes is that derived from property held under trust. The property held under trust being not specifically defined would, therefore, have to be read as without limitation. The only limitation stipulated is per sub-sections (4) and (4A) of section 11, and is in respect of a business undertaking. The same stipulates that only where the business is incidental to the attainment of the objective/s of the trust, that, separate books of account being maintained in its respect, could a business undertaking be considered as a property held under trust. Section 11(1) is to be read in conjunction and harmony with sections 11(4) and 11(4A). It is, thus, only the business undertaking which qualifies as a property held under trust whose income would be eligible for exemption under section 11(1). Given the orders by the Tribunal in the assessee's own case for some of the years under appeal, which have become final, as well as reliance thereon for other years, all that the assessee was required to exhibit in the set aside (or otherwise) assessment proceedings was of the publication business as being incidental to the attainment of its other objects, i.e., as a fact, toward satisfaction of the requirement of the law under sections 11(4) and 11(4A), for the said business to be considered as property held under trust. That the said business does not by itself constitute a charitable object or purpose is no longer res integra in view of the findings by the Tribunal in its own case as well as the law as explained in *Ideal Publications Trust v. CIT* (2008) 305 ITR 143 / 172 Taxman 199 (Ker.). Certainly, there would be no surplus from the business as the profits generated would be required to meet the funding requirements of its capital expenditure as well as concomitant financial obligations, including servicing of debt. The focus of the management is clear, i.e., to set up a large, if not a grandiose publishing house. No wonder the assessee has not been able to generate a 'surplus' (for charitable purposes) in the two decades of its functioning, and despite being run on commercial lines. The plea of no surplus, which is even otherwise not maintainable, is false. (AY. 1998-99, 2000-01, 2003-04, 2007-08, 2008-09)

Prabodhan Prakashan v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 167 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Interest on FDR

284

The Tribunal held that the interest earned by assessee charitable trust on investment of surplus funds in FDR's is directly incidental to main activities hence eligible for exemption under section 11. (AY. 2009-10)

Dy. CIT v. Nehru Prasutika Asptal Samiti (2013) 26 ITR 376 / 145 ITD 8 (2014) 159 TTJ 813 / 97 DTR 357 (Agra)(Trib.)

285 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Application of income – Advance to purchase of land – Project grant neither income nor corpus – Interest on fixed deposit – Interest could not be treated as income. [S.13]**

The Assessee-society was formed at the instance of Government of India with the object to create world class automotive testing, validation etc. It had given advance for purchase of land and upgradation of existing facilities. The Assessing Officer held that said advance given was not according to section 11(5) and therefore violated provisions of section 13(1)(d). The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal, *inter alia* observing that:

(a) project grant was neither income nor corpus of the assessee.

(b) Interest received on fixed deposit receipts made out of unutilized project grant received by the assessee was not an income of society. On appeal by the department before the tribunal, the tribunal confirmed the findings of the CIT(A) and held that the grant received was on capital account and not a recurring grant towards revenue expenses. Hence it could not be taken to income and expenditure account as per Accounting Standards 12 issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. (AY.2006-07)

ADIT(E) v. Natrip Implementation Society (2013) 26 ITR 333 / (2014) 61 SOT 43 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)

286 **S.11 : Property held for charitable purposes – Voluntary contributions – Exemption cannot be denied on the ground that trust is not registered under a State Act or sums received are used for a different scheme as far as prior approval is received from donors. [S.12]**

The assessee, a charitable trust registered u/s. 12A was engaged in helping dalits, women empowerment, upliftment of street children etc. The AO disallowed expenditure incurred on foreign travel for international conference as not being for charitable purpose. The AO also disallowed expenditure in view of that fact that assessee had incurred expense towards a different scheme and had not taken appropriate registrations under the State Act. The CIT(A) however deleted the disallowances holding that the grants received for specific purpose do not form part of corpus of the assessee and can be utilized towards its objects as per the memorandum of association which in this case had the requisite prior approval of the donors. Also the international conference was attended for furtherance of objects of the trust which was an allowable expenditure. Not being registered under a State Act does not render the assessee as non-charitable and hence it can claim deduction u/s. 11.

On appeal by the department, the Tribunal agreed with the findings of the CIT(A) and dismissed the revenue's appeal. (AY. 2007-08)

DDIT(E) v. Society for Integrated Development in Urban and Rural Areas (2014) 29 ITR 506 / 151 ITD 772 / (2015) 170 TTJ 646 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

Section 12 : Income of trusts or institutions from contributions

287 **S.12 : Voluntary contributions – Corpus fund – Specific funds could not be treated as voluntary contribution in the nature of income. [S.12AA]**

Assessee-society of practicing anesthesiologists' received contribution towards life membership fee, award fund and two other funds specifically created for procuring

journals, books and other professional. Since these funds were used only for fulfilling specific objectives for which they were constituted, such specific funds always remained as capital. Said funds could not be treated as voluntary contribution in nature of income. (AY. 2007-08)

Indian Society of Anaesthesiologists v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 178 (URO) / 32 ITR 152 (Chennai)(Trib.)

Section 12A : Conditions for applicability of sections 11 and 12

S.12A : Registration – Apprehension of Commissioner as to whether objects and intentions of trust are genuine or doubtful cannot be decided at threshold

288

Held that there is ample power under law to rectify any error to cancel registration of trust if there is breach of objects of trust in discharge of its charitable object as propounded in trust deed. Apprehension of Commissioner as to whether objects and intentions of trust are genuine or doubtful cannot be decided at threshold.

CIT v. R. K. Deivendra Nadar Trust (2014) 271 CTR 694 / 110 DTR 203 / (2015) 228 Taxman 173 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

S.12A : Registration – Cricket Association – First application not traceable – Defective second application not cured despite opportunities – Failure to provide satisfactory explanation – Tribunal justified in declining plea – Another application with retrospective effect – Commissioner could not grant registration with retrospective effect since rejection of defective application for registration with retrospective effect attaining finality

289

The assessee cricket association, for the period commencing from the assessment year 1992-93, made an application seeking registration under section 12A of the Act, to the Commissioner on December 26, 1997. Since the application was not traceable and was not acted upon by the Commissioner, the assessee made another application on March 10, 2006. Despite notices issued the defects in the application were not cured and the application was rejected. The assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal with an application to condone the delay of 445 days which the Tribunal declined to condone the delay and, accordingly, the appeal was also dismissed. Subsequently, the assessee filed another application on November 8, 2006, with a prayer to grant registration under section 12A with retrospective effect. On that application, registration was granted with effect from April 1, 2006. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee thereagainst. On appeals :

Held, dismissing the appeals, that the assessee failed in providing any satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay of 445 days. It was, therefore that the Tribunal declined the prayer. There was no reason to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal declining to condone such inordinate delay. The rejection of the defective application dated March 10, 2006, for registration with retrospective effect had attained finality. Thereafter, the first valid application made was the one dated November 8, 2006, which did not make out any valid circumstance for a retrospective registration under section 12A. In such a case, there were no circumstances justifying the condonation of delay for the previous period or registration for any period prior to April

1, 2006, and it was, therefore, that the Commissioner granted registration with effect from April 1, 2006. (AY. 1992-93 to 2005-06)

Kerala Cricket Association v. Addl.CIT (2014) 369 ITR 528 (Ker.)(HC)

290 **S.12A : Registration – Application returned because of defects – Assessee not pursuing matter – Expiry of time limit for disposal of application – Application under section 12A could not be considered to be pending.[S. 10(23C)(vi)]**

The assessee-trust applied for registration under section 12A of the Act. There were certain defects in the application which the assessee was directed to rectify and on resubmission also certain defects were noticed. In the meantime, the assessee submitted an application under section 10(23C)(vi) which was rejected by the Commissioner. On a writ petition contending that the application under section 12A for the financial years starting from 2007-08 were pending, the single judge, dismissing the petition, held that though an application was filed under section 12A there were certain defects and deficiencies which the assessee was called upon to cure, that the case was also posted for hearing on May 5, 2008, that the time limit for disposal of application was on May 30, 2009 and in the meantime, the assessee had filed an application under section 10(23C)(vi) before the Commissioner on June 15, 2008 and that under such circumstances, the official records indicated that the application under section 12A was withdrawn. On appeal :

Held, dismissing the appeal, that when the time limit for considering the application was already complete and the matter had been considered by the court in the earlier judgment the single judge had not committed any error of law in dismissing the writ petition.(AY. 2010-11)

Kadakkal Educational Trust v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 59 / 224 Taxman 192 (Mag.) / 108 DTR 24 (Ker.)(HC)

291 **S.12A : Registration – Charitable purpose – Imparting training to students in a ‘Seminary’ is also education and therefore, such an educational institution is entitled to registration. [S.2(15), 10(23C)]**

The assessee was imparting training to students in a ‘Seminary’. In the return of income filed for the assessment year 2005-06, the assessee claimed exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad). The AO disallowed the claim of exemption on the ground that for the year under consideration, the assessee was not given registration u/s.12A. On appeal before the CIT(A), the assessee contended that it was entitled to registration u/s.12A, as the training imparted in the ‘Seminary’ amounted to education. Therefore, it had to be treated as a trust running an educational institution. The CIT(A) rejected the contention of the assessee, opining that the training programme undertaken by the assessee could not be treated as an educational programme in order to give the status of an educational institution. On appeal before the Tribunal, the Tribunal reversed the order of the CIT(A), holding that the training programme undertaken by the assessee was education and, accordingly, the assessee was entitled to registration u/s.12A. On appeal before the High Court by the Revenue, the High Court, relying on its own judgment in the assessee’s own case, held that, imparting training to students in a Seminary is also ‘education’ for the purpose of obtaining registration u/s. 12A. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. St. Mary’s Malankara Seminary (2014) 227 Taxman 124 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)

S.12A : Registration – Committee constituted under State Act constructing hospital – Civil court holding that the establishment of Trust as illegal – Trust not entitled to registration.[Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1971, S. 24]

292

Committee constituting trust to run and operate hospital. Civil court holding establishment of trust illegal and contrary to law. Section 24 not authorising committee to utilise its properties or monies through device of trusts and societies to engage in indirect commercial activity. Court held that Trust is not entitled to registration. Denial of exemption was held to be justified.

DIT v. Guru Harkishan Medical Trust (2014) 363 ITR 186 / 223 Taxman 253 (Delhi)(HC)

S.12A : Registration – “minorities” – No material to show which minority groups in municipality intended to be benefitted – Registration denied on ground intention of trust to benefit particular religious minority. [S.13(1)(b)]

293

Rejection of registration was upheld by the Tribunal on the ground that Trust deed used the word “Minorities”. On appeal the Court held that registration of Trust deed referred to minorities, the trust did not further clarify whether it was religious minority, linguistic minority or cultural minority. No material was brought on record to show which minority groups in the Tellicherry Municipality represented religion, language or culture. In the absence of such details referring to minorities living in the Tellicherry Municipality and its suburbs, the authorities were justified in holding that the real intention of using the word “minorities” in the trust deed was with reference to a particular religious minority. However, the trust was at liberty to approach the authorities after modifying the clauses in the trust clearly indicating that the charitable benefits were meant for all sections across the society and not a particular group. Provisions of section 13(1)(b) was violated hence rejection of registration was held to be justified.

Tellicherry Minority Welfare Trust v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 472 / 105 DTR 147 (Ker.)(HC)

S.12A : Registration – Registration cannot be cancelled once the CIT has satisfied himself about genuineness of objects of assessee and has granted registration u/s. 12AA. [S. 2(15), 11, 12AA, 13]

294

The assessee was a cricket association registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act. The CIT after satisfying himself about the genuineness of the activities/objects of the assessee granted registration to it u/s. 12AA. Subsequently, the CIT noticed that the assessee was deriving income from holding cricket matches which was in the nature of trade or commerce or business. The CIT thereby cancelled the registration on the grounds that the activities of the association were not charitable in nature. The Tribunal confirmed the findings and the order of the CIT.

The High Court observed that the Supreme Court in the case of *CIT v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce (1965) 55 ITR 722* had held that if the primary or dominant purpose of a trust or institution is charitable, another object which by itself may not be charitable but which is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose would not prevent the trust or institution from being a valid charity. The High Court further observed that if a particular activity of the institution appeared to be commercial in character but was not dominant, then it was for the AO to consider the effect of section

11 in the matter of granting exemption on particular head of receipt and that the mere fact that the said income did not fit in with section 11 would not by itself lead to the conclusion that the registration granted u/s. 12AA was incorrect and hence had to be cancelled. The High Court held that the cancellation of registration in a given case could be done only under the stated circumstances u/s. 12AA(3) and in the background of the definition of charitable purpose relevant to the particular year of registration and since the CIT had satisfied himself about the objects of trust and genuineness of the activities, the CIT was wrong in cancelling the registration of the assessee without triggering the circumstances stated u/s. 12AA(3).

Tamil Nadu Cricket Association v. DIT (2014) 360 ITR 633 / 221 Taxman 275 / 265 CTR 277 / 98 DTR 299 (Mad.)(HC)

Editorial: SLP is granted (SLA (C) NO.22388 of 2014 dt 27-1-2015) DIT (E) v. Tamil Nadu Cricket Association (2015) 231 Taxman 225 (SC)

295 **S.12A : Registration – Cancellation of registration was held to be not justified – Direction to grant registration and 80G exemption was held to be valid. [S.12AA, 80G(5)]**

The respondent was granted registration u/s 12A/12AA. Application for approval of renewal of exemption u/s. 80G was filed by the petitioner. CIT cancelled the order for registration already granted to the respondent u/s 12AAA (1b) vide its order dt. 19-5-2010 by exercising powers u/s. 12AA (3) by observing that para 5.10 of the trust deed of the assessee states that the Board of Trustee can do all such works, as deemed fit by them & they have a discretion to do all such works which may or may not be in accordance with the object of the trust. On appeal in Tribunal, Tribunal passed common order wherein Tribunal granted registration and set aside the order passed by CIT. On further appeal in HC, the court held that CIT having not pointed out that any part of the income of the assessee trust was open or any activity other than objects of the trust was carried out, he was not justified in cancelling the registration u/s. 12A already granted to the assessee merely on the ground that a clause in the Trust deed of the assessee empowers the board of trustee to do all such works as deemed fit by them and they have discretion to do all such works which may not be in accordance with the object of the trust. (AY.2006-07)

CIT v. Krishna Chandra Ghandhi Janshika Nyas (2014) 99 DTR 433 / 222 Taxman 108 / 267 CTR 85 (Jharkhand)(HC)

296 **S.12A : Registration – Seized material – Dumb documents – Entitled registration. [S. 132]**

The Tribunal held that the seized material being excel sheets are dumb documents do not form the reason to cancel the registration granted to the assessee the Tribunal also held that reopening of assessment was invalid as it was based simply on suspicion. The addition was also deleted by the Tribunal as the assessee was entitled to the registration under section 12A.

ACIT v. B. Srinivasa Rao (2014) 159 TTJ 483 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

ACIT v. Prathima Educational Society (2014) 159 TTJ 483 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.12A : Registration – Charitable purpose – Main object of assessee was to protect investors – Object being of general public utility – Entitled to get registration. [S.2(15), 10(23EA), 12AA]

297

The object of the assessee was to protect investors by way of creating a fund, which could provide compensation to the investors in case of loss on account of default by any member of a participating recognized Stock exchange. Fund created by is a public charitable fund having been set up to advance an object of general public utility assessee was entitled to get registration.

Inter-connected Stock Exchange Investor Protection Fund (ISE IPF) v. DIT (2014) 146 ITD 443 / 162 TTJ 218 / 102 DTR 330 (Mum.)(Trib).

S.12A : Registration – Club – Cancellation of registration by treating the Trust as non genuine was held to be not justifiable. [Ss.2(15), 12AA]

298

The assessee is a club registered under section 12A as a charitable trust. AO held that the assessee was carrying on activities in the nature of trade commerce or business and its gross receipts therefrom during the year were excess of ₹ 10 lakhs the limit then prescribed under the second proviso to section 2(15). According to AO, the provisions of section 12AA(3) was attracted, he accordingly cancelled the registration w.e.f. assessment year 2009-10. On appeal, Tribunal held that cancellation of registration of the Trust was not correct. The only effect will be that the assessee will not be entitled for exemption or tax benefits which otherwise would have been available to it being registered as charitable institution, for the relevant year during which its income has crossed the limit of ₹ 10 lakhs. Subject to the same, the Tribunal ordered the restoration of the registration granted to the Trust. (AY. 2009-10)

Ghatkopar Jolly Gymkhana v. DIT(E) (2014) 147 ITD 112 / 160 TTJ 620 / 99 DTR 41 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Editorial: By the Finance Act, 2011 the limit prescribed under second proviso to section 2(15) has been increased to Rs 25 lakhs w.e.f. 1-4-2012

Section 12AA : Procedure for registration

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Proceedings were dropped – Direction of High Court was not valid

299

The Apex Court held that where proceedings under section 12AA(3) had already been dropped by Commissioner and this was not an issue before High Court in writ petition, High Court was not justified in issuing direction to Commissioner to pass an order under section 12AA(3)

Fateh Chand Charitable Trust v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 677 / 104 DTR 1 / 268 CTR 483 / 226 Taxman 271 (SC)

- 300 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Trust or institution – Trust yet to obtain registration – Provision requiring furnishing of report of audited accounts has no application – Registration denied on ground trust spent low quantum towards charitable activities – Reasons for declining registration unsustainable. [S.11, Form 10A,R. 17A, 17B]**

The invocation of rule 17B would apply, only when the charitable institution was registered under section 12AA. Trust yet to obtain registration, provision requiring furnishing of report of audited accounts has no application. The original authority declined registration on the ground that the assessee had spent only small amounts towards charitable activities. The *bona fides* of the trust should not be doubted on this ground. The authority has to test the nature and the activity of the trust to grant registration. The original authority had not doubted the *bona fides* of the trust or the activity of the trust but on the ground that the trust had spent low quantum towards charitable activity, the authority had declined registration of the trust. A trust can only do activities within its financial capability. A trust is not measured by its financial clout but by its philanthropic disposition. Therefore, the interpretation given by the original authority declining to register the trust has no legal basis. Hence, the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the order of the original authority. *DIT(E) v. R.J.B.V. Vasudevan Educational and Charitable Trust (2014) 226 Taxman 128 (Mag.) / 271 CTR 688 / (2015) 370 ITR 517 (Mad.)(HC)*

- 301 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Education society – Assessee collecting capitation fee for admission in addition to regular fees – Assessee not carrying on any charitable activities entitling it for registration. [S.2(15)]**

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the contention of the assessee was that when application is made under section 12AA of the Act, the Commissioner is not required to examine the application of income of a trust. This principle has no application to the facts of the case. The rejection of the application for registration under section 12AA made by the assessee was for the reason that the assessee was collecting capitation fee for admission in addition to regular fees prescribed in its engineering college and not on the ground that the funds of the trust were not applied for charitable purpose. Thus, the assessee was not carrying on any charitable activities entitling it for registration under section 12AA.

Travancore Education Society v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 534 (Ker.)(HC)

- 302 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Charitable purposes – Employees' pension fund trust – Pensionary benefit to employees of GCDA from corpus created out of contributions made by employees of GCDA – Activity not general public utility – Not entitled to registration.[S.2(15)]**

Held, the object of the trust was to pay pension to the employees of GCDA or their dependents from out of the corpus collected from the beneficiaries themselves. In other words, the employees of GCDA were contributing and from out of that contribution, they or their dependents were getting pension. Such an object implemented by the assessee could not be said to be an object of general public utility within the meaning of section 2(15).

GCDA Employees Pension Fund Trust v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 532 / 229 Taxman 636 (Ker.)(HC)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Genuineness of objects of trust alone to be seen at this stage – Not application of income to charitable purposes – Genuineness of activities of trust not a criteria as trust yet to commence activities – Commissioner ought to have granted registration

303

Held, that the object of section 12AA is to examine the genuineness of the objects of the trust and not the income of the trust for charitable or religious purpose. The Commissioner cannot sit in the chair of the Assessing Officer to look into amounts spent on charitable activities at the time of creation of the trust. The stage for reviewing the application of income had not arrived, when such trust or institution filed an application for registration. The only thing to be looked into at the time of granting registration was the object of the trust for which it was formed. The Commissioner's satisfaction about the genuineness of the activities of the trust was not a criteria as the trust was yet to commence activities. Asking about charitable activities at the nascent stage would amount to putting the cart before the horse. (AY.2011-12)

CIT v. Vijay Vargiya Vani Charitable Trust (2014) 369 ITR 360 / 271 CTR 698 / 110 DTR 207 / (2015) 232 Taxman 340 (Raj.)(HC)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Cancellation of registration – Whether activities of society not genuine or not being carried out in accordance with objects of society – No satisfaction recorded by Commissioner – Matter remanded. [S.10(23)(vi),11]

304

Court held that for the cancellation of registration under section 12AA of the Act, the satisfaction of the Commissioner to the extent that the activities of the trust or the institution are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust or institution must be recorded. Whether the income of such trust or institution is liable to be exempted on the fulfilment of the requirement provided under section 11 is to be examined by the assessing authority. Commissioner cancelled the registration of the assessee-society under section 12AA(3). The Tribunal set aside the order of the Commissioner. On appeal by revenue :

Held, allowing the appeal, that no finding had been recorded by the Commissioner with regard to the satisfaction that the activities of the assessee-society were not genuine or were not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust or the institution. The criteria to grant exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) and grant of registration under section 12A are different and merely because the exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) was declined, it did not amount to refusal of registration under section 12AA or if the registration has been granted, it may be cancelled on that ground. For the cancellation of registration, the requirements, as provided under sub-section (3) of section 12AA, are to be fulfilled. It is true that the refusal of the exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) may be relevant for the purposes of cancellation of registration but to arrive to the conclusion that the activities of the trust or the institution are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust or the institution, finding in this regard is necessary, based on the relevant material. Therefore, the matter requires afresh by the Commissioner. Matter remanded. (AY. 2004-05 to 2009-10)

CIT v. Sisters of Our Lady of Providence Education Society (2014) 368 ITR 662 / (2015) 122 DTR 194 (All.)(HC)

305 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – When activities of society was held to be genuine – Cancellation of registration was not justified**

The assessee-education society. Commissioner cancelled the registration of society on the ground that the activities of the society were not entirely charitable in nature and that the same was not in accordance with aim and objects of society. On appeal before Tribunal, it was held that the assessee was entitled for grant of registration under section 12AA.

On appeal by revenue dismissing the appeal the Court held that there is no whisper that the assessee did not fulfil any of the conditions mentioned in section 12AA(3), namely, that the activities of such trust was not genuine or was not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust. Order of Tribunal was upheld. (AY. 2004-05 to 2010-11)

CIT v. Varanasi Catholic Education Society (2014) 225 Taxman 81 (All.)(HC)

306 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Statutory body controlling activities at a major port for utilising and creating facilities – Activities of assessee for general public utility – Entitled to registration. [S.2(15)]**

The assessee was constituted under the Major Ports Trusts Act, 1963 enacted with a specific purpose of constitution of port authorities and to vest the administration of major ports, their control and management in such authorities constituted under the Act. The assessee would control the activities at a major port for utilising and creating facilities. Agencies utilising such facilities would pay charges to the assessee at the rates specified with the prior sanction of the Government. The Board constituted under the Act would be allowed to utilise the money credited to the general account for the purposes mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 88, thus the assessee was involved in an activity of general public utility. Further, the fact that there was no profit making or motive to make profit was equally clear from the provisions of the 1963 Act. Therefore, the assessee was entitled to registration.

CIT v. Kandla Port Trust (2014) 364 ITR 164 / 225 Taxman 145 (Guj.)(HC)

307 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Substantial activities – Rejection of registration was held to be not valid**

The assessee-trust made an application for registration under section 12A of the IT Act in prescribed Form No. 10A. The main object of the foundation was to promote, establish, develop, run, support, maintain and advance the cause of education, to grant aid or other assistance to all types of educational institutions including Schools, Colleges, Universities, libraries, reading rooms, formal and non-formal educations, vocational training centres and other institutions for the benefit of the students. The CIT was not satisfied with respect to the activities and was of the opinion that no substantial charitable activities were carried out by the assessee-trust/foundation. The CIT thus issued show-cause notice dated calling upon the assessee-trust/foundation to show cause as to why the application for registration should not be rejected as the foundation failed to comply with the statutory requirement. The CIT was not satisfied with the documentary evidence produced on record and also since no other major activities were carried out by the trust, it rejected the application. The assessee being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of CIT, went in appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal

vide impugned judgment and order allowed the appeal quashing and setting aside the order passed by the CIT rejecting the application for registration and directed to grant the registration to the assessee-trust/foundation under section 12A of the IT Act. On this order, the revenue preferred appeal before High Court. The High Court held that under the circumstances and considering the object and purpose of the trust, it cannot be said that the Tribunal had committed any error and/or illegality in allowing the appeal directing to grant the registration under section 12A of the IT Act to the assessee-trust/foundation. Hence, it did not interfere with the impugned order passed by the tribunal. *CIT v. Satvara Education Foundation (2014) 222 Taxman 32 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)*

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Only genuineness of the objects and activities is to be verified while granting registration to a charitable trust

308

The CIT declined to grant registration under section 12AA of the IT Act, 1961. The only ground on which CIT rejected the application was that though the society was established in August 2011, with a dominant object of imparting higher medical education by establishing Medical Colleges, Hospitals and Research Centres, such charitable activities had not still been commenced. Moreover, the CIT did not raise any issue about the objects of the trust which the Tribunal found are clearly charitable in nature. Thus, the only ground which weighed with the CIT in declining to grant registration had been found to be contrary to law. The Tribunal in this circumstance allowed the appeal and directed the CIT to grant registration under Section 12AA. It held that registration under section 12AA cannot be refused on ground that trust had not yet commenced charitable or religious activity. Only genuineness of objects was to be tested at time of registration, and not activities which was not commenced by that time. The High Court dismissed department appeal.

CIT v. R.S. Bajaj Society (2014) 222 Taxman 111 / 111 DTR 166 (All.)(HC)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Education – Construction of building – Refusal of registration was not justified. [S.2(15)]

309

The assessee started constructing building for its dental college. The assessee filed an application for registration under section 12AA. The said application was rejected on the ground that besides the objects of education, some of objects were distributive in nature and were not related to the object of education. On appeal, the Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and directed to Commissioner to pass consequential order of registration under section 12AA to the assessee. On appeal by revenue the Court held that the Tribunal found that objects of trust were genuine, i.e., of providing education and activities undertaken by it were also genuine as it had started constructing building in which such dental college was to be established. Order of Tribunal was affirmed.

CIT v. Global Educational Society (2014) 225 Taxman 20 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Cancellation of the registration of society on the ground that the activities of the society were not entirely charitable in nature and that the same was not in accordance with aim and objects of society – Held to be not justified. [S. 10(23)(vi)]

310

The assessee-education society filed application for grant of exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) but same was rejected by the Chief Commissioner. Based on that order, a

notice under section 12AA(3) was issued to the assessee to show cause as to why the registration granted under section 12AA be not cancelled, since the activities of society had ceased to remain charitable in nature. The Commissioner, after considering the matter, cancelled the registration of society on the ground that the activities of the society were not entirely charitable in nature and that the same was not in accordance with aim and objects of society. On appeal before Tribunal, it was held that the assessee was entitled for grant of registration under section 12AA. On appeal by revenue the Court up held that order of Tribunal. (AY. 2004-05 to 2010-11)

CIT .v. Varanasi Catholic Education Society (2014) 225 Taxman 81 (All.)(HC)

- 311 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Registration – Trustees given power to amend trust deed – Amendment following conditions laid down in trust deed – Approval of civil court not necessary – Amended trust deed can be relied upon for purpose of registration – Entitled registration. [Code of Civil Procedure S.92]**

When the power has been given to the trustees by the settlor to amend the trust deed it can be amended without approaching the civil court provided all the conditions laid down by the settler are fulfilled. The approval of the civil court is required where there is no such power. The rectified trust deed can be relied upon by the Revenue for the purpose of registration under section 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Order of Tribunal granting registration was held to be justified.

DIT(E) v. Ramoji Foundation (2014) 364 ITR 85 (AP)(HC)

- 312 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Dominant objective for benefit of particular community – Failure to discharge burden – Denial of registration**

Held, the Commissioner held that the dominant nature of underlying the setting up of the assessee-trust was to benefit only the Agrawal community relying on the material as produced by the assessee. The assessee failed to discharge the burden to prove otherwise. Therefore, the denial of registration was justified. Also held that this would not affect the liberty granted to the society to file a fresh application for registration.

Agrawal Sabha (Regd.) v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 244 / 271 CIR 704 / 223 Taxman 353 (All.)(HC)

Editoril : Refer Shri Agrawal Sabha v. CIT (2014) 61 SOT 127 (Agra)(Trib.)

- 313 **S. 12AA : Procedure for registration – Tribunal examined the aims and the objects of the assessee trust directed the Commissioner to grant registration – Upheld by the High Court. [S.2(15), 80G]**

Assessee trust was an educational institution registered under Societies Act. It had approval from All India Council for Technical Education to run engineering and other courses. Commissioner rejected the application for registration on the ground that assessee was not engaged in any charitable activities. Tribunal, after examining the aims, objects and other activities finally observed that the registration and approval should be allowed to the assessee and accordingly directed the Commissioner. High Court refused to interfere in the order passed by the Tribunal.

CIT v. Rajarshi Rananjai Singh Shiksha Sansthan, Amethi (2014) 220 Taxman 2 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Merely because exemption is denied to a society under section 10(23C)(vi), registration under section 12AA cannot be denied. [S.10(23C)(vi), 11, 12]

314

The assessee was granted registration under section 12A for being a charitable institution. The assessee claimed exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) on the ground that the income earned is relating to educational institution solely for educational purpose. The AO held that in the objects of the institution certain other objects were there which proves that the institution has not solely been established for educational purpose and derecognised the registration granted under u/s. 12A merely because the exemption u/s 10(23C)(iv) was denied. The Tribunal held that the proceeding u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act is an independent proceeding and cannot be made the sole ground for cancellation of the registration granted under section 12A of the Act. It further held that the deduction under Section 11 of the Act has been allowed to the assessee in the previous years and set aside the order of the CIT and restored the registration. The High Court affirmed the view of the Tribunal.

CIT v. School of Management Sciences (2014) 220 Taxman 114 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Charitable purpose – Both charitable and religious objects. Not commenced its activities cannot be the ground to deny the registration.[S.2(15), 11]

315

Even if the trust was created with both objects–charitable & religious, law does not make any disqualification for the trust to make an application for registration. Although on the date of the application under section 12AA, it was yet to commence its operation the genuineness of the objects of the trust were not questioned by the Commissioner. Considering the fact that the continuance of registration is further a subject matter of scrutiny by the Commissioner as contemplated under section 12AA(3), the Revenue would not be justified in refusing the registration at the threshold.

DIT(E) v. Seervi Samaj Tambaram Trust (2014) 362 ITR 199 / 110 DTR 193 / 222 Taxman 252 / 271 CTR 684 (Mad.)(HC)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Charitable purpose – Registration cannot be refused on the ground that trust has not commenced its activities. [S.2(15), 11, 12]

316

Commissioner cannot refuse to register trust on the ground that trust has not commenced its activities.

CIT v. Kutchi Dasa Oswal Moto Pariwar Ambama Trust (2013) 212 Taxman 435 (2014) 362 ITR 194 / 271 CTR 595 (Guj.)(HC)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Benefits for a particular community – Denial of registration was held to be valid. [S.2(15)]

317

Assessee society governed by a scheme decree framed by District Court with the object of providing accommodation and facilities for the purpose of marriages and other auspicious functions of the members of a particular community was rightly declined registration u/s. 12AA.

Gowri Ashram v. DIT(E)(2013) 356 ITR 328 / 217 Taxman 97 / (2014) 98 DTR 294 (Mad.)(HC)

318 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Statutory authorities – No motive to earn profit – Eligible to exemption. [S.2(15), 11]**

A trust carrying on its activities for fulfilment of its aims and objectives which are charitable in nature with no motive to earn profit, and in the process earns some profit would not be hit by the proviso to s. 2(15). Assessee was a statutory authority established with the objective to provide shelter to homeless people. Its aims and objects are charitable in nature. For the applicability of proviso to s. 2(15), the activities of the trust should be carried on commercial lines with the intention to make profit. No such material / evidence was on record. Therefore, the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 11. (AY. 2003-04 to 2006-07)

CIT v. Lucknow Development Authority (2013) 219 Taxman 162 / (2014) 98 DTR 183 / 265 CTR 433 (All.)(HC)

CIT v. U.P. Housing & Development Board (2014) 98 DTR 183 / 265 CTR 433 (All.)(HC)

CIT v. Ayodhya Faizabad Development Authority (2014) 98 DTR 183 (All.)(HC)

319 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Bona fide belief – Delay in registration u/s. 12A was condoned. [S.12A]**

Assessee a Mandi Samiti was established as a statutory body with the object to regulate sale and purchase of agricultural produce and also to develop facilities for the farmers. The assessee was enjoying the benefit u/s. 10(20) and 10(29) of the Act. Thereafter, the assessee was required to get registration u/s. 12A after the amendment in section 10(20). Officers of the assessee were under *bona fide* belief that status quo was continuing and there was no need to obtain registration. The assessee filed an application for registration belatedly when the requirement was known to the assessee. The CIT refused to condone the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay. On an appeal by the department, the High Court accepted the contention of the assessee that it was under a *bona fide* belief that status quo was continuing and there was no need to obtain registration and condoned the delay.

CIT v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (2014) 363 ITR 290 / 220 Taxman 211 (All.)(HC)

320 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Reconsideration – Order of Tribunal remitting the matter to Commissioner was held to be proper. [Ss.254(1), 260A]**

The assessee-society made an application for registration as a charitable or religious trust. The Commissioner rejected the application. On appeal, the Tribunal set aside the order passed by the Commissioner and remitted the matter to him for a fresh decision in the light of the directions issued by it. On appeal to the High Court, the assessee submitted that the Tribunal, instead of remitting the matter to the Commissioner, should have allowed registration to go ahead. The High Court held that, although the assessee was aggrieved by remand of the matter to the Commissioner, the jurisdiction to allow or reject an application filed under Section 12A rested with the Commissioner. Although the Commissioner had ignored relevant facts and considered factors that were not germane to the controversy, the order of the Tribunal declining to impose its own opinion on merits and remitting the matter to the Commissioner to decide afresh was proper. In view of this, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed.

Ganeshi Lal Education Society v. CIT (2013) 40 taxmann.com 257 (P&H)(HC)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Registration under section 12A – Cancellation of registration was held to be not valid. [S.12A] 321

The CIT admitted in the impugned order that object of assessee was charitable in nature. As there was no provision for cancellation of registration under section 12AA(3) before 1st June 2010, CIT was not justified in cancelling the registration. The Tribunal held that in the absence of any evidence on record against the trustees and in absence of any addition made against them in their individual cases on the basis of computerised papers, CIT was not justified in taking adverse view of personal enrichment by trustee against the assessee trust. There is no basis whatsoever, to make allegation against the assessee for cancellation of registration. The registration under section 12A is resorted since inception.

Sharda Educational Trust v. CIT (2014) 164 TTJ 762 / 147 ITD 271 (Agra)(Trib.)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Charitable purpose – Cancellation of registration was held to be not valid. [Ss.2(15), 11, 12] 322

Where assessee-association, formed with object of promotion and development of game of cricket, was granted registration under section 12A, Commissioner in exercise of power under section 12AA(3) could not cancel said registration taking a view that assessee was promoting sports activity on commercial basis by holding various tournaments of BCCI and, therefore, its case was hit by amendment to section 2(15) by Finance Act, 2008 with effect from assessment year 2009-10. (AY. 2009-10)

Maharashtra Cricket Association v. CIT (2015) 152 ITD 1 / 119 DTR 251 / 170 TTJ 559 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Rejection of application on the ground that trust had not started its activities was held to be not valid 323

The assessee-trust was established with objects to provide credit counselling services to persons for the purposes of, amongst others, facilitating efficient debt management and promoting and assisting better credit management. It filed application seeking registration under section 12AA. The DIT(E) rejected application of assessee-trust for registration under section 12AA on ground that trust had not started its activities and objects were mixed. Tribunal held that rejection of application on the ground that the Trust has not started its activities was held to be not valid. Matter remanded.

Disha Trust .v. DIT(E) (2014) 31 ITR 154 / (2015) 152 ITD 42 (Chennai)(Trib.)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Commencement of activity is not a pre-condition for grant of registration 324

Commissioner refused registration of trust on ground that assessee was not carrying out any charitable activities and it was premature to register said trust. Tribunal held that Commencement of activity is not a pre-condition for grant of registration under section 12AA, when objects of trust and genuineness of activities of trust are not questioned. Matter remanded.

Maha Avatar Trust v. ITO (2014) 32 ITR 178 / (2015) 152 ITD 31 (Chennai)(Trib.)

- 325 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Nature of activities-CIT, while granting registration or renewal, can only look at the nature of activities and is not concerned with violation of s. 11(5) or s. 13-Rejection of registration was held to be not justified. [S. 11, 13, 80G(5)]**

While granting the exemption or renewal of exemption under section 80G(5) of the Act, the role of CIT is limited to look into the nature of activities being carried on by the institution or fund and the violation if any, of the provisions of section 13 of the Act and its various sub-sections are to be looked into by the Assessing Officer while deciding the issue of grant of deduction under sections 11 and 12 of the Act. The CIT while issuing the extension of exemption under section 80G(5) of the Act has a limited role to play i.e. to see whether the activities of the assessee trust were charitable in nature. Even if the ground about contravention of section 11(5) of the Act was validly taken by the CIT, that would have bearing only at the point of the assessment and would not be a material consideration in so far as the granting approval under section 80G(5) of the Act was concerned.

Ashoka Education Foundation v. CIT (2014) 42 CCH 90 (Pune)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

- 326 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Advance, promote, propagate and preach religion of Islam amongst Daewood Bohras in conformity with Quran, Shariat Mohammediyah and tenets of Dawat-e-Hadiyay to develop, expand, renovate and maintain masjids, Madresahs, etc. – Denial of registration was not valid. [S. 2(15), 11]**

Object of assessee was to advance, promote, propagate and preach religion of Islam amongst Daewood Bohras in conformity with Quran, Shariat Mohammediyah and tenets of Dawat-e-Hadiyay to develop, expand, renovate and maintain masjids, Madresahs, etc. and to carry out charity to needy people. Where assessee was founded for development of Muslim religion, object was beneficial to section of public; registration under section 12AA could not be denied as object beneficial to section of public would amount to an object of general public utility. To secure charitable purposes, it is not necessary that object should be beneficial to whole mankind or all persons in particular country or State. Even if a section of public is given benefit, it could not be said that it is not a trust for charitable purpose in interest of public. Denial of registration was not valid. (AY. 2012-13)

Shia Dawoodi Bohra Jamaat Waqf v. DIT(E) (2014) 64 SOT 173 (Kol.)(Trib.)

- 327 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Charitable purpose – Specified securities – Bonds – Savings certificates – Ancillary activities of business crosses prescribed limit of Rs.10 lakhs, that by itself cannot be ground for cancellation of its registration. [S. 2(15), 12A]**

The assessee cotton textile promotion council was registered as a charitable trust. Its activities were falling in the category of 'advancement of any other objects of general public utility' as per definition of 'charitable purpose' given under section 2(15). The DIT(E) held that the assessee was carrying out activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business, etc., and gross receipts therefrom were in excess of ₹ 10 lakhs. Taking resort to the newly added proviso with effect from 1-4-2009 to section 2(15), he cancelled the registration of the assessee. Tribunal held that, merely because income of a registered charitable trust from ancillary activities of business crosses the prescribed

limit of ₹ 10 lakhs, that by itself cannot be ground for cancellation of its registration. However, assessee will not be entitled for exemption or other admissible benefits of its being charitable in nature for year during which gross receipts from business activities exceeds limit of ₹ 10 lakhs, despite its carrying out charitable activities. Order of DIT(E) was set aside and the registration to the assessee council granted under section 12A. (AY. 2009-10)

Cotton Textiles Exports Promotion Council v. DIT (E) (2014) 64 SOT 167 (URO) (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Rejection of registration was not justified when activities of the institution was not doubted. [S. 11] 328

Assessee-trust moved an application for grant of registration under section 12AA along with all information as requisitioned including objectives of trust. Though assessee did not own land and school building, it had duly furnished complete details and document/evidences in support of ownership and source of investment therein by owner. CIT rejected application on ground that Additional Commissioner and AO had not testified such source of investment. Tribunal held that CIT did indeed err in rejecting application particularly as there were no adverse findings on fundamental issue regarding objectives of trust. With regard to investments, unless there was a categorical finding about lack of *bona fides* in activities, these aspects would not affect registration and same could be addressed at time of assessment.

Shanta Education Academy v. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 168 (URO) / 33 ITR 154 (Agra)(Trib.)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Commercial activities – Cancellation of registration activity was held to be not justified. [S.2(15), 12A] 329

Registration granted to a charitable trust cannot be cancelled merely because trust alongside pursuing advancement of object of general public utility, carries on commercial activities. (AY. 2009-10)

Kodava Samaja v. DIT (2013) 158 TTJ 376 / 28 ITR 224 / 57 SOT 73 (2014) 150 ITD 71 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Charitable status cannot be denied by fact of surplus. Mere levy of fees is neither reflective of business aptitude nor indicative of profit oriented intent – Withdrawal of approval was held to be not valid.[S.2(15), 11, 293C] 330

The appellant is a government agency and engaged in the coordinate and planned development of Jaipur region and which is predominant object of it. The learned CIT also erred in applying the provisions of Section 293(c) of the Act, in this case, which applied withdrawal of approval granted under any provision of this Act, notwithstanding that a provision to withdraw such approval has not been specifically provided for in such provision. For cancellation of registration, the specific provision u/s. 12AA is provided. Withdrawal of approval was held to be not valid.

Jaipur Development Authority v. CIT (2015) 67 SOT 1 (Jaipur)(Trib.)

- 331 **S. 12AA : Procedure for registration – No finding was given by the Commissioner that the activities of the Trust is not genuine – Cancellation of registration was not justified – Award of cost not warranted. [S.11, 12A, 13]**

The assessee was granted registration under section 12A of the Act. Commissioner cancelled the registration on the ground that the assessee was running the hospital on commercial basis with profit motive hence violated the provisions of sections 13(1)(c) and 11(5) of the Act. On appeal the Tribunal held that accordance with the provisions of section 12AA(3) of the Act, the Commissioner could cancel the registration if he was satisfied that the activities of such trust or institution were not genuine or were not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust or the institutions. There was no such findings given by the Commissioner that the activities of the assessee trust were not genuine or were not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the Trust. Accordingly the cancellation of registration was held to be not valid. Tribunal also observed that the Commissioner discharged quasi-judicial duty and there was no *mala fide* intention hence no award of cost is warranted.

Parkar Medical Foundation v. DCIT (2014) 34 ITR 286 / (2015) 153 ITD 297 / 67 SOT 169 (Pune)(Trib.)

- 332 **S.12AA : Procedure for registration – Denial of Registration – No infirmity was found in activities carried out by assessee, Director (Exemption) could not deny registration to assessee. [S.2(15) 11, 12, 13]**

Just because some profit has been earned by an assessee, trust registration u/s. 12AA cannot be denied so long as provisions of sections 11, 12 and 12AA are complied with. So long as it is established that income of the assessee society has been applied for the purpose of charitable activities in terms of section 11(2) and there is no violation of section 13, the assessee would be entitled to enjoy the benefit of registration u/s. 12AA of the Act.

Institute & Electronics Engineers Inc. v. DIT(E) (2014) 146 ITD 263 / 100 DTR 364 (Hyd.) (Trib.)

Section 13 : Section 11 not to apply in certain cases**S.13 : Denial of exemption – Investment restrictions – A charitable and religious trust which does not benefit any specific religious community is not hit by s. 13(1)(b) & is eligible to claim exemption u/s. 11. [S.2(15), 11, 12A, 12AA]**

333

On facts, the objects of the assessee are not indicative of a wholly religious purpose but are collectively indicative of both charitable and religious purposes. The fact that the said objects trace their source to the Holy Quran and resolve to abide by the path of godliness shown by Allah would not be sufficient to conclude that the entire purpose and activities of the trust would be purely religious in colour. The objects reflect the intent of the trust as observance of the tenets of Islam, but do not restrict the activities of the trust to religious obligations only and for the benefit of the members of the community. In judging whether a certain purpose is of public benefit or not, the Courts must in general apply the standards of customary law and common opinion amongst the community to which the parties interested belong to. Customary law does not restrict the charitable disposition of the intended activities in the objects. Neither the religious tenets nor the objects as expressed limit the service of food on religious occasions only to the members of the specific community. The activity of Nyaz performed by the assessee does not delineate a separate class but extends the benefit of free service of food to public at large irrespective of their religion, caste or sect and thereby qualifies as a charitable purpose which would entail general public utility. Even the establishment of Madarsa or institutions to impart religious education to the masses would qualify as a charitable purpose qualifying under the head of education u/s. 2(15). The institutions established to spread religious awareness by means of education though established to promote and further religious thought could not be restricted to religious purposes. The assessee is consequently a public charitable and religious trust eligible for claiming exemption u/s. 11.

On facts, though the objects of the assessee-trust are based on religious tenets under Quran according to religious faith of Islam, the perusal of the objects and purposes of the assessee would clearly demonstrate that the activities of the trust are both charitable and religious and are not exclusively meant for a particular religious community. The objects do not channel the benefits to any community if not the Dawoodi Bohra Community and thus, would not fall under the provisions of s. 13(1)(b).

CIT v. Dawoodi Bohra Jamat (2014) 364 ITR 31 / 102 DTR 361 / 222 Taxman 228 (Mag.)/ 268 CTR 1 (SC)

S.13 : Denial of exemption – Investment restrictions – More than five per cent – “Capital” – Capital includes share capital as well as borrowed capital – Entitled to exemption. [Ss.11, 12]

334

The word “capital” has not been defined under the Act. The word “capital” is also not defined in the Companies Act, 1956. The expression used is “capital” of the concern. If the intention of the Legislature was to restrict it to share capital, then they would have expressly stated so. In the absence of any such expression, before the word “capital” if to read “share”, would amount to the court’s legislating which is not permissible. Especially while granting the benefit to charitable institutions, when the

Legislature consciously provided for the funds of the trust by way of investment and they have fixed a limit of 5 per cent, by placing an interpretation which is contrary to the expressed words, the benefits cannot be denied to the assessee. Therefore, keeping in mind the objective with which exemption is granted, computation is to be made for investment by such charitable trust. The word “capital” of the concern should be understood as the total capital of the concern. Held, dismissing the appeal, that both the Tribunal and the Appellate Authority were justified in holding that the capital of the concern with regard to a company cannot be considered as only a share capital. The assessee was entitled to exemption under section 11. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Islamic Academy of Education (2014) 369 ITR 76 / (2015) 228 Taxman 314 / 117 DTR 422 (Karn.)(HC)

335 **S.13 : Denial of exemption – Investment restrictions – Compensation amount was appropriated towards estate duty – Denial of exemption was held to be not valid. [S.11]**

The assessee-trust acquired property by an oral gift from a settler. The settler had got said property by inheritance on the death of his grandfather with the liability of payment of estate duty of his grandfather and, thus, it was subjected to first charge under section 74(1) of the Estate Duty Act. The Government of Andhra Pradesh acquired this property under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and while doing so the compensation of ₹ 30.19 lakhs was awarded. The entire compensation amount was appropriated towards estate duty arrears by virtue of the first charge created on the property under section 74(1) of the Estate Duty Act.

In the assessment proceedings for the assessment years 1982-83 and 1983-84, the assessee trust claimed that it had not violated the provisions of section 13(1)(c) and therefore, it was eligible for exemption under section 11 of the said Act. The IAC having accepted assessee's claim, extended the benefit of section 11 to assessee trust. The Commissioner, in exercise of his power under section 263, passed a revisional order holding that the appropriation of amount of compensation tantamounts to application of the property of the Trust directly or indirectly for the benefit of the settler and, consequently, the provisions of section 13(1)(c) read with section 13(3) were attracted. He, therefore, set aside the assessment orders and directed the Assessing Officer to re-assess the same by applying the provisions of section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(3) and also to bring to chargeability of tax on the heading capital gain arising from the transaction in question. The Tribunal opined that the assessee-trust could not be said to have made the payment of estate duty on behalf of the settler. The Tribunal, thus, set aside the revisional order passed by the Commissioner. The issue before the HC was whether the recovery of estate duty from the compensation amount can be said to be an expenditure incurred for the benefit of the settler of the Trust to attract the provisions of section 13(1)(c) read with section 13(3) and, consequently, the entire compensation amount is chargeable to tax under the head of 'capital gains'. The HC held that the provisions of section 74(1) of the Estate Duty Act are merely intended to safeguard the interests of the revenue by creating a first charge against the property and do not support the proposition that because of such charge, the payment of estate duty is directly connected with the asset inherited. Even the estate duty paid does not qualify itself to be treated either as cost of acquisition of the asset or cost of improvements

to the asset. Under these circumstances, the estate duty does not also constitute a valid deduction under section 48. This property was transferred by way of a gift for the charitable purposes along with the aforesaid liability of making payment of estate duty. It appeared, on careful reading of the factual and legal position that the assessee-trust did not get any income on account of compensation paid and almost entire compensation amount was eaten up on account of payment of estate duty. A Charitable Trust is disentitled to get benefit under section 11 if any part of any income or any property of the Trust or institution is, during the previous year, used or applied directly or indirectly for the benefit of any persons amongst others of the author of the Trust or the founder of the institution or any person who has made substantial contribution to the Trust or institution under sub-sections (1)(c)(ii) and (3) of section 13.

What had been acquired by the Trust in respect of the property is the right, title and interest in the property excluding the liability of charge. In other words, charge for payment of estate duty cannot be said to be a property of the trust. The compensation amount is received with liability. Admittedly here no part of compensation amount, after deducting amount of estate duty, was utilized or spent by assessee-trust. Hence, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the mischief of section 13 sub-section (1) clause (c)(ii) read with section 13 sub-section (3) was not attracted. Thus the benefit under section 11 was available to assessee-trust.

CIT v. Trustees of HEH the Nizam's Mukarramjah Trust for Education & Learnings (2013) 359 ITR 419 / (2014) 222 Taxman 256 (AP)(HC)

S.13 : Denial of exemption – Investment restrictions – Salaries for teaching and no extra salary for managing work – Denial of exemption was not justified. [S.11, 12]

336

The assessee, a registered charitable organization, carried on work of education through four members, who worked in a dual capacity i.e. as full-time administrators, as also regular time teachers, and were being paid salaries from the earnings of these schools. Members were not being paid separately for managerial work done by them, there was no violation of the provisions of section 13(2)(c), hence, the assessee was entitled to benefit of exemption under section 11.(AY 2003-04 to 2008-09)

CIT v. Idicula Trust Society, Faridabad (2014) 223 Taxman 66 / 104 DTR 9 (P&H)(HC)

S.13 : Denial of exemption – Investment restrictions – Benefit to prohibited persons – Advance of loan – Denial of exemption was held to be justified. [S.11]

337

AO has found that the assessee trust advanced certain money for purchase of land to a person prohibited under section 13(3) and that sale agreement was cancelled after a long time without charging any interest. AO held that provisions of section 13(1)(c)(ii) were attracted with the result the assessee was denied the exemption under section 11. Tribunal has decided the issue in favour of assessee. On appeal by revenue, High Court upheld the finding of AO. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

DIT (E) v. Charanjiv Charitable Trust (2014) 102 DTR 1 / 267 CTR 305 / 223 Taxman 71 (Delhi)(HC)

Editorial: SLP is granted (SLP Nos.11837/18970& 20380 / 20381 of 2014 8-4-2014) Chranjiv Charitable Trust v. DIT (E) (2015) 228 Taxman 58 (SC).

- 338 **S.13 : Denial of exemption – Investment restrictions – Loans given in violations of section 13 not entitled to exemption – Entire income of trust cannot be denied exemption. [S.11, 263]**

In case of a charitable trust, it is only income from investment or deposit which has been made in violation of section 11(5) that is liable to be taxed and that violation under section 13(1)(d) does not tantamount to denial of exemption under section 11 on total income of assessee-trust. Revisional order was held to be not valid. (AY. 2000-01, 2001-02)

CIT v. Fr. Mullers Charitable Institutions (2014) 363 ITR 230 / 102 DTR 386 / (2015) 228 Taxman 319 (Karn.)(HC)

- 339 **S.13 : Denial of exemption – Trust or institution – Remuneration to trustees – Remuneration paid to trustee who was rendering services as full time secretary of trust was about 1 per cent of total value of activities of trust, it cannot be said to be excessive or unreasonable**

The trustee of assessee-trust is rendering services as full time secretary of trust and the remuneration paid to him is about 1 per cent of total value of activities of trust. The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal has taken view that the remuneration paid to the trustee cannot be said to be excessive or unreasonable so as to make disallowance under section 13(1)(c). (AY. 2007-08)

PNR Society For Relief & Rehabilitation of Disabled Trust v. Dy. DIT (2014) 34 ITR 465 / (2015) 67 SOT 171 (URO)(Ahd.)(Trib.)

- 340 **S.13 : Denial of exemption – Investment restrictions – Interest free loan other institutions with similar objects – No violation. [S. 11(5) 12]**

Advancement of interest free loan by a charitable institution to other charitable institutions registered under section 12A having similar objects is not in violation of provisions of section 13(1)(d), read with section 11(5) (AY. 2009-10)(ITA Nos. 1796 & Jt. CIT (OSD)(E) v. Bhaktavatsalam Memorial Trust (2014) 30 ITR 264 / (2015) 152 ITD 48 (Chennai)(Trib.)

- 341 **S.13 : Denial of exemption – Investment restrictions – Waiver fees of six children of persons specified under section 13(3) – Denial of exemption was held to be justified. [S.11]**

Assessee waived fees of six children of persons specified under section 13(3). AO denied exemption under section 11 on ground that assessee was not permitted to apply its income directly or indirectly for benefit of any person specified in section 13(3) and such fees concession violated section 13(1)(c), read with section 13(2)(d). Since assessee had violated provisions of sections 11 and 13 by giving concession to specified persons under section 13(3), exemption under section 11 could not be granted. (AY. 2010-11)

Dy. DIT v. Vidyananda Educational Society (2014) 64 SOT 176 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)

Section 14A : Expenditure incurred in relation to income not includible in total income**S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Judgment of Calcutta High Court was set aside and matter remitted to for de novo consideration. [S. 260A, 261]** 342

The Court observed that issue involved being interpretation of sections 14A which was not considered by the High Court in the impugned judgment. Matter is remanded to High Court for *de novo* consideration. (From the judgment ITA No. 389 of 2007 dt. 21-6-2007)

CIT v. RK BK Fiscal Services (P) Ltd. (2014) 270 CTR 555 / 223 Taxman 258 (SC)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Estimate at 5% of dividend income was held to be proper 343

Dismissing the appeal of revenue the Court held that the estimate at 5% of dividend income was held to be proper. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Teletronics Dealing Systems P. Ltd. (2015) 228 Taxman 194 (Bom.)(HC)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Borrowed funds used for business purpose only and no part thereof was used for making investment – Interest expenditure could not be considered for proportionate disallowance under Rule 8D [R.8D] 344

The AO while passing order u/s. 143(3) noted that assessee had invested a certain amount if its funds in shares and dividend received or as was receivable on these investments did not form a part of the total income. However the assessee had claimed certain expenses on account of interest etc. which were directly attributable to the exempt income. Since the exempt income did not form part of the total income, the expenditure which was directly related to this income, it was held that could not be debited to the Profit & Loss Account in view of the provisions of S/14A of the Act. The AO applied provisions of Rule 14A of the Act by applying Rule 8D. On appeal CIT (A) deleted disallowance. Tribunal partly allowed the appeal. On appeal in HC, HC dismissed assessee's appeal and held that whether or not the AO was satisfied with the correctness of the claim of the assessee has to be deduced from the Assessment Order and there is no straitjacket formula requiring the AO to use any particular languages or form. So long as the order of AO indicates that he is not satisfied with the correctness of the claim of the assessee or the claim of the assessee that no expenditure has been incurred, the AO has to proceed in the manner indicated by Rule 8D(2). (AY. 2008-09) *Dhampur Sugar Mills v. CIT (2014) 111 DTR 345 / (2015) 370 ITR 187 / 273 CTR 85 / 228 Taxman 326 (All.)(HC)*

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Directly credited by way of bank transfer – Disallowance of 2% of gross total income was not justified 345

Where assessee-bank earned tax free income in form of dividends, interest on tax free bonds and interest on long-term finance, in view of fact that said income was directly credited to assessee's account by way of bank transfer, impugned disallowance made

by revenue authorities representing 2 per cent of gross total income on account of expenditure incurred in realising said income was to be deleted. (AY. 1998-99, 2000-01 2001-02)

Canara Bank v. ACIT (2014) 265 CTR 385 / (2015) 228 Taxman 212 / 99 DTR 36 (Karn.) (HC)

346 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – No exempt income – No disallowance can be made. [R.8D]**

Assessee has not made any claim for exemption of any income from payment of tax, hence no disallowance could be made under section 14A. (AY. 2009-10)

CIT v. Corrttech Energy (P) Ltd. (2015) 372 ITR 97 / (2014) 272 CTR 262 / 223 Taxman 130 (Guj)(HC)

347 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Estimated expenditure – Held to be justified**

Disallowance of expenditure for earning interest on tax free bonds and dividends on estimate basis was held to be justified. (AY. 2005-06)

South Indian Bank Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 111 / 226 Taxman 130 (Mag.) / 105 DTR 299 (Ker.)(HC)

348 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Interest free funds – No disallowance can be made – Restricted to amount of STT**

Where the assessee had sufficient profit and interest free funds to be invested in mutual funds from where exempted income was generated and nothing had been charged by bank except STT, disallowance under section 14A was to be restricted to amount of STT. (AY. 2004-05 to 2006-07)

CIT v. Amod Stamping (P) Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxman 256 (Guj.)(HC)

349 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Interest expenditure attributable to a taxable business cannot be disallowed. [S.36(1)(iii), R. 8D]**

The Court held that once it was duly established that no borrowed funds on which interest was paid had been invested for earning tax free income, no disallowance was permissible under Section 14A. The Tribunal has observed that under Rule 8D(2)(ii), a proportionate disallowance out of interest expenditure would be made in respect of interest expenditure which is not directly attributable to any particular income or receipt. Since the entire interest expenditure, in the present case, was attributable to business in which the resultant income was assessable to tax, a disallowance could not be made.

ACIT v. Dhampur Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 370 ITR 194 / 273 CTR 90 / 229 Taxman 271 / 111 DTR 350 (All.)(HC)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Disallowance cannot be made if there is no exempt income or if there is a possibility of the gains on transfer of the shares being taxable. [R.8D]

350

- (i) On the issue whether the assessee could have earned dividend income and even if no dividend income was earned, yet Section 14A can be invoked and disallowance of expenditure can be made, there are three decisions of the different High Courts directly on the issue and against the Revenue. No contrary decision of a High Court has been shown to us. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in *CIT v. M/s. Lakhani Marketing Inc* made reference to two earlier decisions of the same Court in *CIT v. Hero Cycles Limited*, 323 ITR 518 and *CIT v. Winsome Textile Industries Ltd.* 319 ITR 204 to hold that Section 14A cannot be invoked when no exempt income was earned. The second decision is of the Gujarat High Court in *CIT v. Corrttech Energy (P) Ltd.* [2014] 223 Taxman 130 (Guj). The third decision is of the Allahabad High Court in *CIT v. Shivam Motors (P) Ltd*;
- (ii) Income exempt under Section 10 in a particular assessment year, may not have been exempt earlier and can become taxable in future years. Further, whether income earned in a subsequent year would or would not be taxable, may depend upon the nature of transaction entered into in the subsequent assessment year. For example, long term capital gain on sale of shares is presently not taxable where security transaction tax has been paid, but a private sale of shares in an off market transaction attracts capital gains tax. It is an undisputed position that assessee is an investment company and had invested by purchasing a substantial number of shares and thereby securing right to management. Possibility of sale of shares by private placement etc. cannot be ruled out and is not an improbability. Dividend may or may not be declared. Dividend is declared by the company and strictly in legal sense, a shareholder has no control and cannot insist on payment of dividend. When declared, it is subjected to dividend distribution tax;
- (iii) What is also noticeable is that the entire or whole expenditure has been disallowed as if there was no expenditure incurred by the assessee for conducting business. The CIT(A) has positively held that the business was set up and had commenced. The said finding is accepted. The assessee, therefore, had to incur expenditure for the business in the form of investment in shares of cement companies and to further expand and consolidate their business. Expenditure had to be also incurred to protect the investment made. The genuineness of the said expenditure and the fact that it was incurred for business activities was not doubted by the Assessing Officer and has also not been doubted by the CIT(A). (ITA No. 486/2014 and ITA (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)

CIT v. Holcim India P. Ltd. (2014) 111 DTR 158 / 272 CTR 282 (Delhi)(HC)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – No disallowance can be made when interest free funds available with the assessee are much higher than investments made to earn exempt income

351

The assessee received dividend on the units of the Unit Trust of India and the shares of the domestic companies and claimed full deduction for interest expenditure on the ground that investments were made in the previous year out of its abundant interest free

funds and no new investments had been made in the current year. The AO disallowed the interest expenditure on the ground that the expenditure in terms of investment which pertained to the exempt income from interest bearing funds was not allowable. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO.

The High Court confirmed the Orders of the CIT(A) and the Tribunal and observed that the interest free funds available was much larger as compared to the investment and also that there was no new investment made in the current year. The High Court following its own decision in the case of *CIT v. Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 323* held that since the assessee's own funds were higher than the investment made by it and with nothing to indicate that borrowed funds were utilized for the purpose of investment in shares and for earning dividends, no disallowance u/s. 14A could be made. (AY. 2001-02, 2002-03)

CIT v. Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxman 479 (Guj.)(HC)

352 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Prospective in nature and not applicable for assessment years prior to A.Y. 2008-09. [R.8D]**

Sub-Sections (2) and (3) of section 14A of the Act inserted with effect from 1-4-2007 and Rule 8D of the Income tax Rules, 1962 inserted in the Rules on 24.03.2008 are not procedural and apply prospectively from assessment year 2008-09 onwards. (AY. 2001-02, 2004-05, 2005-06)

Birla Corporation Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 102 DTR 264 / 267 CTR 540 / (2015) 228 Taxman 370 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)

353 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – No disallowance of interest paid on borrowings if assessee's own funds and non-interest bearing funds exceeds investment in tax-free securities**

For AY 2001-02 to 2005-06, the Tribunal deleted the disallowance made u/s. 14A on the ground that as the assessee's own funds were more than its borrowed funds, the investments in tax-free securities had to be regarded as being made out of the own funds and no disallowance u/s. 14A for the interest on the borrowed funds could be made. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal:

In principle, if there are funds available, both interest-free and over draft and/or loans taken, then a presumption would arise that investments would be out of the interest-free funds generated or available with the company if the interest-free funds were sufficient to meet the investment. On facts, the assessee's own funds and other non-interest bearing funds were more than the investment in the tax free securities. Consequently, the ITAT rightly held that there was no basis for deeming that the assessee had used borrowed funds for investment in tax free securities. (AY. 2001-02, 2005-06)

CIT v. HDFC Bank Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 505 / 107 DTR 140 / 226 Taxman 132 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

354 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Interest and administrative expenses**

Where the assessee had sufficient funds available with it, which were more than the amount it invested for earning the dividend income, it was held that both the CIT(A)

and Tribunal correctly approached the issue by setting aside the order for disallowance under s. 14A in respect of interest expenditure. As regards administrative expenses disallowance of ₹ 5 lakhs on estimate basis was found to be reasonable.

CIT v. Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 323 / 217 Taxman 229 / (2014) 101 DTR 175 (Guj.)(HC)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Interest – No disallowance if assessee has sufficient funds and it has not used any borrowed funds for making investments.[R.8D]

355

The assessee declared tax free interest on bonds as well as exempt dividend income. The AO observed that interest expenses to earn tax free income was not allowable and thereby made a disallowance of 1% of the interest expenditure u/s. 14A. The Tribunal deleted the disallowance.

On appeal by the department, the High Court observed that it was noted from records that the assessee was having shareholding funds to the extent of 2607.18 crores and the investment made by it was to the extent of ₹ 195.10 crores. In other words, the assessee had sufficient funds for making the investments and it had not used the borrowed funds for such purpose. This aspect of huge surplus funds is not disputed by the revenue which earned it the interest on bonds and dividend income. The High Court further noted that with regard to disallowance of 1% of administrative expenses averred to have incurred on account of the earning of interest, there is nothing on record to indicate that there has been in fact any actual expenditure incurred by the assessee for earning tax free income of ₹ 14 crores. It also noted that out of the total amount of exempt income of ₹ 14 crores, the assessee could point out that 6.12 crores was earned by it from 'S' project which was under construction and for which no expenditure had been claimed and for the remaining income of ₹ 7.88 crores which consists of dividend and tax free interest, no part of expenditure appears to have been made towards the investment activity as emerging from the material. The total investment from the huge surplus is comparatively small and investment made was effortless, without any burden of administrative expenses. Accordingly, the High Court dismissing the departmental appeal held that in view of fact that no expenditure was incurred for earning exempted income and that being the question of fact, disallowance of 1% of interest expenditure artificially or on the basis of assumption rightly has not been sustained by the Tribunal. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Torrent Power Ltd. (2014) 363 TTR 474 / 222 Taxman 367 / 272 CTR 270 / 108 DTR 418 (Guj.)(HC)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Where the assessee's interest free funds exceeded investment made for earning dividend income, disallowance under section 14A was not justified. [R.8D]

356

The AO made a disallowance u/s. 14A on the ground that the assessee had made an investment from interest bearing funds to earn exempt dividend income. The CIT (A) favoured the assessee's claim that its interest free funds were much larger than the investment yielding exempted income. The Tribunal concurred with CIT(A). On an appeal by the department, the High Court held that since the assessee's interest free

funds exceeded investment made for earning dividend income, disallowance under section 14A was not justified. (AY. 1999-2000)

CIT v. Hitachi Home & Life Solutions (I.) Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxman 109 (Guj.)(HC)

357 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Disallowance cannot be made if the assessee has no tax-free income in the year**

From the reading of s. 14A of the Act, it is clear that before making any disallowance the following conditions are to exist:- a) That there must be income taxable under the Act, and b) That this income must not form part of the total income under the Act, and c) That there must be an expenditure incurred by the assessee, and d) That the expenditure must have a relation to the income which does not form part of the total income under the Act. Therefore, unless and until, there is receipt of exempted income for the concerned assessment years (dividend from shares), S.14A of the Act cannot be invoked. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Lakhani Marketing Inc.(2014) 226 Taxman 45 (Mag.) / 272 CTR 265 / 111 DTR 149 (P&H) (HC)

358 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – No disallowance u/s. 14A & Rule 8D can be made if the assessee does not have tax-free income & no claim for exemption is made. [R.8D]**

In the present case, the Tribunal has recorded the finding of fact that the assessee did not make any claim for exemption of any income from payment of tax. It was on this basis that the Tribunal held that disallowance u/s. 14A of the Act could not be made. Held, no question of law arose. (AY. 2009-10.)

CIT v. Cortech Energy Pvt. Ltd. (Guj.)(HC), www.itatonline.org

359 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – The assessee had not earned any tax free income, hence, in the absence of any tax free income, the corresponding expenditure could not be worked out for disallowance. [R.8D]**

For the year in question, the finding of fact is that the assessee had not earned any tax free income. Hence, in the absence of any tax free income, the corresponding expenditure could not be worked out for disallowance. The view of the CIT(A) & Tribunal does not give rise to any substantial question of law. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Shivam Motors (P) Ltd. (2014) 111 DTR 153 / 272 CTR 277 / (2015) 230 Taxman 63 (All.)(HC)

360 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Recording of satisfaction is mandatory disallowance can be made only after recording satisfaction. [R.8D]**

In order to invoke rule 8D, the AO has to first record a finding that he was not satisfied with the correctness of the claim for expenditure made by the assessee in relation to income, which did not form part of the total income. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Hero Management Service Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 68 / 220 Taxman 107 (Mag.)(Delhi.)(HC)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Book profit – Disallowance has to be applied while computing book profits under clause (f) of Explanation to s.115JA. [S.115JA]

361

The assessee's contention that in view of the Proviso to s. 14A, the said provision could not have been invoked for AY 2000-01 in a revision u/s. 263 is not acceptable because the assessment order was passed after section 14A was enacted (Honda Siel Power Products 340 ITR 53 (Del.) (approved by SC) followed). The failure of the AO to invoke s. 14A had resulted in the order being erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. (AY. 2000-01)

CIT v. Goetze (India) Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 505 / 97 DTR 169 (Delhi)(HC)

CIT v. Federal Mogul Goetage (India) Ltd. (2014)361 ITR 505 / 97 DTR 169 (Delhi)(HC)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Rule 8D disallowance cannot be made without showing how assessee's claim/computation is wrong. [R.8D]

362

In AY 2009-10 the assessee earned dividend income of ₹ 1.65 lakhs which was claimed exempt u/s 10(34) of the Act. The assessee claimed that no disallowance u/s. 14A could be made because no expenditure had been incurred to earn the said dividend. It was claimed that no new investment was made during the year. It was also claimed that no loans were taken for making the investments for earning the dividend income. The AO was not convinced with the reply of the assessee and computed the disallowance at ₹ 32.43 lakhs u/s. 14A by making calculation under Rule 8D. This was deleted by the CIT(A). The department filed an appeal before the Tribunal which was dismissed. The Tribunal relied on J. K. Investors (Bombay) Ltd. (ITAT Mum.) and noted that the AO had not examined the accounts of the assessee and had not recorded satisfaction about the correctness of the claim of the assessee before invoking Rule 8D. It held that while rejecting the claim of the assessee with regard to expenditure or no expenditure, as the case may be, in relation to exempted income, the AO had to indicate cogent reasons for the same and was not entitled to disregard the assessee's claim and straightaway embark upon computing disallowance under Rule 8D. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal.

The AO disallowed the expenditure u/s. 14A without first recording that he was not satisfied with the correctness of the claim as regards the claim that "no expenditure" was made by the assessee. The disallowance u/s. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is plainly contrary to the provisions of the statute. The CIT allowed the appeal of the assessee and the Tribunal did not interfere. Challenging the order of the Tribunal, the present appeal has been filed. We are of the opinion that no point of law has been raised. Therefore, this appeal is dismissed. (AY. 2009-10)

CIT v. REI Agro Ltd. (Cal.)(HC), www.itatonline.org

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Matter set aside

363

AO disallowed 6 per cent of expenditure incurred by assessee under head Printing & Stationery, Postage & Telegram, Professional and other services and Payment to Auditors, considering it to be expenses incurred by assessee for earning tax free dividend income without discussing on any claim made by assessee. On appeal Tribunal remitted back to file of AO for consideration afresh. (AYs. 2002-03 & 2008-09)

Metal Powder Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 26 ITR 759 / (2015) 152 ITD 144 (Chennai)(Trib.)

364 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Interest on RBI relief bonds – Investments made with own funds or with borrowed funds – Disallowance under Rule 8D cannot be made for relevant assessment year. [R.8D]**

Assessee Company received interest on RBI relief bonds. AO while disallowing the expenditure applied Rule 8D. A.O. invoking rule 8D, worked out disallowance, did not examine whether investments were made with own funds or with borrowed funds. Rule 8D was not applicable for relevant assessment year hence matter restore to AO. for examination of issue afresh. (AY. 2006-07)

Dy. CIT v. Firestone International (P) Ltd. (2014) 150 ITD 151 (Mum.)(Trib.)

365 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Not recording of satisfaction – No finding was given why the working provided by assessee was not proper and Rule 8D was not applicable in relevant year. [R.8D]**

Assessee earned exempt dividend income and furnished a detailed working in respect of indirect expenses. AO. by applying Rule 8D made disallowance on estimate basis. A.O. nowhere recorded or mentioned any satisfaction that working provided by assessee was not proper. Rule 8D was not applicable to the said relevant year, disallowance was deleted. (AY. 2006-07)

ACIT v. Bharti Teletech Ltd. (2014) 150 ITD 185 / 163 TTJ 36 (UO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

366 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Recording of satisfaction is mandatory – CIT (A) gave opportunity to the assessee and assessee has not demonstrated any mistake in the calculation hence disallowance was held to be justified. [S. 10(35), R.8D]**

Before proceeding to make disallowance under section 14A, AO has to record his satisfaction as required by sub-section (2) and (3) of section 14A. Assessee-company showed dividend income in its return of income, which was exempt under section 10(35). AO disallowed one-half per cent of average of value of investment under rule 8D. Though AO had not specifically recorded his satisfaction regarding claim of assessee that no expenditure was incurred for earning dividend income but CIT(A) after giving fresh opportunity to assessee, recorded his dissatisfaction with correctness of claim of assessee and thereafter computed disallowance, requirement of recording satisfaction was fulfilled. Since disallowance had been worked out as per formula given in rule 8D and assessee failed to show any mistake in calculation made for disallowance, impugned order upholding disallowance was to be affirmed. (AY. 2008-09)

GEBR Pfeiffer (I) (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 172 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

367 **S. 14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Suo motu disallowance of ₹ 1.20 lakh – Disallowance under Rule 8D amounting to ₹ 88.85 was held to be not justified. [R.8D]**

The assessee had suo motu disallowed expenses of ₹ 1.20 lakhs under section 14A of the Act. AO disallowed an amount of ₹ 88.85 lakhs by applying rule 8D. On appeal Tribunal held that the assessee was able to show demonstrate that it had enough interest free funds at its disposal for making investment, therefore there was no basis for deeming that the assessee had used the borrowed funds for investments. Relying on

the ratio in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. and HDFC Bank Ltd (ITA No. 330 of 2012), the addition was deleted. (AY. 2008-09)

Sharekhan Financial Services (P) Ltd v. ACIT (2014) The Chamber's Journal-September-P. 84 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Not recording of satisfaction – Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Stock in trade – Surplus funds – Book profit. [S.115JA, 115JB, Rule 8D]

368

- (i) When it is said that rule 8D is mandatory (i.e., AY. 2008-09 onwards), all that is meant is where the said expenditure cannot be reasonably ascertained with reference to the assessee's accounts, toward which the AO is to issue his satisfaction or, as the case may be, dissatisfaction, he has no discretion in case of the latter in formulating a method of his own, nor indeed has the assessee, and is bound to adopt the prescription of rule 8D. The sole premise of law, it needs to be appreciated, including that mandated per rule 8D, is to arrive at as fair and just an estimation of the sum expended by the assessee in relation to income that is not subject to tax, as the facts and circumstances admit, without at the same time allowing it to degenerate into an arbitrary or subjective exercise.
- (ii) Rule 8D is statutorily prescribed [refer section 14A(2)] only to remove the estimation exercise from the realm of arbitrariness or any subjectivity. Arbitrariness at the end of the assessing authority cannot be substituted by that at the assessee's end, which is equally prescribed by law. The assessee speaks of the bulk, nay, almost the whole of its' investment being in shares in subsidiary companies, which it claims is for strategic reason/s and not for income generation.
- (iii) Toward this, the assessee's argument is of the AO being precluded from proceeding to invoke rule 8D, otherwise mandatory for the current year, in view of his having not expressed his dissatisfaction with the assessee's *suo motu* disallowance. No specific format has been prescribed for communication of his dissatisfaction by the AO, which is imminent in the assessment order in the present case. The assessee's accounts are admittedly not maintained activity-wise, and its claim is de hors its accounts. We have already noted that the assessee's accounts do not in any manner support its claim of the organizational resources being dedicated to the extent of 10% toward the investment activity.
- (iv) We may, however, discuss the assessee's claim on surplus funds, made with reference to the decision in Reliance Utilities & Power Ltd. (supra), so that there was, in its view, no need to apply the proportionate method advocated by rule 8D. The disallowance u/s.14A, it needs to be appreciated, is a statutory disallowance, constituting a complete code in itself. The said decision was cited before, and stands discussed by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. (supra). The relevant discussion appears at paras 85 & 86 (pgs. 135-137) of the reports, and considers the decision by it in Reliance Utilities & Power Ltd. (supra). It stands explained that section 14A has widen the theory of apportionment, which only seeks to effectuate the principle of only the net (i.e., net of all expenses) income, whether positive or negative, being liable to, or not so, to tax, i.e., as the case may be. Where therefore the assessee is able to show,

with reference to its accounts, of the borrowed capital having financed a particular asset, the interest cost relatable thereto would necessarily have to be considered as expended toward the same. None of the decisions by the tribunal cited before us consider the decision by the Hon'ble jurisdictional high court in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd.

- (v) The assessee has also earned interest income at ₹ 2962.63 lakhs. The said income is on long term investments and on loans forming part of current assets. The entire interest income is offered as, and admittedly, business income. As such, the fact of earning of interest income would in our view be by itself of little consequence. There is no claim, which would, where so, though need to be established, of the interest being on borrowings which stood reliant on interest. Rather, all business expenses have been claimed and allowed there-against, i.e., in computing the net assessable income. In fact, our restoration, seen in perspective, is only with the view and toward the assessee being able to establish its case on the lines of dedicated funding, so that the matter gets decided on the basis of the facts, on which it rests, rather than on presumptions. The decision by the Tribunal in Karnavati Petro Pvt. Ltd. (in ITA No. 2228/Ahd.(D)/2012 dated 5-7-2013) (to which no specific reliance though was made before us) would have no bearing in the matter;
- (vi) The second issue raised by the assessee is for the adjustment of the amount disallowed u/s.14A in computing the book profit u/s.115JB. While the assessee's stand is that the disallowance u/s.14A is toward computing the income under the regular provisions of the Act, no corresponding addition could be made while computing the book profit, the Revenue argues with reference to the specific provision of Explanation 1(f) to section 115JB(2). We have also gone through the case law, being decisions by the tribunal relied upon by the assessee (pgs. 83-121 of the compilation of case law). The same is on the premise that the provision of section 14A cannot be imported into Explanation 1(f) to section 115JA or, as the case may be, section 115JB, so that there could be no adjustment in computing the book profit there-under for the disallowance made u/s.14A. Our decision, which is in line with the several by the Tribunal, is however not on the incorporation of the provision of section 14A (or any other provision for that matter) in Explanation 1(f) to section 115JB, nor is the decision based on the principle of incorporation. The expenditure disallowed u/s.14A is only that incurred and claimed by the assessee in respect of dividend income, exempt u/s.10. It is only on this basis, and this basis alone, that we have found Explanation 1(f) to section 115JB (s.115JA) to be providing a clear legal basis to the adjustment *qua* expenditure relatable to dividend income. That the amount disallowed u/s.14A provides a ready basis for determining the amount of such expenditure is another matter. It would be a complete fallacy and a travesty of facts, being without basis and wholly presumptuous to state or consider that the disallowance (u/s.14A) is *qua* notional expenditure and not against that actually claimed by the assessee and, further, per its books of account. Or does it mean to suggest that the expenditure claimed is outside the books of account? We say so as without doubt the adjustment under Explanation 1 could only be *qua* sums debited or credited and thus reflected in the

accounts. In fact, in this regard, we have also clarified that where and to the extent there is a difference between the expenditure, i.e., as per the assessee's books and that as claimed per its return of income, only the sum debited in books (to the profit and loss account) would hold. Further, the decision by the tribunal in *Goetze (India) Ltd. v. CIT* [2009] 32 SOT 101 (Del.), followed, *inter alia*, by the Tribunal in *Ovira Logistics Ltd.* (in ITA Nos. 2439 & 3230/Mum(C)/2012 dated 30-8-2013), stands since reversed by the Hon'ble high court in *CIT v. Goetze India Ltd.* [2014] 361 ITR 505 (Del); (AY. 2008-09)

HSBC Invest Direct (India) Ltd. v. DCIT (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Disallowance is not automatic AO has to examine the books – Interest disallowance worked by CIT (A) as per working given by assessee was held to be correct. [R.8D]

369

It is now settled principle that the assessing officer has to examine the disallowance made by the assessee by having regard to the accounts of the assessee and only thereafter the AO, if he is not satisfied with the correctness of the claim, shall determine the disallowance to be made u/s. 14A of the Act in accordance Rule 8D. In this regard, a gainful reference may be made to the decision rendered by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of *Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd* (328 ITR 81). It is also pertinent to note the decision rendered by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of *Maxopp Investment Ltd v. CIT* (347 ITR 272), wherein the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has expressed the view that the assessing officer has to first reject the claim of the assessee with regard to the extent of expenditure by having regard to the accounts of the assessee and such rejection must be for disclosed cogent reasons. It is only then that the question of determination of expenditure u/s. 14A by the assessing officer would arise. In the instant case, we notice that the workings furnished by the assessee for interest disallowance was not examined at all by the AO, whereas he is required to reject the workings furnished by the assessee after having regard to the accounts of the assessee.

Further we notice that the revenue could not controvert the finding given by the Ld. CIT(A) that the assessee was able to establish the nexus between the borrowings and the investments. We have also noticed that the finding so given by the First Appellate Authority was correct as per the workings furnished by the assessee in the table extracted above. It is also pertinent to note that the revenue did not find fault with the said workings. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the Ld CIT(A) was justified in holding that the interest disallowance was required to be made under Rule 8D(2)(i) of the I.T Rules and also in confirming the disallowance of interest to the extent of ₹ 29,91,393/-, as worked out by the assessee. (AY. 2008-09)

ITO v. Reliance Share and Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. (2015) 67 SOT 73 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.14A: Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Stock in trade – Rule 8D(ii) & 8D(iii) do not apply to shares held as stock-in-trade. Loss arising out of derivatives from the income arising out of buying and selling of shares. [S.43(5), 73, R.8D]

370

- (i) Both trading of shares and derivative transactions are not coming under the purview of Section 43(5) of the Act which provides definition of “speculative transaction” exclusively for purposes of section 28 to 41 of the Act. Again, the

fact that both delivery based transaction in shares and derivative transactions are non-speculative as far as section 43(5) is concerned goes to confirm that both will have same treatment as regards application of the Explanation to Section 73 is concerned, which creates a deeming fiction. Now, before application of the said Explanation, aggregation of the business profit/loss is to be worked out irrespective of the fact, whether it is from share delivery transaction or derivative transaction. Now, this view has been confirmed by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in assessee's own case in GA No.3481 of 2013 and ITAT No. 215 of 2013 dated 12th March, 2014, has held as under:-

It would, thus, appear that where an assessee, being the company, besides dealing in other things also deals in purchase and sale of shares of other companies, the assessee shall be deemed to be carrying on a speculation business. The assessee, in the present case, principally is a share broker, as already indicated. The assessee is also in the business of buying and selling of shares for self where actual delivery is taken and given and also in buying and selling of shares where actual delivery was not intended to be taken or given. Therefore, the entire transaction carried out by the assessee, indicated above, was within the umbrella of speculative transaction. There was, as such, no bar in setting off the loss arising out of derivatives from the income arising out of buying and selling of shares. This is what the learned Tribunal has done.

- (ii) Admitted facts are that the assessee is engaged in composite business of purchase and sale of shares and is a registered stock broker. The main intention of dealing in shares and securities is to earn business profits. During the relevant year under consideration assessee earned dividend income to the tune of ₹ 28,77,678/-, although the dividends were received by assessee on the shares held as stock in trade. Earning of dividend was merely incidental to the holding of shares for a particular period within which dividend was declared. The CIT(A) as well as we have noticed that the balance sheet of the assessee does not show any investment and all the shares are being held as stock in trade only. The AO has calculated the disallowance on the stock in trade/inventories held by the assessee. A plain reading of Rule 8D(2)(ii) and (iii) can only be applied, in the situations, wherever share are held as an investment and this rule will not have any application when the shares are held as stock in trade. (AY. 2009-10)

Dy. CIT v. Baljit Securities Private Limited (Kol.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

371

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Disallowance cannot be made if there is no exempt income. *Cheminvest Ltd. v. ITO 121 ITD 318 (Ahd.)(SB)* is not good law.[R.6D]

There is no dispute that the assessee had no exempt income during both the years involved. No doubt as mentioned by the DR, the Special Bench of this Tribunal in the case of *Cheminvest Ltd. v. ITO 121 ITD 318*, had held that disallowance under section 14A could be made even in an year in which no exempt income was earned or received by the assessee. This decision of Special Bench of the Tribunal has been, in our opinion, impliedly overruled by various decisions of different High Courts, namely, *CIT v. Shivam*

Motors P. Ltd. (All HC), CIT v. Corrttech Energy Pvt. Ltd. (Guj.)(HC), CIT v. Winsome Textile Industries Ltd. 319 ITR 204 (P&H), CIT v. Delite Enterprises (Bom.)(HC) & CIT v. Lakhani Marketing (P&H HC). Therefore, unless and until there is receipt of exempted income for the concerned assessment years, s. 14A of the Act cannot be invoked. (AY. 2009-10, 2010-11)

Alliancce Infrastructure Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (Bang.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Interest expenses – In applying Rule 8D(2)(ii) interest expenses directly attributable to tax exempt income as also directly attributable to taxable income, are required to be excluded from computation of common interest expenses to be allocated.[R.8D]

372

Tribunal held that in our opinion, it is only the interest on borrowed funds that would be apportioned and the amount of expenditure by way of interest that will be taken (as 'A' in the formula) will exclude any expenditure by way of interest which is directly attributable to any particular income or receipt. Therefore, it is not only the interest directly attributable to tax exempt income, i.e. under Rule 8D(2)(i), but also interest directly relatable to taxable income, which is to be excluded from the definition of variable 'A' in formula as per Rule 8D(2)(ii), and rightly so, because it is only then that common interest expenses, which are to be allocated as indirectly relatable to taxable income and tax exempt income, can be computed. Interest expenses directly attributable to tax exempt income as also directly attributable to taxable income, are required to be excluded from computation of common interest expenses to be allocated under Rule 8D(2)(ii). (AY. 2008-09)

Geojit Investment Service Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 67 SOT 37 (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – No disallowance can be made towards exempt income earned on strategic investments.[R.8D]

373

The assessee had made significant investments in the shares of subsidiary companies which are definitely not for the purpose of earning exempt income. Strategic investment has to be excluded for the purpose of arriving at disallowance under Rule 8D(iii). The disallowance under Rule 8D(iii) has to be computed by excluding the value of strategic investments. No disallowance under Rules 8D(i) and 8D(ii) is also warranted. (AY. 2008-09 & 2009-10)

Interlobe Enterprises Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 40 CCH 22 (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – For Rule 8D(2)(i) only expenditure relating to investments resulting in tax-free income can be considered. For Rule 8D(2)(iii) all investments, whether yielding tax-free income or not, have to be considered. [R.8D]

374

The Tribunal had to consider whether in computing the figure of disallowance under Rules 8D(2)(i) and 8D(2)(iii), it was necessary that the investments had to have yielded income which was not chargeable to tax. HELD by the Tribunal:

Rule 8D(2)(i) speaks of expenditure directly relating to income which does not form part of "total income". In the context of s. 2(45) & s. 5, the expression 'total income' in Rule 8D(2)(i) must relate to an income which is sought to be assessed. Therefore, only

expenditure directly relating to income which is earned either on receipt basis or on accrual basis and which does not form part of total income of a particular assessment year can be disallowed under clause (i) of Rule 8D(2). However, while computing disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii), the average of the total investment of the assessee as appearing in the balance sheet on the first day and last day of the year irrespective of the fact whether it has yielded income or not can be considered for the purpose of disallowance. (AY. 2009-10)

Bellwether Microfinance fund Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 165 TTJ 261 / 108 DTR 389 / 65 SOT 75 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

375 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Apportionment of expenditure**

Tribunal held that assessee's own funds are far in excess of the investments made by it which yielded exempt income. Therefore, disallowance under section 14A made by the AO in respect of interest cannot be sustained. (AY. 2002-03)

Reliance Industries v. Addl. ACIT (2012) 79 DTR 315 / (2013) 55 SOT 8 / (2014) 159 TTJ 349 (Mum.)(Trib.)

376 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Disallowance cannot exceed expenditure claimed as deduction – Section 14A and Rule 8D cannot be applied in a mechanical manner – Disallowance cannot exceed expenditure claimed as a deduction. [R.8D]**

The assessee, investment transactions were managed by investment advisers and the assessee paid portfolio management services (PMS) fees which were debited to his capital account. The demat expenses and security transaction tax (STT) was also debited to the capital account. The assessee claimed that the expenses relating to salary, telephone and other administrative expenses were incurred by him for his professional income and not for earning tax-free income. However, the AO rejected the claim and made a disallowance of ₹ 16.35 lakhs, being 0.5% of the average investments under Rule 8D(2)(iii). The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance on the ground that it was without establishing any nexus. On appeal by the department to the Tribunal HELD dismissing the appeal:

The assessee had debited direct expenses on account of dematerialization and STT in the capital account and not in the Profit and loss account. The AO had presumed that the assessee had must have incurred some expenditure under the heads salary, telephone and other administrative charges for earning the exempt income. It is further found that the total expenditure claimed by the assessee for the year is about ₹ 13 lakhs and the AO had made a disallowance of about ₹ 16 lakhs. He has just adopted the formula of estimating expenditure on the basis of investments. But, the justification for calculating the disallowance is missing. The assessee had not claimed any expenditure in its P&L account and so the onus was on the AO to prove that out of the expenditure incurred under various heads were related to earning of exempt income. Not only this he had to give the basis of such calculation. In any manner disallowance of ₹ 16.35 lakhs as against the total expenditure of ₹ 13 lakhs claimed by the assessee in P&L account is not justified. Rule 8D cannot and should not be applied in a mechanical

way. Facts of the case have to be analyzed before invoking them. Consequently the disallowance is deleted (*Justice Sam P. Bharucha v. ACIT (2012) 53 SOT 192 (Mum)(Trib.)* referred). (AY. 2009-10)

ACIT v. Iqbal M. Chagala (2014) 34 ITR 636 / (2015) 67 SOT 123 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – No disallowance can be made if there is no exempt income-Special bench judgment in Cheminvest & CBDT Circular are not good law [R.8D]

377

In AY 2009-10, the assessee held investments worth ₹ 14.05 crore and incurred interest expenditure of ₹ 34.80 lakhs. The assessee claimed that no disallowance u/s 14A & Rule 8D could be made as the investments were made out of own funds and no income was derived from the investments. The AO rejected the claim and made a disallowance of ₹ 19.28 lakhs though the CIT(A) deleted it. Before the Tribunal the department relied on Cheminvest Ltd. 121 ITD 318 (SB) & Circular No.5/2014 dated 11-2-2014 and argued that even if the assessee has not earned any exempt income, still disallowance u/s. 14A read with Rule 8D has to be made and it is mandatory. HELD by the Tribunal dismissing the appeal:

No doubt in *Cheminvest Ltd. v. ITO 121 ITD 318 (SB)* the Special Bench of the Tribunal has held that disallowance u/s. 14A can be made even in the year in which no exempt income has been earned or received by the assessee. This decision of Special Bench of the Tribunal has been impliedly overruled by the decisions of High Courts in *Shivam Motors P. Ltd. (All HC)*, *CIT v. Corrttech Energy Pvt. Ltd (Guj HC)*, *CIT v. Delite Enterprises (Bom. HC)*, *CIT v. Lakhani Marketing (P&H HC)*, *CIT v. Winsome Textiles Industries Ltd 319 ITR 204 (P&H)* where it has been held that when there is no exempt income and no claim for exemption, s. 14A and Rule 8D have no application and no disallowance can be made. (AY. 2009-10)

ACIT v. M. Baskaran (2015) 152 ITD 844 (Chennai)(Trib.)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Investments in subsidiaries to be excluded while computing disallowance. [R.8D]

378

The investments made by the assessee in the subsidiary company are not on account of investment for earning capital gains or dividend income. Such investments have been made by the assessee to promote subsidiary company into the hotel industry. A perusal of the order of the CIT(A) shows that out of total investment of ₹ 64.18 crore, ₹ 63.31 crore is invested in wholly owned subsidiary. This fact supports the case of the assessee that the assessee is not into the business of investment and the investments made by the assessee are on account of business expediency. Any dividend earned by the assessee from investment in subsidiary company is purely incidental. Therefore, the investment made by the assessee in its subsidiary are not to be reckoned for disallowance u/s. 14A r.w.r. 8D. The AO is directed to re-compute the average value of investment under the provisions of Rule 8D after deleting investments made by the assessee in subsidiary company. (AY. 2008-09)

EIH Associated Hotels Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (Chennai)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org

- 379 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – No disallowance of expenditure for investment in shares of subsidiaries & Joint Ventures as the investments are strategic in nature in the subsidiary companies on long term basis and no direct or indirect expenditure was incurred.[R.8D]**

The department has not disputed this fact that out of the total investment about 98% of the investments are in subsidiary companies of the assessee and, therefore, the purpose of investment is not for earning the dividend income but having control and business purpose and consideration. Therefore, *prima facie* the assessee has made out a case to show that no expenditure has been incurred for maintaining these long term investment in subsidiary companies. Accordingly disallowance by the AO was deleted. (AY. 2009-10)

JM Financial Ltd. v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org.

- 380 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Disallowance as per section 14A(2) is required to be made, even if assessee claims that it did not incur any expenditure in earning dividend income. [R.8D]**

The assessee earned dividend income but did not allocate any amount as expenditure incurred in relation to such income and accordingly it did not disallow any amount u/s. 14A. The AO disallowed 0.5% of the average value of investment under Rule 8D(2) (iii). The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance made by the AO and further disallowed proportionate interest expenditure relatable to the exempted dividend income u/s. 14A. On appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee contended that it did not incur any expenditure in earning the dividend income. It also submitted that the AO was not right in taking average value of all the investments for the purpose of calculating the disallowance of expenses, instead of the average value of dividend yielding investments. The Tribunal observed that as per rule 8D(2)(iii), the average value of investment, income from which does not or shall not form part of the total income is required to be considered, meaning thereby the entire value of investments made in shares is required to be considered. The Tribunal while dismissing the assessee's claim also noted that, as per section 14A(3) disallowance as per section 14A(2) is required to be made, even if the assessee claims that it did not incur any expenditure in earning the dividend income. (AY. 2008-09)

ACIT v. Kerala State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (2014) 29 ITR 45 / 62 SOT 115 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)

- 381 **S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Apportionment of expenses. [R.8D]**

No disallowance u/s. 14A can be made if the AO has not recorded his dissatisfaction as regards accounts of the assessee. U/r. 8D(2)(iii) the amount disallowable is equal to ½ percentage of the average value of investment, income from which does not/shall not form part of the total income and not the total investment at the beginning and end of the year. (AY. 2008-09)

REI Agro Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 144 ITD 141 / (2014) 98 DTR 339 / 160 TTJ 107 (Kol.)(Trib.)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Interest and managerial, administrative expenses – Restricted to 1 lakh 382

The Tribunal restored the case to the file of the Assessing Officer with a direction to find out as to whether sufficient own funds / interest free funds were available with the assessee on the date of investment made for earning exempt income and if found so not to make any disallowance for interest cost under this head. As far as managerial and administrative expenses are concerned Tribunal restricted to ₹ 1 lakh only and held that disallowance of ₹ 2,75,000/- is on higher side as there was no separate treasury department and only one employee that too on part time basis, was looking after investments.(AY. 2006-07 to 2008-09)

Godrej Consumer Products Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 151 ITD 566 / 97 DTR 33 / 159 TTJ 21(Mum.)(Trib.)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Book Profit – Amount disallowed under section 14A to be added while computing book profit. [S. 115JB] 383

The Tribunal held that whatever expenditure is found to be disallowed under section 14A, the same is to be added back while computing book profit under section 115JB. (AY. 2007-08)

Godrej Consumer Products Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 151 ITD 566 / 97 DTR 33 / 159 TTJ 21 / (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Interest on taxable business activity – For working the disallowance as per Rule, 8D(2)(ii), interest expenditure on loans taken for taxable business purposes has to be excluded 384

If the assessee is able to demonstrate that the payment of interest is directly attributable to the assessee's taxable business activity, it cannot be considered under Rule 8D(2)(ii) of the I.T. Rules. (AY. 2007-08)

ITO v. Narain Prasad Dalamia (2014) 30 ITR 619 / 152 ITD 276 (Kol.)(Trib.)

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – If AO does not deal with assessee's arguments, it means that he has not reached objective satisfaction that assessee's method is incorrect & cannot invoke Rule 8D. [R.8D] 385

The invoking of Rule 8D to compute the disallowance u/s. 14A is neither automatic nor triggered merely because assessee has earned an exempt income. The invoking of rule 8D of the Rules is permissible only when the AO records the satisfaction in regard to the incorrectness of the claim of the assessee, having regard to the accounts of the assessee.

On facts, the AO has given no reasons why the assessee's calculation was not proper except to say that "the said disallowance was not acceptable".

The department's objection that since the assessee was not maintaining separate accounts with regard to the activity of earning exempt income, the satisfaction contemplated u/s. 14A be considered as implied is contrary to how the implications of sub-section (2) of s. 14A have been understood and explained by the High Courts in *Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd & Maxopp Investment Ltd.* (AY. 2008-09)

Kalyani Steels Ltd. v. ACIT (Pune)(Trib.), www.itatonline.org

386

S.14A : Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Controlling interest – No disallowance can be made if primary object of investment is to hold controlling stake in group concern and not to earn tax-free income. [R.8D]

We find merit and substance in the contention of the assessee that no expenditure had been incurred by the assessee for earning the exempt income on this point because the investment has been made by the assessee in the group concern and not in the shares of any unrelated party. Therefore, the primary object of investment is holding and controlling stake in the group concern and not earning any income out of investment. Further, the investments were made long back and not in the year under consideration. Therefore, in view of the fact that the investment are in the group concern we do not find any reason to believe that the assessee would have incurred any administrative expenses in holding these investments. The AO has not brought on record any material to show that the assessee has incurred any expenditure in relation to the income which does not form part of the total income. Section 14A has within it implicit the notion of apportionment in the cases where the expenditure is incurred for composite/indivisible activities in which taxable and non taxable income is received but when no expenditure has been incurred in relation to the exempt income then principle of apportionment embedded in section 14A has no application. The object of section 14A is not allowing to reduce tax payable on the non exempt income by deducting the expenditure incurred to earn the exempt income. In the case in hand it is not the case of the revenue that the assessee has incurred any direct expenditure or any interest expenditure for earning the exempt income or keeping the investment in question. If there is expenditure directly or indirectly incurred in relation to exempt income the same cannot be claimed against the income which is taxable. For attracting the provisions of section 14A “there should be proximate cause for disallowance which has relationship with the tax exempt income as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of *CIT v. Walfort Share and Stock Brokers P. Ltd. (2010) 326 ITR 1*). Therefore, there should be a proximate relationship between the expenditure and the income which does not form part of the total income. In the case in hand the assessee has claimed that no expenditure has been incurred for earning the exempt income, therefore, it was incumbent on the AO to find out as to whether the assessee has incurred any expenditure in relation to income which does not form part of the total income and if so to quantify the expenditure of disallowance. The AO has not brought on record any fact or material to show that any expenditure has been incurred on the activity which has resulted into both taxable and non-taxable income. Therefore, in our view when the assessee has *prima facie* brought out a case that no expenditure has been incurred for earning the income which does not form part of the total income then in the absence of any finding that expenditure has been incurred for earning the exempt income the provisions of section 14A cannot be applied. Accordingly we delete the addition/disallowance made by AO u/s. 14A r.w. Rule 8D. (AY. 2009-10) *Garware Wall Ropes Ltd v. ACIT (2014) 65 SOT 86 (Mum.)(Trib.)*

Section 15 : Salaries**S.15 : Salaries – Employees Stock Option (ESOP) – Capital gains – Assessable as salaries.[S. 45]**

387

Assessee software engineer initially served a US company SIRF-USA as an independent consultant and thereafter, as an employee. After returning to India, he became an employee of SIRF-India. SIRF-USA granted stock option to assessee, which gave right to him to acquire 35,000 shares of common stock of SIRF-USA. Assessee acquired 7,000 shares of SIRF-USA. He sold said shares on same day and earned income. The Tribunal held that the assessee was not in employment of SIRF-USA would be immaterial, as consideration for payment in question was services rendered by assessee in past and, therefore, assessee was to be regarded as employee for purpose of impugned plan and benefits arising under this plan as well as any other benefit received had to be treated as income under head 'salaries'. Further, by exercising option to acquire shares at a particular price, there was no transfer of any capital asset and, therefore, there was no question of any income being assessed under head 'capital gain'; such income had to be treated as income from salary. (AY. 2006-07)

ACIT v. Chittaranjan A. Dasannacharya (2014) 64 SOT 226 (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.15 : Salaries – Accrual – Salary income accrues at the place where the services are rendered and not where the appointment letter is received. If salary, after accrual abroad, is brought into India, it is not taxable on receipt basis. S. 6(5) which deals with residential status is redundant. [S. 5(2),6(5)]

388

(i) The AO's stand that because the assessee has offered taxation of interest and pension, he has accepted himself as a "resident" and that the other income also becomes taxable u/s. 6(5) is wrong. The pension was paid by his former employer in India, and, therefore, irrespective of his residential status, the income was taxable in India. Similarly, so far as interest on savings bank account was concerned, the interest accrued in India was credited, in income character as such, in India, and was, therefore, taxable in India. This taxability does not require recipient of income to have 'resident' status u/s. 6 at all.

Once it is not in dispute that the assessee qualifies to be treated as a 'non-resident' under Section 6 of the Act, the scope of taxable income in the hands of the assessee, under Section 5(2), is restricted to (a) income received or is deemed to be received in India, by or on behalf of such person; and (b) income which accrues or arises, or is deemed to accrue or arise to him, in India.

That 'receipt' of income, for this purpose, refers to the first occasion when assessee gets the money in his own control – real or constructive. What is material is the receipt of income in its character as income, and not what happens subsequently once the income, in its character as such is received by the assessee or his agent; an income cannot be received twice or on multiple occasions. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

Arvind Singh Chauhan v. ITO (2014) 147 ITD 509 / 101 DTR 79 / 31 ITR 105 / 161 TTJ 791 (Agra)(Trib.)

Section 17 : “Salary”, “perquisite” and “profits in lieu of salary” defined

389 **S.17 : Salary – Perquisite – Family pension – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Family pension received by husband cannot be once again taxed in India-DTAA-India-UK. [S.9(1)((ii), 15, 17(1)(ii), 57(ia), 90, Art, 19(2), 20(1), 23(3)]**

The assessee's wife was working in UK with Royal Bank of Scotland/County Nat West Limited (RBS). She died on 22-4-1989 while she was in service. On her death, her employer decided to family pension to the husband i.e., the assessee under the family pension scheme run by the company. As per commitment of the UK employer of the deceased wife, they would continue to paying her husband, i.e., assessee family pension until his death. The AO had taxed family pension received by the assessee in UK.

On appeal, the CIT(A) granted relief for the assessee holding that the family pension received by the assessee was covered under Article 23(3) of the DTAA between India and UK and could not be taxed in India when source country i.e. UK had already taxed these amounts.

Tribunal held that Article 20 is related to pension, means the payment received by the employee in consideration of past employment. Section 57(ia) read with Explanation defines 'Family Pension' and section 17(1)(ii) which provides that the salary includes 'pension' received by the employee in consideration of past employment. Therefore, Article 20 has no relevance to the family pension which is generally received by the spouse or family members or legal dependent of the deceased employee from the employer of deceased family member. Article 23(1) stipulates about the items of income beneficially owned by the residents of a contracting state wherever arising, other than the income paid out of trust or estates of the deceased person in the course of administration which are not dealt within the foregoing Articles to the Article 23 of this Convention shall be taxable only in that contracting State. Article 23(2) is neither related to pension nor related to family pension. Article 23(3) starts with a word 'notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article' meaning thereby items of income of a resident of a contracting state not dealt with in the foregoing articles of Convention arising in the other contracting state may be taxed in that other state. Therefore Article 23(3) is related to the items of income which are not included in the foregoing articles to Article 23(3) of this Convention, then notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of article 23, the same arising in the other contracting state may be taxed in that other state. Meaning thereby that 'family pension' which was not within the ambit of foregoing articles to the Article 23(3) of Indo-UK Treaty and arose in the other contracting state, may be taxed in other state and the said receipt of the family pension is beyond the purview of Article 23 of Indo-UK DTAA and the same is covered by the residuary article 23(3) of this Convention and, therefore, it was rightly taxed in U.K. i.e. source country. Accordingly, the Commissioner (Appeals) rightly held that the family pension received by the assessee from the employer of deceased wife of the assessee was rightly taxed at source in UK and no amount of family pension is thus taxable in India. The expression 'may be taxed in that other state mentioned in Article 23(3) authorizes only the contracting state of source to tax such income and by necessary implication, the contracting state of resident is precluded from taxing such income, specially when the tax has been deducted by the contracting

state of source and contracting state of the residence cannot tax it again in the hands of resident assessee. If analogy advanced by the revenue and the AO is accepted and the country of source as well as country of receipt, both are allowed to tax the same income twice, then an object of double tax avoidance agreement would become infructuous and the provisions stipulated in the Indo-UK DTAA would be otiose. Accordingly, interpretation adopted by the AO was perverse and wrong which was rightly corrected by the CIT(A) by holding that the income received by the assessee from employer of deceased wife of the assessee and country of source has deducted tax and assessee received amount after deduction of tax, then the same income cannot be taxed second time in the other contracting state i.e. India. (AY. 2001-01, 2002-03, 2003-04, 2006-07, 2009-10)

ACIT v. Karan Thapar (2014) 64 SOT 334 / 163 TTJ 405 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.17(2) : Salary – Perquisite – Free supply of gas, electricity, water – Amount allowed towards perquisites for each employee can be ₹ 500. [S. 15] 390

Free supply of gas, electricity, water - Amount allowed towards perquisites for each employee can be ₹ 500. (AY. 1975-76, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88)

CIT v. Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 132 / 51 taxman.com 545 (T&AP)(HC)

Section 22 : Income from house property

S.22 : Income from house property – Business income – Income derived by the assessee from ownership of a building and not from personal exertion is an income from house property and not a business income.[S.28(i)] 391

The main object of the assessee company according to its Memorandum and Articles of Association was to carry on the business of a hotel, restaurant, cafe, etc. For the relevant assessment year, the assessee company claimed that its income was derived by leasing out the building, plant, machineries, generators, lifts and other amenities, and such income was income from profits and gains of business or profession. The AO held that income was to be assessed under the head 'Income from other sources'. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that income from lease was liable to be assessed under the head 'Income from house property'. On second appeal, one member of the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A), holding that the income of the assessee was an income from house property, but the other member dissented, holding that such income was a business income. On account of the difference of opinion between the two members, the matter was referred to the third member of the Tribunal, who opined that the income of the assessee should be assessed as 'Income from house property'. In view of the opinion of the third member, the appeal of the assessee was dismissed.

On appeal the High Court observed that only the building was leased out, along with a lift, tubewell and electrical fittings. The assessee had not placed any material on record to show that the building had peculiar amenities with which the building could be treated as a 'plant' and not a building simplicitor. No material has been brought on record to indicate that the building had peculiar amenities which could be commercially exploited, such as facilities of sterilisation of surgical instruments and bandages or an operation theatre. The Tribunal has given a categorical finding of fact that the building

which was leased out by the assessee was nothing else but a building simplicitor and was not a building which was equipped with specialized plant and machinery. This being a finding of fact, such findings cannot be interfered with, especially when nothing has been brought on record to indicate that the said finding was perverse. It is also apparent that the assessee is not running the business of a hospital and has only let out the building. Thus, the income derived by the assessee was from the ownership of the building and not from personal exertion, which is necessary to treat the income as a business income. In the light of this, the income derived by the assessee from the leasing out of its property was an income from house property and not a business income. (AY. 1990-91)

Hotel Arti Delux (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 227 Taxman 119 (Mag.) / (2015) 114 DTR 206 (All.)(HC)

392 **S.22 : Income from house property – Business income – Lease for thirty years – Sub letting of office – Assessable as income from house property. [S.23, 27(iii)(b), 28(i) 269UA]**

Owner of land entering into agreement for development of land. Assessee allotted office space on lease for thirty-three years with option of five consecutive renewals. Assessee sub let the premises and shown the income as inform business. AO assessed the said income as income from house property, which was confirmed by Tribunal. On appeal the High Court affirming the view of Tribunal held that the assessee was held to be the owner of office space. Amount earned from sub-letting office space is assessable as income from house property. (AY. 2003-04, 2004-05, 2006-07, 2008-09)

Rayala Corporation P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 95 DTR 321 / (2014) 363 ITR 630 / 264 CTR 282 / 228 Taxmann 250 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

393 **S.22 : Income from house property – Rental income from unused portion of business premises owned by assessee engaged in software business is income from house property**

The assessee was in the business of development of computer/ software. The assessee had received rent from unused portion of business premises and had considered the same as business income and further claimed depreciation in respect of the house property. The AO held that the said income would be treated as income from house property and disallowed depreciation in respect of said house property. The CIT (A) allowed the assessee's appeal. The Tribunal however, treated the income from house property and remanded the matter back to the AO.

The High Court observed that the assessee was in the business of the development of software and not in the business of constructing buildings and letting out the same. It further observed that the assessee had let out the premises so that it could earn some rental income. Hence, the High Court held that such rental income received was to be treated as income from house property and since no substantial question of law arose, the appeal was dismissed. (AY. 2003-04)

Tektronics Engineering Development (India) (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 221 Taxman 134 (Karn.)(HC)

S.22 : Income from house property – Construction – Liable to pay tax on annual letting value on unsold flats 394

High Court held that the assessee, a construction company is liable to pay tax on annual letting value of unsold flats owned by it as income from house property. The Court followed its own earlier years order. (AY. 1999-00, 2002-03, 2003-04)

CIT v. Ansal Housing and Construction Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 157 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.22 : Income from house property – Business income – Rental income from the unused portion of business premises owned by the assessee engaged in a software business was income from house property & not business income. [S.28(i)] 395

The assessee was in the business of development of computer software. It had shown a sum of ₹ 28,11,600 received as rent as part of income from business and claimed depreciation in respect of house property. The AO held that the said income would be treated as income from house property. He disallowed depreciation in respect of said house property. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the income arose from the exploitation of the commercial assets. Thus, it should be assessed as 'business' and, further, depreciation should be allowed in respect of the building. On appeal, the Tribunal held that income received by the assessee had to be assessed as income from house property and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Authority to give deduction treating the said income as a rental income. On appeal by the Assessee, The Hon'ble High Court opined that the assessee was not in the business of constructing, furnishing and letting out buildings. The only business of the assessee was the development of software. It owned the scheduled premises. When the assessee did not need the schedule premises, it let out the premises, so that it could earn some rental income. Therefore, the Hon'ble Court agreed with the Tribunal that it was not business income but 'income from house rental. The Hon'ble Court further agreed with the Tribunal that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of certain deductions in respect of rental income from house property that had not been extended by the assessing authority. Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in remanding the matter to the Assessing Authority to give the benefit of the said deductions after treating the income as income from house property. Hence, the Hon'ble Court dismissed the assessee's appeal. (AY. 2003-04)

Tektronics Engineering Development (India) (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 134 (Karn.)(HC)

Section 23 : Annual value how determined**S.23(1)(a) : Income from house property – Standard rent – Municipal rateable value – Duty of AO to determine standard rent if it is not fixed under Rent Control Legislation. [S.22]** 396

The question before the High Court was "whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the annual letting value of the self – occupied flat has to be the sum equivalent to the standard rent under the Bombay Rent Control Act and not the Municipal Annual Rateable value in computing the property income u/s. 23. The Honourable High Court held that Tribunal cannot ignore the Rent

Control legislation and prefer some other mode in determining fair rent or annual letting value of the property under section 23(1)(a). The Court also held that principle cannot be any different for self-occupied properties and in relation to which the exercise must be carried out in terms of the relevant section 23(1) of the Act.

Kokilaben D. Ambani (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 226 Taxman 208 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

- 397 **S.23(1)(a) : Income from house property – Annual value – Municipal valuation – Interest free deposit – Percentage interest free deposit could not be added for determining the annual letting value – Annual ratable value determined by BMC was correctly directed to be adopted – Decided on the facts of the case. [S.23(1)(b), Maharashtra Rent Control Act.]**

The assessee has let out the premises to sister concern and received the rent and also interest free deposit. The AO took the view that premises being not covered by Maharashtra Rent Control Act, its annual value was determined under section 23(1)(a). CIT(A) and Tribunal directed the AO to adopt the value determined by Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC) in accordance with provisions of section 23(1)(b). Revenue has filed an appeal the said order. Court observed that the revenue has not challenged the order for the assessment year 2005-06 though the facts are identical. The Court observed that situation in present previous assessment year and the assessment year under consideration has not changed, therefore larger controversy need not be gone into and does not arise in this appeal. Therefore no question of law arises. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Angel Infin (P) Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxman 78 (Bom.)(HC)

- 398 **S.23(1)(a) : Income from house property – Annual value – Notional rent on the security deposit cannot be taken into account for the determination of the annual value – Municipal rateable value – Standard rent – The AO either must undertake the exercise to fix the standard rent himself or in terms of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 if the same is applicable.[S.22, 23(1)(b)]**

The High Court had to consider the question of determination of “annual value” u/s. 23(1)(a) in the context of (i) whether the municipal valuation of the property was binding on the AO, (ii) whether notional interest on interest-free security deposit could be added and (iii) whether if the property was covered by the Rent Control Act but no standard rent there under, the AO can disregard the standard rent? HELD by the High Court:

As regards municipal valuation:

- (i) We are not in agreement with the department that the municipal rateable value cannot be accepted as a *bona fide* rental value of the property and it must be discarded straightway in all cases. There cannot be a blanket rejection of the same. If that is taken to be a safe guide, then, to discard it there must be cogent and reliable material;
- (ii) The market rate in the locality is an approved method for determining the fair rental value but it is only when the AO is convinced that the case before him is suspicious, determination by the parties is doubtful that he can resort to enquire about the prevailing rate in the locality. The municipal rateable value may not be binding on the AO but that is only in cases of afore referred nature. It is definitely a safe guide;

- (iii) In the event the security deposit collected and refundable interest free and the monthly compensation shows a total mismatch or does not reflect the prevailing rate or the attempt is to deflate or inflate the rent by such methods, then, as held by the Delhi High Court in *CIT v. Moni Kumar Subba (2011) 333 ITR 38 (Del)(FB)*, the AO is not prevented from carrying out the necessary investigation and enquiry. He must have cogent and satisfactory material in his possession and which will indicate that the parties have concealed the real position. He must not make a guess work or act on conjectures and surmises. There must be definite and positive material to indicate that the parties have suppressed the prevailing rate. Then, the enquiries that the AO can make would be for ascertaining the going rate. He can make a comparative study and make a analysis. In that regard, transactions of identical or similar nature can be ascertained by obtaining the requisite details. However, there also the AO must safeguard against adopting the rate stated therein straightway. He must find out as to whether the property which has been let out or given on leave and license basis is of a similar nature, namely, commercial or residential. He should also satisfy himself as to whether the rate obtained by him from the deals and transactions and documents in relation thereto can be applied or whether a departure therefrom can be made, for example, because of the area, the measurement, the location, the use to which the property has been put, the access thereto and the special advantages or benefits. It is possible that in a high rise building because of special advantages and benefits an office or a block on the upper floor may fetch higher returns or vice versa. Therefore, there is no magic formula and everything depends upon the facts and circumstances in each case. However, we emphasize that before the AO determines the rate by the above exercise or similar permissible process he is bound to disclose the material in his possession to the parties. He must not proceed to rely upon the material in his possession and disbelieve the parties. The satisfaction of the AO that the bargain reveals an inflated or deflated rate based on fraud, emergency, relationship and other considerations makes it unreasonable must precede the undertaking of the above exercise. After the above ascertainment is done by the AO he must, then, comply with the principles of fairness and justice and make the disclosure to the Assessee so as to obtain his view;

As regards addition of notional interest:

- (iv) Notional rent on the security deposit cannot be taken into account for the determination of the annual value. If the transaction itself does not reflect any of the aforestated aspects, then, merely because a security deposit which is refundable and interest free has been obtained, the AO should not presume that this sum or the interest derived therefrom at Bank rate is the income of the assessee till the determination or conclusion of the transaction. The AO ought to be aware of several aspects and matters involved in such transactions. It is not necessary that if the licence is for three years that it will operative and continuing till the end. There are terms and conditions on which the leave and licence agreement is executed by parties. These terms and conditions are willingly accepted. They enable the licence to be determined even before the stated period expires. Equally, the licensee can opt out of the deal. A leave and licence does not create any

interest in the property. Therefore, it is not as if the security deposit being made, it will be necessarily refundable after the third year and not otherwise. Everything depends upon the facts and circumstances in each case and the nature of the deal or transaction. These are not matters which abide by any fixed formula and which can be universally applied. Today, it may be commercially unviable to enter into a lease and, therefore, this mode of inducting a 'third party' in the premises is adopted. This may not be the trend tomorrow. Therefore, we do not wish to conclude the matter by evolving any rigid test;

As regards properties where standard rent is not fixed:

- (v) As regards properties covered by rent control legislation, the AO cannot brush aside the rent control legislation. The AO has to undertake the exercise contemplated by the rent control legislation for fixation of standard rent. The AO either must undertake the exercise to fix the standard rent himself and in terms of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 if the same is applicable or leave the parties to have it determined by the Court or Tribunal under that Act. (AY. 2004-05 to 2006-07)

CIT v. Tip Top Typography (2014) 368 ITR 330 / 107 DTR 282 / 270 CTR 262 / (2015) 228 taxmann 244 (Bom.) (HC)

Section 24 : Deductions from income from house property

399

S.24 : Income from house property – Interest paid on interest levied by bank, because of non-payment of instalments of borrowed capital, does not qualify for an admissible deduction

The assessee claimed deduction of compounded interest, i.e. interest paid on the interest levied by bank due to non-payment of instalments of capital borrowed while computing income under the head house property. The AO rejected this claim and completed the assessment while allowing deduction of only simple interest on amount borrowed from bank for construction of building. The Tribunal upheld the Assessment Order.

The High Court observed that section 24(1)(vi) of the Act stipulates that amount of interest payable on capital borrowed, *inter alia*, for construction of the property yielding income, is an admissible deduction and that only interest payable on such borrowed capital is to be deducted while computing income chargeable to income tax under the head 'income from house property'. Interest paid on interest levied by the bank, because of non-payment of instalments of borrowed capital to the bank, does not qualify for an admissible deduction. Accordingly, following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *Shew Kissen Bhattar v. CIT (1973) 89 ITR 61* held that interest paid on interest levied by the bank, because of non-payment of instalments of borrowed capital to the bank, does not qualify as an admissible deduction and hence the Tribunal was correct in allowing only simple interest as a deduction. (AY. 1985-86, 1986-87, 1988-89 to 1991-92) *Naman Kumar v. CIT (2014) 221 Taxman 269 (P&H) (HC)*

S.24 : Income from house property – Interest paid on loan borrowed at Australia for purchase of House at Australia which was let out held to be allowable – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – DTAA-India-Australia. [S.4, 5, 9(1)(v)(b), 22, 25, 90(2)]

400

Assessee purchased a house property in Australia and let it out on rent. Assessee had also obtained a loan from 'A' bank Australia for construction of said property. Since amount of interest paid on loan amount was higher than rental income, assessee incurred loss under head 'income from house property'. Assessee filed its return declaring income which included loss from house property. Revenue authorities held that as far as rental income from Australia was concerned, assessee was required to file return in Australia and such negative income could not be included in Indian income. In terms of section 5 in case of assessee, a resident, income accruing or arising outside India had to be assessed in India. Even otherwise, when assessee in terms of section 90(2), exercised option of filing return under Indian law, same could not have been refused merely because DTAA was applicable to assessee's case. Order of lower authorities were set aside. (AY. 2008-09)

Sumit Aggarwal v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 265 / 163 TTJ 509 (Chd.)(Trib.)

Section 27 : “Owner of house property”, “annual charge”, etc., defined

S.27 : Income from house property – Deemed owner – Lease for a term not less than 12 years will amount to transfer – Transferee will be deemed owner as per section 27(iib) of the Act – Matter remanded. [S. 22, 269UA]

401

Assessee was a tenant of a house. It had let out premises of that house to a bank. Tribunal and High Court considering assessee as deemed owner under section 269UA(f) (i) held that income received by assessee from that house property will be taxable under section 27(iib), however coming to above conclusion High Court and Tribunal did not take in to consideration period of lease of that premises which is an essential precondition under section 269UA(f)(i), i.e. twelve years. Matter was remanded to Tribunal for reconsideration. (AY.1991-92)

Nahalchand Laloochand (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 228 Taxman 1 / 114 DTR 375 / 274 CTR 246 (SC)

Editorial : Order of Bombay High Court in ITA No.458 of 2004 dt 28-11-2005 Nahalchand laloochand (P) Ltd v. CIT, was set a side.

Section 28 : Profits and gains of business or profession

S.28(i) : Business income – Unclaimed balances – Claim that amount had been taxed in earlier assessment years – No evidence to prove claim – Matter remanded

402

Held, that the AO asserted that no records were produced before him regarding the sum of ₹ 445.75 lakhs. No records were produced before the Appellate Authority also. The Appellate Authorities had not looked into the records. In the circumstances, the findings recorded by the Appellate Authorities were based on no evidence and, therefore, the findings could not be sustained. Matter remanded to the AO. (AY. 1999-2000)

CIT v. McDowell and Co. Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 293 / 227 Taxman 46 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

- 403 **S.28(i) : Business income – Income from house property – Building constructed on leasehold land – Lessee not owner of property – Income from building assessable as business income. [S.56]**

Held that the rents received by the assessee from the buildings constructed on leasehold land was assessable as business income. Dissented from *D. R. Puttanna Sons P. Ltd. v. CIT* [1986] 162 ITR 468 (Karn.)(HC).

CIT v. S. Premalata (Smt.) (2014) 367 ITR 298 / 271 CTR 249 / 52 taxmann.com 58 (T&AP)(HC)

- 404 **S.28(i) : Business income – Income from house property – Tourism – Assessee giving special right or privilege to franchisees to undertake hotel business in property of assessee against receipt of franchise fee – Income therefrom is business income and not income from house property. [S.22]**

The assessee was a wholly owned Government of Tamil Nadu undertaking engaged in the business of development of tourism in the State. Assessee treated the income as property income and claimed deduction at 30 per cent. The AO disallowed the deduction claim and assessed the income as income from business. The CIT(A) held that the assessee did not engage in any commercial or business activity to earn such income and that the income had to be treated as income from house property. The Tribunal was of the view that the assessee continued the business activity of tourism development in the State and carried on the same business, as the franchisees were doing under the same name. The findings of the Tribunal were that the properties were let out to the lessees/franchisees not because the assessee had withdrawn its business of carrying on tourism activities but only to recover better profits out of loss-making units. The assessee did not treat the let properties as non-business assets of the assessee and that the income derived from such transfer to franchisees was shown as franchisee fee. The Tribunal, therefore, concluded that what was derived as income out of the property was business income and not income out of house property and, hence, the assessee was not entitled to 30 per cent deduction. On appeal by assessee, view of the Tribunal was affirmed.(AY. 2005-06, 2006-07)

Tamil Nadu Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 533 / 227 Taxmann 179 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

- 405 **S.28(i) : Business income – Income from house property – Income from other sources – Letting out commercial complex – Matter was restored to file of AO for fresh adjudication. [S.22, 56]**

The assessee received certain income from letting out the commercial complex. He claimed it under the head 'income from business'. The Assessing Officer and the Commissioner held that income received by the assessee from letting out the commercial complex could be brought to tax under the head 'income from house property' and that the maintenance charges could be brought to tax under the head 'income from other sources'. On appeal, the Tribunal reversed the finding and held that the income earned by the assessee from letting out the commercial complex should be brought to tax under the head 'income from business'. On appeal, the High Court held that the materials on record did not clearly show that assessee had other properties and assessee was in

business of acquiring and letting properties, in view of which, the matter was to be restored to file of Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. (AY. 2002-03)
CIT v. Chamundi Industrial Estate (2014) 225 Taxmann 339 (Karn.)(HC)

S.28(i) : Business income – Mutuality – Chit funds scheme – Principle of mutuality does not apply – Income received was held to be taxable. [S.4, Chit Funds Act, 1982] 406

Assessee participating in a scheme offered by third party wherein others also joined. Principle of mutuality does not arise. Dividend received over and above what was contributed by assessee was held to be assessable as income. (AY. 1996-97)
V. Rajkumar v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 21 / 272 CTR 178 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 242 (Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)

S.28(i) : Business income – Excess cash – Income – Trading receipt – Excess cash received by branches of bank – Amounts refundable on demand to customers – Includible in total income of bank 407

According to the assessee, in the course of cash transactions at the branches and also in the case of automatic teller machines, excess amounts were found to be due to operational deficiency. These amounts were all to be repaid to customers as and when claimed by them and could not be considered as the income of the assessee. When these amounts were only to be refunded at the time when there was demand by the customers, the excess cash received by the branches of the assessee had to be included in the total income. (AY. 2005-06)
South Indian Bank Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 111 / 226 Taxman 130 / 105 DTR 299 (Ker.) (HC)

S.28(i) : Business income – Stamp valuation – Circle rate as stipulated under section 50C can become starting point of an inquiry but cannot be sole concluding reason to hold that there was understatement of sale consideration. [S.50C] 408

The assessee had declared business profits from sale of plots at village Behta Hazipur, Loni Pargana, District Ghaziabad. The Assessing Officer during the course of assessment proceedings asked the assessee to furnish the complete details of the transactions. The assessee furnished the relevant details. Assessing Officer observed that as the sale consideration received by the assessee was less than the guideline value fixed by the State Government for stamp duty for registration of sale deeds. Assessing Officer asked as to why the business profit should not be worked out on the basis of value determined for the stamp duty purposes as in section 50C of the Act. The assessee while stating that section 50C of the Act is not applicable to business profits submitted that the sales were made at the fair market value, furnished valuation reports by a registered valuer and also provided various comparable sale instances of same locality of around the same period together with relevant sale-deeds of these comparative sale instances. Assessing Officer did not accept the contention of the assessee. He made the addition of ₹ 54,66,400/-. Held that, the First Appellate Authority and the Tribunal have referred to the material produced by the assessee before the Assessing Officer, which included other contemporaneous sale deeds, copy of valuation certificate issued by the registered valuer etc. The said evidence/material was rejected by the Assessing Officer observing

that 'the value determined by the Government authorities is more acceptable than the value determined by the registered valuer'. We note that that the Assessing Officer has recorded the date of purchase and the value declared at the time of purchase, which was not disturbed. Thus, even assuming that the gain was taxable as capital gains, Revenue cannot succeed.

In view of the aforesaid position, we are not required to go into the question whether the income from sale of plot was taxable as 'business income' or 'income from capital gains'. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the present appeal and the same is dismissed. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Hanuman Prasad Ganeriwala (2014) 222 Taxmann 126 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

409 **S.28(i) : Business income – Income from house property – Software technology park – Letting out buildings along with other amenities – Assessable as business income. [S.22]**

Where assessee company was engaged in business of developing, operating and maintaining an industrial (software technology) park and providing infrastructure facilities to different companies as its business, Tribunal was correct in holding that lease rent received by assessee from letting out buildings along with other amenities in said park would be chargeable to tax under head 'income from business' and not under head 'income from house property'. (AY. 1999-2000 to 2004-05)

CIT v. Information Technology Park Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 460 / 225 Taxmann 25 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

410 **S.28(i) : Business income – Income from house property – Software technology park – Letting out buildings along with other amenities – Assessable as business income. [S.22]**

Where assessee company was engaged in business of developing, operating and maintaining an industrial (software technology) park and providing infrastructure facilities to different companies as its business, Tribunal was correct in holding that lease rent received by assessee from letting out buildings alongwith other amenities in said park would be chargeable to tax under head 'income from business' and not under head 'income from house property'. Followed *CIT v. Velankani Information Systems (P) Ltd. (2013) 218 Taxman 88/35 taxmann.com 1 (Karn.)(HC)*(AY. 2005-06 to 2009-10)

CIT v. Information Technology Park Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 460 / 225 Taxman 26 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

411 **S.28(i) : Business income – Short term capital gains – Dealer in shares – Premature redemption of a dividend plan mutual fund scheme – Assessable as business income and not as short term capital gains. [S.45]**

Where the assessee, engaged in the business of dealing in shares, debentures, mutual funds etc., earned income from the premature redemption of a dividend plan mutual fund scheme, the said income was liable to be taxed as business income.

CIT v. Pooja Investment (P) Ltd. 223 Taxmann 241 (Mag) / 106 DTR 269 (P&H)(HC)

S.28(i) : Business income – Capital gains – Non-convertible debentures – Detachable warrants – Assessable as business income. [S.45]

412

The purchase of non-convertible debentures was not for any investment, it is only for obtaining detachable warrants. Hence, the sale proceeds out of the sale of the detachable warrants after deduction of share application money constitutes business income. (AY. 1993-94)

Ganapati Enterprises v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 480 / 104 DTR 161 / 269 CTR 209 / (2015) 228 Taxman 211 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)

S.28(i) : Business income – Non-convertible debentures with detachable warrants – Sale of part of debentures at a loss of application money – Application money for debentures payable for acquisition of each detachable warrant – Loss not short-term capital loss – Sale proceeds of detachable warrants constitutes business income

413

The assessee applied for non-convertible debentures of ₹ 400 each issued by GACL. The assessee paid application money of ₹ 16,92,000. However, only 82,863 non-convertible debentures were issued to the assessee for a sum of ₹ 9,94,356. The excess paid by the assessee by way of application money was refunded to it. The debentures were accompanied by detachable warrants which entitled the assessee to buy an equal number of shares at a rate to be fixed by the company. The assessee sold the partly paid-up non-convertible debentures at a loss of the application money. The buyer paid the balance. Upon such payment, the detachable warrants became tradable. Out of 82,863 detachable warrants, the assessee sold 13,000 detachable warrants at the rate of Rs. 55 each and, thus, realised a sum of ₹ 7,15,000. The balance 69,863 detachable warrants were retained by the assessee. The assessee contended that since it transferred these units only on the consideration of ISL agreeing to pay the remaining unpaid amount, i.e., the call money, the entire application money, amounting to ₹ 12 per debenture which worked out to aggregate of ₹ 9,94,356, constituted short-term capital loss. Since the cost of acquisition of the detachable warrants was not ascertainable, the sale proceeds of these detachable warrants constituted a capital receipt not liable to tax. The Assessing Officer rejected the contention of the assessee, holding that the application money for non-convertible debentures at ₹ 12 each was payable for acquisition of each detachable warrant. The assessee had retained the detachable warrants worth (69863 x 12) ₹ 8,38,356 and recovered a sum of ₹ 7,15,000 on sale of 13,000 detachable warrants. Thus, the total receipt was (8,38,356 + 7,15,000) ₹ 15,53,356. After deducting the application money (15,53,356 - 9,94,356), a sum of ₹ 5,59,000 was earned which was treated as his business income. The Commissioner (Appeals) held in favour of the assessee but the Tribunal restored the order of the Assessing Officer. On appeal :

Held, dismissing the appeal, that it could not be said that the detachable warrants were received by the assessee except at the cost of ₹ 12 subscribed by it. The view taken both by the Income-tax Officer and the Tribunal was a reasonable view in the facts and circumstances of the case. (AY. 1993-94)

Ganapati Enterprises v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 480 / 104 DTR 161 / 269 CTR 209 / (2015) 228 Taxman 211 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)

414 **S.28(i) : Business income – On Money – Change of contention made before lower authorities**

The assessee was engaged in the business of construction and development activities. During the course of survey operations, certain materials were seized leading to Assessing Officer ultimately framing an assessment during which, he held that there was 40% cash component in the projects developed by the assessee. Before the CIT(A), the assessee contended that the entire on-money should not be taken to be the income of the developer and only 35% of such on-money could be considered as the service charges as the income of the assessee developer. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition only of ₹ 46,55,000/- on the premise that not the entire on-money but only the income of the assessee which should be taxed. He thus reduced the addition to 35% of ₹ 1,33,00,000/- and confirmed it to the limited extent of ₹ 46,55,000/-. In appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee contended that the profit from the sale of the bungalows would be in the vicinity of 25% to 35% which could be treated as the income. The Tribunal recorded that the assessee had admitted before the CIT (Appeals) that a developer - assessee would earn profit in the ratio of 35% on the on-money which should be considered as the assessee's service charges and the income. The Tribunal held that the assessee could not be allowed to now turn around such contention. The High Court confirmed the Tribunal order. (AY. 2002-03)

Gargi Construction Co. v. ITO (2014) 220 Taxmann 38 (Mag.) / (Guj.)(HC)

415 **S.28(i) : Business income – Sale of shops – Suppressed sale price**

The assessee firm was a developer of shopping complexes. During the year, the assessee declared certain income from sale of shops. The AO was of the view that the selling price of shops declared by the assessee was on lower side and thus, rejected the books of account and estimated total income at higher amount. The Tribunal noted that all shops sold by the assessee were registered with sub-registrar and sale deeds were executed for transactions in question. The Tribunal observed that the AO simply rejected the sale deeds and a higher sale consideration was adopted for the purpose of computing income without any reference made to the DVO. It further observed that the AO had not tried to inquire about the circle rates fixed by the Sub Registrar and not even called for or examined the sale deeds. The Tribunal held that the revenue failed to establish that the full consideration recorded by the assessee firm was not the actual price for the transfer of shops and accordingly deleted the addition made. On further appeal by the revenue the High Court dismissed the appeal. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Shanti Enterprise (2014) 220 Taxmann 170 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

416 **S.28(i) : Business income – Additions made on account of unaccounted production and sale of glass – Assessee did not commence the production of the glass – Additions deleted**

Assessee was engaged in business of manufacturing glass. Assessing Officer added certain amount to income of assessee on account of unaccounted production and sale of glass. Commissioner (Appeals) deleted impugned addition holding that no process of manufacturing of glass during year was carried out and only packaging of same was done. Tribunal confirmed order of Commissioner (Appeals). The High Court held that since issue relating to deletion of addition essentially was in realm of facts and there

being no perversity in deletion of such addition, orders of appellate authorities deserved to be upheld. (AY. 1994-95)

CIT v. Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 129 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.28(i) : Business income – Capital or revenue – Subvention receipts from its principal shareholder was held to revenue receipt

417

The assessee company was engaged in manufacturing digital electronic switching systems, computer software and providing software services. During the years under consideration, it received certain amounts from a company 'S', which was its principal shareholder. It explained the said payment as subvention from principal shareholders. It stated that payment made by 'S' was to make good loss incurred by it and it was capital receipt in nature. However, the AO did not agree and treated the receipt as revenue in nature. The Commissioner (Appeals) reversed the order of the AO. The Tribunal also upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). On an appeal by the Department, the High Court, upholding the order of the Tribunal, held that financial aid was made by 'S' to meet recurring expenses. Financial assistance was not extended by 'S' either for setting up any unit or for the expansion of the existing business or for the acquisition of any assets and therefore, the receipts were held to be revenue in nature. (AY. 1999-00 to 2001-02)

CIT v. Siemens Public Communication Networks Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 405 / 265 CTR 532 / 98 DTR 151 (Karn.)(HC)

S.28(i) : Business income – Astrologer – Amounts received for prediction – Assessable as business income

418

The assessee, an astrologer by profession, for the assessment year 2002-03, received the amount of ₹ 10 lakhs from certain persons. In their confirmation letters, these persons indicated that they had paid the amount since they were happy on account of the assembly election results of Tamil Nadu in the year 2001. According to the assessee, he predicted the election result of their leader and since these persons were grateful for the prediction made by him, these contributions had been made. The assessee contended that the contribution being in the form of gift were not taxable. AO held that the assessee had rendered services by performing poojas and further procedure hence taxable as business income. The view of AO was confirmed by Tribunal. On appeal the High Court held that the amount of ₹ 10 lakhs was income from the business of the assessee. Hence assessable as business income. (AY. 2002-03)

N. K. Unnikrishna Panicker v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 187 / 102 DTR 380 / 267 CTR 566 / 222 Taxmann 237 (Ker.)(HC)

S.28(i) : Business income – Subsidy – Grant in aid – Capital or revenue receipt – Sugar development fund was held to be revenue receipt

419

Sum received by assessee by way of grant-in-aid out of sugar development fund to meet expenses of maintaining buffer stock was revenue receipt liable for taxation.

K. M. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 637 / (2015) 229 Taxman 467 (All.)(HC)

420 **S.28(i) : Business income – Settlement of contract – Damages for breach of contract assessable as business income. [S.43(5)]**

The word ‘Settled’ or ‘settlement’ in connection with the contract has not been defined in the Income-tax Act or in the Contract Act or in the Sale of Goods Act or in any other statute. However the proper meaning to be given to the words “to contract, settled” in the definition clause would be “a contract determined or concluded or disposed of”. By the use of expression “settled” what is intended to be dealt with is a case of performance of contract and not non-performance. If the payment is made as damages for breach of contract, it cannot be considered to be a “contract settled”. If the payment is by way of damages and not by way of settlement by a contract, the question of actual delivery or transfer of the goods would be irrelevant. Income was rightly assessed as business income. (AY. 1974-75) *CIT v. Premier Vegetable Products Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 464 / 97 DTR 230 / 227 Taxmann 259 (Mag.) / 264 CTR 417 (Raj.)(HC)*

421 **S.28(i) : Business income – Investment management and advisory fees – Consistency – Income to be assessed as business income and not as income from other sources. [S.56]**

Held, there was no evidence to prove that assessee did not carry out activity of investment management services. Merely because expenses could not be identified and substantiated by the assessee, it could not be held that income was not derived from business activity. Also, since there was no change in the terms of agreement or in the nature of services rendered *vis-à-vis* that of earlier year, on the principle of consistency, income had to be treated as business income and not as income from other sources. (AY. 2000-01) *CIT v. Ashok Mittal (2014) 360 ITR 12 / 222 Taxmann 233 / 100 DTR 233 (Delhi.)(HC)*

422 **S.28(i) : Business income – Capital gains – Profits on sale of mutual fund – Dealer in securities – Even a solitary transaction of redemption of (non-tradeable) mutual fund units amounts to a business activity for an assessee dealing in securities. [S.45]**

Merely because deposits in mutual funds are not traded in the nature of sale and purchase of equity shares and such transactions are different in effect and consequences is no ground to treat those differently. Frequency of dealings in deposits of mutual funds with the strategy of firstly investing in tenurial plans and then getting redemption within the same year of deposit and at times resulting in huge profits while at other times in loss, was the usual business activity of the assessee. Such before term redemption, is done in the usual course of business by the assessee clearly to increase its actual cash inflow to tide over its commitments made in the market and at times to earn higher interest in other lucrative investment plans contemporaneously emerging in the market. In this case, in the name of consistency the assessee had tried to hoodwink the authorities. Rather previous conduct of the assessee reveals that the accounts had been manipulated by the assessee to treat the investment as a capital asset only as a camouflage and smokescreen. It is a case where intention as also principle of consistency sought to be used by the assessee in its favour rather goes against it as year after year the same manipulation strategy and maneuverability had been adopted to hoodwink the revenue. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Pooja Investment Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 106 DTR 269 / 223 Taxmann 241 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

CIT v. Hero Investments (P) Ltd. (2014) 106 DTR 269 (P&H)(HC)

CIT v. Bahadur Chand Investment (P) Ltd. (2014) 106 DTR 269 (P&H)(HC)

S.28(i) : Business income – Investment in shares – Not keeping separate books together with frequent transactions means that gains from shares have to be assessed as business profits instead of as STCG. [S.45] 423

It was observed that separate books were not used. Amounts were freely transferred from the profits gained to business and *vice-versa*. Since very frequent purchase and sale of shares have been done it indicates that the main intention of the assessee was to earn income out of these shares which have been claimed to be under the head of short term capital gains. Having regard to the short duration of holding of the shares, and the lack of clarity in the account books, this Tribunal was wrong in assessing the gains as STCG instead of as business profits. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. D & M Components Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 179 / 223 Taxman 154 (Mag.)/103 DTR 325 (Delhi) (HC).

Editorial: Refer D&M Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT (2012) 49 SOT 224 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.28(i) : Business income – Income from house property – Rental income from temporary letting out of shops flats in commercial complex. [S.22, 36(1)(iii)] 424

Assessee was engaged in the business of construction and sale of properties. Income from temporary letting out a few units in a complex constituted business income and not income from house property. Deduction under section 36(1)(iii) is available. (AY. 1995-96 to 2000-01)

Nirmala Sahu (Late) (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 98 DTR 55 (All.)(HC)

S.28(i) : Business income – Legal consultancy services – Advance from parties – Mercantile system of accounting – Matter remanded. [S.145] 425

Assessee, engaged in business of legal consultancy services. It received advance from five parties as future consultancy fee in relation to some matter pending before SEBI with respect to some IPO scam. AO taxed said receipts as business receipts of year on belief that no client would give money to an advocate unless some work is done by that advocate. Assessee submitted that impugned receipt had been shown as income in assessment year 2010-11 when proceedings before SEBI was concluded same had been assessed as such. Since AO had not considered chronological events of case, issue was to be restored back to him for fresh adjudication Matter remanded. (AY. 2007-08)

Corporate Law Chambers India v. Dy. CIT (2014) 32 ITR 477 / (2015) 152 ITD 74 (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.28(i) : Business income – Lease equalization charges – Depreciation – Difference between annual lease charge of leased assets and depreciation allowed on said leased asset under Income-tax Act should be taken into consideration and not difference between annual lease charge and depreciation claimed by assessee in books of account as per Companies Act. [S.145] 426

The assessee, a non-banking financial company, engaged in leasing business. During the years under consideration, the assessee had entered into various transactions of finance lease worked out the lease equalization in respect of each and every lease transactions as per the guidelines issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI). The lease equalization so worked out was claimed by the assessee was claimed as

deduction while computing its total income. AO disallowed the claim which was confirmed by CIT(A). Tribunal held that when the relevant transactions are treated as finance lease and the assessee is allowed depreciation after having found him the owner of the leased assets, the depreciation allowed as per the rates prescribed in the Income Tax Act could be more than the depreciation claimed by the assessee in its books of account at the rate prescribed under the Companies Act. Therefore, it is necessary that while allowing deduction on account of lease equalization charges for the purpose of computing total income under the Income-tax Act, the difference between the annual lease charge of the leased assets and depreciation allowed on the said leased asset under the Income-tax Act should be taken into consideration and not the difference between the annual lease charge and depreciation claimed by the assessee in the books of account as per the Companies Act. Matter was remanded for calculation. (AY. 1994-95 to 1997-98)

Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 297 / 102 DTR 251 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 427 **S.28(i) : Business income – Capital gains – Profit from sale of land – Converted ancestral land in to smaller plots – Capital assets in to stock in trade – Assessable as business income. [S. 45(2)]**

The Tribunal held that there is sufficient evidence to show that the land which was held as capital asset was converted into stock in trade with the intention to develop and sell the same as are organized and systematic activity and, therefore, the profit arising from the sale of land was chargeable to tax as business income and not as capital gains. (AY. 2003-04, 2006-07, 2007-08)

ITO v. Shiv Kumar Daga (2014) 159 TTJ 415 / 97 DTR 175 / 151 ITD 481 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 428 **S.28(i) : Business income – Income from other sources – Interest on fixed deposits with banks for short periods one day to ninety days is assessable as income from business. [S.56]**

Interest earned by the assessee-company on fixed deposits for short periods ranging from one day to ninety days is taxable as business income and not as income from other sources. (AY. 2009-10)

Green Infra Ltd. v. ITO (2013) 145 ITD 240 / (2014) 98 DTR 187 / 159 TTJ 728 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 429 **S.28(i) : Business income – Interest on fixed deposits with bank for performance guarantee – Assessable as business income**

Fixed deposits with bank were kept by the assessee as its business necessity to obtain the performance guarantee in favour of clients. Interest on such deposits is business income. (AY. 2002-03 to 2004-05)

ITO v. Ricoh India Ltd. (2013) 143 ITD 242 / (2014) 98 DTR 435 / 165 TTJ 211 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.28(i) : Business loss – Difference between setting up and commencement of business – Real estate business – Loan taken and participation in tender for acquisition of land – Business set up-Loss incurred was business loss. [S.37(I)]

430

The assessee was a company incorporated on August 22, 2005, and according to its memorandum of association, it was to carry on the business of real estate development including purchase and sale of land. The official liquidator of the Karnataka High Court floated a tender for sale of 140 acres of land belonging to a company which had gone into liquidation. In order to participate in the tender, the assessee obtained a loan of ₹ 186 crores on November 29, 2005, from its holding company and on the same day deposited the amount as earnest money in response to the tender floated by the official liquidator. The assessee was, however, not successful in purchasing the land and, therefore, the earnest money was returned to it with interest of ₹ 62,28,333. On the amount borrowed from its holding company the assessee was liable to pay interest of ₹ 1,79,37,534. The assessee claimed the difference between the interest received and the interest paid as loss under the head “Business”. The claim was rejected by the AO. The Tribunal observed that having regard to the business of the assessee, which was the development of real estate, the participation in the tender represented commencement of one activity which would enable the assessee to acquire the land for development. The assessee was in a position to commence business and that meant that the business had been set up. It allowed the claim of the assessee. On appeal by revenue the Court, dismissing the appeals held that the finding of the Tribunal was a finding of fact and it could not be said that the finding was without any basis or material. Moreover, the Tribunal did take note of the distinction between the commencement of a business and setting up of a business. The loss was a business loss. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Dhoomketu Builders and Developers P. Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 680 / 216 Taxman 76 (Delhi)(HC)

Editorial : Order in Dhoomketu Builders and Development P. Ltd. v. Addl. CIT [2014] 2 ITR 172 (Delhi)(Trib) is affirmed

S.28(i) : Business loss – Date of setting up of business – Commitment to commence business – When the first steps are taken by a trader, the business is set up, commencement of purchase and then sales is post-set up-Business loss is held to be allowable. [S. 3, 37(1)]

431

The assessee-company was incorporated on September 19, 2007. Even before the incorporation, correspondence had been made with well known companies. It rented out office premises in the month of October, 2007. A bank account was opened on October 4, 2007. Employees were also appointed during that period. Tax deduction at source for the employees was also placed on record. Registration under the Shops and Establishments Act was also effected. These activities were the first stage activities which would lay the foundation for placing orders for procuring the stock and storing them in a warehouse or shop followed by the third stage of marketing them. For the assessee, a foreign entity, without establishing itself under the local laws, appointing personnel, identifying prospective manufacturers, clients, etc., obtaining storage facilities followed by stock-in-trade, the business of trading could not commence. The exercise was a precursor to commencement but post-set up. The activities demonstrated the

setting up of the business by the assessee with a commitment to commence the business. Therefore, the order of the AO disallowing ₹ 8,64,07,610 claimed as business loss was not justified. (AY. 2008-09)

Carefour WC and C India P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 692 / (2015) 228 Taxman 261 (Mag.) / 121 DTR 249 (Delhi)(HC)

432 **S.28(i) : Business loss – Off market transaction – Sale of shares – Below market rate – Disallowance of loss was not justified**

When off market transactions of purchase and sale of shares are permitted in law and there was no evidence to suggest that artificially shares were sold at rates lower than prevailing market rates, conclusion of Assessing Officer that assessee carried off market transactions by simple purchase bills or sales bills ignoring market rates to avoid tax was baseless. On facts entries were made in the account of both sides, i.e. Purchaser and seller and delivery receipts were also passed demonstrating contemporaneous sale and purchase of the shares. Disallowance of loss was not justified.

CIT v. Prudent Finance (P.) Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 125 (Guj.)(HC)

433 **S.28(i) : Business loss – Amortization of securities premium – Held to be allowable as business loss – Instruction is binding on revenue. [S.119]**

As per the RBI guidelines, assessee, a co-operative bank, was required to deposit certain amounts in Government securities and to hold the same till maturity in order to maintain Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR). In certain cases, the acquisition of such securities was at a value higher than the face value of the security itself. The assessee claimed such premium so paid in acquiring the securities as a loss amortized over the entire period of security. The AO as well as CIT(A) rejected the assessee's claim. The Court observed that the CBDT Circular No.17 of 2008 dated November 26, 2008 clearly provided for amortisation of premium paid on acquisition of securities when the same were acquired at the rate higher than the face value. Such amortization would have to be for the remaining period of maturity. Also, the instruction in question having been issued under section 119(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, would bind the Revenue and hence the tax appeal was dismissed.

CIT v. Rajkot District Co-op Bank Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxman 240 (Guj.)(HC)

434 **S.28(i) : Business loss – Abandoned project – Claim was pending before arbitrator – Allowable as deduction. [S.29, 37(1)]**

The assessee company was awarded a contract by Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board. (MPEB) The assessee commenced the project and incurred the expenditure. The Contract was terminated by the MSEB. The assessee debited the expenditure spent on abandoned project as revenue expenditure. On the date of assessment arbitration award was passed, however the MSEB has not paid the amount as an appeal was pending before High Court. Tribunal disallowed the claim on the ground that assessee had made claim before the arbitrator. On appeal the High Court held that the loss was allowable. As and when the money is received the income will be chargeable to tax. Loss claimed by the assessee was allowable as business loss. (AY. 2002-03)

Asia Power Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 226 Taxman 136 (Mag.) / (2015) 370 ITR 257 / 122 DTR 201 (Karn.)(HC)

S.28(i) : Business loss – Illegal business – Business expenditure – Even if the business is illegal, a loss which is incidental to such business has to be allowed, and the Explanation to s. 37(1) has no bearing it cannot override the provisions of section 28. [S.37(1)]

435

The assessee claimed a deduction on account of gold seized by the Custom Authorities. The Tribunal rejected the claim by relying on the Explanation to s. 37(1) of the Act. The assessee claimed before the High Court that as the loss is incidental to the business carried on, the loss is allowable u/s. 28 and the provision of Section 37(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 cannot override the provision of Section 28. HELD by the High Court allowing the appeal:

In view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of *Dr. T.A. Quereshi v. CIT (2006) 287 ITR 547 (SC)*, the loss which was incurred during the course of business even if the same is illegal is required to be compensated and for the loss suffered by the assessee has to be allowed as a deduction. (AY. 1999-2000)

Bipinchandra K. Bhatia v. Dy. CIT (Guj.)(HC); www.itatonline.org

S.28(i) : Business loss – Valuation of stock – Banking business – RBI guidelines – Loss due to diminution in value of current investment and amortization of premium on investments held to be maturity – Held to be deductible. [S. 37(1), 145]

436

Held that the assessee was entitled to deduction with respect to the diminution in value of investment and amortization of premium on investment held to maturity on the ground of mandate of the Reserve Bank of India guidelines. (AY. 2001-02 to 2005-06) *CIT v. HDFC Bank Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 505 / 107 DTR 140 / 226 Taxman 132 (Mag) (Bom.)(HC)*

S.28(i) : Business loss – Stock-in-trade – Loss on sale – Allowable as business loss

437

Where securities held by bank under held to Maturity (HTM) category constitute its stock-in-trade and consequential loss on sale of said securities is revenue in nature and same is allowable. (AY. 2007-08 and 2008-09)

Cosmos Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 90 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.28(i) : Business loss – Foreign currency loan – acquiring a capital asset for expansion of profit earning apparatus, it was to be treated as capital loss

438

Assessee-company advanced foreign currency loan in Indian rupees to its wholly subsidiary company, 'A', Mauritius, for acquiring entire share capital of a South Africa based company. Subsequently, 'A', Mauritius converted loan advanced by assessee into preference shares. However, at time of conversion of loan into cumulative redeemable preferential shares, due to decline in value of Rands, loan amount declined. Assessee claimed that loss was incurred due to difference in foreign exchange conversion rate, and, thus, it was to be allowed as business loss. Revenue authorities rejected assessee's claim. Since loss in question was suffered in course of acquiring a capital asset for expansion of profit earning apparatus, it was to be treated as capital loss which could not be allowed as deduction. (AY. 2007-08)

Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 203 (Cochin)(Trib.)

439 **S.28(i) : Business loss – Foreign currency fluctuation loss – Foreign exchange forward contracts – Mercantile system of accounting – Allowable. [S.145]**

The assessee entered into foreign exchange forward contracts with banks in order to hedge foreign currency fluctuation. It incurred a (net) foreign exchange loss as a result of ‘marking to market’ the forward contracts. AO held that loss was not allowable as deduction in the year of incurrence. Tribunal held that the loss has been incurred for hedging of foreign currency fluctuation involved in sales invoices on the basis of forward contracts, which is a business decision to safeguard its interest. The loss has been incurred on the basis of scientific method in the ordinary course of business. The loss being based on a scientific method, on the basis of contractual liability with banks and on mercantile system has to be allowed to the assessee. It is a business loss incurred by the assessee on mercantile system which method is consistently followed by the assessee. Foreign currency fluctuation loss being based on scientific method, on basis of contractual liability with banks and on mercantile system had to be allowed. (AY. 2008-09)

Bechtel India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 733 (Delhi)(Trib.)

440 **S.28(i) : Business loss – Income – Amount debited to squared up account – No disallowance can be made.[S.4]**

Assessee debited in the P&L account of “loss on transfer of telephone infrastructure” on account of squared up corresponding credit of equal amount representing “amount withdrawn from reserve for business structuring” in the inner column of the P&L account, there was no effective debit to the P&L account and these entries being absolutely profit neutral so far as the profit as per P& Loss account therefore no adjustment were required and therefore the disallowance of the impugned loss made by the AO was not sustainable. (AY. 2008-09)

Bharati Airtel Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 101 DTR 154 (Delhi)(Trib.)

441 **S.28(iv) : Business income – Benefit or perquisite – Allotment of shares at concessional rate – Not taxable as income. [s. 2(24)(vd)]**

Assessee was allotted shares of another company at a concessional rate of ₹ 90 per share. AO took the view that market value of said shares was about 455 per share and charged the differential amount to tax under section 28(iv). There was a bar for block period of three years prohibiting the sale of shares. Tribunal held that allotment of shares at concessional rate was not taxable as income. On appeal by revenue, affirming the view of Tribunal the Court held that benefit could be said to have arisen only if any person would have got the differential price by selling the shares. Tribunal was correct in holding that as long as the bar operates there is no question of any benefit in the form of differential price accruing to the assessee. Further there exists a distinction between “accrual of income” and “arising of income”, while accrual is almost notional in nature, the other is factual. When the parliament has consciously chosen to restrict the taxation of benefit only when it has arisen, it is not permissible to tax the benefit by treating them as “accruals”. Even if the assumption made by the AO that sale of shares would have yielded that differential price is taken as permissible in law, at the most it

amounts to “accrual and not “arising” of income, therefore the differential price of shares allotted to the assessee is not taxable under section 28(iv). (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. K. N. B. Investments (P) Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 616 / 272 CTR 201 (AP)(HC)

CIT v. K. A. R. Investments (P) Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 616 / 272 CTR 201 (AP)(HC)

S.28(v) : Business income – Non-compete fee [position prior to 1-4-2003] Since amendment in Finance Act, 2002 was not clarificatory but amendatory in nature, non-competition fee received under a negative covenant was taxable only with effect from 1-4-2003, and not retrospectively, therefore, non-compete fees received were capital receipts and not taxable.[S.4]

442

The High Court dismissed the appeal of the revenue by relying on the decisions in the case of *Guffic Chem (P) Ltd. v. CIT [2011] 332 ITR 602* and *CIT v. K. Chandrakanth Kini [2012] 347 ITR 388 (Kar.)* wherein it has been held that the payment received as non-competition fee under a negative covenant would be treated as a capital receipt till the Assessment Year 2003-04. After the amendment to section 28 via the Finance Act, 2003, with effect from 1st April 2003 such capital receipts would be taxable. The amendment made by Finance Act, 2002 would apply prospectively. (AY. 1998-99, 1999-2000)

CIT v. Prakash Ladhani (2014) 220 Taxmann 213 (Karn.)(HC)

S.28(va) : Business income – Cash or kind – Capital asset – Income from sale of shares – Under an agreement wherein all pervasive control being entrusted to purchaser and absolute exclusion of the seller whether as a shareholder or for its management and control would be business income and not capital gain. [2(14), 45]

443

The assessee disclosed income from short-term and long-term capital gains on account of sale of shares *vide* a share purchase agreement. The AO referred to various clauses of the agreement, including the clause on non-compete fees, and concluded that the transfer was of business from assessee to the purchaser with all passive control and thus treated the income from it as business income u/s. 28(va). The Tribunal upheld the view of the AO. On an appeal by the assessee, the High Court held that transfer was not an innocent transfer of sale of shares that would take place within section 2(14) but a transfer of business with all pervasive control being entrusted to purchaser to complete and absolute exclusion of the seller, whether as a shareholder or for its management and control, and hence it would be taxable as business income. (AY. 2006-07)

Sumeet Taneja v. CIT (2013) 261 CTR 494 / (2014) 220 taxman 368 (P&H)(HC)

Editorial: The agreement specifically mentioned consideration was for non compete fees.

S.28(va) : Business income – Capital gains – Non-compete fee – Sale of shares coupled with restrictive covenant. [S.48, 55(2)(a)]

444

Tribunal held that prior to assessment year 2003-04, non-compete fee was a capital receipt not liable to tax and, therefore 25 per cent of the sale consideration of the shares is not liable to tax in (AY. 2002-03)

Reliance Industries v. Adl. ACIT (2012) 79 DTR 315 / (2013) 55 SOT 8 / (2014) 159 TTJ 349 / (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 31 : Repairs and insurance of machinery, plant and furniture

- 445 **S.31 : Repairs – Current repairs – Lease hold land – Possession continued after expiry of lease period – Written down value and cost of construction, cannot be allowed as current repairs**

The assessee took a certain extent of land on lease from the Government of Kerala and constructed a building for business purpose. After the expiry of the lease period, the Government did not extend the lease. This matter was under challenge before the Court and there was a stay of the directions issued by the Government and a direction to maintain *status quo*. The assessee claimed the written down value of the cost of construction as revenue expenditure, under the head “current repairs”. The AO disallowed the claim. The Tribunal found that the continuation of the assessee in possession of the property after the expiry of the lease period had to be construed as holding over of the property after the expiry of the lease period. Therefore, there was no question of allowing the written down value and the cost of construction as “current repairs” that “current repairs” is an expenditure incurred by the assessee for the purpose of maintaining machinery, building, etc., used for the purpose of business and therefore, it could not be the written down value of the cost of construction. The Hon’ble High Court held by dismissing the appeal, that the assessee could not claim the benefit of the written down value of the cost of construction which it had incurred under the head “current repairs”. (AY. 2007-08)

Coastal Resorts (India) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 363 ITR 482 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 488 (Ker.) (HC)

- 446 **S.31 : Repairs – Current repairs – Expenditure on replacement of dies and moulds allowable as current repairs**

Expenditure on replacement of dies and moulds allowable as current repairs. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. TVS Motors Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 1 / 223 Taxman 197 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

- 447 **S.31 : Repairs – Current repairs – Expenditure should not result in acquisition of new asset – Expenditure on replacing entire flooring of office and factory premises with marble flooring – Expenditure of capital nature – Not deductible. [S.30]**

The assessee claimed deduction of an expenditure incurred in replacing the floor of its entire office and factory premises with marble. The claim was rejected by the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. On appeal to the High Court, held, dismissing the appeal, that non-marble flooring was ripped apart and replaced in an area covering 9,000 square feet with new type of flooring, i.e., marble flooring. The new flooring was of different type and a distinct advantage of permanent character occurred. The expenditure was not deductible. (AY. 2007-08)

Surinder Madan v. ACIT (2013) 218 Taxmann 461/ 94 DTR 185 / (2014) 364 ITR 461 / 268 CTR 59 (Delhi)(HC)

S.31 : Repairs – Current repairs – Replacement of an old machine with a new one – Not current repairs

448

The assessee engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of yarn, replaced the old machine with the new one and claimed such amount as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of revenue expenditure on the premise that the same was capital in nature. The CIT(A) held that expenditure incurred on modernization by replacing old worn out machinery with new machines could only be treated as a revenue expenditure. The Tribunal confirmed the CIT(A) order. The High Court observed that the entire machinery cannot be regarded as a single asset and each separate machinery was held to be an independent entity, though all machines put together constitute the production process. The asset gives the assessee an enduring benefit of better and more efficient production over a period of time. Such replacement of assets was held to be not amounting to “current repairs”. Hence, High Court decided in favour of revenue and the orders of Tribunal and CIT(A) were set aside. (AY. 1991-92) *CIT v. Madras Spinners Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 116 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)*

Section 32 : Depreciation**S.32 : Depreciation – Investment allowance – Carry forward and set-off – Unabsorbed depreciation against capital gains – Allowable but restricted to two-thirds of such allowance – Matter remanded to Assessing Officer to recompute unabsorbed depreciation. [S.32(2), 32A(3), 34A, 45]**

449

The AO restricted the claim of unabsorbed depreciation under against capital gains holding that in view of the restriction under section 34A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, no set off of unabsorbed depreciation could be allowed and passed the assessment order without giving benefit of the unabsorbed depreciation. The Commissioner (Appeals) directed the Assessing Officer to set off the entire income assessed against the unabsorbed depreciation and fix the total income of the assessee for the current year at nil. This was confirmed by the Tribunal. On appeal :

Held, that the set off of unabsorbed depreciation can be allowed against capital gains, however, it shall be restricted to two-thirds of such allowance. The Assessing Officer was directed to recompute the unabsorbed depreciation after notice to the official liquidator. (AY. 1992-93)

CIT v. Madras Forging and Allied Industries (CBE) Ltd. (In liquidation) (2014) 369 ITR 552 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 325 (Mad.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Non-compete fees – Intangible asset – Depreciation is allowable

450

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of security and access control system integration. The assessee entered into a Business Purchase Agreement (BPA) with DETPL. As per the BPA, the assessee-company purchased the business of DETPL for a consideration of ₹ 11.71 crores. Some of the employees of DETPL were terminated, while others were retained. The purchase consideration included a sum of ₹ 54.43 lakhs as non-compete fees paid to ‘S’ and a sum of ₹ 43.55 lakhs paid to him for the purchase of patents. The payment of non-compete fees was treated as revenue expenditure in the computation of total income as per the Income-tax Act, while in the books of account it

was treated as an asset by the assessee. The Assessing Authority held that non-compete fees is capital in nature and, therefore, he disallowed it as a revenue expenditure. The Court held that right to carry on business without competition has an economic interest and money value. It was also held that whenever assessee makes payment for non-compete fee, commercial right comes into existence and, therefore, that right which assessee acquires on payment of non-compete fee confers in him a commercial or a business right which is held to be similar in nature to know-how, patents, copyrights, trademarks, licenses, franchises. Also, commercial right so acquired by assessee unambiguously falls in category of an 'intangible asset' and, consequently, depreciation provided under section 32(1) is to be allowed. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Ingersoll Rand International Ind. Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxmann 176 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

451 **S.32 : Depreciation – Electric fittings – Part and parcel of wind mill – Depreciation is allowable**

The Court held that civil structure and electric fitting, equipment's are part and parcel of windmill and cannot be separated from same. Hence, assessee's claim for depreciation for cost incurred in civil work, foundation, electrical component, installation and common power evacuation while installing windmills, is justified.

CIT v. K. K. Enterprises (2014) 227 Taxmann 181 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)

452 **S.32 : Depreciation – Power generating undertaking – Option to claim depreciation – Returns filed under section 139(1) and exercised option in form prescribed therein – No separate letter or request or intimation with regard to exercise of option required – Option once exercised will continue to subsequent years – Appeals of revenue were dismissed.[S. 139(1), IT Rules, 1962, R. 5(1A)]**

Held, dismissing the appeals, that if the assessee exercised the option in terms of the second proviso to Rule 5(1A) at the time of furnishing of return, it will suffice and no separate letter or request or intimation with regard to exercise of option is required. Since the returns were filed in accordance with section 139(1) and the form prescribed therein makes a provision for exercising an option in respect of the claim of depreciation, no separate procedure is required. The option once exercised will continue to all the subsequent years, the assessee is not required to exercise such option each and every year separately.

CIT v. Kikani Exports P. Ltd. (No.2) (2014) 369 ITR 500 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 217 / 117 DTR 462 / 276 CTR 369 (Mad.)(HC)

453 **S.32 : Depreciation – Sale and lease back agreement – Entitled depreciation**

The assessee, a finance company and in the course of business, entered into a sale and lease back agreement with the manufacturer of a machinery to acquire the ownership of the machinery for consideration and, thereafter, lease the machinery to the manufacturer. The machinery was sold to the assessee and on the transaction, sales tax was levied and collected from the assessee and paid out to the Government. On the leased machinery, the assessee received rental income and the lease amount was treated as business income of the assessee. The assessee, claimed depreciation on the machinery so leased out to the manufacturer but the claim was disallowed by the AO primarily

relying upon the Central Excise document, where it was shown that the machinery was “not for sale”. The CIT(A) held that once it was admitted by the Assessing Officer that sales tax leviable on such transaction had been levied and paid to the Government and the lease rental in respect of the machinery was assessed as business income of the assessee, it was evident that the assessee was treated as the owner of the machinery and the manufacturer was only a lessee and, therefore, allowed the claim of depreciation made by the assessee. This was confirmed by the Tribunal. On appeal High Court also affirmed the finding of Tribunal. (AY. 1996-97)

CIT v. TVS Finance and Services Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 487 / 226 Taxmann 134 (Mad.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Roads – Rate restricted to 10 per cent – Justified

454

That building includes roads, bridges, culverts, wells and tubewells. The provision was not restricted to only roads adjacent to buildings. The CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal having not considered this aspect fell into error in accepting the assessee’s plea that 20 per cent depreciation on roads and electrical fittings should be allowed. Therefore, the AO was justified in restricting the depreciation to 10 per cent. and 15 per cent., as applicable in the respective assessment years, in terms of the old Appendix I. (AYs. 2003-04 to 2009-10)

CIT v. V. G. P. Housing (P) Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 565 (Mad.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Enhanced depreciation – Notification confining benefit of enhanced depreciation for year 2009-10 to only such commercial vehicles as have been purchased and put to use during period 1-4-2009 to 30-9-2009 – Assessee, an advocate, purchasing a car outside the period for accelerated depreciation – Accelerated depreciation conferred taking into account the policy decision of Union Government to stimulate country’s economy – Not discriminatory – Not violative of fundamental rights. [S. 295, Constitution of India, Art. 14]

455

Held, dismissing the petition, (i) that the notifications were measures that were introduced by way of amendment to the 1962 Rules to cater to a particular situation that existed in the country and affected its economy. There was a policy decision taken by the Union Government, taking into account the impact of the global financial crisis on the country’s economy and providing for additional measures for stimulating the economy to minimise the recessionary trend that it was going through. It was felt necessary by the Union Government to provide for a higher depreciation of 50 per cent in respect of new commercial vehicles that were acquired between January 1, 2009, and September 30, 2009, so as to support the automobile industry during the period when a recessionary trend was noticed in the automobile industry as part of the impact of the global financial crisis on the country’s economy. Thus, the notification to the extent it confines the benefit of enhanced/accelerated depreciation for the year 2009-10 to only such commercial vehicles as have been purchased and put to use during the period from April 1, 2009, to September 30, 2009, cannot be viewed as discriminatory and, therefore violative of the rights of the petitioner under article 14 of the Constitution.

(ii) That it was not a case where there was no depreciation that was granted in respect of the vehicles during the accounting period. The notification only had the effect of confining the benefit of enhanced depreciation to a certain category of vehicles that

were purchased and put to use during the prescribed period. So long as the assessee under the Income-tax Act were granted the benefit of a reasonable rate of depreciation under the Act, the mere grant of an enhanced depreciation to a category of assessee who had complied with the requirement of purchasing and putting to use vehicles during the prescribed period, would not militate against the concept of depreciation that was envisaged under the Act for all such assessee. In so far as the benefit of enhanced/accelerated depreciation was conferred taking into account the policy decision of the Union Government to stimulate the country's economy, it could not be viewed as a situation similar to the introduction of a new rate of tax during the middle of an assessment year. The notifications were issued in response to a situation that called for incentives so as to boost the economy that was facing recessionary trends. The measures introduced in the 1962 Rules to further the policy decision of the Union Government, could not be seen as akin to the introduction of a new rate of tax, for the purposes of mounting a challenge against the same as arbitrary. Thus, there was no merit in the challenge against the notification on the ground that the notification offends the fundamental rights of the assessee under article 14 of the Constitution.

R. Surendran v. UOI (2014) 369 ITR 536 / (2015) 274 CTR 49 / 114 DTR 34 / 230 Taxmann 590 (Ker.)(HC)

456 **S.32 : Depreciation – Plant – Toll road – Would not qualify as a ‘Plant’ hence not entitled higher rate of depreciation. [S.43(3)]**

Manned toll booths/toll plazas are primarily a facility/convenience for collecting the usage charges of the road and nothing more, that would not change the characteristic of “road”, hence the toll road would not qualify as a ‘Plant’ so as to entitle the assessee a higher rate of depreciation. (AY. 2003-04, 2004-05, 2007-08)

Mordadbad Toll Road Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 403 / 272 CTR 209 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 17 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

457 **S.32 : Depreciation – Unabsorbed depreciation – Carry forward and set-off of – Assessment years 1997-98 to 2001-02**

It was held that carry forward of unabsorbed depreciation concerning A.Y 1997-98 to 2000-01 could be set-off in subsequent years without any set time limit.

CIT v. Gujarat Themis Biosyn Ltd. (2014) 105 DTR 72 (Guj.)(HC)

458 **S.32 : Depreciation – Subsidy received in earlier year cannot be assessed as revenue receipt – To avoid taxation of an income twice, depreciation that was so far provided in books of account of prior years was to be reduced from current year income of assessee**

Assessee State Warehousing company constructed godowns and claimed depreciation. It received subsidy during calendar years 1982 to 1992 for construction of godowns, when objection was raised by office of Auditor General, assessee changed method of accounting entry in respect of subsidy and transferred to construction account and reworked depreciation, in respect of godown already sold and amount was credited to prior years income. AO held that individual assets lost its identity and, hence, amount needed to be reduced from block of assets hence sought to be added to current

year income. CIT(A) held that amount of subsidy received for earlier years could not be 'revenue receipt' for current year and, therefore, it could not be taxed in current year. Tribunal also confirmed the order of CIT(A). On appeal Court affirmed the view of Tribunal. Court also affirmed the view that to avoid taxation of an income twice, depreciation that was so far provided in books of account of prior years was to be reduced from current year income of assessee. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Gujarat State Warehousing Co. (2014) 225 Taxmann 182 (Guj.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Gas cylinders – Chlorine toners – Depreciation allowable at 60% 459

Chlorine toners used by assessee for storage and transportation of chlorine gas generated in its caustic soda plant are 'gas cylinders' qualified for depreciation at rate of 60 per cent. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Gujarat Alkalies and Chemicals Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 58 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Computers in factory premises – Eligible 60% depreciation 460

Assessee installed certain computers in its factory premises and claimed depreciation at rate of 60 per cent. AO held that computers should be treated either as office appliances failing which they would form part of machinery and in either case rate of depreciation would be 20 per cent. CIT(A) as well as Tribunal allowed claim of assessee. On appeal by revenue the Court upheld the order of Tribunal. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Gujarat Alkalies and Chemicals Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 58 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Production and manufacturing of milk products – Additional depreciation allowable 461

Assessee was engaged in production and manufacturing of milk products. It had installed a new plant for manufacturing milk powder. It claimed additional depreciation on said plant which was rejected by AO. It was found that Milk powder was completely different from main ingredient and manufacturing process lead to substantial value addition and final product could not be restored to original product. Court held that since a distinct commodity was emerging from entire complex process, plant and machinery installed by assessee were exigible to additional depreciation.

CIT v. Gujarat Co-op. Milk Marketing Federation Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 99 (Guj.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Renewal energy devices – Wind mill – Generator sets would alone qualify for hundred per cent depreciation – Drilling machines – Boring machines – Lathe machines – Entitled to depreciation at twenty-five per cent. [S.2 (11), R. 1962, Appx. I, R. 5, cl. (10A)(xviii)] 462

The assessee was engaged in turnkey projects, for which it used drilling machines, boring machines, boring machine for foundation work and lathe machine. When machinery was not those used in the manufacture of windmill or any specially designed device, which ran windmills, it would not fall for consideration on the block of assets which is defined in section 2(11). Therefore, the generator sets alone would qualify for the rate as prescribed under "renewal energy devices", that is, hundred per cent depreciation. The other machinery would qualify for depreciation at twenty-five per cent and not at hundred per cent as claimed by the assessee. The Assessing Officer was directed to rework the relief on the grant of depreciation treating the generator set

as the block of assets used in the manufacture of windmills and the other machinery would not fall within that head of block of assets, but would be entitled to the relief of depreciation at such rate as had been fixed by him. (AY. 1995-1996, 1996-1970)
CIT v. TTT Industries Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 44 (Mad.) (HC)

463 **S.32 : Depreciation – Higher rate of depreciation – Hotel – Roofing – Temporary construction for convenience of workers of assessee – Construction subsequently demolished – Entitled to hundred per cent depreciation. [S.37(1)]**

Court held that the materials on record showed that the construction was not authorised and had put up only for the convenience of workers who were engaged by the assessee. The record also indicated that the constructions were subsequently demolished. Therefore, the depreciation claimed at 100 per cent could not be termed unreasonable. (AY. 1989-90)

Comfort Living Hotels P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 182 / 227 Taxmann 145 (Mag.) (Delhi) (HC)

464 **S.32 : Depreciation – Leased out asset – Claim allowed in earlier years – Rule of consistency – Held Depreciation allowable**

Assessee claimed depreciation in respect of leased out assets. AO rejected assessee's claim taking a view that assessee did not retain its interest in leased out equipments. Tribunal noted that such claim was made by assessee and duly granted by AO in earlier assessment years. Thus, following rule of consistency, Tribunal allowed assessee's claim in relevant year as well. High Court refused to interfere with the said order of Tribunal. *DCIT v. Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 30 (Mag.) (Guj.) (High Court)*

465 **S.32 : Depreciation – Electrical Installations entitled to depreciation at the rate of 15% whereas electrical fittings entitled to depreciation at the rate of 10%**

Assessee was engaged in manufacture of steel metal components for automobiles and white goods sector. It claimed depreciation under heading 'electrical installations', which included transformers, window ACs, split ACs, invertors, etc., at rate 15 per cent. The revenue allowed depreciation at the rate of 10%, i.e., the rate specified for 'electrical fittings'. The assessee did not succeed at the first as well as the second appeal. On appeal, the High Court held that electrical fittings included electrical wirings, switches, sockets and other fittings, etc. were entitled to depreciation at rate of 10 per cent whereas 'Plant and machinery' was entitled to depreciation at rate of 15 per cent. The matter was accordingly remanded to Tribunal for fresh examination. (AY. 2007-08 & 2008-09)

Neel Metal Products Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 203 (Delhi) (HC)

466 **S.32 : Depreciation – Assessee acquired software development and training division from one 'P' – Amount paid towards IPRs & non-compete Fees – Composite agreement entered into by parties – Depreciation allowable on IPRs as well as non-compete Fees**

Assessee, carrying on business in software development, hardware sales and educational training, entered into an agreement with one 'P' for hiving off and transfer of software

development and training divisions from 'P'. It paid certain amounts towards acquisition of intellectual property rights [IPRs] and non-compete fee and claimed depreciation on such IPRs and non-compete fees. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. However, Commissioner (Appeals) accepted assessee's plea. Tribunal upheld order of Commissioner (Appeals) allowing depreciation on IPRs, but reversed the order in so far as it related to depreciation on non-compete fee. It held that non-compete fee was not an asset. Agreement between assessee and 'P' was a composite agreement and there was no break up details given as to how much of amount was allocable towards transfer of IPRs and how much towards non-compete fee. On appeal, the High Court held that under the agreement, 'P' had transferred all its rights, copy rights, trade mark as well as training and development division exclusively to be exploited by assessee. Further, in order to strengthen aforesaid rights, there was a non-compete clause, by virtue of which 'P' was restrained from using same trade mark, copyrights, etc. Therefore, the assessee was eligible for claiming depreciation even on non-compete fees. (AY. 2002-03) *Pentasoftware Technologies Ltd. v. DCIT* (2013) 96 DTR 233 / (2014) 222 Taxmann 209 / 264 CTR 187 (Mad.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Lease back – Machinery – Order set aside by Tribunal for verification was confirmed 467

During previous year, assessee had purchased machinery and leased back on same day without actual payment. AO treated entire transaction as a device used to reduce incidence of tax. Tribunal held that issue required to be examined in all respect in light of decision of Gujarat High Court rendered in case of *CIT v. Gujarat Gas Co. Ltd.* [2009] 308 ITR 243. It accordingly set aside issue to file of AO for decision afresh after giving an adequate opportunity of hearing to assessee. On appeal by revenue the order of tribunal was affirmed. Whether in peculiar facts and circumstances of case action of Tribunal did not call for any interference. (AY. 1996-97)

CIT v. Indu Nissan Oxo Chemical Industries Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 104 / 225 Taxmann 2 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Franchise agreement – Failure to produce evidence for support claim – Expenditure was held to be not allowable 468

Where assessee entered into a franchise agreement whereby it granted its franchisee business of manufacture, sale and export of footwear and footwear components, in absence of any evidence produced by assessee to support its claim, assessee could no more claim depreciation. (AY. 2004-05)

Liberty Group Marketing Division v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 2 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Building Temporary sheds for parking vehicles – Depreciation allowable at rate applicable to building 469

Temporary sheds for parking vehicles, depreciation allowable at rate applicable to building. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. TVS Motors Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 1 / 223 Taxmann 197 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

470 **S.32 : Depreciation – Factory building – Creche for children of women employees within factory compound – Entitled to depreciation at ten per cent as factory building**

The creche building was situated within the compound of the factory where the assessee carried on manufacturing activity. For the purpose of increasing efficiency and productivity of women employees engaged in the factory, a creche was created by the assessee in a separate building. In other words, the creche building was being utilised in the process of manufacturing of the products. Considering the importance of the creche building, the creche building was included. Thus, the order of the Tribunal in allowing the depreciation at 10 per cent treating the creche building as a business asset could not be found fault with (AY.1983-84 to 1985, 1985-86)

CIT v. Warner Hindustan Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 208 / 112 DTR 281 / (2015) 274 CTR 300/ 231 Taxmann 373 (AP)(HC)

471 **S.32 : Depreciation – Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) – Toll road – The person who constructs a road on Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) basis on land owned by the Government is not the “owner” of the road and cannot claim depreciation thereon. [S.263, National Highways Act, 1956, S. 45, 8A, National Highways Authority of India Act, 1988, S.11,16]]**

The High Court had to consider whether a the business of infrastructure development constructs a road on Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) basis on land owned by the Government, can it claim depreciation on the toll road. HELD by the High Court:

- (i) The functions that are to be discharged by the authority under the National Highway Authority Act does not in any manner mean that this person who is engaged or entrusted with any of the functions by the authority can be said to be the owner of the National Highway. The ownership being that of the Union, it can never be said to be divested of that absolute right by engagement of any person or by entrusting any of the functions of the authority to him.
- (ii) It would not be proper, therefore, to read into section 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 something which is defeating and frustrating the mandate of these laws. It can never be intended by the legislature that the broad and wide definition of the term “owner” as appearing in the Income-tax Act, 1961 would interfere with or take away the absolute rights of the above nature conferred in the union of the National Highways. A provision in one statute or a definition in one statute cannot be interpreted so as to defeat and frustrate another law or statute or any definition therein and when that another statute is a special legislation. The National Highways Act and the National Highways Authority of India Act are, special statutes and when the concept of ownership and vesting therein is of absolute nature that cannot be said to be in any manner restricted or curtailed by a general definition or understanding of the term owner as appearing in the Income-tax Act, 1961. The term is defined widely and broadly in the Income-tax Act, 1961 so as not to allow anybody to escape the provisions thereof by urging that he has a limited right or which is not akin to ownership. Therefore, his income should not be brought to tax;
- (iii) The observations in Mysore Minerals Ltd. (1999) 239 ITR 775 (SC) and Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd. (1997) 226 ITR 625 (SC) must be seen in the backdrop of

the facts. We are not concerned here with an ownership of a building or a land beneath which is not conveyed and sold or transferred by execution of a conveyance or a sale deed. Merely, because the road is laid out does not mean that the assessee is the owner thereof. He has laid it out for the purpose of the Union and for its ultimate vesting in the public.

- (iv) None of the above material was placed before the Allahabad High Court in *CIT v. Noida Toll Bridge Co. Ltd (2013) 213 Taxman 333*. With greatest respect, the conclusion of the Division Bench rests only on section 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It followed the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment in *Mysore Mineral Limited (supra)* but with great respect, failed to refer to the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 or the National Highways Authority of India Act, 1988. We are unable to agree with the observations and conclusions in *CIT v. Noida Toll Bridge Co. Ltd (2013) 213 Taxman 333*. On the facts of the case the assessee has challenged the order of Tribunal which has confirmed the revision order under section 263 wherein the Commissioner has set aside the order. Though the challenge was against the order under section 263 the Court proceeded to decide on merit. (AY. 2005-06)

North Karnataka Expressway Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 272 CTR 225 / 111 DTR 297 (2015) 372 ITR 145 (Bom.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Plant – Nursing home – Eligible higher depreciation as plant. [S.43(3)]

472

High rate of depreciation is allowable on a Nursing home treating it as a plant since the activities carried out by the nursing home are like x-ray plant, pathological laboratory, plant for sterilization of clothes, surgical instruments, Air conditioning plant etc. are of business asset. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. Shashi Nursing Home Ltd. (2013) 216 Taxmann 97 / (2014) 269 CTR 99 / 105 DTR 25 (All.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Sale and lease back – Records of the assessee clearly depicted that transaction of sale and lease back lacked genuine – Depreciation was not allowable on the assets

473

Where the statement given by the managing director of the assessee company as well as, the record of the assessee Company clearly depicted / established that the purchase and lease back transaction were lacking genuineness, further, the records showed that the funds were received back by the assessee within a few days. On basis of the facts the High Court held that depreciation on the assets was not allowable. (AY. 2001-02)

MARG Constructions Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 102 DTR 113 / 223 Taxmann 249 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Additional depreciation – Manufacture – Processing of iron ore in plant and generation of wind energy – Eligible additional depreciation. [S.32(1)(ii), 263]

474

The assessee is engaged in business of processing of iron ore in the plant and also generation of windmill energy. It claimed additional depreciation on machinery and wind mill. The said claim was allowed by AO. CIT revised the order of AO under

section 263 and directed to disallow the claim of additional depreciation. On appeal Tribunal allowed the claim of additional depreciation to assessee. On appeal by revenue, dismissing the appeal the Court held that the activities of assessee, i.e. processing of iron ore in plant and generation of wind energy / eligible for additional depreciation. [S.32(1)(iia)]: Followed the ratio in *CIT v. Sesa Goa Ltd. (2005) 271 ITR 331(SC)*.

CIT v. V. M. Salgaonkar & Brothers (P) Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 27 / 272 CTR 25 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

475 **S.32 : Depreciation – 100% Depreciation on temporary wooden structure and partition for running computer centres**

Assessee put up temporary wooden structure and partition for running computer centres, 100 per cent depreciation on partition and structures was to be allowed (AY. 1998-99) *CIT v. Amrutanjan Finance Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 135 / (2011) 203 Taxmann 295 (Mad.)(HC)*

476 **S.32 : Depreciation – Imported Motor cars acquired on merger/amalgamation – merger/amalgamation after 1.4.2001 – Clause(a) to Proviso to section 32(1) not applicable and depreciation allowable u/s. 32. [S. 2(47), 43(1), 43(6)]**

Under the scheme sanctioned by High Court, three concerns merged with assessee company from the appointed date which was 1-4-2004. The assessee company, *inter alia*, received imported motor cars on merger/amalgamation. The assessee company issued shares in consideration of the merger/amalgamation. These imported cars were acquired by the transferor concern between 28-2-1975 to 1-4-2001. On the imported cars assessee company claimed depreciation u/s. 32 which was denied by the AO by relying on the Proviso to Section 32(1). The High Court held on amalgamation/merger the imported cars were transferred to the assessee company in view of Explanation 7 to section 43(1) which specifically deals with the acquisition of an asset under amalgamation. Further, they were acquired by merged entities and became the property of the assessee company w.e.f. 1.4.2004. Therefore, assessee company was eligible for depreciation u/s. 32 and proviso to section 32(1) was not applicable to the assessee company. (AY. 2005-06 to 2008-09)

CIT v. Mira Exim Ltd. (2013) 359 ITR 70 / 262 CTR 441 / 94 DTR 41 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 156 (Delhi)(HC)

477 **S. 32 : Depreciation – Sale and lease back – Boiler – Genuineness of transaction was doubted**

The assessee purchased a boiler and subsequently leased it out to sister concern of seller. In return of income, assessee claimed depreciation on said boiler. Assessing officer found that boiler was attached to land and sale could not be completed by mere issue of sale bills. It was further noticed that boiler was still lying and functioning in factory of the seller and it was not installed in its sister concern. Assessing Officer thus taking a view that transaction in question was a loan transaction and it was wrongly given colour of lease transaction, disallowed assessee's claim. Tribunal upheld the assessment order. The High Court observed that the assessee had not questioned the findings of facts as regards the genuineness of the lease transactions. Thus when the finding of the fact on genuineness being not challenged in the manner known to law the same having

attained finality, there exists no ground to interfere with the order of lower authorities rejecting the claim of depreciation. On the submission of the counsel of the assessee, to raise additional grounds on genuineness of lease transactions, the court held that question regarding genuineness is a pure and simple factual one and considering the materials discussed by authorities below, the court did not find any justifiable ground to interfere with the order. (AY. 1995-96, 1996-97)

Upasana Finance Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 6 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Computer accessories and peripherals – Integral part of computer systems – Eligible for depreciation at the rate of 60% 478

Assessee claimed depreciation at the rate of 60% on computer accessories and peripherals. Assessing officer rejected the claim of the assessee. CIT(Appeals) and Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee on the contention that computer accessories and peripherals are integral part of computer systems. On appeal by revenue to High Court, Tribunal's order was upheld. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. BSES Yamuna Powers Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 47 (2014) 220 Taxmann 51 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Intangible asset – Disallowance of depreciation on software 479

Depreciation on software cannot be declined where valuation report of assets indicated that software was developed and installed by assessee in system and assessee produced all vouchers and receipts for same (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Shree Ram Multi Tech Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 76 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Foreign exchange rate difference – Considered as a part of cost to plant and machinery 480

Assessee claimed depreciation on account of foreign exchange rate difference capitalized to plant and machinery. Assessing Officer rejected assessee's claim holding that amount was not actually paid at end of accounting year and same was allowable only at time when liability was actually paid. Commissioner (Appeals) and Tribunal had allowed depreciation in case of assessee in earlier assessment years on similar facts. Since facts in relevant year were identical, the High Court, following principle of consistency, allowed assessee's claim.

Addl. CIT v. Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 117 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Rate – Toll roads / bridges to be considered as building for the purpose of granting depreciation 481

Toll roads and bridges are to be considered as building for the purpose of granting depreciation. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Noida Toll Bridge Co. Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 06 (Mag.)(All.)(HC.)

S.32: Depreciation – Vibro bed dryer – Entitled to hundred percent depreciation 482

Vibro bed dryer is entitled to hundred per cent depreciation.

CIT v. McLeod Russel (India) Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 663 (Cal.)(HC)

- 483 **S.32 : Depreciation – Ownership of asset – Possession – Eligible depreciation**
In light of finding that assessee had acquired possession of asset and was using it for the purposes of business, assessee was held entitled to depreciation. (AY. 2001-02)
CIT, Large Taxpayers Unit v. India Railway Finance Corporation Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 548 / 226 Taxmann 184 (Delhi)(HC)
- 484 **S.32 : Depreciation – Transfer of business – Ownership of asset – Entitled depreciation**
Held, transferee was put in possession of building, plant and machinery in terms of agreement to sell and running undertaking in its own right. Hence, it was entitled to depreciation. The fact that legal title conveyed under lease agreement and deed of sale was executed in subsequent years is not material. (AY. 2001-02)
CIT v. WEP Peripherals Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 508 / 102 DTR 219 / 268 CTR 88 (Karn.)(HC)
- 485 **S.32: Depreciation – Dominion over asset – User – Entitled depreciation**
The assets had been transferred by the Government of Rajasthan to the assessee-society and for that purpose the value had been adopted as the value to the previous owner. The assessee-society became the owner of the assets and was actually using the property in its own right as an owner on and from the date of order of the Governor and formation of the society. It was entitled to depreciation. Principle laid down in *Mysore Minerals Ltd. v. CIT (1999) 239 ITR 775 (SC)*, is applied. (AY. 2007-08)
CIT v. Jawahar Kala Kendra (2014) 362 ITR 515 / 100 DTR 65 / 222 Taxmann 222 (Raj.)(HC)
- 486 **S.32 : Depreciation – Goodwill – Amendment is not retrospective hence depreciation is not allowable on good will for the Assessment Year 1987-88**
Depreciation is not allowable on goodwill in AY 1987-88 as amendment of s. 32 wef 1-4-1997 is not retrospective. (AY. 1987-88)
CIT v. Wipro Ltd. (No. 2)(2013) 95 DTR 425 / (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxmann 181 (Karn.)(HC)
- 487 **S.32 : Depreciation – Tanker mounted on chassis of Truck – Entitle to 100% depreciation**
Tanker mounted on chassis of truck is not part of truck, and hence, is entitled to 100 percent depreciation. (AY. 1986-87)
CIT v. H.B. Leasing and Finance Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 362 / 220 Taxmann 215 (Delhi)(HC)
- 488 **S.32 : Depreciation – Motor vehicles – Used in business of leasing – Entitled 40% depreciation**
Assessee entitled to depreciation at higher rate of forty percent on leased vehicles instead of normal rate of thirty percent. (AY. 1986-87)
CIT v. H.B. Leasing and Finance Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 362 / 220 Taxmann 215 (Delhi)(HC)
- 489 **S.32 : Depreciation – Rate – Leased assets – Assessee was entitled to get higher depreciation on trucks at 40 per cent instead of normal rate of 25 per cent**
The assessee had leased out 19 trucks to M/s. Damodar Mangalji & Co. Ltd. for period of 5 years who in turn leased out trucks to drivers with a condition that they would

transport the ore of the assessee. The assessee claimed 40 per cent depreciation at enhanced rate and the same was rejected by Assessing Officer and granted normal depreciation of 25 per cent. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) and Tribunal observed that in case of leasing of vehicle the entire expenditure on maintenance and running was borne by the lessee whereas in case of hiring of trucks the entire expenditure was borne by hirer and, thus, higher depreciation would be allowable only to the hirer of a vehicle and not to a lessor. On appeal, the High Court relied on law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in *I.C.D.S. Ltd. v. CIT (2013) 350 ITR 527 / 29 taxmann.com 129/212 Taxmann 550* and held that what has been postulated is that the assessee must use the asset for the purpose of business. The section does not postulate the use of the asset by the assessee himself and therefore the question was answered in favour of the assessee. (AY. 1997-98).

Damodar Mangalji Mining Co. v. JCIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 344 / 264 CTR 182 (Bom.)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Rates – Parts of assets – A tanker or a gas cylinder attached to body of a truck continues to be a gas cylinder and is, accordingly, entitled to depreciation as applicable to gas cylinder, i.e., 100 per cent depreciation

490

The assessee claimed depreciation @ 100% on gas cylinder attached to the part of truck considering it to be separate part for the purpose of claiming depreciation. The AO denied the assessee's contention for claiming 100% depreciation on gas cylinder. Lower authorities reversed the order of the AO. On an appeal, the High Court relied on the decision of *CIT v. Goyal MG Gases Ltd. (2008) 296 ITR 72 (Delhi)* wherein a similar controversy had arisen and it was held that a tanker or a gas cylinder attached to the body of a truck continues to be a gas cylinder and is accordingly entitled to depreciation as applicable to gas cylinder as per Appendix I to the Income-tax Rules i.e. @ 100%. (AY. 1986-87)

CIT v. H.B. Leasing & Finance Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 215 (Delhi)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Rate – Leased assets – Where assessee engaged in business of leasing and financing of leased vehicles to third parties, assessee would be entitled to depreciation at higher rate of depreciation i.e. 40 per cent

491

The High Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in *I.C.D.S. Ltd. v. CIT [2013] 350 ITR 527* and held that the assessee engaged in the business of leasing and financing leased vehicles to third parties, it would be entitled to depreciation at higher rate of 40 per cent. (AY. 1986-87)

CIT v. H.B. Leasing & Finance Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 215 (Delhi)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – Interest – Distinction between “hire purchase transactions” and “loan transactions” explained

492

The vehicles were registered in the name of the respective customers. However, in the registration certificate a remark in terms of agreement was to be recorded to the effect that vehicle is held by the registered owner under a hire purchase agreement with the assessee. A “Sale Letter” was executed, reciting that the customer had on the date of the application for loan sold to the financier the motor vehicles. The sale of vehicles have not been shown by the assessee in its profit and loss account and no

sales tax return has been filed by it. In its audited account, filed with the income tax returns, the assessee has shown the finance charges as revenue receipts. The auditor has certified that the assessee is not a trading company. The auditor has also certified that the assessee has followed the norms issued by the Reserve Bank of India for non-banking financial companies (NBFC). This shows that the assessee is a finance company engaged in financing of vehicles. There is no evidence that assessee is a trader dealing in purchase and sale of vehicles. Thus the hirer is the real purchaser of vehicles from the dealer. He selects the vehicle for purchase and also the dealer from whom it was to be purchased. At this stage the assessee does not come into picture. After the hirer identified the vehicle and the dealer i.e. the seller then he approached the assessee for finance due to his inability to purchase out of his own funds. At this stage the assessee extended the facility of finance to hirer on willingness of the hirer to pay a price for this facility. The total amount of hire that hirer pays to the assessee exceeds the price at which the vehicle was purchased from the dealer. This is more than that part of the purchase consideration which was paid by the assessee to the dealer as finance to the hirer. The excess amount so paid by the hirer to the assessee is nothing but interest on loan. The amount so invested by the assessee in the purchase of vehicles is the amount of loan advanced by it to the hirer. When tested on the principles of law laid down by Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance Ltd the only conclusion that can be reached is that the transactions entered by the assessee with the customer/hirer is a loan transaction and the finance charges were nothing but interest.

CIT v. Commercial Motors Finance Ltd. (2014) 264 CTR 217 / 97 DTR 137 (All.)(HC)

493 **S.32 : Depreciation – Business expenditure – Film rights – Purchase and sale of films Rule 9B is not applicable – Expenditure allowable as deduction – Entitled 100 per cent depreciation. [S.37(1), R.9B]**

During the year the assessee had purchased the rights of the films and sold same and claimed depreciation/deduction at the rate of 100 per cent as the cost of acquisition under rule 9B(2). The AO observed that the assessee did not purchase any cinematographic films for consumption but what was purchased were broadcasting/exhibition right, satellite rights etc. and, therefore, in terms of section 32, depreciation should be allowed at the rate of 25 per cent instead of 100 per cent as claimed. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that since the assessee had purchased the rights of the films and sold them in the same year, the assessee was eligible for full deduction at the rate of 100 per cent as provided under rule 9B(2) and deleted the additions so made by the AO. On Second Appeal, the Tribunal confirmed the said finding of the CIT(A). On appeal to High Court the revenue has produced photocopies of order sheet, profit and loss account, balance sheet etc. of the respondent assessee and a new factual plea was raised that the assessee may not have sold the films during the year in question. It was also stated that rule 9B would not be applicable, if conditions of sub-rule 5 were not satisfied. It was accordingly submitted that if the assessee had not sold or transferred the rights of exhibition of films etc., benefit under rule 9B(2) would not be applicable. The Court held that the plea cannot be and should not be permitted to be raised in an appeal under section 260A for the first time as it requires examination and verification of fact before any legal opinion can be formed. As noticed above, the AO had

proceeded altogether on a different basis. Before the Tribunal also, where revenue was the appellant, no such submission was raised and made. The CIT(A) in his order has specifically noted and recorded that the films were sold. He has also recorded that films had been sold to different Doordarshan Kendras as also to National Film Development Authority, which are independent third parties and not closely related to the assessee. These were also sales to other parties. There is no finding in the assessment order that the purchase and sale had not taken place and, therefore, rule 9B(2)(a) relied upon by the assessee was not applicable. The AO did not dispute the contention of the assessee that the exhibition rights in the films were purchased during the year and also sold. On the other hand, the AO took a very narrow view on the term 'distribution rights' and held that exhibition rights, television rights or satellite rights cannot be treated as distribution rights. However, this was not acceptable as what was purchased and sold by the assessee were the 'distribution rights'. The said right would include and consist of acquisition and transfer of rights to exhibit, broadcast and satellite rights. These rights are integral and form and represent rights of a film distributor. Even otherwise, if rule 9B would not be applicable, purchase and sale of the film would result in a business transaction i.e. sale consideration received less purchase price paid. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. (AY. 2010-11)

CIT v. Achila Sabharwal (Smt.) (2014) 227 Taxman 171 (Mag.) / (2015) 371 ITR 219 / 123 DTR 174 (Delhi)(HC)

S.32 : Depreciation – No depreciation shall be allowed on leased assets where such assets were found to be not in existence 494

The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal held that the assessee is not entitled to claim depreciation on leased assets where such leased assets are found to be not in existence and lease is found to be bogus lease. (AY. 1996-97, 1997-98)

Dy. CIT v. Chemm Finance Ltd. (2014) 35 ITR 167 / (2015) 67 SOT 156 (URO)(Bang.)(Trib.)

S.32 : Depreciation – Higher rate of depreciation at 40 per cent would be granted on leased out trucks 495

The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal held that higher rate of depreciation is granted to the Assessee at the rate of 40 per cent on leased out trucks as against 25 per cent allowed by the Assessing Officer. (AY. 1996-97, 1997-98)

Dy. CIT v. Chemm Finance Ltd. (2014) 35 ITR 167 / (2015) 67 SOT 156 (URO)(Bang.)(Trib.)

S.32 : Depreciation – Acquisition of AMC Business of another company being acquisition of "business or commercial rights of similar nature" as specified under section 32(1)(ii), are eligible for depreciation – Company acquired elevator business on slump sale basis – Consideration paid in excess of net asset value was Goodwill eligible for depreciation 496

The assessee had acquired the 'Elevator Division' business of ECE Industries Ltd. which comprised of marketing, selling, erection, installation, commissioning, service, repair, maintenance and modernization including major repairs of products on slump basis.

From a perusal of the terms of the agreement between the assessee, and ECE Ltd., it is found that the assessee has acquired maintenance contracts for 3578 elevators which is the main source of revenue for the assessee, and maintenance contracts for 1001

elevators which are under warranty period and which will start yielding revenue once the warranty period expires.

It was observed that in case of the assessee certain annual maintenance contract (AMC's), which constituted the whole and sole of the 'maintenance division' business of the transferor and which was hitherto being carried out by the transferor, without any interruption were transferred under the said undertaking and sale agreement. The aforesaid intangible assets are, therefore, comparable to a licence to carry out the existing transmission and distribution business of the transferor. In the absence of the aforesaid intangible assets, the assessee would have had to commence business from scratch and go through the gestation period whereas by create new/fresh business rights; the assessee got an up and running business.

By applying the principle of *ejusdem generis* in the facts and circumstances of this case, such AMC's should get covered within the expression 'business or commercial rights of similar nature' specified under section 32(1)(ii) and accordingly eligible for depreciation. The assessee had paid consideration for acquisition of the business as a slump sale and the consideration paid was in excess of the net asset value of the business. Even though the amount of 'goodwill' was not a subject-matter in the said agreement, the same was duly reflected for in the audited account books of the assessee for period ending 31-3-2003. It was held that the same would qualify as 'excess consideration' which is over and above the value of net assets and in terms of the ruling by the Apex Court in the case of *Smifs Securities Ltd.* would be considered as 'goodwill' of business. 'Goodwill' being in the nature of excess consideration would get covered within the expression 'business or commercial rights of similar nature' as specified under section 32(1)(ii) and accordingly be eligible for depreciation. (AY. 2003-04)

ThyssenKrupp Elevator (India) (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 66 SOT 103 (URO) / (2015) 167 TTJ 131 (Delhi)(Trib.)

497 **S.32 : Depreciation – Windmill – Electronics fittings cables etc. parts of wind mill – Entitled depreciation at 80%**

Assessee-company engaged in manufacture and sale of cotton yarn, had also erected a windmill. Assessee claimed depreciation at 80 per cent on all components of windmill including electrical fittings, cables, etc.. AO restricted depreciation on electrical components to 10 per cent on ground that electrical fittings and cables were not integral parts of windmill. Tribunal held that electrical cables, fittings and other electrical works connected with windmill were a single composite unit and eligible for depreciation at rate of 80 per cent.) (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)

ACIT v. Kutti Spinners (P.) Ltd. (2014) 34 ITR 470 / (2015) 67 SOT 23 (URO)(Chennai)(Trib.)

498 **S.32 : Depreciation – Additional depreciation – Claim in the course of assessment proceedings – Claim was rejected on the ground that the said claim was not in the revised return**

Assessee had not made any claim for additional depreciation on windmills under section 32(i)(ia) in its original return. Assessee had not even filed a revised return but had staked such claim during course of assessment proceedings. Assessing officer denied

claim – On appeal confirming the order of AO the Tribunal held that claim having not been made through a revised return could not be accepted. (AY. 2002-03, 2008-09)
Metal Powder Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 759 / (2015) 152 ITD 144 (Chennai)(Trib.)

S.32 : Depreciation – Earth moving machine – Hire business – Entitled higher rate of depreciation at 30% 499

Assessee company claimed depreciation on earth moving machine at rate of 30 per cent by treating same as ‘commercial vehicle’. AO restricted rate of depreciation to 15 per cent. Assessee company claimed that it used said machines on hire business. When a particular vehicle was used by its owner on hire basis, then normal rate of depreciation needed to be discarded and substituted with higher rate of depreciation. (AY. 2006-07)
LDS Engineers (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 35 ITR 262 / (2015) 152 ITD 140 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.32 : Depreciation – Electric installations – Part of plant and machinery – Rate of depreciation will be rate applicable to plant and machinery 500

Tribunal held that where electric installations were part of plant and machinery, assessee was entitled to depreciation at rate applicable to plant and machinery and not at rate applicable to electric installations. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)
Century Tiles Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (2014) 33 ITR 230 / (2015) 152 ITD 327 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

S.32 : Depreciation – Goodwill – Depreciation on goodwill is allowable 501

Assessee’s claim of depreciation on goodwill be allowed in view of Tribunal’s decision in a series of earlier years that goodwill is an asset as per section 32 and depreciation is admissible thereon. (AY. 2006-07)
ACIT v. Bharti Teletech Ltd. (2014) 150 ITD 185 / 163 TTJ 36 (UO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

S.32 : Depreciation – Reach stacker – Heavy goods vehicle – Depreciation allowable at 40%.[Rule 5 of Income-tax Rules 1962] 502

Tribunal held that, ‘reach stacker’ is a heavy goods vehicle which falls within the expression ‘motor lorries’ and therefore was eligible for depreciation (a) of 40% (AY. 2005-06)
FIS Logistics (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 26 ITR 605 / (2014) 61 SOT 24 (URO)(Kol.)(Trib.)

S.32 : Depreciation – Goodwill comprise of Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, Privileges and Interest of vendor is eligible depreciation 503

Assessee company was engaged in business of online and other electronic media and other businesses. It acquired running business online and other electronic media including lock, stock and barrel. It allocated as goodwill, which comprised of patents, trademarks or copyrights, privileges and interest of vendor company in any inventions, and employees. Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to depreciation on goodwill. (AY. 2005-06)
Cyber India Online Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 1 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

504 **S.32 : Depreciation – Statutory licences – Intangible asset – Co-operative bank – Eligible depreciation**

Where assessee, a co-operative bank, by acquiring four banks has acquired existing running banking businesses complete with required statutory licences, operational bank branches, customers base as also employees, besides other assets, then consideration paid on account of excess of liabilities over realizable values of assets taken over is liable to be considered as an intangible asset, being 'business or commercial rights of similar nature' contemplated under section 32(1)(ii). (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)
Cosmos Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 90 (Pune)(Trib.)

505 **S.32 : Depreciation – Light motor vehicle – Honda car eligible depreciation at 50%**

Assessee claimed depreciation at 50% in respect of Honda Motor car. AO allowed the depreciation at 15%. On appeal the Tribunal held that the Motor car being light motor vehicle eligible depreciation at 50%. (AY. 2009-10)
Gera Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) 42 CCH 91 (Pune)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

506 **S.32 : Depreciation – Owner of assets – Cost was met by other agencies – Not eligible depreciation**

Assessee-company claimed depreciation on certain assets disclosed in balance-sheet - Entire cost of assets had not been met by assessee, but by other agencies. Assessee was also not exercising absolute dominion or right over assets. Assessee could not be treated as owner of such assets either wholly or partly, therefore, it was not eligible to depreciation. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)
Hyderabad Pharma Infrastructure & Technologies Ltd. v. Addl. DIT (2014) 64 SOT 179 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

507 **S.32 : Depreciation – Additional depreciation – Carry forward – Can be claimed in subsequent year**

There is no restriction on assessee to carry forward additional depreciation and, thus, where only 50 per cent of additional depreciation is allowed in year of purchase of machinery as it was put to use for less than 180 days during said year, balance 50 per cent of additional depreciation can be claimed in subsequent assessment year. (AY. 2007-08)
Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 203 (Cochin)(Trib.)

508 **S.32 : Depreciation – Property held for charitable or religious purposes – Entire cost of asset was allowed by way of application of income depreciation cannot be allowed. [S.11]**

Where entire cost of asset stands already allowed by way of application of income under section 11(1), depreciation claimed by assessee under section 32(1) is not allowable. (AY. 2010-11)
Dy. DIT v. Vidyamanda Educational Society (2014) 64 SOT 176 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)

509 **S.32 : Depreciation – Owner assets – Road constructed by assessee on BOT basis – Eligible for depreciation, even though he is not legal owner of the road**

Assessee a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) was awarded contract by NHAI for widening, rehabilitation and maintenance of existing two lane highways into a four lane one

on BOT basis. Entire cost of construction was borne by assessee, after completion of construction, highway was opened to traffic for use and assessee started claiming depreciation. Disallowed depreciation holding that no ownership, leasehold or tenancy rights were ever vested with assessee for roads, in respect of which it had claimed depreciation. CIT(A) and Hon'ble ITAT reversed the order of AO holding that assessee was entitled for depreciation as, though NHAI remained legal owner of site with full powers to hold, dispose of and deal with site; assessee had been granted not merely possession but also right to enjoyment of site and NHAI was obliged to defend this right and assessee had power to exclude others. 'Owner' is a person who is entitled to receive income from property in his own right, though a formal deed of title may not have been executed. Assessee company entitled to claim depreciation u/s. 32. (AY. 2005-06, 2010-11)

Dy. CIT v. Swarna Tollway (P) Ltd. (2014) 150 ITD 26 / 30 ITR 171 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.32 : Depreciation – Point of sales (POS) systems qualify for depreciation @ 60% being rate applicable to computers 510

Tribunal held that point of sales (POS) systems qualifies for depreciation @ 60% being rate applicable to computers. (AY. 2003-04)

ACIT v. Connaught Plaza Restaurants Pvt. Ltd. (2014) BCAJ – October-P. 29 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.32 : Depreciation – Unabsorbed – Period of set off – Available for setting off for a period beyond eight years. [S.32(2)] 511

During assessment proceedings, AO. held that unabsorbed depreciation in hands of assessee for relevant assessment years could only be carried forward for setting off up to eight assessment years. By following the ratio in the *General Motors India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2013] 354 ITR 244 (Guj.)(HC)* it was held that unabsorbed depreciation relating to assessment years in question was available for setting off for a period beyond eight years. (AY. 1999-2000 to 2002-03)

Dy. CIT v. Bajaj Hindustan Ltd. (2014) 149 ITD 709 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Editorial: Ratio of CIT v. Times Guaranty Ltd. (2010) 40 SOT 14(SB((Mum.)(SB) is held to be not good law.

S.32 : Depreciation – Sale & lease back – Depreciation was held to be not allowable 512

The assessee purchased electricity meters from Gujarat State Electricity Board (GSEB) and leased them back to GEB. Tribunal held that the annual account of GSEB showed that the real intention was to enter into transaction of loan/finance only and the assessee was never intended to be the real and legal owner of the assets. The Tribunal held that the depreciation was rightly denied to the assessee. (AY. 1994-95)

Hathway Industries (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 605 / 163 TTJ 141 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.32 : Depreciation – Valuation of land to be taken as per valuation report and not on estimation-Depreciation was held to be allowable on superstructure 513

The Tribunal held that the estimation of the value of land by the Assessing Officer himself cannot be sustained in the presence of the report of the Government approved

valuer given by assessee itself and directed that the value of the land be taken as per the valuation report given by the assessee and the claim of depreciation of the superstructure be allowed accordingly. (AY. 1994-95 to 1996-97, 2000-01 to 2002-03)
Hathway Industries (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 605 / 163 TTJ 141 (Mum.)(Trib.)

514 **S.32 : Depreciation – Goodwill – Depreciation is allowable**

The Tribunal followed the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *CIT v. SMIFS Securities Ltd. (2012) 348 ITR 302 (SC)* and held that the assessee is entitled to depreciation on goodwill. (AY. 2006-07)
ACIT v. Bharti Teletech Ltd. (2014) 150 ITD 185 / 163 TTJ 36 (UO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

515 **S.32 : Depreciation – WDV – Depreciation not claimed in earlier year**

The Tribunal held that the assessee did not claim depreciation in AY. 2001-02. Therefore, the WDV of the assets as on 31st March, 2001 has to be taken for considering the depreciation to be allowed to the assessee in A.Y. 2002-03. (AY. 2002-03)
Reliance Industries v. Addl. ACIT (2012) 79 DTR 315 / (2014) 159 TTJ 349 / 55 SOT 8 (Mum.)(Trib.)

516 **S.32 : Depreciation – Lease of assets – Assessee (Bank) is entitled to depreciation on assets given on lease**

In so far as the issue relating to the claim of depreciation on leased transactions is concerned, the Supreme Court in *I.C.D.S. Ltd. v. CIT (2013) 350 ITR 527 (SC)* had the occasion to consider the question “whether the assessee is entitled to depreciation on vehicles financed by it which is neither owned by the assessee nor used by the assessee?” The Supreme Court after perusing the lease agreement and other related factors held that the lessor is the owner of the vehicles. As an owner, it used the assets in the course of its business satisfying both the requirements of S. 32 of the Act and hence is entitled to claim depreciation. A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in *CIT v. Cosmos Films Ltd. (2011) 338 ITR 266 (Delhi)* wherein the Delhi High Court considered the implications of S. 19 of Sale of Goods Act, 1930. The Tribunal, Mumbai Bench in the case of Development Credit Bank Ltd. has followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ICDS and the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Cosmos Films and all owed the claim of depreciation. The Tribunal, Mumbai bench, in the case of L&T has considered a similar issue and followed the findings of the Supreme Court in the case of ICDS and also of the co-ordinate bench in the case of Development Credit Bank Ltd. and allowed the claim of depreciation on sale of lease back assets. Considering all these judicial decisions in the light of the facts, we direct the AO to allow depreciation. (AY. 1996-97, 1997-98,)
ICICI Bank Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) CCH 175 (Mum.)(Trib.),www.itatonline.org

517 **S.32 : Depreciation – Depreciation on computer accessories and peripherals allowable at 60%**

Depreciation is allowable at the rate of 60% on the printers, UPS and computer peripherals. (AY. 2006-07)
Dy. CIT v. CNB Finwiz Ltd. (2014) 159 TTJ 146 / 97 DTR 97 / 65 SOT 134 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.32(1)(ia) : Depreciation – Windmill generating machinery – Additional depreciation allowed on setting up of wind electric generator to a chemical manufacturer

518

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of various speciality chemicals and had claimed additional depreciation u/s. 32(1)(ia) on the cost incurred by it for installation of a Wind Electric Generator. The AO did not grant the said additional depreciation on the ground that the assessee was not in the business of generation and distribution of power. The CIT(A) following the decisions of the Madras High Court in the case of *CIT v. VTM Ltd. (2009) 319 ITR 336* and in case of *CIT v. Hi Tech Arai Ltd. (2010) 321 ITR 477* deleted the disallowance so made. The Tribunal confirmed the Order passed by the CIT(A).

The High Court dismissed the departmental appeal and held that the assessee was entitled to claim additional depreciation. The High Court observed that the Madras High Court had an occasion to consider the similar issue and it is held that while claiming the deduction under Section 32(1)(ia) setting up windmill has nothing to do with the power industry and what is required to be satisfied in order to claim additional depreciation is that the setting up of new machinery or plant should have been acquired and installed by an assessee, who was already engaged in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Diamines & Chemicals Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 218 / 271 CTR 98 / 109 DTR 62 (Guj.)(HC)

S.32(1)(ii) : Depreciation – Block of assets – Glow sign boards – Damaged – Loss debited to P & L account – Matter remanded. [S.2(11)]

519

Glow sign boards owned by assessee got damaged. Assessee debited the amount in profit and loss account representing value of glow sign boards written off. AO held that since assessee-company's block of 'furniture and fixtures' was still appearing in its schedule of assets, expenditure on account of damage to glow sign boards could not be charged to profit and loss account. Assessee should have applied provisions of section 32(1)(ii) for treating said loss. Tribunal held that Glow sign boards pertained to block of assets of "furniture and fixtures" which was still appearing in schedule of assets in balance sheet, issue was remitted to the file of AO to state allowance of depreciation. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

Haier Appliances India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 730 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.32(1)(ii) : Depreciation – Intangible asset – Client acquisition cost – Eligible depreciation

520

Customer base of the micro-finance business of SKS was acquired by the assessee as a part of transfer of entire business. Commercial assets of SKS facilitate the assessee to carry on the business smoothly and effectively and was in the nature of business and commercial rights and, therefore, the client acquisition cost paid by the assessee was eligible for depreciation u/s. 32(1)(ii). (AY. 2006-07 to 2008-09)

SKS Microfinance Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 145 ITD 111 / (2014) 98 DTR 321 / 160 TTJ 364 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

Section 32A : Investment allowance**521 S.32A : Investment allowance – Reserve – Creation of reserve in next year is held to be sufficient compliance**

The assessee established sugar factory which was fully owned by the State of UP. The assessee filed return claiming investment allowance under section 32A(1). The AO rejected the claim by observing that assessee had created a reserve which was less than 75 per cent of the claim made. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition. On appeal, the Tribunal upheld order of AO. On further appeal, the High Court held that if during the assessment year relevant to the year of installation or use the total assessed income of assessee, is nil or negative, then the assessee cannot be expected to create an actual and non-illusory reserve equivalent to 75 per cent of the claim and as such reserve can only be created out of assessed profits. There can be no obligation on the part of the assessee to create a reserve as a condition merely for carrying over the development rebate without it being actually allowed to the assessee by setting off the rebate against the assessed profit. It would be sufficient if reserve was created in subsequent years in which assessee was assessed to profits. (AY. 1987-88)

Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. v. ITAT (2014) 220 Taxmann 117 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

522 S.32A : Investment allowance – Composite technology – Eligible higher rate of investment allowance

The assessee was engaged in manufacture of caustic soda. It applied to the Secretary, Department of Science and Technology (respondent), for issue of certificate under section 32A(2B), for use of technology developed by Central Electrochemical Research Institute (CECRI), a unit of National Research and Development Corporation of India (NRDC). The application of assessee was rejected on ground that M/s. Titanium Equipment and Anode Manufacturing Company Ltd. (TEAM) was utilizing the technology developed by CECRI to manufacture Titanium Substrate Insoluble Anodes (TSIA), while the assessee was only using the TSIA manufactured by TEAM for manufacturing caustic soda, which use was not covered under section 32A(2B). Also, a certificate under section 32A(2B) had been issued to TEAM, who had availed of same by claiming higher investment allowance at the rate of 35 per cent under the section. The High Court held that the technology developed by CECRI was a composite technology both for manufacture of TSIA as well as for its utilization in manufacturing caustic soda, and hence it was eligible for issue of certificate under section 32A(2B) for availing higher rate of investment allowance.

Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Secy. Deptt. of Science & Technology, Govt. of India (2014) 220 Taxmann 78 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

523 S.32A : Investment allowance – Plant – Hotel building is not plant and not entitled investment allowance

A hotel building is not a “plant” and is not entitled to investment allowance. (AY. 1986-87)

CIT v. SB Properties and Enterprises Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 483 / 100 DTR 33 / (2015) 232 Taxmann 398 (Raj.)(HC)

Section 32AB : Investment deposit account**S.33AB : Tea Development Account – Interest on deposits whether amounts to income from growing and manufacture of tea in order to compute the permissible deduction u/s 33AB was a question of fact – Matter remanded to Tribunal**

524

Assessee earned interest income from deposits with NABARD, IDBI Scheme on overdue bills from Brooke Bond India Limited, electricity deposits, National Savings Certificates, time deposits, loans to employees, security deposits and so on. Assessee raised an additional ground before the Tribunal that such interest should be considered as income of growing and manufacture of tea in order to compute the permissible deduction u/s. 33AB. Tribunal did not adjudicate on the said issue. Held, whether such deposit was made in connection with the business of growing and manufacture of tea was a pure question of fact and therefore the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal. (AY. 1991-92, 1992-93)

Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 473 / 222 Taxmann 201 (Cal.)(HC)

Section 35 : Expenditure on scientific research**S.35 : Expenditure on scientific research – Expenditure on work-in-progress – Held to be allowable. [S.35(1)(iv)]**

525

Expenditure on work-in-progress is held to be allowable. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. TVS Motors Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 1 / 223 Taxmann 197 (Mad.)(HC)

S.35 : Expenditure on scientific research – Approval had been signed by Secretary, DSIR or by any of Nodal Officer on his behalf would not make any difference and in such a case claim for deduction. [S.35(2AB)]

526

Assessee-company was engaged in business of manufacturing, marketing and processing of drug intermediates pharmaceuticals, chemicals and bulk drugs. It claimed deduction under section 35(2AB) in respect of expenditure incurred on in-house R&D facilities. In support of claim, it filed a copy of letter dated 14-11-2005 (Renewal of recognition of in-house R&D unit certificate), issued by Department of Scientific and Research [DSIR], New Delhi under signature of Scientist-G. AO disallowed claim of deduction on ground that as per provisions of section 35(2AB), approval had to be obtained from prescribed authority, who was Secretary, DSIR. Tribunal held that order of approval had been signed by Secretary, DSIR or by any of Nodal Officer on his behalf would not make any difference and in such a case claim for deduction under section 35(2AB) could not be denied to assessee. Matter remanded. (AY. 2005-06)

ACIT v. Ferment Biotech Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 246 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.35 : Expenditure on scientific research – R&D expenditure approved by the DSIR eligible for weighted deduction – Neither AO nor CIT(A) can decide the quantum of expenditure, only appropriate authority can decide

527

The assessee had claimed a deduction of ₹ 48.58 crores u/s. 35(2AB). However, the Ministry of Science & Technology, the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) had vide their certificate in form 3CL, approved of R& D expenditure of ₹ 31.26

crores only as being eligible for weighted deduction. Accordingly, AO granted weighted deduction of ₹ 46.89 crores (being 150% of ₹ 31.26 crores).

On appeal, the Tribunal observed that neither the AO nor the CIT(A) can decide on the expenditure which will be entitled to weighted deduction u/s. 35(2AB). S.35(2AB) (3) provides that if any question arises about extent of deduction, the matter should be referred to the DSIR whose decision will be final and cannot be tampered with by the Tribunal. Even if the assessee is right in that there is a mistake in the certificate issued by the DSIR, same can only be rectified by DSIR and not in appellate proceedings. (AY. 2007-08)

Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 140 ITD 221 (2014) 29 ITR 637 / 155 TTJ 748 / 89 DTR 190 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

Section 35ABB : Expenditure for obtaining licence to operate telecommunication services

528

S.35ABB : Expenditure for obtaining licence to operate telecommunication services – Licence fee – Capital or revenue – Licence fee for acquiring licence was held to be capital and to be amortised – Yearly licence fee on the basis of revenue sharing basis was held to be revenue in nature. [S.37(1)]

Assessee company was engaged in business of telecommunication services and value added related services. It procured licence from Government for telecommunication services initially under 1994 agreement which was subsequently governed by New Telecom Policy, 1999. In terms of licence agreement, assessee had to pay entry fee payable up to 31-7-1999 and, thereupon, licence fee was payable as a percentage of gross revenue under licence effective from 1-8-1999. Assessee claimed that payment of licence fee was allowable being revenue in nature. Revenue authorities rejected assessee's claim taking a view that payments were of capital nature. Tribunal allowed assessee's claim. On appeal by revenue the court held that, since a part of licence fee was payable to acquire an asset i.e. right to establish cellular telephone service, and remaining part of payment was attributable to yearly licence fee on revenue sharing basis for carrying on business as cellular telephone operator, payment of licence fee was to be regarded as partly capital and partly revenue in nature. Licence fee paid to Government for providing telecommunication services, in view of fact that a part of licence fee was payable to acquire an 'asset' i.e. right to establish cellular telephone service was held to be capital in nature and remaining part of payment was attributable to yearly licence fee on revenue sharing basis for carrying on business as cellular telephone operator, payment in question was to be regarded as revenue in nature. (AY. 1999-2000 to 2007-08)

CIT v. Bharti Hexacom Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 294 / 265 CTR 294 / 221 Taxman 323 (Delhi)(HC)

CIT v. Hutchison Essar Telecom (P) Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 294 (Delhi)(HC)

CIT v. Bharti Airtel Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 294 (Delhi)(HC)

CIT v. Bharti Cellular Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 294 (Delhi)(HC)

CIT v. Bharti Telenet Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 294 (Delhi)(HC)

Section 35D : Amortisation of certain preliminary expenses.**S.35D : Amortization of preliminary expenses – No disallowances in earlier 7 years – Rule of consistency – Held expenses allowable** 529

Assessee amortized preliminary expenses u/s. 35D. AO rejected assessee's claim. Tribunal noted that such claim was made by assessee in last 7 years and was never disallowed by AO in earlier assessment years. Thus, following rule of consistency, Tribunal allowed assessee's claim in relevant year as well. High Court refused to interfere with the said order of Tribunal.

DCIT v. Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxman 30 (Mag.)(Guj.) (HC)

S.35D : Amortization of preliminary expenses – No nexus between investment and project – Interest income not to be adjusted against pre-operative expenses – Interest on investment assessable as income from other sources. [S.28(i), 56] 530

Assessee manufacturing human vaccines received substantial financial grant. It invested said funds and promoters capital with banks under 'Portfolio management scheme' under which assured return was guaranteed by bank. Assessee adjusted interest income on said bank deposit against pre-operative expenses relating to a project. Where there was no inextricable link between investment and project, interest income on said investment could not be permitted to be adjusted against pre-operative expenses in respect of said project. Interest on investment is assessable as income from other sources. (AY. 1992-93) *CIT v. Indian Vaccines Corporation Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 295 / 222 Taxmann 207 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)*

S.35D : Amortization of preliminary expenses – Rule of consistency – Satisfaction of conditions 531

The AO disallowed preliminary expenses claimed by the assessee. On appeal the CIT(A) allowed the expenses on ground that in earlier years, benefit under section 35D was allowed to the assessee. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) holding that the rule of consistency should not come in the way and that the issue should be looked into on merits. The High Court held that the since neither the ITAT not the CIT(A) had considered the issue on merits, the case was to be remanded to the ITAT to consider where deduction under section 35D was allowable on the merits of the issue. (AY. 2004-05)

Gujarat Power Corporation Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 119 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.35D : Amortisation of preliminary expenses – Substantial increase in equity base-purchase of machinery and subsequent increase in sales turnover can be attributed to extension of undertaking 532

The assessee, a public company engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of windmills. The AO disallowed preliminary expenses written off u/s. 35D, holding the same to be capital in nature. The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

In the appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee pointed out that legal and consultancy expenses were incurred for increase in capital base of the company, there was increase in number of windmills, machinery, etc., purchased during the year, which in turn had led to substantial increase in sales turnover which was allowable u/s. 35D. The Tribunal allowing

the claim of the assessee observed that the expenditure incurred can be attributed to extension of undertaking and is thus eligible for deduction u/s. 35D of the Act. (AY. 2009-10) *Chiranjeevi Wind Energy Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 534 / 66 SOT 191 (URO)(Cochin) (Trib.)*

Section 35DDA : Amortisation of expenditure incurred under voluntary retirement scheme

533 S.35DDA : Amortisation of expenditure – Voluntary retirement scheme – Capital or revenue – One-fifth of expenditure allowable in current assessment year and in each of four subsequent assessment years. [S.37(1)]

The assessee was in the business of manufacture of alcoholic beverages. As part of restructuring of business the assessee transferred manufacturing facility and outsourcing production of alcoholic beverages. Assessee claimed payment of severance pay as revenue expenditure. AO disallowed the claim. The Tribunal allowed the deduction of the amounts paid by the assessee to its employees on account of severance pay taking the view that though the assessee was not entitled to claim the deduction under section 37(1), the expenditure could be amortised under the provisions of section 35DDA. On appeal by revenue dismissing the appeal the Court held that the business of assessee was not closed and severance pay being not expenditure incurred for closing down business hence one-fifth of expenditure allowable in current assessment year and in each of four subsequent assessment years. Order of Tribunal was affirmed.

CIT v. Diageo India P. Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 7 / 271 CTR 646 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 191 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

Section 36 : Other deductions

534 S.36(1)(ii) : Bonus or commission paid to employee – Directors giving personal guarantee – Guarantee commission paid to directors was held to be deductible

Directors provided personal guarantees to bank as pre-condition for grant of credit facilities to company for business purpose. Commission was paid to directors for furnishing such guarantee. If commission would not have been paid, sum would not have been distributed to them as dividend. Held, guarantee commission paid to directors deductible. (AY. 2006-07)

Controls and Switchgear Contractors Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 312 / 104 DTR 117 / 269 ITR 44 / 225 Taxman 61 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

535 S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Enhancement of lease rental – Question of fact. [S.37(1), 260A]

High Court dismissed the appeal of revenue in respect of allowability of interest paid on inter-corporate deposits and enhancement of lease rental by holding the same as question of fact. On appeal by revenue the same was dismissed by holding that the questions decided by Tribunal and High Court purely on facts, hence not entertained. (From the Judgment of Bombay High Court in ITA No. 452 of 2000 dt 28-1-2013) (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Essar Projects Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 363 / 223 Taxmann 344 (SC)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Finding that amount borrowed had been used for non-business purposes – Interest not deductible

536

In so far as the interest on borrowed funds was concerned, the admitted position was that the assessee invested ₹ 45.5 crores in the S. N. Project for the purpose of generation of electricity and supply of the electricity to the assessee. Even assuming that it was part of an integrated steel plant and because of various factors it could not manufacture the electricity and supply the electricity, there was no justification for the S. N. Project to lend a sum of ₹ 25 crores from S as unsecured loans. Assuming that the transaction was also to be treated as *bona fide* transaction there was absolutely no justification for S to invest the amount in purchasing shares of the assessee. It was because of these inter connections between these two concerns, in which there were common directors, that the assessing authority and the appellate authority rightly held that it was a sham transaction. The disallowance of interest was justified. (AY. 1997-98, 1999-2000)
CIT v. Bellary Steels and Alloys Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 491 / (2015) 370 ITR 226 (Karn.) (HC)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Assessee as guarantor repaying installments of loans taken by its subsidiary company for its business – Interest on such payments – Deductible

537

Held, that the assessee had deep business interest in the existence of its subsidiary company and discharged its legal obligation by repaying the instalments of loan to the financial institutions. Such loans were given for the purpose of business. The assessee was entitled to deduction of interest. Followed the ratio in *Madhav Prasad Jatia v. CIT [1979] 118 ITR 200 (SC)* wherein the Court held that the expression “for the purpose of business” occurring under section 36(1)(iii) of the Act is wider in scope than the expression “for the purpose of earning income, profits or gains”. (AY. 1983-84)
J. K. Synthetics Ltd v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 310 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 79 (All) (HC)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Interest relatable to investment in capital work-in-progress was held to be allowable – Interest paid by assessee on borrowings and interest charged on loans to sister concern at same rate – No disallowance of interest

538

Held, (i) that no disallowance could be made on account of interest relatable to investment in capital work-in-progress.
 (ii) That the Tribunal had come to the conclusion on the basis of the material on record that the assessee had charged interest on loans to its sister concern not below the interest paid on the funds utilised for the purpose as the plea of the assessee was that it had been charging interest at the rate of 15.5 per cent from its sister concern and the average cost of borrowings to the assessee was also 15.5 per cent. It was in these circumstances that the Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO by invoking section 36(1)(iii). There was no justification to take a different view from the one taken by the Tribunal in the facts and circumstances of the case. (AY. 2000-01)
CIT v. Malwa Cotton Spinning Mills Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 604 (P&H)(HC)

- 539 **S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Finding that borrowed capital was used for expansion of existing business – Interest deductible**
 Held that it was an expansion of the existing business. The interest payments were, therefore, deductible. Applied the ratio in *Dy. CIT v. Core Health Care Ltd. (2008) 298 ITR 194 (SC)*.
CIT v. Nirma Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 12 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 577 (Guj.)(HC)
- 540 **S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Interest not charged because recovery of principal amount was difficult – Notional interest could not be disallowed**
 Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that in view of the findings recorded by the CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal, there was no justification for making an addition under section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. The assessee had not charged any interest on the amount advanced to Nalanda Spinners as the amount advanced to Nalanda Spinners was not returned for which a civil suit was filed and with the assistance of influential people, it was recovered. Moreover, for the assessment years 2006-07 and 2007-08, similar additions had been deleted which had attained finality. (AY. 2008-09)
CIT v. Suraj Dev Dada (2014) 367 ITR 78 / 224 Taxmann 189 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)
- 541 **S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Diversion of funds for unfruitful and non-commercial purposes – Tribunal disallowing claim in earlier year – Tribunal not taken note of earlier assessment year – Matter remanded**
 The AO disallowed the claim of assessee in respect of interest paid on borrowed capital. CIT(A) allowed the claim of assessee, which was affirmed by Tribunal. On appeal by revenue the Court held that, in respect of interest paid on the borrowings, the Tribunal had reversed the order passed by the Commissioner in relation to the assessment year 1988-89. The Tribunal had not taken note of this when it decided the appeals before it. Thus, the matter needed to be examined by the Tribunal with reference to the relevant record, duly giving an opportunity to both the parties. (AY. 1989-90, 1990-91)
CIT v. Hotel Krishna (2014) 368 ITR 445 (T&AP)(HC)
- 542 **S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Interest-free loans to group companies – Similar claim held in favour of assessee in earlier year – No appeal by Department thereagainst – Interest was held to be allowable**
 Court held that the department had not appealed against the order of the Tribunal passed under identical circumstances. That apart, the Department had not produced any iota of material rebutting the finding arrived at by the Tribunal. The Department had also not pointed out any specific error of law committed by the Tribunal on the issue pertaining to interest payment. (AY. 2003-04, 2009-10)
CIT v. V. G. P. Housing (P) Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 565 (Mad.)(HC)
- 543 **S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Conversion of part of equity share into loan – Liability to pay interest on said loan has not accrued during the year – Not allowable as deduction**
 Assessee was a co-operative society. Government was major equity shareholder of said society. *Vide* their letters dated 1-4-1988 and 20-4-1988, Government had converted part

of their equity share-capital into loan with retrospective effect from 26-12-1983 and 20-1-1984. Thereafter, assessee filed revised return and claimed deduction on account of payment of interest under section 36(1)(iii) on said loan during relevant year. Court held that the liability to pay interest on said loan had not accrued during relevant previous years, till then, said sum was part of equity share capital, therefore, deduction under section 36(1)(iii) was not admissible to assessee during relevant previous years. (AY. 1987-88, 1988-89)

Krishak Bharati Co-operative Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 390 (Delhi)(HC)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Sufficient funds available with assessee company – No disallowance can be made

544

Assessing Officer while working out the fund and utilization thereof, concluded that interest bearing funds were utilized for making interest free advances. He therefore disallowed the claim of interest on borrowed fund amounting to ₹ 7,97,83,057/-. Held that, the share capital and the reserves and surplus together with the accumulated depreciation would far exceed the loans and advances made to the above said three concerns. The percentage of loans and advances in relation to the own funds of the assessee company would be 0.012% as on 1-4-1994 and 0.0135% as on 31-3-1995. In other words there were sufficient funds available with the company on which no interest was paid and out of which the loans and advances to the above said concerns could be made. There is no clear evidence that the interest bearing loans taken by the assessee company for the purpose of its own business have been diverted for non-business purposes. No direct nexus has been proved either by the A.O. between the interest bearing loans taken and the interest free advances given. With above-mentioned facts and applying the decision of *Munjal Sales Corporation (298 ITR 298) (SC)*, no disallowance could be made. (AY. 2002-03)

ACIT v. Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxman 28 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Investment in shares – Strategic business purposes – Held to be allowable

545

The investments made in shares by the assessee by utilising borrowed capital were for strategic business purposes because the companies were promoted as special purpose companies to strengthen and promote its existing business by combining different business segments and, therefore, the claim was fully allowable under section 36(1)(iii). The Revenue did not adduce any material to show that the borrowed capital was utilised by the assessee for non-business purposes. Interest payment was held to be allowable. (AY. 2000-01, 2001-02)

CIT v. RPG Transmissions Ltd. (2013) 359 ITR 673 / (2014) 266 CTR 533 / 100 DTR 338 (Mad.)(HC)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Sufficient interest free funds – No disallowance can be made

546

Where assessee had sufficient interest free funds available to be invested in mutual funds, interest on borrowed funds could not be disallowed. (AY. 2004-05, 2006-07)

CIT v. Amod Stamping (P.) Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 256 (Guj.)(HC)

- 547 **S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Investment in shares of a foreign company – Interest was held to be not allowable as it was not in the course of assessee's business. [S.37(1)]**

High Court held that no evidence was placed on record by the assessee to support the argument of commercial expediency hence interest on borrowings for investment in shares of a foreign company was rightly disallowed by Tribunal, since it was found to be not in the course of business. (AY. 2005-06)

Crescent Organics (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 108 DTR 393 / 271 CTR 227 / 226 Taxman 289 (Bom.)(HC)

- 548 **S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Share trading – Interest allowable as deduction**

If the main business of the assessee is to trade in shares as per its Memorandum of Association, the interest paid on the borrowed funds to its sister concern is allowable as business expenditure. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Peninsular Investment Ltd. (2013) 95 DTR 19 / 213 Taxman 327 (2014) 265 CTR 601 (AP)(HC)

- 549 **S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Deduction can be claimed even if interest not paid**

The assessee company received interest bearing loan from the State Government. The assessee claimed deduction pertaining to interest u/s. 36(1)(iii) but has not paid any interest to the Government. The AO made the addition on the ground that the same has not been actually paid. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal deleted the addition. On appeal the High Court observed that the assessee is entitled for deduction as the books are maintained on the mercantile system and affirmed the order of Tribunal. (AY. 2004-05) *CIT v. UP State Agro Industrial Corp. Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxman 119 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)*

- 550 **S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Set up of business – Interest on the loan taken on 16-5-2006 i.e. prior to date of joint venture agreement is allowable. [S.28(i)]**

The assessee company was incorporated on 4-8-2005 to carry on a real estate business. It had taken a loan on 16-5-2006. On 31-5-2006, it entered into a MoU with third parties in respect of a project. Subsequently, a joint venture agreement was executed on 5-7-2006 between the assessee and the third parties. For A.Y. 2006-07, assessee had filed a return of income declaring business loss. In the return of income filed for A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee company claimed a deduction of interest on the loan taken. The Assessing Officer disallowed the said claim on the ground that the business of the assessee was set up on 5-7-2006 i.e. the date of joint venture agreement. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the claim of the assessee which was upheld by the Tribunal as well. On appeal to the High Court, the Bench did not agree with the AO's contention that the date of the joint venture agreement was the date of setting up of business. Setting up of business takes place when the business is ready and first steps are taken. In case of real estate, the said setting up was complete when the first steps were taken by the assessee to look around and negotiate with parties to enter into a written understanding. The MoU is the culmination of the negotiations and in the instant case required payments

to be made. The assessee had, therefore, arranged for funds. Thus it is obvious that the loan was taken for its business and to proceed further with negotiations and conclude the deal. Thus, interest on the loan taken on 16-5-2006 i.e. prior to date of joint venture agreement is allowable u/s. 36(1)(iii) as the business was already set up at the time of taking the loan. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Arcane Developers (P.) Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 627 / 221 Taxmann 475 (Delhi)(HC)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – No requirement that an assessee should have a separate account in respect of non-interest bearing funds from that of interest bearing funds to establish that investments have been made out of its own funds

551

The assessee earned dividend income from investment in mutual funds. The AO noticed that the assessee had borrowed certain sums during the relevant year and had paid interest thereon. On this basis, the AO concluded that part of the amount was invested out of borrowed funds and thus disallowed a part of interest amount claimed as deduction under section 36(1)(iii). The Commissioner (Appeals) recorded a finding of fact that investment in mutual funds was made directly from sales tax deferral amount available to the assessee, thus deleting the AO's disallowance. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). Both the authorities arrived at a concurrent finding that the investment in mutual funds was made by the respondent-assessee out of its own funds and not out of interest bearing borrowed funds. The High Court held that there was no requirement under law that the assessee has separate account for non-interest bearing funds and interest bearing funds to establish that investments had been made out of its own funds i.e. non-interest bearing funds, and thus upheld the Tribunal's order. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Mahanagar Gas Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 80 (Bom.)(HC)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Interest paid by an assessee on a loan utilised for setting up a V-SAT facility was eligible for deduction

552

Interest paid by assessee on loan utilized for setting up a V-SAT facility held to be allowable. High Court relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of *Dy. CIT v. Core Health Care [2008] 298 ITR 194* and allowed the interest expense u/s. 36(1)(iii). (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Kirloskar Computer Services Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 391 / 270 CTR 331 / 106 DTR 395 (Karn.)(HC)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Interest free advance to sister concern – No fresh bowing in year under appeal and reduction of bowed funds – Availability of interest free funds – Disallowance of interest was to be restricted only for the remaining sum

553

The assessee gave interest-free loans to sister concerns. Held, there was no fresh borrowing in year under appeal and there was reduction of borrowed funds. Held, it could not be assumed that borrowed funds were used for non-business purpose. Also, there was availability of interest-free funds. Hence, disallowance of interest was to be restricted only for the remaining sum. (AY. 2003-04, 2004-05)

CIT v. Kajal Exports (2014) 362 ITR 328 / 226 Taxmann 65 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

554 **S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Advance to sister concern – Failure to establish commercial expediency disallowance was justified**

Borrowed capital must be used for commercial expediency. Assessee's sister concern was incurring huge loss and its account was declared non-performing asset by bank. The plea of loss of reputation and goodwill of assessee in view of sister concern being declared non-performing asset was held not justified, and hence, assessee failed to establish commercial expediency. Therefore, disallowance of interest was justified. (AY. 2005-06)

C.R. Auluck and Sons P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 360 ITR 193 / 227 Taxman 264 (Mag.)(P&H) (HC)

555 **S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Loans were made from funds provided by assessee himself – Colourable transaction – Interest was held to be not deductible**

The Assessee took loan from the three persons, namely, BS, TS and JS and the interest paid to them at the rate of 16 per cent per annum, it was found that so far as BS was concerned, he was the son of the assessee and TS and JS were his nephews. It was also found by the AO as well as the Tribunal that the assessee made a gift of ₹ 20 lakhs to each of the three persons on June 19, 2007, and, immediately thereafter, the three persons placed the same amount in the hands of the assessee on which interest at the rate of 16 per cent. aggregating to ₹ 7,46,965 was claimed as deduction. The entire series of transactions were illusory, colourable and not genuine for the purpose of the business. There was no borrowing of capital and, therefore, the requirement of s. 36(1)(iii) was not fulfilled and, therefore, the disallowance by the AO was justified. (AY. 2008-09)

Jayesh Raichand Shah v. ACIT (2014) 360 ITR 387 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 108 (Guj.)(HC)

556 **S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Interest free advances from own capital and advances from customers – No disallowance can be made**

Assessee made interest-free advances to related concerns out of its own capital and interest-free trade credits/advances from customers apart from the fact that he was having substantial trade dealings with two such concerns. Therefore, the Tribunal correctly came to the conclusion that the interest paid by the assessee on borrowings was allowable as deduction and no disallowance was justified. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Jugal Kishore Dangayach (2014) 98 DTR 95 / 227 Taxman 222 (Mag.) / 265 CTR 215 (Raj.)(HC)

557 **S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Interest free advance for acquisition of assets of sick company – Disallowance of interest was not justified**

The Tribunal held that there was commercial expediency for making the payment and there was no diversion of funds for non business purpose. Therefore, disallowance of interest made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the CIT(A) was not justified. (AY. 2008-09)

Sikhwai Chemicals v. ITO (2014) 164 TTJ 1 (UO) / (2015) 68 SOT 39 (URO)(Jodh.)(Trib.)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Interest rate – Disallowing interest exceeding 18 per cent was held to be not justified 558

Assessee paid interest to creditors as well as trade parties up to 30 days at rate of 18 per cent and beyond 30 days at rate of 21 per cent and claimed deduction of same. AO disallowed interest exceeding 18 per cent. Assessee explained that where payment was made within 30 days interest was paid at rate of 18 per cent and in other cases interest was paid at rate of 21 per cent. The rate of interest chargeable for delayed payments are mentioned in the invoices itself. This fact clearly establishes payment policy of the assessee-company. Disallowance of interest exceeding 18 per cent was held to be not justified. (AY. 2009-10)

ITO v. Axon Global (P) Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 473 (Jodh.)(Trib.)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Interest free loan to subsidiary companies 559

Tribunal held that in the absence of any nexus establishing that the interest bearing borrowed funds were given as interest free to its subsidiaries, the disallowance of interest is not justified. (AY. 2002-03)

Reliance Industries v. Addl. ACIT (2012) 79 DTR 315 / (2013) 55 SOT 8 / (2014) 159 TTJ 349 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital – Usance interest and buyers line of credit – No disallowance can be made 560

Usance interest (6.79 per cent) and interest on the buyers line of credit availed from bank (6.9 per cent) was agreed to be paid at international Libor which was much lower than the rate of interest of 13.50 per cent charged for CC limit availed from bank in Indian rupee. AO's objection regarding higher level of stock of imported items was satisfactorily met by the assessee. Relevant international transactions of assessee company with its foreign holding company were accepted by TPO in his transfer pricing analysis. AO was not justified in disallowing expenditure towards usance interest and BLC interest. (AY. 2002-03 to 2004-05)

ITO v. Ricoh India Ltd. (2013) 143 ITD 242 / (2014) 98 DTR 435 / 165 TTJ 211 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.36(1)(vii) : Bad debt – Money-lending – Matter remanded 561

Court held that whether transaction was in the ordinary course of business and the assessee has accounted for accrued interest in earlier years and offered it for taxation has not been examined. Matter remanded. (AY. 2007-08)

Peninsular Plantations Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 363 ITR 441 / 223 Taxmann 258 (Mag.)(Ker)(HC)

S.36(1)(vii) : Bad debt – Provision for doubtful advances made in previous year – Though deduction not claimed – Amount was actually written off in current year 562

Assessee in AY 2003-04 made a provision for bad debt and offered same for taxation. In AY 2005-06 the amount receivable was written off and adjusted against provision for bad debt. AO disallowed the claim in A.Y. 2005-06 on the ground that amount written off has not been taken into account as income in previous year. CIT(A) held

that the assessee had made a provision in the past for the doubtful advances which was not allowed as a deduction, though it was debited to the profit and loss account and, therefore, when the amount was actually written off, the provision was debited but the profit and loss account was not debited again and hence the claim is allowable. Tribunal held that since the revenue had not been able to show that the trilateral agreement is a bogus agreement or a sham and the transaction was not in any manner bogus, the claim was to be allowed. On appeal by revenue the High Court affirmed the view of Tribunal. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Indian Explosives Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 16 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)

563 **S.36(1)(vii) : Bad debt – Loans advanced to associate company – Security scam – Allowed as bad debt. [S.36(2)]**

During the year the assessee wrote off advance made to associate company. AO held that the advance was not in the ordinary course of business hence disallowed the claim. On appeal the claim of the assessee was allowed by CIT(A) on the ground that it could not have for seen that it would not be recoverable and held that the amount advanced to associate company was lost only on account of security scam in assessment year 1993-94. On appeal Tribunal held that in any banking business there were a lot of considerations involved in making advances and merely expressing doubt the genuineness of the advance was not sufficient to take away discretion of the bankers to make advance. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. On appeal by revenue the Court held that there are concurrent findings of fact arrived by the CIT(A) and Tribunal. It is not shown that the said findings of fact are in any manner perverse. Accordingly the order of Tribunal was upheld. (AY. 1993-94)

DIT(IT) v. Deutsche Bank A.G (2014) 225 Taxmann 399 (Bom.)(HC)

564 **S.36(1)(vii) : Bad debt – Bad debts written off on the basis of books of accounts placed before the AO allowable as a deduction**

The AO, on a perusal of the return of income filed by the assessee, observed that it would not be possible for the assessee to establish that the outstanding debts had become bad and doubtful and hence disallowed the deduction of bad and doubtful debts to a certain extent. However, the Tribunal allowed the deduction for the same.

The High Court dismissing the departmental appeal observed that the fact that the assessee could establish before the AO that a debt had become bad was a matter of appreciation. The High Court held that the relevant books of account were placed before the AO and hence the Tribunal was correct in allowing the deduction of bad and doubtful debts written off on the basis of materials placed on record. (AY. 1986-87, 1987-88, 1992-93)

CIT v. Wipro Ltd. (2013) 95 DTR 425 / (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxman 181 (Karn.)(HC)

565 **S.36(1)(vii) : Bad debt – No requirement to prove by documents/evidences that sufficient efforts to recover the debts were made**

The High Court held that, after the amendment in section 36(1)(vii), there is no requirement to establish that debt has become irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee for the previous year. Clause (vii) of section 36(1) provides for allowing deductions subject to provisions of sub-section (2), the amount of any bad debt or part

thereof, which is written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee for the previous year. There is no requirement under sub-section (2) of section 36 that assessee should produce evidence before the Assessing Officer that he has made sufficient effort to recover the amount. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Accord Communication Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxman 120 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)

S.36(1)(vii) : Bad debt – Loans and advances (NPA) – Diminution in the value of investments – Matter remanded

566

Assessee-NBFC classified irrecoverable advances as non-performing assets and made provision for same in books of account and claimed that said transaction was allowable as deduction. Assessing Officer held that assessee was not entitled to claim deduction unless debts were written off in accounts - In *Vijaya Bank v. CIT* Apex Court has held that for allowing claim of deduction, apart from debiting profit and loss account to extent of impugned bad debt, assessee must simultaneously show reduction in amount of loans and advances at year end on asset side of balance sheet so that balance sheet shows net of provisions for bad debt – In the light of said pronouncement, Assessing Officer should consider claim of assessee. Matter remanded. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Amrutanjan Finance Ltd. (2011) 203 Taxman 295 / (2014) 363 ITR 135 (Mad.)(HC)

S.36(1)(vii) : Bad debt – Matter remanded to Commissioner (A). [S.260A]

567

Bad debts disallowed by Assessing Officer. Revision order passed without considering the bad debts issue. Consequential order passed by the Assessing Officer. Assessee filed appeal before the CIT(A) raising the issue of bad debts. Disallowance set aside by the CIT(A) and confirmed by the Tribunal. Matter remanded to CIT(A). (AY. 1999-2000).

CIT v. Canara Bank (2014) 363 ITR 156 (Karn.)(HC)

S.36(1)(vii) : Bad debt – Provision made for non-performing assets – Cannot be allowed

568

Where provision made by assessee against a contingency which might occur in future with regard to non-performing assets does not reflect any particular debt which is doubtful or bad and is only a general and non-specific provision which cannot be allowed. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)

Cosmos Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 90 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.36(1)(vii) : Bad debt – Matter remanded – Held to be justified considering peculiar facts

569

Assessee-company had written off in books of account bad debts pertaining to its customer and claimed deduction of same. It submitted that said customer had not paid amount due, despite making continuous effort for recovery of amount. AO disallowed claim on ground that assessee could not substantiate its claim by producing any documentary evidence. CIT(A) remanded back matter to AO with a direction to re-examine claim of assessee in view of decision of Supreme Court rendered in case of *T.R.F. Ltd. v. CIT (2010) 323 ITR 397 (SC)*. Tribunal held that in peculiar facts of case, CIT(A) was justified in his action. (AY. 2005-06)

ACIT v. Ferment Biotech Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 246 (Mum.)(Trib.)

570 **S.36(1)(vii) : Bad debt – Share broker – Commodity market – Write off of debt owed by client was allowed. [S.28(i), 36(2)]**

Assessee was stock broker in commodity market. Assessee claimed business loss on accounts of write off of debts owed by its client. AO disallowed claim as it was debt *qua* brokerage charge claimed by assessee from its client for services rendered. Tribunal held that there was nothing to show that relevant contract had not been squared up by assessee prior to year end and gain or loss arising thereon being only on behalf of client, adjusted in his account therefore *bona fide* write off in accounts itself was sufficient for claim of deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii). What is relevant is not year to which debt written off pertains, but year in which loss in its respect, relates to. Assessee claiming loss on debt as irrecoverable and written off, in absence of anything to contrary would imply loss on that account to be for year of its write off. Even otherwise by regarding impugned loss as business loss, assessee's claim merited acceptance. (AY. 2006-07)

Angel Commodities Broking (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 754 / 164 TTJ 275 / 106 DTR 131 (Mum.)(Trib.)

571 **S.36(1)(vii) : Bad debt – Irrecoverable amount due from clients – Allowable as deduction after reducing the sum recoverable from sale proceeds of shares with assessee**

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to deduction in respect of the amount becoming unrecoverable from its clients. However the deduction has to be restricted to the amount determined after reducing the sum recoverable from sale proceeds of shares with assessee. The Tribunal set aside the matter and restored back to file of the Assessing Officer to decide afresh after allowing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. (AY. 2008-09)

ACIT v. Rishiti Stock & Shares (P) Ltd. (2014) 159 TTJ 300 / 97 DTR 92 / 29 ITR 61 (Mum.)(Trib.)

572 **S.36(1)(viia) : Bad debt – Banks – Provision for bad and doubtful debts – Non-scheduled banks – Co-operative banks – Definition of Rural Branch applies to Co-operative banks also**

Co-operative banks cannot claim deduction of 10% of the aggregate average advances while computing the income irrespective of falling under rural branch in accordance with the Explanation. The benefit of deduction of 10% of the aggregate average advances is applicable to co-operative banks provided their rural branches as explained under Explanation(ia), have advanced such amounts. Definition of rural bank applies to Co-operative bank also.

Kannur District Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 343 / 226 Taxman 170 (Ker.)(HC)

573 **S.36(1)(viia) : Bad debt – Rural Bank – Co-operative bank – Not satisfied the condition rural branch. [S.36(1)(vii)]**

Assessee was not entitled to deduction of 7.5 per cent under section 36(1)(viia) as benefit of deduction of 7.5 per cent of aggregate average advances was applicable to co-operative bank also provided that their rural branches had advanced such amounts and rural branch means a branch as explained under Explanation (ia). (AY. 2009-10)

Pinarayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. ITO (2014) (2015) 152 ITD 90 (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.36(1)(vii) : Bad debt – Banks – Provision for bad and doubtful debts – Entitled to deduction subject to upper limit of deduction laid down in said section

574

The assessee-bank filed its return claiming deduction on account of provision for bad and doubtful debts under section 36(1)(vii). The AO allowed the claim of the assessee for deduction on account of provision for bad and doubtful debts in respect of rural advances only to the extent of provision created in the books of account by the assessee. Tribunal held that In order to allow assessee's claim under section 36(1)(vii), it has to be seen by A.O. is as to whether provision for bad and doubtful debts is created irrespective of whether it is in respect of rural or non-rural advances by debiting profit and loss account and, to extent PBDD is so created, assessee is entitled to deduction subject to upper limit of deduction laid down in said section. (AY. 2003-04, 2004-05) *Dy. CIT v. ING Vysya Bank Ltd. (2014) 149 ITD 611 / 62 SOT 26 (Bang.)(Trib.)*

S.36(1)(viii) : Eligible business – Special reserve – Penal interest and pre-closure charges on prepayment of loan is to be treated as eligible profit for the purpose of deduction

575

Where the assessee was receiving income from providing long-term finance being an eligible business, miscellaneous income derived from penal interest and pre-closure charges on prepayment of loan are to be treated as eligible profit for purpose of deduction.

CIT v. Weizmann Homes Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 147 (Karn.)(HC)

Section 37 : General**S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Guarantee commission – Matter remanded to High Court. [S.260A]**

576

High Court refused to admit the question on allowability of guarantee commission on the ground that same question for earlier year has not been admitted. On appeal Supreme Court for earlier year remanded to High Court. Question for this year also to be disposed of on merits. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Essar Projects Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 363 / 223 Taxmann 344 (SC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Onetime conversion charges incurred to covert residential property into commercial property was capital in nature in hands of the property owner and not to the user of property. [S.264]

577

The Assessee petitioner was a partnership firm operating guest house services from the property owned by the individual partners. It had to pay conversion charges, a one time charge to the Government, for converting residential property into commercial property. The said payment was claimed revenue in nature which was disallowed by the AO. An application u/s. 264 was partly dismissed by the CIT and subsequently the Assessee filed a writ. It was held that such conversion charges were neither capital nor revenue expenditure to the Assessee i.e. partnership firm. It was capital in nature vis-à-vis the partners and should have been incurred by the owners. The onetime conversion charge converted the property from residential to commercial and the benefit of the same endured to the owners of the property. It enhanced and added value to the capital

asset. Hence the same was capital in nature, but to the owners of the asset and not to the Assessee. (AY. 2008-09)

Hotel Shiv v. CIT (2014) 226 Taxman 80 (Mag)/ (2015) 116 DTR 228 (Delhi)(HC)

- 578 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Mercantile system of accounting – Expenditure on contract work shown as work-in-progress for assessment years 1999-2000 and 2000-01 – Termination of contract in October, 2002 – Amount spent on contract work – Could not be shown as work-in-progress-Amount deductible. [S.145]**

The assessee-company was awarded a contract by the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board. An amount of ₹ 9,29,20,000 was paid as advance. The assessee gave a bank guarantee for the amount. The assessee commenced work under a contract and incurred expenditure. The total amount of expenditure incurred on the project was ₹ 6,64,01,149. The other party arbitrarily terminated the contract. The amount of The assessee debited the amount being the cost of the abandoned project in the profit and loss account. In the notes appended, it was stated that the amount had been charged as expenditure on the abandoned project. The Assessing Officer found that the assessee followed the mercantile system of accounting. The debit of expenditure was disallowed since there was no corresponding credit either by way of contract receipts or at the least equivalent amount of work-in-progress. This was upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. On appeal to the High Court:

Held, that the material on record clearly showed that for the years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 the amount spent towards expenditure was shown as “work-in-progress” in the books of account. It was only in the relevant year that the assessee had not shown the amount spent towards expenditure as work-in-progress. It was during that year that the contract was terminated and the assessee put forth the present claim. The assessee could not have shown it as work-in-progress. Therefore, the finding that the assessee was not entitled to the benefit was ex facie illegal and could not be sustained. Amount deductible. (AY. 2002-03)

Asia Power Projects P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 226 Taxmann 136 (Mag.) / (2015) 370 ITR 257 122 DTR 201 (Karn.)(HC)

- 579 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Redemption – Price higher than market price – Allowable as business expenditure**

Where assessee was a trustee of a mutual fund which did not perform well and in order to preserve its fair name and goodwill in market, assessee purchased units of said mutual fund at a price higher than their market price for redemption, excess amount so paid by assessee was to be allowed as business expenditure. (AY. 1998-99, 2000-01, 2001-02)

Canara Bank v. ACIT (2014) 265 CTR 385 / (2015) 228 Taxman 212 / 99 DTR 36 (Karn.)(HC)

- 580 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Franchise fee – Advertisement – Revenue expenditure**

Franchise fee paid by assessee to a foreign company annually at fixed percentage of its sales turnover for using trademark ‘Dominos’ was to be allowed as revenue expenditure.

Entire expenditure incurred by assessee-company on advertising was to be allowed as revenue expenditure. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Jubilant Foodwork (P) Ltd. (2014) 271 CTR 227 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 311 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Difference between setting up and commencement of business – Characteristics of BPO industry – Recruitment and training of workers, taking premises on lease and getting internet connection on 1-4-2004 – Agreement for provision of BPO services on 1-6-2004 – Business was set up on 1-4-2004. [S.2(13), 3]. 581
On appeal to the High Court : Held, that the business of the assessee had been set up on April 1, 2004, as the assessee had acquired the necessary infrastructure from its sister concern, A, and had also started making payment of salary and wages. This training was given by professional experts under the supervision and control of the assessee. The moment the operations were commenced, the business had been set up. (AY. 2005-06) *Omniglobe Information Tech India P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 1 (Delhi)(HC)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Bank guarantee commission – Expenditure on acquiring asset on deferred payment basis – Revenue expenditure 582
The Tribunal held that generating sets were imported from the USSR and that the purchase of the generating sets was for the purpose of the assets and, therefore, any expenditure incurred in acquiring any asset was a capital expenditure and not a revenue expenditure. Allowing the appeal Court held that,, the expenditure incurred by the assessee in obtaining the asset on deferred payment basis was a revenue expenditure. Applied the ratio in, *CIT v. Sivakami Mills Ltd. (1997) 227 ITR 465 (SC)*. (AY. 1983-84) *J. K. Synthetics Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 310 / (2015) 230 Taxman 79 (All.)(HC)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Lease of production facilities – Compensation paid for reclaiming business – Capital expenditure 583
Held that as a result of the lease agreement SDPL was in complete management and possession of the assessee's business unit. The only right of the assessee was to receive the rental amount or fee for the licence granted. By the payment of ₹ 5.31 crores the entire profit-making unit was transferred to the assessee. This expenditure was made for regaining the assets as well as an advantage for the enduring benefit of the assessee's business. It was properly attributable to capital. It was not deductible. (AY. 1999-2000) *CIT v. McDowell and Co. Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 293 / 227 Taxman 46 (Karn.)(HC)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Royalty – No new factory being set up based on technical collaboration agreements – Expenditure allowable as revenue expenditure. [S.35AB] 584
The Assessee was engaged in manufacture of automobile parts and components and entered into Technical collaboration agreement with a Japanese company. Department in earlier assessment years had accepted that payment made by assessee towards royalty was revenue expenditure. The Court held that unless there is a change in law or on basis of new and acceptable material which went unnoticed, opinion should not differ from time to time based on perception of individual officer. Therefore, payment

of royalty in relevant assessment years was also to be treated as revenue expenditure (AY. 1995-96, 1997-98, 2001-02)

CIT v. Hitech Arai Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 577 / 227 Taxmann 216 (Mag.) / (2015) 116 DTR 398 (Mad.)(HC)

- 585 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Foreign exchange loss – Loan was not for acquiring capital asset and it was part and parcel of payment towards debt servicing – Loss was held to be allowable. [S.43A]**

The assessee had issued Redeemable Non-convertible Debentures. In order to repay the debentures, the assessee borrowed money and the loan was taken against Foreign Currency Non-Resident Loan-Account [FCNR(B) Loan]. In order to hedge against foreign exchange fluctuations, the assessee had entered into forward contracts with banks in India. The assessee incurred loss of ₹ 49.98 lakh on account of foreign exchange fluctuation on account of FCNR(B) Loan. The AO observed that the assessee's contention on section 43A was not acceptable, that no asset had been acquired from the said loan, as assets were acquired in the earlier years for purpose of business or profession. Thus, the provisions of section 43A were applicable. The Court observed that the AO accepted that the loan was not for acquisition of an asset but he observed that assets had been acquired in the earlier period. He did not specify or hold that an asset was acquired. Finding of the CIT (A) is clear and categorical that the loan was not for acquisition of an asset, payment for which was to be made in foreign currency. Keeping in view the aforesaid aspects, it was clear that the payment of ₹ 49.98 lakh would be of revenue nature i.e. virtually in nature of payment of interest for the loan taken having regard to the nature and type of loan which was taken i.e. FCNR(B) Loan Account. It was part and parcel of payment towards debt servicing. (AY 2003-04)

CIT v. Climate Systems (P.) Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxman 174 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

- 586 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Moulds – Cast iron moulds not having enduring shelf life, expenditure on reusable cast iron moulds is held to be revenue expenditure. [S.32]**

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture of cast iron ingots using iron scrap and for the purpose of manufacture of ingots, it used cast iron moulds. The assessee claimed the cost of moulds as revenue expenditure. AO treated the said expenditure as capital and allowed depreciation. On appeal Tribunal treated the said expenditure as revenue expenditure. On appeal by revenue the Court held that cast iron moulds not having enduring shelf life, expenditure on reusable cast iron moulds is held to be revenue expenditure. No substantial question of law. (AY. 2005-06, 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11)

CIT v. Aditya Ferro Alloys P. Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 490 (Mad.)(HC)

- 587 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Expenditure on development of software is held to be revenue expenditure**

Court held that the expenditure on development of software was a revenue expenditure and not a capital expenditure. (AY. 1994-95)

CIT v. Shri Renuga Textiles Mills Ltd. (2012) 254 CTR 423 / 77 DTR 355 / (2014) 366 ITR 649 (Mad.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Advertising and sales promotion – Disallowance for not filing details – Held to be justified. [S.260A] 588

Assessee claimed various deductions, the AO disallowed the advertisement and sales promotion expenses on the ground that no details had been filed by the assessee to justify that the expenses were incurred for the purpose of its business. On appeal High Court held that the concurrent findings by AO, CIT(A) and Tribunal that certain expenses were not deductible. Finding based on evidence. High Court could not set aside findings, expenses not deductible. (AY. 2004-05)

Liberty Footwear Co v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 250 / 51 taxmann.com 87 (P&H)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Lease – Expenditure for alterations – Revenue expenditure 589

Assessee taking premises on lease. Expenditure incurred for alterations and works of arranging partitions extending electricity supplies and carpeting was held to be revenue expenditure. (AY. 1975-76, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88)

CIT v. Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 132 / 51 taxmann.com 545 (T&AP)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Method of accounting – Prior period expenses – Expenses on project work-in-progress – No change in method of accounting – Revenue expenditure. [S.145] 590

The assessee incurred the expenditure as project work-in-progress in relation to the assessment year 2006-07 but did not claim the expenditure in that year. Before the AO it submitted that it had increased the scope and ambit of its business to provide venture capital advisory services. The income from the agreement was continuous in nature and the expenses were written off by the assessee in the assessment year 2007-08. The expenses were accordingly added back in the income on account of the prior period expenses in the assessment year 2007-08. The AO held that the assessee had changed the method of accounting as earlier, the expenses incurred were treated as project work-in-progress to be written off against income earned by applying the principle of matching. The net result of operations in the assessment year 2007-08 would be a loss even after writing back the project expenses and, thereafter, the revised return claiming expenses of ₹ 42,60,293 was filed. The AO disallowed the expenditure of ₹ 42,60,293 on the ground that it should be capitalised as it was project work-in-progress. The CIT(A) held that when the assessee had followed the same method in future, there was no question of disallowance. This finding was confirmed by the Tribunal. On appeal by revenue High Court affirmed the view of Tribunal and dismissed the appeal of revenue. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Gaja Advisors (P) Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 726 (Delhi)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Expenditure on construction of building on leasehold land – Revenue expenditure 591

Held that the expenditure incurred on construction of the building on leasehold land was revenue expenditure. Followed the ratio in

CIT v. Madras Auto Service P. Ltd. [1998] 233 ITR 468 (SC). Consequently, the assessee was not entitled to the benefit under section 32(IA).

CIT v. S. Premalata (Smt.) (2014) 367 ITR 298 / 52 taxmann.com 58 / 271 CTR 249 (T&AP)(HC)

- 592 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Accrual of liability – Disputed enhanced power tariff – No amount paid to Electricity Board – No acknowledgment of liability – No actual accrual taken place – Amount not deductible. [S.145]**

Held, the stand of the assessee was wavering throughout. In the three or four assessment years, for which the liability accrued, deduction was not even claimed. Except that a provision was made, it was neither stated that the amount was paid to the electricity supplier nor that the liability had been acknowledged. It is only when the actual accrual takes place, that allowance can be permitted, irrespective of the actual payment. Such accrual would take place only when the matter is settled amicably between the parties to the contract or the adjudication has reached finality. Admittedly, nothing of that had taken place. Therefore, the appellate authorities had rightly rejected the claim of the assessee. Reference was answered against the assessee. (AY. 1988-89 to 1994-95)

Coromondal Cement Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 144 / 52 taxmann.com 56 (T&AP)(HC)

- 593 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Hotel establishment – Construction of rooms – Whether construction undertaken by assessee was permanent or semi-permanent – Whether building was owned by assessee or was taken on lease – Matter remanded**

The assessee, a hotel establishment, claimed certain amount for construction of rooms as revenue expenditure. AO held that the amount spent by the assessee for construction was to be treated as capital expenditure. The CIT(A) allowed the claim of the assessee. This was upheld by the Tribunal. On appeal :

Held, allowing the appeal, that the Tribunal had simply concurred with the view expressed by the Commissioner taking into account the claim made by the assessee for the assessment year 1982-83 and the fact that the cost of construction incurred by it be treated as revenue expenditure was accepted. Beyond that, no discussion whatever was undertaken. It was obligatory on the part of the Commissioner and the Tribunal, to examine whether the building was owned by the assessee or was taken on lease and whether the construction undertaken by it was permanent or semi-permanent in nature. (AY. 1989-90, 1990-91)

CIT v. Hotel Krishna (2014) 368 ITR 445 (T&AP)(HC)

- 594 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Secret commission – Filed details names and address – Manner of payment – Matter remanded**

Held, the secret commission was the amount, which was paid to certain individuals or agencies, that provided transport business to the assessee. Beyond that, it had no taint of illegality or secrecy. The deduction could not be claimed as a matter of course but only on complying with two requirements, namely, (a) the particulars of the amounts paid as commission are furnished transaction-wise and ultimately they are correlated to the turnover, and (b) the names of the recipients are (i) furnished in the returns; or (ii) a plea is raised to the satisfaction of the assessing authority that the disclosure of the names of the recipients is detrimental to the interests of the assessee. Those two factors had not been addressed by the CIT(A). Therefore, the matter was remanded for fresh consideration and disposal. (AY. 1988-89)

CIT v. Transport Corporation of India (2014) 368 ITR 728 / 272 CTR 97 / 110 DTR 44 (2015) 229 Taxmann 624 (T&AP)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Land development expenses incurred in cash – Cash expenses restricted to the extent of offer 595

Direction of Tribunal to restrict the disallowance of land development expenses incurred in cash to the extent of offer made by the assessee was held to be justified. (AY. 2003-04, 2009-10)

CIT v. V.G.P. Housing (P) Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 565 (Mad.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Drawings of directors under sales promotion and travelling expenses – Assessing Officer to consider on merits – Matter remanded 596

That the issue relating to deleting the addition on account of drawings of directors should be considered by the AO on the merits based on materials to be produced by the assessee. Matter remanded. (AY. 2003-04, 2009-10)

CIT v. V.G.P. Housing (P) Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 565 (Mad.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Mercantile system of accounting – Leave encashment – Estimation without reasonable certainty – Not deductible. [S.145] 597

The assessee had not filed any working sheet for calculation of the amount and there was no basis for arriving at that figure. Since the assessee was following the mercantile system from the accounting year 1998-99, the assessee should have determined the leave encashment amount on the basis of the accepted principles of commercial practice and accountancy. Even though the assessee might not be in a position to give the accurate details that did not allow the assessee to claim a figure in an arbitrary manner without there being any supportive material. In view of the vagueness in the nature of the leave encashment benefits as claimed by the assessee, the assessee was not entitled to claim deduction on the leave encashment. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Wheels India Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 554 (Mad.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Commission – Sub agency – No evidence of services rendered – Not deductible 598

The Court held that the assessee has not furnished the details of services provided by the agents, hence disallowance of commission was held to be justified.

Umakant B. Agarwal v. Dy. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 220 / 224 Taxmann 264 / 108 DTR 428 (Bom.)(HC)

Editorial: SLP of assessee is dismissed. [SLA (C) No 1807 of 2015 dt 13-2-2105]
Umakant B. Agarwal v. Dy. CIT (2015) 231 Taxmann 227 (SC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Club membership fees – Allowable as business expenditure 599

One-time expenditure incurred by the assessee for club membership fees is allowable as business expenditure. (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Upper India Steel Mfg. & Engg. Co. Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxmann 173 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

600 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenditure incurred on obtaining ISO 9002 certification is to be allowed as revenue expenditure**

The substantial question of law before the High Court was whether expenditure incurred for club membership fees and expenditure incurred on ISO 9002 certification is a 'capital expenditure' or 'revenue expenditure'.

Referring to the Full Bench decision of the said High Court, in the case of *CIT v. GrozBeckert Asia Ltd.* [2013] 31 *taxmann.com* 155, wherein it was held that such an expenditure does not bring into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade but is incurred for running the business with a view to produce profit, the High Court dismissed the appeal of the Revenue.

Further, with respect to deductibility of expenditure for obtaining ISO 9002 certification, the High Court, relying on its own decision in the case of *CIT v. Varinder Agro Chemicals* (ITA No. 424 of 2005), held that the said expenditure is revenue in nature. (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Upper India Steel Mfg. & Engg. Co. Ltd. (2014) 227 *Taxmann* 173 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

601 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Fringe benefit tax paid – Tax deducted – Disallowance was not justified**

Where the assessee had submitted complete details of expenses; all expenditures were billed and properly vouched; appropriate deduction of Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) was also made; and that during the current year the assessee was subjected to fringe benefit tax and the AO did not point out any defect in it, no disallowance of such expenses can be made. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Sachitel Communications P. Ltd. (2014) 227 *Taxman* 219 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

602 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Commission at 70% was held to be allowable – AO cannot question the reasonableness of payment**

Assessee-company paid 70 per cent commission to its dealer out of total insurance commission received as per written agreement. AO held that in preceding years, rates of commission were consistently reduced in order to pay commission to its dealer and accordingly, AO restricted commission to 60 per cent. Court held that AO could not have gone into this aspect so as to disallow a part of it. The way parties entering into a voluntary commercial transaction spell out their relationship, is a matter of contract, which except by statutory supervision, the AO cannot go into, at least under section 37(1), given that the exclusive domain of deciding whether the expenditure is warranted, is that of the assessee. The decision is entirely a business related one. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 2006-07)

Maruti Insurance Distribution Services Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 225 *Taxmann* 63 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

603 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Accounting Standard – Real estate business set up – Development expenses – Matter set aside. [S.145, 145A]**

The assessee which had set up a real estate business filed a return showing nil income. The assessment order mentioned that as no income from business was derived during the year, the entire expenses should be capitalized and added to the cost of the real

estate project. The Tribunal held that the business of the assessee had been set up and that it was entitled to deduction of the expenses which were necessary for day-to-day business activity but the expenses which were relatable to the project for which assessee itself capitalized the expenses. On appeal to the High Court. Held, that the primary question, whether the development expenses can be allowed under the applicable accounting standards read with section 145/145A and commercial principles remained unexamined. Court directions to the AO to examine the whole issue afresh without touching upon the expenses which had been allowed by the Tribunal. (AY. 2008-09) *Rangoli Projects P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 192 / 223 Taxmann 6 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Share issue expenses – Directly related to expansion of capital base – Capital expenditure – Not deductible 604

Share issue expenditure directly related to the expansion of capital base, could not be allowed as revenue expenditure. (AY. 2005-06) *South Indian Bank Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 111 / 226 Taxmann 130 / 105 DTR 299 (Ker.)(HC)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Interest – New project – Borrowed funds for purpose of setting new project for expansion of its business, interest was to be allowed as revenue expenditure 605

A textile project was set up for expansion of assessee's business. The assessee had its own share capital. Interest bearing funds were not used by assessee. The AO made an *ad hoc* disallowance of 15% from the profit & loss account of the assessee mentioning that such amount was to be capitalized as work in progress. It was held that even if borrowed amount was used for new project, interest was to be allowed as revenue expenditure as borrowing was used for business purpose. No *ad hoc* disallowance could be made from profit and loss account without giving clear finding that any part of borrowing was used for non-business purpose. (AY. 1995-96) *CIT v. Diwan Rubber Industries (2014) 222 Taxmann 26 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Sub-contract – Disallowance of expenses was held to be not justified 606

Assessing Officer disallowed 25 per cent of sub-contractor expenses and added said amount to income of assessee. He also disallowed entire hiring charges. Commissioner (Appeals) observed that assessee had fully discharged its onus of providing details of sub-contract expenses by submitting complete names, address, PAN, confirmations, IT returns and bank statements of subcontractors as also details of TDS and proof for payment made by account payee cheques. As regards hiring charges, it was found that sufficient material was placed on record inclusive of bills as well as TDS. Tribunal confirmed findings of Commissioner (Appeals). The Court held that reasoning given by Commissioner (Appeals) as well as Tribunal was concurrent finding of facts which was on appreciation of evidence, and, therefore, there was no reason to interfere with impugned order. (AY. 2006-07) *CIT v. R. N. Dobaria (2014) 222 Taxmann 24 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)*

607 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Gifts and articles to various persons which had company’s official rubber stamp imprinted**

Assessee gave gifts and articles to various persons including its employees. Assessee’s claim for deduction in respect of said expenditure was disallowed by the AO. On appeal, the tribunal held that though on gift articles there was no company logo printed, yet there was company’s official rubber stamp on those articles; therefore, gifts were given for purpose of promotion of business. Tribunal thus taking a view that there was element of advertisement in distribution of gift articles, allowed assessee’s claim. The Court agreed with the finding recorded by the tribunal and held that such finding was a finding of fact and hence, no question of law arose there from.

CIT v. Bihar Spunge Iron Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 29 (Mag.)(Jharkhand)(HC)

608 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Interest free funds – Presumption would arise that investment has been made out of interest-free funds available with company and not out of loans. [S.36(1)(iii)]**

With regards to the matter relating to deduction under Section 37(1), both the counsel for the appellant, as well as for the respondent agree that the same is covered by the decision of the High Court of Bombay in the matter of *CIT v. Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. (2009) 313 ITR 340 / 178 Taxmann 135* of this court, wherein it has been held that where interest-free funds are available with an assessee sufficient to meet its investments and at the same time loans are taken, then a presumption would arise that the investment has been made out of interest free funds available with the company and not out of loans taken. In the present case, the interest free funds available were sufficient to meet the investment made by the assessee. In view of the above, the question of law is answered in favour of the respondent assessee and against the appellant-revenue. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Bombay Oil Industries Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 38 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

609 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Discount – Discount evidenced from delivery challans, vouchers etc. – Discount to be allowed**

Assessee was engaged in trade of tractors and spares. It claimed deduction of discount in respect of sale of tractors. Assessing Officer held expenditure was on very high scale and not genuine. He thus rejected assessee’s claim. The High Court held that impugned order passed by Tribunal did not require any interference Tribunal deleted the addition on basis that upon the case being remanded, the Assessing Officer had issued summons to those persons, who then clarified and admitted that they had received the discount. The vouchers were signed evidencing the receipt of the discount by them. No substantial question of law arose. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Patel Ramniklal Hirji (2014) 222 Taxman 15 (Mag.)(Guj)(HC)

610 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Operational expenses – Held to be allowable**

The assessee-company was engaged in business of mobilization of deposits from the General public at large. The assessee-company had entered into an MoU with Sahara India whereby Sahara India agreed to work as an agent to the assessee-company for collecting money, leading money, supply of receipts and documents and communicating

various schemes and proposals launched by the assessee-company from time to time. The assessee-company claimed the expenses paid to Sahara India as operating expenses. The AO found that operational expenses paid by assessee accounted for 18.85 per cent of the total collection made during the year and he allowed only 3 per cent of the collection on estimate basis. On appeal, the CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal allowed the expenditure upto the extent of 4.5 per cent of the total deposit. Hence the revenue was in appeal before HC. The High Court held that these expenditure were likely to be incurred by the assessee-company, or to be paid to the Sahara India. The expenses so claimed pertained to the establishment, travelling, and printing, advertisement and publicity and business development and these expenses were related to the business of the assessee. The same fund were allocated as per MOU between the parties. The said expenses were duly supported by the vouchers as observed by the CIT(A) in his order. But since these expenses were incurred by Sahara India, so the vouchers were in possession of that firm and that the assessee after having satisfied itself about the correctness of these expenses had accepted the debit note of Sahara India and credited in their account the amount by issuing debit vouchers. During the course of arguments, no doubt was raised about the genuineness of the said expenditure. When the expenses were incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business, the same were allowable. Thus, unless a case has been made out that the payment was not genuine and what was borrowed was not true then there is no scope for any interference. Moreover, the AO made the addition on estimate basis. The First Appellate Authority as well as Tribunal restricted the same on estimate basis. Hence, no question of law was emerging from the impugned order. (AY. 1992-93, 1994-95)

CIT v. Sahara India Mutual Benefit Co. Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 16 (All.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Excise and additional custom duty MODVAT credit – Held to be allowable

611

The assessee had claimed unutilized credit of MODVAT as deduction in the computation of income. The said claim was made in the revised return. Assessee premised that they had paid excise duty and additional customs duty and this constitutes an expense under Section 37(1). The claim was rejected by the Assessing Officer observing that the MODVAT credit had not been utilized and could have been utilized in the next year. Under the excise rules, additional customs duty and excise duty paid on raw material formed part of MODVAT credit, which was utilized at the time of clearance of goods, subject to fulfilling conditions. The CIT(A) observed that the assessee had received refund of MODVAT credit in the subsequent assessment year 1996-97, but it could not be ascertained whether the refund was against the MODVAT credit available as on 31st March, 1995. He however held that the respondent-assessee had got refund and the addition should be confirmed. Tribunal accepted the appeal of the assessee. The High Court held that the said issue was covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in *CIT v. Indo Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. (2003) 261 ITR 275 / 130 Taxman 179* wherein it was observed that the Assessing Officer/Revenue was not correct in holding that MODVAT credit was irreversible credit available to the manufacturers upon purchase of duty paid raw material and it should amount to income, which is liable to be taxed under the Act. In view of the aforesaid position and also noticing the fact that the MODVAT credit

paid was brought to tax in the next year, High Court held that there was no ground or reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. (AY. 1995-96)
CIT v. Samtel India Ltd. (2013) 359 ITR 62 / (2014) 222 Taxmann 18 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

612 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Transportation charges – Held to be allowable**

The assessee was a transporter who hired the services of the trucks from other transporter companies. The assessee company filed its return by declaring income of ₹ 74,410/-. During course of assessment proceedings, AO issued notice under section 133(6) to verify genuineness of claim for payment of transportation charges. The A.O. completed the assessment under Section 143(3) at total income of ₹ 16,09,250/- by making addition on account of transportation charges. CIT(A) held that TDS certificate was already submitted and there was no inflation on payment. The CIT(A) therefore deleted the additions and the Tribunal confirmed the same. Being aggrieved, the Department filed the present appeal. The HC observed that there was a concurrent finding of facts from both Appellate Authorities that payments were genuine and revenue had no adverse material in its possession except relying on order of AO. Therefore, there was no reason to interfere with impugned order passed by Tribunal and same was to be sustained. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. Vinayak Traders & Transporters (P) Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 19 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

613 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Commission paid to sub-distributor – Held, allowable**

The assessee was carrying on the business of distribution of cement. Assessee appointed sub-distributors at its own level who were providing services of stockist, taking orders from local customers for sale of cement and supplying/selling cements to local customers. Assessee claimed deduction of the amount of commission paid to the sub-distributors. AO disallowed the commission expense on the ground that the assessee had failed to prove the work done/services rendered by the sub-distributors. CIT(A), relying upon the order of Tribunal in earlier years, allowed the deduction. Tribunal remanded the matter stating that there was no discussion on the evidence collected. High Court held that assessee proved that actual commission was paid to the sub-distributors. Further, such deductions was also allowed for the financial year 1988-89 to 1990-91. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the claim of deduction of commission to the assessee. (AY. 1992-93)

General Trading Co. v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 25 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

614 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Assessee's sister concern entered into a joint development agreement – Assessee assigned to carry out work – Concurrent finding was that all rights were not assigned to the assessee – Deduction of expenses not allowed**

The assignment document established that under the said Deed, the assessee was appointed as an agent to carry out the work for which his sister concern had entered into joint development agreement with the owner. It was not a case of assignment of all rights in the agreement in favour of the assessee. Therefore, the concurrent findings recorded by the authorities below that there was no direct connection could not be faulted with. The deductions claimed were in pursuance of the said contract and the

authorities on careful consideration of the entire material on record have recorded a categorical finding that the assessee was not entitled to any benefit. The High Court affirmed those findings. (AY. 2005-06)

Raja Housing Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 15 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Car Maintenance expenditure – Supporting documents not produced – allowance restricted to 50% of the total expenditure 615

Assessee had debited certain sum towards car maintenance but could not substantiate claim that car was running exclusively for purpose of business by way of producing details of travel, clients visited, vehicle service maintenance record, fuel bill, repair bills, etc. The High Court held that the revenue has rightly restricted the expenditure to 50 per cent. (AY 2008-09)

K. Sivakumar v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 59 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Transfer pricing – Business expenditure – Jurisdiction – AO can determine whether the expenditure is allowable or not. [S.92CA] 616

Jurisdiction of Assessing Officer under section 37 and TPO under section 92CA is distinct and, therefore, a referral made by Assessing Officer to TPO for limited purpose of determining ALP does not take away power of Assessing Officer to determine as to whether payment made by assessee to its AE for services rendered was basically an expenditure incurred for purpose of business so as to allow same under section 37(1).

CIT v. Cushman and Wakefield (India) (P) Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 370 / 104 DTR 249 / 225 Taxmann 8 / 269 CTR 16 (Delhi)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Foreign travel – Directors and employees – Tribunal committed error in allowing travelling expenses without full verification 617

Assessee claimed a certain amount by way of foreign travelling expenses of directors and employees. AO disallowed said expenses on ground that details called for were not furnished. Tribunal following its order made in assessee's own case for earlier assessment years 1994-95 and 1995-96 allowed travelling expenses. On appeal by revenue the Court held that the Tribunal committed an error in allowing travelling expenses without its full verification. (AY. 1996-97)

CIT v. Indu Nissan Oxo Chemical Industries Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 104 / 225 Taxmann 2 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Disputed liability for interest for earlier years was held to be allowable on the basis of the supplementary agreement. [S. 145] 618

Assessee disputed its liability to pay interest @ 12% as stipulated in the agreement with the lender on 30th March 2000 and agrees to pay @ 6% per annum only on the execution of a supplementary agreement was made and, therefore, deduction of interest liability of earlier years was held to be allowable in the relevant assessment year 2008-09. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Shivam Motors (P) Ltd. (2014) 111 DTR 153 / 272 CTR 277 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 63 (All.)(HC)

619 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Franchise agreement – Failure to produce evidence for support claim – Expenditure was held to be not allowable**

Where assessee entered into a franchise agreement granting franchisee business of manufacture, sale and export of footwear and footwear components, in absence of any evidence being produced by assessee to support its claim, assessee could no more claim car expenses, legal and professional charges and establishment expenses. (AY. 2004-05) *Liberty Group Marketing Division v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 2 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)*

620 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Licence fee – Group companies – Share of actual expenses – Held to be allowable**

The assessee by availing of the service benefits from the group resource company, viz., RPG availed of valuable benefits for its business operations and the payment of licence fee to RPG by the assessee was towards its share of actual expenses incurred by RPG. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal clearly pointed out that the expenditure incurred by the assessee towards licence fee payment to RPG was relatable to the business expediency and profits of the assessee and that the benefits availed of by the assessee from the service of the group resource company were tangible and justified. Held to be allowable. (AY. 2000-01, 2001-02)

CIT v. RPG Transmissions Ltd. (2013) 359 ITR 673 / (2014) 266 CTR 533 / 100 DTR 338 (Mad.)(HC)

621 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenditure on distribution of free samples was held to be deductible**

The assessee-company was an export trading house and had distributed carpets and shawls as samples during the year. These items were exported by the assessee in the subsequent assessment years. The samples distributed were not extraneous to the business of the assessee. Furthermore, the samples were given to the foreign agents in person during their business exploratory visit in India. The expenditure on distribution of free samples was deductible.

CIT v. Bazaar Décor (India) P. Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 389 / 222 Taxmann 328 (P&H)(HC)

622 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Provision for warranty liability – Deductible**

Provision for warranty liability in respect of products sold was allowable as revenue expenditure. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Hewlett Packard India Sales P. Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 499 / 226 Taxmann 139 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

623 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Estimated value assigned to news archives allowable as revenue expenditure**

The assessee was in the business of television programme production. Database of programmes utilised for creation of news archives. Repeat value of these resources in future. Estimated value assigned to news archives allowable as revenue expenditure.

CIT v. Television Eighteen India Ltd. (No.1) (2014) 364 ITR 597 / 109 DTR 223 (Delhi)(HC)

CIT v. Television Eighteen India Ltd. (No.2) (2014) 364 ITR 605 / 224 Taxman 130 / 109 DTR 254 (Delhi)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Expansion project – Salary, media professional charges, equipment hire charges and production expenses – No advantage of enduring nature accrued to assessee – Allowable as revenue expenditure

624

The assessee is in the business of television programme production. Salary, media professional charges, equipment hire charges and production expenses. No advantage of enduring nature accrued to assessee. Allowable as revenue expenditure. (AY. 1998-99) *CIT v. Television Eighteen India Ltd. (No.2) (2014) 364 ITR 605 / 224 Taxmann 130 / 109 DTR 254 (Delhi)(HC)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Deposit made by assessee of excess price charged for drugs over and above price fixed by Government – Statutory liability – Allowable

625

The assessee, a pharmaceutical company, paid to the Government on account of the excess amounts charged for the tablets over and above the prices fixed in the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1979. The assessee's liability under the 1979 Act was a statutory liability and was allowable. (AY. 1983-84, 1985-86)

CIT v. Warner Hindustan Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 208 / 112 DTR 281 / (2015) 274 CTR 300/ 231 Taxmann 373 (AP)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Payment for use of customer database and manpower on transfer of business

626

A part of the business being handled by the erstwhile TATA IBM was handed over to the assessee company in view of bifurcation of the software and hardware business. For the transfer of domestic customer database and the manpower, the assessee paid certain amount to TATA IBM which was claimed as business expenditure. The Assessing Officer taking a view that expenditure in question resulted in enduring benefit to assessee, disallowed assessee's claim. The Tribunal, however, allowed assessee's claim. On revenue's appeal it was held that in the instant case, insofar as payment for getting domestic customer database is concerned, it is clear that, assessee has only got right to use that database, the company which has provided such database is not precluded from using such database. Hence the expenditure incurred is for the use of database and not for acquisition of such database. There is no question of acquisition of any assets when the access is made and the payment is made for the same. The said payment cannot (sic -can) be treated as revenue expenditure. There is no infirmity or irregularity in the said finding of the Tribunal. In respect of payment made towards transfer of human skill is concerned, it has been made towards the expenses incurred for training and on recruitment. Such expenses were under revenue field, and therefore the payments have been made to save such revenue expenses as per the agreement. TATA IBM has spent lot of money to give training to those employees who were transferred to the assessee-company. They are trained in the field of software. They have opted for employment with assessee-company and for their past services in TATA IBM, expenditure has been incurred. Such expenditure cannot be termed as expenditure laid for carrying on the business. The order passed by the Assessing Officer to disallow said expenditure is erroneous in law. (AY. 1998-99, 1999-2000)

CIT v. IBM Global Services India (P) Ltd. (2014) 107 DTR 372 / 366 ITR 293 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 351 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

- 627 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Consultancy charges – Parties not traceable – TDS deducted – Expenses cannot be disallowed**
Where payment had been made through banking channels, tax was deducted at source on such payments and the parties were not found to be related to the assessee, the AO cannot treat such expenses as bogus
CIT v. Mundra Port and Sez Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 150 (Guj.)(HC)
- 628 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Feasibility report – Expansion of existing business – Allowable as revenue expenditure**
Where expenditure is incurred on obtaining a feasibility report for the expansion of existing business and where there is unity of control and common funds, such expenditure would be treated as business expenditure. (AY. 1995-96)
CIT v. Euro India Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 97 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)
- 629 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Know-how – Expenditure is not allowed u/s. 35AB being revenue in nature, the same is allowable u/s. 37(1)[S.35AB]**
Where expenditure is not allowable u/s. 35AB being revenue in nature, the same is allowable u/s. 37(1). (AY. 1989-90)
Dy. CIT v. Cibatul Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 133 (Guj.)(HC)
- 630 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Service tax and interest on service tax – Held to be allowable though not collected**
Where the assessee had not collected and deposited service tax but on being pointed out, deposited it, with interest the amount expended by the assessee in the course of business was allowable as business expenditure. Payment of interest is compensatory in nature and would not partake of the character of penalty. (AY. 2009-10)
CIT v. Kaypee Mechanical India (P.) Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 346 / 271 CTR 346 / 108 DTR 237 (Guj.)(HC)
- 631 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Depository charges – Held to be allowable**
Where consequent to introduction of Demat scheme, the assessee-company paid one-time custody charges to the National Securities Depository Limited ('NSDL') on behalf of its shareholders, expenditure so incurred was to be allowed as deduction.
CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 714 / 223 Taxmann 469 / 270 CTR 523 / 104 DTR 282 (Karn.)(HC)
- 632 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Corporate responsibility – Traffic signals – Held to be allowable**
Where the assessee incurred expenditure on the installation of traffic signals at various parts of city in order to secure free movement of its employees so that they reached the office in time, the amount so spent being a part of its corporate responsibility, was to be allowed as business expenditure.
CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 714 / 223 Taxmann 469 / 104 DTR 282 (Karn.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Provision for post-sales customers support – Matter remanded 633

Where the assessee claimed a deduction of the provision for post-sale customer support, in view of fact that the assessee had not maintained separate accounts for the amount claimed and, moreover, it could not even state what was actual amount spent towards said purpose, the matter was to be remanded for fresh disposal.

CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 714 / 223 Taxmann 469 / 104 DTR 282 (Karn.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenditure on creating assets which do not belong to the assessee is revenue expenditure 634

The Court held that the true test is whether the expenditure which has been incurred by the assessee is for the purpose of obtaining a commercial advantage in the capital field. In the present case, it is clearly evident that the power transmission lines which were laid by the assessee were, upon erection, to constitute the exclusive property of UPPCL. UPPCL was the only consumer of the electricity generated by the assessee. The assessee incurred the expenditure to facilitate its own business. The fixed capital of the assessee was untouched and there was no capital accretion for the assessee. (AY. 2008-09)

ACIT v. Dhampur Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 370 ITR 194 / 273 CTR 90 / 111 DTR 350 (All.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Setting up of business – Trading activities – Expenditure on preparatory stage were also allowable as deduction. [S.3, 28(1), 43D] 635

The assessee company was incorporated to carry on trading activities on wholesale basis of all kinds of consumer goods. It had incurred various expenses during the period. The AO disallowed the claim on the ground that the business was not set up. The Tribunal also confirmed the disallowance. On appeal the Court held that the assessee company had appointed the employees, TDS was deducted, Registration under Shops and Establishment Act was also obtained. It had identified the prospective manufacturers clients etc., obtained storage facilities followed by stock in trade. Following the decision in *Sarabhai Mgmt Corporation* (1991) 192 ITR 151 (SC), the Court held that the business of the assessee was “Set up” and the assessee was entitled to claim the loss and expenditure. (AY. 2008-09)

Carefour WC & C (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 90 CCH 124 (Delhi)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Provision for gratuity – Held to be allowable. [S.40A(7)] 636

Payment of gratuity by the employer for the relevant year and for the earlier year is allowable as an expenditure as it satisfied all the norms laid down in provision 40A(7). (AY. 1973-74)

CIT v. Maharaja Shree Umair Mills Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 341 / 269 CTR 70 / 225 Taxmann 363 / 104 DTR 145 (Raj.)(HC)

637 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Reasonableness to be judged from businessman point of view. [S.40A(2)(a)]**

The AO disallowed salary paid to Chairman-cum-Managing director u/s. 40A(2). On appeal, before CIT (A) deleted the disallowance and further CIT(A)'s decision was upheld in Tribunal. On appeal High Court confirmed findings of lower authorities and held that it is for the assessee, a businessman, who is well versed in running business to come to a conclusion to what remuneration/ salary is to be paid to an employee and reasonableness thereof is to be judged from the angle of a businessman rather than from the angle of AO. Further the director was justified in getting salary of ₹ 24 Lacs as he was the sole person who was instrumental in securing the business from the assessee company. Receipts of the assessee company has increased from preceding years mainly due to the competence of the director and the said increase in salary was approved after passing a proper resolution in an extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders. Also revenue had not made out a case that the salary paid to director was not as per the fair market value as provided u/s. 40A(2)(a) of the IT Act. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Consulting Engineering Group (2014) 365 ITR 284 / 267 CTR 447 / 223 Taxman 440 (Raj.)(HC)

638 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Advertisement expenses – Television channels – The fact that the foreign principals also benefited does not entail right to deny deduction and also failure to disclose in Form 3CEB deductions cannot be denied**

The main grounds on which the revenue has questioned the order of the Tribunal are (a) non-disclosure in Form 3CEB of the fact that the principal is also a beneficiary of the advertising expenses; (b) that the advertising and promotional expenses are not wholly for the benefit of the assessee but it also benefited the principal who was an associated enterprise; (c) that advertising and publicity expenses were far higher than the amount of revenue earned and lastly, that although foreign principals i.e. Associated Enterprise benefited from advertising and publicity no compensation was paid by the foreign principals to the assessee to avail of such benefits. Dismissing the appeal of revenue the Court held that;

- (1) It is not possible to accept the Revenue's contentions for the following reasons: Firstly, the contention that there was no proper disclosure of the benefit before the Transfer Pricing Officer cannot now be a reason to entertain the questions and the order of Transfer Pricing Officer is final. It was admitted position that the assessee is a agent of foreign principal and would naturally benefit from advertising carried on by agent in India. However, these benefits were not ascertainable. The contention of the assessee that the benefits were not ascertainable or taxable in view of extra territory appears to be correct and justified. In the instant case we find that the assessee has not suppressed any information. It has offered to tax its income from both business, namely, distribution business as well as advertisement and promotion business. In the assessment year in question, the Assessing Officer has proceeded to grant 33.33% of the total advertising expenses as allowable deduction. We do not find any justification for such restriction of the same. Furthermore, the appellant's case during argument that the fact of the foreign principal benefiting had been disclosed in the Form 3CEB and the Transfer Pricing

Officer ‘could’ have taken a different view. Admittedly therefore the Transfer Pricing Officer had followed a possible view which cannot now be faulted.

- (2) The contention that the expenditure should have been wholly and exclusive for the purpose of business of the assessee under section 37(1) read with provisions of section 40A(2) as being excessive and unreasonable does not appeal to us. There can be no doubt in the instant case, that in view of decision of the Supreme Court in *Sassoon J. David and Co, (P) Ltd. v. CIT (1979) 118 ITR 261 (SC)* it cannot be said that the expenditure was not wholly or exclusively for benefit of the assessee. The mere fact that foreign principals also benefited does not entail right to deny deduction under section 37(1). Furthermore, it is seen that all the amounts earned by the assessee were brought to tax, especially in view of the fact that the payment of expenses were made to Indian residents and there payments were not required to be included in Form 3CEB since Section 92 which governs the effect of form 3CEB covers only international transactions. Furthermore, it is seen that the respondents income from subscription fee is variable and through commission received on the advertising sales is 15% of the value of Ad-sales. The Assessing Officer’s contention that the assessee received fixed income is not justified and there is certainly, in our view, a direct nexus between the amount spent on advertising and publicity, and the appellant’s revenue.
- (3) Advertisers who advertise on these channels act through media houses and advertising agencies and they work to media plans designed in the manner so as to maximise value for the advertiser. They will evaluate expenditure with channel penetration in the market place in as much as only channels with high viewership would justify the higher advertising rates which is normally sold in seconds. Merely having high quality content will not ensure high viewership. This content has to be publicized. The great reach of the publicity, the higher chances of larger viewership. The larger the viewership, the better chances of obtaining higher advertisement revenue. The higher advertisement revenue, the higher will be commission earned by the assessee. Accordingly, we have no doubt that there is a direct nexus between advertising expenditure and revenue albeit the fact that there may be a lean period before revenue picks up notwithstanding high amount spent on such publicity. This justifies the higher expenditure *vis-a-vis* revenue noticed by the department.
- (4) It is also not necessary that the foreign enterprises must compensate the Indian agent for the benefit it receives or it may receive from the advertisement and promotion of its channels by agent in India. The agent in India earns commission from ad sales and distribution revenue, both of which have sufficiently compensated the assessee. We would not expect the revenue to determine the sufficiency of the compensation received by the agent and as such we do not find any justification in this ground either.

CIT v. N.G.C. Network (India) P. Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 738 / 110 DTR 169 / (2015) 273 CTR 483 / 228 Taxman 176 (Bom.)(HC)

Editorial: SLP is granted, CIT v. NCG Network (India) Ltd. (S.L.P (C) No. 15036 of 2015 dated 11-05-2015) (2015) 374 ITR 1(SU)

- 639 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Foreign tour expenses – Disallowance of 10 per cent of foreign tour expenses of directors and auditor for incorporation of company was held to be reasonable**

Tribunal has restricted the disallowance of the foreign travel expenses of the Directors and auditors for the incorporation of a foreign company to 10 per cent. On appeal High Court affirmed the view of Tribunal by observing that it was reasonable. (AY. 2005-06) *Crescent Organics (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 108 DTR 393 / 271 CTR 227 / 226 Taxmann 289 (Bom.)(HC)*

- 640 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Accrual of liability – Professional fees – Accrual, crystallisation and finalisation relatable to year in which returned. [S.145]**

The assessee, a joint venture enterprise, received an advance for equity to the extent of ₹ 7 crores from the Central Government and started its business of comprehensive mobility studies and consultancy to the State Government and local bodies, aimed at restructuring and reforming the public transport delivery system in the year 1994. The amounts given by the Central Government were deployed in investments. The Central Government insisted on return of its contribution of the share application during the financial year 2006-07 (assessment year 2007-08) and as a result the assessee repaid the amount of ₹ 7 crores together with the interest earned from the investments. The Assessing Officer, for the assessment year 2007-08, refused the assessee's claim for deduction of the professional fee paid to W and the interest paid over to the Central Government as business expenditure, on the ground that the assessee did not carry on business in the relevant accounting year and did not earn revenues by utilising the services of W. Held, the Tribunal recorded a finding of fact that not returning the amount to the Government would have cost the assessee its business prospects and its title over the business by way of withdrawing the joint venture. In these circumstances, the assessee in order to protect its business interest and business propriety refunded the amount which could be termed as compensation, return, interest or by whatever name. Its accrual, crystallization and finalisation were relatable to the assessment year 2007-08. Thus, the amount returned was allowable to the assessee as business expenditure. Since the assessee's business had already commenced the entire amount paid to W was to be allowed being professional fee for consultancy services. (AY. 2007-08) *CIT v. Urban Mass Transit Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 442 (Delhi)(HC)*

- 641 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Lump-sum payment – Held to be capital expenditure**

Lease for eighty years from State Industrial Development Corporation with option of renewal of lease. The assignment deed itself did not say anything about reversion of the property to the hands of the assignor, namely, IFML. On the other hand, the rights of the assignor on approval of the assignment came to an end in toto. The lump sum amount paid did not make a permanent lease any less alienation than a sale. The expenditure was capital in nature and not deductible. (AY. 1994-95) *CIT v. Rane Brake Linings Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 401 / 269 CTR 423 / 226 Taxman 355 / 106 DTR 296 (Mad.)(HC)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Contractor – Payment by account payee cheques – Expenditure on soil testing and surveying – Disallowance part of expenditure was not justified 642

Assessee made payment by account payee cheques and receipts were admitted by sub-contractors hence disallowance of part of expenditure was held to be not justified. Similarly disallowance of part of expenditure on soil testing and surveying was held to be not justified. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Consulting Engineering Group Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 284 / 267 CTR 447 / 102 DTR 311 / 223 Taxmann 440 (Raj.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Guest house expenses – Disallowance on estimate basis – Deletion of addition was held to be justified 643

Court held that there was no material to indicate that any other expenses had been incurred by the assessee apart from paying the rent. As no expenditure was incurred and addition was based on estimate Deletion of addition was held to be justified. (AY. 1993-94, 1994-95)

CIT v. Modi Xerox Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 200 / 226 Taxmann 152 (All.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Travel – Hotel – Ceiling on expenditure by employees on travel including hotel charges. [R.6D] 644

Court held that in the present case, the CIT (Appeals) directed the Assessing Officer to recompute disallowance under Rule 6D of the Rules on the basis of the aggregate trips of each employee and not on the basis of each trip undertaken by the said employee. This direction of the CIT (Appeals) was confirmed by the Tribunal. It is common ground before us that even this Question is squarely covered by a judgment of this Court in the case of *CIT v. Aorow India Ltd. [1998] 229 ITR 325(Bom)(HC)*

CIT v. Mafatlal Dyes and chemicals Ltd. (2014) 49 tamann.com 359 (Bom.)(HC); www.itatonline.org

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Payment to labourers cannot be claimed as a deduction if proper books and vouchers are not produced to justify the payment and expenditure cannot be proved to have been incurred 645

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture of pesticide on job work basis. It claimed deduction on account of expenditure incurred on payments made to labour force. The AO after examination of the wage register and other bills and vouchers disallowed the expenditure since proper bills and vouchers had not been maintained. The CIT (A) enhanced the addition on a presumptive basis. The Tribunal deleted 50 percent of enhancement.

The High Court observed that proper books of account with regard to expenditure were never produced or established and huge amounts were said to have been incurred with regard to labour payment. The High Court further observed that disallowance u/s. 37 would not arise only if the expenditure was shown to have been incurred or proved on account of payment for casual labour, etc. The High Court held that since no proper

books of account and vouchers, etc., had been produced, the expenditure was not proved to have been incurred and hence the benefit of section 37 could not be granted. (AY. 2007-08)

S. S. Crop Care Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 221 Taxman 399 (MP)(HC)

646 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Deduction of brokerage fees paid not allowable when evidence on record discloses that amount paid was not brokerage even if payment is confirmed by third parties**

The assessee was engaged in the manufacture of yarn. The AO disallowed brokerage paid on cotton purchased on the ground that the persons to whom some brokerage was paid were closely connected to directors of the assessee and in some cases, no such brokerage fee was paid at all. The CIT (A) confirmed the findings of the AO. The Tribunal allowed the deduction in some cases where it observed that the brokerage had been paid and remanded the matter back to the AO for proper verification and calculation in other cases.

The High Court observed that the material on record showed that the persons to whom the brokerage was paid were closely connected to the Directors of the assessee and that the evidence disclosed that the amounts paid were in itself not brokerage. Allowing the departmental appeal, the High Court held that even though the amount of brokerage paid was confirmed by third parties, the same would not be eligible for a deduction. (AY. 2001-02)

Bhandari Spinning Mills Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 221 Taxmann 397 (Karn.)(HC)

647 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Amounts paid to drivers as incentives out of amounts received from manufacturers as a part of the incentive scheme is an allowable business expenditure**

The assessee had debited amounts paid as incentives to drivers to the P&L account and had shown it as a liability payable in the subsequent years. The AO disallowed the claim stating that he did not find the explanation of the assessee satisfactory. The CIT (A) also upheld the order of the AO and held that incurring of incentive expenditure was contingent upon future action and conduct of the drivers and since it was not within the control of the assessee, in absence of any certainty of liability, such amount needed to be construed as an income of the assessee. However the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal by holding that the same was not a contingent liability.

The High Court observed that if the assessee was maintaining accounts on a mercantile system and a liability had accrued, though discharged at a future date, the same was an allowable deduction. The High Court held that as per the principle of commercial practice and accountancy, such deductions were held permissible and such a liability was not held to be contingent liability. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Shree Dhain Auto Transport Corporation (2014) 221 Taxmann 179 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

648 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Daughter studies abroad – Law firm – Expenditure not allowable**

The assessee is a firm of advocates. The daughter joined the firm and immediately was sent for education abroad. The expenditure on studies were claimed as business

expenditure. AO disallowed the expenditure. In appeal CIT(A) observed that the firm of assessee there were more than 14 associate advocates and none were given an opportunity to go abroad prior for higher education and some of them were working for more than 15 years. Whereas within three months of joining the daughter was sent abroad. Even after completing education she continued to stay abroad and permitted to join other firm. Considering the facts the disallowance of expenses was confirmed. Tribunal also confirmed the order of lower authorities. On appeal confirming the view of Tribunal the High Court held that expenditure on assessee's daughter for studies abroad was not to be interest of the activities of the profession of the form of advocates but for the career prospects of the child/daughter hence was rightly disallowed. (AY. 2005-06) *Divyakant C. Mehta v. ITO (2014) 365 ITR 423 / 269 CTR 452 / 226 Taxmann 48 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Service tax – Interest for late payment – Not penalty for infraction of law – Allowable as deduction

649

The assessee has not collected and deposited service tax on some services in earlier years. Demand was raised including interest thereon. Assessee paid the said amount. AO held that the said amount having been expended for infraction of law, deduction was not allowable. On appeal disallowances were deleted by the Tribunal. On appeal the court held that the amount was incurred in the ordinary course of business, it is only because the assessee failed recover the service tax the amount was paid by them. Further, the said amount cannot be stated to be penalty for infraction of law. Court also held that it is equally well settled that payment of interest is compensatory in nature and would not per take the character of penalty. (AY. 2009-10) *CIT v. Kaypee Mechanical India (P) Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 346 / 108 DTR 237 / 271 CTR 591 (Guj.)(HC)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Lease hold property – Remitting the matter was held to be justified. [S.260A]

650

Assessee spent huge amount of money to improve the lease hold property. The matter was remanded back by the ITAT to find out whether any brick-work was carried out or not during the improvement work which will entitle the assessee for deduction u/s 37(1). As this is purely question of fact, no question of law involved. *CIT v. EDS Electronic Data Systems (I.) (P) Ltd. (2012) 211 Taxmann 133 / (2014) 265 CTR 31 (Delhi)(HC)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Interest on delayed payment of telecommunication licence fee – Partly capital and partly revenue – Matter was remanded

651

If the interest paid was in respect of licence fee payable for the period prior to 31st July, 1999, it will have to be capitalised i.e. Before commencement of operation. If the payment was payable on licence fee for the post, 31 July, 1999, it should be treated

as revenue in nature, if after commencement of operation. Matter was remanded. (AY. 1999-2000 to 2007-08)

CIT v. Hutchison Essar Telecom (P) Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 294 / 265 CTR 130 / 221 Taxman 323 (Delhi)(HC)

CIT v. Bharti Airtel Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 294 (Delhi)(HC)

CIT v. Bharti Cellular Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 294 (Delhi)(HC)

CIT v. Bharti Telenet Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 294 (Delhi)(HC)

652 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Construction of drainage for disposal of effluents – Land not owned by assessee – Capital in nature – Ensure to the benefit of the assessee from year to year**

Assessee runs a paper mill at Ahmednagar and therefore discharged effluents. During the previous year relevant to the assessment year, the assessee applied to the pollution control board and forest department, for permission to discharge effluents into the Tallewal drain. The department of Environment and Forest prepared a proposal to allow excavation of an open drain, through forest land, to enable assessee to discharge effluents into Tallewal drain, which was subject to many conditions like legal status of the ownership of the forest land will remain unchanged, forest department would raise a compensation afforestation on both sides of the drain, forest land will only be used for the purpose it is being permitted to use, etc., The question that arose before the Hon'ble Court was that whether the expenditure incurred by the assessee for construction of the drainage in the nature of capital or revenue. The Court held that expenditure incurred by the assessee for the construction of drainage for disposal of effluents has brought in to existence a capital asset which shall use from year to year for discharge of effluents and would, therefore, ensure to the benefit of the assessee from year to year; expenditure was therefore capital in nature, notwithstanding the fact that land is not owned by assessee. (AY. 1996-97)

CIT v. Shreyans Industries Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 329 (P&H)(HC)

653 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Banking business – Broken period interest was held to be deductible**

Broken period interest was held to be allowable. (AY. 2001-02 to 2005-06)

CIT v. HDFC Bank Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 505 / 107 DTR 140 / 226 Taxmann 132 (Mag) (Bom.)(HC)

654

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Foreign travel – Promotion of business

Assessee was in the business of manufacturing and selling of tea. It claimed expenses in respect of foreign travel of its directors and executives for promotion of its business. AO disallowed one third of the expenditure on the ground that there were already three non-resident director in looking after overseas business. High Court held that there is no need for the assessee to prove that the expenditure was necessary for the purpose of the business. Further, assessee had produced necessary vouchers and bills to prove the same. Thus, the High Court held that the expenditure was allowable. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Williamson Tea (Assam) Ltd. (2013) 355 ITR 323 / 263 CTR 96 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 102 (Mag.)(Gau.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Ad hoc disallowance by the AO – Deletion was held to be justified

655

Assessee claimed deduction of manufacturing and other expenses of ₹ 50.42 lakhs as business expenditure. Assessing Officer disallowed expenses of ₹ 5 lakhs for want of necessary details. Commissioner (Appeals) deleted impugned disallowance holding that assessee had filed audited accounts with regard to expenses claimed and in absence of any adverse comment by auditor no disallowance should be made. The Tribunal and the High Court confirmed the order. (AY. 1994-95)

CIT v. Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxman 129 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S. 37(1) : Business expenditure – Advertisement – Sponsorship of programs – Held to be allowable

656

Assessee was in the business of manufacturing and selling of tea. It claimed expenses in respect of sponsorship of programs. AO disallowed such expenditure. High Court held that it is for the assessee to decide where and in what manner publicity of the business is to be done. Accordingly, it allowed such expenditure incurred by the assessee. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Williamson Tea (Assam) Ltd. (2013) 355 ITR 323 / 263 CTR 96 / (2014) 220 Taxman 102 (Mag.)(Gau.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Provision for warranty – Remanded back

657

Provision for warranty on the basis of principle for matching can be allowed but the amount claimed should have some rational and scientific basis and it cannot be on mere ipse dixit. Though the question of law was decided in favour of the Assessee, the Court remanded back to the Assessing officer, to examine the provision of warranty as claimed, including the actual warranty expenses incurred during the year and then determine and decide the quantum of the claim. (AY. 2005-06)

Wooward Governor India Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 126 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Commission paid to sub agent – Held to be allowable

658

Assessee a del credere agent received commission pursuant to the selling agreements. It claimed brokerage expenses for sales effected through sub-brokers. The AO observed that not a single penny was paid to the Brokers as brokerage and the amount was simply credited in their respective accounts. The AO concluded that there was no necessity to engage services of sub-brokers in light of agreement with principal company. The AO further held that the appellant-assessee did not incur the said expenditure as small time Sub-brokers would work for the appellant-assessee without even receiving any amount towards the services they claimed to have rendered. The CIT(A) and ITAT upheld the order passed by the AO. The ITAT and the lower authorities had given factual findings in their orders that no services were rendered by sub-brokers and no amount was paid to them either during year or even later. On appeal, the High Court held that there was no perversity on the finding of fact recorded by revenue authorities and therefore no question of law arose. (AY. 1998-99)

Gyan Chand Jain v. CIT (2013) 354 ITR 662 (2014) 220 Taxman 7 (Mag.) / 258 CTR 467 (Raj.)(HC)

- 659 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Interest expense – Matter remanded**
 The Assessing Officer made addition on the ground that the assessee had taken overdraft in earlier year but claimed interest payment in profit and loss account during the relevant assessment year. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) and Tribunal affirmed the assessment order. The High Court observed that the Appellate Authority has not examined and had summarily confirmed the assessment order. The matter was remanded back for fresh adjudication. (AY. 1987-88)
U. P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. ITAT (2014) 220 Taxmann 109 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)
- 660 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Interest paid on account of its failure to fulfil export obligation under EPCG scheme**
 Assessee had imported jewellery manufacturing machinery under Export Promotion Capital Goods Scheme (EPCG Scheme) at a concessional rate with an export obligation. Assessee did not fulfil the obligation and was required to pay interest @ 24% per annum to DGFT. Assessing Officer disallowed the interest payment u/s. 37(1) on account that it was penal in nature. CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal. Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal on account that amount paid was compensatory and not penal in nature as it was as per the declared policy of the government and there was no violation of any law. On appeal by revenue to High Court, Tribunal's order was upheld.
CIT v. Enchante Jewellery Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 8 (Mag.)(Delhi) (HC)
- 661 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenses incurred on replacement of parts of machinery**
 The assessee operated as a stone crusher and debited certain amount as machinery maintenance. The assessing officer disallowed the expenses on the ground that same were incurred to convert old machinery into new one and to increase their durability. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the deduction claimed by finding that repairs were made by assessee towards replacement of parts of machines to keep it operational and in working condition and no new machine was purchased. On appeal, the revenue accepted that assessment order was cryptic and did not refer to adverse facts. It, therefore, prayed to the HC to remand matter for fresh enquiry by the assessing officer. The HC stated the prayer for remand cannot be accepted as that it was the duty or responsibility of the Assessing Officer to deal with the contention and facts stated by the assessee. The factual matrix as discussed by the appellant authorities is not controverted and denied by the appellant by filing requisite material. The details of the maintenance expenses have not been placed on record to question the factual findings. The appeal is devoid of merits and, thus, the appeal is dismissed. (AY. 2008-09)
CIT v. Gokul Chand Hari Chand (2014) 220 Taxman 9 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)
- 662 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Lease expenses – Tenancy rights – nature of expense**
 Assessee purchased a running hotel business. As per terms of agreement it was responsibility of vendor to secure transfer of lease of premises in favour of purchaser. The vendor had to negotiate on behalf of purchaser with owner for transfer of unexpired lease period in favour of purchaser and also extension of lease subject to payment of

enhanced rent and deposit. Out of total sale consideration of ₹ 70 lakh, ₹ 55 lakh was paid towards tenancy right. The assessee claimed the said expenditure to be revenue in nature and while submitting the return, the assessee claimed write off of 1/5th of said expenditure every year. The AO disallowed the expense on the grounds that it was capital in nature. The CIT(A) and the ITAT upheld the order of the AO. On appeal to the High Court, held that, the record disclosed that expenditure incurred for getting the said restaurant was revenue expenditure and it could not be treated as capital expenditure. The advantage secured by incurring expenditure for absolution or immunity from liability on revenue account would be in field of revenue and not capital. Hence allowed the appeal of the assessee (AY. 1997-98)

S. M. Dayanand v. Dy. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 104 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Freight charges – Statement of truck owners not creditworthy – No other material – Expenditure allowed

663

Assessee was engaged in transportation of goods. Since assessee did not own any truck, he used trucks available in market for transportation of goods. In assessee's books of account, certain outstanding liabilities in respect of freight charges were shown. Assessing Officer on basis of statements of truck owners, arrived at finding that no trade liabilities as disclosed in books of account were existing. Accordingly, amount of outstanding freight charges was added back to total income of assessee. Commissioner (Appeals) as well as Tribunal set aside said addition. The High Court noted that statements of truck owners who appeared for cross-examination before Assessing Officer were not creditworthy. It was also apparent that if statements of those witnesses were excluded from consideration, there was no material on record which could justify doubting of entries by Assessing Officer. In aforesaid circumstances, impugned addition made by Assessing Officer was rightly set aside by Tribunal. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Pawan Sharma (2014) 220 Taxmann 8 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Training expense before the commencement of the business of manufacturing – Allowable as the expenditure was for new manufacturing unit of the existing business

664

The assessee company incurred training expenses on training given to technical and non technical persons. The AO disallowed the expenditure on the ground that it gives enduring benefit and allowed to amortize over the period of 6 years. The CIT(A) disallowed the entire expenditure on the ground that training was given before the commencement of the business of manufacturing. The Tribunal observed that the expenditure for new manufacturing unit was an extension of existing business, for which commercial operations were started in 1996-97, and new manufacturing unit was an extension of existing business. In view of the decision of *CIT v. Cement Industries Ltd. 91 ITR 170 (Guj)*, it held that the whole expenditure was allowable in the current year. The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Samsung India Electronics Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 158 (Delhi)(HC)

665 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Commission expenses – Payment made by cheques – unrelated party – Held to be not bogus**

The Assessing Officer disallowed the commission on the ground that M/s. Shree Shantinath Silk Industries did not maintain its record and its name did not appear on sale bill. When it was challenged before the CIT(A) it was of the opinion that only one party had been examined by the Assessing Officer and the person examined for and on behalf of such party in fact was not dealing with sales, and therefore, would not be having any knowledge of the brokerage. After dealing with the issue at length, it sustained addition of ₹ 36.18 lakhs. When CIT(A)'s order was challenged before the Tribunal, the Tribunal deleted the entire addition observing that no evidence had been placed on record that the commission expense is bogus. Assessee made payment of commission through account payee cheques for sales canvassed by the party and also in consideration of the collection recovered from purchaser. Payments cannot be unreasonable particularly when M/s. Shree Shantinath Silk Industries is not related to the assessee and so even disallowance made by CIT(A) is not proper. The High Court held that the Tribunal has, with cogent reasons dealt with the issue, no question of law, much less any substantial question of law arises.

CIT v. Nangalia Fabrics P. Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 17 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

666 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Payment made to workers on closure of business allowable as revenue expenditure**

The payment on account of gratuity, retrenchment compensation and leave encashment made to workers in connection with Voluntary Retirement Scheme on closure of business was allowable as revenue expenditure. (AY. 2000-01)

CIT v. Swan Mills (2014) 220 Taxmann 10 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

667 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Pre-operative expenses – Held to be allowable**

Assessee made certain expenses for exploring the possibility of setting up a paper project at Saharanpur which could not materialize. No asset of permanent nature with enduring benefit was acquired by the assessee. The plant could not be set up to which such an expenditure made could possibly be capitalized. The High Court allowed the expenses as revenue expenditure. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. Majestic Auto Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 42 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

668 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Bogus purchases – Tribunal has passed order on basis of concession given by both parties – Matter remanded to decide the case on merits**

Tribunal has partly allowed the appeal preferred by the assessee by restricting disallowance to 25% of the bogus purchases. Before High Court, it was undisputed that the Tribunal has not entered into the merits of the orders passed by the authorities below and has passed the impugned order solely on the basis of the concession given by both the parties. High Court quashed the order passed by the Tribunal and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and on merits. (AY. 2002-03)

ACIT v. Pawanraj B. Bokadia (2014) 220 Taxman 77 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Commission expenses higher than earlier years – No disallowance can be made 669

Merely because in current year more expenses were incurred by assessee, disallowance could not be made in absence of any defect in records and maintenance of books of account. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Shree Ram Multi Tech Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 76 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Licence fee for use of courtyard – Revenue expenditure 670

Licence fees paid for use of the courtyard is only for facilitating the assessee's business operations and therefore a revenue expenditure (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. ITC Hotels (2014) 363 ITR 254 / 269 CTR 308 / 103 DTR 103 / 225 Taxmann 73 (Karn.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Year of allowability – Additional liability on account of exchange rate fluctuation 671

Under mercantile system of accounting, the claim of liability is required to be worked out at the close of the accounting year. Additional liability on account of exchange rate fluctuation against purchase of goods at the year end was allowable in the relevant year itself. (AY. 1990-91)

Gillette India Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 101 DTR 258 (Raj.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Excise duty – Mercantile system of accounting – Allowable in the year in which was paid. [S.43B, 145] 672

It was held that where assessee's liability to pay excise duty relating to earlier years was adjudicated during relevant assessment year, assessee could claim deduction of amount so paid in assessment year in question even though books of account were maintained on mercantile system of accounting. (AY. 1984-85)

ITC Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 532 / 101 DTR 358 / 229 Taxmann 82 / 267 CTR 405 (Cal.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenditure on issue of shares under the employees stock option was allowable as revenue expenditure 673

Assessee had debited a sum of ₹ 66.82 lakhs under the head of staff welfare expenditure incurred in respect of Employee Staff Option Plan and on allowing the shares to the employees, the difference in value was credited to the account of the company to be allowed as expenditure. It was held that difference between the market value of the shares and the value at which the shares were allotted to the employees under Employees Stock Option Plan as per SEBI guidelines was rightly allowed as an expenditure. (AY. 2000-01)

ACIT v. PVP Ventures Ltd. (2012) 211 Taxman 554 / (2014) 101 DTR 161 (Mad.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Corporate debt restructuring expenses – Allowed by spreading it over a period of six years 674

It was held that the Tribunal was right in directing to allow corporate debt restructuring expenses of ₹ 2.57 crore on payment to financial consultants in connection with

waiver of loans, by spreading it over a period of 6 years as agreed to by the assessee. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 323 / 217 Taxmann 229 (2014) 101 DTR 175 (Guj.)(HC)

675 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Repair and maintenance expenses by an assessee in business of running business centres is an ongoing process for such business – Allowable as revenue expenditure**

The assessee had deducted expenses on repairs and maintenance which the AO disallowed on the grounds that the same were capital in nature. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal deleted the disallowance.

The High Court dismissing the departmental appeal observed that the expenses were an on-going process for the type of business run by the assessee. The High Court further observed that the quantum of expense can never be a factor to conclude that the expenses are of a capital nature. Accordingly, the High Court held that the expenses incurred were not for bringing any new asset into existence hence allowable as revenue expenditure. (AY. 1999-2000)

CIT v. DBS Corporate Services (P) Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 31 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

676 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Software – Expenses incurred for upgrading, improving or removing problem areas in an existing old product would be treated as revenue expenditure**

In course of the assessment proceeding the AO noticed that the assessee had claimed an amount of ₹ 90,37,605/- under the head 'Product Improvement Expenses' towards product development expenses for the new product (software). The AO held the said expenditure to be a capital expenditure since the software was capitalized by the assessee and there was a dedicated team of professionals whose job was to carry out further improvement in the software and the expenses incurred were to enhance the value of the capital asset resulting in enduring benefit. The CIT(A) confirmed the findings of the AO. The Tribunal held that the major portion of the expenses were incurred towards salary paid, rent, consultancy charges, electricity charges, etc., which were not expenses incurred towards creating any capital asset for enduring benefits but were normal day-to-day expenses and were, thus, revenue in nature.

The High Court dismissing the departmental appeal held that expenditure which enables the profit making structure to work more efficiently leaving the source of profit making structure untouched, would be revenue in nature. It observed that the assessee had to keep pace with the rapidly changing requirements of the mobile phone users. The assessee was competing with other software providers. Thus, new features, upgrades, patches for removing glitches had to be provided, to keep up with matching needs and requirements of the mobile phone users. The expenditure did not bring into existence a new asset but rectified and improved the product being sold. These were normal day-to-day expenses for running the business in question and did not create enduring rights or advantage or benefit over a long period time. While determining and deciding a question whether the expenditure is capital or revenue in nature, the determination should be based upon consideration of facts and circumstances and by applying principles of

commercial trading and business expediency. Enduring benefit test is not a universal test and can break down. It noted that the said principles had been rightly applied by the Tribunal in the facts of the present case to hold that expenditure incurred was revenue in nature and not capital. (AY. 2003-04, 2007-08)

CIT v. ACL Wireless Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 210 / 222 Taxmann 335 / 264 CTR 164 / 97 DTR 60 (Delhi)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Free sample distribution expenses – Allowable even if there is no effective sale during the year

677

The assessee-company was an export trading house and had distributed carpets and shawls as samples during the year. The assessee claimed deduction on account of distribution of free samples. The AO disallowed the claim by holding that the free sample distribution expenses could be allowed as business expenditure provided the same were sales promotion expenses and there was sale. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal both deleted the disallowance.

The High Court, dismissing the departmental appeal, held that section 37(1) nowhere provides that unless actual sales take place, the deduction would not be admissible. Further, the provision nowhere envisages that the expenditure would be admissible only where such expenditure results in earning of income. The High Court also observed that the samples distributed were not extraneous to the business of the assessee and that the samples were given to the foreign agents in person during their business exploratory visit in India and the same would fall under the expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Bazar Decor (India) (P) Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 389 / 222 Taxmann 328 (P&H)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Allowability of car expenses – Supporting documents not produced to prove that amount was for business purposes – Allowance restricted to 50%

678

The assessee debited a sum of ₹ 1,55,234/- towards car maintenance. The AO asked the assessee to substantiate the above claim that the car was running exclusively for the purpose of the business by producing the details of the travel, the clients visited, the vehicle service maintenance record, fuel bill, repair bills, etc. However, no evidence was produced by the assessee and therefore the AO added back 50% of the said expenditure to the total income of the assessee. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal confirmed the action of the AO.

The High Court, dismissing the assessee's appeal at the admission stage, held that since there was no substantial question of law arising out of the appeal, the action of the lower authorities was confirmed. (AY. 2008-09)

K. Sivakumar v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 59 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenditure towards religious funds, charitable institutions, social clubs or for charity do not stand to test of commercial expediency – No materials placed on record to support expenditure claim expenses are not allowable

679

The assessee incurred expenditure for "community development" in a backward area where its factory was located. The AO disallowed the expenditure on the ground that

they related to charity and were not connected to the business of the assessee. The CIT(A) upheld the findings of the AO whereas the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal.

The High Court allowing the departmental appeal observed that expenditure towards the religious funds, charitable institutions, social clubs or for charity do not stand the test of commercial expediency and further the expenditure under these heads cannot be stated to be exclusively for the purposes of business of the assessee. Accordingly, the High Court held that the assessee had failed to place any material, in support of their case so as to claim the expenditure under this head as contemplated by Section 37(1) of the Act as being commercial expediency thereby allowing the departmental appeal. (AY. 1986-87, 1987-88, 1992-93)

CIT v. Wipro Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxmann 181 (Karn.)(HC)

680 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Shifting of old machinery to make way for installation of new machinery – Is capital expenditure**

The High Court following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *CIT v. Sri Mangayarkarasi Mills (P) Ltd. (2009) 315 ITR 114* held that the expenditure incurred for removal of the existing machinery only to make way for installation of new machinery would be treated as capital expenditure and hence could not be allowed under Section 37(1) of the Act. (AY. 1986-87, 1987-88, 1992-93)

CIT v. Wipro Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxmann 181 (Karn.)(HC)

681 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenditure incurred for aesthetic purpose or for having better working environment is not capital expenditure**

The High Court dismissing the departmental appeal held that the expenditure incurred by the assessee for purchase of paintings to improve aesthetic and working environment cannot be treated as capital expenditure and hence the same was allowable as a business expenditure u/s. 37(1) (AY. 1986-87, 1987-88, 1992-93)

CIT v. Wipro Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxman 181 (Karn.)(HC)

682 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Commission – Percentage of commission allowed by AO cannot be enhanced by the Appellate Authorities without any material on record. [S.251]**

The AO, in the course of the assessment proceedings restricted the commission paid on sales to 1% of the total sales (against the claim of 2.75% of sales) by holding the vouchers produced did not contain the signature or complete address of the recipients of the commission. The CIT(A) allowed the claim of the assessee at 2.5% and disallowed the balance. The Tribunal also concurred with the view of the CIT(A).

The High Court allowing the departmental appeal observed that on facts there was no material to re-fix the commission at 2.5%. It noted that the AO had relied upon the fact that no material was produced to prove the payment of commission and the vouchers produced were unsigned and allowed 1% as commission. In order to increase the said commission to 2.5%, necessarily some additional materials should have been available with the appellate authorities, in the absence of any material to arrive at such a conclusion, the finding is perverse and not substantiated by any materials on record.

CIT v. E.S. Jose (2014) 222 Taxman 29 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Expenditure incurred on replacement of Chamber assembly in intermix machine is allowable as a current repair

683

The assessee engaged in the business of manufacturing procured tread rubber. On being asked as to why there was a sudden increase in the repair and maintenance expenses, the assessee submitted that the sudden increase in the expenses was due to replacing of 'Mixing Chamber Assembly', one of the major parts of intermix Machine used for manufacture of rubber compound. The AO treated the said expenditure as a capital expenditure. The CIT(A) held that the expenditure incurred by the assessee is a repair expense as the machinery is not replaced but only overhauled. The Tribunal dismissed the department appeal by referring to a technical report which was placed before it wherein a picture of the intermix machine and the explanation regarding the function of the unit was shown. The Tribunal observed that, as per the said technical report and the detailed explanation, the mixing chamber (chamber assembly) seems to be one of the integral parts of the intermix machine. The chamber assembly has no independent and separate function unless it is supported with rotors and other parts of the intermix machine. The Tribunal therefore relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of *CIT v. Sharavana Spg. Mills (P) Ltd. (2007) 293 ITR 201* held that the replacement of chamber assembly which is an integral part of intermix machine is nothing but a current repair and not a capital expenditure.

The High Court dismissing the departmental appeal, observed that the two appellate authorities had gone into the factual aspect of the matter in order to understand the actual functioning of chamber assembly in intermix machine and had thereafter opined that the expenditure was not a capital expenditure. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Midas Rubber (P) Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxman 27 (Mag.) (Ker.) (HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Electricity transmission lines neither becoming property of assessee nor bringing any enduring benefit deductible as revenue expenditure

684

The assessee made payments to the UP State Electricity Board (UPSEB) for laying electric transmission lines in the assessee's premises and considered the same as revenue expenditure. The AO however disallowed the expenditure. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the expenditure as deductible on the ground that the transaction lines were not owned by the assessee and the property in them remained with the UPSEB and hence there was no enduring advantage to the assessee.

The High Court dismissing the departmental appeal followed its own decision in the case of *CIT v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2008) 300 ITR 35 (Delhi)* and held that the expenditure did not bring in any enduring benefit and was deductible as revenue expenditure. (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Samsung India Electronics Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 21 (Mag.) (Delhi) (HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Advertisement expenditure incurred in running of business cannot be disallowed merely because a part of expenditure resulted into some benefit to a third party

685

The assessee treated brand building expenses, dealer loyalty expenses, etc. as deferred revenue expenditure. The AO noted that the assessee had entered into an agreement

with Samsung Electronics Company Ltd. of Korea, which was the parent company under which a part of the expenditure incurred for the benefit of the brand “Samsung” and therefore the expenditure could not be said to be wholly and exclusively incurred for the purpose of the assessee’s business thereby disallowing the entire expenditure. The CIT(A) noted that since the assessee as well as the company in Korea benefited from the advertisements and hence allowed only 50% of the expenditure. On appeal, the Tribunal allowed the entire expenditure as a deduction.

The High Court dismissing the departmental appeal followed the decisions in the case of *Eastern Investment Ltd. v. CIT (1951) 20 ITR 1*, *CIT v. Royal Calcutta Turf Club (1961) 41 ITR 414 (SC)* and *CIT v. Chandulal Keshavlal & Co. (1960) 38 ITR 601 (SC)* and held that even if to some extent the expenditure endures a benefit to a third party it cannot in law defeat the effect of the finding as to the whole and exclusive nature of the purpose. (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Samsung India Electronics Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxman 21 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

686 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Year in which deductible – Premium payable on debentures can be spread over entire life period of debentures**

The High Court, dismissing the departmental appeal, followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *Madras Industrial Investment Corpn. Ltd. v. CIT (1997) 225 ITR 802* and observed that allowing the entire expenditure in one year might give a very distorted picture of the profits of a particular year and hence held that deduction for premium payable on debentures could be spread over the life of the debentures.

Dy. CIT v. Atul Products Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 130 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

687 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Method of accounting – Prior period expenses crystallised during the relevant assessment year on receipt of bills and hence, the expenses were allowable as expenditure, even though assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting. [S.145]**

The assessee claimed some expenditure as prior period expenses. The AO disallowed the assessee’s claim on the ground that since the assessee had followed the mercantile system of accounting, expenditure relatable to an earlier year could not be allowed as deduction in the assessment year under consideration. The Commissioner (Appeals) and Tribunal, however, held that in view of the consistent practice followed by the assessee, prior period expenses crystallised during the assessment year under consideration on receipt of bills were to be allowed as expenditure. The High Court directed Revenue too to adopt the consistent approach and allow the expenditure. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Mahanagar Gas Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 80 (Bom)(HC)

688 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – The annual licence fee paid by it in the form of bandwidth charges for improving facilities of telephonic connectivity for transfer of data in and out of the office, is allowed as revenue expenditure**

The assessee company was engaged in providing facilities of telephonic connectivity for transfer of data in and out of the office. To improve said particular facility, the assessee wanted to set up a V-SAT facility and, thus, paid site charges which were in the nature of licence fee for bandwidth charges. The assessee claimed deduction of the said amount

as revenue expenditure. The AO rejected the assessee's claim holding it to be capital in nature. He also disallowed the interest since it was paid on the loan for setting up the said facility. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the AO. The Tribunal, however, allowed assessee's claim holding the expenditure to be revenue in nature. On the revenue's appeal, the High Court observed that the assessee was already using the telephone line and subsequently, a cable network for data transfer but the operation was slow. Hence, the assessee has switched to a new technology in order to increase the capacity and speed of transfer. Thus, the expenditure was held to be revenue in nature allowable under section 37(1). (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Kirlskar Computer Services Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 391 / 270 CTR 331 (Karn.) (HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Payment for acquisition of master copies of soft ware – Revenue expenditure. [S.35A]

689

The assessee-company in pursuance of a licence agreement entered with its holding company incorporated in the USA acquired master copies of software from the holding company and made duplicate copies and sold them to local clients, payment by the assessee for the acquisition of master copies was held to be an expenditure of revenue. (AY. 1994-95 to 2004-05)

Oracle India (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2013) 221 Taxmann 249 / 264 CTR 144 / 96 DTR 249 (Delhi) (HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Where the assessee purchased superior quality goods from its sister concern at a higher rate than the market value but third parties purchased the same at much higher rate, excess payment would be allowable

690

The assessee firm purchased finished goods of superior quality from its sister concern at a higher price than the market value of such goods. The sister concern charged much higher rates than other entities to which it supplied similar finished goods. The sister concern was also paying tax on profit at the same rate as the assessee and, thus, there could have been no incentive for the sister concern to supply goods at a higher rate than the market rate because it would increase its profits. Thus, excess payment was held by the High Court as allowable u/s. 37(1).

CIT v. Mansarover Impex (2014) 221 Taxmann 81 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenditure on education of director is personal consideration and not commercial consideration – Not allowable

691

The expenditure incurred for the education of the Director of the assessee viz. Mr. Krishna Kachalia was out of personal consideration and not commercial consideration. The judgment in *Sakal Papers Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (1978) 114 ITR 256 (Bom.)* has been considered in *D.C. Mehta v. ITO (Income Tax Appeal No. 840 of 2012)*. In that case, the assessee, Mr. D. C. Mehta, an Advocate by profession claimed a deduction of ₹ 22L as expenditure incurred for higher education for his daughter, Hemali. The justification for the said deduction was that she joined the Appellant's firm of Advocates and gave an undertaking that on attaining higher qualification and degree from the University abroad, she would join the firm for a minimum period of five years and thus, the

said expenditure was incurred for the business of the assessee and was allowable as a deduction. It was found that the daughter Hemali joined the assessee and immediately was sent for education abroad. The assessee had not been able to bring on record anything and particularly the scheme for higher education abroad for employees and associates. Despite other associate Advocates working in the firm of the Assessee, none were given an opportunity to go abroad for higher education despite the fact that some were working with him for the last 15 years. Despite the aforesaid, within a period of two to three months, after the daughter Hemali became an Advocate and joined the firm as an Associate, she went abroad. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench upheld the contention of the authorities below in disallowing the deduction. The judgment in Sakal Papers must be seen in the peculiar facts and background and the cumulative impact of all events & circumstances must be seen. Only because there was no commitment or contract or bond taken from the trainee, the expenditure cannot be disallowed to the assessee, particularly when as a result of that expenditure, the trainee had secured both, a degree and training which would be of assistance to the assessee Company. The facts of the present case are totally different from that of Sakal Papers and almost identical to that in D. C. Mehta's case (*CIT v. Chandulal Keshavlal (1960) 38 ITR 601 (SC)*). The assessee to pay costs of ₹ 50,000 to the Respondents. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07)

Shreenath Motors Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 536 / 107 DTR 28 / 269 CTR 456 (Bom.) (HC)

692 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Genuineness of transaction – Books of account not rejected – Deletion of addition on account of purchase transaction was held to be justified. [S.145]**

Tribunal noticed that assessee's books of account as well as sales tax records of seller and found that purchase was a genuine transaction. Also, there was no rejection of books of account by the authorities. Held, deletion of addition on account of purchase transaction justified. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Sunrise Tooling System P. Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 206 / 225 Taxmann 124 (Mag.)(Delhi) (HC)

693 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Amount paid to sub-contractors – Tribunal order based on facts – No substantial question of law. [S.260A]**

Assessee is engaged in the business of construction. AO disallowed the payments made to sub-contractors. CIT(A) relying on remand report and supplementary report partly confirmed the disallowance. Tribunal by passing detailed order deleted the disallowance. On appeal by revenue, the Court held that Tribunal exhaustively noted the details furnished by the parties and deleted entire addition. Held, Tribunal order was based on facts and no question of law arose. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. B.M.S. Projects P. Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 195 (2015) 228 Taxmann 213 (Mag) / 229 Taxmann 83 (Guj.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Tea, coffee etc. for customers – Allowable as business expenditure 694

In view of the finding that expenditure on tea, coffee etc. was for business purposes and that it was very low, the sum was to be allowed as deduction. (AY. 1974-75)

CIT v. Premier Vegetable Products Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 464 / 97 DTR 230 / 227 Taxman 259 (Mag.) / 264 CTR 417 (Raj.)(HC)

S.37(1): Business expenditure – Lease equalization charges – Accounting Standard followed – Allowable as deduction 695

Lease equalisation charge results in debit or credit entry in the profit and loss account and helps the income be staggered or matched during the entire period of lease. As long as the assessee does not indulge in any manipulation of the figures and the capital cost, internal rate of return, etc., are computed in accordance with the Accounting Standards, no error can be found. Held, lease equalisation charges should not be disallowed. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT, Large Taxpayers Unit v. India Railway Finance Corporation Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 548 / 226 Taxman 184 (Mag) (Delhi)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Bond issue expenses – Capital or revenue – Allowable as revenue expenditure 696

Expenses incurred on bonds issued for the purposes of business are allowable as deduction. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT, Large Taxpayers Unit v. India Railway Finance Corporation Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 548 / 226 Taxman 184 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Salaries to relatives – Excessive and unreasonable payments – Not for purpose of business – Disallowance was justified 697

Salaries were paid to relatives of assessee. It was found that payments were not made exclusively for purposes of business. Hence, disallowance was held to be justified. (AY. 2008-09)

Jayesh Raichand Shah v. ACIT (2014) 360 ITR 387 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 108 (Guj.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – For purposes of business – Contributions for religious functions and social clubs – Held to be not allowable 698

Contributions for religious functions and social clubs and donation to municipality for digging bore-well in backward area where assessee's factory was located was not allowable as there was no evidence that the same was incurred for business purposes. (AY. 1986-87, 1987-88, 1992-93)

CIT v. Wipro Ltd. (No.2) (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxman 181 (Karn.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Expenditure on shifting of machinery is capital expenditure 699

Expenditure on shifting machinery to make way for installation of new machinery is capital expenditure. (AY. 1986-87, 1987-88, 1992-93)

CIT v. Wipro Ltd. (No.2) (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxman 181 (Karn.)(HC)

- 700 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Expenditure on painting to improve working environment is revenue expenditure**
 Expenditure on painting to improve working environment was held to be revenue expenditure. (AY. 1986-87, 1987-88, 1992-93)
CIT v. Wipro Ltd. (No.2) (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxmann 181 (Karn.)(HC)
- 701 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Pre-operational trial run expense was held to be revenue expenditure**
 Pre-operational trial run expenses are revenue expenditure. (AY. 1998-99)
CIT v. Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 82 / 226 Taxmann 24 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)
- 702 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Expenditure on raising loan to obtain Technical knowhow is revenue expenditure**
 The assessee was engaged in manufacture and sale of sugar. The B unit was set up in the same line of business from the funds borrowed by the company. There was no material to contend that the new unit was under a different management or that there was no unity of control between the business of manufacture and selling sugar and that in the new unit at B. The expenditure on raising loan for obtaining technical know-how was deductible. (AY. 1998-99)
CIT v. Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 82 / 222 Taxmann 24 (Mag.)(181 (All.)(HC)
- 703 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Dematerialization of securities – Amount paid under statutory obligation is for the purpose of business hence allowable**
 Amount paid to National Securities Depository Limited under statutory obligation for dematerialization of securities Expenditure is for purposes of business. (AY. 1998-99)
CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 714 / 104 DTR 282 / 270 CTR 523 (Karn.)(HC)
- 704 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Installation of traffic signals to enable employees to reach place of work early was held to be for the purpose of business**
 Expenditure on installing traffic signals to enable employees to reach place of work early is for purposes of business. (AY. 1998-99)
CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 714 / 104 DTR 282 / 270 CTR 523 (Karn.)(HC)
- 705 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Provision for warranty – Assessee was not able to specify post-sales expenses – Not allowable as deduction – Matter remanded**
 Where no separate accounts maintained and assessee was not able to specify post-sales expenses, Tribunal was not justified in granting deduction. Matter remanded. (AY. 1998-99)
CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 714 / 104 DTR 282 / 270 CTR 523 (Karn.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Issuing of convertible premium notes – Expenditure to be spread over six years 706

Expenditure on convertible premium notes was spread over the period of life of the convertible premium notes for six years. The year of payment was the sixth year and on which the expenditure was incurred by paying maturity value. The expenditure had to be spread out for a period of six years, and was not allowable in the years 1997-98 and 1998-99 alone. (AY. 1988-89)

CIT v. Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 82 / 222 Taxmann 24 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Electricity expenses – For user of premises belongs to others – Allowable as deduction 707

Tribunal arrived at the finding that the assessee was using the premises belonging to another concern and made payment for actual user of electricity in that premises and that similar claim was being regularly made right from AY. 2003-04. The same had been allowed in entirety in the past. The claim for deduction of electricity expenses is allowable. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Jugal Kishore Dangayach (2014) 98 DTR 95 / 227 Taxmann 222 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Secret commission and distribution of specimen – Matter remanded for reconsideration 708

Any secret transaction/payment that is made to secure an unfair advantage, would necessarily be repugnant to law. When neither the incurring of expenditure as a fact under the two given heads has been properly accounted for nor application, in their relation and impact of Explanation added to s.37 has been taken into consideration, the impugned order is legally vitiated. Matter remanded. (AY. 1990-91)

CIT v. Dhanpat Rai & Sons (2014) 98 DTR 209 / 362 ITR 7 (P&H)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Provision made towards gratuity and leave encashment are not contingent liabilities and hence such provision is deductible 709

The High Court relied on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *Bharat Earth Movers v. CIT [2000] 245 ITR 428 / 112 Taxmann 61 (SC)* wherein it was held that an assessee maintaining the accounts on a mercantile system, a liability already accrued though to be discharged at a future date would be a proper deduction while working out the profits and gains of his business, regard being had to the accepted principles of commercial practice and accountancy. Deduction was not only permissible for amounts actually expended or paid. The liability would be an accrued liability and would not convert into a conditional one merely because the liability was to be discharged at a future date. Therefore based on above gratuity payable and encashment of earned leave was not a contingent liability and provision thereof is deductible from the total income. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Kirloskar Systems Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 1 (Karn.)(HC)

710 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Rent enhancement with retrospective effect – Year of allowability – Assessee would be entitled for claim of additional amount only in subsequent assessment year i.e. 1998-99, and not in any earlier assessment year**

The assessee was engaged in the business of mining and export of ore. It engaged barges for which freight was paid. The rates of freight were enhanced with retrospective effect from 9-5-1997. The assessee made a provision in its accounts for assessment year 1997-98 and claimed additional amount which had been paid by way of rent to the barge owners. The AO, CIT (Appeals) and Tribunal did not allow the claim for AY 1997-98 and held that it could be allowed only in AY 1998-99. On appeal to the High Court, it held that in both the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) and of the Tribunal, it has been consistently held that since the liability accrued on 9-5-1997, the claim was allowable only in Assessment Year 1998-99 and not in AY. 1997-98, and hence no interference is called for. (AY. 1997-98).

Damodar Mangalji Mining Co. v. JCIT (2014) 220 Taxman 344 (Bom.)(HC)

711 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Foreign education – Son of director – Expenditure on foreign education of employee (Son of director) is deductible if there is business nexus**

(i) The question is whether these twin requirements are said to have been satisfied in the circumstances of this case. The first is what are the materials on record? The assessee furnished its resolution authorizing disbursement of the expenses to fund Dushyant Poddar's MBA. It secured a bond from him, by which he undertook to work for five years after return within a salary band and he had in fact worked after graduating from the University for about a year before starting his MBA course. In *Natco Exports P. Ltd. v. CIT (2012) 345 ITR 188 (Del)*, the student had applied directly when she was pursuing her graduation. There was a seamless transition as it were between the chosen subject of her undergraduate course and that which she chose to pursue abroad. In the present case, the facts are different. Dushyant Poddar was a commerce graduate. The assessee's business is in investments and securities. He wished to pursue an MBA after serving for a year with the company and committed himself to work for a further five years after finishing his MBA. There is nothing on record to suggest that such a transaction is not honest. Furthermore, the observation in *Natco Exports* with respect to a policy appears to have been made in the given context of the facts. The Court was considerably swayed by the fact that the Director's daughter pursued higher studies in respect of a course completely unconnected with the business of the assessee. Such is not the case here. Dushyant Poddar not only worked but as stated earlier his chosen subject of study would aid and assist the company and is aimed at adding value to its business;

(ii) Whilst there may be some grain of truth that there might be a tendency in business concerns to claim deductions under Section 37, and foist personal expenditure, such a tendency itself cannot result in an unspoken bias against claims for funding higher education abroad of the employees of the concern. As to whether the assessee would have similarly assisted another employee unrelated to its management is not a question which this Court has to consider. But that it has chosen to fund the higher education of one of its Director's sons

in a field intimately connected with its business is a crucial factor that the Court cannot ignore. It would be unwise for the Court to require all assessees and business concerns to frame a policy with respect to how educational funding of its employees generally and a class thereof, i.e. children of its management or Directors would be done. Nor would it be wise to universalize or rationalize that in the absence of such a policy, funding of employees of one class unrelated to the management would qualify for deduction under Section 37(1). We do not see any such intent in the statute which prescribes that only expenditure strictly for business can be considered for deduction. Necessarily, the decision to deduct is to be case dependent. (AY. 2006-07)

Kostub Investment v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 436 / 102 DTR 97 (Delhi) (HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Sales commission – In the absence of any credible evidence, sales commission cannot be allowed

712

The assessee was dealing in sanitary equipments, plywoods and flooring, among other things. During the year, it had paid sales commission to his agents at the rate of 2.5 per cent of the total turnover and claimed deduction. The Assessing Officer, after considering the general practice of giving commission, restricted the commission payment to 0.5% of the total turnover. The CIT(A), after considering the fact that the assessee was marketing a new product and there was stiff competition, commission at 2.5 per cent of the total turnover was justified and hence, was allowed. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A). On an appeal filed by the department, the High Court held that there was no material on record, verified or relied upon by the CIT(A) to increase the commission from 1 per cent to 2.5 per cent. Therefore, High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and the CIT(A) and upheld the order of the AO. (AY. 1995-96) *CIT v. E.S. Jose (2014) 220 Taxmann 32 (Ker.)(HC)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Year of deductible-Research and development-Allowable in the first year of claim as per return. [S.35D]

713

The assessee was engaged in manufacturing and selling of computers. The assessee, in its books of account, debited one-third of the research and development expenditure as relating to the assessment year under appeal and the remaining two-thirds was written off in the succeeding two years. The assessee claimed the entire expenditure in the first year i.e. the assessment year under question, on the ground that it was revenue expenditure and has to be allowed in the first year itself. The Tribunal allowed the entire expenses in the first year. The High Court, confirming the Tribunal's order, held that since the expenditure incurred by the assessee was revenue in nature and had been spent wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business, it was allowable as deduction in the year under question. (AY. 1992-93)

CIT v. Modi Olivetti Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 388 (All)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Payment to retiring partner – Payment of goodwill made to the retiring partners was held to be not allowable. [S.263]

714

The assessee was originally a partnership firm of four partners involved in the business of pharmaceutical distribution. During the course of its business, three new partners

were introduced; all four original partners then retired from the partnership firm, leaving the three new partners. The firm continued to run the business. The assessee firm claimed deduction of amounts paid to the retiring partners on account of goodwill for the particular assessment year. The claim was allowed by the AO. The assessment was reopened *suo moto* by the Commissioner under Section 263. He disallowed the claim. On appeal, the Tribunal disallowed the claim and stated that there was no question of payment of any goodwill to a retiring partner, as the partnership continued to be a firm carrying on the business without any change in the nature of business by using the earlier name. On appeal filed before High Court it was held that when one partner retired from the business, there was no severance of status so far as the partnership was concerned, as the retiring partner would take his capital investment and retire from partnership and the others would continue the business. By adopting this method, the four partners had not transferred the entire business concern to the new partners, but had chosen to continue for some time and at their leisure, and then retire from partnership one after the other; therefore, both tangible and intangible assets and liabilities of the firm remained the same throughout. A share of the capital came to be paid to the retiring partners, but it could not be treated as cost paid to them towards acquisition of any rights from them. A partner who retired from a partnership firm would take its initial investment and profit, if any, payable to him. Similarly, if he was accountable for any loss in a particular assessment year, that would also be worked out at the time of retirement. Therefore, there was no transfer of any interest and the money paid was only towards the share of the capital invested by that partner along with some profit, if any, and nothing beyond that. Therefore, the question of each year some money paid towards the goodwill would not arise in the facts of the present case. Therefore, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in disallowing the payment of goodwill claimed by the appellant assessee. (AY. 2004-05)

Oberon Trading Corpn. v. ITO (2014) 360 ITR 19 / 220 Taxmann 350 (Ker.)(HC)

715 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Operational expenses – Held to be allowable**

The assessee-company was engaged in mobilizing deposits from the general public at large. It had entered into a MOU with Sahara India whereby Sahara India agreed to work as an agent to the assessee-company for collecting money, supplying receipts and documents, and communicating various schemes and proposals launched by the assessee-company from time to time. The assessee-company claimed the operational expenses paid to Sahara India. The Assessing Officer found that the operational expenses paid by the assessee accounted for 18.85 per cent of the total collection made during the year and, based on an estimate, allowed only 3 per cent of the collection. On appeal, the CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal, allowed the expenditure up to 4.5 per cent of the total deposit. On appeal by the Revenue, the High Court held that the expenses so claimed pertained to the establishment, travelling, stationery and printing, advertisement and publicity and business development and that these expenses were therefore related to the business of the assessee. The same fund was allocated according to the MOU between the parties. Thus, unless a case had been made that the payments were not genuine then there was no scope for any interference. (AY. 1992-93, 1994-95)

CIT v. Sahara India Mutual Benefit Co. Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 16 / 101 DTR 265 (All.)(HC)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Bond registration charges was held to be revenue expenditure 716

Payment of Bond registration charges was held to be revenue expenditure. (AY. 2006-07) *CIT v. Hindustan Organics Chemicals Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 1 / 107 DTR 105 / 270 CTR 478 (Bom.)(HC)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Expenditure incurred in respect of business premises taken on lease – Allowable as revenue expenditure 717

It has been held by the Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal that any Expenditure incurred by Assessee on replacement of old tiles, wooden partition, pest control, etc. in respect of the business premises taken on lease basis is to be allowed as revenue expenditure. (AY. 2007-08)

ACIT v. Sarkar Jewellers (P) Ltd. (2014) 33 ITR 16 / (2015) 67 SOT 125 (URO)(Ahd.)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Expenditure incurred on replacement of latest version of software – Allowable as revenue expenditure 718

The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal held that any Expenditure incurred by the Assessee on replacement of latest version of software is to be allowed as revenue expenditure. (AY. 2007-08)

ACIT v. Sarkar Jewellers (P) Ltd. (2014) 33 ITR 16 / (2015) 67 SOT 125 (URO)(Ahd.)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Expenditure incurred on construction of storage sheds on leasehold land is revenue in nature 719

Assessee is running a flour mill. It is allotted four storage depot, i.e., open land, without sheds, on leasehold basis by Tamil Nadu Food grains Marketing Yard Ltd. (TFMYL). The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal held that as assessee contributed for construction of sheds on that space which helped it to secure lower monthly lease rents the expenditure incurred by assessee on construction of sheds is treated as revenue expenditure. (AY. 2009-10) *Jayakrishna Flour Mills (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 36 ITR 262 / (2015) 67 SOT 214 (Chennai) (Trib.)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Lease Agreement – Claim of Brokerage expenses incurred for finding a tenant for an under-construction building was held to be not on allowable expenditure 720

Assessee - company, engaged in the business in the business of construction of IT parks and Hotels etc, claimed expenses of ₹ 1.64 Cr as revenue expenditure on account of brokerage paid for finding a tenant for its building, which was under construction. The A.O and CIT(A) disallowed the claim as there was no nexus with the trading activity and the payment of brokerage. The Tribunal held that as the building which was sought to be leased out is still under construction and the lease agreement commences only on completion of construction, claim was not maintainable. (AY. 2008-09)

Angelica Properties (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 151 ITD 160 / (2015) 167 TTJ 549 (Pune)(Trib.)

721 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Replaced autoconers which were parts of spinning machines and crankshaft of DG set – Allowable as revenue expenditure**

Assessee replaced autoconers which were parts of spinning machines and crankshaft of DG set. Since machines replaced did not have independent functioning rather they were a part of total plant, it could not be said that assessee acquired new asset; rather a part of old machine was replaced for proper functioning, therefore, amount incurred by assessee for replacement of autoconer and crankshaft would be allowed as revenue expenditure. (AY. 2004-05, 2005-06)

Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 158 TTJ 4 / (2015) 67 SOT 26 (URO)(Jodh.) (Trib.)

722 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Upfront fee – Allowable as revenue expenditure**

Assessee was engaged in export business and as inflow was in foreign currency, it converted rupee loan into foreign currency loan and paid upfront fee to IDBI for such conversion. Assessee also paid upfront fee for reduction of interest rate on loans taken for replacement of machinery under RUF and TUF scheme of Government. Since assessee was benefited and expenses related to business exigency, same were allowable as revenue expenditure. (AY. 2004-05, 2005-06)

Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 158 TTJ 4 / (2015) 67 SOT 26 (URO)(Jodh.) (Trib.)

723 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Prior to set up or commencement of function – Trail run expenses – Capital in nature**

Where assessee had claimed expenditure on account of salary, wages, professional fees etc., and same was incurred prior to set up or commencement of function of new plant and machinery, expenditure was laid out in relation to acquisition and bringing into existence a new asset and were capital in nature. Where trial run expenses was incurred prior to setting up of plant and machinery and same were laid out for bringing a new asset into existence expenditure was capital in nature. (AY. 2006-07)

Essar Steel Ltd. v. ADCIT (2014) 165 TTJ 25(UO) / 35 ITR 432 / (2015) 67 SOT 24 (URO) (Mum.) (Trib.)

724 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Cash expenses – Only because cash expenses are made no disallowance can be made**

The assessee-firm was engaged in the business of reselling of the electrical goods. Tribunal held that in order to disallow any expenditure AO has to establish that same was not incurred for carrying out business for year under consideration or that expenses were not genuine and merely because certain expenditure was incurred in cash cannot be basis for making any disallowance. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10)

Dy. CIT v. Vijay Sales (2014) 33 ITR 546 / (2015) 67 SOT 99 (Mum.) (Trib.)

725 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Payment made to compensate exhibitors – Held to be capital expenditure. [S.57(iii)]**

The assessee-firm was engaged in production and distribution of feature films. Assessee, a film producer, sold its two films for certain consideration. Both movies did not do well in theaters and assessee made certain payment to compensate exhibitors for loss caused

by films. Said payment was claimed as revenue expenditure. Tribunal held that payment was not made to discharge any legal liability but to protect assessee's goodwill in market and, therefore, same was capital in nature not allowable. (AY. 2009-10)
ACIT v. Seven Arts Films (2014) 33 ITR 694 / (2015) 67 SOT 74 (URO)(Chennai)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Abandoned film or teleserial – Allowable as business expenditure

726

The assessee-company was engaged in production of Hindi teleserials. It had written off cost of production of an abandoned teleserial as revenue expenditure. The AO disallowed the said write off and further held that even the claim of the assessee was premature inasmuch as the Prasar Bharti had rejected the said teleserial on 22-1-2010 and, hence, the said loss was pertaining to the subsequent year. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the claim of the assessee holding that in case of abandoned film or television serial, the expenditure was to be allowed as business expenditure.

On revenue's appeal Tribunal held that in case of film/teleserial, cost of production is to be treated as stock-in-trade and expenditure on abandoned film or teleserial is to be allowed as business expenditure. (AY. 2009-10)

ITO v. Rajnandini Entertainment Ltd. (2014) 35 ITR 348 / (2015) 152 ITD 217 (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Loom expenditure – Entire expenses not verifiable – as loom expenditures were necessary for purpose of business, entire expenses claimed by assessee could not be disallowed

727

The Appellate Tribunal held that where loom expenditure was necessary for purpose of business of assessee, entire expenditure could not be disallowed for want of proper vouchers. (AY. 2007-08)

Diamond Carpet v. Addl. CIT (2013) 26 ITR 689 / (2014) 61 SOT 13 (URO)(Agra)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Depreciation – One time Vehicle tax – Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958, could not be allowed as revenue expenditure rather it would form part of actual cost of motor car, a capital asset and, thus, exigible to depreciation. [S. 32]

728

During relevant year, the assessee paid vehicle tax on purchase of vehicle under Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958. The vehicles tax was an annual levy since its inception, however, *vide* an amendment to 1958 Act, effective from year 1995, the annual tax was converted into a one time tax, so that it was required to be paid once during the lifetime of a vehicle. The assessee claimed that amendment in the 1958 Act would not alter character of vehicle tax and same would be allowed as revenue expenditure. The revenue authorities rejected assessee's explanation and concluded that payment in question being a part of cost of vehicle, could not be allowed as revenue expenditure. Before ITAT it was held that the motor cars, on which the impugned tax stands paid, are capital assets intended for use primarily, if not wholly, in Maharashtra, is not in dispute. It is amply clear that the tax is under law payable on motor cars or omnibuses registered in the State of Maharashtra, as a one-time tax for the life time of said vehicles. The question is of the nature of the tax in view of the admitted and given

position, i.e., of the law under which it is paid. The same being payable for plying of vehicles in Maharashtra, i.e., the intended use for which the motor cars stand acquired, one is unable to see as to how the said tax would not go to form a part of the cost of capital asset to the assessee. The stand of the Revenue that the tax levied by the said Act would form part of the actual cost of the motor car, a capital asset, on which the same is levied, and exigible to depreciation as a part to the actual cost thereof. Therefore it is not part of revenue expenditure. (AY. 2004-05)

M. Dinshaw & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 342 / 166 TTJ 516 (Mum.)(Trib.)

729 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Laboratory equipment handed over to Government laboratories – Capital in nature**

The assessee was a wholesale trader of foreign liquor and beer in the State of Kerala. Assessee was regularly conducting chemical analysis of his products at Government laboratories. In order to avoid inordinate delay in getting results, the assessee had incurred expenses for purchasing and handing over the equipment to the Government Chemical Examination Laboratory. According to the assessee these expenses were incurred by the assessee for the business purpose so as to provide chemical analysis of the liquor samples of the assessee at these three laboratories and these expenses incurred by the assessee are to be considered for the purpose of business. Assessee gave these laboratories equipment to enhance capacity and claimed expenditure incurred thereon as business expenditure. Tribunal held that though expenses were incurred by assessee, it would not derive any profit from such expenditure, it could not be said that it was incurred for assessee's business purpose and, therefore, same could not be allowed as business expenditure, as it was to be capitalized. (AY. 2009-10 & 2010-11)

Kerala State Beverage (M & M) Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 35 ITR 481 / 152 ITD 291 (Cochin)(Trib.)

730 **S. 37(1) Business expenditure – Bid loss in chit business – Allowable as deduction. [S.28(i)]**

Bid loss incurred by the assessee is in the normal course of its business, hence allowable as business expenditure. (AY. 2009-10)

Kapil Chit Funds (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 529 / 164 TTJ 191 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

731 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Provision for development expenses – Disallowance of expenses was held to be not proper. [S. 147, 263]**

The Tribunal allowed the deduction of provision for development expenses and confirmed the order of CIT(A) by referring the Apex Court decision in the cases of Rotork Controls (I) (P) Ltd. (2009) 23 DTR 79 (SC) and Bharat Earth Movers (2000) 245 ITR 428 (SC).

The Tribunal set aside the order of CIT under section 263 and allowed appeal of assessee for the AY. 2006-07. The Assessing Officer started reassessment proceedings under section 147 for the AY. 2005-06, 2007-08 and 2008-09 by issue of notice under section 148 of Income Tax Act.

The Tribunal held that the surplus fund were not used otherwise than for business purpose and the explanation given by the assessee cannot be rejected merely on

surmises and conjectures rather it appears to be *bona fide*. The learned Assessing Officer was not justified in making additions by disallowing the provision for development expenses. (AY. 2005-06, 2008-09)

Shree Salasar Overseas P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 164 TTJ 215 / (2015) 67 SOT 68 (URO) (Jaipur)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Contribution to a provident fund was held to be allowable 732

Where assessee, as an employer, made contributions to a provident fund established in terms of Indian Provident Fund Act, 1925, it was entitled to claim deduction in respect of said contributions even if such fund was not recognized. (AY. 2003-04, 2008-09)

ACIT v. Punjab Urban Development Authority, Mohali (2014) 64 SOT 65 (URO) / 32 ITR 481 / 161 TTJ 553 (Chd.)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Contribution to PUDA – Capital expenditure 733

Where assessee, engaged in business of acquiring land and selling plots, made contribution to PUDA for acquisition of land for development of an international airport, said expenditure being capital in nature, assessee's claim for deduction in respect of same was to be rejected. (AY. 2003-04 to 2008-09)

ACIT v. Punjab Urban Development Authority, Mohali (2014) 64 SOT 65 (URO) / 32 ITR 481 / 161 TTJ 553 (Chd.)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Interest – Diversion of funds – Net debit balance of capital account of partners – Disallowance was held to be justified 734

Assessee claimed interest payment to bank. Since there was net debit balance in aggregate capital account of partners, AO proceeded to compute interest at rate of 12 per cent on net debit balance in capital account of partners on notional basis and assessed same. CIT(A) took view that law does not provide for taxing interest income on notional basis, however, since assessee had paid interest to bank which was attributable to huge debit balance in accounts of partners, CIT(A) restricted addition to the extent of interest paid to bank and deleted balance amount. Tribunal held that CIT (A) was justified in confirming addition, apparently on ground of diversion of interest bearing funds. (AY. 2007-08)

Raja & Co. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 12 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Sub-contract – Disallowance made by the AO was deleted 735

Assessee-company obtained land development work. It entrusted said work in sub-contract. AO disallowed the payment, since details of all transactions in respect of which sub-contract payment had been made by assessee-company were duly recorded in payment vouchers and other evidence, impugned disallowance made by AO was to be deleted. (AY. 2009-10)

Dy. CIT v. Muppa Homes (P) Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 91 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 736 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Consultancy charges – Same management – New line of business – Held to be allowable as revenue expenditure**
 Assessee was in business of trading and transportation service, During relevant assessment year it had entered into business of fleet management service and providing security products and networking solution, for which it had hired a consultant who had provided various kinds of advisory services and had also contributed in identifying prospective customers, if there was continuity of business with common management and funds, then even if assessee had started a new line of business in current/relevant assessment year, payment made for carrying out such running of business was nothing but a business expenditure which had to be allowed in year in which it had been incurred. Such expenditure incurred in form of consultancy charges, though might be for enduring benefit of service industry started by assessee, the same is allowable as revenue expenditure. (AY. 2006-07)
Agrani Telecom Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 150 ITD 34 (Mum.)(Trib.)
- 737 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Illegal payments – Procedural irregularities – Payment cannot be disallowed as unlawful or prohibited by law**
 Illegal payments offence or prohibition under law should be judged with ‘purpose’ of expenditure on a standalone basis divorced from fulfilment or otherwise of procedural formalities attached with and necessary for incurring of such expenditure. if expenditure is otherwise lawful and neither amounts to offence nor is prohibited by law, but procedural provisions attached for incurring it are not complied with, no doubt irregularity will creep in, but such irregularity would not make expenditure itself as unlawful so as to be brought within scope of Explanation to section 37(1). (A.Y. 2009-10)
Jai Surgicals Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 150 ITD 60 / 163 TTJ 724 (Delhi)(Trib.)
- 738 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Buy back of shares – Premium paid – Held to be allowable as revenue expenditure**
 Premium paid to buy back shares of recalcitrant shareholders is to facilitate smooth running of business and is allowable as revenue business expenditure. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)
Dy. CIT v. Bramha Corp. Hotel & Resorts Ltd. (Pune)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org
- 739 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Renovation on lease premises [S. 32]**
 When the assessee has incurred expenditure on renovation of the hotel taken on lease, if the expenditure incurred falls in the revenue field, the assessee is entitled to claim it as revenue expenditure irrespective of Section 32(1A) or Explanation 1 of Section 32 of the Act. (AY. 2008-09, 2010-11)
Nandini Delux v. CIT (2015) 37 ITR 52 / 167 TTJ 746 / 68 SOT 5 (URO)(Bang.)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Bogus purchases – Purchases cannot be treated as bogus solely on the ground that suppliers are not traceable if the assessee has paid by a/c payee cheques and produced the income-tax and sales-tax documents and bank statements of the suppliers. [S.40A(3), 69C]

- (i) A perusal of the orders passed by the tax authorities would show that they have suspected the genuineness of the purchases only for the reason that the above said five parties were not available in the given addresses. It is pertinent to note that the AO himself, during the course of remand proceedings, have obtained the bank statements of the abovesaid five Parties. It is in the common knowledge of everybody that the bank account, now a days, could be opened only on submission of proper documents. Further the assessee has furnished the Sales tax documents of the above said five parties and also their income tax details to prove their existence. Thus, it is seen that the assessee has furnished many documents to prove the existence of the parties and they have not been controverted by the assessing officer.
- (ii) Be that as it may, another important factor the bank account copies collected by the assessing officer shows that the assessee had made the payments to the above said parties by way of account payee cheques. Thus, it is seen that the transactions have been routed through the bank accounts. Further, it is not the case of the assessing officer that the assessee has indulged in accounting of bogus purchases. When the assessee submitted that he could not have effected the sales without making corresponding purchases, the AO has taken the view that the assessee could have effected purchases in the grey market, which conclusion is, in fact, not supported by any material. Under this impression only, the AO has further expressed the view that the assessee would have purchased the materials by paying cash thus violating the provisions of sec. 40A(3) of the Act, which is again based on only surmises. In the absence of any material to support the said view, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the tax authorities that the purchases amount is liable to be disallowed u/s. 40A(3) of the Act. On the same impression only, the AO has expressed the view in the remand report that the purchases amount is also liable to assessed u/s. 69C of the Act as the source of purchases were not proved. Again the said conclusion is based upon only surmises, which could not be sustained. Thus, it is seen that the assessing officer has accepted the fact that the quantity details of purchases and sales have been reconciled by the assessee. Further, various case law relied upon by the assessee also supports his case. Under these set of facts, we are of the view that the Ld CIT(A) was not justified in confirming the disallowance of purchases. Accordingly, we set aside the order of Ld. CIT(A) on this issue and direct the AO to delete the disallowance of purchases. (AY. 2009-10)

Ganpatraj A. Sanghavi v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

- 741 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Licence fee-20% of gross profit earned transferred to development reserve – Held to be allowable as revenue expenditure**
 Tribunal held that the licence fee and amount transferred out of its profits to the development reserve was held to be allowable as deduction as the same was a condition precedent for obtaining licence for doing business in that union territory. (AY. 2007-08) *ACIT v. Omnibus Industrial Development Corporation of Daman & Diu & Dadra Nagar Haveli Ltd Nani Daman (2014) ACAJ-September-P. 351 (Ahd.)(Trib.)*
- 742 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Set-up of business – Financial charges and administrative expenses were held to be allowable though no sale of car has taken place. [S.3, 4, 28(i)]**
 The assessee was to commence a business of sales-cum service centre of sale of cars. The assessee has taken premises on rent, manpower was hired, registration under MVAT and CST was obtained and deposit was paid to company whose vehicles were to be sold and sales of some spare parts had been sold, it cannot be said that the business of sales-cum service centre has not been set up merely because sale of cars has not taken place. Disallowance of financial charges and administrative charges was held to be not justified. (ITA No 3530/Del/2012 dt 6-8-2014)(AY. 2007-08) *ACIT v. GMS Motors Pvt. Ltd. (2014)-BCAJ-October-P. 29 (Delhi)(Trib.)*
- 743 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Shelters on build – Operate – Transfer (BOT) – Set up of business – Commencement of business – Ready for providing space for advertising – Discharge of obligation is allowable as deduction. [S.3, 4, 28(i)]**
 The assessee was awarded its first contract by a local authority for construction of Bus Queue Shelters (Shelters) on build-operate-Transfer (BOT) basis. As per the contract, the assessee was required to undertake preliminary investigations study, design, finance construct, operate and maintain shelters at its own cost. In consideration the assessee was allowed commercially exploit the space allotted in these shelters by means of display of advertisement, etc. For a certain period. During the year the assessee claimed deduction of amount incurred in discharge of its obligations under the contract. AO disallowed the said expenditure on the ground that the assessee has not commenced its business. In appeal the CIT (A) confirmed the order of AO. On appeal Tribunal held that the business was set to be set up when shelters would be ready for providing space to assessee for advertisement. (AY. 2007-08) *Jcdcaux Advertising India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 755 / 166 TTJ 121 / 35 ITR 211 (Delhi)(Trib.)*
- 744 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenses incurred up grading software – Revenue expenditure**
 Expenses incurred on upgrading soft ware used by the assessee are revenue expenditure. (AY. 2004-05) *ACIT v. Harper Collins Publishers India Ltd. (2014) 166 TTJ 152 (Delhi)(Trib.)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Foreign travel expenditure – Matter remanded

745

Assessee Company engaged in business of development and sale of real estate had taken up a real estate development project. Tribunal held that expenditure on foreign travel was held to be allowable if the same was incurred for purpose of business. Matter remanded. (AY. 2008-09)

Dy. CIT v. S.P. Real Estate Developers (P) Ltd. (2014) 149 ITD 617 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Disallowance of consent fee paid to SEBI – Not penalty – Payment for technical violation – Allowable as deduction. [Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, S. 11]

746

The Circular issued by SEBI for “Consent application” clearly specifies that the action taken under section 11 of the Act fall in the category of “administrative or civil action”. Further, order passed by SAT also clearly states that the irregularities alleged against the assessee are “technical violations”. Most of all, the amount of ₹ 50.00 lakhs paid by the assessee are not related to the penalty, if any, imposed by the SEBI, rather it was a “Consent Fee” paid by the assessee for settlement of dispute, legal expenses and other administrative charges of SEBI. The said amount was paid clearly specifying that it was paid without admitting or denying the guilt. Hence, in our view, it cannot be said that the assessee has paid the amount of ₹ 50.00 lakhs by duly accepting or upon proving the irregularities alleged against it. On the contrary, it is the case of the assessee that it has taken the decision to settle the dispute on commercial expediency and upon business interests. (AY. 2008-09)

ITO v. Reliance Share and Stock Brokers(P) Ltd. (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Legal fees to defend criminal proceedings – Held to be not allowable

747

As the assessee was arrested in Custom Duty Evasion criminal case by the DRI and the payment of legal expenses and fees to the lawyers was made to defend and to secure bail for the assessee in that case. In this situation following the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *CIT v. H. Hirjee (1953) 23 ITR 427(SC)*, we reach the logical conclusion that the authorities below were right in holding that the payment of legal fees and expenses towards defending in a criminal prosecution not allowable as business expenditure because the same was not expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business. (AY. 2007-08)

Praveen Saxena v. JCIT (2015) 67 SOT 148 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Leave encashment expenses of earlier years was held to be allowable on actual payment. [S.43B]

748

Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to deduction on leave encashment expenses though pertaining to earlier years on actual payment basis as assessee has not claimed in earlier year. (AY. 2006-07)

ACIT v. Bharti Teletel Ltd. (2014) 163 TTJ 36 (UO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

- 749 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Expenditure by way of royalty for use of technology cannot be disallowed on the ground of being capital in nature or for non-business purpose – There is no legal requirement that for allowing expenses there has to be an agreement**

The arrangement between the assessee and the Australian company has been duly signed by both the parties. The rate per piece has also been specified therein. The royalty has been paid in actual. MACNAUGHT is not a related concern of the assessee. There is no allegation that the payments were bogus and it was an arranged affair. This is an actual payment after deduction of TDS and remitted through proper banking channel in foreign exchange. Therefore, the observation of the CIT(A) is not based on any specific finding. The rate, the products on which these are payable are clearly stated in the agreement. There is no legal requirement that there should be a detailed agreement between the parties. However, the only thing required is that there should be an arrangement under which payments have to be made. Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides for allowability of the expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for purposes of the business. The assessee has actually incurred this expenditure for the business purposes, therefore, the CIT(A) was not justified in sustaining the disallowance. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07)

Groz Engineering Tools Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 36 ITR 237 (Delhi)(Trib.)

- 750 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Payment to related party without obtaining prior approval of the Central Government – Procedural irregularity – Cannot be disallowed treating the same as offence or prohibited by law. [Companies Act, 1956, S.297]**

AO disallowed the payment made to related party on the ground that, the assessee has not obtained the prior permission of Central Government in accordance with section 297 of the Companies Act, 1956 hence the explanation to section 37(1) is applicable. Order of AO was confirmed by CIT(A). On appeal the Tribunal held that payments to related parties without obtaining prior approval of the Central Government in accordance with provisions of section 297 of the Companies Act, 1956 was merely an irregularity and cannot be disallowed treating the same as an offence or prohibited by law. (AY. 2009-10) *Jai Surgicals Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 150 ITD 60 / 106 DTR 333 / 163 TTJ 724 (Delhi)(Trib.)*

- 751 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Premium paid on the insurance policies on the partners was held to be allowable. [S.10(10D)]**

Insurance Policies were purchased in the name of the partners and the firm remains the proposer therein and on its maturity, the assured sum is payable to the firm, not to the partners. In the policies the partners were shown as assured person only. Therefore, these policies were purchased to protect the interest of the firm in case of sudden demise of the partners. ITAT Held that, the premium paid on the insurance policies on the partners is allowable as expenditure under section 37(1) of the Act, but in order to give these policies the colour of Keyman, the assessee is required to give an undertaking to the Life Insurance Corporation of India that at the time of receipt of sum assured, the same would form part of the total income of the assessee and no benefit of exemption under section 10(10D) of the Act would be available to the assessee. With these conditions, the claim of the assessee is allowable. (AY. 2008-09)

Reliance International v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 86 (URO)(Luck.)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Discount – Entries in the books of account is not a decisive or a conclusive factor – Overseas commission represented a discount given to purchasers and not a business commission – Disallowance was not justified

752

Assessee company engaged in business of manufacturing and trading of fabric. During the year, the assessee paid certain amount as agency commission and overseas commission and claimed deduction of same. Agency commission had been paid to local agents for their services provided for introducing to overseas parties, to whom it sold goods on principal to principal basis. AO accepted local commission paid and disallowed overseas commission on ground that no services had been rendered by overseas agents. Overseas commission represented a discount given to purchasers and not a business commission. Tribunal held that the AO. was wrong in disallowing overseas commission without appreciating real nature of entries. Amount represents a discount given to the purchases and not a business commission. The transactions are found to be on principal-to-principal basis. There is no element of 'agency' to attract the provisions of section 194H. The overseas parties do not sell the goods as agents of the assessee-company. The assessee is not crediting the personal accounts of the overseas parties. It is a settled principle of law that existence or absence of entries in the books of account is not a decisive or a conclusive factor in ascertaining the income or claiming the expenditure. Therefore, no such disallowance u/s. 37(1) can be made. (AY. 2009-10) *ITO v. Axon Global (P) Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 473 (Jodh.)(Trib.)*

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Construction of road – Disallowance of only 25 percent of the total claim of expenditure incurred on road construction would be justified

753

Assessee claimed that during year it had incurred an expenditure of ₹ 22.10 crores for construction of temporary roads at its contract work sites at Ratnagiri, Maharashtra and Bellary, Karnataka and claimed deduction of same as business expenditure. It explained to Assessing Officer that it had entered into service and supply contracts with two parties, namely, 'J' and 'W' for engineering and construction of thermal power plants for them at Ratnagiri and Bellary. Assessing Officer disallowed claim of assessee on plea that it was bogus - Whether since 'J' and 'W' had stated that assessee might have constructed temporary roads for execution of work, to deny whole of claim of expenditure for laying access road to project sites would be unfair. The Tribunal held that disallowance of 25 per cent of the total claim of expenditure incurred on road construction would be justified. (AY. 2009-10)

Edac Engineering Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 341 / 159 TTJ 526 (Chennai)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Share issue expenses – Capital in nature. [S.35DD]

754

Expenditure incurred on account of issuance of share certificates cannot be considered as revenue expenditure. (AY. 2006-07)

Ricoh India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 798 (Mum.)(Trib.)

755 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Discount – Agency commission was held to be allowable**

Assessee is engaged in business of manufacturing and trading of fabric, During the year, agency commission had been paid to local agents for their services provided for introducing to overseas parties, to whom it sold goods on principal to principal basis, (ii) in invoices from gross amount of sales deduction upto 12.5 per cent had been given in name of commission, and (iii) in books after recording gross sales, deduction was separately recorded as overseas commission. A.O. accepted local commission paid, but disallowed overseas commission on ground that no services had been rendered by overseas agents. Overseas commission represented a discount given to purchasers and not a business commission. Tribunal held that AO wrongly disallowed the overseas commission without appreciating real nature of entries made in books of account. Appeal of revenue was dismissed (AY. 2009-10)

ITO v. Axon Global (P) Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 473 (Jodh.)(Trib.)

756 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Foreign education expenditure of whole time director – Allowable as business expenditure**

The assessee company debited foreign education expenditure and claimed it as allowable expenditure. AO treated the said expenditure as personal nature and disallowed it. On appeal the Tribunal held that the expenditure was incurred as per resolution passed by the company and as per the agreement he will work for two years after his return from USA. Tribunal held that expenditure incurred on foreign education of Mr. Goenka, the whole time director, under authority of a resolution passed pursuant to which an agreement between the assessee and Mr. Goenka, is a business expenditure which is allowable. (AY. 2003-04)

Gujarat Carbon & Industries Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) July-BCAJ-P.32(Ahd.)(Trib.)

757 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Foreign tour expenses – Foreign visits undertaken by directors to places other than Singapore could not be said to be wholly and exclusively for business purposes – Disallowance was confirmed**

Assessee company incurred export promotion expenses which included foreign travelling expenses of directors, claimed to be undertaken for discussion with buyers. AO observing that assessee manufactured products only for its Associated Enterprise (AE) in Singapore, held that foreign travel expenditure was for personal purposes too, allowed only estimated expenditure towards visit to Singapore and disallowed remaining part. Where assessee manufactured product as per specification of AE in Singapore and was its captive supplier of finished goods, foreign visits undertaken by directors to places other than Singapore could not be said to be wholly and exclusively for business purposes. Disallowance of expenses was confirmed. (AY. 2003-04)

Advance Power Display Systems Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 761 / 30 ITR 481 / 105 DTR 269 (Mum.)(Trib.)

758 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Audit fee – Bad debts – Entries in the account after survey – Matter was set aside for readjudication. [S.133A]**

Assessee's claim for audit fees, consultancy fees and bad debts written off was disallowed on ground that assessee's final accounts as found during course of survey

were at variance with final audited balance-sheet and thus, assessee had manipulated its accounts after close of year and claimed inflated expenses. Assessee submitted that passing entries after close of year was not precluded by law, i.e., as long as there was basis thereto and that statements found during survey were unsigned but had failed to provide proper clarification with regard to said claim. Onus to establish its case being on assessee, matter remitted for readjudication. (AY. 2008-09)

Alliance Finstock Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 739 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – laying of cables – Only longevity of the facility cannot make capital asset

759

The assessee incurred huge expenditure in laying cables for providing domestic viewers. It had shown the expenditure in its P & L A/c. as revenue incurred for the purpose of its business. The AO held that the assessee having secured an enduring benefit by laying down the cables, the expenditure incurred was capital in nature and hence disallowed the expenditure, however, allowed depreciation thereon @ 25%. The CIT(A) held that the expenditure was revenue in nature.

On appeal by the Department, the Tribunal confirming the Order of the CIT(A) held that even though the cables were laid by the assessee for carrying on business, the cables did not satisfy the basic features of a capital asset. Enduring benefit in the assessee's case related to safeguarding cable laid down underground or drawn over the electric poles. If an external agency interfered and the cables were damaged, the assessee had no course of action, it could not retrieve the cables profitably nor could it protect the cables. Accordingly, the costs involved was a sunk cost even though the assessee might get the benefit out of the cable for more than a year. That longevity of the facility could not make the cable a capital asset. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the expenditure on laying cables was revenue in nature. (AY. 2003-04, 2005-06)

ACIT v. Gemini TV P. Ltd. (2014) 29 ITR 32 / 66 SOT 9 (URO)(Chennai)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Expenditure neither creating an asset or for providing enduring benefit is a revenue expenditure

760

Out of the capital work-in-progress, the assessee claimed the amount on salary, travelling and communication expenditure as revenue expenditure. The AO held that since these expenses are shown as pre-operative expenses and treated the amount as capital in nature in the books and hence the same cannot be allowed as revenue for income-tax purposes. The stand of the AO was confirmed by the CIT(A).

On appeal the Tribunal held that the AO did not dispute the fact that the expenditure was incurred for expansion of the existing line of business and was in the nature of salary, etc. These expenses did not create any asset nor provided any enduring benefit to the assessee so as to treat this as capital. Therefore the Tribunal held that the expenses cannot be treated as capital expenditure. (AY. 2008-09)

Reliance Footprint Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 82 / 63 SOT 124 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenditure incurred on film which was abandoned halfway – Allowed as revenue expenditure. [R.9A]

761

The assessee, a film producing company, abandoned a film under production as continuation would have led to a higher loss and claimed the expense incurred as

revenue in nature. The AO disallowed the expense as expenditure incurred before release of a film was capital expenditure. The CIT(A) held that during production, the film was a stock-in-trade and on being abandoned was to be treated as revenue expense. On appeal by the department, the Tribunal held that only when expenditure gives rise to an enduring benefit, it can be regarded as capital in nature. As per Rule 9A, for feature films (full cost of production of which is generally realizable within a period as low as 90 days), the cost of production of the incomplete project, is deductible as a business expenditure on its abandonment. Thus in the instant case, where suspension was not temporary, the expense is to be treated as revenue in nature. (AY. 2005-06)

ACIT v. A.K. Films (P) Ltd. (2014) 29 ITR 308 (2015) 152 ITD 538 (Mum)(Trib.)

762 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenditure incurred on an abandoned film – Is a revenue loss and allowable expenditure. [S.28(i)]**

The assessee is engaged in the business of hiring cine equipment, distribution and export of films. The AO disallowed the loss of ₹ 60 lakhs claimed by the assessee in respect of an abandoned film on account of non-advancing of a legal justification and held the same to be capital in nature. The CIT(A) allowed the claim of the assessee observing that since the film no longer had commercial viability, it was scrapped and the amounts incurred till date were written off.

On appeal by the department, the Tribunal relying on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of *CIT v. Mukta Arts P. Ltd. (ITA No. 584 of 2001)* and other decisions on the subject observed that the fact that the film in question was never released, it was simply a stock-in-trade and there was no question of it being a capital asset. Accordingly, the Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the departmental appeal. (AY. 2006-07)

ITO v. Abdul G. Nadiadwala (2014) 29 ITR 528 / 151 ITD 657 (Mum.)(Trib.)

763 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Provision for arrears arising on account of wage revision – Allowable expenditure**

The assessee had made provision for arrears in wage revision. It was argued that the assessee entered into wage agreement for 10 years from 1-1-1997 to 31-12-2006. Therefore, due date for revision of wages and salaries were from 1-1-2007. Even though final memorandum of settlement of demands of workers was reached on 24-9-2009 increase in salary was effective from 1-1-2007. The enhanced salary is an accrued and crystallized liability for 2007. Merely because the same was quantified later would not alter the fact that the amount is a crystallized liability. The AO and CIT(A) disallowed the expenses.

On appeal, the Tribunal allowed the provision as a business expense u/s. 37(1) relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of *Bharat Earth Movers v. CIT [2000] 245 ITR 428* and *Rotork Controls India (P) Ltd. v. CIT [2009] 314 ITR 62* and the accounting standard issued by the CBDT u/s. 145 in terms of which any liability which has accrued during any financial year is to be allowed in that year notwithstanding the fact that the actual quantification and settlement of the liability is made at a later point of time. (AY. 2007-08)

Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 637 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenditure incurred on providing free meals to employees – Essentially for employee's welfare – Allowable as business expenditure

764

The assessee incurred expenses towards food and refreshments, which was included in the expenditure claimed under the head “staff welfare expenses”. The AO was of the view that expenses incurred towards free meals to employees during office hours, cannot be treated as allowable expenditure and disallowed 25% of the said expenses. The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

On appeal, the Tribunal observed that such expenses are essential for the purpose of employee welfare and it is a common, industry-wide practice followed in India by IT companies and hence are allowable as business expenditure u/s. 37(1). (AY. 2004-05 to 2008-09)

SAP India (P) Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2014) 29 ITR 469 / 104 DTR 82 (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenses for advertising product of its holding company in Indian sub-continent – Regarded as sales promotion expenses – Allowable

765

The assessee had incurred certain expenses towards sales promotion. The AO disallowed the expenses - specifically, expenses incurred towards sponsorship of events, hosting of conferences, promotional gifts, public relations as he was of the view that the said expenses cannot be said to be incurred exclusively for business purposes. The CIT(A) reduced the disallowance to 10% of the claim.

During the appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee submitted that such sales promotion expenses are necessary to create awareness of the different SAP products and its utility for the buyer in the Indian sub-continent. It was submitted that the expenses claimed by the assessee are not uncommon expenses and are incurred by any software product company. The quantum of sales promotion expenses are not abnormally high and were incurred wholly and exclusively for its business purposes and would satisfy the test of commercial expediency. Accordingly, the claim of the assessee was fully allowed by the Tribunal u/s. 37(1). (AY. 2004-05, 2008-09)

SAP India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 29 ITR 469 / 104 DTR 82 (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Commencement of business – ROC issued certificate of commencement of business – Business set up – Expenses including depreciation is allowable

766

ROC had issued the certificate of commencement of business to the assessee company during the relevant year. The company had already set up three subsidiaries in furtherance of one of its main objects. It is entitled for deduction of all legitimate expenses including depreciation. (AY. 2009-10)

Green Infra Ltd v. ITO (2013) 145 ITD 240 / (2014) 98 DTR 187 / 159 TTJ 728 (Mum.)(Trib.)

767 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Vehicle lease rental – Operating lease – Lease rental are allowable as revenue expenditure**

Tribunal held that lease in question can be said to be essentially an operating lease and not a finance lease. Assessee has not claimed any depreciation. Thus the assessee is entitled to deduction under section 37(1). The Tribunal followed the decision of Supreme Court in the case of *I. C. D. S. Ltd. v. CIT (2013) 255 CTR 449 (SC)*. (AY. 2005-06 to 2007-08)

Godrej Consumer Products Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 159 TTJ 21 / 151 ITD 566 (Mum.)(Trib.)

768 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Personal expenses – Amount suffered FBT can also be disallowed if the expenditure is of personal nature. [S.115WB]**

Assessing Officer disallowed telephone expenses on account of personal use. Assessee claimed that telephone expenses also suffered Fringe Benefit Tax. Since FBT could only be in respect of expenses incurred for business purpose, it could not be co-related with expenses disallowed on ground of personal use. Where disallowance was effected on ground of non-business or personal nature, said disallowance could not be deleted on the ground that the amount has suffered FBT. (AY. 2007-08)

Hercules Pigment Industry v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 31 (Mum.)(Trib.)

769 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Provision for foreseeable losses is allowable as deduction. [S.145, AS-7]**

Assessee is in business of infrastructure development. Job was done on contractual basis. It claimed entire foreseeable losses of future years in relevant assessment year. Tribunal held that as it was executing fixed price contract, as per AS-7 assessee was entitled to make provision for foreseeable losses. Foreseeable losses provided by assessee in its books of account is to be allowed. (AY. 2004-05)

ACIT v. ITD Cementation India Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 59 / 160 TTJ 628 / 98 DTR 452 (Mum.)(Trib.)

770 **S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Software development – Not allowable as revenue expenditure – Depreciation was allowable in the year of capitalization**

Expenditure incurred on software development expenses was not allowable as revenue expenditure; same was to be treated as capital work-in-progress, which would be entitled to depreciation in year of capitalisation. (AY. 2003-04 to 2006-07)

3i Infotech Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 405 / 162 TTJ 184 (Mum.)(Trib.)

771 **S.37(2) : Business expenditure – Entertainment – Held to be allowable**

The Tribunal allowed the entertainment expenses by following the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of *CIT v. EXPO Machinery Ltd. (190 ITR 576)*. On appeal by revenue the High Court affirmed the view of Tribunal. (AY. 1992-93)

CIT v. Modi Olivetti Ltd. (2014) 220 taxmann 388 (All.)(HC)

S.37(2A) : Business expenditure – Hotel – Entertainment expenditure – The key word in Explanation is “work”. There could be a scenario where in the given set of facts and circumstances it could be validly contended that a hotel was a place of the work of the employees of the Assessee Company – On facts the question was answered against the assessee

772

Whether expenses incurred in a hotel would fall within “or other place of their work” appearing in Explanation 2 to Section 37(2A) of the Act, would entirely depend on the facts of each case. There cannot be any generalization in this regard. The key word in Explanation is “work”. There could be a scenario wherein the given set of facts and circumstances it could be validly contended that a hotel was a place of work of the employees of the Assessee Company, but the same has to be examined on a case to case basis. In the present case, the factual findings given by the authorities below and as can be discerned from paragraph Nos.12 to 14 of the Tribunal’s Order, are against the Applicant/Assessee. Nothing has been brought to our notice to controvert those findings or to show that they are perverse or vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record. It can hardly be argued that by the employees accompanying their customers for lunch and dinner, they were engaged in work and would therefore fall within “other place of their work” as contemplated in the said Explanation. In view of these factual findings of the authorities below, which are uncontroverted before us, we answer Question Nos.14 to 19 in favour of the Revenue and against the Assessee.

Sandvik Asia Ltd. v. CIT (2015) 231 Taxmann 46 (Bom.)(HC)

S.37(3) : Business expenditure – Disallowance – Travelling expenses for purpose of business – Computation – Each trip of individual employee to be taken into account. [I.T. Rules. R. 6D]

773

Travelling expenses for purpose of business-Computation. Each trip of individual employee to be taken into account. (AY. 1975-76, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88)

CIT v. Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 132 / 51 taxmann.com 545 (T&AP)(HC)

S.37(4) : Business expenditure – Guest House expenses not allowed as business expenditure

774

Guest House expenses not an allowable business expenditure in view of the decision of the Apex Court in case of *Britannia Industries Ltd. v. CIT (2005) 278 ITR 546 (SC)* (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Baghpat Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 319 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 320 (All.)(HC)

Section 38 : Building, etc., partly used for business, etc., or not exclusively so used

775 **S.38 : Depreciation – Vehicle – Personal use – Hiring charges – The vehicle had been used for the purpose of earning money by way of hiring charges – Disallowance of any part of depreciation on account of directors’ personal use was misconceived. [S.32]**

The vehicle had been hired out. In other words, the vehicle was not used for the business of the assessee. The vehicle had been used for the purpose of earning money by way of hiring charges. In such a case, the order disallowing any part of the depreciation on account of personal use of the directors, u/s. 38(2), did not appear to have been passed upon application of mind. The question of personal use might have arisen if the vehicle had been used for the business of the assessee. The vehicle had not been used for the business of the assessee at all. On the contrary, the vehicle had been hired out. The assessee, in return, was making profit. Therefore, the directors or any director of the assessee was not likely to get any opportunity to use the car. The car was in the use of the hirer. When the director had no opportunity to use the car, the question of disallowing any part of depreciation on account of directors’ personal use was altogether misconceived.

Sri Saytasai Properties and Investment P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 641 / 106 DTR 420 / 270 CTR 210 (Cal.)(HC)

Section 40 : Amounts not deductible

776 **S.40(a)(i) : Amounts not deductible – Payments to non-resident – Deduction at source – Commission – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.9(1)(vii), 37, 195]**

The assessee was engaged in the leather business. For the assessment year assessee entered into an agency agreement with a non-resident agent to secure orders from various customers, including retailers and traders, for the export of leather shoe uppers and full shoes by the assessee. AO disallowed the payment on the ground that the assessee failed to deduct tax at source. Tribunal held that commission payment to non-residents were not chargeable to tax in India and therefore provisions of section 195 were not applicable. On appeal by revenue dismissing the appeal the Court held that, payment of commission on free onboard basis to non-resident agent for procuring orders for leather business from overseas buyers was Commission simplicitor. Opening of letters of credit for completing export obligation is incident of export. Agent not providing technical services for purposes of running of business of assessee in India. Commission paid to agent not “fees for technical services. Assessee is not liable to deduct tax at source. (AY. 2009-10)

CIT v. Faizan Shoes P. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 155 / 226 Taxmann 115 / 272 CTR 170 (Mad.)(HC)

S.40(a)(i) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Non-resident – Salary to foreign citizen as foreign ship crew – Salary was not taxable therefore no tax was deductible at source hence no disallowance can be made. [S.10(6)(viii), 192]

777

Assessee-employer paid certain sum on account of salary payable to foreigner-crew members without deducting any tax at source. Assessing Officer disallowed same on ground that it was part of fees for technical services on which no tax was deducted at source. The Tribunal, held that impugned payments were payment of salary and not technical fees. The Court held that since payment in instant case was neither royalty or fees for technical services or other sum chargeable under Act, section 40(a)(i) would not apply. Payments made to foreigner-crew member of ship who worked for a period of less than 90 days in India, were not income of employees in India liable to TDS as the said was exempt under section 10(6)(vii) of the Act. (AY. 2004-05)

DIT v. Dolphin Drilling Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 227 / 264 CTR 319 / 221 Taxman 489 (Uttarakhand) (HC)

S.40(a)(i) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Outside India – Non-resident – Fes for technical services

778

The Assessing officer disallowed claim for depreciation under section 40(a)(i) of the Act on the ground that the payments made for technical know-how which had been capitalized, no tax deduction at source had been made thereon. The CIT(A) allowed the depreciation. The Tribunal held that the assessee had not claimed deduction for the amount paid, the provisions contained in section 40(a)(i) were not attracted. The tax deducted in respect of the payment was made over to the Government in the subsequent year and, therefore, depreciation could not be deducted on the capital expenditure incurred by the assessee. The Tribunal confirmed the CIT(A). The High Court held that in the absence of any requirement of law for making deduction of tax, out of the expenditure on technical know-how which was capitalized, no amount was claimed as revenue expenditure and hence the deduction could not be disallowed under Section 40(a)(i) of the Act. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Mark Auto Industries Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 43 (2014) 220 Taxmann 75 (Mag.)(P&H) (HC)

S.40(a)(i) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Non-resident – Even if recipient takes into account such receipts in his computation of business income and files return in respect of same, disallowance will be made. [S.139(1), 195]

779

Tribunal held that when an assessee makes payments to non-resident assessee without deducting tax at source and even if recipient takes into account such receipts in his computation of business income and files return under section 139(1) in respect of same, disallowance will be made nevertheless. (AY. 2007-08)

Mitsubishi Corporation India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 166 TTJ 385 / (2015) 67 SOT 83 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

- 780 **S.40(a)(i) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Royalty – Charter hire payment is not assessable as royalty, there is no obligation to deduct TDS and no disallowance can be made – DTAA-India-UAE [S.9(1)(vi), 90, 195, Art , 8, 12]**

It is very clear that the payments made by the assessee company were in the nature of simple payments for chartering ships on hire for doing the business outside India. Therefore, the payments do not satisfy the test laid down in s.9 of the IT Act, 1961. When s. 9 is not satisfied, there cannot be a case that income is deemed to accrue or arise in India as a result of hire payments made by the assessee-company to foreign ships. The liability under s.195 is cast on the assessee only when the payment is made to a non-resident, which is chargeable under the provisions of the IT Act. Here, the payments made by the assessee do not fall under s.9 and the payments do not take the character of any sum chargeable to tax under this Act. Therefore, s.195 does not come into operation. When s.195 does not apply to the present case, there is no violation of that section and consequently invoking of s.40(a)(i) does not arise. (AY. 2006-07) *Mathewsons Exports & Imports v. ACIT (2014) 112 DTR 233 / 166 TTJ 777 / 66 SOT 278 (Cochin)(Trib.)*

- 781 **S.40(a)(i) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Non-resident – Disallowance of payment made to sub-contractors after deducting TDS at the instance of non-resident contractor. [S.194C,195]**

The Tribunal held that the work was done by the Indian contractors and the TDS was deducted at source in accordance with section 194C and the work was not done by foreign contractor. Tribunal found that there is no finding by any of the lower authorities that the foreign contractor (M/s. Gulf Spic Eng. LLC, Dubai) had done any work for the assessee, for which assessee was obliged to make any payments. In such circumstances, assessee had reasonable grounds to have a bona fide belief that the payments effected to contractors did not attract section 195 of the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that assessee could not be held liable for any failure for non-deduction of tax at source. Disallowance under section 40(a)(i) of the Act. Therefore stands deleted. *Edac Engineering Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 526 (Chennai)(Trib.)*

- 782 **S.40(a)(i) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Fees for technical services – Payments made to non resident for transmission of bulk SMS were not FTS and hence no liability to deduct tax at source – DTAA-India-South Africa. [S, 4, 5, 9(I)(vii), 195, Art 12]**

Assessee availed the services of a telecom carrier in South Africa to transmit bulk SMS. The assessee made the payment without deduction of tax at source. AO held that the payment made by the assessee were FTS and accordingly liable to tax deduct at source . As the tax were not deducted he invoked the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) and disallowed the payments. On appeal the Tribunal held that collection fees for usage of standard facility does not result in payment for providing technical services. The services were rendered outside India. Section 195 should be read along with sections 4, 5, 9 as well as tax treaties and unless the income is chargeable to tax in India, withholding tax obligation does not arise. (AY. 2009-10) *Dy. CIT v. Velti India (P) Ltd. (2014) 105 DTR 213 / 163 TTJ 691 / (2015) 153 ITD 244 (Chennai)(Trib.)*

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Disallowance applies only to amounts “payable” as of 31st March and not to amounts already “paid” during the year – SLP of department was dismissed

783

In *CIT v. Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd. (2013) 357 ITR 642(All)(HC)* held that disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) applies only to amounts “payable” as of 31st March and not to amounts already “paid” during the year. The majority judgement in *Merilyn Shipping & Transports v. Add. CIT (2012) 136 ITD 23 (SB)* was approved. The department filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court. The said SLP has been dismissed by the Supreme Court in limine.

CIT v. Vector Shipping Service (P) Ltd. (SC); www.itatonline.org

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not allowable – Non-resident – Payments to non-resident not liable to deduction of tax at source – DTAA-India-Singapore – Existence of alternative remedy – Not an absolute bar to issue of writ. [S.4, 5, 9, 44BB, 195 Art, 7, 8, Constitution of India, Art. 226]

784

The assessee was engaged in the business of transportation of coal through ships. It entered into an agreement with J, a Singapore company, for transportation of coal for five years. J was assessed to income-tax in Singapore only. It was also evidenced by the fact that it had been issued with the certificate of tax residence and certificate of incorporation by the concerned authority at Singapore and that it did not have any permanent establishment in India to carry out the operations. In terms of DTAA between India and Singapore and as per the terms of the agreement, the profits earned by J were subject-matter of assessment only in Singapore and not in India and, consequently, it was held that there was no obligation on the part of the assessee to deduct any tax at source in terms of section 195. (AY. 2010-11)

Anand Transport P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 226 Taxmann 338 / (2015) 370 ITR 524 / 275 CTR 381 (Mad.)(HC)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Contractor and sub contractor – Condition of second proviso to section 194C(3) are satisfied – Disallowance was not justified. [S.194C, Form no 15], Rule 29D]

785

High Court held that once conditions of second proviso to section 194C(3) are satisfied, liability of payer to deduct tax at source would cease and consequently disallowance of payment for sub-contractor under section 40(a)(ia) could not be made on ground that assessee had not furnished Form No 15 J as required under rule 29D.

CIT v. Valibhai Khanbhai Mankad (2013) 216 Taxman 18 / 261 CTR 538 (Guj.)(HC)

Editorial : SLP of revenue granted. SLP NO 23692 od 2013 dt 13-10-2014, CIT v. Valibhai Khanbhai Mankad (2014) 227 Taxman 372 (SC)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amount not deductible – Deduction at source – Export commission to non-resident agent for rendering services abroad – Foreign agents not assessed to tax in India and not having any office in India-Withdrawal of circular not retrospective – Disallowance merely on ground amount huge not permissible – DTAA-India-UAE-United Kingdom. [S.195, Art.7]

786

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the appellate authorities found that all the three foreign agents were not assessed to tax in India and none of them had any office

in India. Circular No. 786, dated February 7, 2000, (2000) 241 ITR (St.) 132, clearly specifies that the question of deduction of tax at source under section 195 would arise only if the payment of commission to a non-resident is chargeable to tax in India and since the payment was remitted directly abroad it could not be held to have been received on or on behalf of the agent in India. It was a finding by the appellate authorities that the commission paid abroad was not chargeable to tax in India under the Act. Circular No. 7, dated October 22, 2009 (2009) 318 ITR (St.) 1 could not be considered retrospectively to make it applicable to payments made before that date. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Modern Insulators Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 138 / (2015) 230 Taxman 67 (Raj.)(HC)

Editorial : Order of the Appellate Tribunal in Asst. CIT v. Modern Insulator Ltd. [2011] 10 ITR 147 (Jaipur) (Trib) is affirmed.

- 787 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible - Deduction at source – Interest –Resident-Paid before due date of filing of return-No disallowance- Amendment by Finance Act, 2010, would apply retrospectively**

Interest paid to resident and tax was deposited before due date of filing of return. Amendment in section 40(a)(ia) by Finance Act, 2010 would apply retrospectively. No disallowance can be made. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07)

CIT v. Ashok J. Patel (2014) 225 Taxman 79 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

- 788 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Contractor – Sub-contractor – Freight charges – Provision is applicable in respect of amount paid as well as payable. [S.194C]**

Provisions of section 40(a)(ia) are applicable not only to amount which are shown as outstanding on closing of relevant previous year, but to entire expenditure which became liable for payment at any point of time during year under consideration and which was also paid before closing of year. (AY. 2006-07)

Palam Gas service v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 44 (Mag.) / 271 CTR 70 / (2015) 370 ITR 740 (HP)(HC)

- 789 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Payable – Binding precedent – Appellate Tribunal – Powers – Despite stay by High Court, Special Bench verdict in Marilyn Shipping is binding on the ITAT due to judicial discipline. [S.254, 255]**

The Tribunal had to consider whether in view of the Special Bench verdict in Merilyn Shipping & Transport 146 TTJ 1 (Vizag), a disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) could be made in respect of the amounts that have already been paid during the year and are not “payable” as of 31st March. The Tribunal held that as the department’s appeal against the said verdict was pending in the High Court and as the High Court had granted an interim suspension, the AO should decide the issue after the disposal of the appeal in the case of Merilyn Shipping by the High Court. HELD by the High Court.

We are of the view that until and unless the decision of the Special Bench is upset by this Court, it binds smaller Bench and coordinate Bench of the Tribunal. Under the circumstances, it is not open to the Tribunal to remand on the ground of pendency on

the same issue before this Court, overlooking and overruling, by necessary implication, the decision of the Special Bench. We simply say that it is not permissible under quasi judicial discipline. Under the circumstances, we set aside the impugned judgment and order, and restore the matter to the file of the Tribunal which will decide the issue in accordance with law and it would be open to the Tribunal either to follow the Special Bench decision or not to follow. If the Special Bench decision is not followed, obviously remedy lies elsewhere.

CIT v. Janapriya Engineers Syndicate (2015) 371 ITR 439 / 113 DTR 311 / 274 CTR 439 / 229 Taxmann 366 (AP)(HC)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Concession given by counsel pertaining to question of law is not binding – Matter set aside to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. [S.28(i), 245(1)]

790

On account of unexpected administrative exigencies, there was delay in deducting and remitting amount at source under various heads payable to Government account within time stipulated, however, assessee deducted tax at source as stipulated under Chapter XVIIIB and remitted above amount to Government account with late fee stipulated in Act and Rules. Tribunal disallowed total expenditure simply based on concession given by counsel pertaining to question of law and proceeded to opine that expenditure could be claimed in year of payment of TDS. On appeal the Court held that Law involved and process of making interpretation was never discussed. Further, consequences which would result in incurable hardship to assessee was never discussed. Matter remitted back to Tribunal for fresh consideration of relevant provisions. Court relied on the ratio of judgment in *Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet v. Noor Ahmed Sheriff AIR 2011 SC 2057*, for the proposition that if consent is given on question of law, it is not binding, if it is on question of fact then binding. (AY. 2008-09)

Time Ads & Publicity v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 356 (Ker.)(HC)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – In view of retrospective amendment in section 40(a)(ia), deduction made in last month of financial year would be allowable, if same was deposited before filing of return under section 139(1). [S.139(1)]

791

The assessee, a Government contractor, filed its return of income for the relevant assessment year declaring total income. The Assessing Officer made addition under section 40(a)(ia) on account of non-deposit of tax deducted at source within the time prescribed under section 200(1). The Commissioner (Appeals) taking note of amendment in section 40(a)(ia) concluded that in view of the retrospective amendment, the deduction made in the last month of the financial year, i.e., March, 2005 would be allowable, if the same is deposited in the Government account before filing of the return under section 139(1) and recorded a finding of fact that deduction was made on 1-3-2005 and 31-3-2005 by raising bills and the tax deducted was deposited before filing of the return under section 139(1) and, therefore, the amount was deductible. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). The court held that in view of the retrospective amendment, no exception can be taken to the finding arrived at by the Commissioner (Appeals) and affirmed by the Tribunal. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Choudhary Construction Company (2014) 222 Taxman 20 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)

- 792 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Amendment made to section by Finance Act, 2010 – retrospective effect from 1-4-2005–TDS amount deposited before due date of filing return is allowable. [S.139(1)]**

Tribunal noted that under the Finance Act, 2010, the section was retrospectively amended with effect from 01-04-2005. As the assessee had deducted the tax during the last month of previous years and the same was deposited to the credit of the Government in the month of May, 2005, i.e. before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139 of the Act, the expenses relating to the commission paid were allowable. On appeal by revenue, High Court held that no substantial question of law arose. (AY 2005-06)

CIT v. Patel Ramniklal Hirji (2014) 222 Taxmann 15 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

- 793 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source Contractor – Amounts paid without deducting tax – Disallowance of amounts justified – Amendment is effective from 1-4-2013 and held to be not applicable for the assessment year 2007-08. [S.201]**

For failure to deduct tax at source the amount was disallowed by the Assessing Officer and this was confirmed by the Tribunal. On appeal to the High Court; dismissing the appeal, that it was never the case of the assessee that there was no mandate subsequent to the amendment, to deduct tax at source in the light of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia). The assessment year was 2007-08 and the amendment was with effect from April 1, 2013. Therefore, the benefit was not applicable to the assessee. Even otherwise, the fact that these amounts were claimed as loans initially, till the scrutiny came up before the assessing authority, would only indicate the real intention of the assessee, i.e., not to disclose this amount as freight charges but as repayment of loan. The disallowance was justified. (AY. 2007-08)

Prudential Logistics and Transports v. ITO (2014) 364 ITR 689 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 320 (Mag.) / 101 DTR 332 (Ker.)(HC)

- 794 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amount not deductible – Deduction at source – Interest – ax deducted at source deposited on or before due date specifies u/s.139(1). [S.139(1)]**

The assessee deducted tax at source as required before 31st March 2006 but deposited on 30th May 2006. The revenue contended that deposit of the tax at source was beyond the prescribed time and therefore provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) will apply. The Tribunal ruled in favour of the assessee relying on the decision of H. S. Mohindra Traders 44 Sot 43 (Del)(URO) [later affirmed by the High Court]. The High Court in view of the decision of H.S. Mohindra Traders, dismissed the appeal of the revenue. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Royal Builders (2014) 220 Taxman 108 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

- 795 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible - Deduction at source – Amendment made in section 40(a)(ia) by Finance Act, 2010 was retrospective in nature. [S.139(1)]**

The assessee had deducted TDS and had deposited TDS after the end of the previous year but before the date of filing of the return under section 139. The AO disallowed the said expenditure under section 40(a)(ia) on ground that the assessee had failed to deposit TDS on or before 31-3-2008. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the order of the AO. On second appeal, the Tribunal held that amendment made to

section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010 should be given retrospective effect according to which disallowance under said section would be attracted, if after deduction of tax it had not been paid on or before the due date of filing of return under section 139(1). On the Revenue's appeal, it was held by the High Court that the amendment of section 40(a)(ia) is procedural as the same did not impose a new tax but ensured collection of TDS and amendments had streamlined and corrected anomalies noticed in the said procedure by allowing deduction in the year when expenditure was incurred provided TDS was paid before the due date for filing of return. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Naresh Kumar (2013) 262 CTR 389 / (2014) 362 ITR 256 / 221 Taxmann 59 (Delhi) (HC)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Payment to contractors – Amounts deposited with Central Government before last date for filing return – No disallowance can be made. [S.139(1)] 796

No disallowance could be made when tax was deducted at source before March 31 of the year and amounts were deposited with the Central Government before last date for filing return.

CIT v. J.K. Construction Co. (2014) 361 ITR 181 / 225 Taxman 126 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Transportation charges – Sub-contractor – Tax not deducted – No disallowance can be made. [S.194C] 797

Following the judgment in *CIT v. Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co Ltd.* (2014) 361 ITR 192 (Guj.)(HC), no disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) could be made for non-deduction of tax at source from transportation charges. Amendment in section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act by the Finance Act of 2010 has retrospective effect. Relationship between assessee and agent is that of principal and agent. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. B.M.S. Projects P. Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 195 (2015) 228 Taxmann 213 (Mag) / 229 Taxmann 83 (Guj.)(HC)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Tax deducted in March – Deposited in April – Deduction is allowable – Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect from April 1, 2005 and Finance Act, 2010. [S.139(1)] 798

Payment for expenditure was actually made and tax deducted therefrom in March and deposited in April. Held, deduction was allowable. Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the proviso thereto, as amended by the Finance Act, 2008, with retrospective effect from April 1, 2005, acknowledged that where tax was deductible and was deducted during the last month of the previous year but was paid before the due date specified under sub-section (1) of section 139, deduction shall be allowed in the year. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Rajinder Kumar (2013) 260 CTR 113 / (2014) 362 ITR 241 / 220 Taxmann 3 (Delhi) (HC)

- 799 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Payments by society to farmers – ONGC making payment to society-No disallowance could be made. [S. 40A(3), 194C]**
 ONGC acquired lands from farmers and formed a society. The Society received amounts from ONGC and distributed the same to farmers. Held, that payments could not be said to have been expended by society. Hence, they would not come within meaning of expenditure either under section 40(a)(ia) or section 40A(3). No disallowance could be made. (AY. 2009-10)
CIT v. Ankleshwar Taluka ONGC and Land Loser Travellers Co-op Society (2014) 362 ITR 92 / 223 Taxmann 237 (Mag)(Cal.)(HC)
- 800 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Society not a sub-contractor – Payments by society to farmers – ONGC making payment to society – No disallowance could be made – Society need not deduct tax at source on payments made to each farmers. [S.40A(3), 194C]**
 ONGC acquired lands from farmers and formed a society. The Society received amounts from ONGC and distributed the same to farmers. Held, that payments could not be said to have been expended by society. Hence, they would not come within meaning of expenditure either under section 40(a)(ia) or section 40A(3). No disallowance could be made. Society not a sub-contractor. Hence it need not deduct tax at source on payment made to each of farmers. (AY. 2005-06)
ITO.v. Ankleshwar Taluka ONGC and Land Loser Travellers Co-op Society (2014) 362 ITR 87 / 223 Taxmann 50 (Mag) (Cal.)(HC)
- 801 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Payment of tax before filing return – No disallowance can be made**
 Amendment to the provisions of s. 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010 is retrospective from 1.4.2005. As TDS was paid before the due date of filing return, disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) was not sustainable. (AY. 2007-08)
CIT v. Jawahar Lal Agrawal (2014) 98 DTR 289 (MP)(HC)
- 802 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Amounts not claimed as deduction – No disallowance can be made**
 The Tribunal held that the amount not claimed as deduction cannot be disallowed under section 40(a)(ia).
Jaguar Enterprises v. Dy. CIT (2014) 151 ITD 376 / 33 ITR 483 / (2015) 168 TTJ 792 (Delhi)(Trib.)
- 803 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Non-resident – Income shown in the return – Non-residents shown the income in their return and paid the interest – Disallowance was deleted – DTAA-India-Japan. [S.9(1)(i), 195, Art.24(3)]**
 Tribunal held that in terms of article 24(3) of India-Japan DTAA, where payments are made to tax residents of Japan, as long as those residents have taken into account payments made to them by Indian residents without deduction of tax at source in their

computation of income, paid interest thereon and have filed returns under section 139(1), payments in question cannot be disallowed in hands of Indian enterprises. (AY. 2007-08)

Mitsubishi Corporation India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 166 TTJ 385 / (2015) 67 SOT 83 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Non-resident – Deduction of tax at source – DTAA-India-Japan [S.9(1)(i),195 Art. 5]

804

Tribunal held that in terms of article 5 of India-Japan treaty, where recipient entities do not have any permanent establishment in India and transactions in question are of purchases simplicitor, payments made to entities cannot give rise to any income taxable in India . Payments made to these entities cannot be disallowed. (AY. 2007-08)

Mitsubishi Corporation India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 166 TTJ 385 / (2015) 67 SOT 83 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Deduction to be allowed in the year of payment of TDS

805

Question of making disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) would arise only if relevant expenditure was claimed as a deduction. In respect of an estate assessee paid professional charges of ₹ 35 lakhs to one MM in preceding year, however, TDS thereon was paid during current year. Assessee made claim of deduction of impugned amount in preceding year but subsequently withdrew same after discussions with AO. Tribunal held claim of impugned amount in current year was to be allowed. (AY. 2001-02, 2007-08)

M. M. Sulaiman v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 746 / (2015) 67 SOT 32 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Amount payable to a contractor or sub-contractor – Proviso inserted by Finance Act, 2012 in section 40(a)(ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and therefore, it should be given retrospective effect from 1-4-2005, applicable only to amount of expenditure which were payable as on 31st March, of every year and it could not be invoked to disallow expenses which had been actually paid during previous year without deduction of TDS.

806

The assessee was a PWD registered contractor carrying on the business of civil construction. He was awarded Govt. contracts for construction of canals etc. For the purpose of executing the work, the assessee engaged certain sub-contractors. The Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had made payments to the sub-contractor for carrying out works on its behalf. Since the assessee had not deducted tax at source on such payments, the A.O. invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) disallowed the claim of the assessee for deduction. The assessee challenged said disallowance contending that as on the last date of the previous year relevant to assessment year 2005-06, the amounts due and payable to the alleged sub-contractors had been paid and nothing remained payable. The assessee submitted that sub-contractors had included the payments received by the assessee as part of their income and taxes due had been paid by them and therefore there was no loss to the revenue. The CIT (A) relying

upon decision of the Special Bench of ITAT in the case of *Merilyn Shipping Transport v. Addl. CIT [2012] 136 ITD 23 (Vishakhapatnam)*, held that provisions of section 40(a)(ia) were applicable only to the amount of expenditure which were payable as on 31st March of every year and it could not be invoked to disallow which had been actually paid during the previous year without deduction of TDS. The Tribunal held that the Finance Act, 2008 brought out amendment to section 40(a)(ia) w.e.f. 1-4-2005 by relaxing earlier position to some extent. It made two categories of defaults causing disallowance on the basis of the period of the previous year in which tax was deductible. The first category of disallowances included the cases in which tax was deductible and was so deducted during the last month of the previous year but there was failure to pay such tax on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139 of the Act. The amendment to s. 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from 1-4-2010. From the provision as amended by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from 1-4-2010 it can be seen that the only difference which this amendment has made is dispensing with the earlier two categories of defaults as per the Finance Act, 2008, as discussed in the earlier para, causing disallowance on the basis of the period of the previous year during which tax was deductible. (AY. 2005-06)
Dy. CIT v. Ananda Marakala (2014) 150 ITD 323 (Bang)(Trib.)

807

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Contractor – Sub-contractor – Applicable not only to amount which is shown as payable on date of balance sheet, but also applicable to such expenditure which become payable at any time during the previous year and was actually paid with in the previous year. [S.194C]

AO made disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act for the default of non-deduction of tax at source on payments made for bleaching charges, dyeing charge, embroidery charges furnishing charges and furnishing charges. AO held that from the perusal of the bills it is evident that the assessee had out-sourced the job-work in respect of the raw material which was being provided by the assessee to them to carry out the job-work as per their requirements. Accordingly, assessee was liable to deduct TDS thereon as per the provisions of Section 194C of the Act. The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal filed by assessee and held that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) will be applicable with respect to entire expenditure. The provisions of section 40(a)(ia) are applicable not only to the amount which is shown as payable on the date of balance-sheet, but it is applicable to such expenditure, which become payable at any time during the relevant previous year and was actually paid within the previous year. In the result the question is decided in favour of revenue and against the assessee. The assessee filed appeal before the tribunal, the tribunal held that the key words used in Section 40(a)(ia), are “on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII –B”-If the question is “which expenses are sought to be disallowed” the answer is bound to be “those expenses on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B-Once this is realized nothing turns on the basis of the fact that the legislature used the word ‘payable’ and not ‘paid or credited’. Unless any amount is payable, it can neither be paid nor credited. If an amount has neither been paid nor credited, there can be no occasion for claiming any deduction. The Assessee’s appeal dismissed by the tribunal.

Manzoor Admad Walvir v. Dy. CIT (2014) 61 SOT 70 (URO)(Asr.)(Trib.)

S. 40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source- Payable – Merilyn Shipping 146 TTJ 1 (Vizag) has binding effect in view of the SLP dismissal & the clarification in Janapriya Engineers (AP) (HC) and so amounts already paid during the year cannot be disallowed

808

The Tribunal had to consider whether in view of the Special Bench verdict in Merilyn Shipping & Transport 146 TTJ 1 (Vizag), a disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) could be made in respect of the amounts that have already been paid during the year and are not “payable” as of 31st March.

In the light of the decision rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the form of dismissal of Revenue’s SLP in the case of Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd. Section 40(a)(ia) is not applicable with reference to payments already made since the expression ‘payable’ has to be satisfied for invoking provisions of section 40(a)(ia). The fact that the order of the Special Bench delivered in the case of Merilyn Shipping & Transports has been kept in abeyance by the Andhra Pradesh High Court and that the Gujarat High Court has taken a different view is not relevant. In Janapriya Engineers Syndicate (I.T.A. No. 352 of 2014 dt. 24.06.2014) the Andhra Pradesh High Court has clarified the issue of interim stay granted by it in the case of Merilyn Shipping & Transports and held that until and unless the decision of the Special Bench is upset by the High Court, it binds smaller Bench and coordinate Bench of the Tribunal. From the clarification issued by the High Court, it is clear that until and unless the decision of Marilyn Shipping & Transport is reversed by the Court, it is binding on all the benches of the Tribunal. We find that the Hon’ble Court has held that judicial discipline mandates that the decision of the special bench has to be followed by other benches. As on today, the stay order granted by the Hon’ble Court has been vacated and the order of the special bench is binding on other benches of the Tribunal. Therefore, respectfully following the same, we hold that no disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) can be made for amounts already paid during the year and which are not payable as of 31st March (AY. 2006-07)

Arcadia share & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 38 ITR 491 / 167 TTJ 493 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Hire charges-Payment was made before due date of filing of return – Amendment by Finance Act, 2008 is retrospective effect from 1-04-2005. [S.194C, 194I]

809

Assessee, engaged in transportation of goods, made payment of hire charges on 31-3-2007 after deducting tax at source ,however, tax so deducted was remitted to Government Exchequer on 7-7-2007, i.e., beyond due date of remitting tax deducted at source but before due date of filing of return of income. AO disallowed payment of hire charges under section 40(a)(ia). In view of amendment made in section 40(a)(ia) by Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect from 1-4-2005 and CBDT Circular No. 1/2009, dated 27-3-2009, it was to be concluded that impugned disallowance made under section 40(a)(ia) by Assessing Officer was not sustainable and, thus, same was to be deleted (AY. 2007-08)

ACIT v. Shanthi Logistics (P) Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 141 (URO) (Chennai)(Trib.)

- 810 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Royalty – Pay channel charges – No disallowance can be made for failure to deduct tax at source in view of judgment of Delhi High court, though the explanation is clarificatory in nature. [S.9(I)(vi), 195]**

Assessee company was engaged in the business of distributing cable signals. It received satellite signals from various channel companies in capacity of Multi System Operator. Assessee made payments to channel companies for receiving said signals without deducting tax at source. AO taking a view that payments in question were in nature of royalties, disallowed the same on account of non-deduction of tax at source. In view of insertion of Explanation 6 below clause (vi) of section 9(1) by Finance Act, 2012, payments made by assessee as 'Pay Channel Charges' would fall in category of 'royalty' as defined in clause (i) of Explanation 2 to section 9(1), however, even though Explanation 6 to section 9(1)(vi) inserted by Finance Act, 2012 is clarificatory in nature, yet in view of fact that at time of making payment, assessee's case was covered by decision of Delhi High Court in case of *Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. v. DIT [2011] 332 ITR 340 (Delhi)(HC)* assessee could not be held liable to deduct tax at source from pay channel charges., Therefore, AO was not justified in disallowing claim of pay channel charges by invoking provisions of section 40(a)(ia). (AY. 2009-10) *Kerala Vision Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 328 / 35 ITR 81 (Cochin)(Trib.)*

- 811 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Housing project -Disallowance cannot be made if the assessee has not claimed a deduction**

Payment has not been claimed as a revenue expenditure while computing the income chargeable under the head 'Profits and gains of business or profession' in this year and therefore the same would not fall for consideration in section 40(a)(i) of the Act. (AY. 2009-10)

Gera Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT (Pune)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

- 812 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Second proviso inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2013 is curative hence retrospective effect. [S.194C, 194J]**

Tribunal held that second proviso inserted by Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f 1-4-2013 is curative in nature and hence has retrospective effect. (AYs. 2007-08, 2008-09)

ITO v. Dr. Jaideep Kumar Sharma (2015) 152 ITD 270 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 813 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Interest – Amounts not debited to profit and loss account – No disallowance can be made**

When an expenditure is not debited to Profit and Loss Account, same cannot be disallowed by invoking provisions of s. 40(a)(ia). (AY. 2008-09)

Dy. CIT v. S.P. Real Estate Developers (P) Ltd. (2014) 149 ITD 617 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 814 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Second proviso to s. 40(a)(ia) inserted w.e.f. 1.4.2013 should be treated as retrospectively applicable from 1-4-2005 and no disallowance for want of TDS can be made if payee has paid tax thereon. Assessee must be given opportunity to file Form 26A; [S.44AB, Form 26A]**

The undisputed fact is that the assessee has not deducted tax at source on the payments made to Uday Kumar Shetty. The fact that the payee has accounted for these payments

in his books of account, financial statements and the same have been offered for tax in his return of income for the period relevant to AY 2005-06, has not been controverted by the authorities below. In our considered opinion, since the payee/ recipient has accounted for these payments in his books of account, audited u/s 44AB of the Act and has offered the same for tax in his return of income for the relevant period, by virtue of the amendment, by way of insertion of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act w.e.f. 1/4/2013, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act would not be attracted to the payments made by the assessee to Uday Kumar Shetty. In coming to this view, we draw support from the two above cited decisions of the co-ordinate benches of this Tribunal in the case of *DCIT v. Anand Marakala* and *S.M. Anand v. ACIT* wherein it was held that insertion of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act should be read retrospectively from 1/4/2005 and not prospectively from 1/4/2013. In this view of the matter, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act is not attracted to the payments made by the assessee since the object of introduction of section 40(a)(ia) is achieved for the reason that the payee/recipient has accounted for, declared and offered for taxation the payments received from the assessee in his hands. Earlier, we have held that the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act is retrospective in operation w.e.f. 1/4/2005. As per this newly inserted proviso, the assessee is required to file Form No.26A as per rule 31ACB of the IT Rules, 1962 so as not to be held as an assessee in default as per the proviso to section 201 of the Act. As held in the decision of the co-ordinate bench in the case of *S.M. Anand v. ACIT (supra)*, since the assessee in the period under consideration i.e. assessment year 2005-06, could not have contemplated that such a compliance was to be made, we also in the case on hand, remit the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer for affording the assessee adequate opportunity to file Form No.26A and verification of whether the said payee has reflected the payment/receipt in his books of account and offered the same to tax in the period under consideration. (ITA No. 1832/Bang/2013, dt. 10/10/2014) (AY. 2005-06)

G. Shankar v. ACIT (Bang.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S. 40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible-Deduction at source-Non-resident-To avoid discrimination under Article 24(3) of the India-Japan DTAA, the benefit of no disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) (in the case of residents) for want of TDS if the recipient has paid the tax has to be extended to non-residents u/s 40(a)(i). DTAA-India-Japan. [S.195, Art 24(3)]

815

The onus of establishing that the recipient of an income has a PE in India, so as to invite its taxability in India, is on the revenue authorities. The existence of PE cannot be inferred or assumed on the basis of some vague and sweeping generalizations. It is wholly inappropriate to proceed on the basis of assumption that since the recipient entities were following certain business model, these entities must be having a PE in India. In any event, normal purchases from non-resident companies cannot give rise to taxability of income from such purchases, in the hands of the non-resident vendor, unless such non-resident companies have a permanent establishment in India;

As regards cases where the non-resident has filed a ROI, as s. 40(a)(i) does not have an exclusion clause similar to the second proviso to s. 40(a)(ia), payments made to non-residents, without deduction of tax at source will be disallowable even in a situation

when the non-resident recipient has taken into account such payments in computation of his income, has paid taxes on the same and filed the income tax return. However, this creates discrimination in terms of Article 24(3) of the India Japan DTAA in the deductibility of payments made to resident entities vis-à-vis non-resident Japanese entities. Accordingly, the relaxation under second proviso to s. 40(a)(ia) is to be read into s. 40(a)(i) as well and it is required to be treated as retrospective in effect in the same manner as second proviso to s. 40(a)(i) has been treated. Such an interpretation will lead to the deduction parity as envisaged in Article 24(3) of Indo Japan DTAA. (ITA No. 5042/Del/2011, dt. 21.10.2014)(AY. 2007-08)

Mitsubhai Corporation India Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

- 816 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Royalty – Reimbursement of cost – Data processing – DTAA-India-Belgium – Not liable to deduct tax at source – DTAA-India-Belgium. [S.9(1)(vi), 195, Art 12(3)(a)]**

The reimbursement of data processing cost to the head office does not fall within the audit of definition of Royalty under article 12(3)(a). The assessee has opted for the benefit of DTAA the definition and the scope of royalty as given in section 9(1)(vi) cannot be restored to consequently there was no requirement of deducting tax from the payment made by the branch to the head office and the provisions of 40(a)(i) are not applicable. (AY. 2004-05)

ADIT v. Antwerp Diamond Bank NV (2014) 163 TTJ 175 / 65 SOT 23 (2015) 153 ITD 391 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 817 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Amount already paid – Payable – Verdict in Merilyn Shipping & Vector Shipping (All) HC) cannot be followed in view of Crescent Export Syndicate (Cal) HC), Sikandarkhan N. Tunvar (Guj.) (HC) & Rishti Stock & Shares. [Constitution of India, Art 141]**

Tribunal held that we have also carefully gone through the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in *CIT v. M/s. Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd.* The Allahabad High Court, after reproducing the relevant paragraph from the order of CIT(A) and referring to the decision of the Special Bench of this Tribunal in *Merilyn Shipping & Transports* found that the Tribunal has not committed an error. It is obvious that there is no discussion about the correctness or otherwise of the decision rendered by the Special Bench of this Tribunal in *Merilyn Shipping & Transports*. However, we find that the Gujarat High Court in the case of *CIT v. Sikandarkhan N. Tunvar* judgment dated 2-5-2013 considered the decision of the Special Bench of this Tribunal in *Merilyn Shipping & Transports* and specifically disagreed with the principles laid down by the Special of this Tribunal in *Merilyn Shipping & Transports*. The Calcutta High Court also in the case of *Crescent Exports Syndicate & Another* in ITAT 20 of 2013 and GA 190 of 2013 judgment dated 3-4-2013 considered elaborately the judgment of the Special Bench of this Tribunal in *Merilyn Shipping & Transports* and found that the decision rendered by the Special Bench of this Tribunal is not the correct law. It is well settled principles of law that when different High Courts expressed different opinions on a point of law, then, normally, the benefit of doubt under the taxation law would go to the assessee. It is also equally settled principles of law that the judgment which discusses the point in

issue elaborately and gives an elaborate reasoning has to be preferred when compared to the judgment which has no reasoning and discussion. Admittedly, the Calcutta High Court and Gujarat High Court have discussed the issue elaborately and elaborate reasons have also been recorded as to why the Special Bench is not correct. Therefore, this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that the judgments of the Calcutta High Court in Crescent Exports Syndicate & Another and Gujarat High Court in Sikandarkhan N Tunvar have to be preferred when compared to the Allahabad High Court in M/s Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd .

By following the judgments of the Calcutta High Court in Crescent Export Syndicate and the Gujarat High Court in Sikandarkhan N Tunvar, this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that the decision of the Special Bench of this Tribunal in the case of M/s Merilyn Shipping & Transports and the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd are not applicable to the facts of the case under consideration whereas the judgments of the Calcutta High Court in Crescent Export Syndicate and the Gujarat High Court in Sikandarkhan N Tunvar are squarely applicable to the facts of the case. The dismissal of SLP by Apex Court is not a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, mere dismissal of SLP by Apex Court does not mean that the Apex Court declared any law on the subject. Moreover, the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in *ACIT v. Rishti Stock & Shares P. Ltd.* in ITA No.112/Mum/2012 held the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd. is obiter dicta. (ITA No. 802/Coch/2013,dt. 24-9-2014) (AY. 2008-09)

Orchid marine v. ITO (Cochin)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Amounts already paid during the year – No disallowance called for

818

The assessee during the relevant previous year made payment towards transportation charges, export freight charges to the Indian agents of foreign shipping without deduction of tax at source. The AO disallowed the same invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia). On appeal the Tribunal held that provisions of section 40(a)(ia) is not attracted to the payments already made by the end of the previous year. (ITA No 509/Mum/2011 dt. 26-2-2014. (AY. 2007-08).

Vivel Exports P Ltd v. ITO (2014) The Chamber's Journal-April-P. 82 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible-Deduction at source – No disallowance under section 40(a)(ia), for failure to deduct TDS on payment if payee has offered amount to tax. Second Proviso to s.40(a)(ia) inserted by Finance Act 2013 w.e.f. 1.4.2013 should be treated as curative and to have retrospective effect from 1-4-2005. [S. 194A, 201(1)] Held that the insertion of second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and it has retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005, being the date from which sub clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 (AY. 2006-07)

819

Rajeev Kumar Agarwal v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 363 / 109 DTR 33 (Agra)(Trib.)

820 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Contractors – Tax deducted at source paid before due date of filing return, no disallowance can be made. [S.139(1), 194C]**

During the F.Y. 2008-09 the assessee had made certain contractual payments but deposited the same on 26-9-2009 i.e. before the due date of filing of return. The AO disallowed the payment u/s. 40(a)(ia) relying on the case of *Bharati Shipyards Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2011) 132 ITD 53 (Mumbai) (SB)*. The CIT(A) deleted the addition following the decision of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of *ACIT v. M.K. Gurumurthy (2012) 22 taxmann.com 72*.

The Tribunal following the aforesaid decision of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal dismissed the departmental appeal by observing that the amendment to the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010 is retrospective in nature. (AY. 2009-10) *ACIT v. Ace Fire Services (2014) 29 ITR 73 / 64 SOT 42 (URO)(Bang.)(Trib.)*

821 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Tax deducted before 31st March and paid before due date of filing return – Amount deductible. [S.139(1), 263]**

The CIT exercised revisionary powers u/s. 263 and disallowed the expense u/s. 40(a)(ia) as tax on the said amount was deducted before 31st March and paid before the due date of filing return instead of being deposited within 7 days of the following month. On appeal, the Tribunal relying on the decision of the Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal in the case of *Madineni Mohan v. ITO (I.T.A. No. 762/Hyd/2012)* and various other judgments held that amendment to provisions of s. 40(a)(ia) made by the Finance Act, 2010 is applicable retrospectively from 01.04.2005 and if the assessee has deposited TDS before the due date of filing return u/s. 139(1), no disallowance can be made u/s. 40(a)(ia). The Tribunal noted that there is no dispute by the AO or the CIT on the fact that tax was appropriately deducted at source and paid before the due date of filing the return, and hence it held that the revisionary powers exercised by the CIT is not justified. (AY. 2007-08)

R.V. Chakrapani v. ACIT (2015) 67 SOT 30 / (2014) 29 ITR 342 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

822 **S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Special Bench decision in the case of Merilyn Shipping and Transports not accepted**

The assessee was engaged in the business of civil construction. It had suo motu disallowed an amount u/s. 40 (a)(ia) of the Act in respect of payment to sub-contractors, labour charges, transport hiring charges, etc., on which no tax was deducted at source and this deduction continued in the assessment order. The assessee filed cross-objections before the Tribunal claiming that the disallowance made u/s. 40 (a) (ia) was not correct in lieu of the decision of the Special Bench in the case of *Merilyn Shipping and Transports v. ACIT (2012) 16 ITR (Trib.) 1*.

The Tribunal dismissing the cross objections filed by the assessee observed that the decision of the Special Bench was found not acceptable in several cases before the High Court and the decision was itself stayed, therefore the view taken by the Special Bench cannot be accepted. (AY. 2008-09)

ACIT v. Raviraj Relempaadu (2014) 29 ITR 387 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Tax was deposited before due date of filing of return – Payments – Excess or unreasonable – Unable to prove that amounts paid are excessive or unreasonable – No disallowance can be made. [S.40A(2)(b)]

823

The assessee, engaged in share broking business claimed deduction of ₹ 43 Lakhs as 'agents incentive'. The AO held that all three concerns to whom the incentive was being paid were related parties u/s. 40A(2)(b). These expenses were already disallowed u/s.40(a)(ia) for failure to deduct tax at source. The CIT(A) observed that tax was deposited before the due date of filing the return u/s. 139 of the Act and deleted the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia).

On appeal by the department, the Tribunal noted that since the AO was unable to prove that the parties to whom payments were made were related parties, and that payments made were unreasonable the disallowance u/s. 40A(2)(b) was deleted. (AY. 2008-09) *ITO v. Anson Financial Holidays (2014) 29 ITR 620 / 50 taxmann.com 36 (Cochin)(Trib.)*

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Amount paid or payable – Disallowance was held to be justified

824

Disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) is to be made where there is non-compliance with the provision of TDS irrespective of the fact whether the amount has been already paid during the relevant year or the amount is outstanding at the end of the year. (AY. 2008-09)

ACIT v. Rishiti Stock & Shares (P) Ltd. (2014) 159 TTJ 300 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Transponder fee – Matter remanded – DTAA-India-Malaysia. [S.9(1), 90, 195, Art.12]

825

The assessee paid transponder fee to a Malaysian entity for usage of its satellite without deduction of tax at source. The A.O. disallowed the said payment under section 40(a) (ia) of the Act. The C.I.T. (A) deleted the addition without discussing the provisions of the applicable treaty. In view thereof the matter was remanded back to the A.O. Readjudication in light of applicable law and treaty. (AY. 2006-07)

ACIT v. Zee News Ltd. (2014) 61 SOT 59 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Non-residents – Double taxation agreements – Protocol integral part of agreement – Fees for technical services – Design and development cost – Purchase goods – Development costs – DTAA-India-Spain-Italy, Belgium, Ireland, Denmark, Australia-Precedent. [S.90, Art 13, 15, 7, 12(3) (b), 14, 24]

826

Matter remanded to determine to consider whether the payments of design and development services, to an entity or an individual having a no permanent establishment in India, in which case payment would be independent professional services and not taxable. Payments for purchase of goods and recipients is not having permanent establishment in India there is no obligation on assessee to deduct tax at source. Supply of samples and sketches to assessee to enable it to seek information in respect of fashion trends in Europe .Professional services were rendered by individual having no fixed base in India, payments were not taxable as income under "Independent Personal

services” hence no disallowance. Reimbursement of costs incurred by non resident in development of product range of assessee. As there was no income embedded in payment there was no obligation to deduct tax at source. Payment made to professionals services was liable to deduct tax at source, that entity to which payment was made owned by individual would not take payment outside ambit of fees for technical services. Liable to deduct tax at source. Payments of fees for technical services to residents of Ireland, Denmark and Australia. Provisions of deduction neutrality non discrimination attracted hence disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) is not permissible. Disallowance is attracted only when assessee had liability withhold tax, i.e. when income embedded in payment liable to tax in India. Protocol integral part of agreement to be given effect same manner as other substantive parts of agreement. Decision in context of one agreement not necessarily applicable for other agreements where differently worded. (AY. 2008-09)

Dy. CIT v. Gupta Overseas (2014) 30 ITR 738 / (2014) 99 DTR 162 / 160 TTJ 257 (2015) 153 ITD 357 (Agra)(Trib.)

827

S.40(a)(ia) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Non-residents without – TDS violates ‘deduction neutrality non-discrimination’ clause in DTAA as there is no similar bar for residents as per Merilyn Shipping (2012)136 ITD 23 (SB).

The Tribunal had to consider whether, in view of the non-discrimination clause under the tax treaties, the law laid down in Merilyn Shipping & Transport v. ACIT (2012) 136 ITD 23 (SB) and approved in Vector Shipping (All HC), in the context of s. 40(a)(ia), that the disallowance cannot be made for amounts already paid during the year, applies also to s. 40(a)(i)? HELD by the Tribunal:

- (i) In *Rajeev Sureshbhai Gajwani v. Asst. CIT (2011) 137 TTJ 1 (Ahd)(SB)* it was held that differentiation simplicitor is enough to invoke the non-discrimination clause. Consequently, it will be contrary to the deduction neutrality clause in non-discrimination in the tax treaties if the provisions for deduction of payments to non-residents are more onerous than those applicable for payments to residents. The payments made to residents of Ireland, Denmark and Austria are protected by the deduction neutrality clauses and any pre-conditions for deductibility, which are harsher than payments made to the residents are ineffective in law. However, payments to the residents of Belgium, UK, Italy and Spain will not be entitled to the same protection under the omnibus non-discrimination clause of Article 24(1) based on nationality (*Herbalife International India (P) Ltd. (2006) 103 TTJ 78 (Del)* referred);
- (ii) On merits, it is a possible view that Merilyn Shipping (which has been suspended by the A. P. High Court & disapproved by the Gujarat High Court in *CIT v. Sikandarkhan & Tanwar & Ors. (2013) 87 DTR 137*) has not been approved by the jurisdictional High Court in Vector Shipping Services. However, as the CBDT has itself taken the view in Circular No. 10/DV/2013 dated 16-12-2013 that the Allahabad High Court has affirmed Merilyn Shipping, the department is bound by it and no disallowance can be made u/s. 40(a)(ia) for sums paid to non-residents without TDS. (AY. 2008-09)

Dy. CIT v. Gupta Overseas (2014) 30 ITR 738 / (2014) 99 DTR 162 / 160 TTJ 257 (2015) 153 ITD 357 (Agra)(Trib.)

S.40(a)(ii) : Amount not deductible – Deduction at source – Business loss – Taxes – TDS receivable – Unrecovered TDS amount could not be allowed as business loss. [S. 28(i)]

828

Assessee made a claim that certain parties made payments to the assessee after deduction of TDS, but failed to issue TDS certificates and hence the amount of TDS certificates not recovered should be allowed as deduction as business loss. Tribunal held that the amount represents TDS by the parties on behalf of the assessee, the same is in the nature of TDS receivable. It is settled position that tax payment is not a charge against but application of income. S. 40(a)(ii) clearly provides that any sum paid on account of taxes on the profits or gains of any business or profession, is not deductible. Unrecovered TDS amount could not be allowed as business loss. (AY. 2007-08)

Ricoh India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 798 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.40(a)(iii) : Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source – Salaries – Outside India – Non-Resident – Though recorded as salary not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.10(6)(viii), 40(a)(i), 192]

829

Assessee entered into an agreement with a foreign concern. Apart from payment of fixed sum, took over foreign concern's personnel as its own employees and paid salary to them. The AO disallowed salary payment on the ground that the same was part of the fees for technical services, on which tax as was deductible at source u/s 40(a)(i) was not deducted. The CIT (A) confirmed the order of Tribunal and Tribunal reversed the order of CIT (A). On appeal in HC, HC dismissed revenue's appeal and held that S / 40 (a)(i) would not apply in this case in as much as , the payment was neither royalty or fees for technical services or other sum chargeable under the IT Act. What was relevant was words "chargeable" under the head "salaries" in S.40(a)(iii) are of significance. S.192 applied only when there was an income chargeable under the head "salaries" and the payment made by the assessee in this case was the income derived thereby by those, who received the same, was though regarded as salary chargeable under this Act, as the same was outside the purview of the provisions of IT Act by reason of S/10 (6)(iii) of Act. (AY. 2004-05)

DIT v. Dolphin Drilling Ltd. (2014) 264 CTR 319 / 221 Taxman 489 (Uttarakhand)(HC)

S.40(b) : Amounts not deductible – Working partner – Remuneration – Interest – Disallowance on net debit balance was held to be justified

830

Assessee paid interest to one of the partners, since she was having credit balance in her capital account. AO however, noticed that other partners were having debit balances and hence aggregation of capital balances of all partners had resulted in a net debit balance. Hence, Assessing Officer took view that interest was not payable on capital account of one of the partners and accordingly, disallowed interest amount. CIT(A) confirmed addition and held that it was imperative that when interest was payable on credit balance to a partner, interest was also be payable by a partner on debit balance; therefore, Assessing Officer was fully justified in disallowing claim of interest on capital. Since assessee did not deny fact of availability of net debit balance in aggregate capital account of partners, there was no infirmity in decision of CIT (A) in upholding disallowance. (AY. 2007-08)

Raja & Co. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 12 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)

Section 40A : Expenses or payments not deductible in certain circumstances**831 S.40A(2) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Excess or unreasonable –Considering education and experience, no disallowance can be made**

Where the assessee is able to substantiate the reasonableness of payment made to a Director on the basis of his education, experience and contribution to the company, high salary payment cannot be said to be excessive or unreasonable in terms of S.40(A)(2) (AY. 2009-10)

CIT v. Spank Hotels Limited (2014) 227 Taxmann 171 (Mag.)(Delhi) (HC)

832 S.40A(2) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Excessive or unreasonable – Ad hoc disallowance was held to be not justified

The assessee engaged in the business of development of infrastructure facilities mainly relating to water and sewage treatment on turnkey basis claimed deduction on amount paid to its sister concern for supply of labour for operating and maintenance work and claimed deduction. AO disallowed 10 per cent of payment on ground that sister concern run by wife of director of assessee company, hence, element of excessive payment could not be denied. CIT(A) deleted the disallowance, and Tribunal confirmed same . On appeal by revenue the Court held that there was no finding by AO that transaction/ contract with sister concern was not genuine one, there was also no material before AO such as comparable rates etc. to come to conclusion that excessive payment was made to aforesaid firm which warranted disallowance/ad hoc disallowance. In absence of any material before AO, he was not justified in adopting disallowance to extent of 10 per cent payment under section 40A(2)(b), thus, disallowance made by AO was rightly deleted by CIT(A) and Tribunal. (AY. 2005 - 06 to 2007-08)

CIT v. Enviro Control Associated (P) Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 56 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

833 S.40A(2) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Excessive or unreasonable – Burden is on revenue to bring comparable – Deletion of disallowance was held to be justified

The assessee made higher payment on motor bus rent to persons specified under section 40(A)(2)(b). The payment was made by cheque and TDS was also deducted at source. AO made addition by disallowing 5 per cent of total payment on ground that assessee had not produced any comparative market prices and had failed to produce any document regarding reasonableness of payment and further failed to reconcile difference in payment as per tax audit report and that as provided during assessment proceeding . On appeal, CIT(A) and Tribunal held that it was for AO to assess fair market price and give comparative instances. Since AO had not done same, addition made by him was deleted . On appeal by revenue the court held that since onus was on AO and AO had failed to discharge said onus, disallowance was unsustainable in law. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07)

CIT v. Ashok J. Patel (2014) 225 Taxmann 79 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S. 40A(2) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Excessive or unreasonable – Disallowance of commission paid to son of partner was held to be justified 834

Assessee, a partnership firm, was enjoying income from manufacture and sale of tobacco. It had paid excessive commission to son of one of partners on account of utilization of his services in labour, production, packing and dispatch which was disallowed. Facts revealed that he was having no expertise in preparing tobacco and was employed to render service only in new factory but he had been given commission on entire production. Court held that payment of commission be restricted to sum as allowed to other workers, particularly when there was no commercial consideration or business expediency for payment of excessive amount. (AY. 1977-78)

S. M. Haq v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 125 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

S.40A(2) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Excess or unreasonable – Discounts offered to sister concern 835

Assessee has sold a dictionary to its sister concern and had offered a discount of 3 per cent whereas it had offered a discount of 2.5 per cent to other whole sellers. Assessing Officer disallowed difference of 0.5 % u/s. 40A(2). CIT(Appeals) allowed the appeal of assessee. On appeal by revenue to Tribunal, held that provisions of Section 40A(2) (a) of the Act would apply where any deduction is claimed towards excessive and unreasonable expenditure has been incurred by assessee but in this case neither any expenditure has been incurred nor any deduction has been claimed for the amount which has been charged less than that from other customers, thus provision would not apply. On further appeal to the High Court, view of Tribunal was affirmed. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Bhargav Book Depot (2014) 220 Taxmann 12 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

S.40A(2) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Excess or unreasonable Salary/remuneration to directors – Point of view of businessman to be considered – Disallowance of part of expenditure was not justified. [S.37(1)] 836

The assessee had paid remuneration to its chairman-cum-managing director. AO disallowed the part of remuneration holding it as excessive. On appeal addition was deleted the Tribunal On appeal be the revenue dismissing the appeal the Court held that it was the businessman who would determine reasonableness of remuneration. No part of it could be disallowed. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Consulting Engineering Group Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 284 / 102 DTR 311 / 223 Taxmann 440 / 267 CTR 447 (Raj.)(HC)

S. 40A(2) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Excessive or unreasonable payments – Disallowance was not justified without giving a finding that excessive or unreasonable 837

The Assessee Company had purchased yarn and finished fabric from a company 'P', and which was specified u/s. 40A(2)(b). AO disallowed certain payment made to 'P' by considering it as excessive and unreasonable. Tribunal held that AO has not given a finding that the payment made by the assessee is excessive or unreasonable having regard to the fair market value of the goods. Disallowance made by the AO. was not justified. (AY. 2009-10)

ITO v. Axon Global (P) Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 473 (Jodh.)(Trib.)

838 **S.40A(2) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Excess or unreasonable – Disallowance was merely to cover possible deficiencies, 5% estimate of the CIT(A) was justified**

The assessee, engaged in share broking business had claimed certain expenses under the head 'Salary and allowances' and furnished details of employees to whom payments were made. AO observed that employees were drawing salary between ₹ 5,000/- to ₹ 12,000/-, were not registered under the PF Act and also vouchers were not stamped. Therefore AO disallowed 10% of the salary to cover possible deficiencies. On appeal by the assessee, the CIT(A) reduced the disallowance possible deficiencies from 10% to 5% of salary paid.

On appeal by the department, the Tribunal held that although AO pointed out deficiencies in the salary vouchers, he could not prove that the same were bogus. Since the disallowance was merely to cover possible deficiencies, 5% estimate of the CIT(A) was justified. (AY. 2008-09)

ITO v. Anson Financial Holidays (2014) 29 ITR 620 (Cochin)(Trib.)

839 **S.40A(3) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Cash payments exceeding prescribed limits – Cash paid by transport contractor towards lorry hire charges – No evidence that payment covered by exemptions in rule 6DD – Payments not deductible. [R. 6DD]**

The assessee undertook transportation of goods for various organisations. During the year the assessee had paid hire charges in cash. The AO disallowed the payment under the provisions of section 40A(3) of the Act. This was confirmed by the appellate authorities. On appeal to the High Court.

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the assessee was neither the owner of the goods nor the owner of the vehicle carrying the goods. All the income-tax authorities had found that the assessee's claim was not justifiable. The amount was not deductible. (AY. 2009-10)

MRS Roadways v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 62 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 322 (Mag.) / 276 CTR 94 (Ker.)(HC)

Editorial : Order of the Tribunal in MRS Roadways v. Deputy CIT [2013] 26 ITR 317 (Cochin)(Trib.) is affirmed.

840 **S.40A(3) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Cash payments exceeding prescribed limits – Purchases from agriculturists**

The assessee was a firm dealing and trading in purchase of cotton, cotton seeds, processing of cotton seeds and extracting cotton seeds oil, etc. AO disallowed the payment by applying the provisions of section 40(A)(3). Addition was deleted by CIT(A) and Tribunal. On appeal by revenue the Court held that where both authorities relying on cogent evidences concluded that purchases were made from agriculturists as also through common agents, case was correctly held to be falling under exception provided under clauses (e) and (k) of rule 6DD of Income tax Rules. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

CIT v. A. C. Industries (2014) 225 Taxmann 55 (Mag)(Guj.)(HC)

S.40A(3) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Cash payments exceeding prescribed limits–Scrap from Railways – No disallowance could be made

841

Where the assessee purchased scrap from Railways (Union of India), even though cash was paid in excess of ₹ 20,000 in regard to a single transaction, the expenditure in question could not be disallowed by invoking the provisions of section 40A(3).

CIT v. Venkatesh V. Kabade (2014) 223 Taxman 116 (Karn.)(HC)

S. 40A(3) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Cash payments exceeding prescribed limits – No disallowance to be made if AO cannot prove that the payment was made in cash. [S.28(i), 133A]

842

A survey u/s. 133A was conducted at the office of the assessee in consequence to the information received from the Economic Offence Wing, Crime Branch, Mumbai, where the assessee admitted that he was doing the business of bogus diamond billing on commission basis and he issued bills and got commission at 0.25 per cent on the amount of bills. The AO, on the basis of the books of accounts, found that the assessee had paid an amount of ₹ 18.22 crores in cash to six different parties and asked the assessee to explain the said amount. The assessee in response submitted that he had not made any single payment exceeding ₹ 20,000 to the aforesaid parties at a time. However, the AO was not satisfied with the explanation given by the assessee and hence disallowed 20% of the payment u/s. 40A(3). The CIT(A) and Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO.

Dismissing the departmental appeal, the High Court held that it was neither established nor proven that the payment to the six parties were made in cash and when the AO did not choose to verify the parties who have alleged to have purchased the same from the assessee or tried to ascertain whether the same are disclosed in the respective accounts, the AO was not justified in making the addition u/s. 40A(3).

CIT v. Dineshkumar Chandmal Jain (2014) 221 Taxman 367 (Guj.)(HC)

S. 40A(3) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Cash payments exceeding prescribed limits – Lorry drivers – Cash payment in excess of prescribed limits to person other than agent of the assessee is not allowable. [R.6DD(k)]

843

The assessee made payments towards lorry freight in cash and claimed the expenditure as a deduction. The AO disallowed the expenses on the ground that the payments were made through cash and the payments exceeded the limit prescribed u/s. 40A(3). The assessee filed affidavits before the CIT(A) from the lorry owners stating that they collected the lorry freight in cash through the driver of the lorry concerned, in which the goods were transported. The assessee contended that the cash payments for goods and services were made through agents, viz., the lorry drivers. Hence, cash payment for lorry freight paid to the lorry drivers cannot be disallowed. The CIT(A) however held that the claim of the assessee that the lorry drivers acted as agents of the assessee was farfetched and hence confirmed the disallowance. The Tribunal confirmed the findings of the CIT(A).

The High Court observed that there was hardly any material to prove that the lorry drivers acted as agents of the assessee. The High Court held that the assessee's only

claim before the authorities was that the driver acted in dual capacity, for which there is no evidence and hence the payments made to the lorry drivers of the supplier were not payments to agent of assessee and hence rule 6DD(k) could not be invoked. (AY. 2008-09)

P. K. Ramasamy Nadar & Bros. v. ITO (2014) 221 Taxman 362 / 272 CTR 357 (Mad.)(HC)

844 **S.40A(3) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Cash payments exceeding prescribed limits – Purchase of land in auction**

The assessee had purchased a land for ₹ 3.5 crores in an open auction held by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The payment of the amount was made by M/s. Zoom Developers Private Limited on behalf of the Assessee. The Assessing Officer made an addition of ₹ 70,00,000/- being 20% of the total payment of ₹ 3.5 crores by holding that the payment was made in cash as the details of payment were not available in the conveyance deed and no details of payment nor the copies of the relevant bank accounts were furnished. The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance holding that from the record that the entire payment of ₹ 3.5 crores was made through Pay Orders and the Drafts prepared from bank accounts of M/s. Zoom Developers Private Limited on behalf of the assessee and considering the fact that the auction was conducted by the High Court. The Tribunal affirmed the CIT (A) order. The High Court confirmed the Tribunal order. *CIT v. Magnificent Construction (P) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxman 107 (Mag.)(MP)(HC)*

845 **S.40(A)(3) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Cash payments exceeding prescribed limits – Cash payment made due to ‘exceptional or unavoidable circumstances’ was not supported with any evidences, will attract provisions of Section 40A(3)**

Assessee carried on the business of purchase and sale of suitcases. The assessee made cash payments cash exceeding ₹ 10000 for the purchases made during the year. The AO and the CIT(A) did not accepted the explanation given by the assessee and disallowed the same u/s. 40A(3). Before the Tribunal the assessee contended that the situation falls under ‘exceptional or unavoidable circumstances’ and was entitled to benefit under Rule 6DD(j). The Tribunal held that suppliers of assessee, who were delivering goods to him invariably insisted on spot payment of cash to lorry drivers, and decided in favour of the assessee. The High Court held that there must be some evidence to corroborate the explanation furnished by the assessee. The submissions by the assessee were false and the Tribunal has decided purely on surmises and conjectures. Hence the question decided in favour of the revenue. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. Singamsetty Subba Rao (2014) 357 ITR 529 / 220 Taxman 81 (Mag.)(AP)(HC)

846 **S.40A(3) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Cash payments exceeding prescribed limits -There is a difference between “crossed cheque” and “account payee cheque”. Payment by crossed cheque attracts S. 40A(3) disallowance-Disallowance was held to be justified**

The expression earlier used in s. 40A(3)(a) was a “crossed cheque or a crossed bank draft”. This was amended by the legislature to be replaced by the expression “an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft”. This was done in the background

of the experience that even crossed cheques were being endorsed in favour of a person other than the drawee making it difficult to trace the constituent of the money. To plug this possible loophole the requirement of section 40A(3) was made more stringent. If we accept the contention of counsel for the assessee that there was no distinction between a crossed cheque and an account payee cheque, we would be obliterating this amendment brought in the statute with specific purpose in mind. Accordingly, payment by a crossed cheque is subject to disallowance u/s. 40A(3). (AY. 2007-08)

Rajmoti Industries v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 392 / 223 Taxmann 428 / 268 CTR 130 / 103 DTR 113 (Guj.)(HC)

S.40A(3) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Cash payments exceeding prescribed limits – No disallowance for cash payments even if Rule 6DD(j) exception does not apply if there is no dispute as to genuineness of payment and business compulsion – Disallowance was deleted. [R.6DD(j)]

847

Though there was no dispute regarding the genuineness of the payments made, the AO made a disallowance u/s. 40A(3) on the ground that the exception in Rule 6DD did not apply. On facts, though the case of the assessee did not fall within the exclusion clause in Rule 6DD (j), s. 40A(3) will not apply because (a) there is no doubt as to the genuineness of the payment nor the identity of the payee, (b) the assessee was compelled to pay cash owing to the insistence of its principal and if it had not abided by the direction, the business would have suffered & (c) the exceptions in Rule 6DD are not exhaustive and the rule must be interpreted liberally. Purchase of recharge vouchers by cash was held to be allowable. (AY. 2006-07)

Anupam Tele Services v. ITO (2014) 366 ITR 122 / 100 DTR 411 / 268 CTR 121 / 222 Taxmann 318 (Guj.)(HC)

S.40A(3) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Amount paid to villagers – Purchase of land – Addition was deleted

848

The Tribunal found that there was no branch of any bank in the village Ballupura at the time of purchase of the land from various sellers. Normally, the villagers were paid in cash at the time of entering into agreement and sale deed is completed at later stage wherein they have agreed to receive the amount from the assessee either in cash or cheque. This contention of the assessee remained uncontroverted therefore the CIT(A) was right in deleting the disallowance made by Assessing Officer under section 40A(3). Facts of other two years are same and in view of the consistency as on similar facts the Tribunal deleted the additions made under section 40A(3). (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09)

Shree Salasar Overseas P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 164 TTJ 215 / (2015) 67 SOT 68 (URO) (Jaipur)(Trib.)

S.40A(3) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Payments made to farmers or kacha Aarantias – No disallowance can be made

849

Tribunal held that once the payment is treated as having been made to a farmer, section 40A(3) will not come into play and the disallowance was rightly deleted by CIT(A). Payments to Kacha Aarattia is to be taken as a payment to farmer as such Aarattia is a de

facto agent of the farmer and does not receive payment in his own right and therefore, such payment cannot be disallowed. (AY. 2008-09)

ITO v. Ram Prakash (2014) 164 TTJ 7 (UO) / (2015) 67 SOT 126 (URO)(Agra)(UO)(Trib.)

850 **S.40A(3) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Cash payments exceeding prescribed limits – Dealers – Amendment is substantive – Each bill less than ₹ 20000, No disallowance can be made. [R.6DD(k)]**

Purchase of agricultural produce by making payment in cash would not be covered by exception provided in rule 6DD(e), if it is purchased from dealers and not from cultivators or growers.

Where purchases by making payment in cash were effected from registered traders/commission agents who were independent businessmen acting in their own capacity and not as an agent of assessee, purchases were not covered by exception given in rule 6DD(k).

Amendment in section 40A(3) by Finance Act, 2008 with effect from 1-4-2009 can only be considered as substantive in nature and shall have prospective operation only. If purchase is effected from a single person by way of several bills/invoices and if value of each bill/invoice is less than ₹ 20,000 then payments made to settle each bill/invoice would not be hit by provisions of section 40A(3), as each bill/invoice has to be considered as a separate contract. (AY. 2007-08)

Raja & Co. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 12 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)

851 **S.40A(3) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Cash payments exceeding prescribed limits – Rejection books of account- Income estimated – No further disallowance can be made. [S.144]**

Tribunal held that once books of account are rejected and profit is estimated, no further disallowance can be made by invoking provisions of section 40A(3) of the Act. (ITA no 1881 / Kol / 2009 dt. 13-8-2014) (AY. 2006-07)

Sadananda Singh v. ITO (2014) 151 ITD 714 (Kol.)(Trib.)

852 **S.40A(7) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Mercantile basis – Gratuity provision – Held to be allowable. [S.145, Gratuity Act, 1972]**

On coming into force of Gratuity Act, 1972, assessee company became liable for first time in current assessment year 1973-74 to provide an amount by way of gratuity to its employees which included current as well as past liability. Assessee made provision of said amount on actuarial basis. A trust deed came to be executed on 24-12-1975 which was duly registered with District Registration Officer and assessee moved an application before Commissioner for granting approval of gratuity fund and Commissioner granted approval on 30-3-1976 while making it effective from 29-12-1975. Assessee deposited entire amount based on actuarial valuation in trust fund on or before 31-3-1977, i.e., within extended period. Since all conditions laid down in sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of section 40A(7) had been fulfilled, assessee's claim for deduction was to be allowed. (AY. 1973-74)

CIT v. Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 341 / 269 CTR 70 / 225 Taxmann 363 (Raj.)(HC)

S.40A(9) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Contribution to employees welfare trust, etc. – Donation given wholly and exclusively for welfare of employees and also for carrying on business more efficiently by having contended labour force is deductible.

853

The AO disallowed the donations made by the assessee to an education society u/s. 40A(9). The CIT (A) confirmed the action of the AO, however, the Tribunal deleted the disallowance on the ground that the donations made were a welfare measure for the assessee's employees.

The High Court dismissing the departmental appeal observed that the donation given by the assessee was wholly and exclusively for the welfare of its employees and also for carrying on business of the assessee more efficiently by having contended labour force. Further, the High Court held that in applying the test of commercial expediency for determining whether an expenditure was wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the assessee's business, reasonableness of the expenditure had to be judged from the point of view of businessman. (AY. 1986-87, 1987-88, 1992-93)

CIT v. Wipro Ltd. (2014)360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxmann 181 (Karn.)(HC)

S.40A(9) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Donation to society running school in backward area where factory located could not be disallowed

854

Donation to society running school in backward area where assessee's factory was situated could not be disallowed under s. 40A(9). (AY. 1986-87, 1987-88, 1992-93)

CIT v. Wipro Ltd. (No.2) (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxman 181 (Karn.)(HC)

S.40A(9) : Expenses or payments not deductible – Contribution to MSWC Karmchari Welfare Fund as an employer was held to be allowable deduction. [S.37(1)]

The Assessee Company is an undertaking of the government of Maharashtra established for providing Warehousing Facilities. Assessee has contributed towards MSWC Karmachari welfare fund and claimed the same as business expenditure. AO disallowed the claim. On appeal Tribunal held that contribution is allowable as deduction. (AY. 2006-07)

Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 269 (Pune)(Trib.)

Section 41 : Profits Chargeable to tax

S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of liability – State sales tax deferral scheme – Option in subsequent scheme for premature payment of sales tax in consideration of waiver of sales tax – Amount of waiver – No remission of liability – Amount not assessable under section 41(1). [S.43B]

855

As per the scheme the assessee was allowed to retain the sales tax as determined by the competent authority and pay the tax 15 years thereafter. The tax collected was deemed to have been paid and, therefore, the tax so collected could not be construed as income in the hands of the assessee. The tax so retained by the assessee was in the nature of a loan given by the Government as an incentive for setting up the industrial unit in a rural area. The loan had to be repaid after 15 years. Again, it is an incentive. However, by a subsequent scheme, a provision was made for premature payment. When

the assessee had the benefit of making the payment after 15 years, if he is making a premature payment, the amount equal to the net present value of the deferred tax was determined at ₹ 4,25,79,684 and on such payment the entire liability to pay tax/loan stood discharged. Again, it is not a benefit conferred on an assessee. Therefore, section 41(1) of the Act was not attracted. (AY. 2004-2005)

CIT v. McDowell and Co. Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 684 / (2015) 229 Taxman 354 (Mag.) / 273 CTR 394 (Karn.)(HC)

856 **S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Refund of excise duty – Deemed profit – Tribunal deleting addition on account of excise duty refund received by assessee – Held not justified. [S.28(i)]**

Tribunal deleted the addition following the decision of Full Bench in *CIT v. Bharat Iron and Steel Industries (1993) 199 ITR 67 (Guj.)(HC)(FB)*. Decision of Gujarat High Court was stood reversed by the Supreme Court in *Polyflex (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2002) 257 ITR 343 (SC)*. The following question :

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appellate Tribunal has substantially erred in law in deleting addition of ₹ 65,42,000/- being the excise duty refund received by the assessee under section 41(1) of Income-tax Act?” was answered in favour of revenue. (AY. 1989-90)

CIT v. Ahmedabad Advance Mills Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 326 (Guj.)(HC)

857 **S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Refund of duty – Since the actual determination emerged only in May, 1993, it was under obligation to reflect the amount in the return for the year 1994-95 – Appeal of revenue was dismissed**

The assessee was engaged in the activity of manufacturing and marketing of food products. It used to supply the raw material to its sister concern and get certain brands of biscuits manufactured. For that purpose, it used to pay conversion charges in terms of the agreement under which the assessee was under an obligation to compensate or pay the duty component suffered by the sister concern. The products manufactured by or on behalf of the assessee were subject to excise duty. The AO took view that there was no cessation on the basis of the order passed by the Superintendent of Excise and the corresponding amount being ₹ 1,66,62,866 was liable to be assessed for the assessment year 1992-93. He passed a separate order in respect of the refund of ₹ 18 lakhs. Since that refund came only in May, 1993, benefit thereof was extended for the assessment year 1994-95. This was upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal held that there was no cessation or remission referable to section 4 as a result of the order dated May 19, 1993, passed by the Superintendent of Excise and that the corresponding amount was not liable to be brought to tax. On appeal :

Held, that the effect of the order dated May 19, 1993, was two fold. The first was that the conversion unit and thereby the assessee were held to be not under obligation to pay any amount covered under bonds and thereby the bonds stood discharged. The second was that a sum of ₹ 18 lakhs was to be refunded from out of the excise duty already paid by the conversion unit. The benefit of this had also accrued to the assessee since it had claimed deduction on account of payment of excise duty. Once

the assessee was relieved of the liability to pay the amount covered by bonds, section 41(1) was attracted and the liability could be said to have ceased. As a consequence, the assessee had to pay the tax on the amount, regarding which it claimed exemption in the returns for the earlier assessment years. The only difference would be that since the actual determination emerged only in May, 1993, it was under obligation to reflect the amount in the return for the year 1994-95. So was the case with the amount of ₹ 18 lakhs which was ordered to be refunded. Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition of ₹ 1,66,62,866 for the assessment year 1992-93. The amount of ₹ 1,66,62,866 was liable to be dealt with under section 41(1), however, for the assessment year 1994-95.(AY. 1992-93)

CIT v. Ampro Products (2014) 368 ITR 449 (T&AP)(HC)

S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Excise duty refunds – Appeal pending before Supreme Court – Refund received by assessee was held be assessable

858

Assessee firm claimed refund of excise duty. The refund was received pursuant to the order of High Court. The Excise department appealed against the said order which is pending before Supreme Court. AO assessed the said refund as income . Tribunal held that there was no finality to the claim in the light of the pendency of proceedings hence the addition was deleted. On reference the High Court held that the payment in discharge of the statutory liability incurred while earning the income is an expenditure and even if it is possible in some cases that such payment is liable to be excluded from the income as a liability incurred in the course of trade, it does not detract from its character as expenditure. Therefore, the amounts refunded on the levy being held unconstitutional were the amounts received by the assessee in respect of an expenditure and such receipts are liable to be taxed under section 41(1) . Question was answered in favour of revenue.

CIT v. Hansraj Vallabhdas and Sons (2014) 227 Taxmann 227 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Details furnished – Addition was held to be not justified. [S.133(6)]

859

The A.O. had made the addition of ₹ 13,75,874/- on the ground that there was cessation of liability. The Court held that it can be gathered from the record that the assessee had shown fourteen creditors in the books of account. When directed by the Assessing Officer to furnish confirmation of the creditors, the PAN numbers, copy of the bank statements as also acknowledgment of the return filed by the creditors and all other requisite details were furnished vide communication dated 30th December 2010 by the assessee-respondent, with a further request to hold inquiry, if the Assessing Officer deems it fit under section 133 (6) of the Act. The Assessing Officer, however, concluded that the sum of ₹ 13,75,874/- was not genuine amount and added the same as “unaccounted income” in the hands of the assessee. Both CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal when have concurrently held on an issue which is predominantly factual in nature and when no error has been committed, this issue also deserves no further consideration. The assessee on having parted with the confirmation by the creditors, the bank statements, PAN numbers as well as copy of the acknowledgment of the returns

filed by those persons, had duly discharged his obligation, as the law has cast on him, and therefore, if any other further inquiry is necessary, it is for the Assessing Officer to so do and it was also so requested by the assessee while furnishing these details. On Assessing Officer having failed to exercise his discretion, in wake of overwhelming evidences in possession of the Revenue authorities, he was not right in making such additions and both the authorities have rightly deleted the same. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Chanakya Developers (2014) 222 Taxmann 164 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

860 **S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Amount found credited in books of account of assessee, liability to pay back ceased to exist and, hence, Tribunal had rightly treated it to be assessee’s taxable income**

It was found that the balance in name of three parties were appearing since 1984-87 and two parties denied to have any amount payable to them while third was found to be non-genuine. The Court held that in respect of amount found credited in books of account of assessee, liability to pay back ceased to exist and, hence, Tribunal had rightly treated it to be assessee’s taxable income. (AY. 1993-94).

Adarsh Sood (Mrs.) v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 67 (P&H)(HC)

861 **S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Sales tax collected and remitted to Government – Payment of Net Present Value of sales-tax deferral loan does not constitute a taxable “benefit” – Amount not assessable. [S.43B, Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 S. 39(4)]**

The question before the High Court was “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the sum of ₹ 4,14,87,985 being the difference between the payment of net present value of ₹ 3,37,13393 against the future liability of ₹ 7,52,031,378 has rightly been charged to tax u/s. 41 of the I.T. Act 1961” The High Court had to consider whether the judgment of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in *Sulzer India Ltd v. JCIT (2010) 42 SOT 457 (SB)(Mum)* held that the difference between the Net Present Value of sales-tax liability and its future liability is not chargeable to tax u/s. 41(1) is correct or not. HELD by the High Court affirming the judgment of the Special Bench:

Premature payment of Sales Tax already collected but not remitted to the Government is not covered by S. 43B. because otherwise the provision would have been worded accordingly. The applicability of s. 41(1)(a) has to be considered in the light of whether the liability is a loss, expenditure or trading liability. In this case, the scheme under which the Sales Tax liability was deferred enables the Assessee to remit the Sales Tax collected from the customers or consumers to the Government not immediately but as agreed after 7 to 12 years. If the amount is not to be immediately paid to the Government upon collection but can be remitted later on in terms of the Scheme, then, we are of the opinion that the exercise undertaken by the Government of Maharashtra in terms of the amendment made to the Bombay Sales Tax Act and noted above, may relieve the Assessee of his obligation, but that is not by way of obtaining remission. The worth of the amount which has to be remitted after 7 to 12 years has been determined prematurely. That has been done by finding out its NPV. If that is the value of the money that the State Government would be entitled to receive after the end of 7 to

12 years, then, we do not see how ingredients of sub section (1) of section 41 can be said to be fulfilled. The obligation to remit to the Government the Sales Tax amount already recovered and collected from the customers is in no way wiped out or diluted. The obligation remains. All that has happened is an option is given to the Assessee to approach the SICOM and request it to consider the application of the Assessee of premature payment and discharge of the liability by finding out its NPV. If that was a permissible exercise and in terms of the settled law, then, we do not see how the Assessee can be said to have been benefited and as claimed by the Revenue. The argument of Mr. Gupta is not that the Assessee having paid ₹ 3.37 crores has obtained for himself anything in terms of section 41(1), but the Assessee is deemed to have received the sum of ₹ 4.14 crores, which is the difference between the original amount to be remitted with the payment made. Mr. Gupta terms this as deemed payment and by the State to the Assessee. We are unable to agree with him. The Tribunal has found that the first requirement of section 41(1) is that the allowance or deduction is made in respect of the loss, expenditure or a trading liability incurred by the Assessee and the other requirement is the Assessee has subsequently obtained any amount in respect of such loss and expenditure or obtained a benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of a remission or cessation thereof. As rightly noted by the Tribunal, the Sales Tax collected by the Assessee during the relevant year amounting to ₹ 7,52,01,378/was treated by the State Government as loan liability payable after 12 years in 6 annual/equal installments. Subsequently and pursuant to the amendment made to the 4th proviso to section 38 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, the Assessee accepted the offer of SICOM, the implementing agency of the State Government, paid an amount of ₹ 3,37,13,393 to SICOM, which, according to the Assessee, represented the NPV of the future sum as determined and prescribed by the SICOM. In other words, what the Assessee was required to pay after 12 years in 6 equal installments was paid by the Assessee prematurely in terms of the NPV of the same. That the State may have received a higher sum after the period of 12 years and in installments. However, the statutory arrangement and vide section 38, 4th proviso does not amount to remission or cessation of the Assessee's liability assuming the same to be a trading one. Rather that obtains a payment to the State prematurely and in terms of the correct value of the debt due to it. There is no evidence to show that there has been any remission or cessation of the liability by the State Government. We agree with the Tribunal that one of the requirement of section 41(1)(a) has not been fulfilled in the facts of the present case.

CIT v. Sulzer India Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 717 / (2015) 273 CTR 400 / 229 Taxman 264 / 113 DTR 267 (Bom.) (HC)

CIT v. Hardoli Paper Mills Ltd(2014) 369 ITR 717.(Bom.)(HC)

CIT v. Associated Capsules Pvt. Ltd (2014) 369 ITR 717 (Bom.)(HC).

CIT v. K.S.B.Pumps Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 717 (Bom.)(HC)

CIT v. S.I.Group India Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 717 (Bom.)(HC)

CIT v. Godrej Consumer Products Ltd (2014) 369 ITR 717 (Bom.)(HC)

CIT v. Grindwell Norton Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 717(Bom.)(HC)

- 862 **S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Sundry creditors – Sundry creditors paid in subsequent years provision is not applicable in relevant assessment year.**

The liabilities towards the sundry creditors were paid in the subsequent assessment years therefore, there was no remission or cessation of liability (AY.2002-03)

CIT v. Speedways Tyre Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 401 / 271 CTR 614 / 226 Taxman 172 (P&H) (HC)

- 863 **S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Premature payment of sales-tax deferral loan by paying an amount equal to the net present value of the deferred tax by which the entire liability to pay tax/loan stood discharged is not a “benefit” taxable u/s.41 (1).[S.43B]**

As per an incentive scheme announced by the Government of Maharashtra, the assessee entered into an agreement to avail the benefits under deferral/1993 scheme which provides for deferment of payment of taxes. This agreement not only determined the eligibility of the assessee but also laid down the terms and conditions under which the agreement exists. The quantification of this deferment was made by Sicom Limited, a Government of Maharashtra Undertaking, which was an agent for the package scheme of incentives. Sicom quantified the entitlement of deferral of sales tax to the assessee. As against the total amount of ₹ 20 crore collected by the assessee towards Bombay Sales Tax and Central Sales Tax, the maximum entitlement of sales tax incentives by way of deferment was determined at ₹ 13.78 crore. The validity period of the deferral was determined as 1.4.2002 to 31.3.2017, thereby the assessee could retain the amount of sales tax collected to the extent of ₹ 13.78 crore up to 31-3-2017. Consequent to the assessee opting for the scheme of deferment of sales tax, an amount of ₹ 13.78 crore was deemed to have been paid for the purpose of s. 43B of the Act and the same was allowed as a deduction in AY 2003-04. The Maharashtra Government by way of Maharashtra Tax Laws (Levy and Amendment) Act, 2002 substituted the proviso to s. 38 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 which came into effect from 1-5-2002. The proviso provided that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Act or in the Rules or in any of the package scheme of the incentives or in the Power Generation Promotion Policy 1998, the eligible unit to whom the entitlement certificate has been granted for availing of the incentives by way of deferment of sales tax, purchase tax, additional tax, turn over tax or surcharge as the case may be, may, in respect of any of the periods during which, the said certificate is valid, at its option, prematurely in place of the amount of tax deferred by it an amount, equal to the net present value of the deferred tax as may be prescribed and on making such payments, in the public interest, the deferred tax shall be deemed to have been paid. In view of the proviso to Section 38 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, the net present value was determined at ₹ 4.25 crore and the same was paid by the assessee. Consequent to the payment of the net present value, the the balance amount of sales-tax payable amounting to ₹ 9.52 crore was waived. The AO held that the said amount of ₹ 9.52 crore was taxable u/s 41(1). However, the Tribunal (presumably relying on *Sulzer India Ltd v. JCIT 138 ITD 137 (Mum) (SB)*) upheld the assessee's claim that the said amount was not chargeable. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD by the High Court dismissing the appeal:

As per the scheme the assessee was allowed to retain the sales tax as determined by the competent authority and pay the same 15 years thereafter. The tax collected was deemed to have been paid and, therefore, the tax so collected cannot be construed as income in the hands of the assessee. The tax so retained by the assessee is in the nature of a loan given by the Government as an incentive for setting up the industrial unit in a rural area. The said loan had to be repaid after 15 years. Again it is an incentive. However, by a subsequent scheme, a provision was made for premature payment. When the assessee had the benefit of making the payment after 15 years, if he is making a premature payment, the said amount equal to the net present value of the deferred tax was determined at ₹ 4,25,79,684 and on such payment the entire liability to pay tax/loan stood discharged. Again it is not a benefit conferred on an assessee. Therefore, Section 41 (1) of the Act is not attracted to the facts of this case. Hence, the Tribunal was justified in holding that there is no liability to pay tax.

CIT v. McDowell & Co. Ltd. (2015) 113 DTR 261 / 273 CTR 394 (Karn.)(HC)

S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Addition made on the ground that trading liability is outstanding for more than three years is invalid

864

The AO observed that the assessee had outstanding dues with respect to 14 creditors for more than three years and hence added the amount of dues as income u/s. 41(1). The CIT (A) and Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO.

The High Court following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *CIT v. Sugauli Sugar Works (P) Ltd. (1999) 236 ITR 518* and its own decision in the case of *CIT v. Nitin S. Garg (2012) 208 Taxmann 16* held that the assessee had continued to show the admitted amounts as liabilities in the balance sheet and the same could not be treated as cessation of liabilities and since the addition was made solely on the basis of number of years the liability remained outstanding, the addition was not justified. (A.Y. 2009-10)

CIT v. Puridevi Mahendrakumar Chaudhary (2014) 221 Taxman 375 (Guj.)(HC)

S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Liability showed in the books – Merely because no response from creditors additions cannot be made.

865

The assessee showed the liability in the books . It was not proved by the AO as to how the so-called liabilities ceased or crystallised during the previous year. The courts observed that the entire amount has been offered to tax in the AY. 2006-07.

The courts held that merely because there was no response by the creditors, it does not prove that the liabilities ceased during the year. The Courts further observed that when the amount has been offered to tax in the subsequent years, it could not be taxed again in year under appeal. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Narendra Mohan Mathur (2014) 97 DTR 428 (Raj.)(HC)

CIT v. Rita Mathur (Smt.) (2014) 97 DTR 428 (Raj.)(HC)

866 **S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Unexplained purchase – Addition was deleted**

Held, that the Assessing Officer added ₹ 47,00,771 as unexplained purchases. However, the appellate authorities held that the Assessing Officer without sufficient reason arrived at the finding that there was a cessation of liability to the extent of ₹ 13,28,282 because the liability for the sum was not carried over in the following accounting year, whereas the fact was that the credit entry for the sum was the first entry in the ledger of the concerned party. As regards a sum of ₹ 33,72,489, the Commissioner (Appeals) had given some particulars with which the Tribunal concurred in holding that the Assessing Officer ignored those figures. It was, in these circumstances, that the addition made by the Assessing Officer was deleted by the Commissioner (Appeals) and was approved by the Tribunal. The decision entirely was on facts. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Nandadevi Sales Agency (2014) 362 ITR 5 / 224 Taxmann 11 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)

867 **S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Waiver of loan by bank was held to be not liable to tax**

Bank waived the principal amount of loan and interest. AO assessed the waiver of loan also as income of assessee. Tribunal held that as the assessee never claimed the principal amount of loan as deduction, AO was not justified assessing the said amount as income. On appeal by revenue the Court affirmed the view of Tribunal. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Dholgiri Industries (P) Ltd. (2014) 99 DTR 359 / 266 CTR 111 / 225 Taxmann 189 (Mag.)(MP)(HC)

868 **S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Unclaimed liabilities (of earlier years), which are shown as payable in the accounts, are not taxable as income even if creditors untraceable & liabilities are non-genuine**

In AY 2007-08 the assessee showed an amount of ₹ 37.52 lakhs as being due to various creditors. The AO issued summons to the creditors. Some of the creditors were not found at the given address and some stated that they had no concern with the assessee. The AO took the view that there was a “cessation” of the liabilities and assessed the said liabilities to tax u/s. 41(1). The CIT(A) confirmed the addition though the Tribunal deleted it on the basis that as the liabilities had not been written back in the accounts, s. 41(1) did not apply. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal:

S.41(1) would apply in a case where there has been remission or cessation of liability during the year under consideration. In the present case, there was nothing on record to suggest there was remission or cessation of liability in the AY 2007-08. It is undoubtedly a curious case. Even the liability itself seems under serious doubt. The AO undertook the exercise to verify the records of the so-called creditors. Many of them were not found at all in the given address. Some of them stated that they had no dealing with the assessee. In one or two cases, the response was that they had no dealing with the assessee nor did they know him. Of course, these inquiries were made ex parte and in that view of the matter, the assessee would be allowed to contest such findings. Nevertheless, even if such facts were established through bi-parte inquiries, the liability as it stands perhaps holds that there was no cessation or remission of liability and that

therefore, the amount in question cannot be added back as a deemed income u/s 41(1) of the Act. This is one of the strange cases where even if the debt itself is found to be non-genuine from the very inception, at least in terms of s. 41(1) of the Act there is no cure for it. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Bhogilal Ramjibhai Atara (2014) 222 taxmann 313 (Guj.)(HC)

S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Amount withheld by the assessee – Not claimed as deduction – Addition was deleted

869

The Tribunal held that in the present case the assessee has not claimed as a deduction the amounts withheld by it while computing the income of the assessee in any assessment year and also it cannot be said that there is cessation of liability. Being so, there is no question of invoking the provision of section 41(1) of the Act. The addition made by the Assessing Officer is not justified and the same is deleted. (AY. 2009-10) *Kapil Chit Funds (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 529 / 164 TTJ 191 (Hyd.)(Trib.)*

S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Unclaimed & unproven liabilities are deemed to have ceased and are assessable as income.

870

- (i) When the liability continues to subsist year after year, for several years, serious and valid doubts as to its existence or as representing an existing liability, may arise. This is as in the very nature of the events, nobody would ordinarily, i.e., without justifiable reason, not claim his dues, representing his hard earned money or capital built up over years. Then, again, why would one not agitate the matter or take legal recourse to effect recovery. That is, the said presumption fails on the test of human probabilities in the facts and circumstances of the case.
- (ii) The Hon'ble Delhi high court per its recent decision in the case of *CIT v. Chipsoft Technology (P) Ltd. [2012] 210 Taxman 173 (Del)*, examining the legal aspect of the matter, has clarified that the view that merely because a liability outstands in books, and that lapse of time bars the remedy but does not efface the liability, is an abstract and theoretical one which does not ground itself in reality. The interpretation of law, particularly fiscal and commercial legislation, is to be based on pragmatic realities. It would be indeed paradoxical, if not illogical, to allow the assessee-debtor to, while avoiding a liability on the basis that it is no longer enforceable in law, yet claim his status as a debtor, so that he was indeed liable for the amount reflected as a liability in accounts. The said decision by the Hon'ble court stands followed and adopted by the tribunal, as in *ITO v. Shailesh D. Shah and Yusuf R. Tanwar v. ITO*.
- (iii) It could be argued that even where the assessee is unable to prove the existence of a trade liability as at the relevant year-end, which though continues to outstand in books, would yet not exhibit that the remission or cessation of the liability during the relevant year, and which is a prerequisite for the application of section 41(1). The argument, attractive at first sight, in-as-much as the same represents a primary ingredient of the relevant provision, fails on scrutiny. This is for the reason that the assessee reflecting the amount as a liability in his books for the immediately preceding year, has confirmed it as so as at the end of that year,

i.e., 31-3-2008 in the present case. It does not therefore lie in his mouth or is not open for him to say or contend that it was not so, and that the amount was in fact not outstanding even on that date. The Revenue has merely proceeded by accepting the assessee's claims and books for that year. The principle of approbate and reprobate would therefore apply to estopp the assessee from taking such a stand, i.e., legally. The anomaly stands explained famously by the Hon'ble apex court in *Phool Chand Bajrang Lal v. ITO [1993] 203 ITR 456 (SC)* in the context of reopening of reassessment u/s. 147, which requires the assessee to disclose all material facts fully and truly: 'You accepted my lie, now your hands are tied and you can do nothing.' It clarified that it would be a travesty of justice to allow the assessee that latitude. (AY. 2009-10)

ITO v. Sajjankumar Didwani (Mum)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

871 **S.41(1) : Profits chargeable to tax – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Benefit under sales tax deferred scheme – Premature repayment at net present value, to avail benefit of such pre-payment, could not be considered while computing the normal provisions of the Act.[Bombay Sales Tax Act. S.38]**

The assessee had availed the benefit of sales tax scheme and pre-paid a part of the said liability at its Net Present Value (NPV). Assessee excluded the said amount from the normal provision of Income-tax. AO included the said amount as income. On appeal the Tribunal held that pre-payment, could not be considered while computing the normal provisions of the Act. (AY. 2004-05)

ACIT v. Spicer India Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 272 (Pune)(Trib.)

872 **S.41(4) : Profits chargeable to tax – Bad debt – Recovery of bad debts – Co-operative bank – Provision for bad debts under RBI guidelines – No claim for bad debts was allowed – Amounts written back into accounts subsequently – Not assessable. [S.36(1) (via), 36(2), 80P]**

The assessee, a co-operative bank claimed deduction on account of reversal of the non-performing asset provision credited to the profit and loss account. The assessee in the proceedings before the Assessing Officer argued that the provision for bad debts was made due to its reflecting the non-performing asset in terms of the Reserve Bank of India guidelines on bad debts and though such provision was made, there was no claim for deduction and, therefore, at the time of reversal, there could be no justification for adding it to the income. The Assessing Officer rejected its claim but the Tribunal accepted it. On appeal to the High Court, held, dismissing the appeal, that having regard to the fact that in the previous years, the deduction was not allowed, the condition precedent for application of section 36(1)(viiia) and section 36(2) on the one hand were applicable and section 41(4) would not apply. Section 80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961, gives general relief to a class of assessee by way of mandatory deduction of certain categories of income. since the deduction is with reference to the income from the activities listed in section 80P(2) which is part of the gross total income. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 137 (Delhi)(HC)

S.41(4A) : Profits chargeable to tax – Bad debt – Deduction – Provisions of section 41(4A) are not invoked on the basis of balance sheet, wherein certain adjustments have been made by the assessee for the purpose of presenting it to the shareholders and the regulator. [S.36(1)(vii)]

873

The assessee was claiming deduction u/s. 36(1)(viii) in respect of special reserve created and maintained by it. During the year, it had reduced ₹ 53.96 crores from the special reserve account and an equivalent amount from the loans and advances account, as a contra item, for the purpose of preparation of financial statements only and not in the books of account. The assessee was required to create provision for bad debts as per the guidelines issued by Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI). As per the said guidelines, the amount available in special reserve account created u/s. 36(1)(viii) can be treated as part of the provision for bad debts. The AO did not agree with the contentions of the assessee and treated ₹ 53.96 crores as income u/s. 41(4A) as utilisation of amount available in the special reserve account. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition.

On appeal, the Tribunal observed that the entries recorded in the books alone are not determinative factors for the purpose of computing true income of the assessee and that the tax authorities are required to determine the correct income of the assessee by considering the books of accounts, evidences, method of accounting, other surrounding factors, etc. The Tribunal observed that, in the instant case, there is no dispute that the assessee has maintained the special reserve account intact and the CIT(A) has given a categorical finding that there is no debit in this account, meaning thereby, the books of account of the assessee do not show any utilization of 'special reserve account', the assessee was required to do so only as per the directions issued by IDBI, which the assessee is required to comply with. The provision for bad and doubtful debts is created only to safeguard the financial institution against bad debts. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition of ₹ 53.96 crores. (AY. 2008-09)

ACIT v. Kerala State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (2014) 29 ITR 45 / 62 SOT 115 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)

Section 42 : Special provision for deductions in the case of business for prospecting, etc. for mineral oil

S.42 : Business of prospecting – Business income – Clause for granting benefit under section 42 not mentioned in product sharing contracts – Assessee is not entitle to benefit under section 42 of the Act

874

Where the production sharing contract entered into between the assessee with Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas did not incorporate clause for granting benefits under section 42 of the Act, it cannot be said the failure to incorporate the same in the contract was not inadvertently omitted and, therefore, assessee was not entitle for deduction under section 42 of the Act. (AY. 2001-02, 2005-06)

Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. UOI (2014) 102 DTR 51 (Delhi)(HC)

Section 43 : Definitions of certain terms relevant to income from profits and gains of business or profession

875 S.43(1) : Actual cost – Revalued cost – Approval of Dy. CIT was not obtained – AO himself was IAC – Matter set aside to decide on merits. [S.32]

As per Explanation 3 of section 43(1) the previous approval of the 'Inspecting Assistant Commissioner' was required to be obtained. In the present case, it so happened that Assessing Officer himself was Inspecting Assistant Commissioner (Assessments). Under the circumstances, there was no question of obtaining the prior approval by the Assessing Officer of 'Inspecting Assistant Commissioner' as he himself was also 'Inspecting Assistant Commissioner'. The Tribunal has not considered the issue with respect to depreciation on enhanced value to the successor firm and not written down the value on merits and had held against the revenue solely on the ground that the Assessing Officer had not obtained approval of the Deputy Commissioner before applying Explanation 3 of section 43(1). As observed above, the Tribunal has not properly appreciated and considered the relevant provision of section 43(1), more particularly, Explanation 3 of section 43(1) which was prevailing at the relevant time referred to herein above. Under the circumstances, impugned order is set aside and the matter is required to be remitted to the Tribunal to consider the question and to pass appropriate order in accordance with law and on merits. (AY. 1981-82)

CIT v. Jayant Extraction Industries (2014) 227 Taxmann 44 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

876 S.43(1) : Actual cost – Depreciation – Written down value – Amalgamation – Depreciation actually allowed and not on basis that depreciation had been granted on a notional basis. [S. 32, 34, 43(6)]

The assessee was an Indian Company and a subsidiary of UK Company. The UK Company had an industrial undertaking in India which was hived off to assessee under a scheme of amalgamation (approved by High Court of Bombay) in 1975. Accordingly, assets and liabilities of industrial undertaking were taken over by assessee-company under a scheme of amalgamation.

The AO recomputed the depreciation on notional basis and determined the actual cost. Tribunal also affirmed the view of Tribunal. On reference the Court held that, When Indian company taken over assets of Indian branch of non-resident company (in year 1975) was entitled to depreciation on written down value determined under scheme of amalgamation being cost less depreciation actually allowed and not on basis that depreciation had been granted on a notional basis. (AY. 1976-77, 1978-79)

Rhone-Poulenc (India) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 513 / 271 CTR 636 / (2015) 228 Taxman 57 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

877 S.43(1) : Actual cost – Goodwill – Actual cost does not cover goodwill as an asset and the amount of goodwill cannot be allocated to various fixed assets held for purpose of claiming depreciation. [S.32]

The High Court observed that goodwill was not covered for depreciation u/s. 32 of the Act and that the definition of actual cost under Section 43(1) of the Act cannot be read to cover goodwill as an asset for which the assessee had to pay and which

can be termed as actual cost of the assets to the assessee. The High Court held that apportioning the cost of goodwill to various other assets acquired by the assessee for the purpose of claiming depreciation was not legally sustainable. (AY. 1986-87, 1987-88, 1992-93)

CIT v. Wipro Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxman 181 (Karn.)(HC)

S.43(1) : Actual cost – Depreciation on increased cost of fixed assets due to fluctuation in foreign exchange rate allowable. [S.43A]

878

During the year, the liability to pay foreign exchange for the machinery purchased by the assessee went up by Rs. 35,699/- on account of adverse exchange rate fluctuations. The assessee treated the same as a capital asset and claimed depreciation on the same. However the AO held that mere increase in the cost on account of adverse exchange rate fluctuations cannot be taken note of for the purpose of calculating depreciation and that the adjustment to the cost of the asset can be made only at the time of actual payment of the increased foreign exchange and not on notional basis. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the depreciation.

The High Court dismissing the departmental appeal followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *CIT v. Woodward Governor India (P) Ltd. (2009) 312 ITR 254* and held that an assessee was entitled to depreciation on increased cost of fixed assets due to fluctuation in foreign exchange rate. (A.Y. 1997-98)

CIT v. Samsung India Electronics Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 21 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.43(5) : Speculative transaction – Loss on sale of shares by stock broker on his own behalf being ‘jobbing’ is not a speculative loss. [S.28(i)]

879

The assessee was a member of the Stock Exchange and was registered as Stock Broker and carried on the purchase and sale of shares and securities. The AO found that a sum of ₹ 8,53,030/- was debited as loss incurred in respect of transactions done by the assessee for himself on the floor of stock exchange with other brokers and considered it as speculation loss. The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO. However, the Tribunal considering the claims of the assessee that the delivery had been effected at net basis as per the Stock Exchange guidelines held that the loss was not a speculation loss.

On appeal by the department, the High Court observed that the allegation that the transactions were settled without actual delivery is not fully established by the revenue. There being specific case of the assessee noted before the AO that loss of ₹ 8,53,030 was suffered on account of non-delivery base transaction, the above observation of the Tribunal cannot be approved. The High Court also observed that the Tribunal had given a finding that the details of each and every transaction were disclosed by the assessee which were part of the paper book and that no discrepancy in any of the transactions was pointed out by the AO nor the bona fide of the transactions were doubted and hence the transactions carried out by the assessee were part of the ‘jobbing’ within the meaning of proviso (c) to section 43(5). Accordingly, the High Court dismissing the departmental appeal held that the losses suffered by the assessee cannot be termed to be speculative loss by virtue of proviso (c) to section 43(5). (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Ram Kishan Gupta (2014) 222 Taxmann 164 (All.)(HC)

880 **S.43(5) : Speculative transaction – Where the assessee purchased units on 26-12-2003, which was a record date, and sold them on 26-3-2004, a period of three months reckoned from the date of purchase of units would expire on 26-3-2004 and, therefore, provisions of section 94(7) were fully applicable to the instant transaction. [S. 2(42B), 94(7)]**

The assessee suffered loss on account of a sale of shares and claimed the same to be allowed. Further he had purchased units on 26-12-2003, which was the record date. He sold the said units on 26-3-2004 and incurred short-term capital loss thereon. He claimed the said short-term capital loss to be set off against the short-term capital gain. The AO treated the loss on shares to be speculative loss in view of the provisions of section 43(5) and disallowed the same. He also declined to set off the short-term capital loss against the short-term capital gain on the plea that the transaction was hit by the provisions of section 94(7). Both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the order of the AO. On appeal to High Court, the assessee contended that (i) the loss on shares was to be treated as short-term capital loss in view of the proviso (d) to section 43(5), (ii) he had purchased the units on 26-12-2003, which was the record date, and the same were sold on 26-3-2004, i.e., just after the expiry of three months and one day, and (iii) therefore, the period of three months after the said date as provided under section 94(7)(b) applied, whereby he was entitled to claim short-term capital loss on the sale of the units. The Hon'ble Court observed that the proviso (d) was inserted in section 43(5) by the Finance Act, 2005, w.e.f. 1-4-2006 i.e. A.Y. 2006-07. and thus the loss on shares cannot be treated as short-term capital loss. On the second question, the High Court held that the period of three months reckoned from the date of purchase of the units would expire on 26-3-2004. Thus the lower authorities were right in holding that the provisions of section 94 (7)(b) were fully applicable. (AY. 2004-05)

Lachhmi Narain Gupta & Sons v. CIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 356 / 263 CTR 615 (P&H)(HC)

881 **S.43(5) : Speculative transaction – Jobbing transaction – Non-delivery based share transactions – Covered by exception in clause (c) of proviso to section 43(5) – Loss is not speculative allowable as business loss. [S. 70, 73]**

The assessee, a member of the U. P. Stock Exchange, was engaged in the business of purchase and sale of shares and securities. He declared an income of ₹ 81,050 against which he claimed a loss of ₹ 8,53,030 on account of non-delivery based transactions in purchase and sale of shares. the transactions carried on by the assessee for sale and purchase of shares were fully covered by the term “jobbing” and the assessee was entitled to the benefit of proviso (c) to s. 43(5) of the Act. The Tribunal having returned a finding that the details of each and every transaction were disclosed by the assessee, that no discrepancy in any of the transactions could be pointed out by the AO nor the bona fides of the transactions were doubted, the transactions thus carried out were part of the “jobbing” within the meaning of proviso (c) to S. 43(5). (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Sri Ram Kishan Gupta (2014) 361 ITR 387 / 100 DTR 1 (All.)(HC)

S.43(5) : Speculative transaction – Foreign currency forward contracts – Hedging loss – Loss on foreign currency forward contracts by a manufacturer / exporter is a “speculation loss” and not a “hedging loss”

Unless the assessee shows that there was some existing contract in respect of which he was likely to suffer a loss because of future price fluctuations and that it was to safeguard against such loss that he entered into the forward contracts of sale, he could not claim the benefit of clause (a) of the proviso to section 43(5).

From the principles laid down by above mentioned judgments one thing becomes clear that for hedging transaction commodity dealt should be the same. If the subject matter of the transactions is different it cannot be termed a hedging transaction.

In order that forward transactions in commodities may fall within proviso (a) to section 43(5) of the Act, it is necessary that the raw materials or merchandise in respect of which the forward transactions have been made by the assessee must have a direct connection with the goods manufactured or the merchandise sold by him. In other words raw material in respect of which the assessee has entered into forward transactions must be the same raw material which is used by him in his manufacturing business. We find that in the case under consideration assessee was not dealing in Foreign Exchange, therefore transactions entered into by it in Foreign Exchange cannot be held to be hedging transactions. As the assessee is dealing in diamonds and FC entered into only for diamonds would have been covered by the proviso (a) to the section 43(5) of the Act. (Contra view in *Intergold (I) Ltd, Bombay Diamond Co. Ltd, Friends and Friends Shipping & Badridas Gauridu* 261 ITR 256 (Bom) distinguished) (AY. 2009-10)

Araska Diamond Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 203 / 119 DTR 310 / 170 TTJ 634 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.43(6) : Written down value – Depreciation – Block of assets – Compensation – Reduction only to the extent value reflected in accounts. [S.2(11), 32, 41(2)]

The block of assets of the assessee comprised buildings, plant, machinery and the like, valued at ₹ 68,06,562. Certain items of the block assets were destroyed in a fire accident. The assessee received ₹ 1,54, 99,051 on the basis of the insurance claim. However, the assessee deducted only a sum of ₹ 68,06,562 in the process of working out the written down value claimed depreciation. The assessing authority took the view that once the assessee got a sum of ₹ 1,54,99,051 under an insurance claim, that amount must be deducted from the value of the block assets, whatever be the value of the assets that were destroyed in the fire accident. The CIT(A) took the view that irrespective of the amount which the assessee may get either as scrap value or otherwise for any destroyed item, the deduction from the written down value could be only of the value of the concerned items. The Tribunal took the view, that the reduction in the written down value of the block assets must be equivalent to the value of the newly acquired item, being ₹ 1,38,03,407. On a reference the Court Held, that the amount, which the assessee got under the insurance claim was no doubt, phenomenal, compared to the book value of the destroyed goods. The differential amount would certainly have become the subject matter of exercise referable to sub-section (2) of section 41 had that provision been on the statute. Once that provision had been omitted, the assessing authority could

not be permitted to repeat the exercise thereunder, in the process of working out the written down value, under section 43(6)(c). Thus, the Commissioner took the correct view of the matter in permitting the reduction in the written down value only to the extent of ₹ 68,06,652 representing the value of the deduction. The figure ₹ 68,06,562 was not something which was furnished by the assessee, as per its wish or fancy. It was reflected in the account books and assessments, and it was the result of allowing depreciation over the years, for those items. (AY. 1988-89)

CIT v. Priyadarshini Spinning Mills Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 563 / 52 taxmann.com 65 (T&AP) (HC)

884 **S.43(6) : Written down value – Block of assets – Depreciation actually allowed – WDV as per books at beginning of impugned assessment year 2003-04 became WDV for purpose of section 43(6) and entire exercise of re-determining WDV from year of inception till assessment year 2002-03 could not be upheld. [S. 2(11), 10(20), 32]**

Assessee was constituted under Hyderabad Metro Water Supply & Sewerage Act, 1989. Being a local authority, its income was exempt from tax under section 10(20) up to assessment year 2002-03. With insertion of Explanation to section 10(20) by Finance Act, 2002 effective from 1-4-2003, assessee became taxable entity from assessment year 2003-04. AO was of opinion that as per provisions of section 43(6), block of assets were to be re-determined from time of inception and accordingly, referred matter to special audit for purpose of adjusting capital grants-in-aid to assets acquired/capitalized by assessee in all years up to assessment year 2002-03. Based on report of special audit, AO not only re-determined total income but also restricted depreciation. In terms of Explanation 6 to section 43(6), amount of depreciation provided in books of account up to previous year relevant to assessment year has to be considered as depreciation 'actually allowed' under Act, therefore, WDV as per books at beginning of impugned assessment year 2003-04 became WDV for purpose of section 43(6) and entire exercise of re-determining WDV from year of inception till assessment year 2002-03 could not be upheld. (AY. 2003-04, 2004-05) *Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 96 (URO) (Hyd.)(Trib.)*

Section 43A : Special provisions consequential to changes in rate of exchange of currency

885 **S.43A : Rate of exchange – Foreign currency – Matter remanded. [R.115]**

The Assessee received income in foreign currency for contract work undertaken in foreign countries. The Assessing officer observed that credit figure was not credited to profit and loss account but instead same was taken to exchange variation reservation account in balance sheet directly, and thus, he made addition. The Assessee submitted that it had furnished details as per the direction of Tribunal regarding bifurcation of income and further it had already offered certain amount for taxation as per rule 115 but same was not examined by the authority. The matter remanded back to the Assessing officer for verification of the details filed and to decide as per the law. (AY. 1982-83, 1983-84, 1985-86)

U. P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. ITAT (2014) 220 Taxmann 109 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

Section 43B : Certain deductions to be only on actual payment

S.43B : Certain deductions to be only on actual payment – Excise duty – Matter was set aside. [S.145A] 886

The AO disallowed certain amount shown as excise duty payable. The appellate authorities had simply relied on the order passed by the Tribunal in the assessment year 2005-06, which was reversed by the High Court. Facts were also not clearly brought out in the assessment order. In these circumstances, the matter was remanded. (AY. 2008-09) *CIT v. Lakshmi Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 666 / 227 Taxmann 43 (Mag.)(Delhi) (HC)*

S.43B : Certain deductions to be only on actual payment – payment – Sugar factory – Interest payable on purchase tax but not paid actually – Not deductible 887

Held, that the provisions of S.43B are applicable to interest payable on purchase tax. Therefore, the assessee was not entitled to deduction of interest payable on the purchase tax. (AY. 1984-85)

CIT v. Andhra Sugars Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 195 / 52 taxmann.com 61 / (2015) 118 DTR 292 (T&AP)(HC)

S.43B : Certain deductions to be only on actual payment – Bank guarantee – Not deductible. [S.37(I)] 888

Assessee purchasing raw material from importers. Agreement that assessee would discharge liability of importers to customs duty. Levy of additional customs duty challenged by importers. Supreme Court directing stay of major portion of additional customs duty provided importers furnished bank guarantee. Importers giving bank guarantee. Counter guarantee furnished in consequence by assessee. Court held that bank guarantee is not an ascertained statutory liability to pay additional customs duty but only a contractual liability hence not deductible. (AY. 1987-1988)

Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 363 ITR 486 / 222 Taxmann 10 / 268 CTR 181 (Delhi) (HC)

S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment- Provision for leave encashment – Claim was made in revised return filed after due date as provided under section 139(5) – Held not allowable. [S.139(5)] 889

A mere reading of section 43B(f) indicates that a deduction of any sum payable by the assessee as an employer in lieu of leave to the credit of its employee shall be allowed only in computing the income referred to in section 28 of the previous year for which such sum is actually paid. The authorities below had found that the claim with regard to section 43B(f) was enclosed along with the original return as well as the revised returns. Therefore, it was observed that there was no inadvertent mistake in not claiming it. It was found that when section 143(3) provides for assessment of correct taxable income and section 143(2) provides that the AO himself considered the claim made by the taxpayer payable in accordance with the provisions of the Act for determining the correct taxable income under section 143(3), the claim could not be considered since the claim was not bona fide inadvertence as the original and the

revised returns filed in accordance with the provisions of the Act were considered by the Assessing Officer under section 143(3). Further, the revised return was filed after the due date as provided under section 139(5). Therefore, the leave encashment expenses were rightly disallowed. (AY. 2005-06)

South Indian Bank Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 111 / 226 Taxmann 130 (Ker.)(HC)

890 **S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Entry tax – Allowable if paid**

Payment made on the entry tax demand and its adjustment against the sales tax assessment had nothing to do with the deduction under the Act on the entry tax paid. The only question was whether the entry tax actually paid by the assessee during the year under consideration was allowable as deduction or not. The Tribunal rightly allowed the deduction claimed by the assessee on account of tax payment made under Entry Tax Act.(AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. TVS Motors Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 1 / 223 Taxmann 197 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

891 **S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Contribution made before due date for furnishing return of income under 139(1),the employer is entitled for deduction. [S. 2(24)(X), 36(va), 139(1)]**

Allowing the appeal the Court held that from the perusal of paras 30 & 39 of PF Scheme it is clear that the word “ contribution “ is used not only to mean contribution of the employer but also contribution to be made on behalf of the member employed by the employer directly. The word “contribution“used in cl(b) of the 43 B means the contribution of the employer and the employees. That being so , if the contribution is made on or before the due date for furnishing the return of income under the employer is entitled for deduction. (AY. 2008-09)

Essae Tera Oka (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT 266 CTR 246 / 222 Taxmann 170 / 366 ITR 408 (Karn.)(HC)

892 **S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Liability of earlier year Method of accounting – Mercantile – Held to be allowable in the year of payment. [S.37(1), 145]**

The Court held that claim for deduction was therefore allowable in the year of payment i.e AY.1984-85. Claim was made on the basis of valuation which was disputed by the assessee. Even before the introduction of S/43 B, it could not have been said that in all cases the assessee, maintaining books of accounts in a mercantile system , could not be permitted to deduct the amount paid in respect of liability which was incurred in earlier years.(AY. 1984-85)

ITC Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 532 / 267 CTR 405 / (2015) 229 Taxman 82 (Cal.)(HC)

893 **S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Employees’ contribution to PF etc. is allowable if deposited before due date of filing ROI. [S. 2(24)(x), 28,36(1)(va)].**

Section 43B made it mandatory for the department to grant deduction in computing the income under section 28 in the year in which tax, duty, cess, etc. is actually paid. However, Parliament took cognizance of the fact that the accounting year of a company did not always tally with the due dates under certain statutes and, therefore, by way of the first proviso, an incentive / relaxation was sought to be given in respect of tax,

duty, cess or fee by explicitly stating that if such tax, duty, cess or fee is paid before the date of filing of the return under the Income Tax Act, the assessee would be entitled to deduction. It did not apply to contributions to labour welfare funds. The second proviso resulted in implementation problems which led to deletion of the second proviso in the Finance Act, 2003 and bringing about uniformity in the first proviso by equating tax, duty, cess and fee with contributions to welfare funds like employees' provident fund, superannuation fund and other welfare funds. The first proviso by Finance Act, 2003 was made applicable with effect from April 1, 2004 and the assessee would argue that it was curative in nature, clarificatory and, therefore, applied retrospectively from 1st April, 1988. The department argued that applied prospectively. The Supreme Court held that Finance Act, 2003 would be applicable retrospectively and defaulter who fails to pay the contribution to the welfare fund right upto April 1, 2004 and who pays the contribution after April 1, 2004, would get the benefit of deduction under section 43B of the I.T. Act. It was held that the Finance Act, 2003 to the extent indicated above would be curative in nature and hence is retrospective. The reason being to be that the employers should not sit on the collected contributions and deprive the workmen of the rightful benefits under social welfare legislations by delaying payment of contributions to the welfare funds. We are of the view that the decision of the Supreme Court in *CIT v. Alom Extrusions Ltd.* (2009) 319 ITR 306 (SC) applies to employees' contribution as well as employers' contribution.

CIT v. Ghatge Patil Transport Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 749 / 112 DTR 369 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 340 (Bom.)(HC)

S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Excise duty – Interest – Mercantile system of accounting – Provision for excise duty and interest not deductible. [S.145]

894

Object of section 43B is to override mercantile system of accounting where statutory liability was not actually discharged, and provision for excise duty as well as for interest is allowable under section 43B only on actual payment basis. Thus provision is not allowable. (AY. 1990-91)

CIT v. Simbhaoli Industries P. Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 173 / 225 Taxmann 61 (All.)(HC)

S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Excise duty – Payment made after adjudication in assessment year 1984-85 and not during relevant year – Deductible

895

The assessee incurred liability to pay the excise duty. The assessee disputed the valuation and the matter went to the adjudicatory authority. Once the demand was adjudicated, the assessee paid the amount adjudicated and claimed deduction thereof. The assessee made the payment after adjudication and not during the relevant year. The Tribunal held that the liability of earlier assessment years could not be allowed as a deduction out of the profit of the relevant assessment year 1984-85 in terms of section 43B. Allowing the appeal the Court held that for arriving at the total income of the previous year, only the expenditure pertaining to that previous year to be deducted. It was not open to the assessee to deduct the expenses of earlier years or subsequent years for arriving at the total income of that previous year. Payment was made after adjudication in assessment year 1984-85 and not during relevant year, the same is deductible. (AY. 1984-85)

ITC Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 532 / 101 DTR 358 / 229 taxmann 82 / 267 CTR 405 (Cal.)(HC)

896 **S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Excise duty – Mercantile system of accounting – Allowable in the year in which was paid. [S.37(1), 145]**

It was held that where assessee's liability to pay excise duty relating to earlier years was adjudicated during relevant assessment year, assessee could claim deduction of amount so paid in assessment year in question even though books of account were maintained on mercantile system of accounting. (AY.1984-85)

ITC Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 532 / 101 DTR 358 / 44 Taxmann.com 209 (Cal.)(HC)

897 **S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Provident fund – Employees State Insurance – Allowable if payment was made before due date of filing of return. [S.2(24)(X), 36(1), 139(1)]**

Deduction is allowed u/s 36(1) r.w.s 24(x) while computing the income of the Assessee if the contribution toward PF & ESI were made on or before the due date of filing return u/s. 139(1). [S.43B]

CIT v. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation. (2014) 366 ITR 170 / 265 CTR 64 / 223 Taxmann 398 (Guj.)(HC)

898 **S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment-Guarantee fee payable to scheduled bank.**

High Court held that if the amount paid to the scheduled bank is only the guarantee fee then it would not attract Section 43B of the Act; but if it is interest, then it would be covered by provisions of section 43B. Matter was restored to the Assessing Officer to ascertain the facts for fresh determination.

CIT v. Enchante Jewellery Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 8 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

899 **S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Payment to ESI and Provident Fund**
Assessee deposited employer and employee's contribution to ESI and Provident Fund prior to filing of return under section 139(1), it was entitled to deduction of amount so deposited and, thus, impugned disallowance made by assessing authority under section 43B in such a case was to be deleted. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Mark Auto Industries Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 43 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 75 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

900 **S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment-Employer's contribution to ESI and PF contributions**

Subsequent to the income being assessed by the AO, the AO issued a notice under section 154/155 to the assessee and added back under section 43B the employer's contribution to Provident Fund and ESI amount deposited after expiry of relevant year but before filing the return of income. On appeal, both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the additions made by the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee approached the High Court. The High Court following the Supreme Court decision of *CIT v. Alom Extrusions Ltd. (2009) 319 ITR 306* held in favour of the assessee, that the amendment by Finance Act, 2003, whereby second proviso to section 43B was deleted, to be curative in nature and was operative from 1-4-1988 (when first proviso came to be inserted). Once

that was so, the appellant was entitled to deduction on account of contributions made to ESI and PF fund before the filing of the income tax return. (AY. 1998-99)
Nuchem Ltd. v. ITAT (2014) 220 Taxmann 110 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

S.43B : Certain deductions to be only on actual payment – Sales tax converted into loan

901

During the year, assessee converted the sales tax liability into loan on March 24, 2003 which was within the relevant assessment year. The circular issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes permits and allows sales tax liability, which is converted into a loan to be set off in the year in which the liability is so converted and the Government order is issued. In the present case, the order was passed on March 24, 2003, when the conversion was allowed. Therefore the High Court stated that the assessee could not be denied the benefit and the expenditure/ deduction was to be allowed under section 43B of the Income Tax Act, 1961 in the year in question. (AY. 2003-04)
CIT v. Minda Wirelinks (P.) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 81 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Employee's contribution paid after due date but before filing return of income allowed as deduction – Amendment w.e.f has retrospective effect. [S.36(1)(va)]

902

Where PF and/or EPF, CPF, GPF, etc., was paid after due date under respective Acts but before filing of return of income under section 139(1), same could not be disallowed under section 43B or under section 36(1)(va). Amendment is curative in nature, hence it is retrospective in nature and would operate with effect from April 1, 1988. (AYs. 2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04 to 2006-07)
CIT v. State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur (2014) 363 ITR 70 / 265 CTR 471 / 225 Taxman 6 (Mag.) (Raj.)(HC)
CIT v. Jaipur Vidyut Vitaran Nigam Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 70 / 265 CTR 471 (Raj.)(HC)
CIT v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 307 / 265 CTR 471 (Raj.)(HC)
CIT v. Jaipur Vidyut Vitaran Nigam Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 307 / 265 CTR 471 (Raj.)(HC)

S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Employees contribution to Provident Fund & deduction is allowable if paid before due date for filing return of income. [S.36(1)(va), 139(1)]

903

On a plain reading of the second proviso to S.43B, it is clear that the assessees – employers were entitled to deductions only if the contribution to any fund for the welfare of the employees stood credited on or before the due date given in the relevant Act. However, because the second proviso created difficulties for the assessees – employers, an amendment was inserted vide Finance Act, 2003 with effect from 1st April 2004 to delete the second proviso to s. 43B and to amend the first proviso to provide that the deduction would be allowed if the amount was paid on or before the due date for furnishing the return of income u/s 139(1). Therefore, the amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2003 put on par the benefit of deductions of tax, duty, cess and fee on the one hand with contributions to various Employee's Welfare Funds on the other. In *CIT v. Alom Extrusions Ltd. (2009) 319 ITR 306 (SC)* it was held that

the amendment to the s. 43B by the Finance Act, 2003 w.e.f. 1-4-2004 was retrospective in nature and would operate from 1-4-1988. Consequently, the ITAT rightly deleted the addition of ₹ 1.82 cr on account of delayed payment of Provident Fund of employees' contribution. Even otherwise, we fail to understand how this deduction could have been disallowed to the Assessee. Admittedly, the AY in question is 2006-07. The second proviso to s. 43B was deleted w.e.f. 01.04.2004 and simultaneously the first proviso was also amended bringing about a uniformity in deductions claimed towards tax, duty, cess and fee on the one hand and contribution to the employees' provident fund, superannuation fund and other welfare funds on the other. These deductions being claimed in the return of income filed for AY 2006-07, the amendments to s. 43B which came into force w.e.f. 01.04.2004 clearly applied to the assessee's case.

CIT v. Hindustan Organics Chemicals Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 1 / 107 DTR 105 / 270 CTR 478 (Bom)(HC)

904 **S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Employers'/Employees' contribution towards PF and ESI – Paid prior to filing of return – No disallowance can be made. [S.2(24)(x),36(1)(va),139(1)]**

Assessee deposited employer's and employees' contributions to the PF and ESI prior to the filing of the return u/s. 139(1) though beyond due dates. Deductions could not be disallowed u/s. 43B. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Hemla Embroidery Mills (P) Ltd. (2104) 366 ITR 167 / 98 DTR 107 / 265 CTR 57 (P&H)(HC)

CIT v. UT Star Com.Inc. (2104) 98 DTR 107 (P&H)(HC)

905 **S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Employees contribution – Provident fund – Eligible for deduction which was paid before due date of filing of return. [S. 2(24)(x), 36(1)(va), 139(1)]**

Amendment of section 43B applies to employees's as well as employer's contribution towards Provident Fund and assessee was eligible to deduction for employees' contribution which was paid before due date prescribed under section 139(1) of the Act. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Spectrum Consultants India (P) Ltd. (2014) 100 DTR 129 / 266 CTR 241 / 227 Taxmann 164 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

906 **S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Employees' PF/ ESI Contribution is also covered by s. 43B & allowable as a deduction if paid by "due date" of filing ROI. [S.2(24)(x) 36(1)(va),139(1)]**

The assessee collected ESI & PF from its employees but did not pay the sum to the respective funds within the due date prescribed in relevant legislation. The amount was, however, paid before the due date u/s 139(1) for filing the ROI. The AO & CIT(A) disallowed the payment u/s 36(1)(va) read with s. 2(24)(x). Before the Tribunal, the department justified the disallowance by relying on *Dy. CIT v. Ashika Stock Broking Ltd (2011) 139 TTJ 192 (Kol)* (which in turn relied on *Jt. CIT v. ITC Ltd (2008) 112 ITD 57 (Kol) (SB)* where it was held that s. 43B does not apply to employees' contribution). However, the Tribunal declined to follow that law and allowed the appeal by relying on

CIT v. Sabari Enterprises (2008) 298 ITR 141 (Kar) and *CIT v. P.M. Electronics Ltd. (2008) 220 CTR 635 (Del)* where it was held that s. 43B applied also to employees' contribution to ESI and PF and that if a payment was made within the due date u/s 139(1) of filing the ROI, the disallowance cannot be made. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal:

The only issue involved in this appeal is as to whether the deletion of the addition by the AO on account of employees' contribution to ESI and PF by invoking the provision of s. 36(1)(va) read with s. 2(24)(x) of the Act was correct or not. In *CIT v. Alom Extrusion Ltd. (2009) 319 ITR 306* the Supreme Court has held that the amendment to the second proviso to s. 43B as introduced by Finance Act, 2003, was curative in nature and is required to be applied retrospectively with effect from 1st April, 1988. Such being the position, the deletion of the amount paid by the Assessee as Employees' Contribution beyond due date was deductible by invoking the aforesaid amended provisions of s.43B of the Act. We, therefore, find that no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal and consequently, we dismiss this appeal.

CIT v. Vijay Shree Ltd. (Cal.)(HC), www.itatonline.org

Editorial: Jt. CIT v. ITC Ltd. (2008) 112 ITD 57 (Kol)(SB)(Trib.) impliedly reversed.

S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Surcharge on sales tax and turnover tax – Allowable as deduction [S.37(1)]

907

Assessee had quantified liability of surcharge on sales tax and turnover tax. It paid same within due date in terms of section 43B. Since assessee was following mercantile system of accounting, deduction claimed on these amounts was to be allowed. (AY. 2009-10 & 2010-11)

Kerala State Beverage (M&M) Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 291 (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.43B : Certain deductions on actual payment – Leave encashment payment. [S.37(1)]

908

Leave encashment though pertaining to earlier year is allowable on actual payment basis in year of payment. The assessee that the leave encashment though pertaining to earlier year is allowable on actual payment basis in the year of payment i.e. assessment year in question. It has not been disputed that assessee has not claimed this expenditure in earlier year. Assessee is eligible for deduction of leave encashment payment u/s. 43B.

ACIT v. Bhharati Teletech Ltd. (2014) 150 ITD 185 / 163 TTJ 36 (UO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

Section 43D : Special provision in case of income of public financial institutions, public companies etc.

S.43D : Public financial institutions – Bad and doubtful debts – Guidelines of RBI – Rule 6EA of Income-tax Rules, 1962 – Not allowable as per RBI guidelines

909

The assessee was an urban co-operative society engaged in the business of banking. Assessee claimed that categorization of bad and doubtful debts should be made having regard to guidelines issued by RBI. AO as well as CIT (A) was of view that categorization was to be made as per prescribed rules which are contained in rule 6EA of Income-tax Rules, 1962 having regard to section 43D(a). Before ITAT it was found that a similar controversy had been considered by Mumbai Bench of Tribunal in case of

GIC Housing Finance Ltd. v. Addl. CIT [2011] 45 SOT 318 / 10 taxmann.com 50 wherein stand of revenue was upheld. In view of aforesaid precedent, there was no error on part of CIT(A) in upholding stand of AO. (AY. 2007-08 and 2008-09)
Cosmos Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 90 (Pune)(Trib.)

Section 44AD : Special provision for computing profits and gains of business of civil construction, etc.

910 **S.44AD : Civil construction – Estimate of profit – Separate deduction of depreciation is not allowable. [S.115JA]**

During the assessment years under consideration, the assessee worked out the profit as per the provision under section 115-JA. The assessee had not furnished the details as asked by the AO so the books of account were rejected. Thereupon, the AO, thus, estimated the net profit rate at the rate of 10 per cent of the gross receipt and made the additions accordingly. The CIT(A) reduced the net profit rate to 8 per cent on estimate basis, but did not allow depreciation as claimed. The Tribunal reduced the net profit rate at the rate of 3.5 per cent and allowed the depreciation as claimed from the contract receipts.

High Court observed that the net effect of the decision of the tribunal was that it had resulted into a negative figure or marginal profit in other assessment years. Thus the relief appears more than the rate of net profit @ 10 per cent estimated by the AO. In such cases, the intention and purpose behind the relevant provisions in the statute i.e. to estimate the income and not to estimate negative income (loss) is defined. In the instant case, the impugned orders of tribunal have resulted into just opposite to it. The term net profit by its very name is an all-inclusive one or in a nutshell it is the profit which has been arrived at after netting off of income over the expenditure, meaning thereby that whatever expenses or notional expenses were due are to be deducted from the income of the firm or the company prior to deriving the final figure, i.e., profit. It is the same profit that is offered for taxation. Therefore, when the AO applied the rate of 10 per cent for estimating the net profit then the depreciation is deemed to have already been given especially when the AO in his concluding line of the assessment order had clearly mentioned that 'Since no deduction from sections 30 to 38 including depreciation is allowable as per section 44AD, in case of small contractors, therefore no deduction on account of depreciation etc. will be allowed, on net profit, in this case also'. Thus, the estimated net profit includes depreciation and it cannot be claimed separately. Secondly, subsequent to the Assessment year 1994-95, in such matters the basic principle as enumerated in section 44-AD is taken to be applicable wherein the matrix of estimation of profit on gross receipts have been laid down for the civil construction work. In the light of above and by considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Net Profit at rate of 3.5 per cent estimated by the Tribunal was upheld being question of fact. But the AO was directed that no separate deduction like depreciation would be allowed. This was so because, when the Net Profit was made on estimate basis after rejecting the books of account, then no separate deduction including depreciation would be allowed. In the instant case, when the books of account were rejected, then the assessee was not entitled for the depreciation separately on the same set of books of account which have no value after its rejection. Hence, the impugned

order passed by the Tribunal was modified pertaining to the addition and it was directed that the depreciation would not be allowed when the books of account were rejected and net profit rate was estimated. (AY. 1994-95, 2003-04)

CIT v. Sahu Construction (P) Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 609 / 222 Taxmann 167 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

S.44AD : Civil construction – Assessing Officer rejected book results and estimated at 8% u/s. 44AD. Additions also made u/s.68 – Addition was held to be justified. [S.68, 144]

911

Assessment was made u/s. 144 thereby rejecting book results wherein estimation of profit is made as provided in section 44AD and sundry creditors are treated as unexplained u/s 68 on account of non verification due to non submission of details. CIT(Appeals) and Tribunal held that once profit is estimated at 8% u/s. 44AD no separate addition could be made. On appeal by revenue to High Court, held that where certain unexplained sundry creditors are found in the account books of the assessee, whose business income is determined on estimate basis and not on the basis of his returned income, the AO is not prevented from treating the unexplained sundry creditors standing in the books of account as income from undisclosed sources.

CIT v. G. S. Tiwari & Co. (2013) 357 ITR 651 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 111 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

S.44AD : Civil construction – Computation – Net profit of 5% of contract receipt was held to be valid instead of 8% estimated by Tribunal

912

The assessee was a civil contractor. In the absence of proper books of account maintained, the Assessing Officer estimated the assessee's income at 8 per cent of the gross contract receipts by invoking the provisions of Section 44AD. The CIT(A) held that net profit of assessee was to be assessed at 5 per cent of contractual receipts considering the margin of previous years. The Tribunal gave findings that the assessee had not filed profit and loss account or balance sheet for the relevant years and that the returns and the vouchers produced were defective in nature, and it accordingly confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer, thereby taking 8 per cent of the gross turnover as the income of the assessee. On appeal to the High Court, it was held that, since the assessee's gross contract receipts were in excess of ₹ 40 lakhs for the assessment years 2006-07 and 2007-08, Section 44AD had no relevance and thus assessee's income should not have been assessed at the high rate of 8 per cent. The CIT(A) was right in considering margin of 5 per cent of contractual receipts. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

K. Kannan v. ACIT (2014) 220 Taxman 250 / 103 DTR 300 (Mad.)(HC)

Section 44B : Special provision for computing profits and gains of shipping business in the case of non-residents

S.44B : Shipping business – Non-residents – International traffic – Charging freight from place outside India – Income from inland haulage – Part income derived from operation of ships – Not taxable in India-DTAA-India-Belgium [S.9(1)(i), 90, Art. 8(2)(b)(ii)]

913

The assessee was engaged in the business of operation of ships in international traffic. It was tax resident of Belgium. The assessee charged freight from the place inside India

where the goods were picked up to the point of destination port or destination station. Assessee had collected in land hauling charges from its customers for international traffic. AO held that such in land haul charges were not within purview of section 44AB of the Act and charged as business profits. In appeal CIT (A) held that such inland haulage charges earned by the assessee were only part of the income derived from the operation of ships and therefore were covered under article 8 of the DTAA between India and Belgium and consequently not taxable as business profits. On appeal Tribunal decided in favour of assessee. On appeal by revenue, dismissing the appeal the Court held that income from inland transport of cargo within India was covered under article 8(2)(ii) and (c) of the DTAA between India and Belgium and therefore not taxable in India. Article 8(2)(b)(ii) and (c) includes within its ambit the activity of inland transport of cargo from various places within India. (AY. 2006-07)

DIT(IT) v. Safmarine Container Lines NV (2014) 367 ITR 209 / 225 Taxmann 299 / 108 DTR 251 (Bom.)(HC)

914 **S.44B : Shipping business – Non-residents – Computation – Reimbursement of expenses – Provision was held to be not applicable**

Assessee is engaged in business of refining crude oil, entered in to contracts with non-resident for supply of equipment, designs and drawings and project management and supervision contract. Demurrage charges incurred by non-resident on behalf of assessee were reimbursed. The AO brought to tax the said reimbursement under section 44B of the Act. On appeal CIT(A) and Tribunal held that reimbursement of expenses incurred on behalf of assess cannot be brought with in section 44B(1) as the said special provision for computing the profits and gains of shipping business in the case of non-resident and the said section envisages the profits and gains of business of operation of ships. On appeal by revenue, dismissing the appeal the Court held that present case , both conditions envisaged by sub section (1) of section 44B were not fulfilled and thus section 44B was not applicable. Order of Tribunal was confirmed.

CIT v. Mangalore Refineries Petrochemicals Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 58 (Bom.)(HC)

Section 44BB : Special provision for computing profits and gains in connection wit the business of exploration, etc., of mineral oils

- 915 **S.44BB : Mineral oils – Non-resident – Income earned by way of prospecting for, or extraction or production of, mineral oils – Amendment excluding such income from section 115A(1)(b) with effect from 1-4-2004 – Royalty and technical fees taxable under section 44DA(1) – Amendment resolving conflicts between section 44BB(1) and section 44DA(1) with effect from 1-4-2011 – Technical fees rendered for prospecting, etc. of minerals during that period – Taxable under section 44BB(1). [S. 44DA, 115A(1)(b)]**
- Held, allowing the appeal, (i) that since the assessee was engaged in business of providing services in connection with prospecting for mineral oils, if its income fell within the ambit of section 44DA(1) it would be taxable under section 44BB(1).
- (ii) That by virtue of the Finance Act, 2003, such income was excluded from the ambit of section 115A(1)(b) with effect from April 1, 2004. Although with effect from that date such income was taxable under section 44DA(1), in certain cases where such income

was earned by the assessee by providing services in connection with prospecting for, or extraction or production of mineral oils, the income would also fall within the express language of section 44BB(1) and the provisions of section 44BB(1) would be applied in preference to section 44DA(1) in those cases. This conflict between section 44BB(1) and section 44DA(1) was resolved by the Finance Act, 2010, by introduction of a reference to section 44DA in the proviso to section 44BB(1) with effect from April 1, 2011, and simultaneously introducing a second proviso to section 44DA(1). Thus, after April 1, 2011, income falling within the scope of section 44DA(1) would be excluded from the scope of section 44BB. However, during the period from April 1, 2004, to April 1, 2011, i.e., the period when income falling within section 44DA(1) was excluded from the ambit of section 115A(1)(b) but was not expressly excluded from the scope of section 44BB(1), the income was liable to be taxed under section 44BB(1). Since the assessment year 2008-09 fell within the period, the income of the assessee, to the extent it fell within the scope of section 44DA(1) and stood excluded from section 115A(1)(b), would be computed in accordance with section 44BB(1). (AY. 2008-09)

PGS Geophysical AS v. Addl. DIT (2014) 369 ITR 27 / 269 CTR 433 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 394 (Delhi)(HC)

S.44BB : Business of exploration – Fees for technical services. [S. 9(1)(vii)]

916

In this case the AO treated part of the income as fees for technical services without pointing out which part relates to fees for technical services. The Tribunal held that it is settled proposition of law that when a contract consists of a number of terms and conditions, each condition does not form separate contract and the contract has to be read as whole and further held that the CIT(A) has rightly considered the entire income to be taxed under section 44BB. (AY. 2005-06)

Addl. DIT v. Valentine Maritime (Gulf) LLC (2014) 159 TTJ 706 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 44C : Deduction of head office expenditure in the case of Non-residents

S.44C : Non-residents – Head office expenditure – Reimbursement of expenses – Allowed in full – Allocation of expenses towards staff cost has to be considered – Matter remanded

917

Assessee was an Indian branch of a foreign bank. NRI desk expenses and direct staff costs were incurred by its head office. Assessee reimbursed same and claimed that said expenses were attributable to its business activities. However, AO made adjustment to ALP in respect of reimbursement of expenses. On similar issue, Tribunal in assessee's own case in earlier year held that direct and exclusive NRI Desk expenses incurred by head office were to be allowed in full as same were not hit by section 44C; however allocated expenses towards staff cost incurred by various other head offices support centers to NRI Desk were to be considered as per provisions of section 44C. Matter remanded. (AY. 2006-07)

Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait v. Dy. DIT (2014) 64 SOT 125 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)

918 **S.44C : Non-residents – Head office expenditure – Cost reimbursed does not fall within the ambit of head office expenses**

The Tribunal held that the cost which has been allocated to the branch and reimbursed by it does not fall within the ambit of head office expenses for the purpose of section 44C. Expenses as given in section 44C has to be necessarily in the nature of executive and general administrative expenses only. (AY. 2004-05)

ADIT v. Antwerp Diamond Bank NV (2014) 163 TTJ 175 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 45 : Capital gains

919 **S.45 : Capital gains – Relinquishment of sub-tenancy rights – Assessable as capital gains – Not under head “Income from other sources”. [S.10(3), 56(1)]**

The assessee, had received ₹ 5 lakhs as miscellaneous income from relinquishment of sub-tenancy rights of a property and offered as capital gains. AO assessed the amount as income from other sources. Tribunal held that such amount was capital gains. On appeal :

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the Revenue could have taxed the amount of ₹ 5 lakhs, which was received towards surrendering of tenancy rights from the lessor, under the head of “Capital gains” and not under any other head. (AY. 1992-93)

CIT v. G. C. Shah and Co. (2014) 369 ITR 323 (Guj.)(HC)

920 **S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Share broker maintaining separate portfolios for investment and stock-in-trade – Profit from sale of shares of three companies held as investment – Assessable as short-term capital gains. [S.28(i)]**

The assessee, though a member of the Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange, maintained two portfolios, one relating to investments and the other relating to stock-in-trade. Profits and losses from investments were shown as “capital gains” either long-term or short-term and profits and losses from “stock-in-trade” were shown as “business income”. This position was also accepted in earlier assessment years, i.e., 2002-03 onwards. The shares held as investment were kept in a separate portfolio. The shares related to only three companies and were not treated as stock-in-trade. These shares were sold after a gap of four months or more. Hence, the profits were assessable as short-term capital gains. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. CNB Finwiz Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 228 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 175 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

921 **S.45 : Capital gains – Full value of consideration – Distress sale – Assessee objecting to value adopted by stamp valuation authority – AO was directed to work out capital gains by adopting market value under section 50C(2). [S.50C(2)]**

Assessee objecting to value adopted by stamp valuation authority, as the sale was distress sale. AO instead of referring valuation to Valuation Officer estimating capital gains tax confirmed by Tribunal. On appeal by assessee allowing the appeal the Court held that when the assessee has made specific claim that AO should have referred matter to Valuation Officer for valuation of capital asset in terms of section 50C(2). Mere

assertion by assessee suffice for attraction of section 50C(2). AO was directed to work out capital gains by adopting market value under section 50C(2). (AY. 2007-08) *Appadurai Vijayaraghavan v. Jt. CIT(OSD)* (2014) 369 ITR 486 226 Taxmann 111 / (2015) 115 DTR 209 / 275 CTR 565 (Mad.)(HC)

S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Purchase and sale of shares – Purchase of shares of a group of companies – Shares held for a long time Sale of part of holding to repay loan – No adventure in the nature of trade – Profits from sale of shares not assessable as business income. [S.28(i)]

922

The assessee disclosed short-term capital gains at ₹ 67,41,488 in her return of income which was treated by the AO as income from adventure in the nature of trade and hence business income. The Tribunal found that the assessee was not a business person and she hardly ever indulged in any purchase or sale of shares in the past. She had no knowledge of the share market or equities that are traded in it. The majority of the shares purchased were of the group companies only, indicating the lack of intention to deal in the shares. Out of the total shares purchased, only a part were sold because of an unexpected spurt in prices and the remaining were retained. Part shares were sold to repay the loan at the earliest as the assessee was a person of limited means and did not wish to carry a liability for long. Held that the amount were not assessable as business income.

CIT v. Sonia Uppal (Smt.) (2014) 367 ITR 70 / 52 taxmann.com 62 (P&H)(HC)

S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Investment in shares – Certain shares were sold before completion of year – Gain assessable as capital gains and not business income. [S.28(i)]

923

Where the assessee was able to substantiate its intention of holding shares as 'investment' and not as 'stock-in-trade', only because in certain instances shares were sold before completion of the year, there was no reason for the AO to treat this income as 'business income'. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Rita Diwan (Smt.) (2014) 227 Taxmann 39 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Investment in shares – Assessable as capital gains and not as business income. [S.28(i)]

924

Assessee was engaged in marketing and distribution of books. He purchased shares in previous year which was shown as investment and that treatment was accepted by income-tax-authorities. He sold certain shares during earlier year and gains were treated as short-term capital gains. During relevant assessment year left out shares were five-fold increased mainly due to issue of bonus shares which resulted in assessee becoming owner of huge number of shares. AO treated the income derived on sale of these shares were treated as business income instead of capital gain by AO. CIT(A) and Tribunal held that the surplus was assessable as capital gains. On appeal by revenue dismissing the appeal the Court held that surplus realised on sale shares were to be taxed under head 'capital gain'. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Om Prakash Arora (2014) 225 Taxmann 73 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

- 925 **S.45 : Capital gains – TDR – FSI – Gains on sale of TDR received as additional FSI as per the D. C. Regulations has no cost of acquisition and is not chargeable to capital gains. [S.48, 55(2)(a)]**

Only an asset which is capable of acquisition at a cost would be included within the provisions pertaining to the head “Capital gains” as opposed to assets in the acquisition of which no cost at all can be conceived. In the present case as well, the situation was that the FSI/TDR was generated by the plot itself. There was no cost of acquisition, which has been determined and on the basis of which the Assessing Officer could have proceeded to levy and assess the gains derived as capital gains. It may be that sub-section (2) of section 55 clause (a) having been amended, there is a stipulation with regard to the tenancy rights. However, even in the case of tenancy right, the view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after the provision was substituted w.e.f. 1st April, 1995, is as above. The further argument is that the tenancy rights now can be brought within the tax net and in the present case the asset or the benefit is attached to the property. It is capable of being transferred. All this may be true but as the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds it must be capable of being acquired at a cost or that has to be ascertainable. In the present case, additional FSI/TDR is generated by change in the D. C. Rules. A specific insertion would therefore be necessary so as to ascertain its cost for computing the capital gains. Therefore, the Tribunal was in no error in concluding that the TDR which was generated by the plot/property/land and came to be transferred under a document in favour of the purchaser would not result in the gains being assessed to capital gains. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Sambhaji Nagar Co-op Hsg. Society Ltd. (2015) 370 ITR 325 / 113 DTR 89 / 273 CTR 430 / 229 Taxmann 226 (Bom.)(HC)

- 926 **S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Share transactions – Purchase from wife – Matter was set aside. [S.40A(2)]**

The revenue had objected to a certain share transaction undertaken by the assessee contending that such purchase and sale of shares in quick succession was solely with the purpose of booking artificial loss. The CIT(A) had based its order on the premise that the transaction itself was not genuine. The Tribunal remanded the matter back for fresh consideration. It observed that merely the assessee made purchase of shares from his wife cannot be a ground to hold that the transaction has been carried out with the intention to book loss and to evade tax. In order to curb the transaction with the related parties, there is a specific provision under section 40A(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee has also not furnished the necessary details to AO in support of prevailing fair market value of the shares on the date of purchases. Hence, the matter was set aside and AO was directed to apply specific provisions of section 40A(2). The HC stated that no question of law was arose and the appeal was dismissed.

CIT v. Rasiklal Mardia (2014) 222 Taxmann 127 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.45 : Capital gains – Firm – Partner – Stock in trade – Capital asset – Dissolution – Stock-in-trade of firm can be held as capital asset in the hands of partners after dissolution – Sale consideration received by partner is assessable as capital gains and not business income. [Ss.2(14), 28(i)]

927

The correct test to be applied is whether the partnership assets were converted to capital assets of the partners at the time of dissolution. This we find, was provided for in the dissolution deed itself which records in clause (3) that the parties have agreed to take over the plots of land as co-owners and as capital assets and they shall have co-ownership and as a test of conversion if applied, the assessee has indeed provided for conversion. Hence we have no difficulty in concluding that the property does not seem to be stock-in-trade by the execution of the dissolution deed. In our view, there is no mode which provides for conversion of stock-in-trade into capital assets except by agreement of parties.

In the instant case, the deed of dissolution achieves that objective. In the case of Khatau Valabhdas, the Court was concerned with the division of stock-in-trade i.e. grocery products. In the present case, the business of the partnership was of builders / contractors and not of buying and selling the land and the partners at the material time were not engaged in any construction activity and no such construction was being carried out on the land. A building was to be put up on the land purchased by the erstwhile partnership firm but the land remained vacant and nothing is done on the land or to the land so as to show it as stock-in-trade and not treat it as capital assets share of the assessee.

In the circumstances, we answer both the questions in the negative and hold in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. We hold that the Tribunal had no material to come to the conclusion that the land sold by the applicant/assessee was stock-in-trade and the Tribunal was not justified to treat the same as business income. However, we leave open the question whether the amount in the hands of the applicant/assessee is to be treated as long term capital gains or short term capital gains to be decided by the department. (AY. 1998-99)

Arvind Shamji Chheda v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 368 / 112 DTR 143 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 341 (Bom.)(HC)

S.45 : Capital gains – Business income or short term capital gains – Sale of shares – Assessable as capital gains. [S.28(i)]

928

The assessee invested its shareholder's funds in shares/units of mutual funds in terms of the decision of its management from time-to-time. Whilst the investments were not demarcated and sourced through separate accounts, equally the fact remains that the objects of the company permitted such transactions. What is more, there were only 11 sale and purchase of scrips – these did not indicate any great volume or frequency of share/purchase transactions. Keeping in mind the ruling in *CIT v. Associated Industrial Development Co. (P) Ltd.* [1971] 82 ITR 586 (SC) as well as other decisions that undue emphasis cannot be given on one indicating factor alone, the findings of fact arrived at by the Commissioner (Appeals) and confirmed by the ITAT, in the impugned order, do not disclose any error so as to call for interference. Held, the Assessing Officer was considerably influenced by the profit in respect of sale of shares, which, according to

him, on analysis of the facts, was business income. One of the primary reasons for his conclusion was the short duration to the extent of the holding period of 10 days. The assessee counters the revenue's submissions here arguing that the shares had been purchased out of its own funds; the activity was duly authorised by its Memorandum & Articles of Association. As regards the volume of share transactions, the assessee points out that it had dealt in only nine scrips during the entire year, which included 17 share purchase transactions and 22 sale transactions during the year, totalling to 40 transactions in all during the entire year, i.e., one transaction in 10 days. This was not a very high frequency of transactions. The assessee also received dividend on the shares held by it and its infrastructure was small whereas the business activity required a much larger infrastructure. Hence, income from sale of shares was assessable as capital gains. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

CIT v. Devasan Investment P. Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 452 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 273 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

Editorial: Special Leave Petition of revenue was dismissed. (SLA Nos. 17217 & 17946 of 2014 dt. 7-11-2014) CIT v. Devasan Investment (P) Ltd. (2015) 229 Taxmann 496 (SC)

929 **S.45 : Capital gains – Shares – Frequent purchase and sale of shares and magnitude of some transactions being high are not conditions to consider income from sale of shares as business income. [S.2(29A), 28(i)]**

The assessee treated purchase of shares as investment and hence considered sale of shares as long term capital gains. The AO treated the income from sale as business income on the ground that the assessee indulged in frequent purchase and sale of shares and the magnitude of some transactions was very high. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal directed the AO to consider the income as long term capital gains.

The High Court observed that a similar issue in the assessee's own case had come up for hearing in respect of an earlier assessment year wherein the High Court had confirmed that the income was to be considered as capital gains. The High Court following its own judgment in the assessee's own case for the previous assessment year dismissed the appeal and treated the income as capital gains. (AY. 2009-10)

CIT v. Nita M. Patel (2014) 221 Taxmann 416 (Guj.)(HC)

930 **S.45 : Capital gains – Income from sale of shares held as investment in companies which were formed with object to promote agro/horticulture based industry is capital gain and not business income. [S.28(i)]**

The assessee was a Punjab Government Undertaking and its principal object was to promote agro/horticulture based industry in State of Punjab. The assessee made investments in shares of companies which were jointly promoted by assessee along with private entrepreneurs with basic object of promoting agro/horticulture based industry in State of Punjab. The AO held that the surplus/loss resulting to the assessee on sale of the shares was to be considered as a business income/loss since the investments made in shares amounted to a business activity whereas the assessee had declared surplus/loss on the shares as capital gain/loss. The CIT(A) partly upheld the Assessment Order and ITAT upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal holding that the sale of investments of shares by the assessee was exigible to tax under the head capital gain instead of business income.

On appeal by the department, the High Court observed that income in a particular case falls under the head of capital gains or business depending upon the nature of business of the assessee and attending circumstances. It further observed that the dividing line for deciding the head of income may be very thin and a transaction was not necessarily in the nature of trade because the purchase was made with the intention of resale. The High Court following its own decisions in case of *Saroj Kumar Mazumdar v. CIT (1959) 37 ITR 242* and *Janki Ram Bhadur Ram v. CIT (1965) 57 ITR 21* held that a capital investment and resale do not lose their capital nature merely because the resale was foreseen and contemplated when the investment was made and hence the same could be considered as a capital gain/loss. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Punjab Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 419 / 103 DTR 332 (P&H)(HC)

S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Share dealing – Assessee was a salaried employee – Income derived from purchase and sale of shares was held to be capital gain. [S.28(i)]

931

The assessee a salaried person filed a return of income which included income from salary and receipt from trading of the share and long term capital gain. The AO held that the assessee was trading in shares and taxed the entire income as business income. On appeal the CIT(A) and Tribunal held that the assessee cannot be stated in the business of trading in shares. On further appeal by the revenue the High Court observed that the assessee sold small amount of shares under short term capital gains as against the bulk of the shares inviting long term capital gain and upheld the view of the Tribunal. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Saurah Rameshchandra Lavti (2014) 220 Taxmann 14 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Dealer in shares as broker, trader and investor – Shares were shown as capital balance in the return of income of previous year, sale of such shares would be long/short term capital gain. [S. 28(i)]

932

The assessee was dealing in shares as broker, trader and investor and was registered with UP stock exchange. The assessee filed return of income showing total income from business, long term capital gains and short term capital gains. The AO held that the assessee was a share broker and the main business was purchase and sale of shares and had used the investment portfolio as a colourable device to avoid payment of tax. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal directed to show the amount as capital gains and not business income. On appeal by the revenue, the High Court held that the shares were shown as capital balance in return of previous years and on sale of such shares the sale proceed would be long/short term capital gain of the assessee and not the income from the business. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Sunil Kumar Gupta (2014) 220 Taxmann 14 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)

- 933 **S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Investment in shares – Assessee was a salaried employee – Income derived from purchase and sale of share was held to be capital gain. [S.28(i)]**

Assessee, a salaried employee, earned Short Term Capital Gain of ₹ 83,712/- and Long Term Capital Gain of ₹ 53,84,239/-. After considering relevant factors including the amount of shareholding of the assessee, the volume and the frequency of the purchase and sale of shares etc. held that it cannot be concluded that the assessee was a trader in share particularly in view of the fact that Short Term Capital Gains were very less as compared to the Long Term Capital Gains. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Mitesh Nathulal Lavti. (2014) 220 Taxmann 13 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC.)

- 934 **S.45 : Capital gains – Time of transfer – Long term capital gains – When possession given of the immovable property on receiving part payment from the builder. [Ss.2(47(v), 11(IA), Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 53A]**

When the assessee by an agreement dated 14-4-2003 handed over the possession of the land to the builder and received part of the consideration and the builder was also given power of attorney to sell the portions of land, transfer has taken place in April, 2003 (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Cochin Stock Exchange Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 382 / 226 Taxmann 161 / 269 CTR 93 (Ker.)(HC)

- 935 **S.45: Capital gains – Income arising from sale of land taxable capital gains. [S.28(i)]**

The assessee returned his share of gains on sale of land as long term capital gain. The AO, however, held that the receipts are taxable as business income of the assessee and taxed the same accordingly. The CIT(A) and Tribunal rejected the stand taken by the AO.

On appeal by the Revenue, the High Court observed that the Tribunal has noted that except for the present assessee and his brother, the AO has not made such addition in case of any other co-owners of the land. The High Court also noted that there was no allegation suggesting that the assessee was engaged in the business of buying and selling land. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the departmental appeal.

CIT v. Natwarlal C. Bhandari (2014) 222 Taxmann 57 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

- 936 **S.45 : Capital gains – Long-term capital gains – Conversion of rights of lessee in property from leasehold right into freehold only results in improvement of his/her rights over property and it would not have any effect on taxability of gain from such property, which is related to the period over which property is held. [S.2(29B)]**

The assessee purchased a property on leasehold basis in year 1984. She converted the property into freehold property in year 2004 and thereupon sold it within three months. The capital gain arising from sale of said property was declared as long-term capital gain. The AO treated the capital gain as short-term since the property was acquired by converting the leasehold right into freehold and was sold within three months. On an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), he held that the conversion of leasehold into freehold property was nothing but an improvement of the title over the property, as the fact remained that the assessee was the owner even prior to conversion. He,

thus, concluded that capital gain arising from the sale of property was to be taxed as long-term. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). On an appeal by the department, the High Court, upholding the order of the Tribunal, held that the difference between short-term and long-term capital assets is the period over which the property has been held by the assessee and not the nature of title over the property. The lessee of the property has rights as owner of the property subject to covenants of the lease, for all purposes. The conversion of the rights of the lessee in the property from having leasehold right into freehold is only by way of improvement of his rights over the property and it would not have any effect on the taxability of gain from such property, which is related to the period over which the property is held. (AY. 2004-05) *CIT v. Rama Rani Kalia (Smt.)(2013) 358 ITR 499 / (2014) 221 Taxmann 72 (All.)(HC)*

S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Sale and purchase of shares-maintaining two separate portfolio – Short term and long term gains out of investment account is assessable as capital gains and not as business income. [S.28(i)]

937

Held that the assessee's separate activities in shares were further supported and endorsed by the fact that separate dematerialised accounts, bank accounts were being maintained and separate trading and investment accounts were maintained in the books. Thus, the assessee was dealing in different activities of trading and investment. Assessment as short term and long term capital gain was held to be justified. (AY. 2007-08) *CIT v. Avinash Jain (2013) 214 Taxmann 260 / (2014) 362 ITR 441 (Delhi)(HC)*

S.45 : Capital gains – Technical knowhow – Capital asset – Amount received on transfer of technical knowhow is assessable as capital gains

938

Technical know-how acquired on or after 1-4-1998 is a capital asset and amount received on transfer of such asset assessable as capital gains. (AY. 2001-02) *CIT v. Wintac Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 614 / 221 Taxmann 87 (Karn.)(HC)*

S.45 : Capital gains – Capital loss – Set off – Capital asset – Transfer – Write-off of irrecoverable advances is not a “transfer” and the loss cannot be claimed as a capital loss u/s. 45 – Not allowed to be carried forward to subsequent year. [S.2(14), 2(47)]

939

Having regard to the definitions of terms “capital asset” and “transfer” in sections 2(14) and 2(47), in order to be eligible for carry forward of capital loss, the capital asset should be of the nature defined in S.2(14) and should be transferred in the manner defined in S.2(47). Equally, it should be subjected to tax as per S.45(1) of the Income-tax Act. The advances given to the said two parties and written off are not the capital assets nor there is any transfer. Therefore, they were not allowed to be carried forward to subsequent years. It is a capital loss and should be ignored. (AY. 2002-03) *Crompton greaves Limited v. Dy. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 244 / 104 DTR 129 / 226 Taxman 375 (Bom.)(HC)*

- 940 **S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Portfolio Management Scheme (PMS) – Investment in shares – Gains arising from PMS transactions are capital gains & not business profits. [S.28(i)]**

On facts, the source of funds of the assessee were its own surplus funds and not borrowed funds. About 71% of the total shares have been held for a period longer than 6 months, and have resulted in an accrual of about 81% of the total gains to the assessee. Only 18% of the total shares are held for a period less than 90 days, resulting in the accrual of only 4% of the total profits. This shows that a large volume of the shares purchased were, as reflected from the holding period, intended towards the end of investment. The fact that an average of 4-5 transactions were made daily, and that only eight transactions resulted in a holding period longer than one year is not relevant because the number of transactions per day, as determined by an average, cannot be an accurate reflection of the holding period/frequency of transactions. Moreover, even if only a small number of transactions resulted in a holding for a period longer than a year, the number becomes irrelevant when it is clear that a significant volume of shares was sold/ purchased in those transactions. (AY. 2006-07)

Radials International v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 1 / 103 DTR 316 (Delhi)(HC)

Editorial: Matter referred to Special Bench in the case Suraj outsource (Pvt. Ltd.) was withdrawn (2013) 144 ITD Dix (S. No. 3)

- 941 **S.45 : Capital gains – Agricultural land beyond 8 kms – Not capital asset – Not liable to capital gains tax. [S.2(14)]**

The land being admittedly agricultural land situated beyond 8 kms. of municipal limits does not constitute capital asset, hence, sale thereof for profit did not give rise to capital gains chargeable to tax. (AY. 2009-10)

Kapil Chit Funds (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 529 / 164 TTJ 191 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 942 **S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Investment in shares – Merely because assessee liquidates its investment within a short span of time, which had given better overall earning to assessee, it would not lead to conclusion that assessee had no intention to keep on funds as investor in equity shares – Assessable as short term capital gains and not as business income. [Ss.2(42B), 28(i), 115A, 115AD]**

Assessee had been consistently investing in shares, though there was large volume of transactions in trading of shares within a short period, assessee had invested in equity shares of Indian companies and all along treated same as capital asset, i.e., assessee had not valued shares as stock but valued same as investment. Two separate accounts were maintained in respect of shares so purchased, i.e., 'trading account' and 'investment account'. Analysis of balance sheet of assessee also fortified that equity shares were treated as investment. Merely because assessee liquidates its investment within a short span of time, which had given better overall earning to assessee, it would not lead to conclusion that assessee had no intention to keep on funds as investor in equity shares, but was actually intended to trade in shares. Gains earned on sale of such investment was capital gains and AO's action of treating it as business income was not justified. (AY. 2005-06)

Dy. CIT v. E-Cap Partners (2014) 64 SOT 192 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.45 : Capital gains – Share dealings – Investment company – Income derived from sale of shares – Assessable as capital gain. [S.28(i)] 943

Assessee a limited company incorporated and was registered with RBI as a Non-Banking Finance Company. Object was to function as an investment company. Purchased shares and mutual funds and derived income from sale of them. From very beginning it had treated purchase of shares and mutual funds as investments and gain from sale of shares and mutual funds had been shown as capital gain. Income derived from sale of shares during Assessment Year under consideration had to be treated as capital gains. (AY. 2006-07)

ACIT v. Sri ASL Finvest Ltd. (2014) 150 ITD 82 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.45 : Capital gains – Transfer – Development agreements – Developer had right to sell some flats on account of additional FSI by virtue of loading TDR, grant of development right to that extent in said plot of land was to be treated as transfer. [S. 2(47)] 944

Assessee had entered into development agreement under which developer had constructed a building on property of assessee and handed over major part of premises to assessee. Developer was entitled to sell remaining flats. Capital gain arose on account of grant of development rights by assessee. It was contended that since possession of property had never been parted by him, there was no transfer as envisaged in provisions of capital gains. Since developer had no right to sell said flats on account of additional FSI by virtue of loading TDR, to that extent rights, title and interest in said plot of land had been transferred. (AY. 2005-06)

Dy. CIT v. Jai Trikanand Rao (2014) 149 ITD 112 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.45 : Capital gains – Transfer – Possession – Registration – Transfer takes place in year of execution of sale deed, handing over of possession & receipt of sale consideration & is not deferred to year of registration. Verdict in Suraj Lamp and Industries 340 ITR 1 (SC) explained. [S.2(47, Transfer of Property Act, S.53A)] 945

The Tribunal had to consider whether capital gains are assessable in AY 2008-09, being the year when the sale deed was executed and possession handed over and most of the sale consideration was received or in AY 2009-10 when the sale deed was registered. Held by the Tribunal:

The transaction relates to the date when the sale-deed was executed, sale consideration was paid and the possession was handed over but not on the date when the document was presented before the Registrar for registration of the sale-deed. Moreover, the issue whether the transaction would relate to the date when the assessee has received sale consideration, handed over the possession and executed sale agreement or the date when the sale agreement is presented before the concerned Registrar for registration of the document was not before the Apex Court in *Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2012) 340 ITR 1 (SC)*. Also, the judgment in *Suraj Lamp and Industries* was delivered on 11-10-2011, but the sale agreement in the present case was executed on 31-3-2008. The Apex Court has observed that: “It is also submitted that this decision should be made applicable prospectively to avoid hardship. We have merely drawn attention to and reiterated the well-settled legal position that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are not “transfers” or “sales” and that such transactions cannot be treated as completed

transfers or conveyances. They can continue to be treated as existing agreement of sale. Nothing prevents affected parties from getting registered deeds of conveyance to complete their title. The said “SA/GPA/WILL transactions” may also be used to obtain specific performance or to defend possession under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. If they are entered before this day, they may be relied upon to apply for regularisation of allotments/leases by development authorities. We make it clear that if the documents relating to “SA/GPA/WILL transactions” has been accepted, acted upon by the DDA or other developmental authorities or by the Municipal or Revenue authorities to effect mutation, they need not be disturbed, merely on account of this decision.” In the case in hand, the agreement to sell dated 31-3-2008 had already been acted upon by the parties by delivery of possession and registering sale-deed. Therefore, for this reason also, the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of *Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Another (supra)*, would not help the Revenue. (ITA no. 1281/Ahd/2013 dt. 30-10-2014) (AY. 2009-10)

Amitkumar Amblal Shah v. ITO (Ahd.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

- 946 **S.45 : Capital gains – Dissolution – Firm – Capital gains on transfer of capital assets on dissolution of firm has to be worked out on the basis of the fair market value of the capital asset on the date of transfer. [Ss. 2(14), 2(47), 45(4), 47(ii), Indian Partnership Act, S.40]**

Capital gains on transfer of capital assets on dissolution of firm has to be worked out on the basis of the fair market value of the capital asset on the date of transfer. On the facts the AO has adopted the fair value on the basis of report of inspector. Tribunal held that Inspector of Income-tax is not technical person to determine the fair market value. Matter was set aside to the AO to refer the matter to DVO and decide accordingly. (ITA No.159 /Coch/2014 dt 19-09-2014) (AY. 2007-08)

M. Ahammedkutty v. ITO (Cochin)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

- 947 **S.45 : Capital gains – Transfer – No transfer merely because development agreement is entered into. [S.2(47)(v)]**

As can be seen from the observations made by CIT(A), he has given specific finding of fact that development agreement has not been acted upon by the developer till date. Therefore, he has concluded that as there is no willingness or part performance of contract by the developer, which has resulted in filing of civil suit seeking cancellation of the development agreement, it cannot be said that there is transfer of capital asset as envisaged u/s. 2(47)(v) read with section 53A of the Act. This finding of fact arrived at by CIT(A) has not been controverted by the department by bringing on record documentary evidence or through any other mode to prove that development activity under the development agreement has been started by developer. In the aforesaid factual position, since there is failure on the part of the developer to perform his part of the contract, it cannot be said that there is transfer of capital asset merely because assessee has entered into development agreement with the developer.

ACIT v. P. Venkateswara Rao (Hyd.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Transaction of derivatives – Assessable as capital gains. [S.28(i)] 948

Tribunal following the order passed by the Tribunal in assessee's own case relating to earlier year, (*Platinum Asset Management Ltd. v. Dy. DIT(IT) (2014) 61 SOT 119(Mum.) (Trib.)*), income arising from transactions on derivatives to assessee a FII could not be treated as business profit rather same had to be assessed under the head capital gains. (AY. 2006-07)

Platinum Asset Management Ltd. v. Dy. DIT(IT) (2014) 65 SOT 66 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)

S.45 : Capital gains – Business Income – Share dealings – Intention to be seen – Most of the shares sold were carried forward from earlier years – Assessable as capital gains and not as business income. [S.28(i)] 949

The assessee is engaged in the investment and trading in shares through portfolio management scheme. Assessee making investments in shares and also doing trading in shares out of stock-in-trade carried forward from earlier years. Certain shares standing in investment account was sold by assessee and surplus arising thereof was claimed as short term capital gain and long term capital gain. The AO treated said surplus on sale of shares as business income. Most of the shares were from brought forward holding from preceding years which had been accepted as investment in earlier years and further assessee was maintaining separate account for investment as well as stock in trade of shares, surplus received on sale and purchase of shares to be treated as capital gains and not business income. Period of holding of shares and non-receipt of dividend income is not a decisive factor for treatment of particular transactions as investment or trading transaction, one has to see intention of person, who is doing purchase and sale of shares. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

Dy. CIT v. Emerging Securities (P) Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 736 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S. 45 : Capital gains – Business income – Purchase and sale of shares through portfolio management services assessable as capital gains. [S.28(i)] 950

Income earned by assessee on sale/purchase of shares and securities through PMS is to be assessed as capital gains and not business income. (AY. 2007-08)

Nalin Pravin Shah v. ACIT (2014) 98 DTR 420 / 66 SOT 58 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Purchase and sale of shares – Assessee had not borrowed any funds – Accepted as investment in earlier years – Assessable as capital gains. [S.28(i)] 951

Assessee used his own funds for transacting in shares and did not indulge in any transaction for a holding period of less than 15 days or in repeated sale/purchase of same scrip. Held that the shares were purchased by assessee for investment more so when similar kind of transactions have been considered by AO as investment activity in the preceding years. (AY. 2007-08)

Nalin Pravin Shah v. ACIT (2014) 98 DTR 420 / 66 SOT 58 (Mum.)(Trib.)

952 **S.45 : Capital gains – Business income – Share dealing – Business of manufacture and export of electrical goods – Income derived from purchase and sale of shares was held to be Capital gain. [S. 28(i)]**

Assessee was a partner in firms which were engaged in the business of manufacture and export of electrical goods and electrical contractors he had shown income derived from sale and purchase of shares as short-term capital gain. AO taxed the said income as business income. Tribunal held that the gain from such investments has also been assessed as capital gain, even though such assessments have been completed under section 143(1) but the same have not been disturbed. From these facts, it can be gathered that the assessee's intention in the purchase of shares was mostly for investment purpose and to have maximum gain. The details of purchase and sale of shares, it is seen that the maximum gain has been on those shares, which have been held for period of 91 to 180 days and 181 to 365 days. If all these factors are considered in totality, it cannot be held that the assessee was engaged in organised and systematic activity of trading of shares. In case of purchase of shares for the purpose of investment, motive is maximising gain only. Therefore, income from purchase and sale of shares is to be assessed under the head "capital gain" and not under the head "business income". (AY. 2005-06)

Bipin Ram Chainani v. Add. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 257 (Mum.)(Trib.)

953 **S.45 : Capital loss – Long term capital loss – Set off of from one source against income from another source under the same head of income – Share transaction – Loss was held to be genuine and was allowed to to be set off. [S.70]**

Assessee was a company engaged in the business of travel agency and consultancy. The assessee filed return of Income and declared total income. Assessee's assessment was reopened thereafter. The assessment was completed thereby disallowing the claim of the respondents of long term capital loss and consequently, amount was brought to tax. CIT(A) allowed the appeal and held that the transactions were not a colourable device and the long term capital loss was required to be set off against short term capital gains made by the sale of shares. Tribunal confirmed the findings of CIT (A). On appeal by revenue the High Court held that the AO has not disputed any of the transactions that have been duly completed under the law nor that the consideration received not at the market price. Further it was noted that the shares of MM Ltd. were sold at the price quoted at the stock exchange whereas low price of MM Ltd.'s shares stands explained by the fact admitted by the AO that the said company was in red and therefore there was no perversity in the order passed by the lower authorities and further the findings arrived by CIT(A) and Tribunal were not controverted by the revenue. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. Hede Consultancy Co. (P) Ltd. (2014) 266 CTR 594 / (2015) 231 Taxman 421 (Bom.)(HC)

954 **S.45: Capital loss – Sale of shares to subsidiary company to avoid stringent action by financial institution – Sale being genuine – Loss is allowable as capital loss**

In order to avoid the stringent action being taken by the financial institution, the assessee sold the shares to its subsidiary company in order to stabilise its financial position. No document had been produced by the Revenue to show that the transaction

between the assessee and its subsidiary company was a colourable device. The long-term and short-term capital losses were deductible. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Wintac Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 614 / 221 Taxmann 87 (Karn.)(HC)

S.45 : Capital loss – Set-off of capital loss – Loss on sale of exempt capital assets – Loss could not be set off against capital gains. [S.10(38), 70(3), 74] 955

The fact that the capital asset in question, namely, the shares of S was covered under section 10(38) of the Act was not in dispute. That being the position, by virtue of section 10(38) of the Act, in computing the total income of the previous year, any income covered under such clause shall not be included. If that be so, the loss also arising out of such an asset and covered by the clause would likewise be not includible in computation of the income of the assessee for the year under consideration. Applied the ratio in *CIT v. Harprasad and Co. P. Ltd. [1975] 99 ITR 118 (SC) (HC)*(AY. 2006-07) *Kishorebhai Bhikhabhai Virani v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 261 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 91/ 275 CTR 572 / 116 DTR 284 (Guj.)(HC)*

S.45 : Capital loss – No satisfactory explanation given by the Assessee for selling motor car to its own Director at the price less than WDV – Claim for Short-Term Capital Loss of sale of motor car restricted to ₹ 40,000/- [S.48] 956

The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal held that the Assessee could not satisfactorily explain the reason for selling motor car to its own Director at a price less than its written down value. Hence, the claim of short-term capital loss on sale of car made by the Assessee is restricted to ₹ 40,000 as against claim of ₹ 84,174. (ITA No. 969 of 2011 dt 6-6-2014 (AY. 2007-08)

ACIT v. Sarkar Jewellers (P) Ltd. (2014) 33 ITR 16 / (2015) 53 taxmann.com 112 / 67 SOT 125 (URO) (Ahd.)(Trib.)

S.45(4) : Capital gains – Firm – Dissolution – Valuation of assets – Property contributed as capital – Identified objective of firm to carry on business in real estate – Property is stock-in-trade – Market value of property to be taken into account for purpose of valuation 957

On reference by assessee the Court held that : (i) that the assessee having not disputed the existence of firm in the gift-tax case could not plead that the firm did not exist.

(ii) That in the partnership deed itself, the partners made it clear that the property was being contributed as an item of capital. The identified objective of the firm was to carry on business in real estate and in the activity of that nature, an item of immovable property could certainly be a stock-in-trade. Whatever may have been the liberty of an assessee to choose between the cost and market value of an asset, whichever is beneficial to him ; that liberty stands taken away when the firm is dissolved, or the business activity is discontinued. For the purpose of determining the value of property, which is allotted to the respective partners on dissolution, it is only the market value that becomes relevant and that exactly was taken into account. Reference was answered against the assessee. (AY. 1987-88)

Arjundas Rajkumar v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 188 / 52 taxmann.com 359 (2015) 122 DTR 416 (T&AP)(HC)

- 958 **S.45(4) : Capital gains – Distribution of capital asset – Dissolution of firm – Retirement – Cash towards the value of shares – No transfer of capital asset and, therefore, no profits or gains chargeable to tax in the hands of the assessee-firm**

The assessee-firm had purchased property under a registered sale deed. It was reconstituted and five partners brought in cash by way of capital contribution. Nearly a year thereafter, the erstwhile three partners took their share in partnership assets and left the partnership. The AO held that this was a device adopted to transfer immovable property and therefore, capital gain tax was liable to be paid by the firm. On appeal, the CIT (A) affirmed the order of the AO. On second appeal, the Tribunal held that since the assessee-firm had not relinquished any right in property as property was owned by the firm, there was no transfer by the reconstituted firm and the firm was not liable to capital gain tax. On Revenue's appeal, it was held that in order to attract section 45(4) the capital assets of the firm should be transferred in favor of a partner, resulting in the firm ceasing to have any interest in the capital assets transferred and the partners should acquire exclusive interest in the capital asset. In the instant case, after the retirement of three partners, the partnership continued to exist and the business was carried on by the remaining five partners. There was no dissolution of the firm or at any rate there was no distribution of capital asset when three partners retired from the partnership firm. Since retiring partners took cash representing value of their shares in partnership, there was no transfer of capital asset in favour of retiring partner and therefore no profit or gain chargeable to tax under section 45(4) arose in hands of assessee-firm. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. Dynamic Enterprises (2014) 223 Taxmann 331 / (2013) 359 ITR 83 / 263 CTR 138 (Karn.)(HC)(FB)

- 959 **S.45(5) : Capital gains – Compulsory acquisition of land – Accrual – Enhanced compensation – Interest – Taxable in the year of receipt and not to be spread over. [S.2(31), Land Acquisition Act, 1894, S.28]**

The assessee were brothers. Their father died leaving land to the assessee and two others who relinquished their rights in the assessee's favour. Bequeathed land was acquired by the State Government and compensation was paid to the assessee. AO brought to tax the compensation in the status of Association of persons and taxed the interest in the year of receipt. On appeal High Court held that assessee were to be assessed as individuals and not an association of persons and that the interest was to be spread over from the year of dispossession of land, that is, the assessment year 1987-88, till the year of actual payment, which was the assessment year 1999-2000. On appeal by the revenue and assessee the Court held that land inherited by the brothers by operation of law hence assessable as individuals and not association of persons. Interest is taxable in the year of receipt and not spread over.

CIT v. Govindbhai Mamaiya (2014) 367 ITR 498 / 271 CTR 31 / 109 DTR 65 / (2015) 229 Taxman 138 (SC)

Editorial: Judgment of Gujarat High Court in ITA No 8103 of 2009 dt. 16-11-2006 was partly affirmed and partly reversed.

S.45(5) : Capital gains – Cost to tenancy right – Sub tenancy – Compensation was held to be taxable. [Land acquisition Act S.48(2)]

960

Held that the tenancy right had computable cost of acquisition and, therefore, the consideration received on surrender or acquisition was taxable as capital gains even prior to 1st April, 1995. In the present case, as noticed, the sub-lease was for 17 years and even construction had been raised by the predecessors of the respondent assessee. In D.P. Sandu's Bros. case, Supreme Court in categorical terms has held that the cost of acquisition could be computed in case of acquisition of tenancy rights. In the present case, sub-lease in question was for a period of 17 years and the respondent assessee also had constructed a super-structure, a factory, which was constructed by the predecessor of the respondent assessee. The respondent assessee had in the land acquisition proceedings, claimed that they were entitled to compensation on acquisition of their land under the sub-lease. Their rights had been acquired. Value of the sub-lease rights of the respondent assessee was ascertained and accordingly, the compensation was assessed and paid. Thus, the tenancy right had value and, therefore, compensation was paid. Once it was held that it was possible to ascertain the cost of acquisition of tenancy rights then it follows that capital gains could be computed and shall be payable. (AY. 1988-89)

CIT v. Gulab Sundri Bapna (2014) 227 Taxmann 161 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

Section 47A : Withdrawal of exemption in certain cases.**S.47A(4) : Capital gains – Withdrawal of exemption – Limited liability partnership – Giving of interest-free loans to partners of the LLP does not contravene Proviso (c), though it contravenes Proviso (f), to S. 47(xiiib) – Capital gains have to be computed on the book value of assets transferred & not on market value. [S.47(xiiib)]**

961

A private limited company namely Aravali Polymers Pvt. Ltd was converted into a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) u/s. 56 of the Companies Act and the assessee, Aravali Polymers LLP, came into existence. As per s. 58(4) of the Companies Act, the whole of the undertaking of the company stood transferred to and vested in the LLP and the company was deemed to be dissolved. One of the main assets in the company was shares of East India Hotels Ltd. The assessee also received Reserves and Surplus of ₹ 3 crore of the company. The assessee gave an amount of ₹ 50 crores as interest-free loan to the partners of the LLP in the same proportion as their shareholding in the company on the date of conversion. After the conversion of the company into the LLP, the said shares were sold. The resultant capital gains were offered to tax as long-term capital gains. The assessee claimed that the transfer of the assets by the company to the LLP was exempt u/s. 47(xiiib). The AO held that by giving interest-free loans to the partners in the same proportion as their shareholding in the company on the date of conversion, the assessee had contravened provisos (c) & (f) to S. 47(xiiib) and that the exemption granted by S. 47(xiiib) was not available. He held that u/s.47A(4), the transfer of the said shares of EIH by the company to the LLP on conversion was assessable to tax on the basis of the market value of the shares on the date of conversion into the LLP. This was upheld by the CIT(A). On appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal HELD.

(i) Proviso (c) to S. 47 (xiiib) bars the shareholders of the company from receiving any

- consideration or benefit in any form or manner other than by way of a share in the profit and capital contribution in the LLP. This means that both the company and the LLP must exist for the shareholders of the company to receive any consideration. As, in the present case, the company does not exist after conversion, the question of a violation of Proviso (c) to s. 47(xiiib) does not arise;
- (ii) As regards proviso (f) to S. 47(xiiib), it bars payment either directly or indirectly to any partner out of the accumulated profit standing in the accounts of the company on the date of conversion for a period of three years from the date of conversion. Here, the loans given by the assessee to its partners has been paid out of the Reserves and Surplus of the erstwhile Company. This is a clear violation of proviso (f) to S. 47(xiiib). The result is that exemption in S. 47(xiiib) is not available;
- (iii) However, the AO's action of invoking S. 47A(4) and of computing capital gains by adopting the market value of the shares on the date of conversion is not correct. S. 47A(4) applies to a case where the exemption u/s. 47(xiiib) is available and the conditions laid down in the proviso are not complied with. However, as in the present case, the AY under appeal is the year on which the conversion took place and in that year itself, the conditions prescribed for the benefit of S. 47(xiiib) were not complied with and consequently the provisions of S. 47(xiiib) were not available to the assessee, S. 47A(4) is not attracted. Under S. 45, the market value of the asset transferred cannot be deemed to be the 'consideration'. As the shares were transferred at the book value, the capital gains have to be computed on the basis that the book value is the consideration received for the transfer by way of conversion. (ITA No. 718/Kol/2014 dt. 27-6-2014) (AY. 2011-12)

Aravali Polymers LLP v. JCIT (Kol.)(Trib.), www.itatonline.org

Section 48 : Mode of computation

962 S.48 : Capital gains – Cost of acquisition – Property obtained on inheritance – Indexed cost of acquisition of previous owner to be taken into account. [Ss. 45, 49]

While computing the capital gains arising on transfer of a capital asset acquired by the assessee through succession, the indexed cost of acquisition had to be computed with reference to the year in which the previous owner first held the asset and not the year in which the assessee actually became the owner of the asset through succession. (AY. 2005-06) *CIT v. Kaveri Thimmaiah (Smt.) (2014) 369 ITR 81 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 323 (Mag.) / 117 DTR 364 (Karn.)(HC)*

CIT v. Asha Machiah (Smt.) (2014) 369 ITR 81 (Karn.)(HC)

CIT v. Nina Devaiah (Smt) (2014) 369 ITR 81 (Karn.)(HC)

963 S.48 : Capital gains – Cost of acquisition – Indexation – Capital asset inherited – Originally acquired prior to 1-4-1981 – Base cost inflation index to be taken of FY 1981-92 i.e 100

Assessee inherited property in AY 2007-08. This property was acquired in the year 1979. Held cost inflation index base year to be taken as 1981. Followed Bombay High Court in *CIT v. Manjula J. Shah (355 ITR 474) (AY. 2007-08)*

CIT v. Nita Kamlesh Tanna (Smt) (2014) 220 Taxmann 165 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC.)

S.48 : Capital gains – Cost of construction – Local PWD rates should be relied upon rather than Central PWD rates in order to arrive at valuation of renovation and construction of residential property. [S.45]

964

The assessee incurred expenditure towards extension and renovation of its residential house. The Revenue estimated the cost of renovation and construction over and above the cost claimed by the assessee on the basis of a valuation of the property by a District Valuation Officer and made an addition to the income of the assessee. The addition was upheld by all the three authorities on the ground that the assessee did not point out any flaw in the valuation report. On appeal, the assessee submitted that there was no need for the Revenue to secure the information from the DVO who proceeded to value renovation and cost of construction based on Central Public Works Department rates and not based on State Public Works Department rates, whereas, the Revenue submitted that the assessee had not raised the issue before any authority and, therefore, could not raise it before the High Court. The High Court held that in the orders of all three authorities, the consistent stand of the Revenue was that the assessee was unable to point out any flaw in the valuation report; therefore, the valuation report had to be relied upon. What rate should be used as the basis for arriving at the valuation of the renovation and additional construction definitely was a question of law; therefore, even if such issue was not raised earlier before any authority, it could be entertained before this Court. Further, it held that the cost of labour and the cost of construction could vary from State to State and, therefore, it was just and proper to place reliance on the local PWD rates rather than Central PWD rates in order to arrive at the valuation of the property. In view of the above the matter was remanded back to the AO to apply the local PWD rates. (AY. 2006-07)

C.S. Daniel v. Dy. CIT, Central Circle (2014) 220 Taxman 336 (Ker.)(HC)

S.48 : Capital gains – Computation provision fails – Mahogany trees – Shadow trees – No cost of acquisition – Not liable to capital gain tax. [S.45]

965

Once computation provision fails for computing capital gains under Income-tax Act, there cannot be any levy of capital gains tax. Where mahogany trees were planted as shadow trees and grew on their own without any human interference or human effort, there being no cost of acquisition or improvement with respect to such trees, there could not be any levy of capital gains tax. (AY. 2009-10)

ITO v. Gopalakrishna Iyer Venugopal (2014) 31 ITR 248 / (2015) 67 SOT 31 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.48 : Capital gains – Computation – Legal fees – As no evidence was provided legal fees was held not to be considered as cost of new asset. [S.54]

966

In the present case deduction of ₹ 1.65 lakhs was claimed to have been paid to builder for legal fees toward purchase of new asset. It was not clarified as to what legal services were provided except merely producing receipt. Further sale agreements were entered into pre-determined standardised formats as crystallized by builder-seller, as builders would not allow buyers to disturb their specimen arguments. As there was no evidence

with regard to the actual work undertaken, legal fees could not be said to be forming part of cost of purchase in respect of legal service of new asset and therefore would not be entitled to deduction under section 54. (AY. 2006-07)

Achyut Ramchandra Samant v. ACIT (2014) 61 SOT 271(Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 49 : Cost with reference to certain modes of acquisition

967 S.49 : Capital gains – Computation – Inheritance – Cost of acquisition by previous owner – Indexed cost. [S.48(3)]

The High Court held that when an asset is acquired by way of inheritance, cost of acquisition of asset should be calculated on basis of cost of acquisition by previous owner and said cost of acquisition has to be calculated on basis of indexed cost of acquisition as provided in Explanation (3) to section 48 (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Daisy Devaiah (Smt.) (2014) 227 Taxman 153 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

968 S.49 : Capital gains – Computation – Inheritance – Cost of acquisition – Previous owner – Indexed cost. [S.48(3)]

When an asset is acquired by way of inheritance, cost of acquisition of asset should be calculated on basis of cost of acquisition to previous owner and the said cost of acquisition of previous owner has to be calculated on basis of indexed cost of acquisition as provided in Explanation (3) to section 48. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Asha Machaiah (Smt.) (2014) 227 Taxmann 155 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

969 S.49 : Capital gains – Previous owner – Cost of acquisition – Family arrangement – A transfer of shares under a family arrangement is for a determinable “consideration” & is not “voluntary”. Consequently, the shares are not received under a “gift” & the transferee cannot claim benefit of cost, and holding period, of the transferor. [Ss.2(42A)(b), 45]

The members of the Bilakhia family entered into a deed of family arrangement with a view to consolidate and equalize values of the assets held by each of the parties. Pursuance to the said family arrangement, the family members transferred the shares of Nestle India Ltd. and Hindustan Lever Ltd. held by them as investment to the assessee, an investment company in which the individual members of the family had equal interest. The assessee sold the shares and claimed that as it had acquired the shares vide a “gift”, in computing the capital gain, the cost of acquisition of the shares to, and the period of holding by, the transferors, had to be considered. The AO rejected the claim though the CIT(A) accepted it. On appeal by the department to the Tribunal HELD allowing the appeal:

- (i) On the issue as to whether the shares received on family arrangement is pursuant to a “gift”, S. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 provides that a transfer of movable or immovable property can be treated as a gift only if the same is made voluntarily and without any consideration. It cannot be said that a family arrangement is “without consideration”. In *CWT v. H.H. Vijayaba, Downtner Maharani Saheb of Bhavnagar Palace (1979)117 ITR 784 (SC)* it was held that a family settlement or family arrangement which is to buy peace is for

good consideration and creates an enforceable agreement between the parties. Consequently it cannot be said that a family arrangement is without consideration and a “gift”;

- (ii) On the issue as to whether this consideration can be measured in money or monies worth, the purpose of the family arrangement was to equalise the holdings between the respective families of three brothers. Therefore, it cannot be said that consideration for transfer of shares cannot be measured in terms of money or monies worth. The equalisation of wealth has only monetary connotation. To avoid disputes cannot be said to be without monetary consideration as it is common knowledge that family disputes ruin the family financially. The family disputes are being settled in monetary terms by resorting to arbitration and in case such settlements is not done, matter travels to the court and the family suffers heavily not only mentally but also financially. Thus, it cannot be said that the consideration for transfer of shares was not for monetary consideration;
- (iii) On the issue as to whether the receipt of shares under the family arrangement was “voluntary” or not, the term “voluntary” is defined to mean “free choice; done with free will; without any compulsion ..”. The family arrangement cannot be said to be voluntary because it was enforceable and binding on the parties and with the purpose of equalization of wealth of the family members, which had monetary connotation. (ITA No. 981 to 985/Ahd/2009., dt. 30-5-2014. (AYs. 2001-02 to 2004-05, 2006-07)

ACIT v. Bilakhia Holdings P. Ltd. (2014) 65 SOT 195 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

Section 50 : Special provision for computation of capital gains in case of depreciable assets

S.50 : Capital gains – Depreciable assets – Block of assets – Rural Electrification Bonds – Exemption cannot be denied. [Ss.2(11), 54EC] 970

Legal fiction created u/s 50 is restricted to the computation of capital gains. It cannot restrict application of s/54EC which allows exemption of capital gains, if assessee makes investment in the specified assets. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Aditya Medisales Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 600 / 266 CTR 98 / 218 Taxman 477 (Guj.) (HC)

S.50 : Capital gains – Depreciable assets – Block of assets – Flat purchased out of sale of factory premises – New flat used as office premises – Cost of new flat can be adjusted against sale consideration of factory premises and depreciation is to be allowed. [S. 2(11), 32, 43(6)] 971

The assessee sold its factory premises during the year at a total consideration of ₹ 1,05,60,046/-. The assessee also purchased an apartment for total consideration of ₹ 89,06,394/- and after adjusting the cost of new flat against the sale consideration of factory premises under section 50(1)(iii), computed short-term capital gain at ₹ 12,52,974/-. The A.O. relying on the definition of block of assets under section 2(11) of the Act and definition of written down value of block of assets under section 43(6) read with section 32(1), observed that the apartment purchased was a residential apartment on which depreciation was allowable at 5 per cent. As factory building was

eligible for depreciation at 10 per cent the A.O. is of the view that since the asset purchased does not belong to the same block, the deduction cannot be allowed in the computation of capital gains. Accordingly, he computed the capital gains on the sale of the factory premises without reducing the cost of new asset. On appeal the first Appellate Authority upheld the order of the A.O. The Appellate Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee and held that where assessee sold its factory premises and purchased a flat in an apartment, if such flat was used as office premises depreciation was allowable at 10 per cent and said asset would fall in same block of asset for deduction under section 50(1)(iii). (AY. 2009-10)

Avin Pumps (P) Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (2013) 26 ITR 345 / (2014) 61 SOT 116 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)

972 **S.50 : Capital gains – Depreciable assets – Block of assets – Though gains on depreciable assets held for more than 3 years have to be treated as STCG u/s.50, the gains have to be taxed at the rate applicable to a LTCG. [S.2(11), 112]**

The assessee sold a flat at Khar for ₹ 35 lakhs. Since the flat was a business asset and had been shown as part of the block of assets, the assessee computed capital gains u/s. 50 at ₹ 12.52 lakhs after deducting the WDV of block of assets from the sale price. AO held that as the stamp value of the flats sold was ₹ 59 lakhs, s. 50C should be applied and the said value had to be substituted for the consideration received. The CIT(A) upheld the AO's stand. Before the Tribunal, the assessee claimed that (i) s. 50C did not apply to depreciable assets and (ii) for the purpose of application of tax rate, the capital gain has to be assessed as long-term capital gain as the flat had been held for more than three years. HELD by the Tribunal:

The assessee's stand that s. 50C does not apply to depreciable assets is not acceptable in view of *ITO v. United Marine Academy (2011) 130 ITD 113(Mum) (SB)*. As regards the rate of tax, s. 50, which deems the capital gains as short-term capital gain is only for the purposes of sections 48 and 49 which relate to computation of capital gain. The deeming provisions have to be restricted only to computation of capital gain and for the purpose of other provisions of the Act the capital gain has to be treated as long-term capital gain. Consequently, though for the purpose of computation of capital gain, the flat has to be treated as short-term capital gain u/s.50, for the purpose of applicability of tax rate it has to be treated as long-term capital gain if held for more than three years. (AY. 2006-07) *Smita Conductors Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (Mum.)(Trib.),www.itatonline.org*

Section 50B : Special provision for computation of capital gains in case of slump sale

973 **S.50B : Capital gains – Slump sale – Slump sale taken place prior to introduction of section 50B with effect from 1-4-2000, was not held to be taxable**

The assessee company was the marketing division of Nutrine group. A company Sara, with intent to take over the entire business of manufacture of confectionery items and biscuits, along with all the marketing facilities of the manufacturing group company and the assessee company, entered into various agreements with Nutrine group companies. The A.O. noted that out of a total sum of ₹ 23.05 crores, the assessee received various sums on the basis of various agreements. The assessee had offered under the head long-term capital gains ₹ 1 crore that was received as goodwill. The claim of the assessee was that the remaining ₹ 22.05 crores was received in the nature of capital and, hence,

could not be subjected to tax. The A.O. Authority, however, treated the entire consideration towards goodwill that the assessee had built up in the course of its existence for a period exceeding 12 years and brought the aforesaid amount to tax. However, recorded a finding that it was a slump sale. The court held that from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of *PNB Finance Ltd. v. CIT* [2008] 175 *Taxmann* 242 it was clear that a charging section and the computation provisions together constitute an integrated code. When in a case, the computation provisions do not apply, such a case would not come within the ambit of section 45. It is because of these pronouncements, now the law has been amended introducing section 50B, which had come into effect from 1-4-2000. The material on record disclosed that it was a case of slump sale. The said sale had taken place prior to the aforesaid amendment. As the law stood then, it was not taxable. Merely because the assessee had given split up figures of how he had claimed and received the consideration from the purchaser, it would not take the goods out of slump sale. In that view of the matter, section 45 was not attracted.

CIT v. B.V. Reddy Marketing (P) Ltd. (2014) 222 *Taxmann* 309 (Karn.)(HC)

S.50B : Capital gains – Slump sale – Consideration received on sale of business as a going concern is capital receipt and not in the nature of non-compete fee. [Ss.28(va), 55(2)(a)]

974

The assessee received consideration on takeover of her proprietary concern and considered the same as capital gains. The AO however considered the same as business receipt since it represented compensation for not carrying out any activity in relation to the business or profession. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal following the decision of the High Court in the case of *CIT v. Mediaworld Publications (P) Ltd.* 2011 200 *Taxman* 1 held that the right to carry on any business had been recognised by the Legislature as a capital asset, taxable u/s. 55(2)(a) and not u/s. 28(va).

The High Court observed that the agreements entered into for sale had nowhere mentioned that the assessee wanted to continue to carry on the same business and had hence received the consideration as a non-compete fee. The High Court held that the assessee had parted with her controlling interest in the business and had received consideration for the same and hence the same was to be considered as a capital receipt. *CIT v. Sangeeta Wig* (2014) 221 *Taxmann* 159 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.50B : Capital gains – Slump sale – Section applies only to a “sale” for a “monetary consideration” and not to a case of “exchange” of the undertaking for shares under a s. 391/394 scheme of arrangement – No monetary consideration for transfer – Exchange and not a sale – Not a slump sale. [S.2(42C), 2(47), 45, Companies Act, S.391, 394]

975

The assessee transferred its Lift Division to Tiger Elevators Pvt. Ltd. under a scheme of arrangement u/ss. 391 & 394 of the Companies Act, 1956. The transfer of the undertaking took place in exchange of preference shares and bonds issued by Tiger Elevators as per a valuation report. The assessee claimed that the transfer was not liable to tax on capital gains on the basis that there was no “cost of acquisition” of the undertaking. The AO held that the transaction was a “slump sale” as defined in s. 2(42C) and that the gains had to be computed u/s 50B. This was upheld by the CIT(A).

On appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal, the *Tribunal Bharat Bijilee Ltd. v. Add. CIT (2012) 54 SOT 571 (Mum.)* accepted the claim of the assessee. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal:

The definition of the term “slump sale” in s. 2(42C) means the transfer of one or more undertakings as a result of the sale for a lump sum consideration without values being assigned to the individual assets and liabilities in such sale. In *CIT v. Motors & General Stores (P) Ltd. (1967) 66 ITR 692 (SC)* it was held that a “sale” meant a transfer for a monetary consideration and that an “exchange” would not amount to a “sale”. On facts, scheme of arrangement shows that the transfer of the undertaking took place in exchange for issue of preference shares and bonds. Merely because there was quantification when bonds/preference shares were issued, does not mean that monetary consideration was determined and its discharge was only by way of issue of bonds/preference shares. In other words, this is not a case where the consideration was determined and decided by parties in terms of money but its disbursement was to be in terms of allotment or issue of bonds/preference shares. All the clauses read together and the entire Scheme of Arrangement envisages transfer of the Lift Division not for any monetary consideration. The Scheme does not refer to any monetary consideration for the transfer. The parties were agreed that the assessee was to transfer the undertaking and take bonds/preference shares as consideration. Thus, it was a case of exchange and not a sale. Therefore, s. 2(42C) of the Act was inapplicable. If that was not applicable and was not attracted, then, s. 50B was also inapplicable. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Bharat Bijlee Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 258 / 224 Taxmann 282 / 107 DTR 249 / 270 CTR 579 (Bom.)(HC)

976 **S.50B : Capital gains – Slump sale – Depreciable assets – Block of assets – Sale of business as going concern assessable as slump sale. [S.2(11), 45]**

The assessee was engaged in manufacture of dyestuffs and chemicals, pharmaceuticals and pesticides, and also manufacture of additives, polymers, pigments and composites. During relevant year, the assessee sold its oral hygiene business (OHB) to another concern namely CPL. Assessee claimed that since it was a case of slump sale, capital gain arising from said transaction was not liable to tax. Revenue authorities rejected assessee’s claim. Since it was apparent from sale agreement that business was transferred as a going concern and sale consideration was not itemised, transaction in question amounted to slump sale and, thus, assessee’s claim was allowed. (AY. 1995-96) *Novartis India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 182 (URO) / 45 taxmann.com 341 (Mum.) (Trib.)*

Section 50C : Special provision for full value of consideration in certain cases

977 **S.50C : Capital gains – Stamp Valuation – The deeming fiction created by Section 50C applicable only to seller and not buyer. [S.45]**

The assessee made an investment in the land. The AO made addition on the difference in value of the land by treating same as unexplained investment. The Tribunal noted that Section 50C will apply to seller only and not the purchaser, thereby deleting the

addition made. On appeal by the revenue the High Court held that Section 50C is a deeming fiction applicable only in case of seller and affirmed the view of the Tribunal. *CIT v. Sarjan Realities Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 112 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)*

S.50C : Capital gains – Full value of consideration – Stamp valuation – For the purpose of section 50C, land and buildings are not to be considered as separate assets and their joint valuation is to be adopted. [S.45]

978

The Commissioner (Appeals) adopted the valuation of the land by one authority or method and that of the building by another authority or method. The Tribunal reversed the position holding that the asset in question being land and buildings, had to be valued together. On appeal to the High Court, the latter observed by analysing section 50C that there is scope for accepting the valuation of land in case of the vacant land alone and the valuation of the building in case of the building only, or in case of land and building both. Thus, the valuation has to be adopted in case of transfers of land and building jointly and not separately. (AY. 2007-08)

J. Anjaneya Sharma v. CIT (2014) 221 Taxman 148 (AP)(HC)

S.50C : Capital gains – Full value of consideration – Stamp valuation – If the stamp duty valuation is higher than the consideration received, the AO must refer the valuation to the DVO even if there is no request by the assessee. [S.45, 54EC]

979

The assessee sold a piece of land for ₹ 10 lakhs and offered capital gains. However, the AO, CIT(A) and Tribunal held that as the market value of the land was assessed by the District Sub-Registrar at ₹ 35 lakhs for stamp duty purposes, which was duly paid by the buyer, the consideration had to be taken at that figure u/s. 50C. On appeal by the assessee to the High Court HELD allowing the appeal:

No inference can be made that the assessee has accepted the price fixed by the District Sub-Registrar for stamp duty purposes as the fair market value of the property because the assessee has nothing to do in the matter. Stamp duty is payable by the purchaser & it is for the purchaser to either accept it or dispute it. The assessee could not, on the basis of the price fixed by the Sub-Registrar, have claimed anything more than the agreed consideration of a sum of ₹ 10 lakhs which, according to the assessee, was the highest prevailing market price. It would follow automatically that his case was that the fair market value of the property could not be ₹ 35 lakhs as assessed by the District Sub-Registrar. In a case of this nature the AO should, in fairness, have given an option to the assessee to have the valuation made by the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) contemplated u/s 50C. As a matter of course, in all such cases the AO should give an option to the assessee to have the valuation made by the DVO. The valuation by the DVO is required to avoid miscarriage of justice. The legislature did not intend that the capital gain should be fixed merely on the basis of the valuation to be made by the District Sub-Registrar for the purpose of stamp duty. The legislature has taken care to provide adequate machinery to give a fair treatment to the citizen/taxpayer. There is no reason why the machinery provided by the legislature should not be used and the benefit thereof should be refused. Even in a case where no such prayer was made the

AO, discharging a quasi-judicial function, has the bounden duty to act fairly and to give a fair treatment by giving him an option to follow the course provided by law.

Sunil Kumar Agarwal v. CIT (2015) 372 IT 83 / (2014) 225 Taxmann 211 / 272 CTR 332 (Cal.)(HC)

- 980 **S.50C : Capital gains – Full value of consideration – Stamp valuation – Assessee has not sought reference to the DVO for valuation, valuation adopted by stamp authority was held to be binding. [S.54F]**

The revenue has filed the appeal and revised the ground stating the CIT(A) ought to have confirmed the addition made on the basis of the value of the property adopted by the SR for stamp duty purpose.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the revenue and held that the guidelines value of the property sold by the assessee being ₹ 44,57,000 as against the sale deed value of ₹ 15,10,200. The deeming provision of section 50C(1) is applicable and the assessee having not sought reference to the DVO for valuation of property, the Assessing Officer was to complete the assessment of capital gains by adopting the guidelines value, the assessee having not challenged the value adopted by the SRO for registration purposes before the registrar, she cannot challenge the said valuation before the Tribunal. (AY. 2005-06)

ITO v. Chitti Parvatha (Smt.) (2014) 151 ITD 413 / (2015) 168 TTJ 403 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 981 **S.50C : Capital gains – Full value of consideration – Stamp valuation – Assessee claimed that value assessed by stamp valuation authority exceeded fair market value, Assessing Officer ought to have referred the matter to the Valuation Officer [S. 45]**

Assessing Officer ought to have referred matter to valuation officer instead of straightaway deeming the value adopted by the stamp valuation authority as full value of consideration. Order passed by the Assessing Officer was set aside with directions to adopt the course mentioned in section 50C(2)(a) and thereafter, proceed to determine capital gain on sale of the properties in question. (AY. 2006-07)

Sarwan Kumar v. ITO (2014) 150 ITD 289 / (2015) 167 TTJ 794 (Delhi)(Trib.)

- 982 **S.50C : Capital gains – Full value of consideration – Stamp valuation – When assessee objected to the valuation by stamp authorities, AO ought to have referred the matter to Valuation Officer. [S.45]**

Assessee has claimed before AO that value of land and building assessed by stamp valuation authority exceeded fair market value of property, then in terms of section 50C(2)(a), AO ought to have referred matter to valuation officer instead of straightaway deeming value adopted by stamp valuation authority as full value of consideration. (AY. 2006-07)

Sarwan Kumar v. ITO (2014) 150 ITD 289 / (2015) 167 TTJ 794 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.50C : Capital gains – Full value of consideration – Stamp valuation – Leasehold rights – Provision is not applicable. [S.2(14), 45] 983

Section 50C applies only to capital assets being land or building or both, it does not in terms include leasehold rights in land or building within its scope. (AY. 2003-04)

ITO v. Pradeep Steel Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. (2013) 155 TTJ 294 / (2014) 61 SOT 104 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.50C : Capital gains – Stamp duty valuation – Does not apply to purchaser of property. [S.45] 984

A plain reading of Section 50C of the Act shows that the income under the head “capital gains” is applicable to the sale of immovable property, and not to “purchase” thereof. Therefore, the provisions of Section 50C(1) of the Act are not applicable to the case of a purchaser. (AY. 2009-10)

Nitco Logistics Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT (Amritsar)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.50C : Capital gains – Full value of consideration – Stamp valuation – If a charitable institution invests the entire sale consideration in other capital asset, s. 50C should not be invoked. [S.11(IA), 12A] 985

The only issue in the appeal is, therefore, whether while taking the Value of Sale of Capital Asset being immoveable property in case of an institution registered u/s. 12A whether the provisions of section 11(1A) will prevail or deeming provisions of section 50C will apply.

The assessee is a charitable society and is registered under section 12A of the Act. The question of applicability of provisions of section 50C of the Act on transfer of capital asset in the case of a charitable society was examined by the Tribunal in the case of *ACIT v. Shri Dwarikadhish Temple Trust*, Kanpur in I.T.A. Nos. 256 & 257/LKW/2011, in which the Tribunal has held that where the entire sale consideration was invested in other capital asset, provisions of section 50C of the Act should not be invoked. It is specifically mentioned in section 50C(1) of the Act that the stamp duty value is to be considered as full value of consideration received or accruing as a result of transfer for the purpose of section 48 of the Act. It is true that the assessee is a charitable trust and the income of the assessee has to be computed u/s. 11 of the Act. As per sub-section (1A) of section 11 of the Act, if the net consideration for transfer of capital asset of a charitable trust is utilised for acquiring new capital asset, then the whole of the capital gain is exempt. (ITA No. 601/Lkw/2011, dt. 5-11-2014) (AY. 2008-09)

ACIT v. The Upper India Chamber of Commerce (Luck.) (Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.50C : Capital gains – Full value of consideration – Stamp valuation – AO cannot straightaway adopt stamp duty value as consideration for capital gains but must offer assessee benefit of reference to DVO for valuation 986

It is difficult to accept the proposition that the assessee had accepted that the price fixed by the District Sub-Registrar was the fair market value of the property. No such inference can be made as against the assessee because he had nothing to do in the matter. Stamp duty was payable by the purchaser. It was for the purchaser to either accept it or dispute it. The assessee could not, on the basis of the price fixed by

the Sub-Registrar, have claimed anything more than the agreed consideration which, according to the assessee, was the highest prevailing market price. It would follow automatically that his case was that the fair market value of the property could not be the value as assessed by the District Sub-Registrar. In a case of this nature the Assessing Officer should, in fairness, have given an option to the assessee to have the valuation made by the departmental Valuation Officer contemplated under Section 50C. As a matter of course, in all such cases the Assessing Officer should give an option to the assessee to have the valuation made by the departmental Valuation Officer to avoid miscarriage of justice. The legislature did not intend that the capital gain should be fixed merely on the basis of the valuation to be made by the District Sub-Registrar for the purpose of stamp duty. The legislature has taken care to provide adequate machinery to give a fair treatment to the citizen/taxpayer. There is no reason why the machinery provided by the legislature should not be used and the benefit thereof should be refused. Even in a case where no such prayer is made by the assessee, who may not have been properly instructed in law, the Assessing Officer, discharging a quasi-judicial function, has the bounden duty to act fairly and to give a fair treatment by giving him an option to follow the course provided by law. (ITA No. 1065/kol/2011, dt. 27-10-2014) (AY. 2006-07)

ITO v. Onkarnal Kajaria Family Trust (Kol.)(Trib.) (www.itat.nic.in)

987

S.50C : Capital gains – Full value of consideration – Stamp valuation – Reference to DVO cannot be made if assessee has challenged the valuation by the stamp authorities and even if the said challenge is dismissed on ground that as purchaser paid the duty, assessee had no locus standi to challenge stamp valuation. [S.45]

The mandate of section 50C is clear and the sale consideration shall be deemed to be the value adopted or assessed by the Stamp Valuation Authority. The only exception provided is that firstly the assessee should claim before AO that such value adopted or assessed by the Stamp Valuation Authority exceed fair market value and secondly the assessee should not have disputed such valuation adopted in any appeal or revision and no reference is made before any other authority, court or High Court challenging the value adopted by the Stamp Valuation Authority. In the light of aforementioned facts it can be said that the value adopted and assessed by the Stamp Valuation Authority under sub-section (1) was disputed by the assessee in the appeal, revision and even before Hon'ble High Court. If it is so, then according to the provisions of section 50C the assessee cannot obtain the benefit as provided in sub-section (2) of section 50C as neither of the conditions described in sub-section (2) has been fulfilled by the assessee. In this view of the situation, neither the AO nor Learned CIT(A) could adopt sale consideration of the property any amount less than the value adopted or assessed by the Stamp Valuation Authority as section 50C does not recognise such curtailment of the sale consideration in any manner. (AY. 2009-10)

Seksaria Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 36 ITR 409 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.50C : Capital gains – Full value of consideration – Stamp valuation – Addition made to assessee's business income. [S.43CA]

988

Tribunal held that the assessee is engaged in the business of selling of flats after construction, the income from which is chargeable under the head profits and gains of business and profession, the provisions of section 43CA (applicable w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15) cannot apply to substitute the actual sale consideration with the stamp value in the previous year relevant to AY. 2009-10 under consideration. Therefore, the conclusion drawn by the learned CIT(A) in invoking the provisions of section 50C for sustaining the addition has no legal stand. (AY. 2009-10)

Neelkamal Realtors & Erectors India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 145 ITD 217 / (2014) 159 TTJ 471 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.50C : Capital gains – Full value of consideration – Stamp valuation – Assessee objected to the stamp duty valuation – Valuation should be referred to the Valuation Cell.

989

The assessee had recorded STCG on sale of property in which it had one-third share. The AO noticed that the market price of the property was ₹ 7,79,635 as against ₹ 6,00,000 recorded by the assessee and thus made an addition to the capital gain of the assessee. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition as there was not much difference between the sale price adopted by the assessee and the sale price determined by the stamp duty authority.

On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal held that if the assessee was not satisfied with the stamp duty valuation adopted by the AO, the AO ought to refer the valuation of the property to the Valuation Cell and then decide the matter. The case was thus remanded back to the AO for fresh consideration. (AY. 2006-07)

Mansukhlal Ghelabhai Doshi v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 628 (Rajkot)(Trib.)

Nilesh Mansukhlal Doshi v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 628 (Rajkot)(Trib.)

Nilay Masukhlal Doshi v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 628 (Rajkot)(Trib.)

Section 54 : Profit on sale of property used for residence**S.54 : Capital gains – Profit on sale of property used for residence – Transfer – If an agreement to sell is entered into within the prescribed period, there is a transfer of some rights in favour of the vendee. Fact that sale deed could not be executed within the time limit owing to supervening problem is not a bar for s. 54 exemption – Entitled exemption. [S.2(47), 45]**

990

Consequences of execution of the agreement to sell are very clear and they are to the effect that the appellants could not have sold the property to someone else. In practical life, there are events when a person, even after executing an agreement to sell an immovable property in favour of one person, tries to sell the property to another. In our opinion, such an act would not be in accordance with law because once an agreement to sell is executed in favour of one person, the said person gets a right to get the property transferred in his favour by filing a suit for specific performance and therefore, without hesitation we can say that some right, in respect of the said property, belonging to the appellants had been extinguished and some right had been created in

favour of the vendee/transferee, when the agreement to sell had been executed. A right in respect of the capital asset, viz. the property in question had been transferred by the appellants in favour of the vendee/transferee on 27-12-2002. The sale deed could not be executed for the reason that the appellants had been prevented from dealing with the residential house by an order of a competent court, which they could not have violated. As held in *Oxford University Press v. CIT* [(2001) 3 SCC 359] a purposive interpretation of the provisions of the Act should be given while considering a claim for exemption from tax and one can very well interpret the provisions of section 54 read with section 2(47) of the Act, i.e. definition of “transfer”, which would enable the appellants to get the benefit under Section 54 of the Act. (AY. 2005-06)

Sanjeev Lal v. CIT (2014) 105 DTR 305 / 365 ITR 389 / 269 CTR 1 / 225 Taxmann 239 (SC)

Shail Motilal (Smt) v. CIT (2014) 105 DTR 305 / 365 ITR 389 (SC)

991 **S.54 : Capital gains – Profit on sale of property used for residence – “Residential house” includes shared possession of a residential house – Undivided interest – Co-owner is not entitled to exemption – Ownership of more than one house even if Residential house is jointly held. [Ss.45, 54F]**

During relevant assessment year, assessees sold their undivided interest in land. The assessee claimed deduction under sections 54 and 54F in respect of long-term capital gain arising from sale of land. The revenue authorities finding that assessee had sold undivided share in land and not land plus residential house/apartments rejected assessee’s claim for deduction under section 54. As regards deduction under section 54F, revenue authorities having found that assessees were having two residential houses having one half share each therein on date of sale of land, rejected assessee’s claim. The Tribunal, however, allowed assessee’s claim for deduction under section 54F holding that ‘a residential house’, on date of sale of long-term asset as mentioned in said section meant complete residential house and would not include shared interest in a residential house. On revenue’s appeal it was held by the High Court that Section 54F provides that if the assessee has a residential house he cannot seek the benefit of long term capital gain. Under this provision, merely because, the words residential house are preceded by article ‘a’ would not exclude a house shared with any other person. Even if the residential house is shared by an assessee, his right and ownership in the house, to whatever extent, is exclusive and nobody can take away his right in the house without due process of law. In other words, co-owner is the owner of a house in which he has share and that his right, title and interest is exclusive to the extent of his share and that he is the owner of the entire undivided house till it is partitioned. The right of a person, may be one half, in the residential house cannot be taken away without due process of law or it continues till there is a partition of such residential house. Thus, the view expressed by the Tribunal on this issue cannot be accepted. Thus, the order

passed by revenue authorities rejecting assessee's claim was to be restored. The assessee was held to be not entitled to benefit under section 54 or section 54F. (AY. 1997-98(BP. 1-4-1991 to 29-5-2001)

CIT v. M. J. Siwani (2014) 366 ITR 356 / 105 DTR 265 / 226 Taxmann 394 (Karn.)(HC)

CIT v. H. J. Siwani (2014) 366 ITR 356 / 105 DTR 265 / 226 Taxmann 394 (Karn.)(HC)

Editorial: SLP of assessee is dismissed. SLP Nos. 24007 to 24097 of 2014 dt. 10-11-2014) M. J. Siwani (2015) 232 Taxmann 335 (SC)

S.54 : Capital gains – Profit on sale of property used for residence – Two flats, even though acquired under different agreements & from different sellers, are one residential unit if there is a common kitchen – Entitled exemption. [Ss.45,54F]

992

The department's argument, that the law laid down by the Tribunal in *ITO v. Sushila M. Jhaveri (2007) 107 ITD 327 (Mum.)(SB)* and confirmed by this Court in *CIT v. Raman Kumar Suri (Income Tax Appeal No. 6962 of 2010, decided on 27-11-2012)* on the availability of exemption u/s. 54 is applicable only when the house purchased is a single unit and not where two flats, one acquired in the assessee's name and another jointly in the names of the assessee and his wife but under two distinct agreements and from different sellers have been taken into consideration, is not acceptable. Though these flats were acquired under two distinct agreements and from different sellers, the map of the general layout plan as well as internal layout plan in regard to flat Nos. 103 and 104 indicate that there is only one common kitchen for both the flats. The flats were constructed in such a way that adjacent units or flats can be combined into one. The admitted fact is that the flats were converted into one unit and for the purpose of residence of the assessee. Thus, though the acquisition of the flats may have been done independently but eventually they are a single unit and house for the purpose of residence. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. DevdasNaik (2014) 366 ITR 12 / 112 DTR 162 / 227 Taxmann 157 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

S.54 : Capital gains – Profit on sale of property used for residence – Purchase – Purchasing the undivided share of a co-owner in a new flat constitutes a “purchase” & is eligible for exemption. [S.45]

993

The assessee purchased a residential flat on 08.01.1981, which was sold on 7-2-2007 for a sale consideration of ₹ 1,25,00,000/-. The long term capital gain on such sale amounted to ₹ 1,14,63,650/-. Before the said sale, assessee had entered into an agreement to purchase a residential flat, at Santacruz (West), Mumbai along with her son, Gurdeep Singh Bhatia and daughter-in-law, vide agreement dated 28-12-2005 and payment of ₹ 5,00,000/- was made. Another payment of ₹ 5 lakhs was made on 16-5-2006. This payment of ₹ 10 lakhs was claimed as exemption u/s. 54, which has been restricted to ₹ 5 lakhs by the CIT(A). Thereafter the assessee had entered into an agreement with her son Gurdeep Singh Bhatia on 20-3-2007, who was the co-owner, for purchasing his undivided share in the new flat for sum of ₹ 1,10,00,000/-. The department's case is that, firstly, the purchase agreement for new flat was on 28-12-2005, which is beyond the period of one year before the date of sale and secondly, the purchasing of undivided share in the flat from the son does not amount to purchase of a flat; and therefore on

these two counts, exemption u/s. 54 is not available to the assessee. On the first issue CIT(A) has held that the payment of purchase consideration to the extent of ₹ 5 lakhs which was made on 16-5-2006, falls within the period of one year before the date of sale of original flat and hence this amount is eligible for exemption u/s. 54. The other part of the ₹ 5 lakhs paid on 13-10-2005 was denied by him, as it was beyond period of one year. To this extent the finding of the CIT(A) is factually and legally correct therefore no inference is called for and same is affirmed.

(ii) Now coming to the other part of the issue, whether purchasing of share of the son who is co-sharer in the flat amounts to purchase or not. In principle, this issue is settled by the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P & O Nelloyed Ltd. (1979) 120 ITR page 46 (SC) wherein it was held that the word 'purchase' in section 54(1) had to be given a common meaning, that is, buying for a price or equivalent of a price on by payment in kind or adjustment towards debt or for other monetary consideration. In the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, four brothers were the members of HUF, who had partitioned a joint family property, leaving an undivided common house. The three brothers executed a release deed in favour of the elder brother for a consideration which was treated as purchase of the house by the elder brother. The elder brother had sold one of his house and out of the sale proceeds, paid the consideration to his brothers to acquire their shares in the house. In this context it was held that the elder brother would be entitled to relief u/s 54(1). Similarly the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in *CIT v. Chandan Ben Maganlal* has held that sale proceeds invested for purchase of interest in the residential house owned by assessee's husband and son amounts to purchase, hence entitled for exemption u/s 54. There are other High Court decisions on this score, which have been referred and relied upon by the CIT(A). Thus, following the said proposition laid down by the Hon'ble courts, we hold that the reasoning and the conclusion drawn by the CIT(A) is legally correct and the same is upheld. (ITA No. 1791/Mum/2011, dt. 12-11-2014.) (AY. 2007-08)

ITO v. Narinder Kaur Bhatia (Mum)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

994 **S.54 : Capital gains – Profit on sale of property used for residence – Cost of construction made in flats on different floors – Entitled to exemption in respect of all flats**

Assessee claimed exemption u/s. 54 on account of investment/cost of construction made in flats on different floors which were in his possession as his residential house. Assessee was entitled to exemption in respect of all flats. (AY. 2005-06)

Dy. CIT v. Jai Trikanand Rao (2014) 149 ITD 112 (Mum.)(Trib.)

995 **S.54 : Capital gains – Profit on sale of property used for residence – Expenditure on improvement / renovation for making it habitable it would be eligible as investment in new asset. [S.54F]**

Assessee claimed cost of renovation as part of cost of acquisition of new residential house for purpose of deduction under S. 54 of the Act. The AO disallowed cost of renovation holding that renovation was not in connection with any structural damage to house and was only in respect of plastering and renovating of wires which cannot be treated as making house habitable. CIT(A) confirmed disallowance made by AO. The

Tribunal held that the residential house for purpose of section(s) 54 and 54F means a habitable house and investment made up to stage of making house as habitable to be considered as investment in purchase of house. Assessee chose to purchase a house and incurred *bona fide* expenditure on improvement/renovation for making it habitable it would be eligible as investment in new asset for section 54 of the IT Act. (AY. 2009-10) *Meher R. Surti v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 5 (URO) / 27 ITR 340 (Mum.)(Trib.)*

S.54 : Capital gains – Profit on sale of property used for residence – Income from building is chargeable to income tax under the head Income from house property it is not necessary that the assessee must earn income from such property – Exemption was allowed

996

The assessee was owner of a land on which a residential building was constructed with funds of assessee's husband. The assessee sold said property and invested sale consideration in purchasing a new residential house property and claimed exemption under section 54. Exemption was denied to assessee on the ground that assessee was not owner of the house property and no income had been assessed relating to the said property in hands of assessee under head 'House property' Tribunal held that the requirement of s. 54 is that the income of the building which is being sold should be chargeable under the head "Income from house property". The requirement of section is not that the assessee must earn income from said property. If there was a tenant then the income from the property was chargeable to tax. Therefore, exemption also cannot be denied to the assessee on the ground that assessee did not show any income chargeable under the head "Income from house property. There cannot be any dispute on the fact that the new residential property purchased by the assessee and her husband is fulfilling the criteria for exemption u/s. 54, as the revenue itself has granted such exemption to the husband of the assessee for his 50% share. Exemption u/s. 54 has wrongly been denied in the case of assessee. (AY. 2004-05)

Sheela Bhagwandas Nichlani (Mrs.) v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 244 / 161 TTJ 496 / 100 DTR 370 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 54B : Capital gain in transfer of land used for agricultural purposes not to be charged on certain cases

S.54B : Capital gains – Transfer of land used for agricultural purposes – Distance to be measured from approachable road. [S.2(14)(iii)(b)]

997

For the purpose of determining capital gain on the sale of agricultural land, the existence of the agricultural land should be measured from the approachable road. Not as per sec. 2(14)(iii)(b) stipulations. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Shabbir Hussain Pithawala (2014) 265 CTR 606 / 226 Taxman 174 (MP)(HC)

Section 54EC : Capital gain not to be charged on investment in certain bonds

- 998 **S.54EC : Capital gains – Investment in bonds – Assessee is eligible for deduction of ₹ 1 crore in respect of investment of ₹ 50 lakhs made in two different financial years. Proviso to s. 54EC seeking to curb this has effect from AY. 2015-16**

The Court held that on a plain reading of section 54EC(1) of the Act it is clear that it restricts the time limit for the period of investment after the property has been sold to six months. There is no cap on the investment to be made in bonds. The first proviso to section 54EC(1) of the Act specifies the quantum of investment and it states that the investment so made on or after 1.4.2007 in the long-term specified asset by an assessee during any financial year does not exceed fifty lakh rupees. In other words, as per the mandate of Section 54EC(1) of the Act, the time limit for investment is six months and the benefit that flows from the first proviso is that if the assessee makes the investment of ₹ 50,00,000 in any financial year, it would have the benefit of section 54EC(1) of the Act.

The legislature has chosen to remove the ambiguity in the proviso to section 54EC(1) of the Act by inserting a second proviso with effect from 1-4-2015. The memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2014 also states that the same will be applicable from 1-4-2015 in relation to assessment year 2015-16 and the subsequent years. The intention of the legislature probably appears to be that this amendment should be for the assessment year 2015-16 to avoid unwanted litigation of the previous years. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

CIT v. C. Jaichander (2015) 370 ITR 579 / 229 Taxman 10 / 115 DTR 251 (Mad.)(HC)

CIT v. Sriram Indubai (2015) 370 ITR 579 (Mad.)(HC)

- 999 **S.54EC : Capital gains – Investment in bonds – Exemption available even in case of gains arising from sale of depreciable assets. [S.50]**

The assessee sold two properties and purchased REC bonds to claim deduction u/s. 54EC. The AO did not grant deduction u/s. 54EC in respect of capital gain arising out of one of the properties. The CIT(A) relying on decisions of the Bombay High Court and Guwahati High Court allowed the deduction u/s. 54EC on the sale of depreciable assets, which according to him was held by the assessee for more than 36 months. The Tribunal confirmed the order of CIT(A). The High Court following its own decision in the case of *CIT v. Aditya Medisales Ltd. (2013) 38 taxmann.com 244* held that the deeming fiction u/s. 50 cannot restrict the application of section 54EC if the assessee makes investments in the specified assets and hence the deduction u/s. 54EC was available in case of capital gains arising out of transfer of depreciable assets.

CIT v. Polestar Industries (2014) 221 Taxmann 423 (Guj.)(HC)

- 1000 **S.54EC : Capital gains – Investment in bonds – Short-term or long term – Date of allotment of plot to be considered for purpose of capital gains. [S. 45]**

Assessee was allotted the plot on 3-8-1999 and 96% of the amount was paid by 3-10-1959. Possession of the property acquired on 12-12-2005 and the same was sold on 9-1-2008. Date of allotment of plot to be taken for the purpose of computing long term capital gains.

CIT v. K. Ramakrishnan (2014) 363 ITR 59 / 225 Taxmann 123 (Delhi)(HC)

S.54EC : Capital gains – Investment in bonds – The deeming fiction of long-term capital gain to be treated as short-term capital gain is restricted only to section 50 and would have no application to other provisions such as section 54EC. [S.50]

1001

The assessee sold its factory shed and had earned long-term capital gain of ₹ 1.31 crores. However, as the asset sold was depreciable asset, the gains were computed in terms of Section 50 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The respondent–assessee invested the capital gains arising from the transfer of a long-term asset as specified under Section 54EC of the Act to claim deduction from tax. The assessing officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the gain is a short-term gain in view of Section 50 of the Act. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the AO. The Tribunal reversed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). On an appeal by the Department, the High Court, following the order of the Ace Builders (P) Limited (281 ITR 210) (Bom.) held that the deeming fiction of a long-term capital gain to be treated as a short-term capital gain is restricted only to section 50 of the Act and would have no application to other provisions such as section 54E of the Act. The above rationale would be equally applicable to the claim of deduction under Section 54EC of the Act. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. United Paper Industries (2014) 221 Taxmann 158 (Bom)(HC)

S.54EC : Capital gains – Investment in Bonds – Short-term or long-term – Assessee has acquired beneficial interest to the property on paying 96% of the amount – Entitled to exemption as long-term. [S.2(29B), 2(42A), 2(42B), 45]

1002

Assessee had paid 96% of the consideration on 3rd October, 1999 for purchase of plot of land. The assessee got the possession of the land on 12-12-2005. The assessee sold the land on 9-1-2008 and invested in capital bonds and claimed exemption under section 54EC. AO held that the capital gain is short-term capital gain and disallowed the claim under section 54EC. Tribunal allowed the claim of assessee. On appeal by revenue the court upheld the view of the Tribunal by observing that the assessee had acquired the beneficial interest to the property at least 96% of the amount on payment by 3rd October, 1999. Order of Tribunal was upheld. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. K. Ramakrishnan (2014) 363 ITR 59 / 225 Taxmann 123 (Delhi)(HC)

S.54EC : Capital gains – Investment in bonds – The term “month” in S.54E, 54EA, 54EB & 54EC does not mean “30 days” but the “calendar month”. The expression “within a month” means “before the end of the calendar month”

1003

The term ‘month’ is not defined in the Income-tax Act. Therefore, its meaning has to be understood as per the General Clauses Act, 1897 which defines the word “month” to mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. In *CIT v. Munnalal Shri Kishan (1987) 167 ITR 415 (All)* it was held in the context of limitation u/s. 256(2) that the word ‘month’ refers to a period of 30 days and, therefore, the reference to “six months” in s. 256(2) is to “six calendar months” and not “180 days”. On some occasions, the Legislature had not used the term “Month” but has used the number of days to prescribe a specific period. For example, the First Proviso to s. 254(2A) provides that the Tribunal may pass an order granting stay but for a period not exceeding 180 days.

This is an important distinction made in the statute while subscribing the limitation/ period. This distinction thus resolves the present controversy by itself)

Alkaben B. Patel v. ITO (2014) 148 ITD 31 / 101 DTR 251 / 161 TTJ 417 / 31 ITR 231 (SB)(Ahd.)(Trib.)

Section 54F : Capital gain on transfer of certain capital assets not to be charged in case of investment in residential house

- 1004 **S.54F : Capital gains – Investment in residential house – Acquisition of five flats in a multi storeyed building having single door No, was held to be eligible to exemption – Prior to amendment Act 2014, w.e.f. 1st April, 2005. [S.45]**

Assessee having entered into an agreement with a developer of her land whereby she was entitled to receive 43.75 per cent of the built up area which was eventually translated into five flats having common door no. was held to be eligible exemption in respect of all the five flats. Prior to the amendment of section 54F by Finance (No 2) Act, 2014, which came into effect from 1st April, 2015. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. V. R. Karpagam (Smt) (2014) 109 DTR 504 / 272 CTR 184 / 226 Taxmann 197 (2015) 373 ITR 127 (Mad.) (Ttc)

- 1005 **S.54F : Capital gains – Investment in residential house – Extent of construction of residential building and facilities provided in such building are not relevant**

In the return filed, the assessee claimed exemption u/s. 54F of capital gains earned during the year. The AO held that the assessee had not purchased any residential property within the prescribed time period and hence disallowed the exemption. The CIT(A) confirmed the Order of the AO. The Tribunal, however, held that the residential property was actually purchased based on the material on record.

On appeal by the department, the High Court observed that the Act does not provide as to what should be the extent of construction of residential building or what facilities should be provided in such constructions to be eligible for the exemption. Accordingly, the High Court held that all that the Authorities have to look into is, whether what is purchased is a residential construction or not ? if the material on record shows that prior to sale, the vendor lived there with his family and he has sold the site along with the residential construction, merely because the property is not suitable to the assessee and construction material are kept there, is not a ground to deny exemption under Section 54F of the Act”

CIT v. R. Balaji (Dr.) (2014) 222 Taxmann 305 / 272 CTR 189 (Karn.)(HC)

- 1006 **S.54F : Capital gains – Investment in residential house – Benefit cannot be denied on ground that construction of house had commenced before sale of shares ‘original asset’**

The assessee, an individual, had sold shares and the sale proceeds were invested in construction of house property and an exemption was claimed u/s. 54F of the Act. The AO rejected the claim for benefit u/s. 54F on the ground that the construction of the house had commenced before the date of sale of shares. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal both allowed the assessee benefit u/s. 54F.

The High Court dismissing the departmental appeal held that it is not stipulated or

indicated in the section that the construction must begin after the date of sale of the original/old asset. There is no condition or reason for ambiguity and confusion which requires moderation or reading the words of the said sub-section in a different manner. Section 54F is a beneficial provision and is applicable to an assessee when the old capital asset is replaced by a new capital asset in the form of a residential house. Once an assessee falls within the ambit of a beneficial provision, then the said provision should be liberally interpreted. (AY. 2009-10)

CIT v. Bharti Mishra (2014) 222 Taxmann 2 / 265 CTR 374 / 98 DTR 1 (Delhi)(HC)

S.54F : Capital gains – Investment in residential house – Construction of house– Purchase and demolition of old house – Construction having been carried out within three years from the date of sale of capital asset qualifies for exemption. [S.45]

1007

The word “construction” for the purposes of s. 54F has to be given a realistic, practical and pragmatic meaning keeping in mind the object and purpose of the provision. The assessee, an individual, sold a property and declared capital gains of ₹ 51,71,994. He purchased a fully built up property, demolished it and rebuilt it. The money spent on construction as declared by the assessee was ₹ 59,98,451. The assessee claimed exemption under s. 54F. The AO denied the exemption. The AO held that there was neither the need for the assessee to reconstruct nor renovate the purchased property as it was already fully constructed. Held, Assessee was entitled to exemption as construction was carried out within the outer limit of three years. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Ashok Kumar Ralhan (2014) 360 ITR 575 / 224 Taxmann 137 (Mag.) / 109 DTR 150 / 272 CTR 71 (Delhi)(HC)

S.54F : Capital gains – Investment in residential house – investment made by his sister- in law and nephew – Exemption cannot be allowed. [S.54]

1008

Assessee claimed deduction under section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was claimed by assessee for investment made by his sister-in-law and nephew. It was held that such a liberal interpretation could not be given by courts for the said deduction and the same was denied to assessee. This deduction can be extended to investments made in the names of spouse and minor children but not beyond that. (AY. 2005-06)

Girish Dharod v. ACIT (2014) 61 SOT 99 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.54F : Capital gains – Investment in residential house – Amount paid to builder – Amount paid to builder for house is equivalent to amount spent by assessee for construction. Fact that only advance is given and construction is delayed beyond 3 years does not deprive assessee of exemption

1009

The Tribunal held that the flat which is newly constructed by a builder on behalf of the assessee is in no way different from a house constructed. Section 54F being a beneficial provision has to be interpreted so as to give the benefit of residential unit viz., flat instead of house in the present state of affairs. Even if only advance is given the benefit still will be available for exemption u/s. 54F, though the construction is delayed beyond 3 years does not deprive assessee of exemption. (AY. 2009-10)

Pradeep Kumar Chowdhry v. Dy. CIT (2015) 115 DTR 208 / 168 TTJ 552 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

Section 54G : Exemption of capital gains on transfer of assets in cases of shifting of industrial undertaking from urban area

1010 S.54G : Capital gains – Shifting of industrial undertaking from urban area – Eligible exemption. [S.45]

The assessee had sold its land located at City belt area and set up an industrial undertaking at Koppur village and claimed the exemption under section 54G. The Tribunal held that the object of enacting section 54G was to deurbanise and remove industries from populated area and promote industrialisation in underdeveloped areas. Section 54G is a provision intended for promoting inclusive growth of the country. In such a situation, giving a very narrow interpretation to the said section will defeat the very purpose thereof. Thus the assessee was eligible for claiming exemption under section 54G.

Edac Engineering Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 341 / 159 TTJ 526 (Chennai)(Trib.)

Section 55 : Meaning of “adjusted”, “cost of improvement” and “cost of acquisition”

1011 S.55 : Capital gains – Computation – Capital asset – Agricultural land – Cost to be taken at fair market value on statutorily specified date or at option of assessee market value on date of acquisition. [Ss.45, 55(3)]

Where the cost of acquisition of a capital asset cannot be ascertained, section 55(3) of the Act, statutorily prescribes the cost to be equal to the market value on the date of acquisition. Even where the cost of acquisition of the capital asset cannot be ascertained but the asset has a market value, the cost of acquisition is to be taken as the fair market value on the date statutorily specified or at the option of the assessee, the market value on the date of acquisition. (AY. 2006-07)

Thakur Dwara Shri Krishnaji Maharaj Handiyaya, Barnala v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 381 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 1 (P&H)(HC)

1012 S.55 : Capital gains – Cost of improvement – Cost of acquisition – Fair Market Value – The fair market value for purpose of computing capital gain tax is the price which property would fetch on sale in the open market on a relevant date – The guideline value prescribed for the purpose of stamp duty registration or net wealth value under the Wealth Tax Act could not be the guiding factor for determining fair market value. [S.2(22B)]

The assessee had purchased land and buildings in 1960s. She sold the said property on 4-11-2000. For the purpose of computation of the capital gain, the assessee took the value of the property as on 1-4-1981. The AO required the assessee to file the valuation report of the property as on 1-4-1981. The assessee did not furnish such report but filed the computation of net wealth as on 31-3-1992, showing the value of the property as on 31-3-1992 for the purpose of wealth tax. In absence of any valuation report, the AO obtained the details from the office of the Sub-Registrar and accordingly, capital gains payable was assessed on that basis. The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal. On appeal, the Tribunal held that though the guideline value for registration may not be adopted as conclusive evidence for ascertaining the value of the property,

the value of the property written by the assessee in wealth tax return could be taken into consideration. The Hon'ble Court held that the 'fair market value' had been defined under section 2(22B), specifically in relation to the capital asset to calculate the capital gain tax which made it clear that fair market value was the price that the capital asset would ordinarily fetch on sale in the open market on the relevant date and the guideline value prescribed for the purpose of stamp duty and registration under the Karnataka Stamp Act and the Indian Registration Act or the net wealth value arrived at under the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act could not be a guiding factor to determine fair market value. (AY. 2001-02)

Krishna Bajaj (Smt.) v. ACIT (2014) 221 Taxman 431 / 267 CTR 172 (Karn.)(HC)

S.55 : Capital gains – Cost of acquisition – Market value as on 1-4-1981 – AO could not substitute valuation of registered valuer – Order of Tribunal was confirmed. [Ss.48, 260A]

1013

Memorandum of understanding reflected higher sale price but agreement to sell and sale deed recorded a lower figure. Held, there was no material to suggest excess consideration was actually paid. Also, limited use of land was allowed to the purchaser of land. There was no evidence other than memorandum of understanding to controvert evidence. Held, without further evidence, Assessing Officer could not substitute valuation of registered valuer. In light of concurrent factual finding of Commissioner (Appeals) and Tribunal, held no question of law arose for consideration.

CIT v. Hiraben Govindbhai Patel (2014) 362 ITR 59 / (2015) 229 Taxman 17 (Guj.)(HC)

Section 55A : Reference to Valuation Officer

S.55A : Capital gains – Reference to Departmental Valuation Officer – Consideration reflected in sale deed higher than valuation adopted by stamp valuation authority. Reference to Departmental Valuation Officer not justified. [S. 48]

1014

Dismissing the appeal of revenue the Court held that the sale consideration reflected in the sale deeds was higher than the valuation adopted by the stamp valuation authority. The reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer for ascertaining the fair market value of the capital asset as on the date of the sale in the present case was wholly redundant. The reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer ascertaining the fair market value as on April 1, 1981, also such reference was not competent. The assessee had relied on the estimate made by the registered valuer for the purpose of supporting its value of the asset. Any such situation would be governed by clause (a) of section 55A of the Act and the Assessing Officer could not have resorted to clause (b) thereof. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Gauranginiben S. Shodhan (2014) 367 ITR 238 / 224 Taxman 253 (Guj.)(HC)

S.55A : Capital gains – Reference to Valuation Officer – Cost of acquisition – FMV as on 1-4-1981 – Reference to DVO – Amendment of s. 55A(a) by the Finance Act, 2012 is effective from 1-7-2012 and is not retrospective in nature. [S.45]]

1015

Assessee adopted the value of the property at ₹ 35.99 lakhs as on 1-4-1981, which was much more than FMV of ₹ 6.68 lakhs as determined by the DVO. Therefore, s. 55A(a) could not be invoked. Amendment of s. 55A(a) by the Finance Act, 2012 is effective

from 1-7-2012 and is not retrospective in nature. Decision in *CIT v. Daulat Mohta (HUF)* ITA No. 1031 of 2008 dated 22-9-2008 was followed (2014) 360 ITR 680 (Bom.) (HC) of Tribunal was affirmed. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Puja Prints (2014) 98 DTR 177 / 360 ITR 697 / 265 CTR 124 / 224 Taxmann 22 (Bom.) (HC)

1016 **S.55A : Capital gains – Reference to Valuation Officer – Value of the capital asset shown by the assessee more than its fair market value**

Reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer can only be made in cases where the value of the capital asset shown by the assessee is less than its fair market value as on April 1, 1981. Where the value of the capital asset shown by the assessee on the basis of the approved valuer's report was more than its fair market value, reference under s. 55A was not valid.

CIT v. Daulal Mohta (HUF) (2014) 360 ITR 680 (Bom.) (HC)

1017 **S.55A : Capital gains – Reference to Valuation Officer – Land – Reference to Valuation Officer was held to be valid – Valuation in case of land should be arrived at by taking into account adverse factors attached to land [Ss.50C, 131(1)(d)]**

Assessee sold an agricultural land to his family member for a consideration of ₹ 2.96 crore and declared capital gain. AO made reference to DVO who valued said land at ₹ 3.65 crore. AO issued commission under section 131(1)(d) to DVA for ascertaining fair value under section 55A. AO taking market value as determined by DVO, made addition. Before Tribunal the assessee contended that reference made by the AO under section 131(1)(d) was illegal as there was a separate provision for reference to Valuation Officer under section 55A of the Act. Tribunal held that AO was justified in issuing commission under section 131(1)(d) to DVD for ascertain fair market value under section 55A of the Act. Assessee also contended that while making valuation of land DVO had not considered that transaction was more of family settlement rather than actual sale; that saleable area was much less since road was proposed by IDA which was going through land in question; and that construction made was of no use since road was proposed on said land and, thus, it had to be demolished sooner or later. Keeping into account factors pointed out by assessee which were going to adversely affect fair market value of land, AO. should reduce valuation arrived at by DVO by 20 per cent and recompute capital gain accordingly. (AY. 2008-09)

Jai Kumar Chawla v. ITO (2014) 149 ITD 38 (Indore) (Trib.)

Section 56 : Income from other source

1018 **S.56 : Income from other sources – Interest earned on Central Government Grant would not be treated as taxable income if conditions in the grant stated that interest would form part of Central grant**

The assessee had filed its return of income declaring total income as NIL. During the assessment proceedings, it was found that the assessee received grant from the Central Government of ₹ 16.70 crores and earned interest of ₹ 21,22,253. The bank had deducted TDS of ₹ 4,32,939 on the said interest amount. The assessee claimed refund of ₹ 4,32,939 being the TDS deducted on the aforesaid amount of ₹ 21,22,253

treating it as income. The AO thereafter passed the assessment order making addition of ₹ 21,22,153 in income of assessee on ground of escaped assessment. On appeal, the CIT(A) dismissed the assessee's appeal. On appeal, the Tribunal considered the letter of the Central Government while sanctioning the grant in favour of the assessee, more particularly the condition that the interest earned on the Central grant already released would form part of the Central grant limit of ₹ 50 crore. The Tribunal allowed the appeal by deleting the addition of ₹ 21,22,153 made by the Assessing Officer. The High Court held that no error had been committed by Tribunal in deleting the addition of ₹ 21,22,253 made by the AO, treating it as the income of the assessee. (AY. 2005-06) *CIT v. SAR Infracon P. Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 294 (Guj.)(HC)*

S.56 : Income from other sources – Corporation formed after division of the states to pay tax in the specified ratio

1019

The Assessee, UP State Forest Corporation purchased FDRs from undivided funds in undivided State of UP and same was kept in commercial bank to earn interest. On formation of new State of Uttaranchal after division of UP State, notification was passed whereby fund was divided in ratio of 46:54 per cent respectively in favour of old and new State Forest Corporations. The department taxed the entire income in the hands of the assessee. The assessee contended that the State was divided in the ratio of 46:54 and accordingly FDR should also be divided. The High Court observed that the FDRs were purchased from the undivided funds and consequently by virtue of the notification the State was divided in the ratio of 46:54%. Accordingly the High Court held that interest income has to be divided and only 46% to be taxable in the hands of the assessee and the rest 54% to be taxable in the hands of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation. (AY. 2002-03 to 2004-05)

CIT v. UP Forest Corporation (2014) 220 Taxmann 15 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)

S.56(2)(vi) : Income from other sources – Amounts received under a Power of Attorney for making investments cannot be treated as income in the hands of the recipient

1020

Section 56 of the Act deals with income from other sources. Sub-clause (vi) to section 56(2) was inserted by Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2006, with effect from 1-4-2007. A plain reading of the aforementioned statutory provisions reveals that it is intended to tax a receipt of money without consideration. The impugned amount was received by the assessee for making the investment on behalf of Shri Zakir Hussain, on the basis of Power of Attorney. If the provisions of the Act and the content of the Power of Attorney are kept in juxtaposition and analysed then it can be concluded that the mutual funds, purchase and sold by the assessee were made on behalf of Shri Zakir Hussain and there is no evidence to establish that the investment made by the assessee is from the funds of Shri Zakir Hussain as is evident from return of income, balance sheet filed in the case of Shri Zakir Hussain and the explanation of the assessee there is no doubt about the genuineness of the transaction. The assessee never became the beneficiary of the impugned amount i.e. ₹ 25 lakh, thus there is no question of making the addition u/s. 56(2)(vi) of the Act. Even otherwise, the amount after liquidating the mutual fund was returned back meaning thereby, the amount was returned back

along with profit, consequently, the provision of section 56(2)(vi) is not applicable (*CIT v. Saran Pal Singh (HUF)* 237 CTR (P&H) 50 followed) (ITA No. 6232/Mum/2011, dt. 17-12-2014) (AY. 2008-09)
Sannidhi C. Patel v. ITO (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

1021 **S.56(2)(vii) : Income from other sources – Section does not apply to bonus & rights shares offered on a proportionate basis even if the offer price is less than the FMV of the shares. [Companies Act, 1956, S.81]**

The assessee held 15,000 shares in Dorf Ketel Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. representing 4.98% of the share capital. Pursuant to a further issue, it was allotted 1,94,000 shares at the face value rate of ₹ 100 each, on a proportionate basis. The AO held that as the book value of the shares was ₹ 1,538 per share, computed under Rules 11U & 11UA), the difference of ₹ 1,438 per share (aggregating ₹ 27.89 crore) was “inadequate consideration” and assessable to tax u/s. 56(2)(vii)(c). This was upheld by the CIT(A). On appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal HELD allowing the appeal:

S.56(2)(vii)(c)(ii) provides that where an individual or a HUF receives any property for a consideration which is less than the FMV of the property, the difference shall be assessed as income of the recipient. S. 56(2)(vii) does not apply to the issue of bonus shares because there is a mere capitalisation of profit by the issuing-company and there is neither any increase nor decrease in the wealth of the shareholder as his percentage holding remains constant. The same argument applies *pari materia* to the issue of additional shares to the extent it is proportional to the existing shareholding because to the extent the value of the property in the additional shares is derived from that of the existing shareholding, on the basis of which the same are allotted, no additional property can be said to have been received by the shareholder. The fall in the value of the existing holding has to be taken into account. As long as there is no disproportionate allotment, i.e., shares are allotted *pro rata* to the shareholders, based on their existing holdings, there is no scope for any property being received by them on the said allotment of shares; there being only an apportionment of the value of their existing holding over a larger number of shares. There is, accordingly, no question of s. 56(2)(vii)(c) getting attracted in such a case. A higher than proportionate or a non-uniform allotment though would attract the rigour of the provision to the extent of the disproportionate allotment and by suitably factoring in the decline in the value of the existing holding (AY. 2010-11)

Sudhir Menon HUF v. ACIT (2014) 148 ITD 260 / 103 DTR 145 / 162 TTJ 425 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 57 : Deduction

1022 **S.57(iii) : Income from other sources – Interest – Borrowed fund not utilised for the purpose of business – Interest not allowable as deduction**

When the borrowed funds were not utilised in the course of business to earn profit, the interest paid on the borrowed funds were not allowable as deduction u/s. 57(iii).(AY. 1995-96 to 1997-98)

CIT v. Subrata Roy (2014) 265 CTR 481 (All.)(HC)

CIT v. Srivastava, O.P. (2014) 265 CTR 481 (All.)(HC)

S.57(iii) : Income from other sources – Interest – Borrowed – Shares – Tribunal was justified in sending the matter back 1023

It is not justified to allow the deduction by the Tribunal without examining the facts when the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee is borrowing funds to buy shares of a closely held company to reduce his tax liability. The matter was rightly remanded back. (AY. 1994-95)

CIT v. Srivastava, O. P. (2013) 212 Taxmann 505 / (2014) 265 CTR 505 (Delhi)(HC)

CIT v. J. B. Roy (2013) 212 taxmann 505 / (2014) 265 CTR 505 (Delhi)(HC)

S.57(iii) : Income from other sources – Interest on funds borrowed for investment in shares is allowable expenditure, though no dividend is received. [S.37(1), 56] 1024

Interest on funds borrowed for investment in shares is allowable expenditure, though no dividend is received.

Sri Saytasai Properties and Investment P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 641 / 106 DTR 420 / 270 CTR 210 (Cal.)(HC)

S.57(iii) : Income from other sources – Interest paid on a loan taken to avoid premature encashment of a fixed deposit is deductible against the interest earned on the fixed deposit. [S.36(1)(iii)] 1025

The assessee placed a fixed deposit of ₹ 1 crore with ICICI Bank on which she earned interest of ₹ 11.77 lakhs. The assessee took a loan of ₹ 75 lakhs on the security of the said fixed deposit and paid interest of ₹ 4.36 lakhs thereon. The assessee claimed that the loan was taken to avoid premature encashment of the fixed deposit and the interest paid on the loan had to be deducted against the interest earned on the fixed deposit u/s 57(iii). The AO & CIT(A) rejected the claim. On appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal HELD allowing the appeal:

S. 57(iii) allows a deduction of “any...expenditure (not being in the nature of capital expenditure) laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of making or earning such income”. Thus even in a situation in which proximate or immediate cause of an expenditure was an event unconnected to earning of the income, in the sense that the expenditure was not triggered by the objective to earn that income, but the expenditure was, nonetheless, wholly and exclusively to earn or protect that income, it will not cease to be deductible in nature. It is also important to bear in mind the fact that a borrowing against fixed deposit cannot be considered in isolation of a fixed deposit itself inasmuch as, going by the admitted facts of this case, the interest chargeable on the fixed deposit itself is linked to the interest accruing and arising from the fixed deposit. On these facts, in order to protect the interest earnings from fixed deposits and to meet her financial needs, when an assessee raises a loan against the fixed deposits, so as to keep the source of earning intact, the expenditure so incurred in wholly and exclusively to earn the fixed deposit interest income. The authorities below were apparently swayed by the fact that the borrowings were triggered by assessee’s financial needs for personal purposes and, by that logic, the borrowing cannot be said to be wholly and exclusively for the purposes of earning interest income, but what this approach overlooks is whether the expenditure is incurred for directly contributing to the beginning of or triggering the source of income or whether the expenditure is for protecting, and thus keeping alive, that source of income, in either case it is expenditure

incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of earning that income. The assessee could have gone for premature encashment of bank deposits, and thus ended the source of income itself, as well, but instead of doing so, she resorted to borrowings against the fixed deposit and thus preserved the source of earning. The expenditure so incurred is an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for earning from interest on fixed deposits. We are alive to the fact that in the case of a business assessee, and in a situation in which the borrowings against fixed deposits were resorted to for use in business, consideration for end use of funds so borrowed would be relevant because the interest deduction is claimed as a business deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii). That aspect of the matter, however, is academic in the present context.

Raj Kumari Agarwal v. Dy. CIT 150 ITD 597 (Agra)(Trib.)

Section 64 : Income of individual to include income of spouse, minor child, etc.

1026 S.64 : Clubbing of income – Transfer of assets – Minors – Admitted to benefits of partnership – Clubbing provision was held to be applicable. [S. 64(1)(iii)]

Two minor sons of assessee were admitted to benefits of partnership in three firms. Assessing Officer clubbed interest paid to accounts of minors from deposits with firms with income of assessee under section 64(1)(iii). Tribunal deleted addition by observing that as there was no specific provision or obligation on part of minors to contribute any capital, amount standing to credit of minors on which interest was paid should be treated as loan account. On reference the Court held that, it appeared that partnership deed of one firm provided that minors could invest any capital in firm if they wanted for which they would be paid interest and partnership deeds of other two firms provided that each partner was required to bring capital. Considering relevant clauses in partnership deeds amount credited in accounts of respective minors on which interest had been paid, was to be treated as capital investment and, therefore, section 64(1)(iii) would be attracted. Reference was answered in favour of revenue. (AY. 1976-77 to 1978-79)

CIT v. Shardaben Kishorebhai Patel (2014) 225 Taxmann 375 / (2015) 117 DTR 445(Guj.) (HC)

Section 67A : Method of computing a member's share in income of association of persons or body of individuals

1027 S.67A : Association of persons – Loss return of Association of persons was not filed within time – Member cannot claim to carry forward and set off of loss. [S. 80]

The assessee, a member of an association of persons, entered into a joint venture to put up a wind energy generator. The assessee, claimed 100 per cent depreciation and his share of depreciation loss. He sought to set off his share of depreciation loss as against the individual income under various heads. He also claimed carried forward loss and loss from the windmill. After set off of the loss against other incomes, he carried forward unabsorbed depreciation. The AO and the CIT(A) disallowed the claim. The Tribunal held that the association of persons had not filed its return within time to claim the loss and, in the absence of any determination of the loss in the hands of the association of persons, the claim of the assessee was not tenable. On appeal.

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the grant of relief under section 67A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is dependent on the determination of the income in the hands of the association of persons, so that the computation of the share income of the member in the association of persons could be given effect in the manner in which it has been determined in the hands of the association of persons or the body of individuals. When the association of persons was under legal obligation to file its return declaring loss or income, as the case may be, and had defaulted in filing the return within the time prescribed, the assessee could not take advantage of the absence of a reference to section 67A in section 80. (AY 1995-96)

N. Jagadeesan v. ACIT (2014) 363 ITR 140 / 224 Taxman 33 (Mad.)(HC)

Section 68 : Cash credits

S.68 : Cash credits – No proper explanation regarding loan transactions – Addition of 10% of value of credits was held to be justified

1028

For the assessment year 1998-99, no details of amounts allegedly received from creditors was forthcoming. The Assessing Officer considered 10% of the total advances received during the year under consideration as not having been satisfactorily explained under section 68 and, therefore, he brought to tax a sum of ₹ 7,16,30,000 under section 68. The addition was deleted by the Tribunal. Held, that regarding cash credits particulars were sought for, complete particulars were not furnished thereby disabling the assessing authority to make any further enquiry. In those circumstances, the assessing authority had been very reasonable, and instead of treating the entire credit, for which the particulars were not given as unexplained, he had treated only 10% of the total advances as unexplained cash credits. This was justified. (ITA Nos 225/227 of 2010 dt 29-1-2014). (AY 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000)

CIT v. Bellary Steels and Alloys Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 491 / (2015) 370 ITR 226 (Karn.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Foreign gifts – No relationship between donor and assessee – Amount assessable as income of assessee

1029

An addition was made of an amount claimed to be a gift from a foreign resident. The Tribunal deleted the addition. On appeal to the High Court :

Held, allowing the appeal, that a person residing abroad had sent a gift to a stranger. The donor made contradictory statements about his relationship with the donee. But the sum and substance of his version lead to the fact that there existed no blood relationship between them. The donor had also admitted that he had not gifted any amount to any other person. Therefore, there was no occasion for him to make the gift and the amount could not have been deleted. (AY. 1989-90)

CIT v. Kailash Kumar (2014) 369 ITR 656 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 200 (P&H)(HC)

- 1030 **S.68 : Cash credits – Gifts – Foreign residents – No relation ship – No occasion – Addition was held to be justified. [S.69]**
 Amounts claimed to be gifts from foreign residents there is no relationship between assessee and donors and there was no occasion for gift. Court held that the addition of amounts as undisclosed income of assessee was justified. (AY. 1998-99)
CIT v. Sandeep Goyal (2014) 369 ITR 471 (P&H) (HC)
Editorial: SLP is granted, Sandeep Goyal v. CIT (S.L.P.(C) No. 13675 of 2015 dt 14-5-2015)(2015) 374 ITR 2(St)
- 1031 **S.68 : Cash credits – Gifts form non-resident – No occasion – Not genuine – Additions was held to be justified**
 AO doubted the veracity of various entries in the assessees' books and directed addition thereof in the income of the assessees but the Tribunal found them genuine and ordered deletion of the additions. On appeal by revenue, allowing the appeals in view of the totality of facts and circumstances this family had adopted a modus operandi of creation of capital by gifts from non-resident Indians without there being any occasion and the alleged gifts could not be held to be genuine. The additions to the income of the assessees were justified. (AY 1996-97)
CIT v. Narendra Kumar Sekhri (2014) 366 ITR 225 / (2015) 228 Taxman 345 (Mag.)(P&H) (HC)
CIT v. Chaman Lal Sekhri (2014) 366 ITR 225 (P&H)(HC)
CIT v. Subhash Chander (2014) 366 ITR 225 (P&H)(HC)
- 1032 **S.68 : Cash credits – Share application money – Assessee not discharging burden – Addition was held to be justified. [S.133(6)]**
 On the facts it was found that the investors had by and large reported amounts far less as compared to the sums invested by them, towards share capital. Furthermore, the AO had during the course of the assessment issued notices under section 133(6) of the Act eleven investors have not submitted any confirmation and reported far less income than the amounts invested, the assessee could not under the circumstances be said to have discharged the burden which was upon it in the first instance. It is not sufficient for the assessee to merely disclose the addresses or identities of the individuals concerned. Having given the addresses, the inability of the noticees approached by the AO to afford any reasonable explanation as to how they got the amounts given the nature of their income which was disproportionally less than what they subscribed as share capital would also amount to the Revenue having discharged the onus if at all which fell upon it. The assessee was incorporated barely a few months before the commencement of the assessment year, and there was no further information, or anything to indicate why its mark up of the share premium thousand fold in respect of the shares which were of the face value of ₹ 10 lakhs was justified. Thus, the order of the Tribunal was set aside to the extent it deleted the addition of ₹ 31,94,000. (AY. 2006-07)
CIT v. Empire Builtech P. Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 110 / (2015) 228 taxman 346 (Mag.)(Delhi.) (HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Gift – Gift by cheque or draft through banking channels – Not sufficient – No occasion – Addition was held to be justified – Addition of ten per cent for notional premium paid to middlemen not proper

1033

Allowing the appeal of revenue the court held that the burden of proof is on assessee to prove the identity of donor, Capacity of donor to gift, genuineness of transaction. Gift by cheque or draft through banking channels may not be sufficient to discharge the burden accounted cash of assessee deposited in different accounts in an organized manner, from where transfer entries given to donors, who at the same time made entries in favour of assessee by way of bank drafts and amounts claimed as gift. Gifts without any occasion or out of love and affection hence the addition of gift amounts was held to be justified, however addition of ten per cent for notional premium paid to middlemen was held to be not proper. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Y. M. Singla (2014) 366 ITR 242 / (2015) 228 Taxman 90 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

Editorial: SLP of assessee was dismissed. (SLA (C) No. 20954 of 2014 dt 6-1-2015)
Y. M. Singla v. CIT (2015) 230 Taxmann 270 (SC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Burden of proof on assessee – No enquiry by AO – Burden discharged – Lender is assessed to tax – Addition was deleted. [S.131]

1034

Court held that the burden on assessee to prove genuineness of transaction and creditworthiness of depositor, thereafter the burden shift on the AO, on facts no enquiry was made by the AO by issuing summons u/s 131 therefore credits not assessable as income of assessee. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Varinder Rawlley (2014) 366 ITR 232 / 51 taxmann.com 524 (P&H)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Two-thirds of creditors unconfirmed – Unconfirmed sundry creditors treated as unexplained cash credit – Justified. [S.44AB]

1035

The assessee was engaged in the business of wholesale and retail distribution of auto spares and accessories of two and three wheelers. During the course of assessment the assessee was called upon to get confirmation from all its sundry creditors. The assessee was unable to confirm more than two-thirds of the sundry creditors. It took a plea that the figures relating to the unconfirmed creditors could be taken as “sales turnover”. The claim of the assessee was, however, rejected by the AO on the ground that the assessee’s turnover during the year was ₹ 5,56,35,636 and the assessee’s accounts were audited by a qualified chartered accountant as required under section 44AB of the Act; that there was nothing on record in the audit report to show that the closing stock was on estimate basis only and that the sales suppressions were introduced in the names of sundry creditors ; and that the assessee had not produced any details to the effect that the actual closing stock as on March 31, 2009, was less than ₹ 2 crores in the balance-sheet. Thus, the AO invoked section 68 and treated the amount as “income unexplained cash credit”. Order of AO was affirmed by CIT(A) and Tribunal. On appeal High Court also affirmed the finding of Tribunal. (AY. 2009-10)

R.C. Auto Centre (S.I.) v. ITO (2014) 366 ITR 305 / 224 Taxmann 354 / (2015) 115 DTR 196 / 275 CTR 104 (Mad.)(HC)

- 1036 **S.68 : Cash credits – Source of credits satisfactorily explained – Deletion of addition was held to be justified**
 Held that the deletion addition by the CIT(A) was based on appreciation of evidence on record. The CIT(A) having undertaken detailed exercise of reconciling the accounts and examined the source of different deposits in cash, limited the addition. No question of law arose from the order of the Tribunal confirming the order of the CIT(A).
CIT v. Kamlaben Sureshchandra Bhatti (2014) 367 ITR 692 / 44 taxmann.com 459 (Guj.) (HC)
- 1037 **S.68 : Cash credits – Private limited company – Share application money – Assessee unable to produce directors and principal officers of six shareholder companies – Tribunal merely reproducing order of CIT(A) and affirming deletion of addition – Decision relied upon a co-ordinate Bench overturned by High Court – Matter remanded**
 Held, allowing the appeal, that the Tribunal had merely reproduced the order of the CIT(A) and upheld the deletion of the addition. In fact, it had substantially relied upon and quoted the decision of its co-ordinate Bench, a decision which had been overturned by the Delhi High Court in *CIT v. MAF Academy P. Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 258 (Delhi) (HC)*. It was accepted that the assessee was unable to produce the directors and the principal officers of the six shareholder companies and also that as per the information and details collected by the AO from the concerned bank, the AO had observed that there were genuine concerns about identity, creditworthiness of shareholders as well as genuineness of the transactions. Thus, the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication. (AY. 2002-03)
CIT v. Navodaya Castles P. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 306 / 226 Taxmann 190 (Mag.) (Delhi.) (HC)
Editorial: SLP of assessee was dismissed SLA (C) No 374 of 2015 dt. 16-1-2015)
Navodaya Castle P. Ltd v. CIT (2015) 230 Taxmann 268 (SC)
- 1038 **S.68 : Cash credits – Share application money – Genuineness of transaction and creditworthiness of applicants proved – Amount not assessable. [S.153A, 260A]**
 Dismissing the appeal of revenue the Court held that the assessee had discharged the onus of establishing the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the transactions hence no substantial question of law arose. (AY. 2007-08)
CIT v. Vacmet Packaging (India) P. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 217 / 224 Taxmann 217 (Mag.) (All) (HC)
- 1039 **S.68 : Cash credits – Explanation was found to be false – Addition of amount justified**
 Held, dismissing the appeal, that the findings of fact recorded by the AO and the Tribunal were not shown to be erroneous or perverse in any manner. Explanation was found to be false. Accordingly, no question of law much less a substantial question of law arose in this appeal. The addition was justified. (AY. 2005-06)
Ravinder Pal Singh v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 65 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 58 (P&H) (HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Jewellery disclosed under VDIS – Diamonds thereafter separated from gold and sold – Sale proceeds shown as capital gains in return – Sale of diamonds in a phased manner – Relief granted by Tribunal on pure question of fact. [S.260A, Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme, 1997]

1040

Held, dismissing the appeals, that the purchaser was a dealer in diamonds. Even assuming that on certain occasions, the assessee did not proceed to Surat, it could not be a factor to disbelieve the transaction. When the assessee had not only disclosed the wealth in terms of the Scheme but also had shown sale proceeds as capital gains, it was farfetched, if not unreasonable, on the part of the Assessing Officer to doubt their honesty in this behalf. For all practical purposes, the Assessing Officer subjected the assessee to a verification equivalent to the one made by the police officials vis-a-vis a person, who committed the crime. Though it is a prerogative of the State to levy tax, referable to its sovereign power, it cannot be extended to the level of regulating the conduct of a citizen to such minute extents. Therefore, the sale transaction of diamonds worth ₹ 51,92,750 as claimed by the assessee was a genuine transaction and it could not be added as unexplained cash credits under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Tilak Raj Kumar (2014) 369 ITR 180 (2015) 230 Taxmann 640 (T&AP)(HC)

CIT v. Harish Kumar (HUF) (2014) 369 ITR 180 (T&AP)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Foreign remittances – Non-residents – Identity of investor and genuineness – Assessee neither appearing against remand nor seeking dilution of points on which Tribunal recorded finding after enquiry – Addition was held to be justified

1041

During relevant assessment year the assessee received two amounts from two different non-resident Indians. During the course of enquiry, the assessee explained same to have been received for purchase of land on behalf of these NRIs. The AO found that as per foreign exchange remittance and certificate impugned amount had not been sent by two persons but was sent by two companies of Thailand. Since credit entry which was made in the name of NRI individuals remained unexplained, he made addition under section 68. On appeal, the CIT(A) taking into fact that sale deed were in name of said NRI individuals deleted addition. On further appeal, the Tribunal though accepted evidence of sale deeds as genuineness of transaction, remanded matter back to AO to re-examine matter and also to afford an opportunity to assessee to prove whether said two companies were owned by two NRI's and, if it was not so, how assessee had made credit entries in its books of account when foreign remittance was made to its by these two companies. In remand proceeding, the assessee produced affidavits of one person who facilitated transaction and also affidavit of said two NRI purchasers to establish identity of persons. The AO rejected the assessee's explanation and confirmed addition on ground that the assessee was unable to collect any evidence or show whether the two companies which had remitted the amounts were substantially owned or any substantial shareholding in them was owned by the said two NRI individuals. On appeal, the CIT(A) deleted addition by accepting the assessee's submission. On further appeal, the Tribunal directed the addition of these amount and restore the order of the AO. On further appeal it was held no doubt, the

affidavits of the purchasers (of the property), in support of the assessee's assertions as well as the affidavit of the person who facilitated transaction, to some extent, advance its case. At the same time, the immediate foreign remitters' explanation is absent. The assessee contended with some vehemence that being foreign nationals or concerns, it was not possible to secure their confirmations or affidavit and future, they are beyond the pale of jurisdiction of the Indian authorities. Whilst that may be so, the Court cannot help notice that when asked to produce materials in support of its contention after the remand, the assessee was able to secure affidavits of the person who facilitated transaction as well as the alleged purchasers. When the scope of remand itself is narrow and limited, in proving of entire chain of transactions leading to the remittance to the assessee, the missing link was also an aspect which had to be established. This becomes critical because the monies were immediately remitted to the assessee by the two Thai companies. There is no need for any authority for the proposition that the scope of enquiry of lower authority or Court in the face of a remand is confined to the points required of it to return a finding. Having regard to this aspect, it was not now open for the assessee to contend that the requirement was unreasonable. The assessee did not appeal against the remand nor seek dilution of points on which the Tribunal recollected finding after due enquiry. In these circumstances, it was not open for the assessee to state that even though it could afford explanations by way of affidavits of the two individuals and the foreign national, its inability to secure any confirmation or documentary proof in support of its contention that the two foreign remitters did not have any independent transaction carries no consequence. Since this aspect went to the root of the second requirement under section 68, the Court held that the genuineness of the transaction alleged by the assessee cannot be said to have been shown by it in discharge of the initial burden placed on it by section 68 of the Income-tax Act. Addition was held to be justified. (AY. 1996-97)

Bon Sales (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 44 / 104 DTR 314 / 224 Taxmann 38 (Delhi)(HC)

1042 **S.68 : Cash credits – Identity and capacity proved – Addition was deleted**

Where the assessee proved the identity of the creditor and capacity to pay and that payment was made through the banking channel, no addition could be made as unexplained cash credits. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Sachitel Communications P. Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxmann 219 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

1043 **S.68 : Cash credits – Identity had not been proved, their creditworthiness not established and genuineness of transactions not demonstrated, addition was held to be justified**

For the year under consideration, the AO made an addition pertaining to unsecured loans credited in the books of account of the assessee company as income from undisclosed sources u/s. 68. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee by holding that, though the assessee was not able to provide the PAN of the parties who had lent the money, it had been able to provide all the other material to prove the identity of the parties by furnishing the account opening form mentioning the address, photo of one of the lenders and the PAN of the introducer of the account. Further,

money had been received by the assessee from the bank account of the lenders by account payee cheque only. A certificate from the bank had also been submitted before the AO which was a part of the affidavit submitted by the assessee. On appeal, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the Revenue affirming the finding of the CIT(A). On further appeal, the High Court observed that the assessee could not produce the PAN of both the parties nor could the bank produce any substantive particulars. The High Court also took note of the fact that neither of the parties nor the introducer could be produced by the assessee; the bank accounts were also opened around the same time. Taking note of all the above facts, the High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and restored the order of the AO. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. T. S. Kishan & Co. Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxman 250 (Mag.) / 114 DTR 422 / (2015) 370 ITR 163 (Delhi)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Telescoping – Deletion of opening balance – No substantial question of law. [S.260A]

1044

During assessment proceedings, Assessing Officer made addition of ₹ 10.09 lakhs under section 68. Tribunal held that only ₹ fifty thousand were received in year under consideration and remaining amount was opening balance in account of assessee. Tribunal, thus, set aside addition. As regards, amount of ₹ fifty thousand, by applying principles of telescoping, Tribunal deleted said addition also on ground that it had independently confirmed addition of ₹ 1.58 lakhs. No substantial question of law arose from Tribunal's order. (AY. 2000-01)

CIT v. Jagatkumar Satishbhai Patel (2014) 225 Taxmann 190 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Storage rent – Failure to produce the address of framers – Addition as undisclosed income of the firm was held to be justified. [S.145]

1045

Assessee firm was running cold storage. Assessee had not furnished addresses of farmers from whom cold storage rent was received, nor receipts in support of alleged receipt of rent from said farmers had been produced. Assessing Officer held that money introduced in names of partners was in fact earned by firm from its business of cold storage and was its unaccounted income. Further, no material had been produced to show that partners had independent source of income and assessee firm, in spite of several opportunities having been provided to it to produce partners so that confirmation of introduction of cash by them could be verified, had failed to comply with it. Hence addition made in hands of assessee firm on account of said cash was justified. (AY. 1995-96, 1996-97)

Mukand Cold Storage v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 281 / 225 Taxmann 113 (Mag.) / 274 CTR 182 (P&H)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Merely because gift received by demand draft would not lead to a conclusion that gifts were genuine – Addition was justified

1046

The assessee had claimed that he had received a gift of ₹ 50,000/- from a certain resident of Nepal. The assessee was required to furnish necessary details to ascertain the genuineness of the gifts, which they failed to provide. Accordingly, the amount of gifts were treated as unexplained money of the assessee. Since assessee failed

to produce documents regarding identity or capacity of donors to make gifts, merely because receipts were shown by demand drafts could not lead to conclusion that gifts were genuine.

Dr. Ram Autar Agarwal v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 173 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

1047 **S.68 : Cash Credits – Share money – Certificate of incorporation of company, payment by banking channel etc., cannot in all cases be said as satisfactory discharge of onus – persons behind the company were not produced – Addition was held to be justified**

Assessment orders was passed by making addition u/s. 68 on account of creditworthiness and genuineness of share money. CIT(A) held that Assessing Officer had not effected inquiries to bring on record and establish that the other parties had given accommodation entries and the money. It was further recorded that assessee was not provided any opportunity to cross-examine the entry providers and the Assessing Officer simply relied upon the investigation reports/information provided by the Information Wing of the Department. Thus, CIT(A) deleted said addition after verification of PAN that were furnished and found to be correct. CIT(A) proceeded on the basis that even if the subscribers to the share capital were not genuine, the amount received cannot be regarded as undisclosed income of the assessee. Tribunal confirmed the order of CIT(A). Before the High Court the issue of the court or Tribunal should be convinced about the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction. The onus to prove the three factum is on the assessee as the facts are within the assessee's knowledge. Mere production of incorporation details, PAN Nos. or the fact that third persons or company had filed income tax details in case of a private limited company may not be sufficient when surrounding and attending facts predicate a cover up. These facts indicate and reflect proper paper work or documentation but genuineness, creditworthiness, identity are deeper and obtrusive. It is highly implausible that an unknown person had made substantial investment in a private limited company to the tune of ₹ 63,80,100 and ₹ 75,60,200 in two consecutive assessment years 2002-03 and 2003-04 respectively without adequately protecting the investment and ensuring appropriate returns. Other than the share application forms, no other agreement between the respondent and third companies had been placed on record. The persons behind these companies were not produced. On the other hand assessee adopted prevaricate and non-co-operation attitude before the Assessing Officer once they came to know about the directed enquiry and the investigation being made. Evasive and transient approach before the Assessing Officer is limpid and perspicuous. Identity, creditworthiness or genuineness of the transaction is not established by merely showing that the transaction was through banking channels or by account payee instrument. It may, as in the present case required entail a deeper scrutiny. It would be incorrect to state that the onus to prove the genuineness of the transaction and creditworthiness of the creditor stands discharged in all cases if payment is made through banking channels. Whether or not onus is discharged depends upon facts of each case. It depends on whether the two parties are related or known to each; the manner or mode by which the parties approached each other, whether the transaction was entered into through written documentation to protect the investment, whether the investor professes and was an angel investor, the quantum of money, creditworthiness of the recipient, the object

and purpose for which payment/investment was made etc. These facts are basically and primarily in knowledge of the assessee and it is difficult for revenue to prove and establish the negative. Certificate of incorporation of company, payment by banking channel, etc. cannot in all cases tantamount to satisfactory discharge of onus. The facts of the present case noticed above speak and are obvious. What is unmistakably visible and apparent, cannot be spurred by formal but unreliable pale evidence ignoring the patent and what is plain and writ large. (AY. 2002-03, 2003-04)
CIT v. N.R. Portfolio (P) Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 157 (Mag.) / 264 CTR 258 (Delhi)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Unsecured loan – Name, address, PAN, copy of IT Returns, balance sheet, profit and loss account of all creditors/lenders as well as their confirmation had been furnished, A.O. could not make addition on account of unsecured loan and interest thereon

1048

When full particulars, inclusive of the confirmation with name, address and PAN Number, copy of the Income Tax Returns, balance sheet, profit and loss accounts and computation of the total income in respect of all the creditors/lender were furnished and when it has been found that the loans were received through cheques / banking channels and the loan account were duly reflected in the balance sheet, the A.O. was not justified in making the addition on account of Cash Credit u/s. 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Apex Therm Packaging (P) Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 125 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Amount received from NRE account of his brother – Source was not explained satisfactorily – Could not give any further details of either source or creditworthiness of the same – Said amount is justified as unexplained cash credits

1049

The appellant-assessee had NRE account. During the course of the assessment proceedings, noticed that there were total deposits of ₹ 25,97,902/. A.O. Therefore, called upon the assessee to explain such deposits. The assessee, before him submits that taken such loans from Shri Yakub Patel, which were transferred from U.K. under the instructions of Habib Bank. A.O. held that sizable amount of money was credited in the account of the assessee, he could give no explanation about the source or the creditworthiness of the payee. This was certainly not a case where the revenue was insisting on gathering source of the source from the assessee. In the present case, the assessee, when confronted with the sizable credits in his account, merely stated that the sums were received from his brother without giving any further details of either the source or the creditworthiness thereof. Though before the High Court revenue contended that the amounts were received for the construction of a hospital, all throughout apparently, the stand of the assessee was that such amount was received as loan from his brother but could not give any further details of either source or creditworthiness of the same hence said amount is justified as unexplained cash credits u/s. 68.

Aiyub Umarji Patel v. ITO (2014) 222 Taxmann 126 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

- 1050 **S.68 : Cash credits – Booking of flats – Address and PAN of concerned persons discharged its primary onus – Addition of said amount to income – Without making proper inquiries u/s. 133(6) was not justified. [S.133(6)]**

Assessee received certain amount from four persons on account of booking of flats. A.O. rejected assessee's explanation and added said amount to its taxable income. Tribunal opined that since assessee had discharged primary onus cast on it, A.O. should have made inquiry u/s. 133(6). On issuance of notice, the assessee claimed that these were not deposits, but, were booking amounts for flats purchased. The identity with the address and PAN numbers had been supplied to the A.O. The A.O. not being satisfied with the documents. The Hon'ble High Court held that the onus which was required to be discharged on the part of the assessee respondent was duly done. Not only the identity of the persons concerned but also the PAN numbers were before the Assessing Officer. In the event of any further inquiry, it was open to the A.O. to make inquiry under section 133(6) of the Act. On its choosing not to exercise such powers, it was erroneous on the part of the Assessing Officer to make addition of a sum of ₹ 23,00,000/-, despite such cogent evidences having been put-forth by the assessee. No question of law, therefore, arises and hence in absence of any such enquiry the addition made by the A.O. u/s. 68 was deleted. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Chanakya Developers (2014) 222 Taxmann 164 (Guj.)(HC)

- 1051 **S.68 : Cash credits – Loan – Books of account, bank statement and income-tax return of lender was on record – Loan could not be regarded as bogus**

The addition on basis that four depositors furnished requisite details to prove their identity, and showed the place of their residence. The loan was received through account payee cheques, Copies of bank statement was given and the details of PAN were available. All these materials duly proved the genuineness of the transaction of loan as well as the creditworthiness of the depositors. Hence, the Addition u/s. 68 cannot be made. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Patel Ramniklal Hirji (2014) 222 Taxmann 15 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

- 1052 **S.68 : Cash credits – Where in support of receipt of share application money – Assessee produced names, addresses and PAN of depositors which were sufficient to prove their identity and creditworthiness – It was not justified in making addition u/s. 68 in respect of amount in question**

The AO found that the assessee had reflected amount in the balance sheet under the head 'Share application money pending allotment' as on 31-3-2005. During the assessment proceedings the assessee could not file confirmation of share applications and therefore addition of the entire amount is made in the hands of the assessee. The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal confirming the findings of the AO. Share application money had deposited the cash in their respective bank accounts before issuing cheques in the name of the assessee for share allotment. The High Court observed that the AO made the addition for the reason that the assessee did not file confirmation from the share applicants. However, he did not doubt either the identity or the creditworthiness of the share applicants because no such discussion has been made in the assessment order. The explanation of the assessee as regards to the inability in filing the confirmation before the Assessing Officer was that the sufficient time was not provided. It is noticed

that the learned CIT(A) confirmed the addition for the reason that the creditworthiness was not proved. High Court Held that, the assessee had discharged the onus by furnishing the name, address and Permanent Account Number of the share applicants and if the A.O. was having any doubt he could have issued the summons to the persons who were claimed to be assessed to income tax and were having Permanent Account Number. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Som Tobacco India Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 58 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Unexplained cash credit – Necessary expenditure to be deducted and only profit alone could be taken was held to be unacceptable 1053

Assessee, who was a civil engineer, failed to prove that cash deposited in its saving bank accounts belonged to various people who had made payments for getting various civil works done in respect of their house properties. Amount was treated as unexplained cash credit under section 68. Further, once unexplained cash credit had been added to income, contention of assessee that necessary expenditure should be deducted and profit alone could be taken as income was unacceptable.

S. Muthukumars Stanley Rajan v. ITO (2014) 222 Taxmann 113 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Gift from brother not substantiated by any evidence – Addition u/s. 68 justified 1054

Assessee received certain sum as gift from his brother and was asked to prove genuineness of transaction. Assessee failed to produce cash flow statement. Since proof was necessary to prove creditworthiness of person making such a gift but assessee had not placed any material before Authority to substantiate gift from his brother, assessment was to be confirmed under section 68. (AY. 2008-09)

K. Sivakumar v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 59 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Firm – Partner – Money introduced by partners of firm – Addition was held to be justified 1055

Assessee-firm was running cold storage. Assessee had not furnished addresses of farmers from whom cold storage rent was received, nor receipts in support of alleged receipt of rent from said farmers had been produced. Assessing Officer held that money introduced in names of partners was in fact earned by firm from its business of cold storage and was its unaccounted income. Further, no material had been produced to show that partners had independent source of income and assessee-firm, in spite of several opportunities having been provided to it to produce partners so that confirmation of introduction of cash by them could be verified, had failed to comply with it. It was held that addition made in hands of assessee-firm on account of said cash was justified. (AY. 1995-96 and 1996-97).

Mukand Cold Storage v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 281 / 104 DTR 241 / 225 Taxmann 113 (P&H)(HC)

1056 **S.68 : Cash credits – Books of account rejected – Additions cannot be made as cash credits. [S.144]**

Where books of account are rejected in their entirety, the AO cannot rely upon any entry in those books of account to make an addition to the assessee's taxable income under section 68.

CIT v. Dulla Ram, Labour Contractor, Kotkapura (2014) 223 Taxmann 24 (P&H)(HC)

1057 **S.68: Cash credits – Gifts – Burden of proof on assessee – Explanation not satisfactory – Addition was held to be justified**

Court held that the Tribunal had considered the materials on record and come to conclusions which were purely factual in nature. The Tribunal considered several factors to come to the conclusion that the transactions were not genuine and the so-called donors did not have the capacity to give such large gifts. In that view of the matter, though the identity of the donors was established, two other important elements, namely, that of the genuineness of the transactions and the creditworthiness of the donors were not established. The Tribunal had assessed the facts in the proper perspective and come to a conclusion which could not be stated to be perverse. The amounts were assessable as income of the assessee. (AY. 2005-06)

Kaushal H. Patel v. ITO (2014) 365 ITR 383 / 226 Taxmann 175 (Guj.)(HC)

1058 **S.68 : Cash credits – Identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of transaction not established merely by filing bank account details**

During the course of the assessment proceedings, the assessee claimed that adequate materials were produced by it to establish that the transaction vis-à-vis creditors was genuine. It produced bank account details of the creditors which was sufficient to prove the identity and genuineness of those parties and transactions. The AO however contended that the bank statements were not conclusive proof of identity and creditworthiness of the creditors and since the assessee had failed to produce confirmation from their parties and prove their identity, the same was added to the income of the assessee. The CIT(A) held that the information provided by the assessee was sufficient and therefore reversed the Assessment Order. The Tribunal disapproved the order of the CIT(A) and passed an order in favour of the revenue.

The High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the assessee observed that the proof of genuineness had to be produced and established by the assessee at the first instance. The High Court following its own decision in the case of *R B Mittal v. CIT (2000) 246 ITR 283* held that by merely filing bank account details of the alleged creditors, was not enough to hold that the assessee had satisfied the conditions of Section 68. (AY. 2005-06)

Gayathri Associates v. ITO (2014) 221 Taxman 143 (Mag.)(AP)(HC)

1059 **S.68 : Cash credits – Gifts – Gift received from family friends is to be treated as undisclosed income when relationship or occasion to receive the gift cannot be established**

The assessee received certain sums as gifts from family friends who lived in a foreign country. The AO found that the donors were not related to the assessee by blood and

there was no specific occasion on account of which the alleged gifts were received by the assessee thereby treating the gifts as undisclosed income.

The CIT(A) deleted the addition, however, the ITAT restored the addition.

The High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the assessee, observed that the gifts had been made by the donors who were neither related to the assessee nor was there any specific occasion on which the alleged gifts could have been given to the assessee. The High Court held that even when the donor had the means to make the gifts there was no circumstance to show that the gifts were made out of natural love and affection of the donor for the donee and hence the same were to be considered as undisclosed income. (AY. 1990-91)

Hanuman Dass v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 131 / 221 Taxmann 137 / 264 CTR 211 (P&H)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Share transactions – Concurrent find recorded by the Appellate Authorities that the transactions of purchase and sale of share transactions are genuine – No substantial question of law arises from such findings. [S.45, 260A]

1060

The Appellate Authorities after examining the documents placed on record by the assessee namely, broker note, contract note, cash book, copies of share certificate demat statements, etc, finding the documents/details not to be false or fabricated, such concurrent finding of fact recorded by the authorities could not give rise to any substantial question of law. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Sumitra Devi (Smt.) (2014) 102 DTR 342 / 229 Taxmann 67 (Raj.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Share Application money – Bank accounts were fabricated – Addition was held to be justified

1061

The addition was made u/s. 68 with respect to share application money received by the assessee. The AO held that assessee had failed to discharge the onus to prove the creditworthiness of the said investors in terms of S/68 as the extracts of bank statements furnished by assessee was fabricated and further held that assessee had failed to discharge the onus in proving the identity of the creditors/subscribers, genuineness of the transactions and held that even if the transactions were not required to be fulfilled in respect of share application money/share capital once identity is established. On appeal in Tribunal, Tribunal confirmed the finding of the CIT(A) relying on *CIT v. Lovely Exports (P) Ltd. 216 CTR (SC) 195*. On further appeal in HC, the court reversed the order of Tribunal & held that bank statements of the investors furnished by the assessee during the original assessment proceedings were fabricated and misleading. They omitted to show that there was deposit of cash immediately prior to issuance of cheques for preparation to pay orders or DDs in favour of the assessee regarding subscription of its share capital. Court further held that false evidence had been adduced by the assessee during the original proceedings to get undue advantage of giving colour of genuineness to bogus entries through the bank accounts and the deposits were mostly by cash, the AO was justified in making addition u/s. 68. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. N. Tarika Properties Investment (P) Ltd. (2014) 264 CTR 472 / 221 Taxmann 14 (Delhi)(HC)

Editorial: SLP of assessee was rejected. SPL No. 7784 of 2014 dt 26-9-2014 N. Tarika Property Investment (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 373 (SC)

1062 **S.68 : Cash credits – Share capital – Appreciation of evidence – No question of law arises – Order of Tribunal was confirmed. [S.260A]**

The AO made certain additions on account of unexplained share capital contribution on account of unexplained share capital contribution on the basis of unexplained unsecured loans. Ex parte order was passed by AO while making an addition. On appeal before CIT(A), CIT(A) deleted the additions. On appeal by revenue in Tribunal, Tribunal confirmed the view taken by CIT(A). On further appeal in High Court, revenue contended that CIT(A) & Tribunal had not verified the genuineness, creditworthiness & identity of those creditors could not be verified for want of requisite details, the AO had not committed error in making the additions. Dismissing the revenue's appeal, High Court held that as points sought to be raised by the revenue were all matters relating to appreciation of evidence. All the share capital contributions were Income Tax assesses were assessed to tax. Further court held that whether the source of investment or of credit has been satisfactorily explained or not remains within the realm of appreciation of evidence and such a matter did not give rise to any substantial question of law. Departmental appeal was dismissed. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Morani Automotives (P) Ltd. (2014) 264 CTR 86 / 224 Taxmann 177 (Mag.)(Raj.) (HC)

1063 **S.68 : Cash credits – Gifts from NRI – Neither any relationship was established nor any circumstance was shown to justify that gift was out of natural love and affection of donor for assessee – Addition was held to be justified. [S.69]**

Assessee had received a certain sum as gift from his family friends outside India who had means to make gifts. Neither any relationship was established nor any circumstance was shown to justify that gift was out of natural love and affection of donor for assessee. Moreover there was no occasion to make such gifts to assessee, addition was held to be justified. (AY. 1990-91)

Hanuman Dass v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 131 / 97 DTR 10 / 221 Taxmann 137 / 264 CTR 211 (P&H)(HC)

1064 **S.68 : Cash credits – Share capital – Identity, creditworthiness of all share holders were not established – Matter was remanded to the Tribunal to deal with fresh, including the issue of summoning of share holders, directors or principal officers**

The court observed that identity creditworthiness of the share holders and genuineness of the transaction in all cases was not established by only showing that the transaction was through banking channels or account payee instrument may not be sufficient; surrounding and corroborative factual details are equally important, all these aspects were required to be gone into by the Tribunal in detail. Matter was remanded to the Tribunal to deal with fresh, including the issue of summoning of shareholders, directors or principal officers. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Globus Securities & Finance (P) Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 201 / 224 Taxman 237 / 264 CTR 481 (Delhi)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Purchases cannot be treated as “bogus” only on the ground that the suppliers are not traceable – Sales accepted – Purchases cannot be held to be bogus

1065

The AO held that as the parties from whom the purchases were allegedly made by the assessee could not be located, they were bogus and an addition had to be made u/s. 68 in the hands of the assessee. The CIT(A) and Tribunal deleted the addition on the basis that the purchases could not be held to be bogus as corresponding sales had been effected by the assessee and similar purchases in the earlier and subsequent years were not questioned by the AO. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal:

The Tribunal has found that the purchases are genuine because they are supported by bills, entries in the books of account, payment by cheque and quantitative details. The AO did not find any inflation in purchase price or inflation in consumption or suppression in the production. The addition had been made only on the ground that the parties are not traceable. The assessee had made payment through crossed cheques and AO did not find that payment made came back to assessee. The ratio of creditors to purchases is normal considering the past records of the assessee. The creditors were outstanding owing to liquidity as assessee is also required to get credit in respect of sales also. Even otherwise, section 68 is not attracted to amounts representing purchases made on credit. This is a finding of fact which does not give rise to a question of law. *CIT v. Nangalia Fabrics Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 17 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)*

S.68 : Cash credits – No explanation provided by assessee – Assessee failed to discharge its onus

1066

Assessing Officer made addition on account of cash deposit made in the bank account and investment made in shares. CIT (Appeals) and Tribunal upheld the order passed by Assessing Officer. High Court upheld the order passed by Tribunal on the basis that assessee failed to prove the sources of cash deposit and investment in shares. Assessee did not discharge its onus despite of several opportunities provided, not only by the Assessing Officer but even by the Commissioner (Appeals). (AY. 1994-95)

Bhairavnath Agrofin (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2013) 354 ITR 276 / 259 CTR 51 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 1 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Loan in the name of partner – Corresponding loan appearing in the return of the partner – No addition can be made

1067

Unsecured loan appearing in the books of the assessee firm in the name of the partner. Partner also declared unsecured loan in his independent return. Held, unsecured loan could not added to the income of the firm u/s. 68. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Nisuki Farms (2014) 220 Taxmann 17 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC.)

S.68 : Cash credits – Gains from sale of shares

1068

The Assessing Officer treated ₹ 36,71,882 as unexplained cash credit under section 68 of the Act as against capital gain on sale of long-term share declared by the assessee. The CIT(A) allowed the appeal. The Tribunal, held that the assessee had explained that the purchase transactions were made on the “Online Trading System” and these transactions were genuine and was further proved by the contract notes for sale and

purchase, the bank statement of the broker, the Demat Account showing transfer in and out of shares, as also abstract of transactions furnished by the CSE. The High Court held that the revenue was not in a position to show the Tribunal had placed reliance upon any irrelevant material. Hence the appeal was dismissed. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Maheshchandra G. Vakil (2014) 220 Taxmann 166 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

1069 **S.68 : Cash credits – Share application money – Addition was held to be not justified**

Assessee issued preferential warrants and received share application money as part of debt recovery process under scheme of compromise and arrangement with its lenders and shareholders. AO made addition as unexplained share application money. Held that the assessee furnished complete details of receipt of share application money with share application forms, names, addresses, PAN and other details of share applicants, identity of share applicants, genuineness of transaction and their creditworthiness was proved, and addition under section 68 was unjustified (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Shree Ram Multi Tech Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 76 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

1070 **S.68 : Cash credits – Bogus purchases – Payment made by cheques – Sales accepted – Purchases cannot be held to be bogus**

The assessee had made certain purchases. On account of unverifiable purchases, the Assessing Officer made additions to the tune of ₹ 1.27 crores. He was of the opinion that none of the parties could be located and therefore, such purchases were held to be bogus. When it was challenged before the CIT(A), the CIT(A) was of the opinion that they could not be held bogus as the corresponding sales had been effected by the respondent in the next year. In subsequent year also and in the past, such purchases were made which were never questioned. When challenged before the Tribunal on the basis of the facts presented before us, it held that these purchases could not be held bogus. The High Court held that the issue is essentially based on facts. The Tribunal, having been satisfied by genuineness of the purchases as also specially considering the payments made through the cheques, was of the opinion that such addition could not be sustained. Issue, essentially and pre-dominantly based on facts, requires no consideration as no question of law arises.

CIT v. Nangalia Fabrics P. Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 17 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC.)

1071 **S.68 : Cash credits – Share application money – Notice u/s. 133(6) returned unserved**

AO noticed that assessee received share application money from nine applicants. Notices issued to five out of nine share applicants under section 133(6) were returned unserved. Returns of income of share applicants furnished by assessee disclosed that applicants had very meagre income. Accordingly the AO added amount of share application money under section 68. The CIT(A) and the ITAT ruled in favour of the assessee as the assessee had discharged its onus by furnishing documentary evidence such as PAN numbers, addresses, audited accounts and bank statements of share applicants etc., which sufficiently proved identity and creditworthiness of share applicants. The High Court held that, the information the assessee furnishes would have to be credible and at the same time verifiable. In view of fact that notices to five share applicants returned unserved and still assessee was able to secure documents such as their income tax

returns as well as bank account particulars, would itself give rise to a circumstance in which Assessing Officer rightly proceeded to draw adverse inference and that and Tribunal fell into error in holding that Assessing Officer could not have added back said amount under section 68. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Ultra Modern Exports (P.) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 165 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Gift – Only affidavit was filed – Addition was held to be justified

1072

Assessee had received sizable amount by way of gift from one particular source. Assessing Officer did not accept validity of gift so made and added said amount to assessee's taxable income. Tribunal noted that in order to prove genuineness of gift, assessee had only filed an affidavit and copies of cheques and pay orders but did not file any of documents such as copy of proof of income of donor, copy of bank account of donor from where withdrawals were made along with proof of identity. Further, relationship between donor and assessee and reasons for gift were also not proved. Tribunal, thus, upheld addition made by Assessing Officer. The Court held that Tribunal had taken into account entire relevant material on record before confirming impugned addition, no substantial question of law arose from Tribunal's order. (AY. 2004-05)

Seema Anil Modani v. ITO (2014) 220 Taxman 167 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Charitable Trust – Opportunity to cross examination was not given – Matter remanded. [S.10(22)]

1073

The assessee, a charitable trust running various educational institutions, claimed exemption u/s. 10(22). Assessee claimed to have received certain sum as loan from three parties. Assessing Officer made addition of said loan applying section 68 relying upon statement of one creditors that he had not granted any loan to the assessee. The assessee contended that assessee as an educational institution, existing solely for educational purposes and not for the purpose of profit, within the ambit of Section 10(22) of the Act., is entitled to exemption. The disallowance under section 68 is erroneous. It was further contended that production of confirmation letters from persons lent money was sufficient proof and assessee ought to have been given an opportunity to examine such creditor, who denied having given any such money to assessee. The High Court held that assessee would not have expected one of the contributors, to have denied the factum of contribution. When there is unexpected change of facts/situation/circumstances, the party taken by surprise should not be deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the witness branded as assessee's witness. Evidence Act also permits a party to cross examine his own witness under stated circumstances therein. From the overall facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that unless it is proved that the income derived is covered under section 10(22), it cannot be decided as to whether addition of the same under section 68, is possible or not. Hence, the matter was remanded for fresh consideration and also to provide the assessee to cross examine the witnesses, whose evidence the Assessing officer rely upon. (A.Y. 1997-98 to 2000-01)

Sri Krishna Educational & Social Trust v. ITO (2013) 351 ITR 178 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 16 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

1074 **S.68 : Cash credits – Sale consideration from sale of agricultural land – Deposited in to bank ₹ 1.20 crores – Deed recorded only ₹ 22.22 lakhs – Addition as undisclosed income was not justified – CBDT was directed to take action against AO**

The assessee sold his agricultural land and deposited sale consideration of ₹ 1.20 crs. in his bank account. However, the purchasers stated that they had purchased the land for ₹ 22.2 lakhs only. Sale deed also reflected sale value at ₹ 22.2 lakhs. The assessee produced witness to sale deed and the bank manager, who confirmed submission of the assessee and he had also produced the report of Tahsildar to justify valuation of the property. Assessee had also filed complaint before stamp valuing authority about deficiency in stamp duty in sale deed but sale consideration in sale deed was not adjudicated in favour of assessee. The Assessing Officer did not disbelieve the evidence that the amount was received by sale consideration. He, however, relying only on the report of the Stamp Valuing Authority, treated the amount to be undisclosed income of assessee. The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal. The Tribunal held that whatever the assessee had explained about the source of the deposit could not be doubted especially in absence of contrary material on record and deleted the addition. The High Court held that the assessee as an honest citizen not only made a complaint to the registering authority that the sale deed had been registered at a value much below the amount, which he has actually received, he deposited the entire amount in the bank and voluntarily filed return. There was no material whatsoever or any circumstance, which could have suggested that this amount was received by him from any other source. The deposition of witness of the sale deed, the bank manager and the evidence filed with regard to valuation of the property was more than sufficient to discharge the burden, which the Assessing Officer had unreasonably placed on the assessee. The Assessing Officer in disbelieving the evidence has not given any reasons whatsoever to discard the statement of the witnesses, deposit of the entire sale consideration in bank and the deposition of the bank manager. The High Court held that the Income Tax Officer did not act in *bona fide* manner. Overwhelming evidence led by him was discarded without giving any reasons at all. The assessment was framed only on the *ipse dixit* of the A.O., which gives reason to believe that he had exceeded his authority with some ill will or with ulterior motive. Therefore, HC directed the Registrar General of the Court to forward a copy of this judgment to the Chairman of the Central Board of Direct Taxes to cause an enquiry into the conduct and motives of Income Tax Officer, in framing the assessment and raising demand of income tax against the petitioner. (AY. 2008-09) *CIT v. Intezar Ali (2014) 99 DTR 201 / 220 Taxmann 72 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)*

1075 **S.68 : Cash credits – Account payee cheque – Bank statement – Assessed to tax – Burden discharged**

Once the amount was advanced by the creditors by account payee cheque from their respective bank accounts and the said creditors were being assessed to income tax, then capacity of the creditors and genuineness of the transactions stood proved and in the absence of any evidence to prove that money actually belonged to the assessee himself, addition under s. 68 was not sustainable. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Jai Kumar Bakliwal (2014) 366 ITR 217 / 101 DTR 377 / 224 Taxmann 87 / 267 CTR 396 (Raj.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Share capital – Identity disclosed – Deletion was held to be justified 1076

Once the identity and other relevant particulars of shareholders are disclosed, it is for those shareholders to explain the source of their funds and not for the assessee company to show wherefrom these shareholders obtained funds. It was held that Tribunal was justified in deleting addition in the hands of assessee company.

CIT v. Nishan Indo Commerce Ltd. (2014) 101 DTR 413 (Cal.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Share application money – Cash was deposited on same day – Addition was justified 1077

Where deposits in accounts having been made in cash on same day and share applicants lacked resources, it was held that the assessee's position vis-à-vis share amounts received and its commercial condition, all pointed to the amount received by it falling within the mischief of s. 68 as unexplained amounts. (AY. 2007-08)

Onassis Axles (P) v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 53 / 101 DTR 49 / 224 Taxmann 80 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Gifts – Gift received from brother without any evidence is to be assessed 1078

The assessee showed a receipt of ₹ 7,50,000 from his brother. The AO asked the assessee to prove the genuineness of the transaction by producing statement of affairs, cash flow statement, return of income with computation of the said brother. However, the assessee failed to produce the cash flow statement to show the genuineness of the gift and hence the AO assessed the gift u/s. 68. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal confirmed the action of the AO.

The High Court dismissing the assessee's appeal at the admission stage held that since there was no substantial question of law arising out of the appeal, the action of the lower authorities was confirmed. (AY. 2008-09)

K. Sivakumar v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 59 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Share application money – No addition shall be made in the hands of the assessee where transactions related to the receipt of share application money are genuine and are fully recorded by the share applicants 1079

The assessee had received share application money from 11 different companies. The AO proposed an addition on the ground that the assessee could not discharge the onus and prove the genuineness of the receipt. The First Appellate Authority observed that the assessee had placed on record various documents in support of the share application money received. The Tribunal restored the matter to the AO since it was not evident that the impugned amounts were assessed in the hands of share applicants, in which case they could not be assessed in the hands of the assessee and vice versa. The High Court upheld Tribunal's order clarifying that the AO should objectively examine the whole issue and in case he found that the transactions were genuine and fully recorded by the share applicants, no addition would be made in the hands of the respondent assessee. In other words, the two conditions had to be satisfied. First the transaction should be genuine, true and not a camouflaged, and secondly the transaction should be duly recorded in the books of the share applicants. In case any of the two conditions

were not satisfied, it would be open to the AO to act in accordance with the law and make appropriate additions if justified and mandated by statute. (AY. 2001-02)
CIT v. Kansal Fincap Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 151 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

1080 **S.68 : Cash credits – Unexplained investment – Assessee discharging initial burden – Deletion of addition was justified**

Appellate authorities found that director of assessee had ample availability of funds from which he could have advanced loan to assessee. Assessee discharged initial burden to establish identity, creditworthiness and genuineness for allotment of shares. Held, deletion of addition was justified. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Nipuan Auto P. Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 155 / 227 Taxmann 147 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

1081 **S.68: Cash credits – Mercantile system of accounting – Advances received offered as income upon distribution of films – Addition as cash credit was not justified. [S.145]**

The assessee was an individual in the business of production and distribution of films. During the financial year 2005-06, he received a sum of ₹ 50 lakhs from K and treated such receipt as advance and accounted for it under the liabilities side in his balance-sheet, as the distribution process of the film had not started during the assessment year 2006-07. The receipt was offered as income in the subsequent year, when the distribution of film was executed. When the AO directed the assessee to confirm the source of such receipt, the assessee produced a confirmation letter from K. The assessee reported that the sum of ₹ 50 lakhs received by the assessee recorded in its cash book had been offered as income in the subsequent year and the assessee had also provided confirmation letter in this regard. Held, amount was not taxable in AY 2006-07. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. K.E. Gnanavelraja (2014) 361 ITR 446 / 107 DTR 38 / 225 Taxmann 143 (Mad.)(HC)

1082 **S.68: Cash credits – Firm – Partners – Capital introduced by partners – No material showing partners had no capacity to introduce such capital – The sums could not be taxed in the firm's hands**

There was no material showing partners had no capacity to introduce capital in the firm. Also, assessment orders of partners showed capital introduced by partners represented their agricultural income. Held, the sum could not be assessed in the hands of the firm. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Odedara Construction (2014) 362 ITR 338 / 223 Taxmann 42 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

1083 **S.68 : Cash credits – Identity and creditworthiness was proved – Assessee need not prove source of funds of creditor – Deletion of addition was held to be justified. [S.2(24)]**

Assessee must prove identity of creditor, genuineness of transaction and creditworthiness of creditor. Assessee need not prove source of funds of creditor. In all cases in which a receipt is sought to be taxed as income, the burden lies on the revenue to prove that it is within the taxing provisions; but once that burden is discharged, the burden of proving that it is not taxable because it falls within exemption provision under the

Act, lies on the assessee. When assessee has filed income tax return, balance sheet etc, the identity of the creditor and the genuineness of transaction have been proved. The burden thereafter shifted to the AO to prove the contrary. On facts the AO has failed to show either directly or with the help of circumstantial evidence that the said amount belonged to the assessee. In the absence of evidence, deletion of addition was held to be justified. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Sanghamitra Bharali (Smt.) (2014) 361 ITR 481 / 97 DTR 345 / 227 Taxmann 65 (Mag.)(Gauhati)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Share application money – Accommodation entries – Failure by assessee to discharge initial onus to establish identity, creditworthiness of share applicants and genuineness of transaction – Addition made by the AO was held to be justified – Finding of Tribunal was reversed

1084

When an assessee does not produce evidence or tries to avoid appearance before the AO, it necessarily creates difficulties and prevents ascertainment of the true and correct facts as the AO is denied the advantage of the contention or factual assertion by the assessee before him. If an assessee deliberately and intentionally fails to produce evidence before the AO with the desire to prevent inquiry or investigation, an adverse inference should be drawn. The assessee had not discharged the initial onus to establish the identity, creditworthiness of the share applicants and the genuineness of the transaction. The additions made by the AO were justified and sustainable. Various judgments referred by the assessee was distinguished on the ground that assessee is a private limited company. Appeal was allowed with cost of ₹ 20,000. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. MAF Academy P. Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 258 / 224 Taxmann 212 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Share application money – Source was explained and identities of the applicants – Deletion of addition was held to be justified. [S.69]

1085

Since the assessee explained the source of money and identities of applicants and their creditworthiness was established, burden of proof can be said to have been discharged by assessee and the onus shifted on the Department. Since there was no evidence to show transactions were not genuine, ss.68 and 69 were not applicable.

CIT v. Kamdhenu Steel and Alloys Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 220 (Delhi)(HC)

S.68: Cash credits – Share application – Genuine applications

1086

The assessee had furnished material which included income-tax returns, balance-sheets, Registrar of Companies particulars and bank account statements. On the basis of these, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the share application money or the source of the share application money had been satisfactorily explained. The Tribunal was of the opinion that no interference was warranted having regard to the facts of this case. This was a pure finding of fact. S. 68 was not applicable. (AY. 2000-01)

CIT v. Expo Globe India Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 147 / 227 Taxmann 149 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

1087 **S.68 : Cash credits – Credit in capital account of partner – Gift from NRI – Addition was confirmed as undisclosed income**

A partner of the firm allegedly received gift of ₹ 1 lakh from a distant NRI relative which was credited in the capital account of the partner in the books of the firm. The gift was held not be genuine as there was no connection between the partner and alleged donor except a vey distant relationship and there was no occasion to make such gift. As partners had not maintained their own books of account, such non-genuine credit was to be treated as income of the firm u/s. 68. (AY. 1989-90)

CIT v. Udham Singh & Sons (2104) 365 ITR 137 / 98 DTR 273 / 222 Taxmann 155 (Mag.)/ 266 CTR 218 (P&H)(HC)

1088 **S.68 : Cash credits – Sundry creditors – Merely because some creditors had not confirmed receipts, additions could not be made to assessee's income when creditworthiness had been proved beyond doubt**

The assessee was a manufacturer of fabrics. The Assessing Officer doubted the genuineness of the sundry creditors in the return of income. Accordingly, notices were sent by the Assessing Officer to those creditors, but the notices were received back unserved. In view of the above, the Assessing Officer made an addition to the assessee's income on account of cash credit u/s. 68 of the Act. The CIT(A) deleted the addition. However, the Tribunal confirmed the same. On further appeal, the High Court held that the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the creditors had been proved beyond doubt, as had been observed by the First Appellate Authority and hence the addition was deleted. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Jagdish Prasad Tewari (2014) 220 Taxmann 141 (All.)(HC)

1089 **S.68 : Cash credits – Unsecured loan – No additions on account of unsecured loan when identity and creditworthiness of the party is proved, more so amount received through proven banking channels**

The AO. made an addition of ₹ 10 lakhs pertaining to the loan received from M/s L.N. Seth, HUF. This was upheld by the First Appellate Authority. However, the Second Appellate Authority deleted the addition. Being aggrieved, the department filed an appeal. The High Court dismissed the appeal by stating that money had come at all levels through banking channels and the creditworthiness and identity of the donors/creditors had been proved. All the three conditions (proven identity, proven creditworthiness, and proven banking transactions) had been satisfied in the instant case and accordingly upheld the order of the Tribunal. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Shalimar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 138 (All.)(HC)

1090 **S.68 : Cash credits – Burden of proof – Non-examination of creditworthiness of persons or genuineness of transactions by the Appellate Authorities – Matter restored for verification**

The assessee was engaged in trading of consumable goods. During the year, the assessee had given certain loans to various persons. The AO doubted the creditworthiness of

persons / genuineness of transactions and made an addition u/s. 68 of the Act. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal deleted the addition. On appeal by the department, the High Court remanded the matter back to Tribunal for fresh adjudication to verify certain facts. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Prem Lata Sethi (Smt.) (2014) 220 Taxmann 333 (All.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Loan – Additions deleted as there was sufficient evidence available to prove the source. [R.46A] 1091

The assessee, in the return of income filed, had shown several loan credits for different amounts. The Assessing Officer treated the loan credits of ₹ 11.91 lakhs as unproved cash credits in absence of any evidence filed in these respects. The CIT(A), after considering the explanation given by the assessee, deleted the addition made by the AO. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A) order. On an appeal by the Department, the High Court held that the issue was considered by the fact finding authorities in detail and does not require any reconsideration. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. E.S. Jose (2014) 220 Taxmann 32 (Ker.)(HC)

S.68 : Cash credits – Confirmation was filed first time before Tribunal – Matter remitted to AO 1092

Assessee has shown sundry creditors. The AO issued letters to parties to verify the genuineness. Letters were received back as unserved. AO made addition under section 68 as assessee could not get confirmation letters in time from creditors. CIT(A) had not granted sufficient opportunity to assessee to file confirmation letters. Assessee however same was produced before Tribunal. Tribunal remitted the matter to AO to verify genuineness of said letters. (AY. 2009-10)

S. Govindaraj v. ITO (2014) 35 ITR 160 / (2015) 152 ITD 303 (Chennai)(Trib.)

S.68 : Cash credits – Share application – Rejection of explanation without examination of parties and without verifying from the respective AOs who are assessing the parties who have deposited by the respective parties was held to be not justified 1093

The only issue here is the addition of ₹ 60 lakhs made by the Assessing Officer as unexplained credit on account of the share application money. On going through the facts of the case, we notice that assessee has filed the relevant details which it could have filed in support of its contention of having received the share application money from each of these shareholder companies. The Assessing Officer has issued summons to the directors of these shareholder companies. In response there to, the directors have not attended. Assessing Officer has not conducted any further inquiry for non-attendance of the persons. Non-attendance on issuing summons itself, cannot be a ground for rejecting all the relevant documents furnished by the assessee company. Summons issued by Assessing Officer have not been received back as unserved. Therefore, it cannot be said that these companies were not in existence at the given addresses. The documents filed with the Registrar of Companies show that these companies were active during the relevant period. Assessing Officer has not verified any of the relevant documents submitted by assessee for discharging onus u/s. 68 of the Act. We also note that the Assessing Officer has not referred nor discussed about the so-called

alleged statement of entry providers against the assessee company. It is also not known whether assessee's name figured in that statement. The contention of the assessee has been rejected without examination and verification of the documents submitted by the assessee. The information received by him from the Investigation department has been made the basis of addition without any further investigation in this regard. Even the process of examination of the directors by issue of summons has not been taken to the logical end as after the failure of the directors to attend in response to the summons issued to them no further steps were taken. The Assessing Officer could have done cross verification about the status of these companies with the respective Assessing Officer of these shareholder companies. (ITA No. 2821/Del/2011.dt. 16-11-2014) (AY. 2003-04) *ITO v. Rakam Money Matters P. Ltd. (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org*

1094 **S.68 : Cash credits – Bogus purchases – Hawala dealer – Fact that alleged supplier is not traceable and has been termed a “hawala dealer” by the VAT authorities is not sufficient to treat the purchases as “bogus”. [S.133(6)]**

The assessee claimed to have made purchases from certain parties. In support of the genuineness of the purchases, he produced bills from the parties and proof of payment by cheque. However, the AO treated the purchases as “bogus” purchases u/s 68 on the ground that the notices u/s. 133(6) sent to the alleged suppliers at the address stated in their bills were returned unserved. Further, the said suppliers were termed as ‘Hawala Dealers’ (i.e. person who issued a bill for purchase of goods without delivery) by the Maharashtra VAT department. On appeal, the CIT(A) deleted the addition. On appeal by the department to the Tribunal HELD dismissing the appeal:

The fact that the supplier is declared as a “Hawala dealer” by the VAT department is a good starting point for making further investigation and taking it to its logical end. However, suspicion of highest degree cannot take place of evidence. The AO ought to have called for details of the bank accounts of the suppliers to find out as whether there was any immediate cash withdrawal from their account. No such exercise was done. There is nothing in the order of the AO about the cash trail. Transportation of goods to the site is one of the deciding factors to be considered for resolving the issue. Proof of movement of goods is not in doubt. In the absence of sufficient evidence, the purchases cannot be treated as bogus. (AY.2009-10)

Dy. CIT v. Rajeev G. Kalathi (2015) 67 SOT 52 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)

1095 **S.68 : Cash credits – Share application money – No independent enquiry – Addition was deleted**

Tribunal held that no addition is called for as the amount was received by the assessee through banking channel and the company was assessed to tax, the CIT has found that the assessee has furnished complete details to the AO and the AO has not conducted any independent enquiry in the matter. (AY. 2001-02)

ITO v. Anmol Marmo Grani (P) Ltd. (2014) 159 TTJ 5 (UO)/ 67 SOT 480 (Jodh.)(Trib.)

S.68 : Cash credits – Share application – Primary burden is on AO to show that share application money is assessable as unexplained cash credit. AO cannot sit back with folded hands & simply reject assessee's evidences

1096

- (i) Even if the reopening is sustained, the primary burden that income has escaped assessment is on the shoulder of the AO and after discharging this burden only, the onus shifts to the shoulder of the assessee. There are two types of cases. One in which the AO carries out the exercise which is required in law and the other in which the AO 'sits back with folded hands' till the assessee exhausts all the evidence or material in his possession and then comes forward to merely reject the same on the presumptions. On facts, nothing has been brought on record by the AO to substantiate his serious allegation that these two entries are accommodation entries which was the sole ground and basis for reopening;
- (ii) The assessee produced the necessary documents before the authorities below and discharged the obligation to explain the transaction with it. If the AO was still not satisfied with the aforesaid documents & explanation of the assessee, he should have resorted to s. 131 and other provisions in the Act to investigate and check the veracity of the documents. A cloud of suspicion and doubt can be raised by stating that a lot of cash was deposited in the accounts of M/s Gupta and Gupta and immediately thereafter cheque transaction could be evident from the side of M/s Gupta and Gupta to some other person/legal entity. However, a judicially trained mind will search from the said cloud brought before it, relevant admissible evidences if any from the records before it, to see whether the said evidence support the transaction as alleged by the AO which is under consideration before it, and not get swayed by other irrelevant materials which comes on record. Suspicion howsoever cannot take the place of evidence or proof (AY. 2002-03)

Mithaila Credit Services Ltd. v. ITO (Delhi)(Trib.), www.itatonline.org

S.68 : Cash credits – Income from other sources – Share premium – 'Income of every kind' – Capital receipt – Neither assessable as cash credits nor as income from other sources. [S.4, 56(1)]

1097

Share premium, received by the assessee company on issue of shares, is a capital receipt and therefore, it could not be taxed u/s. 56(1). As assessee company is holding 99.88 per cent of shares in its subsidiaries and several PSUs are contributors in IDFC PE Fund-II which is holding 98 per cent shares of the assessee company, the receipt of share premium could not be said to be a sham transaction. S. 68 is not attracted in these facts. (AY. 2009-10)

Green Infra Ltd. v. ITO (2013) 145 ITD 240 / (2014) 98 DTR 187 / 159 TTJ 728 (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.68 : Cash credits – Fund manger for other people – Benefit of telescoping – Peak credit – May be allowed

1098

Assessee was held to be a fund manager for other people for which purpose moneys were frequently withdrawn or deposited. Therefore, assessee was entitled to work out a peak credit and avail the benefits of telescoping. (AYs. 2001-02 to 2003-04)

Chetan Gupta v. ACIT (2013) 144 ITD 344 (2014) 98 DTR 209 / 160 TTJ 9 (Delhi)(Trib.)

Section 69 : Unexplained investment

- 1099 **S.69 : Unexplained investments – Amount claimed as lease rental on purchase and lease back of assets – Transaction of lease purchase and lease back found to be bogus – Addition of amount claimed as deduction to total income of assessee – Held to be justified**

The assessee was engaged in manufacture of iron and steel products. It undertook a new project consisting of power supply and integrated steel plant. For the assessment years 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000, the assessee claimed deduction of lease rentals which were debited to the profit and loss account. It was found that the claim of lease rentals was bogus and was for the purpose of accommodating the lessor companies in claiming depreciation in respect of non-existing assets. For the assessment year 1998-99, the Assessing Officer disallowed a sum of ₹ 1,63,10,230. He declined to treat the amount as financial charges. Similarly an amount of ₹ 1,38,65,266 and ₹ 44,63,063 were disallowed as being bogus lease rentals for the assessment years 1997-98 and 1999-2000. The Tribunal set aside the disallowances. Held, that the Tribunal had not disturbed the finding that there was no purchase of machinery, there was no lease of machinery and there was no payment of lease rentals. The claim for lease rental could not be allowed. (AY. 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000)

CIT v. Bellary Steels and Alloys Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 491 / (2015) 370 ITR 226 (Karn.) (HC)

- 1100 **S.69 : Unexplained investments – No reasonable explanation for investment – Addition was held to be justified. [S.264, Article 226]**

Assessee was an employee of Bank. Her account was credited with from NRE account and the amount was withdrawn for purchase of Gold. Assessee not appeared in response to summons. AO made addition as unexplained investment. The assessee filed revision application, which was rejected. On a writ petition :

Held, dismissing the petition, that it was clear from the orders passed by Commissioner and the Assessing Officer that in spite of opportunity having been provided to the assessee to appear before them, she did not choose to appear. On a query as to why the assessee entered into transaction on behalf of TS who was stranger and had no relationship with the assessee, the assessee did not give any reply much less a satisfactory reply. In such circumstances, no illegality or perversity could be pointed out in the orders passed by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner. The orders were valid. (AY. 2009-10)

Veena (Miss) v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 242 (P&H)(HC)

- 1101 **S.69 : Unexplained investments – No evidence regarding investment – Addition of amounts – Not justified**

During the survey an unsigned memorandum of understanding between the assessee and one JS was found. The AO made an addition on account of unexplained investment. The Tribunal also took the view that the onus was on the AO to establish that an investment in cash had been made. That onus was not discharged. On appeal to the High Court : Held, dismissing the appeal, that there was not even an iota of evidence to establish the

Revenue's contention that any unexplained investment in cash had been made by the assessee. The findings of the Tribunal were pure findings of fact and no question of law arose from it. The deletion of addition was justified. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Gian Gupta (2014) 369 ITR 428 / 224 Taxmann 172 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.69 : Unexplained investments – Explanation regarding investment satisfactory – Deletion of addition was held to be justified 1102

Held that the CIT(A) had given cogent reasons and found no grounds for sustaining the addition by the AO. He held that the source of investment in the property stood explained. This was confirmed by the Tribunal. The entire issue was based on facts which had been examined by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal and they had come to a concurrent finding of fact. Hence, no question of law arose.

CIT v. Kamlaben Sureshchandra Bhatti (2014) 367 ITR 692 / 44 taxmann.com 459 (Guj.)(HC)

S.69 : Unexplained investments – Seizure of project report – No evidence that work was done as per project – Addition of amount based on project report – Not justified. [S.158BD] 1103

Merely because a project report showed an estimated figure that did not prove that undisclosed investment was really made by the assessee. The Revenue had not discharged the burden of proving unexplained investment in terms of section 69. The addition of the amount was not justified

CIT v. Vinayak Plasto Chem P. Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 596 / 221 Taxmann 439 / 264 CTR 313 (Raj.)(HC)

S.69 : Unexplained investments – Stock – Statement – Retraction – No addition can be made merely on the basis of statement made in the course of search which was retracted. [S. 132, 132(4)] 1104

The assessee-company was engaged in manufacturing iron/steel windows, doors and frames. During search operation, excess stock was noticed by the Assessing Officer. Managing director admitted in the statement as undisclosed income. Later on, the said statement was retracted on ground that physical verification of stock was not done properly. Addition was made by Assessing Officer in respect of excess stock found in search. Tribunal had undertaken entire exercise of computation and examining summary of stock valuation and other relevant material, it reconciled entire material and concluded that Assessing Officer was not right in making such addition. On appeal by revenue, order of Tribunal was confirmed. (AY. 1994-95)

CIT v. Agew Steel Mfg. (P.) Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 28 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.69 : Unexplained investments – Without verifying details, considered it as unexplained investments, matter required fresh adjudication 1105

The High Court observed that the question before the Tribunal was whether the assessee had explained the investment made and the expenses incurred in case of construction of building and whether the interest was to be disallowed or not. The HC held that the same was a question of fact. The question whether assessee had incurred any expenses

for the previous year, was required to be taken into consideration while passing the order of assessment. The AO had to consider the same in accordance with law and pass an order on merits after providing an opportunity to the assessee to explain the expenditure incurred by him for the previous assessing year. Therefore, HC was of the opinion that for answering the question of law framed, the Matter was required to be reconsidered by the AO afresh. The matter was remanded to AO for fresh consideration in accordance with law. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Vijayanand Road lines Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 125 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

1106 S.69 : Unexplained investments – Purchasers not traceable – Profit element embedded in purchases

Assessee is engaged in the business of trading in finished fabrics. Assessing Officer disallowed the purchases on account that parties from whom purchases were made are not found at the addresses given. CIT(Appeals) confirmed the assessment order. Tribunal held that purchases were made from bogus parties, but the purchases themselves were not bogus as entire quantity of opening stock, purchases and the quantity manufactured during the year under consideration were sold by the assessee. Therefore, Tribunal held that additions should not be the entire amount, but the profit margin embedded on such purchases would be subject to tax. On appeal by revenue to High Court, Tribunal's order was upheld. (AY 2005-06)

CIT v. Bholanath Poly Fab (P) Ltd. (2013) 355 ITR 290 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 82 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

1107 S.69 : Unexplained investments – Search at place of third party showed that assessee had purchased plot by paying cash consideration – No evidence that those documents belonged to assessee – Documents at best shows projected purchase consideration – Addition was deleted

Certain documents were found during search at the place of third party which indicated that assessee purchased certain plot of land by paying cash consideration. AO made additions u/s. 69. The Court held that there was no evidence that the documents belong to the assessee. Further, it was held that documents, at best, only showed projected consideration. Accordingly, it was held that the evidences could not be treated as conclusive evidence of money transaction and therefore, addition was deleted.

CIT v. Prem Prakash Nagpal (2014) 220 Taxmann 168 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC.)

1108 S.69 : Unexplained investments – Gifts – Ornaments and cash – Deletion was held to be justified

The assessee, a doctor, was the only daughter and her father belonged to a reputed family of jewellers for more than three generations who were also jewellers to the royal family of Gaikwad, the erstwhile rulers of the Baroda State. She received a sum of ₹ 53.21 lakhs under the will of her father, out of which ₹ 35.21 lakhs was by way of ornaments and the remaining amount by way of cash. The report of the valuer was also furnished and a copy of the will was submitted as well. Her father was staying in the USA and, hence, she was asked to furnish the channel through which the cash and jewellery had been received. The capacity of the father was also examined. His

income-tax returns filed in the USA for the period 1994 to 1997 were also furnished along with other necessary proof establishing his capabilities. The certificate furnished by the advocate and that of the notary in whose presence the will was executed were on record.

The Tribunal noted that the maximum sum that could have been transferred by the father if considered by each trip from the USA was ₹ 10 lakhs and, accordingly, the Tribunal sustained a sum of ₹ 8 lakhs out of ₹ 18 lakhs. (AY. 2006-07)
CIT v. Diptiben D. Patel (2014) 362 ITR 325 (Guj.)(HC)

S.69 : Unexplained investments – Amounts of investments not fully disclosed in books of account – Agreements claimed to be cancelled – No evidence of on-money – Addition was not justified. [S.69B] 1109

Agreements found during the search were claimed to be cancelled by executors. There was no evidence to show that assessee paid on-money for purchase of land. There was nothing on record to show that agreements were acted upon and no trace of cash payment in excess of amount shown in registered documents. Held, addition on basis of agreements was not sustainable. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10)
CIT v. Fairdeal Textile Park P. Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 497 / 229 Taxmann 97 (Guj.)(HC)

S.69 : Unexplained investments – Excess investment – Money for carrying out construction was arranged by assessee – Company has no income during the year – Excess investment was assessable in the hands of assessee. [S. 69B] 1110

The assessee, a member of a Hindu undivided family was engaged in the construction of a building on a plot which belonged to the Hindu undivided family. The assessee floated a company with the object of carrying hoteling. The amount for construction was borrowed by the assessee from the HUF. AO found that there was excess investment in the company. Company having no income during the period of construction of Hotel. AO held that it was the assessee who was arranging for the funds for construction and it was assessee who was held responsible for such unaccounted investment hence taxed in the hand of assessee. Addition was confirmed by CIT(A). Tribunal deleted the addition. On reference the Court held that money for carrying out construction arranged by assessee in terms of agreement, excess amount assessable in hands of assessee. (AY. 1975-76 to 1977-78)

CIT v. D. P. Kanodia (2014) 362 ITR 163 / 226 Taxmann 67 (Mag.) / (2015) 120 DTR 262 (All.)(HC)

S.69 : Unexplained investments – Sale of shares – Purchase and sale of shares was held to be non-genuine transaction – Amount claimed to be capital gains held to be not justified – Order of AO was confirmed [S.45] 1111

Court held that although the assessee had produced documentary evidence to show that shares were sold at a price prevailing in the stock market on the date of sale, no documentary evidence was produced to show that on the date of purchase, the market price of the shares was the same as that at which the shares were claimed to have been purchased. It was highly improbable that a company whose shares rose by more than 25 times, within a span of one year was not in existence and that the directors of

the company were not traceable at the address given. The addition of ₹ 15,33,160 was justified. Appeal of revenue was allowed. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Sanghamitra Bharali (Smt.) (2014) 361 ITR 481 / 97 DTR 345 / 227 Taxmann 65 (Mag.)(Gauhati)(HC)

1112 **S.69 : Unexplained investments – Difference in purity of gold – Onus on assessee to reconcile – Addition was held to be justified. [S. 69A]**

The assessee is a manufacturer and exporter of gold ornaments. Documents recording manufacture showed substantially higher purity of gold than export documents. The onus on assessee to reconcile the difference was not discharged. Held, value of unaccounted gold was to be added to income. (AY. 1989-90)

Subodhchandra and Co. v. CIT (2014) 362 ITR 387 / 224 Taxmann 59 / (2015) 120 DTR 248 (Guj.)(HC)

1113 **S.69 : Unexplained investments – Gold biscuits recovered from locker – Owner of gold biscuits – Deletion was justified on facts**

There was a concurrent finding at time of recording his statement that gold biscuits recovered from locker of the assessee were not owned by brother of assessee. Hence, addition in hands of assessee was sustainable. (AY. 2006-07)

Dharmendra Kumar Varshney v. CIT (2014) 360 ITR 563 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 94 (All.)(HC)

1114 **S.69 : Unexplained investments – Agricultural income – Explanation for source of cash – No justification for addition**

Tribunal held that the amount of total income and agricultural income declared by assessee aggregating to ₹ 2.50 lakhs was sufficient enough to explain sources for ₹ 50,000, hence, there was no justification in confirming addition of said amount. (AY. 2001-02 to 2007-08)

M.M. Sulaiman v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 746 / (2015) 67 SOT 32 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)

1115 **S.69 : Unexplained investments – Purchase of car – Burden was not discharged by revenue – Addition was deleted**

Consequent to search, AO made an addition on account of investment made by assessee in purchase of car stating that assessee could not explain sources for purchasing car. Tribunal held that since department did not unearth any material to show that assessee had purchased vehicle during relevant assessment year, CIT(A) was justified in deleting addition. (AY. 2001-02 to 2007-08)

M. M. Sulaiman v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 746 / (2015) 67 SOT 32 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)

1116 **S. 69 : Unexplained investments – Investment in property – Source explained – Addition was deleted**

Assessee proved that investment in purchase of impugned property was made out of money returned by two parties with whom he carried out financial transactions.

Tribunal held that since fund was available with assessee at relevant time, additions made by AO towards unexplained investment in property were not maintainable and AO was to be directed to delete same. (AY. 2001-02 to 2007-08)

M.M. Sulaiman v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 746 / (2015) 67 SOT 32 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)

S.69 : Unexplained investments – Reconciliation of payment was filed – Deletion of addition was held to be justified 1117

Tribunal held that when the assessee had reconciled payments made for purchase of rubber estate and assessee's explanations were supported by statements given by person from whom he had taken money, as well as by letter given by bank which issued demand draft, additions were rightly deleted by CIT(A). (AY. 2001-02 to 2007-08)

M.M. Sulaiman v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 746 / (2015) 67 SOT 32 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)

S.69 : Unexplained investments – Telescoping benefit – Additional income disclosed – Deletion on account of investment on car was held to be justified 1118

Assessee had purchased a car during relevant year - As, assessee could not substantiate his claim of having received loan for purchasing car, Assessing Officer treated above said investment in purchase of car as income of assessee and made additions - Whether since assessee had declared additional income of ₹ 15 lakhs during year under consideration and same should be available with him for making investments; cost of car being ₹ 5.70 lakhs, could have been funded through this additional income and CIT(A) was justified in giving telescoping benefit. (AY. 2001-02 to 2007-08)

M. M. Sulaiman v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 746 / (2015) 67 SOT 32 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)

S.69 : Unexplained investments – Source explained – Deletion of addition by CIT (A) was held to be justified 1119

Tribunal held that where assessee had explained that payments made by him for purchase of cars were from several car loans taken from banks, CIT(A) had rightly deleted addition. (AY. 2001-02 to 2007-08)

M.M. Sulaiman v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 746 (2015) 67 SOT 32 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)

S.69 : Unexplained investments – Burden is on revenue – Additions were deleted on the ground that agreements cannot be treated as fabricated without any evidence 1120

Assessee had made certain deposit in bank account. Before AO he explained that said amount was mainly out of sale proceeds of an agricultural land he also produced agreements for purchase and sale of said land, however, AO doubted said agreements noticing certain defects therein and added entire amount of bank deposit under section 69. Tribunal held that the agreements could not be treated as fabricated without there being any contrary evidence and, therefore, addition was not justified. When any addition is proposed under provisions of section 69, it becomes bounden duty of AO himself to prove that explanation of assessee is not correct. (ITA No. 357 (Jodh.) of 2013 dt. 30-4-2014) (AY. 2009-10)

ITO v. Satish Kumar (2014) 163 TTJ 33 (UO) (2015) 67 SOT 49 (URO)(Jodh.)(Trib.)

1121 **S.69 : Unexplained investments – Investment by wife – Land not owned by assessee – Acted as broker – Order of CIT(A) deleting the addition was held to be justified**

Where AO accepted investment in property in hands of wife of assessee and all documents relating to said investment were available in assessment record of wife of assessee, who was assessed by the same AO, addition under section 69 in respect of investment in such property in hand of assessee was unjustified.

AO having found that assessee owned a plot of land for which sale agreement was made by him by taking advance and issuing Kachcha receipt for same but neither assessee declared purchase of above property nor sale thereof, made addition under section 69 in hands of assessee. CIT(A) having found that there was no evidence with AO that land in question was owned by assessee and that was sold to a person, deleted addition. There was no infirmity in order of CIT(A).

AO having found that assessee had made sale of a plot of land and same was not disclosed in return of income, treated entire sale consideration as undisclosed income and made addition accordingly. However Inspector's report clearly stated that the assessee had neither purchased this plot nor had sold same but he had acted as power of attorney holder on behalf of seller. Since AO failed to bring any evidence on record to substantiate that assessee was owner of plot, he was not justified in considering sale consideration for which assessee acted as an agent of seller as an undisclosed income of assessee. (AY. 2005-06)

ACIT v. Om Prakash Lohiya (2014) 64 SOT 186 (URO)(Jodh.)(Trib.)

1122 **S.69 : Unexplained investments – Sale of flats – Valuation shown at higher for mortgage – AO could not adopt said value in respect of flats sold to other persons [S.28(i)]**

Assessee was engaged in business of developing real estate projects, Assessee sold some flats at rate of 1,200 per sq. yd. AO noticed that assessee had mortgaged some flats to PUDA where value of flats was shown at rate of 5,000 per sq. yd. Accordingly, relying upon value of flats shown in mortgage deed made addition to total income of assessee. Claim of the Assessee that valuation of flats mortgaged with PUDA was artificially inflated so that less number of flats had to be mortgaged. CIT(A) accepted claim of assessee and held that valuation mentioned in mortgage deed could not be taken to be value of flats so as to reject sale consideration as recorded in registered deeds which was in accordance with stamp duty regulation. Since no other evidence or material on record to justify addition of differential rates as recorded in mortgage deed and registered sale deed, impugned addition was deleted. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

Dy. CIT v. Singla Enclave Developers (P.) Ltd. (2013) 156 TTJ 1 / (2014) 149 ITD 177 (Chs.)(Trib.)

1123 **S.69 : Unexplained investments – Income from undisclosed sources – Bogus purchases – Filing of confirmation of suppliers with PAN and TIN number are not sufficient to prove the purchases are genuine if they are not supported by other facts including delivery of goods & presence of suppliers – 15% of bogus purchases was confirmed. [S. 143(3), 145]**

The department had gathered the information through survey and search seizure in above parties and they categorically admitted that they have provided entries and not

doing any purchase and sale of gems and jewellery. Even then Assessing Officer asked to produce these parties for verification which could not be produced by it. The Assessing Officer also issued summons U/s. 131 of the Act, which was partly served and partly returned back unserved. The assessee's argument that case laws applied by the Assessing Officer i.e., Sanjay Oil Cake Industries and Vijay Protein are not squarely applicable, is not accepted as such because primary onus is on the assessee to produce these parties for verification before the Assessing Officer. In the assessment, the Assessing Officer has a right to estimate the profits on a reasonable basis, adopting the base provided by ITAT judgments cannot to be termed as unscientific, unreasonable or arbitrary. Filing of some confirmation with PAN and TIN number are not sufficient to prove the purchases are genuine as they are to be supported by other facts including delivery of goods, as held by the various courts. The appellant cannot directly or indirectly put blinkers on investigations of the Assessing Officer to compel him to do it as per sweet will of the assessee. It is not permissible that the assessee will direct the Assessing Officer to enquire his case at his own way, which is not required by law. The assessee wanted to shift his onus on the Assessing Officer on flimsy ground. It is rampant practice in gems and jewellery business in Jaipur that the assessee has been getting accommodation bills to reduce the profitability which has been established by the department. The Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court recently in the case of *Venus Arts & Gems v. ITO* vide order dated 20-8-2014 has also confirmed the addition on unverifiable purchases @ 21.96% and also found order of the ITAT being purely a finding of fact by the two appellate authorities as to what should be a reasonable G.P. rate after rejection of books of account and various infirmities noticed by the lower authorities and in their view no question of law much less substantial question of law can be said to emerge out of the order of the Tribunal. Tribunal held 15% of bogus purchases was held to be reasonable. (ITA No. 187/JP/2012, Dt. 22-10-2014.) (AY. 2007-08)

Anuj Kumar Varshney v. ITO (Jaipur)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org

Editorial: Group matters relating to bogus purchases were decided depending on facts.

S.69 : Unexplained investments – Sale of shares – Capital gains – “Penny Stock” – AO can assess on consideration of material available on record, surrounding circumstances, human conduct, preponderance of probabilities and nature of incriminating information/evidence available on record. [S.45]

1124

Tribunal held that the tax authorities have applied the test of human probabilities explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Sumati Dayal and Durga Prasad More to disbelieve the claim of long term capital gains put forth by the assessee. We notice that the test of human probabilities was not applied by the co-ordinate Benches of Tribunal in the case of Shri Avinash Kantilal Jain and Mr. Shyam R Pawar. Hence, in our view, the assessee cannot take support from the abovesaid decisions. We further notice that the learned CIT(A) has placed reliance on the decision dated 4-1-2011 rendered by ITAT Delhi in the case of *Haresh Win Chaddha v. DDIT*, wherein the Tribunal has expressed the view that there is no presumption in law that the AO is supposed to discharge an impossible burden to assess the tax liability by direct evidence only and to establish the evasion beyond doubt as in criminal proceedings. Further it was held that the AO can assess on consideration of material available on record,

surrounding circumstances, human conduct, preponderance of probabilities and nature of incriminating information/evidence available on record.

In the case of Smt. Jamnadevi Agrawal, the Hon'ble Bombay High Court has upheld the order of Tribunal on the reasoning that no fault can be found with the findings recorded by the Tribunal. A perusal of the abovesaid order would show that the revenue in the abovesaid case had contended that the assessee in the group have purchased and sold shares of similar companies through the same broker. Further the purchase prices and sale prices were supported by producing the evidences to show that the said transactions were undertaken at the rates prevailing on the respective dates. Under these set of facts, the High Court held that the findings given by the Tribunal cannot be found fault with and further held that the decision rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sumati Dayal was not applicable. In the case of Shri Mukesh Ratilal Marolia, the Hon'ble Bombay high Court has observed that the assessee has furnished copies of Share certificates to show that the shares were in fact transferred to the name of the assessee before it. Further there was no allegation that the prices of shares purchased by the assessee in the case before High Court were manipulated.

However, in the instant case, the assessee could not produce the copies of share certificates and copies of share transfer forms. The transaction of purchase of shares could not be cross verified. The shares of M/s. Prime Capital Markets Ltd. was declared as "Penny Stock" by SEBI and the broker Sanju Kabra, through whom the shares were sold by the assessee was indicted for manipulating the prices of penny stock shares. Hence, in our view, the tax authorities have rightly applied the test of human probabilities to examine the claim of purchase and sale of shares made by the assessee. *Usha Chandresh Shah v. ITO (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org*

1125 **S.69 : Unexplained investments – Land – Additions cannot be made merely on the basis of stamp valuation**

The Tribunal held that the AO made the addition merely on the basis of value taken by the register for stamp duty purpose, but nothing was brought on record to substantiate that the assessee had invested more than the amount shown in the books of accounts. Therefore, addition made by the AO was not justified. The Tribunal followed the decision in the case of *Krishna Kumar Rawat & Ors. v. Union of India (1995) 214 ITR 610 (Raj.)*. (AY. 2001-02)

ITO v. Anmol Marmo Grani (P) Ltd. (2014) 159 TTJ 5 (UO) / 67 SOT 480 (Jodh.)(Trib.)

1126 **S.69 : Unexplained investments – Immovable property – Transaction between related parties – Sale consideration partly set aside to decide on the basis of prevailing market rate.**

Assessee is a construction company. It constructed five flats in 1994 and also constructed another three flats in same building in 2006 and sold all of them to related parties. A.O. recomputed the income by taking a uniform rate being maximum value of flat declared by assessee with regard to first five flats and FMV in respect of three flats subsequently constructed, and made addition. CIT(A) deleted addition on ground that there was no proof that any excess consideration had passed on to assessee over declared sales consideration. On appeal by revenue, assessee contended that sale

consideration was at prevailing market value. Tribunal held that where construction of first five flats was completed way back in 1994 and were not comparable with subsequently constructed three flats, adoption of uniform rate by Assessing Officer as sales consideration for first five constructed flat was acceptable. However, whether assessee's declared sale rate in respect of three flats subsequently constructed remained unexplained and in absence of full and proper details regarding declared sale value being in line with prevailing market rate of similar properties, matter was to be remitted back to A.O. for making fresh assessment in respect of three flats subsequently constructed. Tribunal also observed that True, genuine and *bona fide* transactions, even if made below par, the fair market valuation would not have any tax implication, being only undertaken in the normal course of business and in business interest. (AY. 2007-08) *ITO v. Lakewood Construction Co. (P) Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 19 (Mum.)(Trib.)*

Section 69A : Unexplained money, etc.

S.69A : Unexplained money – Cash seized by police – In the absence of supporting evidence addition was held to be justified 1127

Court held that in absence of documents supporting contention, Tribunal was justified in confirming that all amount shown in bank account as entirely different from cash amount of ₹ 65 lakhs found in hands of assessee. (AY. 1997-98 to 2003-04) *Madathil Zainuddin v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 118 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)*

S.69A : Unexplained money – Pawning of ornaments – Initial working capital – Accrued interest – Addition was held to be justified. [S.132] 1128

Assessee was engaged in business of advancing loan and pawning of ornaments. Search conducted at his premises unearthed pawned ornaments and registers showing advances of certain sum. Assessee offered to pay tax on an amount after claiming exemption in respect of part of sum as initial working capital of his ancestors but no material was produced to prove the same. Addition made by Assessing Officer on account of the said amount was justified. Addition towards accrued interest on account of re-pawning was to be made where in search of money lenders with whom re-pawning was done, corresponding amount was recovered.

Ramesh Prasad Dhahayat v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 191 (Mag.)(MP)(HC)

S.69A : Unexplained money – Addition made in respect of gold found during search 1129

The Assessing Officer made additions of ₹ 47.11 lakhs under section 69A on account of unexplained jewellery. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the additions of ₹ 41.43 lakhs and confirmed addition of only ₹ 5.69 lakhs. This order was affirmed by the Tribunal. The Court held that both the Tribunal as well as the Commissioner (Appeals) have deleted the addition of ₹ 41,42,515, on appreciation of evidence, which are neither reported to be perverse and/or contrary to the evidence on record. While doing so, it was opined that the appellant and his family members had valid evidences to prove owing of jewellery by him and his family members in the form of wealth tax returns, valuation reports, purchases bills, payment evidences and bank statements for payments, will, social occasions as per caste/society, etc. Most of the jewellery was acquired by them prior to the search period. The gold ornaments and jewellery received

as per social customs, within the limit of CBDT Instruction No. 1916 were considered as explained. There is no reason to interfere with the same as no question of law, much less substantial question of law arises in the appeal. (AY. 2009-10)
CIT v. Ashok Chandrakant Gandhi (2014) 222 Taxmann 119 (Guj.)(HC)

1130 **S.69A : Unexplained money – Jewellery – No addition can be made in respect of jewellery found within the limits prescribed in the circular. [S. 153A]**

No addition u/s. 69A could be made if the Jewellery found during the search is within the limit as prescribed by the Board Instruction No.1916 dated 11-5-1994 as per the Indian custom and tradition where a married lady is permitted to possess to the extent of 500gms, 250 gms per unmarried lady and 100 gms per male members in a family. On the facts of the case the extent of 2700 gms was held to be reasonable and deletion was held to be justified. (AY. 2005-06).

CIT v. Satya Narain Patni (2014) 366 ITR 325 / 269 CTR 466 / 214 Taxmann 312 (Raj.)(HC)

1131 **S.69A : Unexplained money – In absence of information to prove that the bank account in question is not the assessee's, addition of unexplained money is to be made in assessee's individual status**

During the course of the assessment proceedings, the AO observed that there was a cash deposit in the assessee's bank account and disallowed the same as unexplained income in the hands of the assessee on a protective basis and in the hands of the HUF on substantive basis. The assessee clarified that the said amount was on account of money lending business of the family and was received in the name of the HUF. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal confirmed the action of the AO.

The High Court observed that on the basis of the material on record the assessee could not prove that the bank account in question was that of the HUF and not the assessee's personal account. The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose in the appeal and that it was in fact a question of fact and hence dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. (AY. 2005-06)

Ashok P. Magajikondi v. ITO (2014) 221 Taxmann 446 (Karn.)(HC)

1132 **S.69A : Unexplained money – Investment in shares – Burden discharged by showing circumstantial evidences, though the persons who have sold the shares have not responded to the summons – Deletion was held to be justified**

The assessee had purchased shares from a person in the year 1994-95. In the return for the relevant year the AO sought to make addition. On request of the assessee, when notices were handed over to the assessee's representative and no response was received from the person who were stated to have sold the shares.

The Courts held that the details and other evidences like details of payments, cheque numbers and dates, etc., in respect of the persons who had sold the shares to the assessee, which have also been transferred by the company in the name of assessee, and therefore the initial burden on the assessee stands effectively discharged and therefore no addition ought to have been made. The court held that the Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition made u/s. 69A. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. Sadhana Jain (Smt.) (2014) 97 DTR 1 / 224 Taxmann 28 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

S.69A : Unexplained money – Additional sale consideration – Finding of fact – No substantial question of law 1133

Assessing Officer made additions of undisclosed income being additional sale consideration received by assessee in respect of two properties. In respect of first addition, Tribunal found that assessee furnished documentary evidence and details of transactions and that apart from e-mail seized during search action, there was no supporting evidence to conclude that there was any undisclosed income. In respect of second addition, Commissioner (Appeals) duly considered materials and deleted addition on ground that Assessing Officer had acted without any material so as to justifying additions. The High Court held that since there were pure findings of facts by Commissioner (Appeals) and Tribunal, which were borne out from material available on record, no substantial question of law arose. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Reis Magos Estates (P) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 169 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

S.69A : Unexplained money – Search – Angadia – Search on bus – seized cash belonging to assessee – Adequate cash balance at Mumbai office of assessee on the date of search – Employee of the assessee explained that the cash belonged to the assessee – Addition was deleted 1134

Assessee was in the business of 'Angadia'. A search was carried on a bus belonging to some other person which carried cash belonging to the assessee. AO treated the same as unexplained money. High Court held that finding of fact was given by the Tribunal that assessee had sufficient cash balance on the day of the search at the Mumbai office and also the employee of the assessee carrying the cash explained that the cash belonged to the assessee. In such circumstances addition u/s. 69A was not warranted.

CIT v. Patel Natverlal Chinubhai & Co. (2014) 220 Taxmann 168 (Mag.)(Guj)(HC.)

S.69A : Unexplained money – Where the assessee has no connection with NRI accounts found from possession of assessee – Addition is unjustified 1135

A search was carried out at business premises of Partnership firm. During search certain bank pass books and cheque books were found and seized. The Assessing Officer was of view that bank pass books had been found from possession of assessee and therefore the assessee was owner of bank pass books. The Assessing Officer further opined that as the firm was controlled by the assessee, tax should be levied. The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal held that, the accounts seized during the search were non-resident external accounts and they could be funded only with foreign currency inward remittance by a non-resident through FCNR procedure and thus, the assessee firm had no connection with those bank accounts. Therefore the addition was not justified. (AY. 2002-03, 2005-06, 2007-08)

ACIT v. Mohammed Mohsin Rajabali Dosani (2014) 34 ITR 271 / (2015) 67 SOT 130 (URO) (Ahd.)(Trib.)

S.69A : Unexplained money – Bank balance relating to transaction of earlier year was directed to be deleted 1136

AO noticed huge transactions in various bank accounts maintained by assessee. In absence of details, AO computed peak credit balance at ₹ 98.65 lakhs and assessed same as income of assessee. Tribunal held that in absence of corresponding asset/expense

vis-à-vis alleged income, it would not be proper to presume that entire amount of deposits made into bank account represented current income of assessee. Tribunal also held that AO having accepted for previous year that deposits found in bank accounts relate to transactions carried by assessee in his real estate and vehicle brokerage business, same logic was to be extended for current year also. Accordingly the Tribunal directed the AO to delete additions relating to bank deposits. (AY. 2001-02 to 2007-08) *M. M. Sulaiman v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 746 / (2015) 67 SOT 32 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)*

1137 **S.69A : Unexplained money – Survey – Shortage of cash and gold ornaments – Shortage of ornaments at best be treated as undisclosed sales and not as undisclosed investment. [S.133A]**

During course of survey operations, certain shortages pertaining to cash in hand, gold ornament, diamond items and silver items was noticed. Tribunal held that merely because shortages had been noticed as compared to books, it could not be said that any undisclosed investment/money was made by assessee. Whether cash might have been used for making unaccounted purchases or other purposes for which no cogent material was available and in such circumstances merely on conjectures or surmises addition under section 69A was unsustainable. As regards shortage in gold, silver and diamond ornaments could at best be treated as undisclosed sales and not undisclosed investment. Appeal of revenue was partly allowed.(AY. 2005-06)

ITO v. Subhas Brothers Jewellers (P) Ltd. (2014) 33 ITR 66 / (2015) 67 SOT 50 (URO) (Kol.)(Trib.)

1138 **S.69A : Unexplained money – Documents found in the course of search – Merely on the basis of documents additions cannot be made – Matter remanded – Assessee admitting advances as income on the basis of seized documents – Addition was held to be justified**

Tribunal held that where some document showing payment to assessee impounded during search and there was serious doubt regarding authenticity of were document and neither AO nor CIT(A) had conducted any enquiry to ascertain real fact, solely relying upon that single piece of evidence addition could not be made at hands of assessee and matter was to be remitted back to consider issue afresh. Tribunal also held that when assessee accepted advances mentioned in seized material as his income, interest calculated on amount advanced as noted in very same seized material certainly had to be considered to have been earned by assessee. (AY. 2007-08 to 2010-11)

B. Bhaskar Rao v. Dy. CIT (2014) 34 ITR 277 / (2015) 152 ITD 280 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

1139 **S.69A : Unexplained money – Survey – computer printout sheet – Assessee has not explained satisfactorily – Addition was held to be justified. [S.68, 69, 133A, 292C]**

A computer printout sheet was found during course of survey proceedings at assessee-firm's business premises, which reflected ₹ 18.44 lakhs received from one of its partner 'P' for being used by a number of persons, including assessee. AO made addition under section 68 for amount noted to have been given to assessee-firm as assessee did not fulfil its obligation to explain document. However, assessee claimed it to be explained in as much as document itself reflected 'P' to be source of funds. CIT(A) held that as

sums were not admittedly reflected in books and no money was actually found, section 69 was applicable. Tribunal held that section 69A would apply as section 69 applies in respect of an unexplained investment. Tribunal held that question of applicability of any particular section was never an issue as it was inconsequential in view of assessee's obligation to explain transaction, failing which amount reflected as received would be deemed as its income. Addition was justified. (AY. 2006-07)

Alliance Hotels v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 163 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 69B : Amount of investments, etc., not fully disclosed in books of account

S.69B : Amounts of investments not fully disclosed in books of account – Value estimated by DVO indicated that consideration recorded and corroborated statement of assessee, addition was held to be justified. [S. 131]

1140

On the basis of intimation received from the intelligence wing the AO issued the summons to the assessee. The assessee admitted the under consideration and retracted later on. AO referred the matter to valuation office who estimated the land at high value. The AO accepted the value adopted by DVO and difference was added under section 69B of the Act. Tribunal deleted the addition. On appeal by revenue allowing the appeal the Court held that; difference in consideration recorded was understated and DVO report was to be relied upon to corroborate statement of assessee, hence addition made by the Assessing Officer under section 69B was justified. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Narinder Kr. Budhiraja (2014) 368 ITR 709 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 592 (Delhi)(HC)

S.69B : Amounts of investments not fully disclosed in books of account – Addition on the basis of departmental valuation Officer – Deletion justified. [S.142A]

1141

On appeal by revenue, dismissing the appeal the Court held that, the addition was made merely on the basis of the Departmental Valuation Officer's report without there being any other material. Moreover, the Departmental Valuation Officer had also substantially relied on jantri rates and had made other references for arriving at the valuation. Both the issues were based primarily on factual aspects. No question of law arose. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11)

CIT v. Jayendra N. Shah (2014) 367 ITR 686 / 52 taxmann.com 54 (Guj.)(HC)

S.69B : Amounts of investments not fully disclosed in books of account – Purchase of agricultural property – Report of DVO – Addition merely on the basis of DVO's report was held to be not justified

1142

During relevant year, assessee purchased agricultural property value of which was disclosed in the books of account. Assessing Officer finding some discrepancies with respect to investment, referred matter to DVO. DVO reported value of investment of agricultural property, at higher value. AO relying upon report of DVO, made addition to assessee's income on account of unexplained investment. Tribunal deleted said addition. On appeal by revenue the court held that onus to prove under valuation of property through positive evidence was upon revenue and mere reliance upon report of Valuation Officer expressing his opinion as to true value would be inadequate material

for Assessing Officer to constitute evidence in absence of any other positive evidence on record, therefore, addition was rightly deleted by Tribunal. (AY. 2007-08)
CIT v. Agile Properties (P) Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 107 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

1143 **S.69B : Amounts of investments not fully disclosed in books of account – DVO valuation must be supported by other positive evidence**

During relevant year, assessee purchased agricultural property value of which was disclosed at ₹ 5.22 crore. Assessing Officer finding some discrepancies with respect to investment, referred matter to DVO. DVO reported value of investment of agricultural property as ₹ 10.51 crore. Assessing Officer relying upon report of DVO, made addition to assessee's income on account of unexplained investment. In appellate proceedings, Tribunal deleted said addition. It was held that onus to prove undervaluation of property through positive evidence was upon revenue. Mere reliance upon report of Valuation Officer expressing his opinion as to true value would be inadequate material for Assessing Officer to constitute evidence in absence of any other positive evidence on record. Hence, impugned addition was rightly deleted by Tribunal. (AY. 2007-08)
CIT v. Agile Properties (P) Ltd. (2014) 107 DTR 201 / 225 Taxmann 107 (Delhi)(HC)

1144 **S.69B : Amounts of investments not fully disclosed in books of account – Loose papers – Survey – Affidavit – Statement does not lose its evidentiary value – Addition was held to be justified. [S.133A]**

The assessee is a practising dentist. During survey loose papers were found which recorded the monthly receipts of the assessee. Assessee agreed to offer additional receipts shown in the loose paper to tax. Thereafter the assessee explained that page no had been prepared by his financial consultant for preparing a project report to obtain funds from bank so as to take from the bankers. The assessee also filed the affidavit of consultant. AO concluded that the affidavit was after thought and not supported by evidence hence made addition on the basis of statement. CIT(A) confirmed the addition. Tribunal also confirmed the order of CIT(A). On appeal to High Court the Court held that no evidence was produced regarding appointment of said consultant or that fees being paid. Moreover, no details were furnished by assessee of equipment's which were to be purchased, in the circumstances no credence could be given to affidavit filed by consultant and receipts recorded in said loose papers was undisclosed income of assessee. (AY. 2004-05 to 2007-08)
Dr. Dinesh Jain v. ITO (2014) 363 ITR 210 / 226 Taxmann 27 / 272 CTR 73 (Bom.)(HC)

1145 **S.69B : Amounts of investments not fully disclosed in books of account – Accounts not rejected – Reference to Valuation Officer and addition based on his report – Held to be not valid**

The Assessing Officer, after making a reference to the Valuation Officer for ascertaining the assessee's investment in the house property on the basis of such report made addition under section 69B as the assessee's unexplained investment. The Tribunal deleted the addition. On appeals to the High Court; Held, dismissing the appeals, that the Assessing Officer having made a reference to the Valuation Officer without rejecting the books of account, the addition under section 69B was not justified. (AY. 2005-06)
CIT v. Vijaykumar D. Gupta (2014) 365 ITR 353 / 227 Taxmann 21 (Guj.)(HC)

S.69B : Amounts of investments not fully disclosed in books of account – Sale of shares below market price – Deletion of additions was held to be justified

1146

UPCL a co. promoter of HC Ltd., held 4,000 shares in the assessee company and the balance 36,000 shares were held by M Ltd. Later on HC Ltd., merged with three other companies to form a new company known as HCL Ltd. UPCL did not want to continue as a shareholder of the new HCL, it entered into a tripartite agreement with M. Ltd., and HC Ltd., to the effect that it shall sell 4,000 shares to M Ltd., or its nominee, for ₹ 1.27 Crs. M Ltd., did not have sufficient funds to make such payment and it entered into an agreement with SBICM Ltd., for payment of said amount to UPCL. Accordingly 4000 shares were transferred and registered in the name of SBICM and it paid ₹ 1.27 crs to UPCL . Pursuant to the scheme of merger, the originally allotted 4,000 shares of ₹ 100 each stood increased by 12,70,000 of ₹ 10 each in HCL. Acting as a trustee pursuant to an oral trust, assessee HEICL transferred 12,70,000 shares to HCL to 62 persons at prices varying from ₹ 6.02 to ₹ 18.91 per share.

The AO made an addition of ₹ 2,39,86,572/-, taking into consideration the difference between the market prize and declared sale consideration.

The Hon'ble Court held that the in the absence of any allegation or finding to the effect that an under-table consideration was received by the assessee on sale of shares made by it at a prize below the market prize, AO was not justified in making addition to income of the assessee of the amount representing the difference between the market prize and the declared sale consideration. More so the assessee acted as a trustee in selling the shares.

As far as the transfer or sale of shares by ATPPL is concerned the matter was remanded back to the AO for consideration. (AY. 1989-90)

CIT v. Associate Technoplastics (P) Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 17 (Delhi)(HC)

CIT v. HCL Employees & Investments Co. Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 17 (Delhi)(HC)

S.69B : Amounts of investments not fully disclosed in books of account – Unaccounted stock – Survey – Addition was held to be justified. [S.133A]

1147

In course of survey carried out at assessee's premises, unaccounted stock of ₹ 27.70 lakh was found. Statement of assessee was recorded wherein he admitted that he was unable to explain such stock. Accordingly, addition was made to assessee's income. Commissioner (Appeals) as well as Tribunal confirmed said addition. The Court held that, two lower authorities concurrently recorded a finding of fact that assessee was unable to explain unaccounted stock at time of survey, and in absence of any evidence on record controverting said finding, no question of law arose in instant appeal and thus, it was to be dismissed.

Razakbhai R. Arabiani v. ITO (2014) 220 Taxman 82 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.69B : Amounts of investments not fully disclosed in books of account – Enquiry under Wealth-tax Act towards estimating market value of property – Provisions of the Wealth-tax Act and Schedule III thereto cannot be imported into the provisions of section 69B

1148

During assessment proceedings, Assessing Officer observed that assessee had acquired immovable properties for prices which were very low considering the rental income yielded by those properties. Therefore, Assessing Officer applied the rent capitalisation

method provided in Rule 3 of Part B of Schedule III to the Wealth-tax Act and estimated the value of the properties at higher figures. Difference between the prices were treated as undisclosed investment u/s. 69B of the Act. Tribunal however, deleted the entire addition. On appeal by revenue to High Court, dismissing the appeal held that, section 69B requires the Assessing Officer to first prove that the assessee has actually expended an amount which he has not fully recorded in his books of account. There has to be a finding that such amount was actually paid by the assessee over and above the declared consideration and the extra amount was not recorded in the assessee's books of account. The provisions of the Wealth-tax Act and Schedule III thereto cannot be imported into the provisions of section 69B because the enquiry under the Wealth-tax Act is towards estimating the market value of the property which is different from the actual price paid for the property. Section 69B does not permit an inference to be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the transaction that the purchaser of the property must have paid more than what was actually recorded in this books of account, because such an inference could be very subjective and could lead to the taxation of notional or fictitious income contrary to the strict provisions of Article 265 of the Constitution of India.

CIT v. Dinesh Jain HUF (2014) 220 Taxmann 160 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

1149 **S.69B : Amounts of investments not fully disclosed in books of account – Survey – Statement of partner cannot be relied upon – Addition made only on the basis of statement was deleted. [S.133A]**

The AO added an amount of ₹ 31,21,590 on the basis of a document impounded during the survey and statement of partner of the assessee's firm who stated that one zero was omitted from such impounded document. The Tribunal relying on the decision of Kerala High Court in the case of *Paul Mathews and Sons v. CIT [2003] 263 ITR 101/129 Taxman 416* deleted the addition on the ground that such statement recorded during survey could not have been relied upon. Tribunal further noted that theory of omission of one zero is not borne out from the impounded document. Tribunal further observed that the contents of the documents do not suggest or bring out that notings are of loans and advances. The Tribunal was therefore, of the opinion that such addition was made only on conjectures and surmises. The HC based on the observations of Tribunal stated that it did not commit any error. A careful perusal of the orders on record would suggest that except for the impounded document and statement of partner, there was no further evidence with the Revenue to make addition. It was on the strength of the statement of the partner during the survey that the Revenue inflated such figure 10 times by adding zero. Statement of partner also suggested that it was his personal income and not that of firm. Thus entire statement was also not taken in its entirety. Further other than such statement, there was no further material available on record. Tribunal also recorded that from the document there was nothing to suggest that the entries pertained to loan and advances. Therefore no question of law arises and hence the appeal was dismissed.

CIT v. Golden Finance (2014) 220 Taxmann 162 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.69B : Amounts of investments not fully disclosed in books of account – Difference in the value of property shown in sale deed and as confirmed by seller – No evidence that witness gave false statement – Addition was held to be justified

1150

Difference in value of property as mentioned in sale deed and as confirmed by seller and seller had also filed an affidavit confirming said facts. On cross examination, he had confirmed his said statements and moreover, he had declared income from sale of property and paid tax. Differential treated as unexplained investment of assessee (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. P. M. Aboobacker (2014) 363 ITR 447 / 270 CTR 217 / 225 Taxman 178 (Mag.) / 107 DTR 383 (Ker.)(HC)

S.69B : Amounts of investments not fully disclosed in books of account – Stocks – Bank – Addition could not be made on account of difference between the quantity and value of stock shown in the books of account and that shown in a statement furnished to the banking authorities to avail higher credit facilities if satisfactory explanation provided

1151

The assessee-company was engaged in manufacturing of pipes. The Assessing Officer, having noticed that there was a difference between the quantity and value of stock as shown in the books of account and that shown to the bank, asked the assessee to explain it. The assessee in its reply stated that the difference was for the purpose of availing a credit facility from the bank. The Assessing Officer, having noted all these facts added the differential amount in both the statements to the income of the assessee under section 69B. On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the action of the Assessing Officer. On second appeal, the Tribunal considered various decisions and held that the addition could not be made on account of difference between the quantity and value of stock shown in the books of account and that shown in a statement furnished to the banking authorities to avail higher credit facilities. On appeal to the High Court, it upheld the order of the Tribunal and held that if for the purpose of fulfilling the margin requirements of the bank purely on inflated estimate basis, when the stock statement had reflected inflated value of the stock, in wake of otherwise satisfactory explanation, both for the purpose of value as well as quantity, there is no reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. (AY. 2009-10)

CIT v. Riddhi Steel and Tubes Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 148 (Guj.)(HC)

Section 69C : Unexplained expenditure, etc.

S.69C : Unexplained expenditure – Amounts not forming part of books of account – No supporting material as to their source – Addition justified

1152

Dismissing the appeal of assessee the Court held that section 69C would take in its sweep, not only expenditure which was reflected in the books of account but also other items of expenditure regarding which no proper explanation is forthcoming from the assessee, once they were discovered in the course of search and seizure. Therefore, the

assessee was not entitled to claim deductions or allowances in respect of amounts which were found as unaccounted cash payments in the course of search under the resultant block assessment.

Srinivasa Ferro Alloys Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 368 ITR 424 / 231 Taxmann 60 / 272 CTR 192 (T&AP)(HC)

1153 S.69C : Unexplained expenditure – No allegation that either purchase of raw material or production was found unrecorded – There was some variation in electricity consumption – No addition can be made on account of unaccounted production and gross profit on unaccounted sales

Assessing Officer made additions on two account, first in respect of unaccounted purchases and second addition was with regard to gross profit on unaccounted sales. AO was of the view that the average consumption of electricity per quintal exceeded and therefore there was unaccounted production of castor oil. CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal. Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal held that once the books have been prepared on the basis of the bills and vouchers and there is no allegation that either the purchase of raw-material or production was found unrecorded, then there was no reason for an addition, that too on presumptions. Considering the totality of the book result it can also be opined that if no discrepancy is found in the average consumption of production and the book results are based upon the details of manufacturing activity, etc. then also there was no reason for such a presumptive addition. On further appeal by revenue, High Court dismissed the appeal. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Paras Agro Products (2014) 222 Taxmann 60 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

1154 S.69C : Unexplained expenditure – Proviso to section 69C does not apply retrospectively

As per the notes on clauses accompanying the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 1998 which was inserted in the proviso to sec 69C and CBDT circular No. 772 dated 23rd Dec, 1998 w.e.f AY. 1999-2000, the expenditure incurred is explained but in the absence of the details about the source of income, the same shall not be allowed as deduction under any income. (AY. 1886-87, 1996-97)

Ram Gopal Varma v. Dy. CIT (2013) 357 ITR 493 / (2014) 265 CTR 79 / 220 Taxmann 84 (Mag.)(AP)(HC)

1155 S.69C : Unexplained expenditure – Marriage of two daughters – Addition was held to be not justified merely on estimate basis

The AO found that during the year under consideration, marriage of two daughters of the assessee were solemnised but the assessee failed to furnish complete details as regards various expenditures on the marriage/engagement ceremonies. The AO deduced that the assessee had incurred more than the declared expenditure on the ceremonies and thus estimated the expenditure considering the gifts received by the daughters and made addition on account of unexplained and undisclosed expenditure. In appeal CIT(A) deleted the addition. Tribunal also affirmed the order of CIT(A). On appeal by revenue the Court held that when the CIT(A) and the Tribunal has concurrently appreciated the

entire evidence on record and have returned concurrent findings against the revenue, deleting addition under sec. 69C, there is no illegality or perversity leading to any substantial question of law. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Babulal Agarwal (2014) 97 DTR 284 (Raj.)(HC)

S.69C : Unexplained expenditure – Discrepancy in stock – Rejection of books of account – Addition confirmed by the Tribunal was held to be reasonable 1156

The Assessing Officer, from the material available on record had found that there was negative stock in case of assessee from time to time. After confronting assessee with such figures and calling for his explanation, he believed that there was huge discrepancies in the stock available with the assessee which the assessee could not reconcile. For the entire year under consideration, he took aggregate of such negative stock valued at ₹ 47,72,525/- and added the entire amount as “unexplained stock” representing unexplained investment made by assessee under section 69C of the Act. Aggrieved, assessee went in appeal before the CIT(A) who rejected the appeal. On appeal to Tribunal, it gave substantial relief to the assessee and reduced the addition to ₹ 3,00,000. The Tribunal noted that the discrepancies noted by the AO were not clarified before the AO. Therefore it would be reasonable and proper for the AO to reject the book results of the assessee and to make reasonable addition considering the history of the assessee. Tribunal noted that without purchases there couldn't be any sales. Since the stock during the course of the proceedings was found to be negative, therefore, it could be presumed that the same was sold outside the books of account. The entire amount of the negative balance would not be treated as unexplained expenditure. The profit could be computed on the basis of sales made by the assessee. Tribunal noted that the assessee produced all the books of account and sales and purchase vouchers before the AO for verification. The profit rate of the assessee in the assessment year is better as compared with the earlier years. The Tribunal held that ends of justice would be met if lump sum addition of ₹ 3,00,000/- is maintained as against the addition made by the authorities below. The High Court confirmed the Tribunal order.

CIT v. Jhaveri Industries (2014) 220 Taxmann 70 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.69C : Unexplained expenditure – Mere increase in consumption of fuel – Addition cannot be made for alleged undisclosed production 1157

Assessee was engaged in manufacturing and trading of glazed tiles. Assessing Officer noticing that fuel consumption increased abnormally in relevant assessment year in comparison to increase in production, computed unaccounted production and made addition – Whether in absence of any material to show that assessee actually produced quantity more than what had been disclosed in books of account, variation in amount of consumption of fuel did not by itself, empower Assessing Officer to assume some undisclosed production and thereby make addition to result disclosed by regularly maintained books of account. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

Century Tiles Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (2014) 33 ITR 230 / (2015) 152 ITD 327 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

1158 **S.69C : Unexplained expenditure – Cash vouchers – Addition was confirmed in earlier year – Once again addition cannot be made for the relevant year. [S.68]**

An addition was made as unexplained cash receipt on ground that assessee company was unable to explain some cash vouchers. Said sum was being repaid by assessee. Revenue sought to add said sum under section 69C for relevant assessment year. Addition having already been made in respect of cash vouchers in earlier year in hands of assessee, there was no scope or merit in sustaining another addition for current year on basis of same vouchers. (AY. 2008-09)

Alliance Finstock Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 739 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 70 : Set off of loss from one source against income from another source under the same head of income

1159 **S.70 : Set off of loss – One source against income from another source under same head of income – Loss arising on short-term capital assets can be set off against income arising from such assets for same year**

It has been held by the Appellate Tribunal that the assessee has an option to adjust the loss arising on a Short Term Capital Asset against the income arising from such assets for the same year, irrespective of whether the transactions are categorized as 'off market transactions' or 'on market transactions' (AY. 2008-09).

ADIT v. Legg Mason Asia (Ex Japan) Analyst Fund (2014) 61 SOT 277 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 71 : Set off of loss from one head against income from another

1160 **S.71 : Set off of loss – Business loss – Set off against income from house property – Lease of entire factory premises – Rejection of case of assessee that it was still carrying on business activity – Disallowance of set off of business loss against income from house property – Held to be justified. [S.28(i)]**

The assessee gave its complete production facility on rent and entered into a lease agreement with a company allowing it to utilise the buildings with the land and received the total rental income. Against the rental income under the head "Income from house property" the assessee claimed a deduction of under section 24. The AO held that as there was no business or manufacturing activity carried out during the assessment year the claim of business loss could not be set off against the income shown under the head of House property. The CIT(A) concurred with the findings of the AO. The Tribunal confirmed the orders passed by the AO as well as the CIT(A). On appeal High Court affirmed the finding of Tribunal. (AY. 2009-10)

Phelix Appliances Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 366 ITR 574 / 227 Taxman 36 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

1161 **S.71 : Set off loss – One head against income from another – Profit on sale of business – Loss on transfer of land could not be set off against profits from sale of business – Two transactions were different. [S.28(i)]**

The assessee purchased a unit from Hindustan Polymers in the year 1978. For expansion of the polymer business, it purchased industrial land in the financial year 1994-95. Subsequently, the assessee realised that the polymer business was not a prudent venture

and sold the manufacturing unit as a going concern. In the said transaction, it earned a profit. In land transaction it incurred a capital loss. Assessee carried forward the capital loss. The AO held that the transaction was one and the same and, therefore, the loss suffered while surrendering the land had to be set off towards profit earned in the sale of the going concern. Therefore, the Assessing Authority disallowed the claim of the assessee to carry forward capital loss. On appeal the Assessing Officer was directed to treat the capital loss arising out of the surrender of the industrial land to be carried forward as capital loss independently. This was confirmed by the Tribunal. On appeal to the High Court, held, that the properties were separate and distinct. Admittedly, no industrial activity was carried on in the land at G. It was surrendered when it was of no use to the assessee. The transactions were with two distinct persons. As they were two independent transactions, the loss sustained in one transaction could not be set off against the profit made in the other transaction. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. McDowell and Co. Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 699 (Karn.)(HC)

S.72 : Carry forward and set off of business losses – Closed down business losses set off against income from new business

1162

Assessee closed down its steel mill and thereafter, started new business of rake handling. It claimed carry forward and set off of accumulated losses pertaining to steel business against income from rake business. Assessing Officer disallowed brought forward loss on ground that carried forward loss related to such business, which was not carried on during year under consideration. Tribunal allowed set off recording a finding that business of assessee remained same as there was unity of control and common management. On further appeal it was held that mere fact that loss related to business which was closed down would not make any difference because other conditions such as common management, unity of control or common control of business continued. In instant case business of assessee remained same because criterion was not nature of business but unity of control and common management of business. Thus, assessee was entitled to claim of set off of past losses against income of impugned assessment year. (AY. 1988-89).

CIT v. Ganga Corporation Asbestos (P) Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 582 / 269 CTR 313 / 104 DTR 305 (All.)(HC)

S.72 : Carry forward and set off of business losses – Commission income – Closed business – unity of management and control – Can be set off against any other business income

1163

Carry forward of losses of past years can be set off against the profits/income of any other business carried out by the assessee even if the business is different as determination test of unit of management and control is same in the case of both the business. Loss was allowed to be set off against commission income. (AY. 1988-89)

CIT v. Ganga Corporation Asbestos (P) Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 582 / 269 CTR 313 / 104 DTR 305 (All.)(HC)

1164 **S.72 : Carry forward and set off of business losses – Business losses in respect of 100 per cent EOU can be set off against profit of other units.**

The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal held that the Business Loss and Depreciation Loss arise in respect of 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU) can be set off against profits derived from other units. (AY. 2005-06)

DCIT v. Gloster Jute Mills Ltd. (2014) 33 ITR 322 / (2015) 67 SOT 21 (Kol.)(Trib.)

1165 **S.72A : Carry forward and set off of accumulated loss – Amalgamation – Co-operative society – Amalgamating co-operative society cannot carry forward and set off its accumulated losses against profits of the amalgamated co-operative society. [S.72]**

There were four co-operative societies in which the State Government had substantial shareholding. An administrative decision was taken by the State Government to amalgamate all the co-operative societies into the assessee co-operative society. After the amalgamation, a return was filed wherein the assessee claimed to carry forward the losses of those societies so that the same could be set off against the profits of the assessee under the provisions of section 72. The AO held that since these four societies were not in existence, their accumulated losses could not have been carried forward or adjusted against the profits of the assessee society. The Tribunal as well as the HC confirmed the order of AO. On appeal by the assessee to the Supreme Court, the latter held, dismissing the appeal, that:

All those four societies, upon their amalgamation into the appellant society, had ceased to exist and the registration of those societies had been cancelled. In these circumstances, those societies had no right under the provisions of the Act to file a return to get their earlier losses adjusted against the income of a different legal personality, i.e., the appellant society. So far as companies are concerned, there is a specific provision in the Act that upon amalgamation of one company with another, losses of the amalgamating companies can be carried forward and the amalgamated company can set losses off against its profits subject to the provisions of the Act. This is permissible by virtue of section 72A of the Act but there was no such provision in the case of co-operative societies. The submission made by the assessee with regard to discrimination and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India would thus not help the assessee. The societies and companies belonged to different classes and simply because both had a distinct legal personality, it could not be said that both must be given the same treatment. In view of aforesaid, the appeal was dismissed.

Rajasthan R. S. S. & Ginning Mills Fed. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 564 / 223 Taxmann 259 /268 CTR 225 (SC)

1166 **S.73 : Losses in speculation business – Company – Memorandum of Association showing assessee as an investment company – Assessment as investment company for several years – Income from share – dealing more than income from investment in some years – Not a ground for treating loss as speculation loss**

Held, dismissing the appeal that the finding of the Tribunal, which was based on the reading of a memorandum of association of the company that its principal business was finance and granting loans and advances was correct. The Assessing Officer compared the income received from investment and financing activity and ultimately held that the

assessee's business was mainly in share dealing and it was a speculative business. When the findings of the Tribunal remained unchallenged and the earlier years' assessments remained intact treating the loss as business loss, the Tribunal had rightly drawn the conclusion as to the nature of business on the basis of memorandum. (AY. 1997-98, 1998-99)

CIT v. Ashley Services Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 209/105 DTR 166 (2015) 229 Taxmann 620 (Mad.)(HC)

S.73 : Losses in speculation business – Carry forward and set off – Gross total income mainly consists of income chargeable under head capital gains or income from other sources – Deeming fiction cannot be applicable – Loss cannot be treated as speculation loss.

1167

Whether assessee was in business of advancing loans and earning interest is not to be concluded by one isolated instance. The gross total income of assessee mainly consisted of income chargeable under head “Capital gains” or “Income from other sources”. Therefore, deeming fiction not applicable and loss cannot be treated as speculation loss. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 2000-01)

CIT v. Paranjay Mercantile Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 462 / 105 DTR 116 / 223 Taxmann 10 (Guj.)(HC)

S.73 : Losses in speculation business – Speculation loss on transactions in derivatives can be set off against the gains of delivery shares. [S.43(5)]

1168

Assessee, a share broker, entered into derivatives in which it suffered losses. The said losses constituted “speculation loss” (prior to the exclusion of derivatives from the ambit of speculative transactions under clause (d) of s. 43 (5) w.e.f. AY 2006-07). The assessee claimed that the said speculation loss was eligible to be set-off against the income arising out of purchase and sale of shares. The Tribunal upheld the claim of the assessee. On appeal by the department to the Tribunal HELD dismissing the appeal: Under the Explanation to s. 73 where any part of the business of a company consists in the purchase and sale of shares of other companies, such company shall, for the purposes of the section, be deemed to be carrying on a speculation business to the extent to which the business consists of the purchase and sale of such shares. Therefore, the entire transaction carried out by the assessee was within the umbrella of speculative transaction. There was, as such, no bar in setting off the loss arising out of derivatives from the income arising out of buying and selling of shares.(AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Baljit Securities Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 470 /224 Taxmann 45 (Cal) (HC)

S.73 : Losses in speculation business – Losses on account of purchase and sale of shares – Speculation loss – Set off against income from other sources. [S.56]

1169

Loss on account of purchase and sale of shares be set off against profits earned from other sources if transaction did not constitute business carried on by assessee. (AY. 1991-92)

CIT v. Orient Instrument P. Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 182/(2015) 228 Taxmann 136(Mag.) (Delhi) (HC)

Section 74 : Losses in speculation business

- 1170 **S.74 : Losses – Capital gains – Derivatives – Loss incurred from transaction in derivatives by assessee, being sub-account FII, could not be treated as business loss rather it was to be considered as short-term capital loss which was eligible for adjustment against short-term capital gain arising from sale of shares. [Ss.43(5), 115AD(1)(b)]**

Following the judgment of Tribunal in *Platinum Investment Management Ltd. v. Dy. DIT (IT) in [2013] 33 taxman.com 298 (Mum. Trib.)* the Tribunal held that loss incurred from transaction in derivatives by assessee, being sub-account FII, could not be treated as business loss rather it was to be considered as short-term capital loss which was eligible for adjustment against short-term capital gain arising from sale of shares and held that CIT(A) was not justified in holding that income from Index based or non-Index based derivatives be treated as “business income”, whether speculative or non-speculative. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside by holding that income from derivative transaction resulting into loss of ₹ 11.27 crore is to be considered as short-term capital loss on the sale of securities which is eligible for adjustment against short-term capital gains arising from the sale of shares. Accordingly, the income arising from transaction in derivative by assessee(s), being sub-account FII cannot be treated as business profit or loss. section 115AD(1)(b). (AY. 2006-07)

Platinum Asset Management Ltd. v. Dy. DIT(IT) (2014) 61 SOT 119 / (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 80 G : Deduction in respect of donations to certain funds, charitable institutions, etc.

- 1171 **S.80G : Donation – In order to get recognition u/s. 80G, mere registration u/s. 12A is not sufficient. [S.12A]**

The assessee filed an application seeking registration u/s. 12A. This application was rejected by the Director on the ground that one of the objects of the trust was establishment of small scale industries and carrying on commercial activities and therefore the assessee was not entitled to the registration. The Tribunal took a view that the objects of the trust were charitable in nature and thus granted registration. In the meantime, the assessee had filed an application before the Director seeking recognition u/s. 80G. As the application filed for registration u/s. 12A had been rejected, the said application came to be dismissed by the Director. The Tribunal, while granting registration u/s. 12A, also granted recognition u/s. 80G on the ground that once registration was granted u/s. 12A as a consequential order, recognition u/s. 80G was to be granted.

The question of law that arose for consideration before the High Court was whether grant of recognition u/s. 80G is automatic on the assessee being granted registration u/s. 12A. The High Court held that both these provisions are exclusive. In order to obtain recognition u/s. 80G, mere registration u/s. 12A is not sufficient. Further, the assessee has to satisfy the requirement mentioned u/s. 80G. Though grant of registration u/s. 12A is a condition precedent, unless the conditions stipulated in section 80G are fulfilled, the recognition u/s. 80G cannot be granted. In that view of the matter, that portion

of the order is erroneous and required to be set aside. Accordingly, the matter was remitted to the Director for consideration of the application for recognition u/s. 80G, in accordance with the law, and then for appropriate orders to be passed.

DIT(E) v. Sri Jain Educational Social Cultural Welfare Charitable Trust (2014) 227 Taxmann 24 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

S.80G : Donation – Granting exemption only object of trust is required to be examined – Approval cannot be rejected on the ground that it failed to incur expenditure to the extent of 85 per cent of its income during the relevant year

1172

At the time of granting approval of exemption u/s. 80G, only the object of the trust is required to be examined and, therefore, the assessee's application seeking approval u/s. 80G(5) cannot be rejected on the ground that it failed to incur expenditure to the extent of 85 per cent of its income during the relevant year. (AY. 2012-13)

CIT v. Shree Govindbhai Jethalal Nathavani Charitable Trust (2014) 227 Taxmann 27 (Mag.) (2015) 373 ITR 6195 (Guj.)(HC)

S.80G : Donation – Mere registration of the society cannot disentitle the assessee from renewal of exemption [S.12A]

1173

Where a society was formed by an assessee trust with the same name as that of its trust, mere registration of the society cannot disentitle the assessee from renewal of exemption claimed for its trust u/s. 80G. Appeal of revenue was dismissed.

CIT v. RKM Educational and Charitable Trust (2014) 227 Taxmann 25(Mag.) (P&H)(HC)

S.80G : Donation – Deductions can be claimed for donation as well as exemption under section 10A. [S.10A]

1174

The assessee made a donation of a certain amount, which was debited to its 'K' Unit. In the computation of income, entire donations paid were added back to income of 'K' unit and exemption under section 10A was claimed on the entire income of 'K' Unit the AO opined that once donations debited in the Profit and Loss Account were added back to the Net Profit of the 'K' Unit, it became the income of 'K' Unit on which exemption under section 10A had been allowed. Hence, claiming deduction under section 80G in respect of donation amount would amount to claiming double deduction for a single outgo. The Tribunal, however held that section 10A was an exemption section whereas section 80G was a deduction section and therefore there would be no double deduction of the same item, even if a benefit under both the sections had been claimed. Therefore, the Tribunal held that donation amount qualified for deduction under section 80G. On appeal to the HC, the Court concurred with Tribunal's view. It observed that as the entire income from the 'K' Unit was exempted from tax, debiting the donation in the first instance and adding it back subsequently made no difference. The entire income was exempted. Therefore the deduction under section 80G is claimed from the total income excluding the income of 'K' Unit and in law, the assessee is entitled to the said benefit.

CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 714/ 223 Taxmann 469 / 270 CTR 523 (Karn.)(HC)

1175 **S.80G : Donation – Object of Trust – Statute does not require that a charitable trust carry out all activities mentioned in the object clause of the trust [S.80G(5)(vi)]**

The main objective of the assessee trust was to establish hospitals and impart medical treatments. However, during the year the assessee carried out the organization of yoga camps. The assessee trust's claim for recognition under section 80G(5)(vi), was rejected by the Revenue. The Tribunal held that assessee had carried out activities for the organisation of yoga campus, which formed part of the objects of the assessee trust. Therefore, such activity was charitable in nature and he granted recognition to assessee under section 80G(5)(vi). On an appeal by Revenue, the HC held that it was clear that an important circumstance which weighed with him was that the assessee was not carrying out all the activities mentioned in the objects clause of the trust. Now, *ex facie* statute does not require that the assessee carry out all the activities mentioned in the objects clause. The fact that the assessee was carrying on the activity of conducting Yoga camps was not in dispute and hence, the assessee trust's claim for recognition under section 80G(5)(vi) could not be rejected.

CIT v. Vihangam Yoga Prachar and Social Welfare Trust (2014) 223 Taxmann 16 (All.)(HC)

1176 **S.80G : Donation – Community hall – Possibility of using for commercial purposes – Refusal of application was held to be not valid**

The Commissioner declined the application of the assessee-institution for grant of approval for purpose of section 80G on the ground that since the assessee had spent ₹ 49.54 lakhs for purchase of land and construction of a community hall, the use of such a community hall for commercial purposes could not be ruled out. Tribunal held that where there was a possibility that assessee-institution would engage in commercial activity with help of community centre which assessee was building, this possibility could not be reason enough to decline assessee's application by Commissioner for grant of approval under section 80G. Matter remanded.

Mahor Vaish (Mahajan) Sewa Sansthan v. CIT (2015) 67 SOT 57 (Agra)(Trib.)

1177 **S.80G : Donation – Copy of registration was not available – Cannot be the ground for denial of recognition under section 80G [S.12A]**

Tribunal held that merely because copy of registration under section 12A was not available with assessee and Revenue was not able to trace file and copy of registration, it could not be said that assessee was not eligible for recognition under section 80G, when the assessee filing the returns as charitable institution before DIT (E) and revenue dept. *Andhra Pradesh Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Trade v. DIT (2014) 31 ITR 244 / 2015) 152 ITD 279 (Hyd.)(Trib.)*

1178 **S.80G : Donation – Foreign national – Application for renewal cannot be rejected on the ground that director of company is a foreign national who has signed the application and without giving an opportunity to rectify the curable defects. [Ss.2(15), 12A]**

The assessee filed an application for renewal of approval granted under section 80G. The Director (Exemption) rejected said application on grounds that two of the directors of the assessee company were foreign Nationals therefore such persons were not allowed

to perform work of trustees of a charitable institution in India and that application for renewal was verified and signed by incompetent person.

Though the application for renewal of approval u/s. 80G(5)(vi) was signed by the Chartered Accountant of the assessee, form 10G annexed to the formal application has been verified and signed by one of the directors of the assessee. The view of the DIT (Exemption) that the defect is not curable is against the settled principle of law as the DIT has not granted any opportunity to the assessee to either rectify or to explain the so called defect in the application. Therefore, the said technical objection is not sustainable. The objection of foreign national being the directors of the assessee, there is no such requirement or condition u/s. 80G(5) that the institution or fund should not have any director of foreign national. section 80G(5)(v) stipulates the conditions for eligibility to the donations for deduction. When no such objection was raised at the time of granting the earlier registration, not once but at four occasions and under different provisions of Income tax Act as well as under Companies Act, then the objections raised by the DIT(E) are not sustainable. Denial was held to be not valid.

GLA India v. DIT (E) (2014) 146 ITD 238 /161 TTJ 391/101 DTR 115 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 80HH : Deduction in respect of profits and gains from newly established industrial undertakings or hotel business in backward areas.

S.80HH : Newly established industrial undertakings – Computation – Exclusion of certain incomes not qualifying for deduction – Net incomes to be excluded. [Ss. 80I, 80IA.] 1179

Held, that in computing the special deductions under sections 80-I, 80-IA and 80HH net incomes not derived from industrial undertaking should be excluded. Applied the ratio in *ACG Associated Capsules P. Ltd. v. CIT* [2012] 343 ITR 89 (SC).

CIT v. Nirma Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 12/52 taxmann.com 88 (Guj.)(HC)

S.80HH : Newly established industrial undertakings – Back ward areas – Depreciation – Unabsorbed loss – No positive income, assessee was not entitled to any deduction under sections 80HH & 80I. [Ss.32, 72, 80I] 1180

After allowing depreciation, unabsorbed loss and unabsorbed depreciation, there was no positive income and thus the assessee was not entitled to any deduction under sections 80HH & 80I. (AY. 1998-99, 1990-91, 1992-93)

Vijay Solvex Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 382 / 266 CTR 113 / 223 Taxmann 192 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)

Editorial: SLP is granted [SLA(C) No. 4129 of 2015 dated 13-3-2015] Vijay Solvex Ltd. v. CIT (2015) 231 Taxmann 229 (SC)

S.80HH : Newly established industrial undertakings – Derived – Scrap – Income from sale of scrap generated from manufacturing activity – Entitled to deduction 1181

Since scrap generated from the three units had direct and immediate nexus with the industrial undertaking and was generated from the manufacturing process itself, section 80HH benefit was to be allowed. (AY. 1993-94, 1994-95)

CIT v. Modi Xerox Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 200/ 226 Taxmann 152 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

- 1182 **S.80HH : Newly established industrial undertakings – Non-submission of Audit Report in Form-10C along with Return of Income – Only a technical default – Deduction allowable – Form was submitted during rectification proceedings – Deduction allowable. [S.154, Form No.10C]**

AO disallowed the deduction u/s. 80HH by rectifying the assessment u/s. 154, on the ground that Audit Report in Form-10C was not submitted along with the Return of Income. Audit Report in Form-10C was submitted by assessee during the rectification proceedings. High Court held that non-submission of Audit Report in Form-10C was a mere technical default and assessee submitted the same during the rectification proceedings. Therefore, deduction allowable.

CIT v. A. W. Prod (2014) 220 Taxmann 70 (Mag.)(All.)(HC.)

- 1183 **S.80HH : Newly established industrial undertakings – Back ward areas – Crushing of granite boulders into small pieces amounts to production [Ss.80], 80IB]**

Crushing of granite boulders for bringing out graded metal of various sizes, which are used in construction activities, amounts to production. Special deductions can be granted under more than one provision of the Act. Special deductions under Chapter VI-A can be granted under more than one provision.

CIT v. Panachayil Industries (2014) 363 ITR 261/(2015) 228 Taxmann 209 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)

- 1184 **S.80HH : Newly established industrial undertakings – Interest from trade debtors on outstanding balance of credit sale – Part of income of assessee from industrial undertaking – Eligible for deduction under sections 80HH and 80-I. [S.80I]**

The assessee, an industrial undertaking, claimed deduction under sections 80HH and 80I on the amount of interest received from the trade debtors on the outstanding balance of credit sale. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of deduction. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the sale was integrated part of business run by the assessee and, therefore, the interest received on outstanding balance of credit sale had to be considered as income of industrial undertaking belonging to the assessee. He, therefore, held that the interest in question was income of the assessee from the industrial undertaking and was eligible for deduction under sections 80HH and 80I. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). On an appeal before the High Court, it held that the very source of interest received is as per terms of contract of sale of goods manufactured in the industrial undertaking. Hence, it is an inseparable part of the contract of sale. Consequently, it forms part of the income of the assessee from the industrial undertaking and is eligible for deduction under sections 80HH and 80I. (AY. 1992-93)

CIT v. Jindal Polyester and Steel Ltd. (2013) 221 Taxmann 30 (All.)(HC)

- 1185 **S.80HH: Newly established industrial undertakings – Manufacturing cement is eligible – Derived from – Profits attributable to mining of lime used as raw material in manufacture of cement would not qualify the deduction under section 80H**

The connotation of the words “derived from” is narrower as compared to that of the words “attributable to”. The words “derived from” must be understood as something which has a direct or immediate nexus with the assessee’s industrial undertaking.

When the Legislature has excluded the mining activity with specific words, this has to be accepted.

Therefore, the assessee was entitled to deduction only with respect to the profits attributable to the manufacture of cement and not with respect to profits attributable to the mining activity. The profits derived from the cement manufacturing activity could be apportioned in order to find out the profit derived from the mining activity. (AY. 1997-98)

Deccan Cements Ltd v. CIT (2014) 360 ITR 444 / 268 CTR 212 / 103 DTR 57 (AP)(HC)

S.80HH : Newly established industrial undertakings – Computation of profits – Market value – Determination of value of raw material to be made taking in to account cost at nearest available place, cost of transportation and local taxes. [S.80-I(8)] 1186

The determination of the market value for the purpose of the Explanation to s. 80-I(8) would arise in a situation where there is an absence of a market. Therefore, one would have to hypothetically assume the existence of a market and what goods would be available there. For this purpose, the cost of the goods available at the nearest market would have to be reckoned and to that the cost of expenses such as transportation, local taxes, etc., has to be added. These inputs would have to be added to the cost of the goods available at the nearest market. A hypothetical assumption would have to be made by the AO with reference to the cost of the goods as available at the nearest market.

CIT v. Wipro Ltd. (No.1) (2014) 360 ITR 606/224 Taxmann 220(Mag)(Karn.)(HC)

S.80HH : Newly established industrial undertakings – Consistency – Not eligible deduction – Unit was modernised and there was new Industrial undertaking. 1187

Claim of deduction u/s. 80HH and s. 80I for assessment year 1985-86 was denied because of a finding that existing unit had been modernised and there was no new undertaking. In the absence of new evidence for assessment years 1986-87 and 1987-88, Assessee was held not entitled to deductions under sections 80HH and 80I for those years as well. (AY. 1986-87, 1987-88, 1992-93)

CIT v. Wipro Ltd. (No.2) (2014) 360 ITR 658 / 222 Taxmann 181 (Karn.)(HC)

Section 80HHA : Deduction in respect of profits and gains from newly established small-scale industrial undertakings in certain areas.

S.80HHA : Newly established small-scale industrial undertakings – Interest earned on fixed deposits placed out of business compulsion is “derived” from the undertaking. [S.80 IA] 1188

Income earned from fixed deposit placed for business purpose cannot be treated as income from other source but must be seen as part of the assessee's business income. In the present case also the assessee was compelled to park a part of its funds in fixed deposits under the insistence of the financial institutions and therefore the income received thereupon cannot be termed to be income from other sources. (AY. 1991-92)

Empire Pumps Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 229 Taxmann 379 (Guj.)(HC)

1189 **S.80HHB : Projects outside India – More than one project – Deduction is available to each project separately**

The assessee was having more than 50 projects in India and outside India. The assessee claimed deduction in respect of each overseas project separately. The AO allowed the relief on the basis of netting up of all the overseas projects. Tribunal decided in favour of assessee. On appeal by revenue the Court affirmed the view of tribunal and held that deduction could be made in respect of each unit and the same was not prohibited by section 80HHB(1) (AY. 1984-85)

CIT v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 733 /230 Taxmann 555 (Bom.)(HC)

1190 **S.80HHB : Projects outside India – Supply of material and labour by third party contractor – Assessee to supply designs, drawings and other technical inputs – Eligible deduction [S.80HHBA]**

The AO disallowed claim u/s. 80HHB and 80HHBA of the assessee observing that merely giving consultancy or supervising the design of project or making work cost effective could not be said execution of any project. On appeal, the CIT(A) recorded finding that assessee was not merely providing consultancy services, but was also providing engineering services to projects namely, construction, supervision and other engineering services in execution of highway projects. He further found that there was combination of both the contractors - one, who supplied material and labour and the second, the assessee who rendered services in technical / consultancy / supervision field in completing the projects. The interdependence of both aspects was essential for the completion of project and one cannot stand without other. Both the physical as well as technical aspects of the project are equally important and one cannot be separated from the other. It was, therefore, impossible to say that assessee was not involved in executions of the entire project, both for the purpose of section 80HHB and for section 80HHBA. The Tribunal affirmed the order of the CIT(A). High Court upheld the decision of Tribunal. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats (P) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 28 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

1191 **S.80HHB : Projects outside India – Definition of foreign project – Planning and designing executed as a single integral work order – Deduction is available**

The assessee was engaged in assembly, reassembly, installation, renovation, continuous updating of machines, plants, mechanical, electronic and air-conditioning systems on board foreign vessels mostly while the vessels were sailing on the high seas with the help of highly efficient, quality conscious and competent technicians approved for the class of vessels they were to work on with the most modern computerised techniques. On receipt of orders the requirements of men, material, technology, cost and time was meticulously worked out, the plans got approved by principals, the equipment and technicians were carefully selected and got approved, the project was executed with a high degree of know-how, vigilant supervision and monitoring and maintenance of highest quality, efficiency, cost and time schedules was ensured. The workmen and

the work executed had to be approved by international agencies and certificate of seaworthiness of the vessel had to be obtained at every port. Held, assessee was entitled to deduction u/s. 80HHB. Order of Tribunal was reversed.

Maritime Overseas v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 434 /227 Taxmann 150 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)

Section 80HHC : Deduction in respect of profits retained for export business

S.80HHC : Export business – Duty Entitlement Pass Book(DEPB) – Turnover exceeding ₹ 10 Crores – Computation of higher profits. [S.28(iiid), 28(iiie)] 1192

Where an assessee had an export turnover of exceeding ₹ 10 Crores and had made profits on transfer of Duty Entitlement Pass Book under clause (iiid) of section 28 he would not get benefit of addition to export profits under provision to section 80HHC(3), on the contrary he would get benefit of exclusion of a smaller figure from ‘profits from business’ under Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC. In other words where the export turnover of an assessee exceeds ₹ 10 crores, he does not get benefit of addition of ninety per cent of export incentive under clause (iiid) of section 28 to his export profits, but he gets a higher figure of profits of business, which ultimately results in computation of a bigger export profit

Harnam Syntex (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 182 (Mag.)(SC)

S.80HHC : Export business – “turnover” – Sale proceeds of scrap is not “turnover” for s. 80HHC – Provision intended to encourage businessmen in order to bring more foreign exchange – Department should encourage such traders 1193

- (i) The word “turnover” means only the amount of sale proceeds received in respect of the goods in which an assessee is dealing in. So far as the scrap is concerned, the sale proceeds from the scrap may either be shown separately in the Profit and Loss Account or may be deducted from the amount spent by the manufacturing unit on the raw material. When such scrap is sold the sale proceeds of the scrap cannot be included in the term ‘turnover’ for the reason that the unit is engaged primarily in the manufacturing and selling of steel utensils and not scrap of steel. Therefore, the proceeds of such scrap would not be included in ‘sales’ in the Profit and Loss Account of the assessee. (The situation would be different in the case of a person who is primarily dealing in scrap).
- (ii) The intention behind enactment of s. 80HHC was to encourage export so as to earn more foreign exchange. For the said purpose the Government wanted to encourage businessmen, traders and manufacturers to increase the export so as to bring more foreign exchange in our country. If the purpose is to bring more foreign exchange and to encourage export, we are of the view that the legislature would surely like to give more benefit to persons who are making an effort to help our nation in the process of bringing more foreign exchange. If a trader or a manufacturer is trying his best to increase his exports, even at the cost of his business in a local market, we are sure that the Government would like to encourage such a person. In our opinion, once the Government decides to give some benefit to someone who is helping the nation in bringing foreign exchange, the Revenue should also make all

possible efforts to encourage such traders or manufacturers by giving such business units more benefits as contemplated under the provisions of law.

CIT v. Punjab Stainless Steel Industries (2014) 364 ITR 144/103 DTR 49/268 CTR 113/ (2015) 229 Taxmann 423 (SC)

CIT v. Punjab Stainless and steel Industries (2014) 364 ITR 144/ 103 DTR 49 (SC)

CIT v. Dhram Industries (2014)364 ITR 144/103 DTR 49 (SC)

1194 **S.80HHC : Export business – Deduction allowable on gross total income – Before deduction of unabsorbed losses and carried forward depreciation. [Ss.5, 80AB, 80B(5), 80HHA]**

According to the assessee, the deduction of the amount covered under section 80HHC can be done at the threshold, i.e., before deduction of unabsorbed losses or carried forward depreciation are effected. The assessing authority did not agree with the contention and by placing reliance upon section 80HH directed the deduction under section 80HHC at a later stage. This was confirmed by the Tribunal but the Tribunal allowed the claim as claimed by the assessee. On appeal:

Held, dismissing the appeal, that from the point of view of the assessee, the stage at which the deduction is to be made, would make substantial difference. If the deduction components, such as current or carried forward depreciation and whether fresh or unabsorbed losses are to be made at the threshold the assessee would stand to lose. If, on the other hand, the deduction of such amounts is made after the other deductions, he would stand to benefit. In a given case, he may be able to carry forward the unabsorbed loss or depreciation, if the deduction is made at a stage where the income gets down sized on account of deduction of other amounts. Once the deduction under section 80HHC is to be made from the total income, there may not be any justification to insist that it shall be the first of all the deductions. If that were to be so, Parliament would have employed the expression “gross total income” under section 80HHC also, instead of the expression “total income”. Once the deduction is to be made from the total income, in contradistinction to the gross total income, the assessee must be given the facility, as to the stage of deduction. Law provides the assessee, the freedom to arrange his affairs in a manner, which is beneficial to him, as long as the same is not prohibited by or is contrary to any provision of an enactment. (AY. 1993-94)

CIT v. Sri Krishna Drugs Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 365 / 52 taxmnn.com 442 (T&AP)(HC)

1195 **S.80HHC : Export business – Computation – Turnover – Service charges must be included in total turn over and ninety percent of service charges would be excluded for arriving at profits of business**

Held, allowing the appeal, that service charges would be included in the total turnover and 90 per cent. of the service charges shall be excluded from the gross total income for arriving at the profits of the business for calculating the deduction under section 80HHC of the Act. (AY. 2000-01)

CIT v. Nahar Spinning Mills Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 467 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 538 (P&H) (HC)

S.80HHC : Export business – Counter sales – Deduction available in respect of counter sales against foreign currency 1196

The assessee is entitled to the deduction under section 80HHC of the Act, in respect of countersales against foreign currency. Followed, *CIT v. Silver and Arts Palace [2003] 259 ITR 684 (SC) (AY. 1990-91)*

CIT v. Oswal Exports (2014) 369 ITR 630 (All.)(HC)

S.80HHC : Export business – Industrial undertakings – Depreciation – Block of assets – Eligible deduction – Despite the introduction of ‘block of assets’ depreciation cannot be thrust on the assessee while computing quantum of eligible deduction [Ss.2(11), 32,80IA] 1197

The High Court had to be consider whether for computing the profits eligible for deduction u/s. 80HHC and 80IA, depreciation (under the concept of ‘block of assets’) had to be deducted even though the assessee had not claimed the same. The department relied on the judgement of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in *Plastiblends India Ltd. v. ACIT (2009) 318 ITR 352 (FB) (Bom.) (HC)* where it was held that for the purposes of deduction under Chapter VIA, the gross total income has to be computed *inter alia* by deducting the deductions allowable under sections 30 to 43D of the Act, including depreciation allowable under section 32 of the Act, even though the assessee has computed the total income under Chapter IV by disclaiming the current depreciation. HELD by the Gujarat High Court taking a different view:

Depreciation is optional to the assessee and once he chooses not to claim it, the Assessing Officer cannot allow it while computing the income. Further, once depreciation is optional, it will be optional for block of assets also. It is not necessary that the depreciation is allowable or not allowable as a whole. The assessee can claim it partly also in respect of certain block of assets and not claim in respect of other block of assets. Accordingly, for purposes of sections 80HHC and 80IA, depreciation not claimed for by the assessee cannot be allowed as a deduction despite the introduction of the concept of block of assets.

DCIT v. Sun Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2015) 122 DTR 223 (Guj.)(HC)

S.80HHC : Export business – Total turnover – Excise duty and sales tax should be excluded 1198

High court also held that excise duty and sales tax should be excluded from total turnover for purpose of calculation of deduction under section 80HHC. Also, income from windmill should be excluded from turnover for computation of deduction under section 80HHC. (AY. 1995-96, 1997-98, 2001-02)

CIT v. Hitech Arai Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 577 / 227 Taxmann 216 (Mag.) (2015) 116 DTR 398 (Mad.)(HC)

S.80HHC : Export business – Fluctuation of rate of exchange – Amount earned on account of fluctuation of rate of foreign exchange – Gains derived from export – Entitled to special deduction 1199

High Court held that the income from foreign exchange fluctuations could be considered for calculating profits for special deduction under section 80HHC

CIT v. Alps Chemicals P. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 594 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 388 (Guj.)(HC)

1200 **S.80HHC : Export business – Assessee entitled to claim proportionate indirect expenses in respect of its two units – Remand for recomputation in the light of decision of Special Bench was held to be proper**

Held that in so far as the question whether the assessee was entitled to claim proportionate indirect expenses only in respect of the unit which was carrying on export activity whereas the assessee was carrying business in two units, the Tribunal relied upon decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal at Mumbai and only remanded the matter to the AO to decide the issue in the light of the judgment. No meaningful argument had been advanced to assail the findings of the Tribunal in this regard or to show that the decision of the Special Bench as affirmed by the Bombay High Court had been reversed. Thus, there was no infirmity in remitting the matter to the AO for recomputation in the light of the decision of the Special Bench in *Surendra Engg. Corporation v. ACIT (2003) 86 ITD 121(SB)(Mum.)(Trib).* (AY. 2000-2001)
CIT v. Malwa Cotton Spinning Mills Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 604 (2015) 55 taxmann.com 397 (P&H)(HC)

1201 **S.80HHC : Export business – Finding by Tribunal that export proceeds realised during period extended by competent authority – Tribunal remanding matter for recomputing amount which remained unrealized – Held to be proper**

Held that on the question whether the outstanding amount of export sale proceeds which remained pending had to be disallowed for purposes of calculation of benefit under section 80HHC, the plea of the assessee was that it had realised certain portion within the period extended by the competent authority. In terms of the certificate of the bank, out of the total outstanding export invoices the assessee realised a sum of ₹ 2,10,99,228 within the extended period. In view of this, the Tribunal had held that there was no justification for excluding a sum of ₹ 2,10,99,228 from the export turnover for computing the deduction under section 80HHC of the Act and remanded the issue to the AO for recomputing the amount which remained unrealised on account of export invoices even during the extended period from the export turnover for computing the deduction under section 80HHC. Thus, no error could be found in the decision of the Tribunal. (AY. 2000-2001)
CIT v. Malwa Cotton Spinning Mills Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 604 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 397 (P&H)(HC)

1202 **S.80HHC : Export business – Deduction to be computed on profits after reducing deduction allowable under 80-IB. [Ss.80IA(9), 80IB(13)]**

Held that the Tribunal was not correct in law in directing the Assessing Officer to compute the relief under section 80HHC without reducing the deduction eligible under section 80IA / 80IB disregarding the provisions of section 80IA(9) read with section 80IB(13). (AY. 2000-01)
CIT v. Malwa Cotton Spinning Mills Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 604 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 397 (P&H)(HC)

S.80HHC : Export business – Manufacture and export of Jewellery – Manufacture of Jewellery for others on jobwork basis – Integral part of dominant business activity of assessee – Job work charges are in nature of business receipts and form part of operational income – Includible in profits of business – Revision of order was held to be not justified [S.263]

1203

The AO treated the receipt of job charges by the assessee as part of the total turnover in the business of manufacture and export of jewellery. CIT was of the opinion that the job charges were not part of the turnover. He, accordingly, passed an order under section 263 setting aside the assessment order and directed the AO to pass a fresh assessment order. The Tribunal set aside the order passed by the Commissioner under section 263.

On appeal by the revenue the Court held that;

That there was no difference between the activity relating to export business and the job work carried out by the assessee. There was no difference between manufacture and export of jewellery on the one hand and manufacture of jewellery for others on job work basis. Therefore, the receipt by way of job work charges was an integral part of the dominant business activity. The only difference between regular manufacturing and processing for others was that the assessee did not own the goods processed by it in the case of job work. The expenses and efforts for the job charges were the same in relation to the regular manufacture on the assessee's own account. The assessee had not maintained a separate account for manufacturing and sale of jewellery on the one hand and job works undertaken by it. Therefore, it could not be said that the job work undertaken by the assessee was not an integral part of the business. The job work charges were in the nature of business receipts of the assessee and, therefore, formed part of the operational income and had to be included in the profits of business. Explanation (baa) cannot be invoked in every matter involving receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges, etc. These items of income have to be seen in the context of the business activity of the assessee. The charges credited by the assessee in its turnover were the proceeds of the manufacturing and job work charges carried on by the assessee which were part of its principal business. Therefore, the charges received by the assessee for the job works undertaken as in the nature understood in this case could not be held similar to the word "charges" provided in sub-clause (1) of clause (baa) of the Explanation given under section 80HHC. Thus, there was nothing to suggest that the Assessing Officer did not follow the formula as per the provisions of section 80HHC while computing the deduction. The order of the Assessing Officer was not prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Divya Jewellers P. Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 671/(2015)230 Taxmann 321 / 121 DTR 74 (All)(HC)

S.80HHC : Export business – Fixed deposit interest – Total turnover – Business income – Eligible deduction [S.28(i), 56]

1204

The assessee was mainly exporting gold jewellery through MMTC which is a Government undertaking. The assessee claimed interest on FDRs as a business income and claimed deduction under section 80HHC. The AO disallowed the interest in view of Explanation (baa) and treated the interest as income from other sources while computing the deduction under section 80HHC. On appeal High Court held that in view of the fact

that deposit of FDRs was part the integral business activity of the assessee and therefore interest accrued on FDRs was liable to be included in the total turnover. Income from interest cannot be assessed as income from other sources and has to be taken as an allowable deduction under section 80HHC. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (ITA No. 88 of 2009 dated 4-7-2014)(AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Divya Jewellers P. Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 671/(2015)230 Taxmann 321 (All.)(HC)

1205 **S.80HHC : Export business – Computation – Apportionment of expenses**

Where direct expenses were not attributable to exports exclusively, apportionment was to be done according to formula given under section 80HHC(3). (AY. 2001-02 to 2003-04) *CIT. v. Cavincare (P) Ltd. (2014) 268 CTR 167 / 226 taxman 101(Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)*

1206 **S. 80HHC : Export business – Profit on transfer of DEPB and DFRC – Constitutional validity – Doctrine of promissory estoppel – Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005, with retrospective effect from 1-4-1998 – Amendment within legislative competence of Parliament – Classification of assessees with export turnover of over ten crores of rupees and those with export turnover less than ten crores of rupees reasonable – Amendment not violative of article 14 or 19 of Constitution – Amendment with retrospective effect valid [Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19]**

Court held that;

- (i) The amendment in section 80HHC of the Act made by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005, did not suffer from lack of legislative competence of Parliament to legislate on the subject.
- (ii) That the classification of exporters on the basis of turnover of less than ₹ 10 crores and more than ₹ 10 crores is a valid classification based on intelligible differentia. Exporters having export turnover not exceeding ₹ 10 crores referable to the second proviso to section 80HHC(3) fall under one group while exporters having export turnover exceeding ₹ 10 crores referable to the third and fourth provisos to section 80HHC(3) fall under another group. Thus, the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes the exporters falling under one group (having export turnover not exceeding ₹ 10 crores) from those who fall under another group (exporters having export turnover exceeding ₹ 10 crores). The provisions are not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
- (iii) That the amendment in section 80HHC made by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005, with retrospective effect from April 1, 1998, does not suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality. It does not violate Article 19 of the Constitution.
- (iv) That the presumption of validity of the amendment had not been rebutted.
- (v) That the provisions of section 80HHC(3) of the Act as amended by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005, were wholly valid with retrospective effect from April 1, 1998.
- (vi) That the assessees who were exporters having export turnover of more than ₹ 10 crores were not entitled to the benefit of deduction under the unamended provisions of section 80HHC with respect to the DEPB credit sales and DFRC.

They became entitled to claim deduction only because of the amended provisions.
(AY. 1998-99)

Mentha and Allied Products Ltd v. UOI (2014) 363 ITR 504 / 223 Taxmann 208 (Mag) / 269 CTR 150 (All)(HC)

Editorial: Avani Exports v. CIT (2012) 348 ITR 391 (Guj.) dissented from.

S.80HHC : Export business – Computation – Excise duty and sales tax – Total turnover – Not to be included 1207

It was held that excise duty and sales tax is not to be included in total turnover while calculating deduction under section 80HHC (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Supreet Chemicals (P) Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 104 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S. 80HHC: Export business – Net Interest and not gross interest included in profits of business to be deducted under clause (1) of Explanation (baa) to determine profits eligible for deduction 1208

High Court held that Tribunal was right by holding that it is the net interest which has to be taken into consideration while computing deduction under Section 80HHC as per Clause (baa) of the explanation to Section 80HHC of the Act. (AY. 1993-94)

CIT v. Paliwal Industries (P) Ltd. (2014)222 Taxmann 61 (Mag.) (P&H) (HC)

CIT v. Paliwal Overseas Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 103 (P&H) (HC)

S.80HHC : Export business – Duty drawback – Supporting manufacturer – Matter remanded 1209

The assessee, a supporting manufacturer, manufactured and exported cotton textiles through their export house M/s. Ikea Trading (I) Limited. In respect of the sale effected, the assessee received the value of the duty drawback available to the export house. The assessee included the duty drawback as part of its deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act. The Court remanded to consider the assessee's claim and apply the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2012) 342 ITR 49 in the case of Topman Exports. (AY. 2001-02 2003-04)

CIT v. Asian Handloom (2014) 222 Taxmann 112(Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

S. 80HHC : Export business – Interest income – Net interest to be included in the profit 1210

In the case of *ACG Associated Capsules (P) Ltd (343 ITR 89)* it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision that 90% of not the gross interest but only the net interest, which has been included in the profits of the business of the assessee as computed under the heads "Profits and gains of business or profession" is to be deducted under clause (1) of Explanation (baa) to Section 80HHC for determining the profits of business. Applying the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *ACG Associated Capsules (P) Ltd. (supra)* the question of law raised in the present appeal is held against the Revenue. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. Atul Oilcake Industries Ltd.(2014) 222 Taxmann 107 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

- 1211 **S. 80HHC : Export business – Components of sales tax and central excise do not form part of sale proceeds for purpose of section 80HHC [S.145A]**
 The HC applying the ratio laid down by Hon'ble SC in the case of *Lakshmi Machine Works [2007] 290 ITR 667 (SC)* and *Shiva Tex Yarn Ltd. [2012] 210 Taxmann 256 (SC)*, based on the facts of the case on hand and the question raised in the present tax appeal, answered the appeal against the revenue and it held that the learned tribunal had not committed any error in holding that the components of sales tax and central excise did not form part of sale proceeds for the purpose of section 80HHC of the Act despite insertion of section 145 A of the Act. Hence the appeal was dismissed. (AY. 2001-02)
CIT v. Supreet Chemicals (P) Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 104 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)
- 1212 **S.80HHC : Export business – Components of sales tax and central excise do not form part of sale proceeds for purpose of s. 80HHC despite insertion of s. 145A**
 The ratio laid down by Hon'ble SC in the case of *Lakshmi Machine Works [2007] 290 ITR 667 (SC)* and *Shiva Tex Yarn Ltd. [2012] 210 Taxmann 256 (SC)*, based on the facts of the case on hand and the question raised in the present tax appeal, answered the appeal against the revenue and it held that the learned Tribunal had not committed any error in holding that the components of sales tax and central excise did not form part of sale proceeds for the purpose of Section 80HHC of the Act despite insertion of Section 145 A of the Act.
CIT v. Vapi Product Industries (2014) 222 Taxmann 62 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)
- 1213 **S.80HHC : Export business – 90 per cent of net interest and not gross interest, which is included in profits of the business of assessee, to be deducted under clause (1) of Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC for determining profits of business**
 The Ratio laid down by Supreme Court in case of *ACG Associated Capsules (P) Ltd. v. CIT [2012] 343 ITR 89/205 Taxmann 136 (Mag.)/18 taxmann.com 137*, it is 90 per cent of net interest and not gross interest, which has been included in profits of business of assessee as computed under heads 'Profits and gains of business or profession' which is to be deducted under clause (1) of Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC for determining profits of business. (AY. 1997-98)
Milton Laminates Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 106 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)
- 1214 **S.80HHC : Export business – Forward contracts – Fluctuation of foreign exchange – Matter remanded**
 Profits from forward contracts owing to fluctuation of foreign exchange. Matter remanded to determine whether forward contracts made in course of business of export and whether profits earned with reference to particular contract. (AY. 2003-04)
CIT v. TVS Motors Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 1 / 223 Taxmann 197 (Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)
- 1215 **S.80HHC : Export business – Computation – Turn over exceeding 10 crores – Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005 is wholly valid with retrospective effect from 1-4-1998. [Ss.28(iiid), 28(iii)]**
 Deduction was not available in respect of profit on transfer of DEPB. It became available to exporters in respect of DEPB credit sale and DFRC referable to section 28(iiid)/(iii),

only when 2nd, 3rd and 4th proviso were inserted in section 80HHC (3) and clauses (iiid)/(iiie) in section 28 by Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005 with retrospective effect from 1-4-1998. It was held that no one can have grievance against amended provisions in as much as such eligible person falling under scope of section 80HHC would have benefit of deduction under section 80HHC with retrospective effect. Classification of exporters having export turnover not exceeding ₹ 10 crores under one group and exporter having export turnover exceeding ₹ 10 crores under another group was valid, as classification of exporters was based on intelligible differentia, and, therefore, impugned provision was not violative of Article 14 of Constitution. Thus, provisions of section 80HHC(3) as amended by Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005 is wholly valid with retrospective effect from 1-4-1998.

Mentha and Allied Products Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 363 ITR 504 / 104 DTR 193 / 269 CTR 150 (All.)(HC)

S.80HHC : Export business – Turnover – For calculating deduction under section 80HHC, the turnover of 10A unit should not be taken into consideration. [Ss.10A, 80A, 80AB]

1216

The assessee-company was an exporter of manufactured goods and traded goods. It also had a unit exclusively for export at Export Promotion Zones, which was exempt under section 10A. The assessee claimed deduction under section 80HHC. The AO noticed that for computing the said deduction, the assessee included the export turnover of its unit (profit of which was exempt under section 10A) claiming it to be total export turnover. He observed that since the income of the unit did not form part of the assessee's total income within the meaning of sections 80A and 80B, no deduction under section 80HHC was allowable with reference to the export turnover of unit. The Tribunal reversed the order of the AO. On an appeal by the assessee, the HC observed that while computing the claim of deduction under section 80HHC, the assessee itself had not taken into account, the profits of the NEPZ unit, which was exempt under section 10A. The assessee, however, had taken into account the turnover of the unit while calculating deduction under section 80HHC. When the assessee itself accepted that profit of unit had to be ignored for the calculation of deduction under section 80HHC, applying the same logic, the turnover of the unit in Export Promotion Zone will also not be taken into account for calculating the deduction under section 80HHC.

CIT v. Roto Pumps Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 51 (All) (HC)

S. 80HHC : Export business – Total turnover – Trade discount – For the purpose of computing deduction trade discount will not form part of total income

1217

The substantial question of law before the HC was whether the Tribunal was correct in interpreting the provision of section 80HHC with special reference to the interpretation of the phrase 'total turnover' as existing in the said statutory provisions. Referring to the definitions of 'sales price' and 'turnover' under the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and various judicial precedents, the High Court held that the Tribunal committed an error in holding that trade discount given to the assessee should form part of total turnover for the purpose of computing deduction u/s. 80HHC. (AY. 1993-94) *Dutron Plastics Ltd. v. Dy. CIT(2014) 223 Taxmann 108 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)*

1218 S.80HHC : Export business – Derived – Deemed credit under the CENVAT Incentive Scheme is part of the business profits eligible for deduction u/s. 80HHC

Court held that CENVAT incentive being the refund of tax and duty paid on inputs consumed for goods manufactured and exported would automatically reduce the cost of manufacture of the exported goods, thereby necessarily increasing the profit. In view thereof, the deemed credit under the CENVAT Incentive Scheme at ₹ 89,34,887/- would be a part of the business profits eligible for a deduction under section 80HHC.

In the present case, it can hardly be argued that the deemed credit under the CENVAT Incentive Scheme would not reduce the material / manufacturing cost of the goods exported by the Assessee. This was not the case of the Revenue also. That being the case, under the provisions of section 80HHC, the Assessee would be entitled to a deduction to the extent of the profits referred to in sub-section (1-B) thereof derived by the assessee from the export of such goods or merchandise. No other provision was brought to our notice that would justify the disallowance of CENVAT incentive whilst computing the admissible deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act.

CIT v. Valiant Glass Works Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 110 DTR 281 (Bom.)(HC)

1219 S.80HHC : Export business – Unabsorbed investment allowance – Required to be set off while computing the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession” [S.32A(3), 80AB]

Court held that for the purpose of computing the deductions under section 80HHC, unabsorbed investment allowance is required to be set off while computing the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”. Appeal of revenue was allowed. (AY. 1991-92)

CIT v. V. M. Salgaonkar & Bros. (P) Ltd. (2014) 109 DTR 142 (Bom.)(HC)

1220 S.80HHC : Export business – Exchange rate difference pertaining to exports made in earlier years – Eligible for deduction under section 80 HHC of the Act. Such amount of Exchange rate difference could neither be deducted from Export turnover nor ninety percent thereof can be excluded from business profit

Amount representing the exchange rate difference relating to export of earlier period is eligible for deduction under section 80HHC of the Act. Further, the amount of exchange rate difference cannot be deducted from the export turnover and ninety percent (90%) thereof also cannot be excluded from business profit while computing deduction under section 80HHC of the Act. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Priyanka Gems (2014) 366 ITR 575 / 102 DTR 193 / 267 CTR 480 (Guj.)(HC)

1221 S.80HHC : Export business – Deduction u/s 80IB to be reduced from profits for calculating deduction u/s. 80HHC. [S.80IB]

High Court relying upon the decision of the same court in case of *Asian Exim International v. CIT (IT Appeal No. 469 of 2010)*, held that for calculating deduction u/s. 80HHC, deduction u/s. 80IB is required to be reduced from the profits. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Preet Forgings (P) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 163 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

S.80HHC : Export business – Export of marble blocks which were not polished as required vide item (X) of XIIth Schedule – Eligible deduction 1222

Deduction under section 80HHC could be allowed on export of marble blocks which were not polished as required vide item (X) of XIIth Schedule as held in case of *CIT v. Arihant Tiles & Minerals (P) Ltd.* [2013] 34 taxmann.com 114 (Raj.)
CIT v. Rameshwar Sharma (2014) 220 Taxmann 30 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)

S.80HHC : Export business – Audit report was filed during course of assessment proceedings – Eligible deduction. [Form no 10CCAC] 1223

For the, the assessee claimed deduction under Section 80HHC of the Act to the tune of ₹ 39,86,538/-. However, a copy of the audit report in Form No.10CCAC was not filed along with the return. During the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee, along with his letter dated 19-12-2005, submitted the report in the prescribed Form No.10CCAC dated 23-5-2003 claiming deduction under section 80HHC at ₹ 37,08,019.97. The AO declined to allow the deduction as claimed by the assessee under Section 80HHC of the Act. The High Court held that the expression “along with return of income” occurring in Sub-section (4) of section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is directory in nature insofar it relates to the time for furnishing of the report of an accountant by the assessee in the prescribed form; and even if such a report in the prescribed form is not furnished along with the return of income, but is furnished during the course of assessment proceedings, it cannot be removed out of consideration only for the reason of the same having not been filed at the initial stage of filing of the return. (AY. 2003-04)
CIT v. Godha Chemicals (P) Ltd. (2013) 353 ITR 679/ 257 CTR 10(2014) 220 Taxmann 31 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)

S.80HHC : Export business – Scrap sales not to be included in total turnover 1224

Scrap sales is not to be included in total turnover for purpose of computing deduction under section 80HHC (AY. 1998-99)
Brakes India Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) 363 ITR 13 / 222 Taxmann 359 / 104 DTR 122 / 270 CTR 98 (Mad.)(HC)

S.80HHC : Export business – Commission to foreign agent not to be reduced from export turnover 1225

Commission paid to the foreign agent cannot be reduced from the export turnover while calculating the deduction. (AY. 2003-04)
CIT v. Koncherry Coir Factories (2014) 363 ITR 463 (Ker)(HC)

S.80HHC : Export business – Bottling of gas into gas cylinders – Amounts to production – Entitled to deduction. [Ss.80I, 80IA] 1226

Bottling of gas into gas cylinders amounts to production, and assessee was entitled to deduction. High Court referred the judgment of Gujarat High Court in *Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd v. State of Gujrat and others*. Appeal of revenue was dismissed.
CIT v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 190 / 110 DTR 295 / 272 CTR 154 (Bom.)(HC)

- 1227 **S.80HHC : Export business – Job work basis – Computation of deduction – Total turnover – Ninety percent to be reduced in total turnover to arrive at business profits**
 The assessee manufactured yarn out of cotton and cotton waste purchased on its own and also did conversion of raw materials into yarn, on job work basis. The AO excluded the conversion charges received on job work from the profits of the business for arriving at the adjustable book profits in terms of clause (baa) of the Explanation to s. 80HHC. Held, that net conversion charges on job works would also form part of the gross total income. Therefore, 90 per cent of the sum had to be reduced in the total turnover of the assessee for arriving at the business profit. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 1997-98)
CIT v. Kadri Mills Ltd (2014) 360 ITR 595/222 Taxmann 108 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)
- 1228 **S.80HHC : Export business – Computation – Demurrage and dead freight charges to be allowed while calculating relief under section 80HHC**
 The foreign company deducted the amount towards demurrage and dead freight and remitted the balance amount to the assessee, as agreed between it and the assessee. Held, that the fact that the assessee received only the balance, did not mean that the sale consideration was anything less than ₹ 6,14,87,164 for the purpose of claiming deduction under section 80HHC. There was no material to show that the parties had agreed that the balance after adjusting demurrage and dead freight charges alone would be the sale consideration. Thus, the demurrage and dead freight charges were to be allowed while calculating the relief under section 80HHC. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 1996-97)
CIT v. Bannariamman Exports Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 591/221 Taxmann 199 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)
- 1229 **S.80HHC : Export business – Receipt of premium on special import licence, insurance claim on vehicles and service charges were not linked with export business and thus would be treated as charges within meaning of Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC, thus would not be entitled to deduction**
 During the year assessee received premium on special import licences, insurance claim on vehicles and was in receipt of certain service charges. The assessee claimed deduction on these receipts under section 80HHC on the ground that these receipt were linked with export business and thus could not be treated as charges within the meaning of Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC. The Tribunal disallowed the claim. On appeal, the High Court relied on the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in *CIT v. K. Ravindranathan Nair [2007] 295 ITR 228* and held that the view which has been taken by the Tribunal is, therefore, consistent with the law which has been laid down by the Supreme Court and the question was answered in favour of revenue. (AY. 1997-98).
Damodar Mangalji Mining Co. v. JCIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 344 / 264 CTR 182 (Bom.)(HC)
- 1230 **S.80HHC : Export business – Computation – Total deduction should not exceed the eligible profits of the undertaking. [Ss.80IA, 80IB]**
 Tribunal held that the export profits of the export units which have been allowed as deduction under section 80IA / 80IB should be reduced in proportion of export

turnover to total turnover while allowing deduction under section 80HHC and not the entire deduction allowed under section 80IA / 80IB, subject to the condition that total deduction should not exceed the eligible profits of the undertaking. (AY. 2002-03) *Reliance Industries v. Addl. ACIT (2013) 55 SOT 8 (URO) / (2014) 159 TTJ 349 / (Mum.) (Trib.)*

Section 80HHD : Deduction in respect of earnings in convertible foreign exchange.

S.80HHD : Earnings in convertible foreign exchange – All units of assessee to be taken together – Computation of benefit cannot be given separately to each hotel [S.80IB] 1231

The assessee which is in the business of hotel, declared loss in the computation. The AO disallowed the deductions claimed under section 80HHD and section 80IB of the Act. This was confirmed by the appellate authorities. On appeal : Held, dismissing the appeal, that so far as the principle adopted, the eligibility to deduct under section 80HHD and also the eligibility of deductions under section 80IB being the same, the Tribunal was justified in negating the contentions of the assessee. (AY. 2000-2001) *Hotel and Allied Trades P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 328 / 49 taxmann.com 360 (Ker.) (HC)*

S.80HHD : Earnings in convertible foreign exchange – Hotel – Reserve – Utilized on heads prescribed under section – No question of law [S.260A] 1232

In the assessment proceedings the AO found that reserve account under Section 80HHD must be utilized within a period of 5 years next following previous year in which amount was credited. Since the assessee did not furnish required information it is to be presumed that foreign exchange reserve credited to the reserve account was not utilised. He disallowed claim for deduction under Section 80HHD of ₹ 9 lakh. The CIT(A) allowed the appeal giving details of the expenditure made from reserve account under Section 80HHD (4) giving items on which the amount in reserve account was spent in the assessment years 1989-90 to 1994-95. He held that the figures of fixed assets like building, plant, machinery, furniture and fixtures make it evident that reserve has been utilised. There was no justification for making addition of ₹ 9 lakh, which was not warranted at all. The ITAT agreed with the findings of CIT(A). In the present case we do not find that any such argument was taken by the revenue either before the CIT(A) or in appeal in ITAT that the amounts were not spent on the heads specified under section 80HHD(4) nor any argument was taken that detailed accounts or certificate of the accounting was not produced. The findings recorded by CIT(A) and ITAT that entire amount was utilised on the heads prescribed under Section 80HHD are finding of fact from which no question of law much less substantial question of law arise for consideration by the High Court. The Income tax appeal is hereby dismissed. (AY. 1994-95)

CIT v. Hotel Clarks Varanasi Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 62 (Mag)(All.)(HC)

- 1233 **S.80HHD : Earnings in convertible foreign exchange – Tour operator – Convertible foreign exchange Deduction to be computed on entire business or each eligible unit**
Deduction to be computed on entire business or in respect of each eligible unit decided against the assessee following earlier years subject to the outcome of the SLP pending for the earlier years before the Apex Court. (AY. 1998-99)
CIT v. ITC Hotels (2014) 363 ITR 254 / 269 CTR 308 / 103 DTR 103 / 225 Taxmann 73 (Karn.)(HC)
- 1234 **S.80HHD : Earnings in convertible foreign exchange – Profits of entire business-Computation benefit cannot be given separately to each hotel.**
Computation of benefit cannot be given separately to each hotel. Profits of entire business of assessee should be reckoned as a whole. (AY. 1997-98)
Hotel and Allied P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 184 / 48 taxmann.com 50 (Ker.)(HC)

Section 80HHE : Deduction in respect of profits from export of computer software, etc.

- 1235 **S.80HHE : Export business – Computer software – Turnover – While determining admissible deduction the turnover of software business would only be considered and loss of other business cannot be adjusted against the profits of eligible business. [S.80HHC]**
The assessee was engaged in two different activities. One was the manufacture of gear-boxes coupling and spares and another in software business, profits from which were eligible for deduction u/s. 80HHE. The Revenue sought to compute eligible profit under section 80HHE(3) after deducting loss from gear-boxes etc. from profit of software business by drawing comparison from section 80HHC(3). On appeal, the Tribunal upheld the same. On further appeal, the High Court held that, section 80HHC is a provision general in nature intended to encourage export of any goods or merchandise except minerals and mineral oil while section 80HHE specifically provides for computer related business separately and, thus, it is specific and carved out from the general category of export of goods appearing from section 80HHC, there is, as such, no reason to treat them identically. Therefore, neither turnover nor profit or loss arising out of business activity relating to gear box, etc., had anything to do with the computation of admissible deduction under section 80HHE(3) and accordingly, while determining admissible deduction u/s. 80HHE, the turnover of software business would only be considered and loss of other business could not be adjusted against the profits of the eligible business.
Flender Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 223 Taxmann 221 (Cal.)(HC)
- 1236 **S.80HHE : Export business – Computer software – Total turnover. [S.10A]**
While computing total turnover for deduction u/s 80HHE, the profit or turnover of the other unit of the same concern which are otherwise eligible deduction u/s. 10A, should not be computed. As the underlying principle is once the profit and gains of an undertaking is allowed as deduction the other benefit can not at the same time be allowed under any other provision. (AY. 2001-02)
CIT v. Sasken Communication Technologies Ltd. (2014) 265 CTR 540 / 98 DTR 194 / 227 Taxmann 23 (Karn.)(HC)

S.80HHE : Export business – Computer software – Free trade zone – total turnover – Turnover of eligible units does not form part of the profits of the business for the purpose of deduction. [S.10A] 1237

When assessee is held to be eligible exemption section 10A, neither the profits and gains of that business nor the turnover of that business could be added to find out the profits from export of computer software under section 80HHE. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Sasken Communication Technologies Ltd. (2014) 265 CTR 540 / 98 DTR194 / 227 Taxmann 23 (Karn.)(HC)

S.80HHE : Export business – Computer software – Service Income would not be susceptible to a reduction of 90 per cent 1238

Income emanating from services rendered would not be susceptible to a reduction of 90 per cent as it does not constitute a receipt of nature similar to brokerage, commission, interest, rent or charges. Such receipt could not be subject to deduction of 90 per cent under sub-cl(1) of c. (d) of the Explanation and therefore, not liable to be reduced to the extent of 90 percent. (AY. 1999-2000, 2002-03)

CIT v. Robert Bosch (India) Ltd. (2014) 98 DTR 18 (Karn.)(HC)

S.80HHE : Export business – Computer software Data processing – Eligible for deduction 1239

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled for deduction under section 80HHE in respect of the income earned from data processing services rendered to the enterprise outside India. The Tribunal followed earlier year's Tribunal order in assessee's own case. *TNS India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 163 TTJ 576/ 32 ITR 44/(2015) 152 ITD 123 (Hyd.)(Trib.)*

Section 80-I : Deduction in respect of profits and gains from industrial undertakings after a certain date, etc.

S.80I : Industrial undertakings – Income from sale of scrap and waste, gunny bags, etc. – Interest on late payment of sale consideration – Entitled to deduction 1240

That the Tribunal was right in granting the benefit of deduction under section 80I of the Act on various incomes, such as job work receipt, sale of empty soda ash bardan, sale of empty barrels and plastic waste. Followed the ratio in *Dy. CIT v. Harjivandas Juthabhai Zaveri [2002] 258 ITR 785 (Guj)(HC)*. That the assessee's claim for deduction under section 80I of the Act on the interest received on late payment of sale consideration as amount derived from eligible business was allowable. Followed ratio in *Nirma Industries Ltd. v. Deputy CIT [2006] 283 ITR 402 (Guj)(HC)*.

CIT v. Nirma Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 12/52 taxmann.com 88 (Guj.)(HC)

S.80I : Industrial undertakings – Manufacture – Process of twisting and texturising of partially oriented yarn amounted to manufacture in terms of section 80IA – entitled for deduction u/s. 80HH & 80I [Ss.80HH, 80IA] 1241

Applying the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *Yashasvi Yarn Ltd. [2013] 350 ITR 208/210 Taxmann 262/25 taxmann.com 266* and in the case of *Emptee Poly-Yarn (P) Ltd. [2010] 320 ITR 665/188 Taxmann 188*, the High Court

held that the assessee was entitled to the deduction under Sections 80HH and 80I of the Income Tax Act by holding that the process of twisting and texturising of partially oriented yarn amounted to manufacture in terms of section 80IA. (AY. 1995-96 & 1996-97)

Nirman Syntex (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 63 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

1242 **S.80I : Industrial undertakings – Computation of relief – Relief granted u/s. 80HH cannot be deducted from gross total income. [S.80HH]**

Relief granted under S. 80HH cannot be deducted from gross total income for computing of relief under section 80-I.

CIT v. Hindustan Pipe Udyog Ltd. (2013) 255 CTR 389/214 Taxmann 9 (Mag.) / (2014) 360 ITR 437 (All.)(HC)

1243 **S.80I : Industrial undertakings – Income earned or derived – Interest on short-term deposit is not includible in profits and gains from manufacturing activity undertaken by Industrial undertaking [S. 263]**

Interest on short-term deposit is not income earned or derived from manufacturing activity undertaken by industrial undertaking. Also, tank hire charges received by assessee from consumers separately billed and charged is not includible in profits and gains from manufacturing activity undertaken by industrial undertaking. (AY. 1993-94, 1994-95)

Krishak Bharati Co-op Ltd v. CIT (2012) 208 Taxmann 37 (Mag.) / (2014) 360 ITR 209 / 272 CTR 130 (Delhi)(HC)

1244 **S.80I : Industrial undertakings – Profit derived – Service charges – crane hire charges – Interest from bank – Not entitle to deduction – Service charges from heavy water board – Entitle to deduction**

Service charges, crane hire charges, ammonia hire charges and interest from banks and financial institutions are not entitled to deduction under section 80I, However service charges received from heavy water board of the Department of Atomic Energy could be considered a profit derived from industrial undertaking to qualify for deduction under section 80I. (AY. 1995-96)

Krishak Bharati Co-operative Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) 360 ITR 219 / 101 DTR 352 / 272 CTR 138 (Delhi)(HC)

Section : 80-IA Deductions in respect of profits and gains from industrial undertakings or enterprises engaged in infrastructure development, etc.

1245 **S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Job work – Decoration of plain glazed ceramic tiles through process of printing and embossing the designs job work undertaken by the assessee constitutes manufacture and entitled to the benefit**

The assessee was engaged in job work of decoration of plain glazed ceramic tiles, through process of printing and embossing the designs. The assessee claimed deduction under section 80-IA. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the job work of decoration of glazed ceramic tiles did not amount to manufacturing activity. Therefore,

the profits derived therefrom were not eligible for the said deduction. The Court held that industry set up by the assessee is for processing plain glazed ceramic tiles. The process includes application of chemical and other materials like glazes, colours, mediums, glass, luster, etc. and burning at a very high degree of controlled temperature with the help of the kiln which is also imported from Italy by adopting the single fast fired technology, which is the latest development in the ceramic industry. Before that, designing and preparation of a photomechanical film, preparation of screens, colour-recipe-formulation, automatic screen-printing and spray application, three dimensional glass-embossing and single-fast-firing is undertaken and the object of this process of printing results in decorating or painting the said glazed tiles which constitutes a distinct and different article in the market. Therefore, both the CIT(A) and Tribunal, were justified in holding that the job work undertaken by the assessee constitutes manufacture and they are entitled to the benefit of section 80-IA. (AY. 2000-01 to 2002-03)

CIT v. Murudeshwar Decor Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxmann 29 (Mag.) / (2015) 122 DTR 24 / 278 CTR 356 (Karn.)(HC)

S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Infrastructure development – Profits derived by the assessee’s power generation unit would be eligible for deduction as a separate undertaking

1246

The assessee had an Abrasives Grains Division that manufactured fused Aluminium Oxide grains etc. It had setup a power plant for captive supply only to its Aluminium Oxide grains unit. Profit earned from the power plant unit was claimed to be eligible for deduction under section 80IA as an undertaking engaged in generation of electricity. The AO denied benefit of section 80IA in respect of power plant unit on the ground that the power plant unit was supplying captive power only to the assessee and profits declared as earned from the power plant unit were exorbitant and attempt had been made to enhance/increase the profits to claim higher deduction under section 80IA. The Tribunal deleted the disallowance. The Court held that it was not disputed that generation of electricity was eligible business. The AO was entitled to compute the profits of the eligible undertaking on the basis of the market value/price, and ignore and not accept the value mentioned/recorded in the account books. There was no need to prescribe and incorporate sub-section (8) in case the assessee could not have transacted and sold goods or services manufactured/produced by the eligible undertaking to another unit or business of the same assessee. The proviso stipulated that the AO in order to compute such profits and gains shall adopt reasonable basis as he may deem fit. Explanation states that the market value in relation to goods or services meant the price that such goods or services would ordinarily fetch in the open market. Though, sub-section (10) would not be directly applicable in the present case which relates to captive consumption, the provision postulates re-working of the profits in cases where more than expected profits stand declared by the eligible undertaking because of proximity and close connection between the eligible undertaking and the persons to whom goods and services were supplied. Having noted the statutory provisions of section 80IA, it was observed that the statutory provisions in fact were to the contrary and stipulate computation of an eligible undertaking’s profit or loss, even when the

sales/transactions were made to a related party or to the same assessee, but in such cases, the profits have to be computed in the manner stipulated in sub-sections (8) and (10) to section 80IA. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it has to be held that the finding of the Tribunal that the profits derived by the assessee's power generation unit would be eligible for deduction as a separate undertaking under section 80IA is correct. (AY. 2002-03 to 2007-08)

CIT v. Orient Abrasive Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxmann 240 (Mag.) / 271 CTR 626 (Delhi)(HC)

1247 **S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Profit from sale of DEPB licence – Not entitled to special deduction – Profit due to fluctuation in rate of foreign exchange – Entitled to special deduction**

That the amount received on sale of DEPB licence was not entitled to special deduction and the amount received on account of fluctuation in rate of foreign exchange was entitled to special deduction under section 80IA.

CIT v. Alps Chemicals P. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 594/ (2015) 55 taxmann.com 388 (Guj.)(HC)

1248 **S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Infrastructure development – Outdoor advertisement – construction of bus shelter, putting up of foot bridge etc. – Advertisement business to recoup expenditure – Not eligible deduction under section 80IA(4)**

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of outdoor advertisement and media advertising. Assessee-company had entered into an agreement with local authority for construction of bus-shelters, putting up of footbridge, beautify road medians and erecting street lights-Assessee was allowed to utilise these bus shelters, lamp posts, road medians and footbridge, for their advertisement business to recoup expenditure incurred for same. Assessee claimed deduction under section 80IA(4) contending that it was involved in infrastructure development Since assessee eventually was an advertising company, and had developed, existing road median, erected bus-shelters and light poles for its advertisement business, activities indulged by assessee were part of its normal activities of advertising and publicity rather than one of infrastructure development. Since assessee derived income only from advertisement hoardings erected on bus shelters, road medians and street light poles, said income could not be treated as income derived from 'infrastructure facility'. Assessee was not eligible for deduction under section 80IA(4). (AY. 2006-07 to 2008-09)

CIT v. Skyline Advertising (P) Ltd. (2014) 269 CTR 289 / 225 Taxmann 220 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

1249 **S.80IA: Industrial undertakings – Manufacturing or production – Installing air conditioning system at the premises of its customers amounted to assembling not entitled deduction**

Purchase of air conditioners and other parts and installing the same after connecting them with the panels and ducting at its customers premises amounted to assembling and not manufacturing and assessee is not entitle to deduction under section 80IA of the Act. (AY. 2000-01)

Koolnest (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 102 DTR 127 / 223 Taxmann 223 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Set-off of brought forward losses and depreciation of earlier years – If before claiming deduction under section 80 IA – Losses and depreciation in respect of eligible business is set off against income from other sources – The same losses and depreciation cannot again be notionally set off against the profits of eligible business

1250

Where before claiming deduction under section 80IA of the Act, losses and depreciation claimed by the assessee in respect of eligible business is set off against income from other sources, the said loss or depreciation cannot again be notionally set off against the profits of eligible business while computing deduction under section 80IA of the Act. (AY. 2008–09)

CIT v. Anil H. Lad (2014) 102 DTR 241 / 225 Taxmann 170 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

S. 80IA : Industrial undertakings – Set off of losses of non-80IA unit towards profits of 80IA Unit – Tribunal held that losses could not be set off – New plea raised first time before High Court – Not entertained [S.260A]

1251

The assessee company was engaged in the business of manufacturing poultry vaccines (Section 80IA unit) in collaboration with Vineland Laboratories, USA. It claimed that it had opened another unit, i.e., Animal Healthcare Products Division under the name of “Avitech”. The company reported losses in respect of “Avitech” Unit and profit from its vaccine centre/undertaking. The Assessing Officer adjusted the amount of loss so claimed towards the profits earned in the Poultry Vaccine Division and computed the deduction only on the balance of profits. The assessee carried the matter in appeal. The CIT(A) observed that this was the first year of its operation and for the separate division under name ‘Avitech’. Though it incurred losses in the first year, it reached stability and it earned a net profits in subsequent years and the deduction u/s. 80IA has not been claimed on this profit. The CIT(A) allowed the claim of the assessee. The Tribunal agreed with the decision of the CIT(A). Before the High Court, the Revenue stated that a fair and objective reading of the record would reveal that the assessee’s claim was inadmissible under section-80IA because the second Unit was located within the same premises and could not, therefore, be characterised as a “separate undertaking”. Counsel urged that once the assessee decided to open the separate division in the same premises, he cannot claim the benefit of Section 80IA as far as that activity is concerned. The High Court observed that neither the Tribunal nor the CIT(A) in fact dealt with this issue. Also, no contention that the undertaking was located within the same premises as the other poultry vaccine division or undertaking was raised before Tribunal. This being a question of fact, the High Court did not interfere with the conclusion of the below authorities. As far as the legality of the conclusions were concerned, it agreed with the view of CIT(A) and Tribunal as far the reliance on the ruling of Supreme Court in *CIT v. Canara Workshops (P). Ltd (1986) 161 ITR 320 (SC)* was concerned. Appeal of revenue was dismissed.

CIT v. Indovax (P) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 164 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

1252 **S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Derived from – Interest income not eligible for deduction**

Interest on KEB and NSC deposits is not income derived from Industrial undertaking and therefore not entitled to deduction u/s. 80IA (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. ITC Hotels (2014) 363 ITR 254 / 269 CTR 308/103 DTR 103/225 Taxmann 73 (Karn.)(HC)

1253 **S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Manufacture or production – Centrifuging of transformer oil purchased from the market – Not manufacturing activity or production of new articles or things – Not entitled to deduction**

Assessee purchased transformer oil from the market and the centrifuging was done by the centrifugal machine in order to make it usable in transformers. No new substance or articles or things emerged from that processing. No manufacturing activity/production. (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. S. K. Transformer P. Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 394 / 223 Taxmann 231 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

1254 **S. 80IA : Industrial undertakings – Insurance claim received on loss of production is not eligible for deduction**

The assessee had suffered a fire accident on 11-3-1996 relevant for AY 1996-97. It subsequently received compensation from an insurance company for loss of production due to the accident and considered the same eligible for grant of relief under section 80IA in AY 1998-99. The AO rejected the claim for lack of nexus between the claim and the loss suffered. The High Court noted that there were no materials produced by the assessee to substantiate the nature of the fire accident that had taken place to link it to the commercial activity to earn profit. There being no material to link this accident and the nature of damage caused in the industrial activity and to the productivity of the company, the AO had rightly held the compensation received ineligible for the purpose of granting relief under Section 80IA of the Act. Reliance placed by the Tribunal on the decision of *Rollatainers Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2000] 111 taxmann 221 (Mag.)* in favour of the assessee held to be misplaced on account of distinguishing facts. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Gangothri Textiles Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 28 (Mad.)(HC)

1255 **S. 80IA : Industrial undertakings – Derived from manufacturing activity – Scrap sales, labour work and interest receipts – Direction was given to compute the income unit wise**

The Tribunal set aside the finding rendered by the Commissioner (Appeals) and restored the matter to the files of the AO with a direction to examine whether the receipts were derived from manufacturing activities of the assessee and if it was found that they were derived from the manufacturing activity, they should be included in the profits of the industrial undertaking and such exercise to be done after affording an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

The High Court modified the order of the Tribunal and the AO was directed to look at the scrap sales and labour work and other interest receipts unit-wise for the purpose of computing the deduction u/s. 80IA. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Brakes India Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 424 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 898 (Mad.)(HC)

S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – The effect of s. 80-IA(9) is that s. 80IA deduction has to be reduced for s. 80HHC deduction in all cases and not only when the combined deduction exceeds the profits. [Ss.80HHC, 80IA(9)]

1256

The Gujarat High Court had to consider the controversy whether the assessee can claim deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act, ignoring the deduction already claimed and allowed u/s. 80IA of the Act, unless and until the combined effect of the deductions flowing from both the sections is to exceed the profit and gain of the eligible business of the undertaking or enterprise. HELD by the High Court deciding in favour of the department:

Sub-section (9) of section 80IA is aimed at restricting the successive claims of deduction of the same profit or gain under different provisions contained in sub-chapter C of Chapter VI of the Act. This provision, therefore, necessarily impacts other deduction provisions including section 80HHC of the Act. Nothing contained in section 80HHC suggests that the deduction provided therein was immune from any outside influence or that the provision was impregnable by any other statute or enactment. Accepting any such theory would lead to incongruous results. Even the assessee concedes that sub-section (9) of section 80IA would operate as to limiting the combined deductions to a maximum of the profits and gains from an eligible business of the undertaking or enterprise. If s. 80HHC contained a protective shell making it immune from any outside influence, even this effect of sub-section (9) of section 80IA could not be applied. This would completely render the provisions of sub-section (9) of section 80IA redundant and meaningless. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Atul Intermediates (2014)103 DTR 353 (2015) 373 ITR 638 (Guj.)(HC)

S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Infrastructure development – Inland container depot operated by company is an ‘inland port’ – eligible for tax holiday under section 80IA(4)(i). [S.80IA(4)(i)]

1257

The Inland container depot operated by assessee company is an Inland Port which is one of the infrastructure facilities for purpose of section 80A and therefore said Company is eligible for Tax liability under section 80-IA(4)(i) (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

ACIT v. JWC Logistics Park (P) Ltd. (2014) 34 ITR 598 / (2015) 67 SOT 132 (URO) (Pune) (Trib.)

80IA : Industrial undertakings – Infrastructure development – Port – Storage facility was not developed by the assessee – Not eligible deduction

1258

Tribunal held that where storage facility was not a part of infrastructure facility developed by assessee operating and maintaining port, assessee was not entitled to claim any deduction in respect of income earned on account of storage facility. (AY. 2009-10) *Dahej Harbour and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 33 ITR 634 / (2015) 67 SOT 55 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)*

S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Infrastructure development – Port – Transportation charges – Not eligible deduction

1259

Tribunal held that assessee operating and maintaining port, was not entitled to claim deduction an account of transportation charges as same was earned for arranging

transportation from jetty to party's place and same could not be a part of infrastructure facility development by assessee. (AY. 2009-10)

Dahej Harbour and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 33 ITR 634 / (2015) 67 SOT 55 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)

- 1260 **S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Unabsorbed depreciation of earlier yeas to be set off first against income of assessee from eligible unit during relevant year. [S.32(2), 72]**
Unabsorbed depreciation pertaining to eligible unit carried forward from earlier years has to be set off first against income of assessee from eligible unit during relevant year before allowing deduction under section 80-IA. (AY. 2006-07) (ITA No. 972 (Bang.) of 2012 dated 31-7-2013)

ACIT v. Subhash Kabini Power Corpn. Ltd. (2015) 152 ITD 150 (Bang.)(Trib.)

- 1261 **S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – positive gross total income in each under taking – Setting up of losses of other units where deduction was not claimed was held to be not proper**

Assessee claimed deduction under section 80IA, Assessing Officer denied same on ground that assessee had incurred loss in one unit of undertaking and such loss had to be adjusted against profits of another unit – Whether since assessee had positive gross total income, each undertaking had be considered separately for working out deduction under section 80IA without setting off losses of units on which such deduction was not being claimed. (AY. 2002-03, 2008-09)
Metal Powder Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 26 ITR 759/ (2015) 152 ITD 144 (Chennai)(Trib.)

- 1262 **S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Windmills – Set-off of notional losses – Prior to initial year was held to be not justified. [S.32(2)]**

Assessee was engaged in manufacturing and sale of metal powders It was captively consuming electricity generated by its own wind mill power plant. AO held that assessee could not claim deduction under section 80IA on windmills as he has adjusted set off of notional losses of prior to initial Year. In appeal, CIT(A) allowed deduction for windmills treating same as separate undertaking and directed not to adjust notional losses of years prior to initial year of such claim. Tribunal held that question of set-off notional losses prior to initial year of claim did not arise in view of High Court's decision in case of *Velayudhaswamy Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. v. ACIT [2012] 340 ITR 477(Mad.) (HC)*. (AY. 2002-03, 2003-04, 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08 & 2008-09) (ITA Nos. 782 to 787 & 869 to 874 (Mds) of 2012 dated 21-2-2013)

Metal Powder Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 26 ITR 759/ (2015) 152 ITD 144 (Chennai)(Trib.)

- 1263 **S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Audit report – Initial assessment year – Contention of the assessee that the audit report was wrong was held to be not acceptable**

Tribunal held that when the Auditor in audit report in Form No. 10 CCB, filed along with return for assessment year 2004-05, assessee had mentioned initial assessment year as 2003-04, assessee could not turn back and say that data furnished therein was wrong, hence the lower authorities rightly relied on audit report filed and considered assessment year 2003-04 as initial assessment year. (AY. 2002-03, 2008-09)

Metal Powder Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 26 ITR 759 / (2015) 152 ITD 144 (Chennai)(Trib.)

S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Infrastructure development – Improvement and strengthening of State Highway on BOT (Built, Operate and Transfer) basis – Eligible deduction

1264

Assessee company was engaged in business of Developing and Execution of infrastructure contracts. It was awarded contract by Government of Rajasthan for improvement and strengthening of State Highway on BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer) basis. Assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80IA of the Act. AO disallowed deduction claimed holding that work executed by assessee was not for development of “new” infrastructure facility and work undertaken by assessee was merely of increasing thickness of existing road. The CIT(A) affirmed findings of AO. The Assessee filed appeal before the Tribunal, the Tribunal held that the work carried by assessee that was not merely a repair and maintenance work but doing entire restructuring of existing road. The CBDT Circular No. 4/2010 also shows that widening of existing road by constructing additional lane as a part of highway project is a new infrastructure facility. Assessee had also increased width of highway as one additional lane is developed, Project report which was part of agreement clearly suggest that existing road was not capable of taking increased load of vehicles and hence, there was necessity for strengthening as well as widening said road. It is not the case that merely some minor work like carpeting has been done to be done but the additional lane of 1 mtr. widening with 12 cm. increased thickness has been done. Assessee’s work was of bringing into existence new infrastructure facility which was in nature of road. Assessee was entitled for deduction u/s. 80IA(4) (AY. 2006-07)

Rohan & Rajdeep Infrastructure v. ACIT (2013) 92 DTR 402 / 157 TTJ 333 / (2014) 61 SOT 9 (URO)(Pune)(Trib.)

S.80IA : Industrail undrtakings – Infrastructure development – Carbon credit – Derived from – Income on sale of Certified Emission Reduction/carbon credit – Not entitled for deduction

1265

The income on sale of Certified Emission Reduction/carbon credit cannot be treated as capital receipt, therefore, it is to be treated as profits and gains of business or profession; hence liable for taxation. Deduction in respect of profit and gains from industrial undertakings or enterprises engaged in infrastructure development, etc. deduction of an amount equal to 100% of the profit derived from business undertaking is alone eligible for deduction u/s 80IA. The industrial undertaking shall be the direct source for earning the profit and not a means to earn any other profit. Therefore, the income on sale of Certified Emission Reduction/carbon credit would form part of the profit and gains of business; cannot be treated as profit derived from the industrial undertaking. The assessee is not entitled for deduction u/s. 80IA of the Act. (AY. 2008-09)

Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 756 / 31 ITR 477 (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.80IA : Industrail undrtakings – Infrastructure development – Developer – Contactor – A developer is a person who designs and creates new projects whereas a contractor is a person who has a contract to do work

1266

Tribunal held that having regard to the scope of work executed by the assessee, it is difficult to comprehend that assessee was merely acting as a contractor. In common

parlance, a contractor is understood as a person who carries out the assigned work as per the directions given by the contractee. In the present case, the assessee has used own-developed technology and its own resources to conceptualise, design, erect, commission, test and operate the 'Saurashtra Branch Canal Pumping Scheme'. Therefore, in our view, assessee is to be understood as a 'developer', and distinct from a 'contractor' qua the impugned contract awarded by SSNNL.

Kirloskar Brothers Limited v. DCIT (Pune)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

1267 **S.80IA : Industrial undertakings – Infrastructure development – Works contract – Contractor – Developer – Construction and engineering – Matter was remanded back for to verify whether the assessee fell under category of 'contractor' or a 'developer'**

Assessee carried out development work in respect of water supply and sewerage system of municipal authorities. The assessee filed its return claiming deduction under section 80IA. The AO opined that the work was executed on behalf of the owner, i.e., the authorities who had given the contract. The assessee had not worked as a developer because for providing infrastructure facilities the assessee had not used its own funds. As per the AO the assessee had only executed the 'work contract' and there was no operation or maintenance on the part of the assessee. The AO thus, taking a view that assessee could not fulfil conditions specified u/s. 80-IA(4), rejected assessee's claim for deduction. In appeal The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's claim. Before ITAT the issue is only that whether assessee fell under category of 'contractor' or a 'developer'. The ITAT remanded back the matter for disposal afresh to ascertain whether the assessee fell under category of 'contractor' or a 'developer'. (AY. 2002-03)

Modern Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 71 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

1268 **S.80IA(4) : Industrial undertakings – Infrastructure development – Advertisement revenue – Could not be treated as income derived from 'infrastructure facility'. Hence, assessee was not eligible for deduction**

Assessee-company had entered into an agreement with local authority for construction of bus-shelters, putting up of footbridge, beautify road medians and erecting street lights. Assessee was allowed to utilise these bus shelters, lamp posts, road medians and footbridge, for their advertisement business to recoup expenditure incurred for same. Assessee claimed deduction under section 80IA(4) contending that it was involved in infrastructure development. It was held that benefit under section 80IA could be extended only to those assessee who had developed infrastructure facility as defined under sub-section (4) of section 80IA and income eligible for deduction had to arise from use of such infrastructure facility. Since assessee eventually was an advertising company, and had developed, existing road median, erected bus-shelters and light poles for its advertisement business, activities indulged in by assessee were part of its normal activities of advertising and publicity rather than one of infrastructure development. Further since assessee derived income only from advertisement hoardings erected on bus shelters, road medians and street light poles, said income could not be treated as income derived from 'infrastructure facility'. Hence, assessee was not eligible for deduction under section 80IA(4).

CIT v. Skyline Advertising (P) Ltd. (2014) 104 DTR 98 / 225 Taxmann 220 / 269 CTR 289 (Karn.)(HC)

S.80IA(8) : Industrial undertakings – Infrastructure development Income from generation of power – Market value of captive consumption of power – Grid price-Arm’s length value – If there are multiple “market values” assessee has the right to choose the suitable one.

1269

Section 80IA(8) provides that if goods or services held by the eligible unit are transferred to the non-eligible business or *vice-versa*, the assessee must adopt ‘Market Value’ as the transfer price. In the open market, where a basket of ‘Market Values’ (say like, independent third party transactions, grid price (average annual landed cost at which grid has sold power to the assessee), Power Exchange Price for the relevant period etc.) are available, the law does not put any restriction on the assessee as to which ‘Market Value’ it has to adopt, it is purely assessee’s discretion. So long as the assessee has adopted a ‘Market Value’ as the transfer price, that is sufficient compliance of law. The AO can adopt a different value only where the value adopted by assessee does not correspond to the ‘market value’. Even if assessee’s Cement Unit has purchased power, also from the Grid or that assessee’s Power Unit has also partly sold its power to grid or third parties that by itself, does not compel the assessee or permit the Revenue, to adopt ONLY the ‘grid price’ or the price at which the Eligible Unit has partly sold its power to grid or third parties, as the ‘market value’ for captive consumption of power to compute the profits of the eligible unit. Any such attempt is clearly beyond the explicit provisions of s. 80IA(8) of the Act. If the value adopted by the assessee is a ‘market value’ it is not permissible for the revenue to recompute the profits and gains on the eligible unit by substituting the said value by any other market value. (AY. 2007-08 to 2009-10)

Shree Cement Ltd. v. ACIT(2014) 100 DTR 33 / (2015)152 ITD 561(Jaipur)(Trib.)

Section 80-IAB : Deductions in respect of profits and gains by an undertaking or enterprise engaged in development of Special Economic Zone

S.80IAB : Undertaking – Development of Special Economic Zone – Since BOA had granted approval for transfer of bare-shell to co-developer in accordance with relevant provisions of SEZ Act and SEZ Rules, profits arising to assessee from such an authorised transaction were eligible for deduction

1270

Assessee was engaged in business of developing, operating and maintaining real estate projects which *inter alia* included development of SEZs. Assessee company entered into a memorandum of understanding with DAPL as a co-developer for developing, operating and maintaining SEZ. Board of Approval (BOA) granted approval to said agreement. Assessee claimed deduction under section 80IAB of Act against development income earned during year in respect of its SEZ project. AO rejected assessee’s claim holding that assessee sold bare-shell buildings to co-developer DAPL which was not a permitted activity. Since BOA had granted approval for transfer of bare-shell to co-developer in accordance with relevant provisions of SEZ Act and SEZ Rules, profits arising to assessee from such an authorised transaction were eligible for deduction. (AY. 2008-09) *DLF Info City Developers (Chennai) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 94 (URO) (Delhi) (Trib.)*

Section 80-IB : Deduction in respect of profits and gains from certain industrial undertakings other than infrastructure development undertakings

1271 S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Manufacture – Cut and polished diamonds – Matter set aside to the Tribunal for *de novo* consideration

The assessee is engaged in the business of cutting and polishing rough diamonds .The AO disallowed the deduction under section 80IB following the judgment in *CIT v. Gem India Mfg. Co. Ltd.* 249 ITR 307 (SC). The appeal was dismissed by CIT(A), Tribunal and High Court. Aggrieved by the order of High Court the assessee filed SLP before the Supreme Court. Allowing the Civil Appeal the Court observed the Tribunal ought to have examined the process undertaken by the assessee, and High Court ought to have set aside the matter. The Apex Court directed the matter to the Tribunal to consider whether the process undertaken by the assessee constituted ‘manufacture’. Order of High Court and Tribunal set aside and matter remitted to the Tribunal for *de novo* assessment. CA No. 9936 of 2011 dated 18th November 2011.

Heaven Diamonds Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) The Chambers’ s Journal – October-P-84 (SC)

1272 S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Proprietorship converted in to partnership – Transfer of undertaking as a whole – Deduction is available

On going through the claim of the assessee, the AO found that the assessee was running the business from the same premises as a proprietorship concern and that on 1-4-2004 a partnership firm was constituted in which two other persons were inducted as partners. The AO held that the industrial undertaking under proprietorship was converted into a partnership firm on 1-4-2004 and that the transfer of machinery or plant previously used by the proprietorship concern was being used by the partnership firm and, accordingly, the assessee was not entitled to exemption under section 80IB. The Court held that where assessee company converted its proprietorship concern to a partnership concern and there was a transfer of said industrial undertaking as a whole along with its assets and liabilities, there was no transfer of plant and machinery to said partnership firm and thus deduction under section 80IB was available. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Prisma Electronics (2014) 227 Taxmann 237 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)

1273 S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – New unit – Separate unit – Entitle exemption – No substantial question of law. [S.260A]

Assessee had claimed a benefit under section 80-IB on account of establishment of new industrial unit ‘second unit’. During scrutiny, it was held that assessee had illegally claimed benefit under section 80IB since second unit was an expansion of existing unit .It was found that Government of Goa itself had granted expansion by an order by giving exemption from local and central sales tax for 12 years and separate permission was also obtained from Director of Industries and Mines for setting up second unit. A certificate of consulting engineer was also produced in support of contention that construction of second unit was a new construction. Further, there was nothing on record to show that cost of old machinery utilised was more than 20 Per cent of total cost of plant and machinery which satisfied Explanation 2 of section 80IB(2). On facts, assessee had fulfilled all parameters as laid down by Apex Court in *Textile Machinery*

Corpn. Ltd. v. CIT [1977] 107 ITR 195 for establishment of a new unit and, hence, Commissioner (Appeals) was justified in holding that second unit was separate unit entitled to deduction under section 80-IB. The same view was confirmed by Tribunal. On appeal by revenue, the Court held that no substantial question of law arises. (AY. 2003-04, 2007-08)

CIT v. Alcon Cement Co. Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 146 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Audit report was filed first time before the Court – Denial of exemption was held to be justified – No justification was provided why the report was not filed before lower authorities. [Ss.260A, 10CCB]

1274

The assessee-company claimed deduction under section 80IB. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of deduction on the ground that audit report in Form No. 10CCB was not filed by the assessee before completion of the assessment proceedings. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Assessing Officer. On appeal to High Court: The assessee on being asked by the Court admitted that no such report was filed till the Tribunal decided the appeal. It filed the audit report in Form No. 10CCB for the first time before the High Court and made a request to take the same on record. Dismissing the appeal the Court held that without any justification and without any indication of reasons why such report could not be filed earlier, assessee could not for first time file such report before High Court and sought benefit of deduction. (AY. 2003-04)

Panasonic Energy India Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 245 / 225 Taxmann 148 (Mag.) / (2015) 274 CTR 250 / 114 DTR 379 (Guj.)(HC)

S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Activities of cutting stones and manufacturing tiles amounts to manufacturing – Entitled deduction

1275

An activity of cutting stone and manufacturing tiles will amount to manufacture or production by relying on decision of Jurisdictional Court in *Arihant Tiles & Marbles Pvt. Ltd v. ITO (2007) 295 ITR 148 (Raj)(HC)*, which was affirmed by Apex Court in *ITO v. Arihant Tiles and Marbles P. Ltd (2010) 320 ITR 79 (SC)*. Therefore, benefit of deduction u/s 80IB will be available in respect of said activity. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07)

CIT v. Om Prakash Jain (2014) 222 Taxmann 103 (Raj.)(HC)

S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Manufacture – Buying monitor, key board, mouse and assembling – Amounts to manufacture – Entitle to deduction

1276

The assessee bought basic computer items such as monitor, key board, mouse, etc., and was into the activity of assembling them. The Tribunal had rightly deleted the disallowance of deduction under section 80IB made by the Assessing Officer. Further, there was a specific finding by the Commissioner (Appeals) that the assessee had employed at least ten persons. This was a finding of fact and it could not be said that the assessee was not entitled to deduction under section 80-IB on this ground. (AY. 2003-04, 2007-08)

CIT v. Sai Infosystem India P. Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 433 / (2015) 114 DTR 239 / 274 CTR 414 (Guj.)(HC)

CIT v. Sunilbhai S. Kakad (2014) 365 ITR 427 (2015) 228 Taxmann 97 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

- 1277 **S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Delay in filing return and audit report – CBDT notification extending the date – Matter to be decided afresh as it goes to the root of the matter. [Ss.44AB, 80AC, 119, 139].**

The AO, CIT(A) and Tribunal held that the deduction u/s. 80IB for AY 2007-08 could not be granted as the assessee had filed the return on 5th November, 2007 instead of the due date of 31st October, 2007. Before the High Court, the assessee contended that the CBDT had extended the due date of furnishing the return for the said year. Held, since the impugned notification goes to the root of the matter, the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal for decision afresh. (AY. 2007-08)

Bal Kishan Dhawan (HUF) v. Dy.CIT (2014) 365 ITR 581/55 taxmann.com 101 (P&H)(HC)

- 1278 **S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Film production – Rule of consistency – Manufacture – An “industrial undertaking” can be formed by taking Plant and machinery on hire – Not necessary for the assessee to “own” the Plant and machinery Dept’s tendency to try to unsettle matters strongly disapproved**

The assessee, a film producer, claimed deduction u/s. 80IB in respect of the profits from his film called ‘Border’. The AO, relying on *Textile Machinery Corp. Ltd. v. CIT (1977) 107 ITR 195 (SC)*, denied the claim for deduction on the ground that as the assessee did not own any plant & machinery, he was not an “industrial undertaking” u/s. 80-IB(2) (ii). However, the CIT(A) & Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. On appeal by the department, HELD dismissing the appeal:

- (i) The argument of the department that if an assessee does not own plant and machinery, it cannot be an industrial undertaking is extreme and misconceived. section 80IB permits an undertaking to be formed by ‘hire’ of plant and machinery and does not require the assessee to own the same. A film production unit formed by engaging cameraman, editor, sound technicians and using their equipments for filming, processing, sound recording and mixing machines on contract basis is an “industrial undertaking” eligible for section 80IB deduction (*CIT v. D. K. Kondke (1991) 192 ITR 128 (Bom.)* followed, *Textile Machinery Corp. 107 ITR (SC)* distinguished);
- (ii) It is unfortunate that the department does not maintain the rule of consistency and instead disobeys it. As the Tribunal had for the earlier years decided the issue in favour of the assessee and the High Court had dismissed the department’s appeals, the Revenue ought not to have filed an appeal for the present year. We strongly disapprove of the attempt to canvass extreme arguments so as to take a chance and try to unsettle the settled matters and things. This tendency has to be curbed and we must come down heavily on parties to curb it, may it be the Revenue. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Jyoti Prakash Dutta (2014) 367 ITR 568/271 CTR 159 / 109 DTR 17 / 227 Taxmann 234 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

- 1279 **S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Small Scale Industrial Undertaking – Investment in Plant & Machinery to be restricted to ₹ 1 crore – Cost of gas fire equipment not to be included for calculating the limit**

Assessee claiming to be a small scale industry (SSI) filed its return claiming deduction under section 80-IB. Assessing Officer rejected assessee’s claim holding that investment

made by assessee in plant and machinery was more than ₹ One crore and, therefore, assessee could not be treated as SSI. Commissioner (Appeals) noted that Assessing Officer had wrongly included cost of gas fire equipment falling in category of 'gas producer plant', in cost of plant and machinery. Commissioner (Appeals) finding that if cost of gas fire equipment was excluded, then investment in plant and machinery would not exceed ₹ One crore, allowed assessee's claim. Tribunal upheld order of Commissioner (Appeals). The High Court observed that even as per the earlier notification [even prior to 1997], an SSI undertaking in which the investment in fixed assets whether held on ownership terms or lease or on hire does not exceed ₹ 1 Crore shall be regarded as SSI undertaking. As per the said notification in calculating the value of plant and machinery the cost of Gas Producer Plant was required to be excluded. It appears that subsequently by notification of 1997, the limit of ₹ 1 Crore is increased to ₹ 3 Crore. As per the circulars dated 27-3-2000 and 19-12-2000 it was clarified that if any unit has obtained any provisional registration on the basis of the registration dated 10-12-1997 and has taken concrete steps for implementing projects prior to 24-12-1999, it would continue the SSI status so long as investment in plant and machinery does not exceed ₹ 3 Crore. On appreciation of evidence and documents on record, CIT(A) held that gas fire equipment falls in the category of gas producer plants and therefore, while considering the limit of ₹ 1 Crore / 3 Crore, the cost of gas fire - gas producer plant is to be excluded i.e. ₹ 17,62,620/-. Therefore, without even considering whether the limit of ₹ 3 Crore [as per the subsequent notification] is to be considered or not, if the cost of gas fire/gas producer plant i.e. ₹ 17,62,620/- is excluded, in that case, the cost of plant and machinery for the purpose of SSI unit does not exceed ₹ 1 Crore and therefore, as rightly held by the CIT(A), confirmed by the ITAT, the assessee would be entitled to deductions under Section 80-IB of the IT Act as SSI unit.

CIT v. W. Refoil Earth (P) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 155 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Number of workers – Workers of another unit also required to be considered

1280

Assessing Officer denied the deduction u/s. 80-IB on the basis that number of workers attending the factory and working in the manufacturing process were less than 10. Appellate authorities allowed claim of assessee holding that Assessing Officer had only considered workers engaged in one unit, whereas assessee was having another unit of same activity and, therefore, workers engaged in another unit was also required to be taken into consideration while computing total number of workers employed by assessee. On appeal by revenue the High Court affirmed the view of Tribunal.

CIT v. Areez P. Khambhata (2014) 220 Taxmann 34 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Manufacturing rubber treading material and rubber compound on job work basis – Deduction allowable

1281

Assessee manufacturing rubber treading material and rubber compound and mixing on job work basis. Income therefrom entitled for deduction. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Midas Polymer Compounds P. Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 309/225 Taxmann 82 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)

1282 **S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Manufacture of Polyurethane foam for automobile seats is not entitled to deduction as the articles is mentioned in eleventh schedule**

Where assessee was engaged in manufacture of polyurethane foam [PT foam] in different shapes of automobile seats and it claimed deduction under section 80IB contending that PT foam was used by it as a raw material for manufacturing automobile seats and, therefore, end product was automobile seats, since assessee simply produced foam seats and did not undertake any further process to change its original character as PT foam, said item was covered by Entry No. 25 of Eleventh Schedule to Act and, therefore, assessee was not entitled to deduction under section 80IB (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Polyfex (India) (P) Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 224 / 224 Taxmann 74 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

1283 **S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Manufacture – The process of bottling of gas into gas cylinders, which is very specialised with an independent plant with machinery, amounts to the production of ‘gas cylinders’ for the purpose of claiming deduction.**

The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80IB of the Act contending that bottling LPG gas in the cylinders amounted to production/manufacturing and hence was eligible for deduction.

The issue before the Hon'ble Court was whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and in law, the authorities below were justified in holding that bottling gas into gas cylinders was production for the purpose of Section 80IB(3). The Hon'ble High Court opined that though it was a fact that the assessee was neither a manufacturer/producer of gas nor of empty cylinders and the activity in which he was involved was only bottling gas into cylinders, it could not be overlooked that the activity of bottling of LPG gas required a very specialised process. It required an independent plant and machinery, and what ultimately the assessee produced was ‘gas cylinders’. Unless a cylinder is produced in the form of a gas cylinder as is known in common parlance, it cannot be sold to the customers. The assessee, however, produces/manufactures gas cylinders, and once the manufacturing process is complete, neither gas nor cylinder can be regarded as original commodities and are recognised in the trade as a new and distinct commodity. In arriving at this understanding, the Hon'ble Court followed the judgment dated 7-3-2013 passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in *CIT v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.* and the judgment dated 28-8-2012 passed by the Supreme court in *CIT v. Vinbros & Co. [2012] 210 Taxmann 252*. Hence, the Hon'ble Court held that the process of bottling of gas into gas cylinders, which requires a very specialised process and an independent plant and machinery, amounted to production for the purpose of claiming deduction under Section 80IB of the Act. (AY. 2001-02)

Puttur Petro Products (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 290/ 221 Taxmann 43 / 264 CTR 307 (Karn.)(HC)

1284 **S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Manufacture – Purchasing old and used tyres / rubber scrap to make rubber crumb amounted to manufacturing of rubber crumb and hence was eligible for deduction**

The assessee was engaged in purchasing old and used tyres/rubber scrap, which were cut into small pieces and thereafter grounded with the help of machines producing rubber crumb, which was sold to the tyre manufacturing company. It claimed deduction

under section 80IB. The claim was disallowed by the AO as well as the Commissioner (Appeals) holding that the assessee was not engaged in manufacturing of any product. On Second Appeal, the Tribunal found that the end product of the assessee was different from its raw material and was commercially known to be different in the market, and allowed the deduction to the assessee. On appeal to High Court, it noted that there is nothing to indicate that the old rubber tyres and rubber scrap could be straightway reused for manufacture of new tyres without resorting to processing, as was being done by the assessee. It thus concurred with the Tribunal's view that assessee was engaged in the manufacture of rubber crumb and hence was entitled to deduction claimed under section 80IB. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Doon Valley Rubber Industries (2014) 221 Taxmann 40 / 268 CTR 102 (HP)(HC)

S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – A duty drawback incentive would not form part of profits earned for purposes of deduction

1285

The assessee-company was engaged in manufacturing and selling finished knitted fabrics and readymade garments. It filed its return claiming deductions under section 80IB including on the receipt of duty drawback (DDB). The AO excluded duty drawback (DDB) from the eligible profit for the purpose of calculating the deduction u/s. 80IB of the Act. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the action of the AO. On an appeal, the Tribunal held that DDB was eligible for deduction under section 80IB. The High Court held that when income on DDB falls exclusively in the domain of export incentives earned by the assessee in the nature of a facility provided under legislative enactments or by the Government of India in its schemes and is not 'derived' from the 'business of industrial undertaking' of the assessee and lacks nexus between the profits earned and business of such industrial undertaking, it would not form part of profits earned for the purposes of section 80IB. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Vallabh Yarns (P) Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 146 (P&H)(HC)

S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – If the undertaking satisfies the conditions for eligibility in the initial year, it must get deduction for 10 years & non-compliance in a subsequent year is irrelevant – Revision was not justified. [S.263]

1286

The assessee was initially set up as a small scale (SSI) undertaking and was eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB. In the ninth year, the assessee ceased to be a SSI undertaking as its investment in plant & machinery exceeded ₹ 1 crore. The AO, CIT(A) and Tribunal (order attached) held that as each AY was separate and independent, the assessee was not eligible to claim deduction u/s. 80-IB in the ninth year. On appeal by the assessee to the High Court HELD allowing the appeal:

There is no indication in s. 80IB that the conditions stipulated therein has to be fulfilled by the assessee in all the 10 years. When once the benefit of 10 years, commencing from the initial year, is granted, if the undertaking satisfy all these conditions initially, the undertaking is entitled to the benefit of 10 consecutive years. The argument that, in the course of 10 years, if the growth of the industry is fast and it acquires machinery and the total value of the machinery exceeds ₹ 1 crore, it ceases to have the said benefit, do not follow from any of the provisions. It is true that there is no express provision indicating either way, what would be the position if the small scale industry

ceases to be a small scale industry during the said period of 10 years. Because of that ambiguity, a need for interpretation arises. If we keep in mind the object of the Legislature providing for these incentives and when a period of 10 years is prescribed, that is the period, probably, which is required for any industry to stabilise itself. During that period the industry not only manufactures products, it generates employment and it adds to the wealth of the country. Merely because an industry stabilises early, makes profits, makes future investment in the said business, and it goes out of the definition of the small scale industry, the benefit u/s. 80IB cannot be denied. If such a literal interpretation is placed on the said provision, it would run counter to the very object of granting incentives. It would kill the industry. Therefore keeping in mind the object with which these provisions are enacted, keeping in mind the industrial growth which is required to be achieved, if two interpretations are possible, the courts have to lean in favour of extending the benefit of deduction to an assessee who has availed the opportunity given to him under law and has grown in his business. Therefore we are of the view, if a small scale industry, in the course of 10 years, stabilises early, makes further investments in the business and it results in it's going outside the purview of the definition of a small scale industry, that should not come in the way of its claiming benefit u/s. 80IB for 10 consecutive years, from the initial assessment year. Revision was held to be not justified. (AY. 2005-06)

Ace Multi Axes Systems Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 367 ITR 266/ 228 Taxmann 98 (Mag)(Karn.)(HC)

1287 S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Bottling of gas into gas cylinders – Specialised process – Entitled to deduction

The process of bottling of gas into gas cylinders, which requires a very specialised process and independent plant and machinery, amounts to production of “gas cylinders” containing gas for the purpose of claiming deduction u/s. 80-IB. (AY. 2001-02)

Puttur Petro Products P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 290 / 221 Taxmann 43 / 264 CTR 307 (Karn.)(HC)

1288 S.80IB : Industrial undertakings –Transfer before expiry of exemption – Exemption is available to transferee for remaining period

In case of sale of business by sale of building, plant and machinery before expiry of period of exemption, transferee is entitled to deduction for remaining period.

CIT v. WEP Peripherals Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 508 / 268 CTR 88/ 44 taxmann.com 273 (Karn.)(HC)

1289 S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Survey – Surrendered income – No presumption that surrendered income is eligible for deduction – No evidence was established – Not entitled to deduction. [S.133A]

There is no presumption that surrendered income is eligible for deduction under s. 80IB. Burden is on assessee to demonstrate that surrendered income is derived from industrial undertaking and is eligible for s. 80IB. In the absence of evidence to establish direct nexus of income with industrial undertaking, assessee was held not entitled to deduction. (AY. 2002-03)

Tudor Knitting Works P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 360 ITR 453/225 Taxmann 31/108 DTR 180 / (2015) 275 CTR 415 (P&H)(HC)

S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Non-claiming of s. 80-IB deduction in return is no bar for claiming it before CIT(A). [Ss.80HHC, 139(1)] 1290

Non-claiming of s. 80-IB deduction in return is no bar for claiming it before CIT(A). CIT(A) was justified in allowing the assessee's claim for deduction under sections 80HHC and 80IB though it was not claimed in the return and was not claimed by way of filing revised return. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Mitesh Impex (2014) 367 ITR 85 / 104 DTR 169 / 270 CTR 66/225 Taxmann 168 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC).

S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Business of handling storage and transportation of foodgrains – Entitled to deduction 1291

The assessee company carrying on the business of taking godowns on lease from private parties and letting them to FCI on guarantee for specific years. The assessee claimed the deduction under section 80IB. The Assessing Officer and CIT(A) denied the deduction and on appeal to Tribunal, the Tribunal held that the assessee corporation is entitled to deduction under section 80IB in respect of income derived from warehouses for storage, handling and transportation of food grains. The assessee has engaged outsiders for transportation or leased out some of the godowns for storage does not mean that the assessee is not engaged in the integrated business of handling and storage of food grains. The Tribunal sent the matter back to the file of Assessing Officer with a direction to verify the claim of the assessee for deduction under section 80IA and allow the same in accordance with law and after giving due opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

(AY. 2005-06, 2007-08)

A. P. State Warehousing Corporation v. Dy. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 485 / (2015) 168 TTJ 679 / 115 DTR 335 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Manufacture of article or thing – Development of Geographical Information System software – Eligible deduction 1292

Assessee was engaged in development of Geographical Information System Software, which, inter alia, included converting raw data supplied by its customers into maps by digitizing and vectorising it. Claim of deduction u/s. 80IB was disallowed by AO and CIT(A). Tribunal held that the software produced by the assessee is not a map *simpliciter* but an integrative digital product which produces lots of reports and relevant information, on the basis of various inputs including maps of area. It is also clear that the product, i.e. software, comes into existence after carrying on several processes, and only on completion of these processes, the property in the product can be transferred on to the customer. The transfer of property is therefore not an ongoing process at each stage of work as will be the case of a provision of services. The fact that it has produced on a platform not owned by the assessee is irrelevant in as much as what is being transferred by the assessee is not the platform but the end product. The mere fact that one of the inputs is owned by the client does not mean that the property in the product never belongs to the assessee. Appeal of assessee was allowed. (AY. 2003-04)

Bhavin Arun Shah v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 641 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

- 1293 **S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Claim for higher deduction cannot be made before the CIT(A) for the first time**
 In the return of income filed, the assessee claimed a deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act for an amount of ₹ 10,78,976/-. During the course of the hearing before the CIT(A), the assessee for the first time raised an additional claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB of ₹ 50,61,142/-.
 The Tribunal noted that the claim was never made before the AO and hence did not allow the additional claim for deduction u/s. 80IB. (AY. 2009-10)
Chiranjeevi Wind Energy Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 534 /66 SOT 191 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)
- 1294 **S.80IB : Industrial undertakings – Manufacture – Granite boulders – Furnishing SSI certificate is not mandatory. [Ss.2(29BA)]**
 The assessee was engaged in the business of extraction of granite boulders from hills and producing granite aggregates of different sizes by crushing and segregating through mechanical process. It claimed deduction under section 80IB of the Income-tax Act 1961. Whether activity of extraction of granite boulders from hills and producing granite aggregate would constitute ‘manufacture’ and hence eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB of the Act. It was held that the same amounted to manufacture within the meaning of section 2(29BA) of the Act. Furnishing SSI certificate is not mandatory. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)
Poabs Rock Products (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 61 SOT 143 (Cochin)(Trib.)
- 1295 **S.80IB(8A) : Industrial undertakings – Income from scientific research and development – Activity of clinical trials of pharmaceuticals carried on by the assessee could not be termed as research and development. [R.18DA]**
 Prescribed authority had granted approval u/s. 80IB(8A) to the assessee. The approval was renewed/extended twice after being satisfied about the main objective of the assessee, research and development activities carried on by it and the infrastructure facilities available with it. Assessee’s claim for deduction could not be disallowed by the AO on the ground that the activity of clinical trials of pharmaceuticals carried on by the assessee could not be termed as research and development. (AY. 2003-04, 2008-09)
SIRO Clinpharm (P) Ltd. v. Dy.CIT (2014) 98 DTR1 / 65 SOT 149 (Mum.)(Trib.)
- 1296 **S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Developer – Not necessary that developer should own the land**
 Section 80-IB(10) of the Act provides for deductions to an undertaking engaged in the business of developing and constructing housing projects under certain circumstances. It does not provide that the land must be owned by the assessee seeking such deductions.
CIT v. Shital Corporation (2014) 369 ITR 476 / 223 Taxmann 18 (Guj.)(HC)
- 1297 **S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Project approved prior to 1-4-2005 – No provision in Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act for issue of completion certificate – Deduction is allowed**
 The housing project of assessee builder was approved by local authority prior to 1-4-2005. The High Court held that the benefit under section 80IB could not be denied on ground that assessee did not comply with provisions of section 80IB(10). The revenue

authorities rejected assessee's claim under section 80-IB on ground that assessee failed to submit completion certificate in respect of housing project developed by it, however, there was no provision in Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act for issue of completion certificate, hence deduction was allowed. (AY. 2004-05, 2007-08)

CIT v. Ittina Properties (P) Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxmann 236 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Ownership of land – Possession of land obtained in part performance of contract – Assessee not legal owner of land – Assessee is entitled to deduction – Under utilisation of floor space index – No explanation for such under utilisation – Profit from sale of unutilised floor space index – Assessee is not entitled to deduction

1298

Held, that the Tribunal was right in law in allowing deduction under section 80IB(10) read with section 80IB(1) to the assessee although the approval by the local authority as well as completion certificate was not granted to the assessee but to the land owner and the rights and the obligations under the approval were not transferable and when the transfer of dwelling units in favour of the end users were made by the land owner and not by the assessee. Followed, *CIT v. Radhe Developers [2012] 341 ITR 403 (Guj.)(HC)*. Court also held that the assessee was not entitled to deduction on profits derived from the sale of unutilised floor space index. Followed, *CIT v. Moon Star Developers [2014] 367 ITR 621 (Guj.)(HC)*

CIT v. Sahajanand Associates (2014) 367 ITR 645 (Guj.)(HC)

S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Approval prior to 1-4-2004 – Construction completed prior to 31-3-2008 – Entitled deduction

1299

The assessee, was engaged in the business of builders and developers. It claimed deduction under section 80IB(10) with respect to 'housing project' named 'Maninagar' at Rajkot having 119 units. The Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction under section 80-IB(10) by observing that with respect to the entire project there was no approval and/or the entire housing project was not completed and there were multiple approvals with respect to different units of housing project. CIT(A) and Tribunal allowed the claim of assessee. On appeal by revenue the Court held that where housing project was approved prior to 1-4-2004 and some of its units were constructed before 31-3-2008, deduction under section 80IB(10) was to be allowed with respect to only those units of housing project, which were approved prior to 1-4-2004 and of which construction had been completed prior to 31-3-2008. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. B. M. & Brothers (2014) 225 Taxmann 149 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Deduction can be allowed only when return is filed on or before due date specified under section 139(1). [S.139(1)]

1300

The assessee was engaged in the business of construction of housing projects. The assessee filed its return claiming deduction under section 80IB(10). The Assessing Officer noted that in case of assessee company, due date specified under section 139(1) Explanation 2 to file return of income was 30-9-2009, however, assessee filed its return on 11-2-2010.

Since assessee filed its return beyond the due date, the Assessing Officer rejected assessee's claim for deduction. The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the order of Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal, however, allowed assessee's claim. On revenue's appeal, Court held that the benefit of deduction under section 80IB(10) can only be availed by the assessee if he has filed his return on time. If he has not filed his return on time, the benefits cannot be claimed. In the result, the revenue's appeal is allowed. (AY. 2009-10)

CIT v. Shelcon Properties (P) Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 165 (Mag.) / (2015) 273 CTR 106 (Cal.)(HC)

1301 **S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Proportionate deduction – Profit from sale of units having area more than 1500 sq. ft. – Question of law. [S.260A]**

The appeal had been made by revenue against the order of the Tribunal. The HC admitted the appeal on the question that whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the deduction is not to be allowed on profit from sale of units having area more than 1500 sq. ft., when section 80-IB(10) allows deduction to the entire project approved by the local authority and not part of the project. Question of law is admitted by High Court.

CIT v. Satadhar Enterprises (2014) 222 Taxmann 105 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

1302 **S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – For purpose of allowing deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) – Not necessary that assessee is a developer of housing project – Owner of property as well eligible for deduction. [S.263]**

The assessee is engaged in the business of developing and construction of housing projects. It entered into sale agreement with M/s. Ashok Industries. The agreement of sale empowered the assessee to deal with the property as it wanted. Based on the agreement, the assessee devised a housing project for which it sought for planning permission applied through one of the power agents of the vendors. In the meantime, it also took charge for sale of undivided share in the property. It is stated that a power of attorney was entered into between the assessee and the vendors towards making the application for sanction and other statutory requirements. The Commissioner held that the assessee was not the owner of the property and the intention of the owners of the land was to develop the land and construct the building, and that the assessee was only acting as a builder, who assisted the landowner in the construction. In the circumstances, the assessee's claim u/s. 80IB was not allowed. It was held that for the purpose of considering the deduction, it is not necessary that the assessee, engaged in developing and construction of housing project, should be the owner of the property. The assessee engaged in developing and building the housing project is entitled to relief under Section 80IB of the Act and on profits and gains earned in the housing projects. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Ceebros Property Development (P) Ltd. (2014)222 Taxmann 128 (Mag)(Mad.)(HC)

1303 **S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Pro rata deduction – Entitled to pro rata deduction in respect of units which had built up area of less than 1,500 sq. ft.**

The assessee is a company engaged in property development and promotion. It claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB in respect of houses having built up area of less than 1,500 sq. ft.. Claim of the Assessee rejected taking a view that some of houses had built up area of more than 1,500 sq. ft. and violation of condition under section 80IB(10) in respect

of any one of units would result in denial of total relief because assessee had to fulfill criteria for entire project as a whole for claiming deduction under section 80IB(10). Tribunal and High Court held that assessee was entitled to *pro rata* deduction in respect of units which had built up area of less than 1500 sq. ft. and, thus, there could be no disallowance of entire claim. (AY. 2003-04, 2004-05)

CIT v. Sreevatsa Real Estates (P) Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 105 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Limit on extent of commercial area of housing project inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2005 does not apply to projects approved before that date.

1304

S. 80-IB(10) was amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, w.e.f. 1-4-2005 by insertion of clause (d) to provide that the built up area of the shops and other commercial establishments included in the housing project should not exceed five percent of the aggregate built up area of the housing project or 2000 square feet, whichever is less. In one case, the assessee's housing project was approved before 31-3-2005 and completed before 1-4-2005 but the sale of some of the units in the said project took place after 1-4-2005 i.e. in AY 2005-06. In another case, the housing project was approved before 31-3-2005 but completed on or after 1-4-2005, but within the time-frame as laid down in s. 80IB(10). The High Court had to consider whether the limitation inserted by the said clause (d) of s. 80IB(10) applied to projects that were approved before 1-4-2005. HELD by the High Court:

- (i) Clause (d) of section 80-IB(10) is a condition that relates to and/or is linked with the approval and construction of the housing project and the Legislature did not intend to give any retrospectivity to it. At the time when the housing project is approved by the local authority, it decides, subject to its own rules and regulations, what quantum of commercial area is to be included in the said project. It is on this basis that building plans are approved by the local authority and construction is commenced and completed. It is very difficult, if not impossible to change the building plans and/or alter construction midway, in order to comply with clause (d) of s. 80IB(10). It would be highly unfair to require an assessee to comply with s. 80IB(10)(d) who has got his housing project approved by the local authority, before 31-3-2005 and has either completed the same before the said date or even shortly thereafter, merely because the assessee has offered its profits to tax in AY 2005-06 or thereafter. It would be requiring the assessee to virtually do a humanly impossible task. This could never have been the intention of the Legislature and it would run counter to the very object for which these provisions were introduced, namely to tackle the shortage of housing in the country and encourage investment therein by private players. It is therefore clear that clause (d) of s. 80IB(10) cannot have any application to housing projects that are approved before 31-3-2005.
- (ii) The other reason for coming to the aforesaid conclusion is that if the revenue's contention is accepted, then an assessee following the project completion method of accounting, who has completed the housing project by complying with all the conditions as set out in s. 80IB(10) as it stood prior to 1-4-2005 would be disentitled to claim the deduction merely because he offers his profits to tax in AY. 2005-06 while an assessee following the work-in-progress method of accounting

would be entitled to the deduction u/s. 80IB(10) up to AY 2004-05, and denied the same from AY 2005-06 and thereafter. It could never have been the intention of the Legislature that the deduction u/s. 80IB(10) available to a particular assessee would be determined on the basis of the accounting method followed. This would lead to startling results (*CIT v. Brahma Associates (2011) 333 ITR 289 (Bom)*, *CIT v. G. R. Developers (2013) 353 ITR 1 (Kar.)*, *Manan Corporation v. Asst. CIT (2012) 356 ITR 44 (Guj.)* followed; *Reliance Jute & Industries Ltd. v. CIT (1979) 120 ITR 921*, *SEBI v. Ajay Agarwal AIR 2010 SC 3466* distinguished). (ITA No. 201 of 2012, dated 19-9-2014)

CIT v. Happy Home Enterprises (2014) 271 CTR 524 / 110 DTR 49 / 51 taxmann.com 281/ (2015) 372 ITR 1(Bom.)(HC)

CIT v. Kanakia Spaces P. Ltd. (2014) 271 CTR 524/ 110 DTR 49/ 51 taxmann.com 281 (2015) 372 ITR 1 (Bom)(HC)

Editorial: Affirmed in *CIT v. Sarkar Builders & Others (CA No. 4476 of 2015, dated 15-5-2015) (2015) 375 ITR 392 / 277 CTR 301 (SC)*

1305 S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Building plans were approved after 1-10-1998 – Deduction allowable

High Court held that deduction u/s. 80IB(10) will be allowed to the construction company when building plans were approved after 1-10-1998. The Court followed its own earlier years order. (AY. 1999-2000, 2002-03, 2003-04)

CIT v. Ansal Housing and Construction Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 157 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

1306 S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Amended provision of section 80IB (10)(d) made effective from 1-4-2005 and is not applicable to projects approved before that date

The Tribunal held that amended provision of section 80IB(10)(d) having been made effective from 1-4-2005, was not applicable to assessee's housing project approved in year 2003 in view of the case of *Manan Corpn. v. Asstt. CIT [2013] 214 Taxmann 373 (Guj.)* and held that housing project having more than 2000 sq. ft. commercial construction was eligible for deduction. The High Court dismissed the appeal made by the revenue.

CIT v. Shreenathji Construction (2014) 220 Taxmann 154 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

1307 S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Open terrace area cannot form part of “built up area” – Need not own property to claim deduction

The assessee is engaged in the business of construction. The assessee entered into an agreement of sale with one Ashok Kumar for joint development of the property. The assessee's claim for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of Act was rejected on the ground that the assessee was not the owner of the land. The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. The ITAT, granted the assessee partial relief.

Deciding the appeals filed by both the assessee and the department, the High Court following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *Ceebros Hotels (P) Ltd. v. DCIT* held that it was not necessary for the assessee to own the property so as to claim deduction u/s. 80IB(10) and it also held that the open terrace area cannot form part of the built up area. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07)

CIT v. Mahalakshmi Housing (2014) 222 Taxmann 356 (Mad.)(HC)

S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Developer – Project completed – Building permission was applied – Permission was rejected on technical grounds – Entitled to exemption

1308

The AO did not allow the deduction on the ground that the assessee was not a developer and the assessee did not complete the housing project within the statutory time frame. Tribunal held that construction was completed in 2006. Application for building use permission to the Municipality authorities was filed on February 15, 2006, but was rejected on July 1, 2006. Several residential units were occupied without necessary permission. The assessee paid penalty and got such occupation certificate regularized. Tribunal allowed the deduction. On appeal by revenue the court held that assessee could not be denied the benefit of deduction on the ground that the assessee was not a developer. Under sub clause (i) of clause (a) of section 80IB(10), since the assessee had got approval for the housing project from the local authority before April 1, 2004, it was required to complete the construction latest by March 31, 2008. The assessee had not only completed the construction two years before the final date but had applied for the building use permission. Such permission was not rejected on the ground that construction was not completed but on some other technical ground. Thus, granting the benefit of deduction could not be held to be illegal. Order of Tribunal was affirmed.

CIT v. Tarnetar Corporation (2014) 362 ITR 174 / 210 Taxmann 206 (Mag)(Guj.)(HC)

S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Built up area – Court yard cannot be included to calculate the built up area – Deduction was held to be allowable

1309

Tribunal has held that the court yard is to be included to calculate the built up area and there by holding that the residential unit was more than 1500 sq. ft and the assessee was not eligible to claim deduction. On appeal the Court held that built up area is the carpet area plus the thickness of outer walls and balcony. Carpet area of property is defined as net usable area from the inner side wall to another. It can be seen that to meet the requirement of an area to be treated as a 'built up area' some construction has to be in existence in such area. Area of court yard cannot be included to calculate the built up area in terms of section 80IB(10). Therefore Tribunal was not justified to come to the conclusion that the said area of the court yard is to be included to calculate the built up area and thereby holding that the unit was more than 1,500 sq. ft, which would disentitle the assessee to claim such deduction. Accordingly the appeal of assessee was allowed. (AY. 2005-06)

Commonwealth Developers v. ACIT (2014) 102 DTR 89/267 CTR 297 / 224 Taxmann 77 (Mag.) / (2015) 370 ITR 265 (Bom.)(HC)

S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – If developer does not (without just cause) develop to full extent of FSI, a part of the sale proceeds has to treated as being for sale of FSI and denied S. 80IB(10) deduction – In the present cases none of assessee have made any special ground for non utilisation of the FSI – Assessee is entitled to deduction though land was not owned by him.

1310

The assessee, engaged in development of housing projects, constructed a residential project. Though total FSI of 15312 sq. metres was available for construction, the assessee utilized only 3573 sq. metres. The residential units were constructed only

on the ground floor. The said residential units were sold and the entire surplus was claimed u/s. 80IB(10) as profits derived from activity of developing housing project. The AO and CIT(A) held that a part of the consideration received by the developer was relatable to the unutilised FSI and had to be excluded from the profits eligible for s. 80IB(10) deduction. However, the Tribunal upheld the assessee's claim on the basis that the assessee was not compelled to construct up to the maximum FSI and that it had satisfied all the other conditions of section 80IB(10). On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD reversing the Tribunal:

- (i) For any commercial activity of construction, be it residential or commercial complex maximum utilisation of FSI is of great importance to the developer. Ordinarily, therefore, it would be imprudent for a developer to underutilise available FSI. Sale price of constructed properties is decided on the built up area. It can thus be seen that given the rate of constructed area remaining same, non-utilization of available FSI would reduce the profit margin of the developer. When a developer therefore utilises only say 25% of FSI and sells the unit leaving 75% FSI still available for construction, he obviously works out the sale price bearing in mind this special feature. Thus, therefore, when a developer constructs residential unit occupying a fourth or half of usable FSI and sells it, his profits from the activity of development and construction of residential units and from sale of unused FSI are distinct and separate and rightly segregated by the AO;
- (ii) It is true that section 80IB(10) does not provide that for deduction, the undertaking must utilise 100% of the FSI available. The question however is, can an undertaking utilise only a small portion of the available area for construction, sell the property leaving ample scope for the purchaser to carry on further construction on his own and claim full deduction u/s. 80IB(10) on the profit earned on sale of the property? If this concept is accepted, in a given case, an assessee may put up construction of only 100 sq. ft. on the entire area of one acre of plot and sell the same to a single purchaser and claim full deduction on the profit arising out of such sale u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act. Surely, this cannot be stated to be development of a housing project qualifying for deduction u/s. 80IB(10);
- (iii) This is not to suggest that for claiming deduction u/s. 80IB (10), invariably in all cases, the assessee must utilise the full FSI and any shortage in such utilisation would invite wrath of the claim u/s. 80IB(10), being rejected. The issue has to be seen from case to case basis. Marginal under-utilization of FSI certainly cannot be a ground for rejecting the claim u/s. 80IB(10). Even if there has been considerable under-utilisation, if the assessee can point out any special grounds why the FSI could not be fully utilized, such as, height restriction because of special zone, passing of high tension electric wires overhead, or any such similar grounds to justify under utilization, the case may stand on a different footing. However, in cases where the utilisation of FSI is way short of the permissible area of construction, looking to the scheme of s. 80IB(10) and the purpose of granting deduction on the income from development of housing projects envisaged thereunder, bifurcation of such profits arising out of such activity and that arising out of the net sell of FSI must be resorted to. On facts, none of the assessees have made any special ground for non-utilization of the FSI. Court held that for allowing

deduction assessee need not be the owner of the land. If permission is given in the name of land owners is sufficient compliance. (AY. 2003-04)
CIT v. Moon Star Developers (2014) 367 ITR 621 / 103 DTR 278 / 269 CTR 259/225 Taxmann 156 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Approval of the project – Completion certificate – Non granting of completion certificate exemption cannot be denied where the approval was obtained on 16th March, 2005 – Not required to produce competition certificate – Exemption was allowed

1311

Assessee had obtained the approval of the project on 16th March, 2005 from the development Authority and also applied to the Authority on 5th November 2008 for issue of completion certificate. The AO denied the exemption on the ground that completion certificate in terms of Explanation (ii) which was inserted w.e.f. 1st April 2005 had not been granted so as to enable to avail the benefit under section 80IB(10). Tribunal allowed the claim of assessee. On appeal by revenue the Court held that approval related to the period prior to 2005, i.e. before the amendment of section 80IB which insisted on issuance of completion certificate by the end of the 4 year period was brought into force. Application of such stringent conditions which are left to an independent body such as the local authority who has to issue the completion certificate, would have led to not only hardship but absurdity. The Court held that since the approval was granted to the assessee on 1st April 2005, therefore, the assessee is not expected to fulfil the conditions which were not in the statute when such approval was granted to the assessee. (AY. 2007-08)
CIT v. CHD Developers Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 177 / 99 DTR 401 / 266 CTR 360 / 225 Taxmann 154 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Floor plan showing less than 1000 sq. ft – Constructed duplex as per the need of the buyers – Brouchers to merge flats into duplex for boosting sales – Denial of exemption was held to be not justified. [S.133A]

1312

The assessee was an AOP of three members. The AOP was formed for developing a property and the assessee constructed two wings and each wing was to have 96 flats. All the flats were approved to be with the built up area of less than 1000 sq. ft. as prescribed in clause (c) to Explanation to section 80-IB(10). The project was approved in the assessment year 2005-06 and completed before March 2009 relevant to the assessment year 2009-10. There was a survey action under section 133A and during the survey, the officers noted that flats were constructed in such a way that the said flats could be conveniently combined with the lower 1-BHK flats vertically in order to generate spacious duplex flats. Revenue Officers interpreted these findings by stating that the assessee intended to sell 1-BHK flats as duplex flats. Further, the Assessing Officer relied on a colour brochure of 'Duplex Floor Plan' showing the drawing how two 1-BHK flats (located one above other) could be joined. It was found at the site and the same was impounded too. When combined, obviously, the built up area of each of the said duplex flat exceeded the stipulated area limit of 1, 000 sq. ft. built up area. Considering the discrepancies and the intention for generating duplex flat, the Assessing Officer interpreted the same against the assessee and opined that the assessee violated the condition relating to the area of the flat provided clause (c) of the Explanation to

section 80-IB(10). Therefore, assessee was not found eligible for claim of deduction under such section. On appeal Tribunal held that, where construction provision and supply of design through brochure to merge flats into a duplex constituted only a marketing strategy to boost sale of flats and otherwise assessee constructed flats in accordance with approved plan and sold them as such to buyers, assessee was entitled for deduction under section 80IB. (AY. 2009-10) (ITA No 2443, 3704 / Mum / 2012 dt. 30-9-2014)

Poddar & Ashish Developers v. ITO (2015) 152 ITD 117 (Mum.)(Trib.)

1313 **S. 80IB(10) : Housing projects – Income disclosed in the course of search and seizure- Deduction is eligible for additional income disclosed. [Ss.132, 132(4), 153A, 153C]**

The assessee, a partnership firm engaged, in construction business was subject to a search action under section 132(1). In the course of search, partner of the assessee-firm in a statement deposed under section 132(4), declared certain additional income pertaining to the housing project undertaken by the firm. The additional income declared was on account of on-money received from the customers to whom flats were sold in the said project. The assessee duly reflected such additional income in the returns of income filed in response to notice issued under section 153A(1)(a) for the captioned assessment years as the profits from its housing project, and since the said housing project was eligible for deduction under section 80IB(10), it claimed deduction under section 80IB(10) in relation to such additional income. The AO did not allow the claim of the assessee for deduction section 80IB(10). CIT(A) affirmed the action of the AO.

The Tribunal held that, where in response to notice issued under section 153A(1)(a) after search, assessee-firm declared certain additional income pertaining to a housing project undertaken by it, nature of income has to be treated as 'business income' albeit same was not accounted for in books of account. Benefits of Chapter VI-A, which inter alia includes section 80IB(10) are applicable to an assessment made sections 153A to 153C. Assessee is eligible for deduction under section 80IB(10) in relation to additional income pertaining to a housing project which was offered in a statement under section 132(4) in course of a search and subsequently declared in return filed in response to notice under section 153A(1)(a). (AY. 2008-09, 2010-11)

Malpani Estates v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 105 (URO) / 164 TTJ 803 (Pune)(Trib.)

1314 **S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Completion certificate – Deduction cannot be denied on the ground that the completion certificate has not been issued by the Municipality if the assessee has completed construction before the due date. [S.133(6)]**

Explanation (ii) to section 80IB(10)(a) of the Act prescribes that the date of completion of construction of the housing project shall be taken to be the date on which the completion certificate in respect of such housing project is issued by the local authority. In the present case, the local authority, i.e. Pune Municipal Corporation has not issued the requisite completion certificate (to be understood as occupancy certificate in the context of the PMC) before the stipulated date. However, the assessee has countered the aforesaid objection by pointing out that in-fact it has completed the construction of the project on 4-12-2007 i.e. much before the stipulated date of completion contained in

section 80IB(10)(a) of the Act, it had applied to the PMC for obtaining of the occupancy certificate based on the certificate of the architect and the other NOCs required for the said purpose. The CIT(A) has also called for information u/s. 133(6) of the Act from the PMC and its response did not reveal any objection on the part of the PMC that the construction was not complete with respect to the sanctioned plans. Therefore, there is no controversion to the assertions of the assessee that its project was otherwise complete as per the sanctioned plans within the stipulated date. Deduction is eligible. (ITA No. 598 / PN / 2013, dt. 31-12-2014 'A.') (AY. 2009-10)

Gera Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT (Pune)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Area of projected terrace, open to sky is not liable to be included within the meaning of expression “built-up area”-Undisclosed income earned in course of development and execution of housing project is to be treated as business income and eligible for deduction – Peak negative balance in cash book, addition can not be made as the assessee has already disclosed undisclosed income. [Ss.132(4), 153A]

1315

The controversy revolves around the condition prescribed in clause (c) of section 80IB(10) of the Act. As per clause (c) of section 80IB(10) of the Act, the maximum built-up area of the residential units comprised in the eligible housing project shall not exceed 1000 sq. ft. where such units are situated within city of Delhi and Mumbai or within 25 km. from the Municipal limit of such cities and in other places the prescribed limit is 1500 sq.ft. The housing project of the assessee before us is located within the Municipal limits of PCMC and therefore in terms of clause (c) of section 80IB(10) of the Act, the maximum built-up area of the residential unit is capped at 1500 sq.ft. The dispute before us is with regard to six residential units, which have been detailed by us earlier, wherein as per the Assessing Officer, the individual built-up area exceed 1500 sq.ft.. The working of built-up area done by the Assessing Officer is sought to be resisted by the assessee and the bone of contention is whether or not to include the area of projected terrace (open to sky) for computing the built-up area of the respective units. The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 inserted the definition of built-up area w.e.f. 1-4-2005 in terms of section 80IB(14)(a) of the Act. In terms of the said definition, built-up area means the inner measurement of the residential unit at the floor level, including the projections and balconies, as increased by the thickness of the walls but does not include the common areas shared with other residential units. On the strength of the aforesaid definition, the claim of the Revenue is that the terraces in question are projections attached to the respective residential units and also that there is no room under the area of the terrace and such terraces are exclusively used by the respective unit owners. In other words, as per the Revenue the projected terrace falls within the meaning of words ‘projections’ and ‘balconies’ contained in section 80IB(14)(a) of the Act and the same is not a common area shared with other residential units and in this manner, in terms of section 80IB(14)(a) of the Act, such an area is liable to be included in the expression ‘built-up area’.

In so far as the applicability of the definition of built-up area inserted by Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 w.e.f. 1-4-2005 is concerned, it is quite clear that the same is applicable for ascertaining the fulfillment of condition prescribed in clause (c) of the Act in relation

to the present project, since the project of the assessee has been approved by the local authority on 29-7-2005 i.e. after the definition of built-up area contained in section 80IB(14)(a) of the Act came into force w.e.f. 1-4-2005. Therefore, in the present case, it is imperative that the meaning of expression 'built-up area' is to be understood having regard to its definition contained in clause (a) of section 80IB(14) of the Act.

Consequently, the AO is wrong in including the area of terrace as a part of the 'built-up area' in a case where such terrace is a projection attached to the residential unit and there being no room under such terrace, even if the same is available exclusively for use of the respective unit holders. Undisclosed income earned in course of development and execution of housing project is to be treated as business income and eligible for deduction. Peak negative balance in cash book, addition can not be made as the assessee has already disclosed undisclosed income. (AY. 2007-08, 2009-10)

Naresh T. Wadhawani v. DCIT (2015) 37 ITR 179/ 68 SOT 235 (URO) (Pune)(Trib.)

1316 S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Bogus purchases – Even in an assessment under section 143(3) r.w.s. 147 addition to income on account of bogus purchases will qualify for deduction. [Ss.143(3), 144, 147]

The assessment of the assessee completed under section 144 and addition was made disallowing the fictitious purchases. AO has not allowed deduction under section 80IB(10) in respect of enhanced income. On appeal CIT(A) upheld the addition. However following the decision of Tribunal in *S. B. Builders & Developers 45 SOT 335 (Mum.)(Trib.)* he allowed the alternative claim of assessee under section 80IB(10). On appeal by revenue the Tribunal held that the fictitious purchases if it is relatable to profits / receipts which are eligible for deduction under section 80IB(10) of the Act. It cannot be said that the disallowed expenditure cannot be considered as profits derived from housing project or as operational profit. Tribunal confirmed the order of CIT(A). (AY. 2004-05)

ACIT v. Gopalan Enterprises (2014) BC AJ – August-P.25 (Bang)(Trib.)

1317 S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Income from developing and building housing project – Completion certificate

The Tribunal held that even a building or a group of buildings comprised in a larger project approved by a local authority can be construed as a housing project for the purpose of deduction under section 80IB(10). The completion certificate clearly states that it is issued w.e.f. 26th March, 2008, it is to be accepted that the construction was complete on that date and, therefore, assessee is entitled for deduction under section 80IB(10). (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

Siddhivinayak Kohinoor Venture v. Addl. CIT (2014) 159 TTJ 390 / (2015) 67 SOT 284 (URO)(Pune)(Trib.)

1318 S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – SRA project – Notification dated 5th Jan 2011 – Retrospective effect – Entitled to exemption project started earlier

Assessee had developed a "Housing project" at Dharavi, which is a Slum Rehabilitation Project (SRA), as approved by the Government of Maharashtra. One of the conditions in section 80IB(10) is that the project size should be more than one acre. However by Finance Act (No.2) 2004, the legislature has removed the restriction of the project size

by a proviso in case of SRA project. Subsequently *vide* notification dated 3-8-2010 and notification dated 5-1-2011 the SRA projects had been notified by the Board. It was submitted that the proviso was inserted to cure defect and will have retrospective effect. The Tribunal held that the proviso has been inserted to relax the condition provided under clause (a) and (b) of section 80IB(10) and not for adding any new condition which is otherwise not required for housing projects for availing the benefit of deduction under section 80IB(10). Accordingly the assessee's project is entitled to the benefit of proviso and eligible for deduction. (AY. 2008-09)

Ramesh Gunshi Dedhia v. ITO (2014) 148 ITD 356 / 107 DTR 357 / 164 TTJ 822 (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Amendment to section 80IB(10) with effect from April 1, 2005 restricting the built up area of shops and commercial establishments included in housing project – Prospective – Not applicable to projects approved prior to April 1, 2005. [S.80IB(10)(d)] 1319

Section 80IB(10)(d) was prospective in nature and could not be made applicable to the projects approved prior to 1st April, 2005. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

ITO v. Velentine Developers (2014) 31 ITR 452 (Mum.) (Trib.)

Editorial: Judgment of Tribunal in ITO v. Everest Home construction India P. Ltd (2012) 139 ITD 1 (Mum.) (Trib.) considered and held not applicable in view of later judgment of Gujarat High Court in Manan Corporation v. ACIT (2013) 356 ITR 44 (Guj.) (HC)

S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Joint venture agreement – Claim allowed in the hands of one party to the joint venture – Claim of assessee also to be allowed 1320

Assessee entered into a JV for developing a property. Assessee's claim for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) could not be disallowed on the ground that the assessee has not honoured the conditions of the JV agreement or that it could not substantiate its claim that the profit has been shared equally with the JV partner as these are not the conditions under s.80IB(10). On identical facts and for the same project the revenue has accepted the claim in the hands of one party to the joint venture agreement. Claim of assessee was allowed. (AY. 2009-10)

Rajkotia Securities Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 98 DTR 275 / 65 SOT 178 (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.80IB(10) : Housing projects – Limit on extent of commercial area imposed by clause (d) of S. 80IB (10) inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2005 does not apply to projects approved before that date 1321

In the assessee's own case for the same project relating to AYs 2005-06 and 2006-07, which falls after the insertion of clause (d) to s. 80IB(10), the Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) in respect of the housing project. Not only this, in *Manan Corporation v. Asst. CIT (2012) 214 Taxmann 373 (Guj.)* it was held that the condition of limiting commercial establishment/shops to 2000 sq.ft, which has come into force w.e.f. 1-4-2005 would be applicable for projects approved on or after 1-4-2005 and where the approval of the project was prior to 31-3-2005, the amended provision would have no application for those projects. The Gujarat High Court placed heavily

reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in *Brahma & Associates* 333 ITR 289 (Bom.). (ITA No. 809 / Mum / 2011, dt. 31-1-2014.) (AY. 2008-09)
ITO v. Yash Developers (Mum.)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org

Section 80-IC : Special provisions in respect of certain undertakings or enterprises in certain special category States.

1322 S.80IC : Special category States – Manufacture – Cutting and polishing of diamond – Eligible deduction

Cutting and polishing of diamond amounts to manufacturing or production of article or thing and, therefore, an assessee, engaged in said activity, is entitled to claim deduction. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

Flawless Diamond (India) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 135 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)

1323 S.80IC : Special category of States – Manufacture – Blending and mixing different reactive dyes – Matter was set aside to CIT(A) to decide the issue after considering the opinion of expert whether the activities of the assessee can be considered as manufacture. [S.2 (29BA)]

Assessee firm had undertaken activity of blending and mixing different reactive dyes with different salts with help of two ball mills. AO disallowed the claim on the ground that no manufacturing activities were carried on by the assessee. CIT(A) allowed the claim. On appeal by the revenue the Tribunal observe that, nothing had been brought on record before the Tribunal to demonstrate that the chemical composition of the raw materials used by the assessee had undergone a change or there was a substantial change in the chemical composition or integral structure of the raw materials so as to form a new product and the chemical composition of the finished product was different from that of original raw material. Tribunal also observed that no report was obtained from an expert to conclude that new product which came into existence by undertaking process of mixing and grinding was on account of manufacturing process. A definite finding was required to determine as to whether activity of assessee could be termed as manufacture so as to enable assessee to claim deduction under section 80IC. An expert opinion on composition of raw material and its transformation into finished goods was required to assess whether due to activity done by assessee, any change in chemical composition, etc. had taken place. Matter was set aside to the file of CIT(A). (AY. 2007-08, 2009-10)

ACIT v. Avinashi Industries (2014) 149 ITD 80 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

1324 S.80IC : Special category States – Manufacture or Production – Manufacture of air spring assembly

The Tribunal held that air spring assembly produced by the assessee is quite distinct from the component used and has distinct usage, therefore assessee is engaged in manufacture or production of an article or thing and it is eligible for deduction under section 80IC, more so as it has been granted similar deduction in the preceding two assessment years. (AY. 2009-10)

Resistoflex Dynamics (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 616 / 159 TTJ 425 (Delhi)(Trib.)

Section 80M : Omitted by the Finance Act, 2003, w.e.f. 1-4-2004**S.80M : Intercorporate dividends – Tax on distributed profits – Domestic companies – Dividend was received by assessee-company by 31-3-2003, i.e., before, 1-4-2003 – Exemption is available. [S.115-O]**

1325

Assessee-company claimed deduction under section 80M in respect of proposed final dividend during financial year 2002-03. AO disallowed assessee's claim on ground that such dividend distribution was hit by section 115O, so that no deduction under section 80M was eligible for Assessment Year 2003-04. Tribunal held that deduction under section 80M was in respect of dividend received by assessee-company which had, by itself, nothing to do with dividend declared, distributed or paid by assessee-company, which alone could be a subject matter of tax under section 115O(1). There was no overlap between deduction under section 80M and tax under section 115O(1) in instant case, so that a deduction under former could not be withdrawn with reference to latter. Even otherwise since impugned dividend was received by assessee-company by 31-3-2003, i.e., before, 1-4-2003, there was no question of applicability of section 115O. (AY. 2003-04)

New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 156 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.80M : Inter corporate dividends – Once deduction is allowable under specific section, which is on an altogether different footing, same cannot be withdrawn by any other section unless conditions mentioned under any overriding section have been infringed [S.115O]

1326

Assessee, engaged in business of sale of shares and investments in mutual funds, received dividend on which tax was deducted. It had distributed same before due date of filing of return to its shareholders and claimed exemption under section 80M. AO noticed that section 115O had been brought in statute book with effect from assessment year 2003-04 which clearly provides that dividend distributed will be subject to additional tax and no deduction would be allowed under any other provisions of Act and, accordingly, he held that no deduction under section 80M was allowable to assessee. Tribunal held that purpose and intent of section 115O is entirely different from section 80M deduction inasmuch as it sought to tax dividend at time of declaration/distribution/ payment and such payment of tax cannot be claimed as deduction under any section or any other provision, and, thus, in instant case deduction allowable under section 80M to assessee was not overridden by section 115-O and provisions of section 115O would not negate assessee's claim for deduction under section 80M. Once deduction is allowable under specific section, which is on an altogether different footing, same cannot be withdrawn by any other section unless conditions mentioned under any overriding section have been infringed. (AY. 2003-04)

Shah Investments Financials Developments & Consultants Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 270 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section : 80-O Deduction in respect of royalties, etc., from certain foreign enterprises

- 1327 **S.80O : Remuneration from foreign enterprise – Services should be rendered outside India – Advocate – Furnishing of legal opinion to foreign company on matters relating to setting up industry in India – Amount received from foreign enterprise not entitled to deduction of 50%**

The assessee, an advocate, entered into a retainer agreement with a foreign company. He gave legal opinion on all matters required by the company, since the company wanted to establish an industry in India. In consideration of the professional services rendered or agreed to be rendered outside India, he received fees in convertible foreign exchange and the income was brought to India. He claimed deduction of 50 per cent of the income so received or brought to India in computing the total income of the assessee. The AO rejected the claim and the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer. On appeal to the High Court : Held, dismissing the appeal, that the assessee was rendering services in India to a foreign company, and, hence, he was not entitled for any deduction under section 80O (AY. 1997-98)

H. Raghavendra Rao v. Dy. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 238/49 Taxmannn.com 425 (Karn.)(HC)

Section 80P : Deduction in respect of income of co-operative societies

- 1328 **S.80P : Co-operative societies – Assessee not being a bank, exclusion provided in section 80P(4) would not apply-Appeal of revenue was dismissed**

Assessee was a co-operative society providing credit facilities. Assessing Officer disallowed claim of assessee made under section 80P. Commissioner (Appeals) as well as Tribunal reversed decision of Assessing Officer on premise that assessee not being a bank, exclusion provided in section 80P(4) would not apply. Revenue contended that section 80P(4) would exclude not only co-operative banks other than those fulfilling description contained therein but also credit societies, which are not cooperative banks. CBDT issued circular No. 133 of 2007 dated 9-5-2007 which provides clarification regarding admissibility of deduction under section 80P as per which section 80P will not apply to an assessee which is not a cooperative bank. In instant case assessee was admittedly not a credit cooperative bank but a credit co-operative society, hence, in view of clarification given by CBDT circular No. 133 of 2007 dated 9-5-2007 exclusion clause of sub-section (4) of section 80P, will not apply to assessee. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 2009-10)

CIT v. Surat Vankar Sahakari Sangh Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 162 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

- 1329 **S.80P : Co-operative societies – Exclusion in section 80P(4) applies only to credit co-operative banks but not to credit co-operative societies – Assessee is entitled to deduction**

From CBDT circular No.133 of 2007 dated 9-5-2007 it can be gathered that sub-section (4) of section 80P will not apply to an assessee which is not a co-operative bank. In the case clarified by CBDT, Delhi Co-op Urban Thrift & Credit Society Ltd. was under consideration. Circular clarified that the said entity not being a co-operative bank, section 80P(4) of the Act would not apply to it. In view of such clarification, we cannot

entertain the Revenue's contention that section 80P(4) would exclude not only the co-operative banks other than those fulfilling the description contained therein but also credit societies, which are not co-operative banks. In the present case, respondent assessee is admittedly not a credit co-operative bank but a credit co-operative society. Exclusion clause of sub-section (4) of section 80P, therefore, would not apply to an assessee which is not a co-operative bank as clarified by circular. Assessee is entitled to deduction. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 2009-10)

CIT v. Jafari Momin Vikas Co-op. Credit Society Ltd (2014) 362 ITR 331 / 100 DTR 421/227 Taxmann 59 (Mag.) / (2015) 274 CTR 153 (Guj.)(HC)

S.80P : Co-operative societies – Co-operative bank – Not eligible to deduction

1330

Primary business of assessee societies was to provide financial accommodation to its members for agricultural purposes, however they were doing banking business and provided only nominal amount of loan for agricultural purposes, assessee was to be treated as co-operative bank and would not be eligible for deduction under section 80P. (AY. 2009-10)

Pinarayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. ITO (2015) 152 ITD 90 (Cochin)(Trib.)

Section 80V : Omitted by the Finance Act, 1994, w.e.f. 1-4-1995

S.80V : Deduction of interest on moneys borrowed to pay taxes – Benefit of section 80V would be available to the Assessee if the borrowings were taken for the purpose of payment of tax

1331

In *Hindustan Cocoa Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax*, reported in [1999] 236 ITR 140, this Court observed that the benefit of section 80V would be available to the assessee if the borrowings were taken for the purpose of payment of tax. In view of the factual findings in the present case that the deposits were primarily taken for the payment of taxes, and which are uncontroverted even before us, we are of the view that the ratio of the judgment of this Court in *Hindustan Cocoa Products Ltd.* (supra) would squarely apply to the facts of the present case.

CIT v. Mafatlal Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. (Bom.)(HC); www.itatonline.org

S.80V : Deduction of interest on moneys borrowed to pay taxes – Not allowable as deduction

1332

Assessee failed to establish that money borrowed for purpose of payment of taxes, deduction of interest could not be allowed.

Sandvik Asia Ltd v. CIT (2015) 231 Taxmann 46 (Bom)(HC)

S.90 : Double taxation relief – Capital Gains arising to resident of UAE from sale of Government securities in India – Not taxable in India – DTA – India-UAE, [Ss.45, Article 13]

1333

The respondent-bank had allowed certain residents of the United Arab Emirates to open account in India with it, depositing in their accounts monies which were the income derived from sale of Government securities by the account holders in India. Capital gains had arisen to the concerned person on account of sale proceeds of Government securities and such gains being exempt under article 13 of the Double Taxation

Avoidance Agreement between India and the UAE, no tax was liable to be deducted at source. ITA Nos. 341/ 342 dated 21-8-2014.

DIT(I) v. ICICI Bank Ltd. (2014) 226 Taxmann 335 / (2015) 370 ITR 17 / 116 DTR 414 (Bom.)(HC)

- 1334 **S.90 : Double taxation relief – Permanent establishment – USA tax treaty clarifies the usage of an installation or structure for the exploration of natural resources and if it was so used for a period of 120 days in 12 months, only then could it be considered as a permanent establishment ('PE') in India and not merely being 'ready for use' – DTAA – India-USA. [Art. 5]**

The assessee brought in a rig in India and operated it for its clients in India. Those rigs were deployed for such purposes on some days and remained unused for others on account of maintenance and repair. While determining whether the assessee formed a PE during the relevant year, the AO held that Article 5 of India-US tax treaty uses word 'used' without furnishing meaning to said word and, accordingly, meaning thereof should be culled out from Income Tax Act which includes 'ready for use' within the ambit of the word 'used'. He thus, taking into consideration the period of repairs of rig also, concluded that since rig had been used for more than 120 days in India, assessee had its PE in India within meaning of Article 5(2)(j) of India-US tax treaty. The CIT(A) confirmed the same. On appeal before the HC, the HC concurred with the finding of the Tribunal that the word 'used' as specified in the said DTAA clarified the usage of an installation or structure for the exploration of natural resources and if it was so used for a period of 120 days in 12 months, only then it could be considered as PE in India and not merely being ready for use.

DIT(IT) v. R&B Falcom Offshore Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 266 (Uttarakhand)(HC)

- 1335 **S.90 : Double taxation relief – The suspension of assessment and collection of tax takes place as soon as an application is made to Competent Authorities to settle dispute under MAP proceedings – DTAA – India-USA [Art. 27]**

The assessee company was incorporated in USA and was also a tax resident of USA and eligible to the benefit under the DTAA. The assessee was engaged in the business of international express delivery and had developed an international network of transporting documents, parcels and other items from one country to another. The assessee had taken a stand that the income which it earned under the agreement entered into from its overseas customers in respect of parcels/documents to be delivered in India were not taxable. The assessee also filed an application to respondent 3 under section 197 requesting to issue nil tax withholding order for assessment year 2010-11. The assessee also informed that the said year has been also considered while filing application of MAP proceedings with Competent authority and providing the bank guarantee. The respondent No. 3 passed an order rejecting the assessee's application for nil tax withholding order/certificate on ground that assessee's request for inclusion of said assessment year was not pending before the MAP authorities as informed by the FTD of the CBDT. Subsequently, the competent authority of USA issued a certificate confirming that withholding tax application in respect of assessment year was being considered under the MAP proceedings. On aforesaid communication, revised application was made by assessee which was rejected.

On a Writ Petition by the assessee, the High Court observed that when respondent was exercising jurisdiction under revision and he does not dispute the fact that MAP proceedings for the assessment year 2010-11 have been admitted and are pending for the assessment year 2010-11 it was obligatory on his part to have directed the grant of certificate of nil withholding tax under section 197. The High Court held that in terms of Article 27 of India-US DTAA read with MOU, suspension of assessment and collection of tax takes place as soon as an application is made to Competent Authorities to settle dispute under MAP proceedings and revenue is secured by tax payer by furnishing a bank guarantee, therefore, benefit of suspension of assessment and collection of taxes cannot be denied by taking a view that issue raised by assessee has not been admitted for consideration under MAP proceedings (AY. 2010-11)

Halliburton Offshore Services Inc. v. Jt. CIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 414 (Uttarakhand)(HC)

S.90 : Double taxation relief – Rate applicable – DTAA – India-France [Art. 26]

1336

Tribunal held that in view of the order in *Dy. CIT v. Sakura Bank (IT Appeal No. 1230 (Bom.) of 1995 dated 31-10-2003)* rate of tax applicable to assessee, a non-resident company was not violative of non-discriminatory clause i.e. Article 26 of DTAA between India & France. (AY. 2000-01, 2001-02)

Dy. DIT v. BNP Paribas (2014) 61 SOT 285 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.90 : Double Taxation relief – Once resident State has a right to tax income of partnership firm irrespective of fact that same is being taxed from partners of firm, then it has to be treated as fiscal domicile of that State – DTAA – India-Denmark [Art., 4]

1337

The assessee firm was a partnership firm existing under the laws of Denmark and was also the resident of Denmark. The assessee had been appointed as the managing owner of the two Danish companies. The main activities of these two companies were shipping operations in the international traffic at the global level and the effective place of management was in Denmark. Tribunal held that, once resident State has a right to tax income of partnership firm irrespective of fact that same is being taxed from partners of firm, then it has to be treated as fiscal domicile of that State within Article 4 and, therefore, benefit of India-Denmark DTAA has to be allowed to said firm. (AY. 1997-98, 2003-04)

Dy. DIT v. A. P. Moller (2013) 158 TTJ 537 / (2014) 64 SOT 147 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)

S.90 : Double taxation relief – Shipping business Receipts fell within treaty – Not liable to tax in India – DTAA – India-Denmark [S.44AB, Art. 9]

1338

Assessee company was tax resident of Denmark and was in business of shipping in international water. It disclosed freight income from 145 voyages and claimed benefit under article 9 of DTAA. AO accepted assessee's claim in respect of 141 voyages for which assessee had provided details, there is no dispute with regard to the operation of ships in international traffic in case of four ships, whose revenues were less than even 5 per cent of the total revenue of the assessee. Since receipts in four cases were covered in exhaustive details filed with return and fell within treaty, they were not exigible to tax in India. (AY. 2006-07)

A. P. Moller Maersk v. Dy.DIT (2014) 149 ITD 434 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 1339 **S.90 : Double taxation relief – Shipping business – Presumptive profit – Once assessee became otherwise liable to tax in UAE treaty, DTAA becomes operative – DTAA – Indo-UAE – Matter set aside for verification. [Ss.44B, Art. 8]**

Assessee is a resident of UAE. Business of shipping was entered into joint pool agreement whereby other shipping company and assessee shared space on vessel owned by other. A.O. held that assessee had not paid taxes in UAE, benefit of DTAA was not applicable. AO has invoked the provisions of section 44B and computed the presumptive profit on total receipt applying the rate of 7.5 per cent. CIT(A) has deleted the addition. On appeal by revenue the Tribunal held that, once assessee became otherwise liable to tax in UAE treaty, DTAA becomes operative. Since no details were given by revenue regarding nature of receipts of assessee from shipping business, issue be restored to file of Assessing Officer to consider same and consequently, availability of article 8 of Indo-UAE DTAA. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

ADIT(IT) v. Simatech Shipping Forwarding LLC (2014) 146 ITD 48 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 92B : Meaning of international transaction

- 1340 **S.92B : Transfer pricing – Corporate guarantee – A transaction (such as a corporate guarantee) which has no bearing on profits, incomes, losses or assets of the enterprise is not an ‘international transaction’ u/s. 92B(1) and not subject to transfer pricing, even after amendment of Explanation to section 92B**

The assessee issued a corporate guarantee to Deutsche Bank on behalf of its associated enterprise, Bharti Airtel (Lanka), whereby it guaranteed repayment for working capital facility. The assessee claimed that since it had not incurred any cost on account of issue of such guarantee, and the guarantee was issued as a part of the shareholder activity, no transfer pricing adjustment could be made. However, the TPO held that as the AE had benefited, the ALP had to be computed on CUP method at a commission income of 2.68% plus a mark-up of 200 bp. This was upheld by the DRP by relying on the retrospective amendment to s. 92B which specifically included guarantees in the definition of “international transaction”. On appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal HELD allowing the appeal:

- (i) A transaction between two enterprises constitutes an “international transaction” u/s 92B only if it has a bearing on profits, incomes, losses, or assets of such enterprises”. Even the transactions referred to in the Explanation to s. 92 B, which was inserted with retrospective effect (which includes giving of guarantees under clauses (c)), should also be such as to have a bearing on profits, incomes, losses or assets of such enterprise;
- (ii) The onus is on the revenue to demonstrate that the transaction has a bearing on profits, income, losses or assets of the enterprise. The said impact has to be on real basis, even if in present or in future, and not on contingent or hypothetical basis. There has to be some material on record to indicate, even if not to establish it to hilt, that an intra AE international transaction has some impact on profits, income, losses or assets;
- (iii) When an assessee extends assistance to the AE, which does not cost anything to the assessee and particularly for which the assessee could not have realised money by giving it to someone else during the course of its normal business, such

an assistance or accommodation does not have any bearing on its profits, income, losses or assets, and, therefore, it is outside the ambit of international transaction u/s. 92B (1). (AY. 2008-09)

Bharti Airtel Limited. v. ACIT (2014) 101 DTR 154 / 161 TTJ 42 8 / 63 SOT 113 (Delhi) (Trib.)

S.92B : Transfer pricing, – Arm's length price – Outstanding balances cannot be added to total income of assessee 1341

The assessee had certain receivable from its associated enterprise which were outstanding for more than 30 days. TPO, relying on the assessment years 2003-04 and 2004-05, worked out the interest that would have been charged at 3.26% on the outstanding balances with the associated enterprises exceeding 30 days and made transfer pricing adjustments. Similar addition was deleted by Tribunal in earlier years. Following the order of Tribunal for earlier years the Tribunal deleted the addition for the relevant year. (AY. 2005-06)

ACIT v. Nimbus Communications Ltd. (2014) 100 DTR 259 / 30 ITR 349 (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.92B : Transfer pricing – Advertisement, marketing and sales promotion (AMP) expenses – Research and development activity – Commercial benefit from payment of royalty to its AE – International transaction subject to transfer pricing provision – Partly set aside. [S.92C] 1342

Advertisement, marketing and sales promotion (AMP) expenses incurred by assessee constituted band promotion and development of marketing intangible for its associate enterprise there by being international transaction subject to transfer pricing provisions. Tribunal remitted the issue of AMP expenses to the files of the TPO with the directions that expenditure in connection with sales cannot be brought within the ambit of advertisement, marketing and promotion expenses for determining the cost/value of the international transactions. the veracity of description and quantification of the amount of selling expenses, allow the assessee's claim. After deducting the selling price from the AMP expenses, the TPO shall decide the issue of AMP expenses by applying the proper comparables. Tribunal also, held that the assessee rightly considered the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method for determining the arm's length price. The conclusion of the TPO that the arm's length price of the royalty payment should be NIL, without specifying any cogent basis, is not sustainable, hence, the adjustment made by the TPO was deleted. (AY. 2008-09)

Reebok India Co. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 469 (Delhi) (Trib.)

Section 92C : Computation of arm's length price

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Issue of shares to non-resident – Chapter X would have no application to transaction of issue of equity shares to non-resident AE's for the reason that the transaction of issue of shares is on capital account not giving to any income [Ss.2(24), 56, 92, 92B, 92F] 1343

Following the ratio in *Vodafone India Services (P) Ltd v. UOI (2014) 368 ITR 1 (Bom) (HC)*, the Court held that, Chapter X would have no application to transaction of issue

of equity shares to non –resident AE's for the reason that the transaction of issue of shares is on capital account not giving any income. Accordingly the order of TPO as well as draft assessment orders are set aside. (AY. 2009-10)

Shell India Markets (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 516/ 112 DTR 169 / (2015) 273 CTR 161 / 228 Taxmann 99 (Bom)(HC)

- 1344 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Issue of shares at premium to non-resident holding company – Does not give rise to income in an international transaction – Capital receipts arising out of capital account transaction – Transfer pricing provisions held to be not applicable. [S.92CA]**

TPO held that the difference between the arm's length price and issue price (Including premium) was required to be treated as deemed loan given by the assessee to its holding company and deemed interest on such deemed loan was also treated as interest income. The DRP decided the issue in favour of revenue. On writ allowing the petition, that the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer made under section 92CA(3) was liable to be quashed as the issue of shares at premium does not give rise to income in an international transaction. Capital receipts arising out of capital account transaction transfer on pricing provisions are not applicable. Followed *Vodafone India Services P. Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 368 ITR 1 (Bom.)(HC (AY. 2010-2011)*

Vodafone India Services P. Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 369 ITR 511 / 272 CTR 17 (2015) / 231 Taxmann 645 (Bom.)(HC)

- 1345 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arms length price – Higher commission to subsidiaries was held to be justified**

During relevant year, assessee paid commission to its subsidiaries located abroad for customisation work. TPO/AO finding that commission had been given to local distribution agents at rate of 10 per cent only, made certain adjustment to assessee's ALP in respect of payments made to subsidiaries. Tribunal, however, deleted said addition. On appeal by revenue, dismissing the appeal, the Court held that once subsidiaries were found to be performing customisation work which was not being done by independent distributors, justification of payments made to subsidiaries at higher rate was rightly accepted by Tribunal. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. I-Flex Solutions Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 37(Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

Editorial: ACIT v. I.Flex Solutions Ltd. (2010) 42 SOT 7(URO)(Mum.)(Trib.) is affirmed.

- 1346 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arms' length price – Purchase and sale transactions with parent company – Functional and risk profile as well as working capital exposure was considered as comparable – Order of Tribunal was confirmed**

Assessee, a subsidiary company entered into transactions of purchase and sale of goods with its parent company. Contention of the assessee that cost of goods sold should not be taken into consideration while computing profit margins and appropriate ratio to be considered for comparing with other entities would be ratio of net revenue to operating costs. Revenue authorities rejected the contention of assessee and made addition to ALP, which was confirmed by Tribunal. On appeal by assessee, the Court held that Tribunal had made it clear that only those entities which were similarly placed as assessee in respect of their functional and risk profile as well as working capital exposure would

be chosen as comparables, hence assessee's appeal had no merit and, thus, it was to be dismissed.

Mitsubishi Corporation India (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 495 / 269 CTR 329 / 225 Taxmann 38 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Issue of shares at premium – Neither the capital receipts received by the Petitioner on issue of equity shares to its holding company, a non-resident entity, nor the alleged short – Fall between the so called fair market price of its equity shares and the issue price of the equity shares can be considered as income within the meaning of the expression as defined under the Act – Issue of shares at a premium by the Petitioner to its non resident holding company does not give rise to any income from an admitted International Transaction. Thus, no occasion to apply Chapter X of the Act can arise in such a case. [Ss.2(24)(xvi), 56(2)(viib), 144C]

1347

The assessee, an Indian company, issued equity shares at the premium of ₹ 8,591 per share aggregating ₹ 246.38 crores to its holding company. Though the transaction was reported as an “international transaction” in Form 3 CEB, the assessee claimed that the transfer pricing provisions did not apply as there was no income arising to it. The AO referred the issue to the TPO without dealing with the preliminary objection. The TPO held that he could not go into the issue whether income had arisen or not because his jurisdiction was limited to determine the ALP. He held that the assessee ought to have charged the NAV of the share (₹ 53,775) and that the difference between the NAV and the issue price was a deemed loan from the assessee to the holding company for which the assessee ought to have received 13.5% interest. He accordingly computed the adjustment for the shares premium at ₹ 1,308 crore and the interest thereon at ₹ 88 crore. The AO passed a draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1) in which he held that he was bound u/s. 92-CA(4) with the TPO's determination and could not consider the contention whether the transfer pricing provisions applied. The assessee filed a Writ Petition challenging the jurisdiction of the TPO/AO to make the adjustment. The High Court directed the DRP to decide the assessee's objection regarding chargeability of alleged shortfall in share premium as a preliminary issue. Upon the DRP's decision, the assessee filed another Writ Petition. HELD by the High Court allowing the Petition:

- (1) A plain reading of Section 92(1) of the Act very clearly brings out that income arising from a International Transaction is a condition precedent for application of Chapter X of the Act.
- (2) The word income for the purpose of the Act has a well understood meaning as defined in s. 2(24) of the Act. The amounts received on issue of share capital including the premium is undoubtedly on capital account. Share premium have been made taxable by a legal fiction u/s. 56(2)(viib) of the Act and the same is enumerated as Income in s. 2(24)(xvi) of the Act. However, what is bought into the ambit of income is the premium received from a resident in excess of the fair market value of the shares. In this case what is being sought to be taxed is capital not received from a non-resident i.e. premium allegedly not received on application of ALP. Therefore, absent express legislation, no amount received, accrued or arising on capital account transaction can be subjected to tax as Income (*Cadell Weaving Mill Co. v. CIT 249 ITR 265* approved in *CIT v. D. P. Sandu Bros 273 ITR 1* followed);

- (3) In case of taxing statutes, in the absence of the provision by itself being susceptible to two or more meanings, it is not permissible to forgo the strict rules of interpretation while construing it. It was not open to the DRP to seek aid of the supposed intent of the Legislature to give a wider meaning to the word 'Income';
- (4) The other basis in the impugned order, namely that as a consequence of under valuation of shares, there is an impact on potential income and that if the ALP were received, the Petitioner would be able to invest the same and earn income, proceeds on a mere surmise/assumption. This cannot be the basis of taxation. In any case, the entire exercise of charging to tax the amounts allegedly not received as share premium fails, as no tax is being charged on the amount received as share premium.
- (5) Chapter X is invoked to ensure that the transaction is charged to tax only on working out the income after arriving at the ALP of the transaction. This is only to ensure that there is no manipulation of prices/consideration between AEs. The entire consideration received would not be a subject-matter of taxation;
- (6) The department's method of interpretation indeed is a unique way of reading a provision i.e. to omit words in the Section. This manner of reading a provision by ignoring/rejecting certain words without any finding that in the absence of so rejecting, the provision would become unworkable, is certainly not a permitted mode of interpretation. It would lead to burial of the settled legal position that a provision should be read as a whole, without rejecting and/or adding words thereto. This rejecting of words in a statute to achieve a predetermined objective is not permissible. This would amount to redrafting the legislation which is beyond/ outside the jurisdiction of Courts.
- (7) In tax jurisprudence, it is well settled that following four factors are essential ingredients to a taxing statute:- (a) subject of tax; (b) person liable to pay the tax; (c) rate at which tax is to be paid, and (d) measure or value on which the rate is to be applied. Thus, there is difference between a charge to tax and the measure of tax (a) & (d) above;
- (8) The contention that in view of Chapter X of the Act, the notional income is to be brought to tax and real income will have no place is not acceptable because the entire exercise of determining the ALP is only to arrive at the real income earned i.e. the correct price of the transaction, shorn of the price arrived at between the parties on account of their relationship viz. AEs. In this case, the revenue seems to be confusing the measure to a charge and calling the measure a notional income. We find that there is absence of any charge in the Act to subject issue of shares at a premium to tax.
- (9) W.e.f. 1st April 2013, the definition of income u/s. 2(24)(xvi) includes within its scope the provisions of section 56(2) (vii-b) of the Act. This indicates the intent of Parliament to tax issue of shares to a resident, when the issue price is above its fair market value. In the instant case, the Revenue's case is that the issue price of equity share is below the fair market value of the shares issued to a non-resident. Thus Parliament has consciously not brought to tax amounts received from a non-resident for issue of shares, as it would discourage capital inflow from abroad.

- (10) Consequently, the issue of shares at a premium by the Petitioner to its non-resident holding company does not give rise to any income from an admitted International Transaction. Thus, no occasion to apply Chapter X of the Act can arise in such a case.

Vodafone India Service Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI(2014) 368 ITR 1 / 271 CTR 56 (2015) 228 Taxmann 25 (Bom.)(HC)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Computation of arm's length price – Tribunal confirmed the order of CIT(A) – No substantial question of law. [S.254(1), 260A]

1348

Tribunal affirmed the order of CIT(A) on point of determination of arm's length price in respect of transaction entered into by assessee with its associated enterprise in detail. It also gave an opportunity to department to controvert or rebut finding arrived at by CIT(A). Revenue filed an appeal before the Court and contended that the Tribunal should have given its own findings rather than confirming the finding of CIT(A). Dismissing the appeal of Revenue the Court held that department, was not able to controvert those findings to enable Tribunal to take a view other than view taken by CIT (A) hence the said order needed no interference. (AY. 2003-04, 2005-06)

CIT v. Global Vantedge (P) Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 438/225 Taxmann 193 (Mag.) (Delhi) (HC)
Editorial : SLP of revenue was dismissed SLP CC 21808 of 2013 dated 2-1-2014

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Comparable – Cost plus – Mark up – Addition to assessee's ALP by applying cost plus mark up of 5 per cent on FOB value of goods exported to AE located abroad without any foundation and liable to be deleted. [S.92D]

1349

Assessee, a wholly owned subsidiary of a Mauritius based company, entered into international transactions of buying services for sourcing of garments, leather products etc. in India for its AE and was paid service charges of 5 per cent of cost plus mark up. TPO applied a markup of 5% of on the FOB value of export of ₹ 1202.96 crores made by the Indian manufacturer to overseas third party customers. Order of TPO was confirmed by Tribunal. On appeal by assessee reversing the order of Tribunal the court held that in absence of any material on record showing that assessee bore significant risks and enjoyed some locational advantages, revenue authorities were not justified in making addition to assessee's ALP by applying cost plus mark up of 5 per cent on FOB value of goods exported to AE located abroad. Order of Tribunal was set aside. (AY. 2006-07) *Li & Fung India (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 85 / 223 Taxmann 368 / 97 DTR 70 (Delhi) (HC)*

Editorial: Order of Tribunal Li& Fung (India) (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2011) 64 DTR 73/12 ITR 748 / (2012) 143 TTJ 201 (Delhi)(Trib.) was set aside.

Editorial: SLP of revenue was admitted SLA (C) No. 11346 of 2014 dt. 11-8-2014, CIT v. Li & Fung India (P) Ltd. (2015) 228 Taxmann 65 (SC)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Reliability and Authenticity of the independent international organization and its publication of rate list accepted by the appellate authorities – Deletion of addition by Tribunal was held to be justified

1350

In course of transfer pricing proceedings, assessee presented two sets of prices claiming them to be comparable. One set of transactions relied on by assessee was supplied

by Malaysian Palm Oil Board 'MPOB' and other quotations by one Oil World, an organization based in Germany. Assessee adopted average of two sets of prices and claimed that price variance between assessee's transaction and average of two sets of prices did not exceed 5 per cent and, therefore, no addition to arm's length price was necessary. TPO made addition to assessee's ALP by rejecting comparable price list of an independent international organization submitted by assessee without assigning any reasons therefore, impugned addition deleted.

CIT v. Adani Wilmar Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 338 / 224 Taxmann 51 / 111 DTR 60 / 272 CTR 20 (Guj.)(HC)

1351 S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Notional interest on outstanding amount of export proceeds realised belatedly – Addition was deleted

TPO made notional addition in respect of amount outstanding for more than year and taking interest rate at 10%. Tribunal noted that that there was complete uniformity in act of assessee in not charging interest from both associated enterprises and non-associated enterprise debtors for delay in realization of export proceeds. Tribunal thus deleted the addition. On appeal by revenue the Court dismissed the appeal holding that no substantial question of law.

CIT v. Indo American Jewellery Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 8 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

1352 S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Technical fees – Services not rendered – Matter remanded

Assessee paid a sum as technical fees towards technical services rendered by its AE. TPO held service was not actually availed by assessee, hence made TP adjustment. Tribunal following the order of earlier year, on same facts, remanded matter to determine ALP of said transaction. (AY. 2009-10)

VA Tech Escher Wyss Flovel (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 67 SOT 61 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

1353 S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Corporate guarantee to subsidiary – Matter set aside

Assessee, a global healthcare services company, offered a range of BPO services to commercial and healthcare service providers. In transfer pricing proceedings, TPO noticed that assessee had provided corporate guarantee to its subsidiary for obtaining loan in USA. Assessee had not charged any fees for corporate guarantee given. TPO held that by providing corporate guarantee, subsidiary's creditworthiness had increased and, accordingly, difference between average yield of 5 years bond and loan rate was benefit by way of cost saving, which was determined at 4.12 per cent. Accordingly, TPO proposed certain addition to assessee's ALP on account of corporate guarantee. DRP confirmed said addition. Tribunal held that TPO could not arrive at credit rating of AE without there being any analysis on creditworthiness of AE, moreover, addition made by TPO on basis of difference between domestic bond yield and that of loan availed in USA could not be accepted as domestic yield so as to compare it with loans in US and rates charged there, in view of aforesaid, impugned addition was to be set aside and, matter was to be remanded back for disposal afresh. (AY. 2009-10)

Apollo Health Street Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 67 SOT 64 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – TPO cannot question business expediency of payment – RBI approved royalty rate – Adjustment was held to be not justified

1354

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading of glass fibre products and articles thereof. The assessee was being rendered technical assistance through the royalty agreement entered into with Owens Corning Invest Co-operatief U.A., Netherlands and the royalty agreement had been in application from 1-7-2008. TPO agreed that assessee received technical assistance through royalty agreement with its AE while disagreeing with quantum of royalty payment for said assistance by assessee at 5 per cent and 4 per cent of net sales. TPO carried out a study to obtain comparable transactions in open markets and royalty right paid by such comparable companies. Assessee claimed that royalty payments were based on agreement which was approved by RBI and hence TPO could not question same. Tribunal held that TPO was not correct in going into business expediency of payment of royalty and it erred in holding that no tangible benefits were derived by assessee out of royalty payments made by it and restricting payment to 2 per cent of net sales, further since RBI approval of royalty rate was obtained payment was at arm’s length. (AY. 2009-10)

Dy. CIT v. Owens Corning Industries (India) (P.) Ltd. (2015) 67 SOT 61 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Direction of DRP was not properly considered – Matter remanded

1355

Assessee had two segments of operations, one was Information Technology Enabled Services (ITES) segment and other was packaging unit segment. During course of proceedings before TPO, assessee filed a revised segmental workout through which a part of total operating cost, earlier considered as pertaining to ITES segment, was moved out of that segment and aggregated with packaging segment. TPO did not consider revised working of margin submitted by assessee. DRP had directed AO to consider reallocation of cost made by assessee, but TPO had not made any change in adjustment. Tribunal held that since directions of DRP had not been properly considered by lower authorities, order of AO was to be set aside. (AY. 2009-10)

Digital Juice Animations (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 67 SOT 62 (URO)(Bang.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Comparable adopted by TPO was inappropriate on account of functional difference – Matter set aside

1356

Assessee was engaged in software development and support services. During relevant year, assessee entered into international transactions with its AE located abroad. In transfer pricing proceedings, TPO adopted some new comparables, determined ALP of international transaction at a higher amount. Accordingly, certain adjustment was made to assessee’s ALP. Tribunal observed that in case of one comparable selected by TPO, there was merger of another company which resulted in its earning high operating margin. It was further found that some of comparables adopted were inappropriate on account of functional difference and related party transactions. Besides, issues relating to working capital adjustment and risk adjustment also required re-examination. Accordingly the Tribunal held that impugned addition was to be set aside. Matter remanded back for disposal afresh. (AY. 2005-06)

Cordys Software India (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 33 ITR 160 / (2015) 67 SOT 65 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)

1357 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – TNMM – Capacity and under utilization – Comparability adjustments can only be made in comparables and not in tested party itself – Order of CIT(A) was set aside**

The assessee, a captive unit for its German parent company, was engaged in the business of providing computer aided services, for engineering and design of automobile components, on project basis. During the relevant financial year, the assessee reported international transactions. The TPO rejected the adjustments carried out by the assessee on account of underutilisations. While rejecting these financial adjustments, the TPO observed that the assessee had mechanically carried out these adjustments without justifying the cause of adjustment, that the assessee has delivered services only to its AE, and, as such, the assessee did not assume any kind of third party risk, and that since the assessee was a captive unit, any underutilisation of capacity was to be compensated by the AE. Accordingly, ALP adjustment was made. The CIT(A) held that the assessee had used lower man hours than available and that the assessee was a 100 per cent captive unit and had to keep minimum staff of technical engineers for smooth functioning of its operation, held that the assessee should be granted adjustment on account of capacity underutilisation. On revenue’s appeal the Tribunal held that Comparability adjustments can only be made in comparables and not in tested party itself, therefore, adjustments on account of capacity underutilisation in results shown by tested party and computing hypothetical financial results which tested party would have achieved in perfect conditions is impermissible, further, in case of 100 per cent captive service unit, very concept of capacity underutilisation may not really make any sense unless assessee has not been able to offer, for reasons beyond its control, underutilised capacity to its AE. Tribunal held that the CIT(A) has granted the impugned relief merely by making capacity underutilisation adjustments to the profits achieved by the tested party, but then such an approach, is wholly unsustainable in law. In view of the above discussions, it is deemed fit and proper to vacate the impugned order and direct the CIT(A) to decide the matter afresh. (AY. 2005-06)

Dy. CIT v. EDAG Engineers & Design India (P.) Ltd. (2014) 166 TTJ 364 / (2015) 67 SOT 81(URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

1358 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Trading in goods – TNMM – Berry ratio can be used as PLI to bench mark gross profit**

The assessee was a wholly owned subsidiary of Mitsubishi Corporation Japan (MCJ). One of the leading *sogoshosha* establishments in Japan. These *sogoshosha* companies were unique in the world of commerce, and played an important role in linking buyers and sellers for products ranging from bulk commodities, such as grain and oil, to more specialized products, like industrial equipment. The assessee company was carrying a low risk activity and the primary source of activity was in the nature of commission earned on the traded goods. The assessee used TNMM as the most appropriate method, and that the PLI (profit level indicator) selected was ‘Berry Ratio’ which, benchmarked gross profit and/or net revenues (after subtraction of any potential cost of sales) against operating expenses. The assessee’s claim was that since MCI’s three year’s average berry ratio was 1:19, whereas in the case of 22 comparables set out in the report, using three year data, the average berry ratio is 1:14 and adjusted average berry ratio is 1:13, the international transactions entered into by the assessee were at arm’s length price.

The TPO was of the view that since the assessee had used berry ratio as PLI, entire international transactions relating to sales and service of commodities had remained out of PLI, and that, most importantly, the cost of sales was not included in the denominator of PLI used. The TPO was further of the view that the legal provisions, as set out in the Act, 1961 or the Income-tax Rules, 1962, did not permit the use of operating expenses in the base as these expenses did not include cost of sales. Thus, as for the use of berry ratio, the TPO rejected the same for two main reasons-first, that the scheme of rule 10B(1)(l)(e)(i) did not permit the same, and second, that berry ratio was unsuitable for the situations involving unique intangibles like supply chain intangibles and human assets intangibles developed by the assessee. It was in this background, and having arrived at an arithmetic mean of 2.49 per cent in respect of the OP/OE in respect of finally selected comparables, the TPO made certain adjustment to the assessee's ALP. The DRP set aside objections raised by the assessee. On appeal Tribunal held that while determining ALP of international transaction in case of a low risk high volume trading business involving back to back trading without any value addition to goods traded, berry ratio can be used as PLI to benchmark gross profit/net revenue against operating expenses, berry ratio is equally useful in a case in which business entity is engaged in trading, with zero or low inventory levels, and it does not involve any unique intangibles or value addition to goods traded, use of berry ratio is appropriate in case of transactions between AEs engaged in *sogoshosha*, i.e., in general trading business from food grains to industrial equipment. (AY. 2007-08)

Mitsubishi Corporation India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 166 TTJ 385 / (2015) 67 SOT 83(URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Cost of inventories – Justified in excluding cost of inventories – Conflict of accounting and legal principles with economic principles – While determining of arm's length price the accounting principles have to make way for economic principles

1359

The assessee was a wholly owned subsidiary of Mitsubishi Corporation Japan (MCJ). One of the leading *sogoshosha* establishments in Japan. These *sogoshosha* companies were unique in the world of commerce, and played an important role in linking buyers and sellers for products ranging from bulk commodities, such as grain and oil, to more specialised products, like industrial equipment. The assessee company was carrying a low risk activity and the primary source of activity was in the nature of commission earned on the traded goods. While adopting the FAR analysis the TPO dopted the cost of inventories. Tribunal held that once one comes to conclusion that cost of inventories is not a material factor so far as FAR analysis is concerned, it is wholly justified to exclude cost of inventories in formulae adopted for ALP determination. (AY. 2007-08) *Mitsubishi Corporation India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 166 TTJ 385 / (2015) 67 SOT 83 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)*

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Comparables and adjustments. [S.92CA]

1360

The assessee was engaged in the export of network security and administrative software solutions which were developed exclusively for its parent company (BDC). For purpose of determining the Arm's Length Price, the assessee selected 11 comparables and determined the Average Arithmetic Mean at 10.30%. Since the mean operating profit/

Total cost of comparable companies was less than the OP/TC of 12.90% of the assessee, it was claimed that its international transaction relating to software development services was at Arm's Length Price.

The TPO did not accept the comparables given by the assessee and selected 14 new companies. Accordingly, the TPO determined the mean of margins earned by the final set of comparables at 26.07% as against the margins of 12.40% and computed ALP. Thus, he made T.P. adjustment to the total income of the assessee.

DRP directed the TPO to consider 11 companies as comparables which included 4 companies originally selected by the assessee. On appeal Tribunal held that ; Assessee company having turnover of ₹ 24.48 crores from software development services, could not be compared with company whose turnover exceeded ₹ 50 crores and research and development expenses also crossed R&D/sales threshold of 3 per cent. Where relevant data of entire year of a company is not available, it cannot be selected as comparable. Where a company which had incurred super losses due to extraordinary events like winding up of relationship with clients, filing of bankruptcy by some clients, etc., it is to be excluded from comparables list; simultaneously company earning super profit should also have to be excluded from list of comparables. Where a company had discontinued its product division and was into IT services, it cannot be said to be functionally dissimilar to company engaged in software services. When a company was selected as comparable in earlier year, there being no change in its business activities, same should not be excluded from comparable list. Partly in favour of assessee. (AY. 2005-06)

Bindview India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 152 ITD 120 (Pune)(Trib.)

1361 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Royalty – Exclusive use – To be determined independently**

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of manufacture of automobile parts. Tribunal held that where payment of royalty was exclusively towards use of know-how in manufacturing process undertaken by assessee and was not in any way interlinked with other international transactions and it would not lead to inaccurate result if it was analyzed separately, in such a situation contract of payment of royalty could be analyzed separately and arm's length price of such payment could be determined independently. (AY. 2007-08)

Toyota Kirloskar Auto Parts (P) Ltd v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 148 (Bang.)(Trib.)

1362 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Royalty – sitting in judgment on business and commercial expediency of assessee was erroneous – TNMM – Disallowance of royalty was held to be not justified. [S.37(1)]**

Company was engaged in undertaking design, manufacturing, marketing and sale of air and gas separation equipments/plants. During the relevant year assessee paid royalty to AE on account of sale made to unrelated party through AE. TPO opined that since sale was made by AE to other AEs of same group, there was no necessity for payment of royalty. He thus held that royalty paid by assessee to its own AE could not be allowed, same being unreasonable and purely a cosmetic transaction. Accordingly, addition was made to assessee's ALP taking value of royalty paid to AE as nil. In view of order passed in case of *CIT v. EKL Appliances Ltd. [2012] 345 ITR 241/209 Taxmann 200/24*

taxmann.com 199 (Delhi), impugned order of TPO sitting in judgment on business and commercial expediency of assessee was erroneous. Even otherwise, once TNMM had been applied to assessee company's transaction, it covered under its ambit royalty transactions in question also and, thus, a separate analysis and consequent deletion of royalty payment was unwarranted. (AY. 2005-06 and 2006-07)

Dy. CIT v. Air Liquide Engineering India (P) Ltd. (2014) 31 ITR 205 / (2015) 152 ITD 157 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Variation in depreciation – Matter remanded 1363

Assessee was engaged in business of trading of diagnostic instruments and consumables manufactured by its associated enterprises. Assessee entered into international transactions of purchase of goods from associated enterprises. Assessee claimed for a suitable adjustment regarding its claim of depreciation as there was huge difference in amount of depreciation between assessee company and chosen comparable case and also difference in method of providing of depreciation in two companies, however, Transfer Pricing Officer had given no finding on variation in amount of depreciation as well as effect of variation in two different methods of providing depreciation. Tribunal remanded back to file of Transfer Pricing Officer for proper verification of said claim. (AY. 2008-09) *Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 155 (Ahd.)(Trib.)*

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arms' length price – CUP method – Medical transcription services – Order of earlier year was followed 1364

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of providing medical transcription services. TPO made addition to assessee's ALP by adopting TNMM in respect of rendering medical transcription services to its AE, since said addition had been deleted by Tribunal in earlier assessment year by accepting CUP method followed by assessee, in absence of any change in circumstances, impugned addition was to be deleted in assessment year in question as well. (AY. 2008-09)

Dy. CIT v. CBay Systems (P) Ltd. (2015) 152 ITD 126 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Comparables – Manufacturing of printing inks cannot be compared with manufacturer of toners and developers for photocopies, laser printers etc. 1365

Assessee manufactured printing inks whereas comparable company manufactured toners and developers for photocopies, laser printers and digital printers, owing to vast difference in products manufactured by assessee company same could not be taken as comparable, further where NIC code of both companies were different, they could not be taken as comparables.

Sankata Inx (India) Ltd v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 137 (Jaipur)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – TPO cannot reject entire payment – Matter remanded 1366

Assessee was engaged in conducting quantitative and qualitative market research, having specialized divisions for media, social development, healthcare projects, opinion polls, IT & telecom sectors. During relevant year, assessee entered into various international

transactions with its AE located abroad. In transfer pricing proceedings, TPO determined ALP of payment for management services at ₹ Nil as he held that assessee could not substantiate receipt of said services from AE. Role of TPO is to determine arm's length price of a transaction, however, he cannot reject entire payment under provisions of section 92CA. Even otherwise, since TPO had already considered management fee while determining PLI and it was only thereafter assessee's transactions were deemed to be at arm's length, in such a situation, denial of payment of management fees was not proper, therefore, impugned order was to be set aside and, matter was to be remanded back for disposal afresh. (AY. 2003-04, 2004-05)

TNS India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 32 ITR 44 / 164 TTJ 576 (2015) 152 ITD 123 (Hyd.) (Trib.)

1367 S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Brand building – Credit notes – Software development – Matter remanded

The assessee-company was incorporated in year 1989. Its majority shares were held by Motorola International Credit Corporation, USA (MICC). The assessee was primarily engaged in the distribution of tele-current equipment, mobile phones and provision of tele-communication service in India. The company also provided software development services to the group companies. In transfer pricing proceedings, TPO noticed that the assessee had debited expenses under the head 'advertisement and market promotion activities' (in short AMP Expenses) to the profit and loss account.

TPO made addition to assessee's ALP taking a view that AMP expenditure incurred by assessee on behalf of its AE resulted in brand building of AE for which no cost or markup had been received, matter was to be remanded back for determination of AMP expenditure afresh after taking into consideration documents produced by assessee for substantiating its plea that credit notes had been issued by foreign AE towards compensation for promotion of brand. TPO also made addition to assessee's ALP in respect of providing software development services to its AE as a captive service provider on basis of weighted operating margin of comparables selected by him, in view of fact that some of those comparables were inappropriate on account of functional difference, related partly transactions brand value etc, impugned addition was to be set aside and, matter was to be remanded back for disposal afresh. Matter remanded. (AY. 2007-08)

Motorola Solutions India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 158 (Delhi) (Trib.)

1368 S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Selection of comparables – Merger and demerger – Lower employee cost etc. Matter remanded – While computing operating costs, reimbursement costs should be excluded – Before utilising information obtained, TPO has to give fair opportunity to assessee to have its say in matter. [S.133(6)]

Tribunal held that, company where extraordinary events like merger and demerger took place during year could not be selected as comparable since those events will have an effect on profitability of company. Though TPO is empowered under provisions of Act to obtain information with regard to selection of comparables, however before utilising information obtained, he has to give fair opportunity to assessee to have its say in matter. A company having lower employee cost as compared to assessee could not be selected as comparable. Company engaged in software development, KPO services or

providing highly technical engineer's services or outsourcing its major services to third party vendors could not be selected as comparable to ITES service provider. Company earning extraordinary high profit could not be selected as comparable. Matter remanded. While computing operating costs, reimbursement costs should be excluded as they do not involve any functions to be performed so as to consider it for profitability purposes. (AY. 2007-08)

HSBC Electronic Data Processing India (P.) Ltd v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 128 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S. 92C :Transfer pricing - Arm's length price – Comparables – Various principles explained and matter set aside to follow the principle

1369

Where turnover of assessee was about ₹ 15.20 crores, comparable having turnover of over ₹ 150 crores was to be excluded; comparables having turnover between ₹ 1 crore to ₹ 150 crore should be selected. Where extraordinary events like merger and demerger have an effect on profitability of company in financial year in which such event takes place, and a company which is undergoing said events cannot be considered as comparable. Where both comparables and assessee were providing similar services, comparables could not be rejected on ground that it was functionally dissimilar. Functionally different companies could not be considered as comparable. Company having super normal profit by way of acquisition of a company which contributed to increase in customer base and revenue base of said company during year, could not be taken as comparable. When a company had incurred huge selling and marketing expenses and its brand value was high as compared to assessee, it should not be selected as comparable as brand value of significantly influenced pricing policy would impact margins. Where employees cost filter determined by TPO was between 45 per cent to 60 per cent, but comparable had only 19.96 per cent as employee cost, this company should not be taken as comparable company. Where a comparable was not at all discussed either by TPO or DRP though assessee had contested it on ground that failed operating income filter applied by TPO, matter needed fresh adjudication. Where assessee contested a comparable on ground that it failed revenue filter test, i.e., having not less than 75 per cent from export activities, as it was in two segmental business of printing and processing and ITES activities, but TPO found that receipts from export of ITES services was more than 75 per cent of revenue from export, matter needed fresh adjudication. Where assessee was having single customer risk but other comparables had market risk, issue was to be examined by TPO afresh. (AY. 2008-09)

Hyundai Motors India Engineering (P.) Ltd. v. ITO (2014)30 ITR 655 / 165 TTJ 406 / (2015) 152 ITD 112 (Hyd.) (Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arms' length price – Working capital adjustment – Matter remanded

1370

Tribunal held that where authorities below failed to consider assessee's claim of allowing working capital adjustment on merits and simply rejected same at threshold by canvassing a view that same is allowable only in manufacturing sector or trading sector, etc., matter was to be remitted to file of AO/TPO for examining assessee's claim for grant of working capital adjustment on merits. (AY. 2006-07)

Agilent Technologies International (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 165 TTJ 54 / (2015) 152 ITD 226 (Delhi)(Trib.)

- 1371 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Safe harbour rules – ALP can only be considered on value of international transactions alone and not on entire turnover of assessee**

Assessee was in business of diamond export and Jewel manufacturing, allocated expenditure on actual basis. AO rejected such allocation and went on to allocate expenditure in ratio of sales in respect of diamond unit and jewellery unit. ALP cannot be considered on a ratio basis. The ALP can only be considered on value of international transactions alone and not on entire turnover of assessee. Where the operating cost is within safe harbour range, there is no need to make any addition under provisions of Transfer Pricing. (AY. 2006-07)

Dy. CIT v. Firestone International (P) Ltd. (2014) 150 ITD 151 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 1372 **S. 92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Each STP unit stand alone basis – Adjustment was held to be not justified**

TPO made addition to assessee’s ALP in respect of software development services rendered to AE by benchmarking each STP unit of assessee on stand alone basis, in view of fact that profit of each of STP units of assessee company could not be evaluated independently of one another, they could not be segregated and therefore, impugned addition deserved to be deleted. (AY. 2005-06)

Dy. CIT v. Birla Soft India Ltd. (2014) 150 ITD 378 / 32 ITR 117 (Delhi)(Trib.)

- 1373 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Payments made to royalty – Adjustments was not justified**

Assessee paid royalty at rate of 4 per cent on sales to its AE located abroad for use of its trade mark. In view of fact that said rate was as per RBI formula and lesser than average royalty rate for comparable marketing know-how, TPO could not make adjustment to assessee’s ALP taking a view that payment of royalty was unnecessary as products sold by assessee had already acquired a reputation of quality before conclusion of royalty agreement. (AY. 2006-07)

Johnson & Johnson Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 377 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 1374 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Interest on loan advanced to AE – Adjustment made was deleted**

The Tribunal held that the interest charged by assessee from its AE on loan advanced in foreign currency should be bench marked by inter bank rate and assessee having charged interest from its AE at a rate (6%) higher than LIBOR (2.49%), no transfer pricing adjustment is warranted. (AY. 2008-09)

Hinduja Global Solutions Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2013) 145 ITD 361/ (2014) 164 TTJ 280 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 1375 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – TNMM – Comparable**

In transfer pricing proceedings, there is no warrant for substituting ‘net operating profit’ with ‘cash profits’ in determining ALP under TNMM and thereby excluding depreciation from total operating costs. While applying TNMM, it is not allowed to compare each and every item of operating cost incurred by assessee with similar cost in case of comparables to ask for adjustment, rather it is overall effect of all such individual

items culminating into operating profit, which has to be considered for benchmarking assessee's international transaction. In determining operating profit under TNMM, adjustment can be made in respect of depreciation, in case rate of depreciation charged by assessee *vis-à-vis* its comparables is different, but simplicitor difference in amount of depreciation is inconsequential. (AY. 2003-04)

Dy. CIT v. Sumi Motherson Innovative Engineering Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 57 (URO) / 30 ITR 367 / 150 ITD 195 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – TNMM – Exclusion of one comparable by TPO was held to be not justified – Matter remanded

1376

Assessee-company was engaged in business of trading of a variety of products such as steel products, dies, components of automobiles etc. For purpose of benchmarking international transactions, Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) was applied as most appropriate method and each of such transactions were separately benchmarked. Assessee selected two comparables earning a mean operating margin of 0.21 per cent. Assessee's claim was that since its operating profit margin (OP/OC per cent) in import segment at 5 per cent was much higher than average of two comparable companies at 0.21 per cent, international transactions entered into by assessee were to be considered at arm's length price. TPO excluded one of comparables selected by assessee whereas a new comparable was added in list of comparables. On basis of arithmetic mean of operating profit earned by new set of comparables, certain adjustment was made to assessee's ALP. It was noted that new comparable selected by TPO was not an appropriate comparable in terms of functionality and FAR. It was also undisputed that comparable rejected by TPO had been considered as appropriate comparable by DRP itself in preceding year. In view of above, impugned adjustment was to be set aside and, matter was to be remanded back for disposal afresh. Matter remanded (AY. 2008-09) *Honda Trading Corpn. India (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 8 (URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)*

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Advertisement expenses paid to AE – Ad hoc addition was held to be not justified

1377

Assessee entered into international transactions and benchmarked these transactions at entity level on basis of TNM method. It was case of assessee that its operating margin on its export activity was 47.17 per cent as against similar margin of comparables of 8.08 per cent. TPO accepted operating margin of assessee on export activity to be at arm's length. However, transactions relating to advertising expenses paid to AEs was not considered to be at arm's length price and entire amount was added as TP Adjustment. CIT(A) held that TPO had made this addition in *adhoc* manner without adopting any method prescribed to determine ALP of a transaction and, consequently, deleted additions so made. Expenses of advertisement reimbursed by assessee to its AE belonged to export activity of assessee. Total expenditure made by assessee on sharing of advertisement expenses was reduced from operating margin of exports then also operating margin of assessee would be much more than operating margin of comparables. Thus, CIT(A) was right in deleting adjustment as though transaction of sharing advertisement expenditure might be an independent transaction but it related to activity of export. (AY. 2003-04, 2005-06)

Lever India Exports Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 45 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)

- 1378 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Trading – CUP – Matter remanded**
 CUP is most appropriate method in case of trading transactions provided uncontrolled transactions relied by assessee are really comparable and necessary data requiring adjustments, if any, is available, however the authorities below did not look into material brought on record showing, that assessee’s invoices to AE were comparable with that charged from non-AEs, impugned adjustment was to be set aside and, matter was to be remanded back for disposal afresh. Matter remanded. (AY. 2006-07)
Noble Resources & Trading India (P) Ltd v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 4 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)
- 1379 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – CUP – Geographical location of market is of no consequence – Foreign exchange borrowings – Rupee loan cannot be compared with dollars or Pounds – Higher rate for lack of security was not justified**
 Assessee company was engaged in business of providing telecommunication services in India. In course of business, assessee provided its customers facilities for making calls to, and receiving calls from, overseas subscribers. However, assessee’s network was used only to extent of domestic segment of those calls. Assessee entered into a bilateral arrangement with its AE located in Singapore. Assessee claimed that said transaction was entered into within tolerance range of +/- 5% of arm’s length price computed on basis of Internal Comparable Uncontrolled Prices. TPO rejected said plea on ground that for purpose of valid CUP analysis, rate charged to AE should be compared with non-AE in same market or geographically nearest market. TPO thus relying upon rate charged from a Malaysian company, made certain adjustment to assessee’s ALP. Since assessee provided services to international telecommunication companies only with respect to activity performed in India irrespective of area from where such international calls originated, impugned addition made on basis of geographical location of market was not sustainable.
 When parent company is able to raise foreign exchange borrowings at a certain rate, such rate can constitute a valid comparable for similarly placed borrowings by subsidiary as well particularly in a case where subsidiary is under management and control of lender parent company and business risk is much lower.
 Inflationary pressure on strong currency remains lower and, therefore, while determining ALP of interest charged by assessee-company on loans given to its non-resident subsidiaries in foreign currencies like British Pounds, US Dollars etc., TPO could not compare interest rate on rupee loans with interest rate on aforesaid strong currencies. Where assessee had advanced monies to its subsidiaries which were under its management and control, TPO was not justified in making addition to assessee’s ALP in respect of interest charged by adding higher points to LIBOR as balancing figure towards lack of security. (AY. 2007-08)
Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 50 (URO) / 161 TTJ 283 (Delhi)(Trib.)
- 1380 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – CUP method – Matter remanded**
 The assessee-company had entered into international transactions with its AE on account of import of raw materials, packing materials, and finished goods; drop shipment commission receipts; and export of finished goods. The assessee chose the Transactional Net Margin (TNM) method as the most appropriate method and the

operating profit/costs was taken as the Profit Level Indicator (i.e. 'PLI'). After comparing the assessee's PLI in both the segments with those of the external comparables chosen from the database in public domain, it was found that assessee's operating margins were above the average mean margin of the comparables and thus it was contended that the stated values of the international transactions were at an arm's length price. However, the TPO did not agree with the assessee's selection of TNM method as the most appropriate method and instead he has adopted the Comparable Uncontrolled Price (i.e. 'CUP') method as the most appropriate method. Tribunal held that where internal comparable uncontrolled transactions are available, adoption of CUP method as most appropriate method for purposes of comparability analysis in respect of international transactions of export of goods to AE deserves to be upheld. Where comparability analysis has been carried out by adopting CUP method, adjustments to uncontrolled comparable transaction which are permissible in order to facilitate comparability of international transaction with uncontrolled comparable transactions, deserve to be allowed.

Where TPO made addition to assessee's ALP in respect of import of raw material from AE by picking up only those transactions where prices charged by associated enterprises were higher in comparison to prices charged by the third parties without considering reasons for same, impugned adjustment was to be set aside and matter was to be remanded back for recomputation of ALP after taking into consideration international transactions of import of raw materials from AE in its entirety. Matter remanded. (AY. 2007-08)

Henkel Adhesives Technologies India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 111 (URO) / 163 TTJ 491 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Adjustments made by the TPO was set-aside – Matter remanded

1381

Assessee was a subsidiary of Lucent Inc., holding 99.66 per cent of its shares. Assessee was engaged in providing software development services to its holding company located abroad. Assessee followed TNMM as most appropriate method with Profit Level Indicator (PLI) of Operating Profit/Operating Cost (OP/OC) to benchmark its international transactions. Assessee computed its OP/OC at 14.89 per cent with weighted average of last three years OP/OC of 36 comparables giving out such margin at 12.04 per cent. On said basis, assessee claimed that its international transactions were at Arm's Length Price (ALP). TPO rejected 28 comparables out of 36 chosen by assessee and final benchmarking was done by using eight comparables. Resultantly, OP/OC of such comparables was determined at 23.55 per cent which led to transfer pricing adjustment. Assessee raised objection before DRP regarding inclusion of two comparables namely 'I' and 'M'. DRP set aside assessee's objection. It was noted that assessee did not own proprietary product like Finacle owned by 'I'. Further, assessee was claiming to have spent only nominal amount of expenditure at ₹ 2.7 lakhs on advertisement/sales promotion and brand building as against ₹ 499 crores incurred by 'I'. As regards 'M' Ltd., it was noticed that 'M' was engaged in diversified IT services segment offering business process operations, application development and maintenance etc. as against assessee providing only contract software development services. On facts,

assessee made a *prima facie* case for exclusion of aforesaid comparables and, therefore, impugned adjustment was to be set aside and matter was to be remanded back to AO for disposal afresh. Matter remanded. Where assessee has wrongly included some cases in list of comparables, which position has not been disturbed by TPO, in such a case, there can be no embargo on pleading by assessee for exclusion of those comparables at a subsequent stage. (AY. 2006-07)

Alcatel Lucent Technologies India (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 108 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

1382 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Foreign exchange gain/loss is a relevant factor in computation of assessee’s ALP – Matter remanded**

Assessee-company was providing high value designing, engineering and computer aided design services to its parent company in UAE. In order to benchmark its international transactions, assessee adopted TNMM. In transfer pricing proceedings, TPO rejected a comparable selected by assessee namely ‘K’. On basis of new arithmetic weighted mean of remaining comparables, certain addition was made to assessee’s ALP. Assessee filed instant appeal raising a plea that said comparable had been duly accepted in succeeding assessment year. Moreover, TPO had not given a comprehensive show cause to assessee before rejecting comparable in question. On facts, impugned adjustment was to be set aside and matter was to be remanded back for disposal afresh. Matter remanded.

In case of international transactions entered into by assessee with its AE, foreign exchange gain/loss is a relevant factor in computation of assessee’s ALP. (AY. 2008-09) *Petrofac Engineering Services India (P) Ltd v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 147 (Chennai)(Trib.)*

1383 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Oil World, being independent organisation provided independent forecasting services for oil seeds, oils and meals and that quotation adopted by assessee from Oil World was an independent authentic trade quotation which could not be ignored**

Assessee, engaged in business of manufacturing of edible and trading oil, entered into international transaction with its Malaysian AE by way of purchase of edible oil. To determine ALP of said transaction, it used two quotations, one from Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB) and Oil World and claimed that no TP adjustment was required as price paid to AE was within 5 per cent of arithmetical means of said quotations. However, TPO ignored quotations of Oil World, it being not a Government agency and made TP addition on account of price differential between that charged to AE and MPOB. CIT(A) observed that Oil World, being independent organisation provided independent forecasting services for oil seeds, oils and meals and that quotation adopted by assessee from Oil World was an independent authentic trade quotation which could not be ignored without any valid reason and he held that no adjustment under section 92C was required. Tribunal held that revenue could not controvert findings of CIT(A) by bringing any contrary material on record, therefore, said order need not be interfered with. (AY. 2002-03)

ACIT v. Adani Wilmar Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 122 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Notional interest – In absence of any independent uncontrolled transaction available on record for purpose of making adjustment, impugned addition made by AO was to be set aside

1384

Assessee gave certain amount as loan to its AE located abroad in respect of which no interest was charged. Assessee’s case was that no addition on account of notional interest was called for as assessee had been getting regular business from AE and, therefore, interest free advances were given on commercial expediency. AO rejected assessee’s explanation. He further finding that assessee had charged interest at rate of 8 per cent from other AEs, made adjustment to assessee’s ALP by adopting same rate. Since assessee’s transactions with other AEs were also controlled transactions, same could not be considered as comparable. Therefore, in absence of any independent uncontrolled transaction available on record for purpose of making adjustment, impugned addition made by AO was to be set aside. (AY. 2003-04)

Crest Animation Studios Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 116 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Closely linked international transactions can be aggregated to determine the ALP

1385

Tribunal held that on a combined reading of Rules 10A(d) and 10B of the Rules, a number of transactions can be aggregated and construed as a single ‘transaction’ for the purposes of determining the ALP, provided of course that such transactions are ‘closely linked’. Ostensibly the rationale of aggregating ‘closely linked’ transactions to facilitate determination of ALP envisaged a situation where it would be inappropriate to analyse the transactions individually. The proposition that a number of individual transactions can be aggregated and construed as a composite transaction in order to compute ALP also finds an echo in the OECD guidelines. As per an example noted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (‘ICAI’) in its Guidance Notes on transfer pricing in para 13.7, it is stated that two or more transactions can be said to be ‘closely linked’, if they emanate from a common source, being an order or contract or an agreement or an arrangement, and the nature, characteristic and terms of such transactions substantially flow from the said common source;

On facts, the international transactions of import of spare parts, export of spare parts, IT support services, access to customised parts catalogue and amount received for warranty consideration are inter-related transactions, which were the sourcing activities of the assessee company and have to be aggregated in order to benchmark the international transactions. The assessee had benchmarked the arm’s length price of all the transactions by comparing results of the comparable companies which were found to be at arm’s length price. (AY. 2005-06)

Cummins India Limited v. ACIT (2015) 68 SOT 14 (URO) / 170 TTJ 746 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – ALP of interest on funds advanced to AEs has to computed on LIBOR and not as per domestic Prime Lending Rate (PLR)

1386

While benchmarking the international transactions what has to be seen is the comparison between related transactions i.e., where the assessee has advanced money to its associated enterprises and charged interest then the said transaction is to be compared with a transaction as to what rate the assessee would have charged, if it

had extended the loan to the third party in foreign country. Once there is a transaction between the assessee and its associated enterprises in foreign currency, then the transaction would have to be looked upon by applying the commercial principles with regard to the international transactions. In that case, the international rates fixed being LIBOR+ rates would have an application and the domestic prime lending rates would not be applicable. The assessee has further explained that it had raised the loan from Citi Bank on international rates for the purpose of investment in the share application money of its associated enterprises, which in turn was partly converted from capital into loan. Where the assessee had a comparable of borrowing loan on international rates and advancing to its associated enterprises, then the said comparable was to be applied for benchmarking the transaction of advancing the loan on interest to its associated enterprises. The assessee had charged interest rate of 4.75% on the loan advanced to the associated enterprises. The assessee on the other hand, claims that it had borrowed the money on LIBOR+ rates i.e., international rates, which were Japanese based LIBOR+ rates which were lower than the US based LIBOR+ rates. The plea of the assessee before us was that it had advanced the loan to its associated enterprises on LIBOR+ rates i.e., 4.75%. Where the assessee has the internal CUP of operating at international rates available and since the said loan raised by the assessee at international rates was advanced to its associated enterprises, we find no merit in the order of the TPO in applying the domestic loan rates i.e., BPLR rates for benchmarking transaction of charging of interest on the loans advanced to the associated enterprises by the assessee. Where the assessee had made the borrowings on LIBOR+ rates and advanced the same at LIBOR+ rates, then the said transaction is at arm's length price and there is no merit in any adjustment to be made on this account. (AY. 2008-09)
Varroc Engineering Pvt Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 168 TTJ 514 / 54 taxmann.com 384 (Pune) (Trib.)

- 1387 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Turnover filter – Comparables have to be excluded by the turnover filter without FAR analysis being required to be conducted. The AO cannot rely on information obtained u/s. 133(6) which was not available in public domain [S.133(6)]**

In view of the turnover being higher than ₹ 200 crores in the case of the above companies, which was elected by TPO Tribunal directed the AO to exclude these companies from the list of comparables.

Tribunal also held that the TPO has drawn conclusions on the basis of information obtained by issue of notice u/s. 133(6) of the Act. This information which was not available in public domain could not have been used by the TPO. (AY. 2006-07)

Yahoo Software Development India P. Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 54 taxmann.com 362 (Bang.) (Trib.)

- 1388 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arms' length price – Cost Plus Method (CPM) – Contract manufacturers**

The assessee manufactured components of medical devices and sold it to its AE. The assessee claimed that it performed functions and undertook risks that were normally performed by a contract manufacturer. It chose Cost Plus Method (CPM) as the

Most Appropriate Method (MAM) for determination of ALP. The assessee identified 19 comparable companies. Tribunal held that Cost Plus Method (CPM) is most appropriate method in case of contract manufacturers but that would be subject to satisfaction of parameters laid down in Rules 10C(1) and 2(2). Matter remanded.

Tribunal also held that where assessee entered into international transactions of contract manufacturing only with its AE, TPO in course of transfer pricing proceedings was required to give adjustments of additional functions performed by comparables in nature of selling and marketing as assessee being a contract manufacturer, was not required to perform said functions. (AY. 2004-05)

Dy. CIT v. GE BE (P) Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 129 (URO) / 164 TTJ 40 (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Loan – LIBOR method of rate

1389

During relevant year, assessee advanced loan to its AE located in Mauritius carrying interest at rate of 7.5 per cent per annum. In transfer pricing study, assessee benchmarked international transaction using LIBOR. Six months average US\$ LIBOR rate for period April, 2006 to March, 2007 came to 5.39 per annum. Since, assessee actually charged 7.5 per cent which was higher than comparable uncontrolled price of six months US\$ LIBOR, transaction of advancement of loan was claimed to be at arm’s length price. TPO by adopting interest rate taken earlier for advancing similar loans to associate enterprises, made certain adjustment. DRP confirmed said adjustment. Tribunal following the order passed in *Siva Industries & Holdings Ltd. v. ACIT [2011] 46 SOT 112 (URO)(Chennai)* and Mumbai Bench in *Tata Autocomp Systems Ltd. v. ACIT [2012] 52 SOT 48 (Mum.)*, order of lower authorities was set aside and AO was to be directed to consider LIBOR method of rate of interest for purpose of determining arm’s length price of transaction in question. (AY. 2007-08)

Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 203 (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Libor+ percentage – Matter remanded

1390

Assessee-company was engaged in manufacture of bulk drugs and pharmaceutical formulations. It advanced funds to its associate concerns and earned interest. Assessee claimed that it had charged interest on basis of LIBOR+ certain percentage points which was more than interest paid on such loans. TPO, however, did not agree with assessee and considered rate of interest at 12 per cent per annum would be reasonable for arriving at arm’s length price. Accordingly, TPO proposed certain adjustment to assessee’s ALP which was accepted by AO. CIT(A) reduced rate of interest to 11 per cent and, accordingly, granted partial relief to assessee. Following order passed by Co-ordinate Bench of Tribunal in ITA No. 1866/Hyd./2012 dated 29-11-2003, matter was to be remanded back to Assessing Officer to examine whether rate of interest received was at LIBOR + percentage points and, in case some of loans were reflecting rate at ordinary percentage points, conversion to LIBOR plus was required. Matter remanded. (AY. 2005-06 to 2007-08)

Aurobindo Pharma Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 166 (URO) (Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 1391 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – CUP method – Future data cannot be contemplated – Valuation of goods accepted by custom authority cannot be considered appropriate for purpose of arriving at ALP**

Where assessee purchases raw material from its AE located abroad as well as from uncontrolled enterprises operating in domestic market and, there is high degree of product comparability, in such a case CUP method is most appropriate method to determine ALP in respect of such transactions. Transfer pricing regulations do not contemplate taking into account future data for purpose of benchmarking international transactions. Valuation of goods accepted by custom authority cannot be considered appropriate for purpose of arriving at ALP. Matter remanded. (AY. 2003-04)

ACIT v. Denso India Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 191 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)

- 1392 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – All comparable selected by revenue to same test for selecting unsuitability of same – Matter remanded**

Assessee has to subject all comparables selected by revenue to same test for selecting unsuitability of same. In process of qualitative analysis based on which comparables are finally selected, objectivity and consistency are to be maintained. The income tax proceedings are not adversarial proceedings, as these are the proceedings to reach the correct position. In the process of analysis, objectivity and consistency is to be maintained. Matter was remanded (AY. 2008-09)

Allscripts India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 157 TTJ 509 / (2014) 150 ITD 105 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

- 1393 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Though there is a functional difference between a PE Fund and a Merchant Banker, A manager or a sub-advisor to the PE Fund cannot be equated with the PE Fund so as not to be comparable with Merchant Bankers**

(i) A merchant bank, apart from helping businessmen in raising finance, also renders consultancy services. It helps its clients in raising finance through issue of shares, debentures, bank loans, etc., from the domestic and international market. The term “Merchant Banker” has been defined in the Rule 2(e) of SEBI (Merchant Bankers) Rules, 1922, to mean : ‘any person who is engaged in the business of Issue Management either by making arrangements regarding selling, buying or subscribing to Securities as Manager, Consultant, Adviser of rendering Corporate Advisory Service in relation to such Issue Management’. Its activities also include project counselling, corporate counselling in areas of capital restructuring, amalgamations, mergers, takeovers, discounting and rediscounting of short-term papers in money market and acting as brokers in stock exchange and advisors on portfolio management. On the other hand, a Private equity firm also known as a Private equity fund (hereinafter also called the ‘PE fund’), is a group of investors, which collects money from wealthy individuals or institutions etc. for the purposes of investing in or buying companies. PE fund is managed by a Fund Manager. Thus, PE Fund is overall responsible for managing the money taken from its investors. PE Fund oversees its day-to-day operations including making investment decisions and managing the acquired companies, which, after acquisition, are known as portfolio companies. PE Funds earn income by charging an annual

management fee as some percentage of the money under their management and then some percentage of the profits when they sell portfolio companies. Simply put, whereas, a merchant banking is a capital raising/advisory service, a private equity is an investment business. To put succinctly, PE Funds are investors and not advisors.

- (ii) Turning to facts of the instant case is that there are three investors. Xander Master Fund, a Mauritius limited liability company (Fund), is responsible for private equity investment. It appointed Xander Investment Management Ltd., Mauritius (Manager) for providing overall investment advice. The Manager sub-contracted specific activities to the assessee (Indian Sub-Advisor). The Manager and the Indian Sub-Advisor entered into an Agreement on 10-10-2005, under which the assessee (Indian Sub-Advisor) undertook to provide general advisory services to the Manager in relation to real estate sector in India. Such services, as discussed above include providing feedback to the Manager in relation to the real estate investment opportunities in India; identifying the potential vendors; negotiating with the vendors as an agent of the Manager, finalising deals, if the Manager is satisfied, and; to provide actual support services, if the investment is made by the Manager. In this three-tier hierarchy, Xander Master Fund is 'the PE Fund', Xander Investment Management Ltd., Mauritius, is the 'Manager' and the assessee is simply 'Sub-Advisor to the Manager'. From an overview of the nature of activities discussed above, it is noticed that the contention of the learned. AR that the assessee acted as a PE Fund in India, is not tenable. The Manager subcontracted specific activities to the assessee, which were in the nature of advisory to him. By no stretch of imagination, the assessee can be described as PE Fund, who, in present facts is, Xander Master Fund. The name by which a transaction is coined is not decisive of its character. It is the real nature of a transaction which is always relevant and conclusive. A bare perusal of the nature of activities carried out by the assessee in the extant international transaction abundantly proves that these are not that of a PE Fund. Ex consequenti, the decisions cited by the learned. AR seeking to canvass the exclusion of three companies on the strength of the assessee in those cases acting as PE Funds, do not advance his case any further. As such, we are desisting from considering such decisions, which were rendered drawing distinction between a merchant banker and a PE Fund and holding that a merchant banker cannot be considered as comparable to a PE Fund. Be that as it may, a company cannot be considered as comparable or incomparable on the generality of mere description of its overall category. This assumes more significance when a company is otherwise entitled to pursue several lines of activities. One needs to verify the nature of activity actually carried on for deciding its comparability or otherwise. No nomenclature can superimpose the real character of a transaction. (AY. 2008-09)

Xander Advisors India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 36 ITR 499 / (2015) 153 ITD 528 (Delhi Trib.)

1394 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – CUP method can be applied by comparing a pricing formulae, rather than the pricing quantification in amount – Rule 10AB inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2012 is beneficial in nature and so retrospective w.e.f. 1-4-2002. [R.10B]**

The assessee followed the 50:50 business model of sharing residual profits in equal ratio with the service provider at the other end of the transaction i.e. at the consignee's end in the case of export transaction and at consigner's end in the case of import transaction. This is a standard practice in the Industry. Even with respect to transactions with unrelated parties in this line of activity, it is admitted practice to share the residual profit in equal ratio. The assessee accordingly claimed that its transactions with the AE are at arm's length as per the CUP method. However, though there is a standard formula for computing the consideration, the data regarding precise amount charged or received for precisely the same services is not available for comparison. The TPO held that as data about exactly the same amount having been charged for exactly the same service in the uncontrolled transactions has not been furnished by the assessee, it is not a fit case for application of CUP and applied TNMM. On appeal by the assessee HELD by the Tribunal:

- (i) Transfer pricing should not be viewed as a source of revenue. It is an anti-abuse measure in character and all it does is to ensure that the transactions are not so artificially priced, with the benefit of *inter se* relationship between associated enterprises, so as to deprive a tax jurisdiction of its due share of taxes. Our transfer pricing legislation as also transfer pricing jurisprudence duly recognise this fundamental fact and ensure that such pedantic and unresolved procedural issues, as have arisen in this case due to limitations of the prescribed methods of ascertaining arm's length price, are not allowed to come in the way of substantive justice, particularly when it is beyond reasonable doubt that there is no influence of intra AE relationship on the determination of prices in respect of intra AE transactions. A pedantic approach in determination of arm's length price, which serves letter of the law but leads to the conclusion diametrically opposed to the spirit of the law, has to be deprecated. We are in considered agreement with this school of thought.
- (ii) The connotations of 'price', as set out in rule 10B(1)(a) are required to be taken to be something much broader than the expression 'amount' inasmuch as it is required to cover not only quantification of price in terms of an amount but also in terms of a formulae according to which the price is quantified. Such an interpretation is a very purposive and realistic interpretation.
- (iii) As one can come to the conclusion, under any method of determining the arm's length price, that price paid for the controlled transactions is the same as it would have been, under similar circumstances and considering all the relevant factors, for an uncontrolled transaction, the price so paid can be said to be arm's length price. The price need not be in terms of an amount but can also be in terms of a formulae, including interest rate, for computing the amount. In any case, when the expression 'price which would have been charged set paid' is used in rule 10BA, dealing with this method, in this method the place of "price charged or paid", as is used in rule 10B(1)(a), dealing with CUP method, such an expression not only covers the actual price but also the price as would have been, hypothetically

speaking, paid if the same transaction was entered into with an independent enterprise. This hypothetical price may not only cover bona fide quotations, but it also takes it beyond any doubt or controversy that where pricing mechanism for associated enterprise and independent enterprise is the same, the price charged to the associated enterprises will be treated as an arm's length price. In this view of the matter, the business model said to have been adopted by the assessee, in principle, meets the test of arm's length price determination under rule 10AB as well.

- (iv) Rule 10B(1)(f) inserted *vide* notification dated 23rd May, 2012 is not a residual method in the sense that it is not a condition precedent for the application of this method that all other methods set out in s. 92C(1)(a) to 92C(1)(e) and as elaborated under rules 10B(1)(a) to (e), must fail and only then this method can be applied. This method is at par with all other methods of determining the arm's length price as set out in sections 92C(1)(a) to (f), and, in terms of Section 92C(2), the most appropriate method, referred to in section 92C(1), "shall be applied, for determination of arm's length price, in the manner prescribed". Therefore, as long as the method covered by rule 10AB, which is duly covered by section 92C(1) satisfies the test of being the 'most appropriate method', it can be applied to a fact situation. The expression 'price which....would have been charged on paid' is used in rule 10BA, dealing with this method, in this method the place of "price charged or paid", as is used in rule 10B(1)(a), dealing with CUP method, such an expression not only covers the actual price but also the price as would have been, hypothetically speaking, paid if the same transaction was entered into with an independent enterprise. This hypothetical price may not only cover *bona fide* quotations, but it also takes it beyond any doubt or controversy that where pricing mechanism for associated enterprise and independent enterprise is the same, the price charged to the associated enterprises will be treated as an arm's length price. In this view of the matter, the business model said to have been adopted by the assessee, in principle, meets the test of arm's length price determination under rule 10BA as well.
- (v) Though rule 10BA as also the corresponding enabling rule 10B(1)(f) are inserted by the Income Tax (Sixth Amendment) Rules 2012 and are specifically stated to be effective from 1st April 2012, i.e. assessment year 2012-13 onwards, it has to be treated as being retrospective in view of the law laid down in Vatika Townships that a legislation conferring a benefit but without inflicting a corresponding detriment would warrant it to be given a retrospective effect. As rule 10BA, confers the benefit of an additional method of ascertaining arm's length price and, *inter alia*, relaxes the rigour of CUP method, it can only be retrospective in effect and effective from 1st April 2002. (AY. 2006-07)

Toll global forwarding India Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 152 ITD 283/ 37 ITR 391 / 167 TTJ 67 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Cup method

Assessee was engaged in the business of manufacturing/refining and trading of edible oils. It had entered into international transaction with one of its 'Associated enterprise in Malaysia by way of purchase of edible oil. While determining the ALP of said

transaction, the assessee had used two rates/quotations, one from 'MPOB' (Malaysia Palm Oil Boar) and other from Oil World. The assessee claimed that since the price paid to the associated enterprises was within 5% of the arithmetical mean of quotation of 'MPOB' and from oil world, no TP adjustment should be made. However TPO ignored quotation of Oil World and directed for addition of price differential between that charged to AE and that charged to 'MPOB'. The CIT(A) deleted the said addition. As the Revenue could not controvert the findings of CIT(A) by brining any contrary material on record, the tribunal did not interfere with his findings. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s findings that Oil World was an independent organisation which provided independent forecasting services for oil seed oils and meals and that quotation adopted by assessee from Oil World was an independent authentic trade quotation. Which could not be ignored. (AY. 2002-03)

ACIT v. Adani Wilmar Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 122 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

1396 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – CUP method**

Where assessee purchases raw materials from its AE located abroad as well as from uncontrolled enterprises operating in domestic market and, there is high degree of product comparability in such a case CUP method is most appropriate method to determine ALP in respect of such transactions. It was held that transfer pricing regulations do not contemplate taking into account future date for purpose of benchmarking international transactions. It was also held that valuation of goods accepted by customs authority cannot be considered appropriate for purpose of arriving at ALP. (AY. 2002-03, 2003-04)

ACIT v. Denso India Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 191(URO)(Delhi)(Trib.)

1397 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – CUP is suitable method when twin conditions of comparability and uncontrolled transactions are satisfied – Method adopted by assessee was contrary to basic and fundamental principles – Matter remanded DTAA – India-USA. [Article 12]**

It is a pre requisite essential condition for determination of ALP applying CUP method in relation to international transaction that price paid in a comparable uncontrolled transaction has to be taken into consideration and both these conditions, i.e., comparable and uncontrolled transactions, must exist. Assessee paid royalty at rate of 5 per cent to its AE in USA on account of technical know-how of carcass products. It applied CUP method to determine ALP of royalty and took royalty paid to its AE as comparable for purpose of determining ALP of royalty. It was held that entire exercise of determination of ALP by assessee was contrary to very basic and fundamental requirements of law and, thus, method adopted by it could not be accepted. (AY. 2006-07)

Cabot India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 802 / (2013) 158 TTJ 840 (Mum.)(Trib.)

1398 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – CUP Method – internal CUP was available in case of assessee itself in form of guarantee charges, charged by bank from assessee – Adjustment made by TPO was deleted**

Assessee had given corporate guarantee to its AEs and charged 0.2 per cent of guarantee amount as commission. TPO held that payment of guarantee commission by AEs to assessee was an international transaction which had to be benchmarked with external

CUP method and accordingly, he benchmarked ALP for guarantee at rate of 3 per cent of amount of guarantee and made upward adjustment. Assessee submitted that banks in case of assessee itself charged guarantee commission at rate of 0.25 per cent to 0.35 per cent or nil. since there was an internal CUP in form of bank guarantee charges, charged by bank from assessee, same ought to had been first analyzed and examined. Tribunal had deleted similar addition and no question of law on this score had been raised by revenue, adjustment so made by TPO was deleted. (AY. 2006-07)

Asian Paints Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 511 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – TPO had accepted segmental results for purpose of computing deduction u/s. 10B, he could not reject those results while determining ALP of international transactions with its AE.

1399

TPO had accepted segmental results for purpose of computing deduction u/s. 10B, he could not reject those results while determining ALP of international transactions with its AE. There is no need for upward adjustment to be made on the AE sales of the assessee. Addition was deleted. (AY 2008-09)

Honeywell Electrical Devices & Systems India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 514 (Chennai)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Methodology for working of ALP on selection of CPM and RPM method supported by appropriate comparable, working could only be dislodged by TPO on basis of cogent reasons and objective findings – Method adopted by assessee was upheld

1400

No objective findings had been given to come to a reasoned conclusion that assessee’s adoption of CPM for manufacturing segment and RPM for trading segment was factually and objectively not correct. Rejection of methods by TPO as adopted by assessee was bereft of any cogency and objectivity and same was work of guessing and conjectured and similarly adoption of TNM method by TPO suffered from same inherent aberrations as mentioned. Assessee’s methods of CPM and RPM respectively worked by applying appropriate comparables. Once assessee had given a methodology for working of ALP on selection of a particular method supported by appropriate comparables, working could only be dislodged by TPO on basis of cogent reasons and objective findings. Method adopted by assessee was upheld. (AY. 2008-09)

Frigoglass India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 429 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Comparables selected by TPO were not appropriate on account of functional difference, high turnover etc. – Matter was set aside

1401

Assessee company engaged in providing services in enterprise solutions by operating software products and services in ITES sector, entered into international transactions with AE as well as non-AEs. For benchmark international transactions assessee adopted TNMM, a search was carried out in public data bases which yielded 27 comparable companies with weighted average arithmetic mean of 14.2 per cent. Assessee’s operating margin was shown at 14.76 per cent as against 14.2 per cent of comparable companies, price charged for international transactions with AEs was considered to be within arm’s length range. TPO rejected TP study submitted by assessee, proceeded to select its own

set of comparables. TPO selected 26 companies as comparables with an average margin of 26.36 per cent. Certain adjustment was made to assessee's ALP. Some of comparables selected by TPO were not appropriate on account of functional difference, high turnover etc. It was held that TPO had not properly allocated segmental expenditure as bad debts not related to AE transactions could not be considered as part of operating cost for determining ALP of transactions with AE. Hence the matter was remanded for fresh disposal. (AY. 2007-08)

Four Soft (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 732 / 164 TTJ 561 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 1402 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Turnover filter – Company with turnover of ₹ 13,000 crore cannot be comparable to company with turnover of ₹ 32 crore.**

Infosys Technologies limited cannot be considered as comparable as it is not only functionally different but it is a giant company having a turnover of about ₹ 13,000 crores, M/s. Infosys Technologies Limited is a giant in the field of software development services having considerable brand value, it also assumes all the risks related to the business. Further, the turnover of Infosys Technologies during the year is about ₹ 13,000 crores as against ₹ 32 crores of the assessee. This itself makes Infosys Technologies Limited uncomparable to the assessee. The turnover filter by adopting a lower limit of ₹ 1 crore, he should also have fixed an upper limit while applying the turnover filter. Infosys Technologies Limited cannot be considered to be a comparable to the assessee. (AY. 2004-05)

Cordys R & D (India) (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 587 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 1403 **S. 92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – RPT filter – Reimbursement of cost – Cannot be considered to be part of turnover.**

Reimbursement of cost actually incurred cannot be considered to be part of the turnover while computing the percentage of RPT to turnover and they are purely in the nature of reimbursement. The assessee is required to establish by producing necessary evidences that they are in the nature of reimbursements only. (AY. 2004-05)

Cordys R & D (India) (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 587 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 1404 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Data in public domain – Should not have rejected**

When assessee has placed annual reports of companies, should have considered same and should not have rejected it on ground of non-availability of data in public domain as information relating to companies was available. If information relating to the companies are available with the TPO and if the companies satisfy the filter applied by the TPO then there is no justification for rejecting the aforesaid two companies as comparable.

Cordys R & D (India) (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 587 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 1405 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Internal comparisons – CUP/TNM Method**

Where internal comparisons were available, application of CUP method, instead of TNM method was more appropriate. Agreement which existed in number of years cannot be

ignored. Comparisons by TPO without checking FAR convergence with assessee was to be rejected. (AY. 2004-05, 2005-06)

Dy. CIT v. Lumax Industries Ltd. (2014) 149 ITD 371 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – TNM Method – Cost plus method – AO had excluded research and development expenditure while arriving at operational profit of comparable company, computation of ALP in case of assessee had to be reworked

1406

Assessee was engaged in business of manufacturing and exporting of industrial valves made of steel casting & for determining ALP, Adopted Cost Plus Method. TPO however was of the view that (TNMM) was most appropriate. For necessary comparison TPO selected one company ‘A’ as comparable for A.Y. 2004-05 and two companies ‘O’ and ‘S’ as comparable for A.Y. 2005-06 and compared financial statements of assessee company with comparable and determined ALP adjustment and accordingly, upward revision of income was made. AO had excluded research and development expenditure while arriving at operational profit of ‘A. CIT(A) without verifying computation adopted by assessee by Cost Plus Method and without any finding on same simply deleted addition made on basis of TNM method. TPO did not examine intricacies of assessee company and cryptically arrived at conclusion that assessee company should have determined ALP for its international transactions and should have determined ALP for its international transactions, the issue was to reexamined by TPO and AO afresh. Matter remanded. (AY. 2004-05, 2005-06)

Dy. CIT v. Flow Link Systems (P) Ltd. (2014) 149 ITD 604 (Chennai)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Transaction with international transaction has to be decided by using current year data – Current year data does not give a true picture, multiyear data can be considered

1407

In order to determine ALP, comparability of an uncontrolled and unrelated transaction with international transaction has to be decided by using current year data, when current year data does not give a true picture of affairs and results of comparables due to existence of abnormal circumstances, multiyear data can be considered. An entity cannot be excluded or eliminated from list of comparables solely on basis of high profit making unit or loss making unit until such factor finds place either in rule 10B(2) or 10B(3) of 1962 Rules. benefit of +/- 5 per cent under proviso to section 92C(2) shall not be allowed as standard deduction for purpose of computation of arm’s length price rather such a benefit has to be allowed only when price of international transaction is within tolerance range of +/- 5 per cent of ALP computed by taking arithmetic mean of more than one price. Decided in favour of revenue. (AY. 2008-09)

Chrys Capital Investment Advisors India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 566 / (2015) 170 TTJ 185 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Developer of software products could not be held as comparable with a software service provider company – Objections regarding comparables which were not raised before DRP can be permitted to be raised before Tribunal

1408

Once the assessee has accepted the aforesaid company as a comparable by not raising any objection before the DRP, the issue attained finality so far as the selection of the

aforesaid comparable is concerned. The assessee cannot be permitted to raise objection with regard to the said company before the Tribunal once the selection of the said comparable has attained finality. A mistake on the part of the assessee that it failed to object to the selection of the aforesaid company as a comparable. Assessee has not shown any reasonable cause as to why it did not object to the said company before the DRP. Tribunal held that development of software products could not be held as comparable with a software service provider company. (AY. 2008-09)

App Labs Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 99 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

1409 S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Transfer pricing adjustment could not exceed global profit earned by assessee and its AE from international transactions

Assessee had entered into certain international transactions with its AEs. TPO had made TP adjustment for purpose of determining ALP. DRP had allowed assessee's ground with regard to restricting TP adjustment to global profits of group from international transactions. TPO had not implemented such direction of DRP in consequential order passed by him. Adjustments if any, cannot exceed the global profits earned by the group from 'those transactions'. The DRP while summarising its finding categorically held that it has allowed the assessee's ground with regard to restricting TP adjustment to the global profits of the group from the international transactions. Tribunal directed the AO for deciding it a fresh inconformity with direction given by DRP. (AY. 2008-09)

App Labs Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 99 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

1410 S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Difference in operating margin was within the range of plus/minus 5 per cent, no adjustment was required to be made

The difference in the operating margin, as per the TPO's order itself, is within the range of 5% and, accordingly, no adjustment under law is required to be made. No doubt, the safe harbour rule of 5% is with reference to the arm's length price; the same however translates to an equivalent difference in the operating margin, as the costs toward the same are not disturbed. If a part of the interest cost, is to be excluded from the operating cost, being a part of the capital cost, the assessee's profit margin would rather stand further improved. Therefore, consider the sustenance of the said adjustment. Difference in operating margin was within range of plus/minus 5 per cent, no adjustment was required to be made. (AY. 2006-07)

BASF Coatings (India) (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 802 (Mum.)(Trib.)

1411 S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Deputation of employees to AE – TPO was justified in making addition to assessee's ALP holding that a markup of 5 per cent should have been charged in addition to reimbursement of salary expenses by AE.

Assessee's technical/manufacturing process being followed for manufacturing of tyres by AE located abroad, it had deputed some of its employees to South Africa. Deputed employees remained on payroll of assessee but worked for AE and salary of those employees were paid by assessee. Subsequently recovered from AE without a markup by way of a debit note. Salary expenses were reimbursed on account of certain services rendered by deputed employees to AE. Addition to assessee's ALP holding that a markup of 5 per cent should have been charged in addition to reimbursement of actual expenses.

Unless there was a commercial value in services rendered by employees deputed by assessee, there was no occasion for AE to reimburse expenditure incurred by assessee. To determine quantum of addition TPO was justified in making addition to assessee's ALP holding that a markup of 5 per cent. (AY. 2008-09)

Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 756 / 31 ITR 477 (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – AE located abroad as well as in domestic sector, various differences in export segment and domestic segment – Adopting CPM as most appropriate method not correct – Matter remanded

1412

Assessee was engaged in business of manufacture and sale of industrial products such as decanters, separators etc. to its AE located abroad as well as in domestic sector, in view of fact that there were various differences in export segment and domestic segment such as market functions, geographic difference, volume difference, credit risk, related party transactions etc., In adopting CPM as most appropriate method in order to make adjustment to assessee's ALP in respect of international transactions entered into with AE is not a correct method. CPM was not the most appropriate method for determining the ALP. Matter remanded. (AY. 2008-09)

Alfa Laval (I) Ltd. v. Dy. ITO (2013) 158 TTJ 409 / (2014) 149 ITD 285 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – TP adjustment towards AMP expenses – 'Selling expense' / Discounts Not an 'international transaction' – Matter remanded

1413

Assessee was engaged in business of providing data processing and related services to its AEs. TPO made addition on account of transfer pricing adjustment towards AMP expenses. Revenue generated from bookings done by subscribers was major source of assessee's income from its AE and such 'Incentive' to subscribers could not be viewed as anything other than 'Selling expense' which was liable to excluded from total AMP expenses. Contention of assessee that it was not an 'international transaction' was rejected and further contention about application of 'Bright Line Test' as a method for determining ALP was also repelled in view of Special Bench order in *LG Electronics India (P) Ltd v. ACIT (2013) 140 ITD 41 (Delhi)(Trib.)*. Matter was remitted to file of AO with direction to redo determination of TP adjustment if any on account of AMP expenses by considering relevant factors as noted in the order. (AY. 2007-08)

Amadeus India (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 496 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – TPO selected a company as comparable on basis of S. 133(6) – Duty of TPO to have necessarily furnished information – TPO selected a company as comparable based on reasoning given in TPO's order for earlier year – Selection process adopted by TPO was defective. [S.133(6)]

1414

Where TPO selected a company as comparable only on basis of information obtained u/s. 133(6), it was duty of TPO to have necessarily furnished information so gathered to assessee and taken its submissions thereon into consideration before deciding to include that company in its final list of comparables. Non-furnishing of information obtained u/s. 133(6) to assessee would vitiate selection of that company as a comparable. Annual reports of companies selected as comparables showed that those companies were functionally dissimilar and different from assessee, said companies ought to be omitted from set of comparables. Where TPO selected a company as comparable based on

reasoning given in TPO's order for earlier year and had not conducted any independent FAR analysis for that company for year under consideration, selection process adopted by TPO was defective. (AY. 2008-09)

Curam Software International (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 149 ITD 458 (Bang.)(Trib.)

- 1415 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Company owns intellectual property in form of registered patents, it cannot be compared with the companies which does not own intellectual property – Product designing company cannot be compared with company engaged in software development services**

A company, which owns intellectual property in form of registered patents and several pending applications for grant of patents, cannot be considered as a comparable to assessee which does not own any intangible. A company, predominantly engaged in product designing services, cannot be compared to a company engaged in software development services. Functionally different company cannot be selected as a comparable.

Curam Software International (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 149 ITD 458 (Bang.)(Trib.)

- 1416 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – RPT filter has to be on a standalone basis and not on a consolidated basis – Matter remanded**

While selecting a company as comparable, RPT filter has to be on a standalone basis and not on a consolidated basis. TPO rejected certain companies selected by assessee as comparables on ground that they failed export revenue filter and RPT filter adopted by him. Issue of comparability of said companies was to be fresh considered. Remanded to TPO.

Curam Software International (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 149 ITD 458 (Bang.)(Trib.)

- 1417 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Mere investment in a business activity cannot be a reason for rejection of a company as a comparable**

Mere investment in a business activity cannot be a reason for rejection of this company as a comparable. Every company is normally required to make investment in business activities and this factor alone cannot be a reason for rejection of a comparable; particularly if the investment pertains to the earlier years, as claimed by the assessee. The TPO is required to demonstrate as to how this particular investment has impacted the margin and why such an impact could not have been adjusted for comparability. In this view of the matter, we restore this issue back to the file of the TPO to consider the issue afresh in the light of the above observations. The TPO is directed to afford the assessee adequate opportunity of being heard before deciding the issue. It is ordered accordingly. (AY. 2008-09)

Curam Software International (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 149 ITD 458 (Bang.)(Trib.)

- 1418 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Foreign exchange gain related business activities to be treated as operating income while computing operating margins and comparable companies**

The TPO has considered the foreign exchange income as non-operating income based on assumptions and surmises. Foreign exchange gain related to business activities is

to be treated as operating income while computing operating margins of assessee and comparable companies.

Curam Software International (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 149 ITD 458 (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Method of applying Resale Price Method (RPM) method, (ii) high advertisement expenses has no bearing on the RPM, (iii) comparables with more than 25% of related party transactions (RPTs) have to be excluded, (iv) transactions which do not impact the profitability should be excluded from the formula, (v) potentially comparable companies cannot be expelled only on the ground of high or low turnover. [S.92CA]

1419

- (i) The assessee simply purchased mobile phones and accessories from Nokia group companies situated outside India and resold the same as such without any further value addition, mainly, to HCL Info systems in India. Since the goods imported from the foreign AEs representing the international transaction under this segment were neither processed further nor used as raw material for manufacturing any other product, in our considered opinion, RPM is the first choice as the most appropriate method for determination of ALP of the international transaction under this segment.
- (ii) The incurring of high advertisement and marketing expenses by the assessee vis-a-vis the other comparable companies does not in any manner affect the determination of ALP under the RPM. When we consider gross profit in numerator and net sales in denominator, all the expenses debited to the Profit & Loss account automatically stand excluded. It is but natural that only those expenses can have bearing on the gross profit that are debited to the trading account. As the amount of advertisement and marketing expenses falls 'below the line' and finds its place in the Profit and Loss account, the higher or lower spend on it cannot affect the amount of gross profit and the resultant ALP under the RPM. If the assessee has incurred more expenses on advertisement and promotion, which, in the opinion of the learned. DR went on to brand building for an AE, then, the transfer pricing adjustment on account of such AMP expenses was separately called for.
- (iii) In principle if any company though functionally comparable, but, has more than a specific percentage of the RPTs, then, the same should be ignored by treating it as a controlled transaction. However, the percentage of RPTs to make a company as ineligible for comparison, in our considered opinion, should be taken as more than 25% and not 15% as suggested on behalf of the assessee. The view adopting more than 25% RPTs making a company incomparable has been taken by various benches of Tribunal including *Aglient Technologies International P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 36 CCH 187 Del Trib.*; *Stream International Services Pvt. Ltd. v. ADIT (IT) (2013) 152 TTJ (Mumbai) 553*; and *Act is Advisers Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (2012) 20 ITR (Trib) 138 (Delhi)*. We, therefore, hold that a company can be considered as incomparable if its RPTs exceed 25%.
- (iv) Ratio of the RPTs represents the proportion of transactions with the associated enterprises (numerator) vis-a-vis the total of transactions (denominator). In order to decide that what should constitute the contents of numerator and denominator for the purposes of finding out the percentage of RPTs, it is relevant to note the logic behind applying this filter. It is manifest that the aim of the transfer pricing

regime is to ensure that the international transactions are recorded at arm's length price. This is done under the TNMM by comparing the profit earned from the international transaction with that earned by the comparable independent parties in an uncontrolled situation. Thus, while choosing comparables, it must be ensured that the profit earned by them correctly reflects true profit as is earned by an enterprise from an independent third party. If such a chosen company, though functionally comparable, has also entered into international transactions beyond a particular percentage with the related parties, it is quite possible that its overall profit may have been distorted due to such transactions rendering it as incomparable. That is why, this filter is applied to make certain that a company sought to be considered as comparable should have its profit uninfluenced by the impact of the related party transactions.

- (v) Transactions which do not impact the profitability, such as loan given or taken or other items finding place in the balance sheet, can have no place either in the numerator or the denominator of this formula. However, any income or expenditure resulting/relating from/to or likely to result/relate from/to such items of assets or liabilities, should not be confused with the *per se* international transactions finding place in the balance sheet of the company calling for exclusion.
- (vi) In *CIT v. Agnity India Technologies (P.) Ltd. (2013) 219 Taxmann 26 (Del)*, the assessee was a captive unit providing software services to its associated enterprises. The Hon'ble High Court directed the exclusion of Infosys Ltd. from the list of comparables, which list otherwise included several companies with huge turnover. The exclusion was ordered on account of the giantness of this company, which was, in turn, determined by seeing the cumulative effect of several factors, including risk profile, nature of services, turnover, ownership of branded/proprietary products, onsite vs. offshore services, expenditure on advertisement and R&D etc. The higher turnover was only one of the criteria and not the sole criteria for the exclusion of this company. In view of the above discussion, we hold in principle that no potentially comparable company can be expelled from the list of comparables simply for the reason of high or low turnover. (AY. 2002-03)

Nokia India (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2015) 167 TTJ 243/115 DTR 179 (Delhi)(Trib.)

1420 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Resale Price Method applies even where the goods are bought from an AE and sold to another AE**

The argument of the department that under Rule 10B(1)(b) the Resale Price Method can be applied only when the assessee buys from an associated enterprise and sells to a non-associated enterprise and not when the sale is to an AE is not correct. As per the Rule 10B(1)(b), under the Resale Price Method the price at which property purchased or services obtained is sold to an unrelated enterprise, the price at which this property is sold less margin of the associated enterprise is to be reduced for determination of the resale arm's length price. There is no condition that this method cannot be used when the tested party is an associated enterprise. The contention of the learned DR that the basic condition of resale price method is that "the property has to be obtained by the enterprise i.e. the assessee from an associated enterprise is incorrect." In the Act as well as Rules the words 'enterprise' and 'associated enterprise' have been

used interchangeably. Thus the argument that enterprise will mean ‘the assessee’ and associated enterprise will mean ‘the other party’ to whom the assessee has sold or purchased the goods is incorrect. The above definition of ‘enterprise’ and ‘associated enterprise’ in the Act nowhere indicates that the ‘enterprise’ shall mean the assessee and the ‘associated enterprise’ will mean other than the assessee. Thus the contention of the learned DR that resale price method cannot be used in the case of the assessee company is devoid of any merit. This view gets further supported by the fact that there is no such condition or prohibition provided in section 92C as well as Rule 10B. In the absence of any such condition or prohibition it cannot be read into the Rule to mean that resale price method shall not be applicable in case the assessee company is selling its product to an associated enterprise. The OECD guidelines in respect of resale price method support this interpretation. (AY. 2007-08)

Yamaha Motor India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 151 ITD 731 / (2015) 37 ITR 208 / 117 DTR 305 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C: Transfer pricing – “Umbrage” taken in Casio that BMW did not follow L. G. Electronics is based on “wrong head note”. L. G. does not deal with a case of distributor and so there is no conflict with the law laid down therein

1421

In *L. G. Electronics 140 ITD 41 (Del.)(SB)*, the Special Bench laid down guidelines on how to determine whether a transfer pricing adjustment for “Advertisement & market Promotion” (“AMP”) expenses had to be made or not. Subsequently, in *BMW (AY 2008-09)*, a division Bench held that the ratio of *L. G. Electronics* did not apply to a “full risk distributor”. Another Division Bench in the case of *Casio* “took umbrage” at the observations made in *BMW* and made “surprising observations” that “There is no prize for guessing that Special Bench order has more force and binding effect over the Division Bench order on the same issue.” The Bench in the case of *Casio* and later in *Perfetti Van Melle* took the view that the principle laid by the Special Bench in *L. G. Electronics* applied to the case of a “distributor” as well. When the case of *BMW* for AY 2009-10 came up for hearing, the Bench took the view that there was a conflict between the order passed in the case of *BMW (AY. 2008-09)* and that passed in *Casio/Perfetti Van Melle* and the VP was asked to consider whether the matter ought to be referred to a 5 Member Bench. Thereafter, when the matter came up before the present Bench HELD: The observations of the co-ordinate Bench in *Casio India* and *Perfetti Van Melle* are based probably on the line of arguments advanced by the parties, presumably relying on head notes of the publisher in *BMW’s* case. This may not be the appropriate way to conclude what was decided in the decision dated 16-8-2013 in *BMW*. We are of the view that it would be more appropriate to refer to the said decision itself and see if the decision of the Special Bench in *L. G. Electronics* case has been by-passed in *BMW’s* case. The umbrage expressed in the decision dated 13-12-2013 of the co-ordinate Bench in *Casio India* on reflection and consideration would show that it may have been based probably on incorrect pleadings before it based on the head notes as such the observation that there are no prizes for guessing that Special Bench shall prevail probably would not have been made. This aspect has adequately been addressed in the order dated 31-7-2014 in *Bose Corporation India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT* case where it was held that “needless controversy appears to have arisen apparently due to certain

observations made in order dated 13-12-2013 in Casio India Company wherein in para 5 and 6, the co-ordinate Bench appears to be guided by the arguments addressed by the Ltd. AR in that case who, relying upon the order in the case of *BMW India Pvt. Ltd.*, advanced arguments apparently on the basis of head notes of the order in BMW India Pvt. Ltd. instead of reading the complete order and submitted that BMW India Pvt. Ltd. be followed in preference to the Special Bench in L. G. Electronics. The observations in para 5 and 6 of the order appears to completely overlook the fact that the material finding in BMW India Pvt. Ltd. actually considered and followed wherever applicable the principles laid down by the Special bench in L. G. Electronics. Hence the surprising observation in para 6 that “there is no prize for guessing that Special Bench order has more force and binding effect over the Division Bench order on the same issue. This contention raised by the Ltd. AR, therefore, fails” appears to be the result of the mistaken submissions which could not have been based on reading the entire order and appears to be based only on a reading of the head notes. The fact that head notes can at times be misleading is a well known fact as they are only the reporting done for the convenience of the professionals and it is imperative therefore to read the entire order. Be it as it may, we would not be out of place to sound a caution that hasty conclusions based on arguments advanced on the basis of the head notes in the reporting of the orders may not be advisable and it may lead to misleading conclusions The advancing of arguments that a distributor remuneration model is separate and distinct is accepted in L. G. Electronics case also as would be borne out from parameter one of para 17.4 of L. G. Electronics. Accordingly taking cognizance of this decision rendered in BMW India Pvt. Ltd. does not run contrary to the decision of L. G. Electronics case. The fact that in L. G. Electronics case there was no occasion to analyze, consider in detail and consequently adjudicate only on a distributor’s case is self evident since all possible manner of business models were considered together for which purposes acknowledging its humane limitations the Special Bench was constrained and candid to admit the obvious fact that it is not possible to have a straightjacket formula for all eventualities The view taken in BMW India Pvt. Ltd. was that a distributor remuneration model is distinct and peculiar. Thus the view taken was in conformity with the decision of the Special bench and concurring with the view taken, we hold that this view does not override the Special Bench.” Accordingly we hold that there is no conflict between the decision in BMW India Pvt. Ltd. with L. G. Electronics. (AY.. 2009-10) *BMW India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 112 DTR 99 / 166 TTJ 657(Delhi)(Trib.)*

1422 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Principles on right of TPO to collect info u/s. 133(6), exclusion of high profit comparables, adjustment for limited risk environment, exclusion of reimbursement costs for computing operation margins explained. [S.133(6)]**

- (i) The TPO conducted search in the data bases for finding additional comparable by applying 25% employee cost filter. After examining the information obtained from the company u/s 133(6) of the Act the TPO treated it as comparable by observing that the company is engaged in IT enabled services and qualifies all the filters adopted by the TPO. It is very much clear from the order of the Assessing Officer that the assessee was not given any opportunity / information to examine the

comparability of the aforesaid company. Though the TPO is empowered under the provisions of the Act to obtain information with regard to selection of comparables, however before utilising the information obtained, he has to give fair opportunity to the assessee to have its say in the matter. The DRP has also over-looked this aspect.

- (ii) Company showing extraordinarily high profit cannot be treated as comparable and have to be excluded as held in *Avineon India P. Ltd.*, *Zavata India P. M/s. Capital IQ, M/s. HSBC Electronic Data Processing India P. Ltd.*, *Information Systems India Pvt. Ltd.* and also Special Bench decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in *Maersk Global Centres (India) P. Ltd., Mumbai v. ACIT, Circle 6(3), Mumbai* dated 7-3-2014.
- (iii) The assessee is a captive provider functioning under a limited risk environment with most of the risks being assumed by its AEs and comparables selected for analysis include companies which have fairly diversified areas of specialisation, bearing risks akin to any third party independent service provider. Since assessee is operating in a risk mitigated environment vis-à-vis the comparable companies performing entrepreneurial risk taking functions, the assessee seeks adjustment for the risk being taken by the comparable, whose profit would be more dependent on the risk involved. Since the assessee does not bear any risk of incurring losses and since comparable companies work in the market environment, the margins earned by the comparable companies would be comparatively more to reflect the higher level of functions and risks.
- (iv) Reimbursement transactions towards travel, air fare and site expenses relating to employees of AE travelling to India for business purposes. Even though these transactions are considered as international transactions for the purposes of TP, since there is no mark up on these reimbursements, these transactions are to be excluded for working out the operative costs/operative margins. (AY. 2007-08)

HSBC Electronic Data Processing India v. ACIT (Hyd.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.92C : Transfer pricing – In case of “sogo shosha” business model (high volume, low risk, trading of goods), the “berry ratio” (benchmarking gross profit and / or net revenues (after subtraction of cost of sales) against operating expenses is an appropriate PLI

1423

- (i) Even the TPO does not dispute that (a) MCI is a low risk activity in the field of trading, (b) MCJ group is primarily involved in high volume sales, or ‘colossal sales’ of a wide range of merchandise; (c) MCJ, following the sogo shosha business model, has global network and MCI is a part of this network. The low risk high volume business model of the assessee is thus not even in dispute. It is also not the case of the revenue that the assessee is only playing an assigned role in linking the buyers and sellers and is not engaged in the sogo shosha activity as a whole. As a corollary to this accepted position, the unique intangible of sogo shosha business model, even if that can be treated as a unique intangible asset, belongs to the MCJ group and not the MCI individually;
- (ii) The assessee plays an assigned role, which is essentially a support function, in the core sogo shosha activity of the parent company MCJ. While sogo shosha is a Japanese expression which means, when translated literally, a general trading

company, in business parlance a sogo shosha is something much more than a general trader. Sogo shosha is a unique business model in the world of commerce. A sogo shosha cannot be equated with a general trading company in all material respects;

- (iii) In case the normal PLI of operating profit to operating costs (including inventory costs) or operating profit to sales was applied, every comparable which is picked up for comparing trading activity of the assessee, which is admittedly an integral part of sogo shosha activities of the MCJ group, will, therefore, have its inherent limitations because functional profile of the assessee's trading activity is, and cannot be, the same as that of the comparables. It is, therefore, important to find out a way, by selecting the appropriate profit level indicator, to eliminate this critical difference between sogo shosha activity of the assessee and any other trading activity that the comparables may have. As a matter of fact, it is the level of inventory which is crucial factor in determining the kind of trading activity an assessee has carried out. The CBDT has defined wholesale trader with reference to, *inter alia*, its monthly inventory level being less than 10% and prescribes a lower tolerance range at one third the level of normal tolerance range. This notification is in the context of tolerance range, prescribing lesser tolerance range for the whole traders implying that the margin of profits for wholesalers must move in a lower range which can only happen when margins are also lower vis-à-vis margins in wholesale trading, but this also indicates that lower inventory levels lead to lower inventory risks and generally resultant lower profit levels also. There is thus a direct relationship between the normal inventory levels and the normal profitability;
- (iv) It is beyond dispute and controversy that the comparables carrying on the trading activity similar to assessee group's trading activity are difficult to find. Here is a case in which true comparables are difficult, or almost impossible, to find and, therefore, a way is to be found to find such comparison meaningful by adopting a profit level indicator which ignores the impact of vital dissimilarities in inventory levels between the assessee and the comparables;
- (v) What follows is that use of transfer pricing mechanism, on the facts of this case, should be in such a manner so as to minimise the impact of higher risks assumed by, and higher assets employed by, a normal trader *vis-à-vis* a sogo shosha entity. It is, therefore, worth an examination whether use of berry ratio, which assessee has all along contended to be appropriate to eliminate differences between an ordinary trader and the assessee, could indeed help in elimination of this vital difference of profile of the assessee vis-à-vis normal trading entities which may be available as comparables;
- (vi) The answer to the fundamental question of whether a taxpayer should be entitled to a return on the value of goods handled by it, would actually depend on the functions performed and the related risks borne by it, with respect to the goods; and not on whether the taxpayer has taken title to the goods, shorn of the assessee's FAR profile;
- (vii) On facts, neither the assessee has performed any functions on or with respect to the goods traded by it, beyond holding flash title for the goods in some of the

cases, nor has the assessee borne any significant risks associated with the goods so traded. All the functions, assets and risk of the assessee are quite reasonably reflected by the operating costs incurred and the value of goods traded does not have much of an impact on its analysis of FAR. The cost of goods sold would be relevant if and only if the assessee would have assumed any significant risks associated with such goods sold and when monetary impact of such risks is not reflected in operating expenses of the assessee. The berry ratio should, therefore, be equally useful in the present case as well. In the case of the traders like assessee, who neither assume any major inventory risk nor commit any significant assets for the same and particularly as there is no value addition or involvement of unique intangibles, the berry ratio should also be equally relevant as in the case of a limited risk distributor;

- (viii) What berry ratio thus seeks to examine is the relationship of the operating costs with the operating profits. It thus proceeds on the basis that there is a cause and effect relationship between operating costs and the operating profits. The factors, however, which can also have substantial impact on the operating profits, and thus dilute this direct relationship, could be factors like (a) in terms of functions – processing and value addition to the goods; (b) in terms of assets – fixed assets such as machinery, inventory, debtors and otherwise high assets, including intangible assets; and (c) in terms of risks – risk associated with holding inventories;
- (ix) In typical cases of pure international trading, there is neither any processing of goods involved nor is there use of any significant trade or marketing intangibles. The inventory levels are also extremely low, at least with respect to the goods traded, since the nature of activity does not require maintenance of inventories and there is sufficient lead time between order being received and the actual procurement activity. There are no other factors, in addition to the operating costs, which affect direct relationship between operating costs and operating profits. Therefore, except in a situation in which significant trade or marketing intangibles are involved or in a situation in which there is further processing of the goods procured before selling the same or in a situation which necessitates employment of assets in infrastructure for processing or maintenance of inventories, the use of berry ratio does seem to be quite appropriate;
- (x) There is, therefore, neither anything inappropriate in the use as such of berry ratio *per se*, nor there are any real issues with respect to accounting policies of the assessee vis-à-vis accounting policies of the comparables finally selected. Obviously, as final comparables are not yet selected, there cannot be any question of the accounting policies adopted by the comparables vis-à-vis accounting policies of the assessee being so significantly different that the very comparability is not possible; (AY. 2007-08)

Mitsubishi Corporation India Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 166 TTD 385 / 67 SOT 83 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)

- 1424 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length – If assessee has followed CUP method, it cannot argue at the appellate stage that TNMM should be followed even if TPO has for later years accepted TNMM as the most appropriate method**

The assessee applied CUP as the most appropriate method for benchmarking the international transactions undertaken by it. The assessee did not dispute before the TPO that the CUP was the most appropriate method. However, it was only during the course of first appellate proceedings that the assessee came out with an additional ground contending that the most appropriate method was TNMM and the same should be applied. Even in AY. 2002-03, the assessee applied the CUP method for benchmarking its international transactions.

On appeal the Tribunal held that, we do not find any force in the argument of the ld. AR that simply because the TPO has applied TNMM for the AYs 2007-08 and 2008-09 and hence the application of the same by the CIT(A) be upheld. This factor, though significant, but is not conclusive. What persuaded the TPO to observe departure in these two later years from the consistent stand taken by him in the immediately preceding four years up to AY 2006-07 in following the CUP method, is not available on record. There may have been some change in the factual position necessitating the adoption of TNMM in these later years. Further, the mere fact that the TPO adopted TNMM in a later year can be no ground to argue before the Tribunal that the same method be followed in a preceding year, which stand has been specifically rejected by him in the instant years. As such, we cannot uphold the application of TNMM on this reason alone, more specifically, when in the immediately preceding year, where the facts are admittedly similar, the Tribunal has restored the matter to the TPO for *de novo* adjudication. (AY. 2003-04)

DCIT v. Insilco Ltd. (2014) 36 ITR 439 / (2015) 57 taxmann.com 134 (Delhi)(Trib.)

- 1425 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Payment of management fees to AE – Matter restored**

The Tribunal held that neither the TPO nor the Assessing Officer has examined whether the payment of fee is according to the agreement or not. The assessee was given invoices for a fixed amount whereas the agreement provides otherwise therefore in order to verify the pricing methodology as prescribed in the agreement and payment by assessee the matter is restored to the Assessing Officer to examine this aspect with reference to the agreement between the parties. (AY. 2003-04, 2005-06)

TNS India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 163 TTJ 576/32 ITR 44/(2015) 152 ITD 123 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 1426 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Fraud in determination of LIBOR / EURIBOR is no reason to discard it as ALP**

The department claimed that in determining the ALP of an international transaction of loan by the assessee to its AE, LIBOR could not be treated as the ALP as there was a “fraud” regarding fixation of ‘LIBOR’ as evidenced by the fact that Barclays Bank & UBS were fined by the United States Department of Justice for attempted manipulation of the LIBOR and EURIBOR rates and ultimately UBS agreed to pay to regulators. HELD by the Tribunal:

Even though Revenue has raised additional grounds on the reason that LIBOR cannot be considered as a basis as it was fraudulently fixed, we are not in a position to agree with

the additional grounds. Whether that was fraudulently fixed or not is not a consideration now, as it was the basis for all international transactions at that point of time as far as borrowing of funds are concerned. In fact, assessee's A.E. also obtained loan from a local branch at LIBOR plus basis only. Accordingly, assessee has justified the interest on the rate prevalent at that relevant point of time. Even though there may be same fraud involved in fixing the rate of international rates, as it became basis for subsequent international transactions at that point of time, We do not see any reason to differ from the LIBOR plus basis points for T.P. comparison. The Revenue cannot contend that rate of interest prevailing in India has to be adopted as the rates in India cannot be compared while loans are obtained abroad, even though funds are flown from India. What is required to be seen is whether the transaction is at arms length or not. Since, the international loan rates are based on LIBOR, we do not see any reason for differing from the learned. CIT(A) order, which itself based on Co-ordinate Bench decisions that LIBOR plus basis points is at arm's length. (AY. 2008-09)

Vijay Electricals limited v. ACIT (2015) 54 taxmann.com 19 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arms' length price – Foreign exchange fluctuation gain arising on realisation of trade debtors, payment to creditors etc. is operational income

1427

The TPO had considered foreign exchange fluctuation gains to be non-operational in nature. This view was confirmed by the DRP stating that the foreign exchange fluctuations had nothing to do with the business operations of a tax payer. The DRP had refused to follow the decision of M/s. Saplap India (P) Ltd. None of the authorities have given any finding that foreign exchange fluctuation gains were relatable to any capital receipts or outgoes. Assessee had given a break up of foreign exchange gain in which it had specifically excluded the exchange loss on purchase of fixed assets. We are of the opinion that the foreign exchange fluctuation gain arising to the assessee on realization of trade debtor's, payment to creditors etc., were nothing but operational income. (AY. 2009-10),

Cisco System Service B. E. India Branch v. ADIT(IT)(2015) 68 SOT 18 (URO) / 120 CTR 72 / 171 TTJ 367 (Bom.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Turnover filter is an important criteria in choosing comparables

1428

Tribunal held that, the ICAI TP Guidelines note on this aspect lay down in para 15.4 that a transaction entered into by a ₹ 1,000 crore company cannot be compared with the transaction entered into by a ₹ 10 crore company. The two most obvious reasons are the size of the two companies and the relative economies of scale under which they operate. The fact that they operate in the same market may not make them comparable enterprises.

A reading of the provisions of Rule 10B(2) of the Rules shows that uncontrolled transaction has to be compared with international transaction having regard to the factors set out therein. Before us there is no dispute that the TNMM is the most appropriate method for determining the ALP of the international transaction. The disputes are with regard to the comparability of the comparable relied upon by the TPO. In this regard we find that the provisions of law as the decisions clearly lay down the principle that the turnover filter is an important criteria in choosing the comparables.

The assessee's turnover is ₹ 47,46,66,638. It would therefore fall within the category of companies in the range of turnover between 1 crore and 200 crores (as laid down in the case of *Genesis Integrating Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT, ITA No.1231/Bang/2010*). Thus, companies having turnover of more than 200 crores have to be eliminated from the list of comparables as laid down in several decisions referred to by the ld. counsel for the assessee. (AY. 2007-08)

Trilogy E-Business Software India v. DCIT(2013) 140 ITD 540 / 23 ITR 464 (Bang.)(Trib.)

- 1429 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Adjustment for capacity underutilisation has to be in the results of the comparables and not the tested party. A 100% captive unit has to show that underutilisation was for reasons beyond its control. [S.10B]**

The CIT(A) granted relief by making adjustments, on account of capacity underutilisation, in the results shown by the tested party and thus computing hypothetical financial results which the tested party would have achieved in perfect conditions. Such an exercise is impermissible. As is the undisputed legal position, such comparability adjustments can only be made in the comparables and not the tested party itself. It is specifically provided in Rule 10B(1)(e)(iii) that adjustments for variations, which could materially affect the amount of net profit margin in the open market in comparable uncontrolled transactions, are to be made in respect of net profits realised by the comparable transactions or enterprises. The CIT(A) was thus clearly in error in proceeding to make capacity underutilisation adjustments in the profits earned by the assessee. That apart, in the case of a one hundred per cent captive service unit, as is the assessee before us, the very concept of capacity underutilisation may not really make any sense unless the assessee has not been able to offer, for reasons beyond its control, the underutilised capacity to its AE. There is no finding on this aspect of the matter. As the assessee does not have the liberty to work for any other customer, and is wholly dependent on its AE for productive use of its capacity to work, the AE should normally make good any losses to the captive unit caused by its not being able to make use of the available capacity. In the case before this, the AE has indeed given some financial support to the assessee which has been reduced from the ALP adjustment figure, and the business rationale of AE's extending financial support to the assessee is thus not in doubt. However, there is nothing on record to show how this financial support has been computed and is on what ground, and on what basis, this financial support is given. The reason for underutilised capacity and the facts regarding financial support extended to the assessee are not clear from the material on record. The CIT(A) has granted the impugned relief merely by making capacity underutilisation adjustments to the profits achieved by the tested party, but then such an approach, as we have noted earlier, is wholly unsustainable in law. (AY. 2005-06)

DCIT v. EDAG Engineers & Design India Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 166 TTJ 364/67 SOT 81 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)

- 1430 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Foreign exchange gains and loss – In computing operating profits, expenditure of other years has to be excluded. Forex gains and losses have to be treated at par**

There is a categorical finding by the CIT(A) that superannuation contribution of ₹ 5,88,254 pertains to the assessment years 2000-01 and 2001-02. This finding remains

uncontroverted. In this view of the matter, there cannot indeed be any rationale in taking into account this expenditure for computation of operating profits of the assessee for the current year. Similarly, there is a categorical finding that Catia software, in respect of which amount of ₹ 8,21,628 was excluded, was not used for the purpose of any work in the relevant previous year and it was only subsequent year that this software was actually used. This finding also remains uncontroverted. Clearly, therefore, this expense cannot be included in the computation of operating profit for the current year. As regards forex gain, the relief granted by the CIT(A) is only a natural corollary to the stand taken by the TPO to the effect that the forex losses are to be included in computation of operating income. When he does so, it cannot be open to him to take a stand that income from forex gain is to be treated as non operational income. In any event, forex gains cannot be considered in isolation of the revenues generated. It is in respect of such revenues that forex gains are received. As for the exclusion of bad debts, amortisations and provisions, in computation of the PLI of the comparables, we are unable to see any rationale in the same nor has it been justified before us. (AY. 2003-04) *ITO v. EDAG Engineers & Design India Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 52 taxmann.com 398 (Delhi)(Trib.)*

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – CUP cannot be applied on hypothetical or imaginary value but a real value on which similar transactions have taken place is required. TPO has no jurisdiction to question commercial expediency of transaction

1431

One of the very basic preconditions for use of CUP method is availability of the price of the same product and service in uncontrolled conditions. It is on this basis that ALP of the product or service can be ascertained. It cannot be a hypothetical or imaginary value but a real value on which similar transactions have taken place. Coming to the facts of this case, the application of CUP is dependent on the market value of the arrangements under which the present payments have been made. Unless the TPO can identify a comparable uncontrolled case in which such services, howsoever token or irrelevant services as he may consider these services to be, are rendered and find out consideration for the same, the CUP method cannot have any application. His perception that these services are worthless is of no relevance. It is not his job to decide whether a business enterprise should have incurred a particular expense or not. A business enterprise incurs the expenditure on the basis of what is commercially expedient and what is not commercially expedient. As held by Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of *CIT v. EKL Appliances Limited (345 ITR 241)*, "Even Rule 10B(1)(a) does not authorise disallowance of any expenditure on the ground that it was not necessary or prudent for the assessee to have incurred the same".

The very foundation of the action of the TPO is thus devoid of legally sustainable merits. There is no dispute that the impugned payments are made under an arrangement with the AE to provide certain services. It is not even the TPO's case that the payments for these services were not made for specific services under the contract but he is of the view that either the services were useless or there was no evidence of actual services having been rendered. As for the services being useless, as we have noted above, it is a call taken by the assessee whether the services are commercially expedient or not and all that the TPO can see is at what price similar services, whatever be the worth of such services, are actually rendered in the uncontrolled conditions.

As for the evidence for each of the service stated in the agreement, it is not even necessary that each of the service, which is specifically stated in the agreement, is rendered in every financial period. The actual use of services depends on whether or not use of such services was warranted by the business situations whereas payments under contracts are made for all such services as the user may require during the period covered. As long as agreement is not found to be a sham agreement, the value of the services covered under the agreement cannot be taken as 'nil' just because these services were not actually required by the assessee. In any case, having perused the material on record, we are satisfied that the services were actually rendered under the agreement and these services did justify the impugned payments. (AY. 2008-09)

AWB India Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 166 TTJ 521/(2015) 152 ITD 770 (Delhi)(Trib.)

1432 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Failure to pass draft assessment order after TPO's order renders proceedings void. SCN cannot be equated with draft assessment order. [S.144C]**

Even though a transfer pricing adjustment under section 92CA(1) was made to the income of the assessee, and accordingly the assessee is covered by the provisions of section 144C(15), the Assessing Officer did not furnish to the assessee a draft assessment order, before passing a final assessment order. The assessee was thus deprived of an opportunity of approaching the Dispute Resolution Panel. Under section 144(C) of the Act, it is evident that the Assessing Officer is required to pass only a draft assessment order on the basis of the recommendations made by the TPO after giving an opportunity to the assessee to file their objections and then the Assessing Officer shall pass a final order. Where there is an omission on the part of the Assessing Officer to follow the mandatory procedures prescribed in the Act, such an omission cannot be termed as a mere procedural irregularity and it cannot be cured. The impugned assessment order is a legal nullity. The show cause notice issued by the Assessing Officer, before making the ALP adjustment cannot be treated as a draft assessment order nor the assessee could have approached the DRP against the same. (*Vijay Television Pvt. Ltd. v. DRP [(2014) 46 taxmann.100 (Mad) followed]*. (ITA No. 1356/Del/2012, dt. 30-9-2014.) (AY. 2007-08)

Capsugel Healthcare Ltd. v. ACIT(2015) 152 ITD 142 (Delhi)(Trib.)

1433 **S.92C : Transfer Pricing – Arm's length price – Resale price Method – If margins of the wholesale distributor can be compared with the margins of the assessee, no adjustment can be made**

The assessee used Resale Price Method for benchmarking its international transactions so far as purchase of books is concerned. The claim of the assessee was that its purchase is at arm's length price because while its gross margin for the sale of books, other than imported books, is 33.82%, whereas its gross margin for sale of imported books is 38.08%. The TPO, however, rejected this stand on the ground that the comparison of profit earned on imported books with profit earned on other books is incorrect because the latter is an entirely uncomparable activity on the facts of this case. It was pointed out that, apart from distributing books imported from the AEs, the assessee publishes Indian reprints of foreign books by paying royalty thereon, and that this activity cannot be compared with distribution of books.

A plain look at the computations done by the TPO shows glaring inconsistencies. While the TPO has proceeded on the basis that the assessee has received 85.15% discount on published price of the books and allowed 30% discount on the same published price to the wholesale dealers, the figures reproduced above have a different story to share. Going by the business model as perceived by the TPO, which constitute foundation of the impugned ALP adjustment, for each purchase of ₹ 24.85 (100-85.15) by the assessee, the sale price has to be ₹ 70 (100-30). The profit margin thus works out to 45.15 which works out to margin of 64.50% of sales whereas the profit margin of the assessee on sale of these books is admittedly 38.08%. Clearly, therefore, there is a discrepancy in the perceptions of the TPO vis-à-vis actual facts of the case. This discrepancy, however, seems to be explained by the assessee's uncontroverted claim that, as submitted by the assessee before the AO *vide* chart attached to letter dated 13-12-2006- a copy of which is placed before us at the paper-book page 144, the UK cover price of the book and Indian cover price is not the same. While the discount allowed to the assessee is on the UK published price, the discount allowed to wholesale dealer is on Indian cover price. For example, UK cover price of the book 'The Age of Kali-Indian Travels and Encounters' is stated to be UK £ 8.99 whereas Indian cover price for sale is stated to be UK £ 4.99 and the discount allowed to the distributor is on Indian cover price. There are variations in the discount rates also but that aspect, for the present purposes, is not really material. Similarly, in the case of 'Sleepover Club Ponies' the UK cover price is stated to be UK £ 3.99 whereas Indian cover price is stated to be UK £ 2.50. All these details were before the TPO, yet has proceeded to compute the hypothetical sale price of the books in the hands of the distributor on the basis that it will be equivalent to 402.414869% (i.e. $100/24.85 \times 100$) of the purchases in the hands of the assessee. This approach, including the presumption underlying therein, is clearly erroneous. The computation of profit margins of the wholesale distributor, as computed by the AO, are, therefore, are also incorrect. The TPO has not adopted the profit margin by the wholesale distributors on the basis of actual figures or the undisputed discount policies on cover prices but based on certain hypothesis which turns out to be based on misconception of facts and is, in any case, unsubstantiated by material on record. We are, therefore, of the view that the very foundation of impugned ALP adjustment is unsustainable in law. (ITA No. 4790 / Del. / 2010, dt. 13-10-2014). (AY. 2004-05)

ACIT v. Harper Collins Publishers India Ltd. (2014) 166 TTJ 152 (2015) 54 taxmann.com 14 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – The expenses like rent, depreciation, electricity, insurance charges, office maintenance and other miscellaneous expenses have no co-relation with the number of employees

1434

The assessee has used allocation key of employee head account. The expenses like rent, depreciation, electricity, insurance charges, office maintenance and other miscellaneous expenses have no co-relation with the number of employees. On the contrary, these expenses have a direct bearing to the revenue generation. As per Rule 10-B(1) of the Act, determination of ALP u/s. 92CA(2) of the Act, the ALP in relation to an international transaction has to be determined by the most appropriate method. In our considered opinion, the method adopted by the TPO is slightly better than the method adopted

by the assessee. More so when the allocation by the assessee is not supported by any certificate from the management. Considering the nature of expenses in totality, we do not find any merit in the case of the assessee. (dt. 26-9-2014)

Varian India Pvt. Ltd v. Addl. DIT (2015) 67 SOT 17 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)

1435 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length – Operating Profit to Operating Revenue should be taken as the PLI and not Operating Profit to Operating Cost**

The purpose of identifying the PLI is to ensure that the comparability of the controlled transactions is objective and reference in this regard was made by him to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2010, wherein it was explained that the denominator should be reasonably independent from controlled transactions, as otherwise, there would be no objective starting point. Explaining further, it was observed in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines that when analysing a transaction consisting in the purchase of goods by a distributor from an associated enterprise for resale to independent customers, one could not weigh the net profit indicator against the cost of goods sold because these costs are the controlled costs for which consistency with the arm’s length principle is being tested.

In the present case, the issue involved was relating to determination of arms length price of the international transactions of the assessee company with its AE involving purchase of medical devices, and this being so, we are of the view that the CIT(A) was fully justified in accepting the Operating Profit to Operating Revenue as the PLI, as claimed by the assessee for Transfer Pricing Analysis, and not Operating Profit to Operating Cost as taken by the Assessing Officer/TPO, relying on the relevant OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2010.

DCIT v. St. Jude Medical India Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 152 ITD 572 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

1436 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Comparables and Adjustments – Functionally dissimilar companies cannot be taken as comparable**

As the same comparables had been chosen by TPO as in case of *Trilogy E-Business Software India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2013] 140 ITD 540 / 29 taxmann.com 310 (Bang.)* Tribunal’s order in such case for same assessment year was to be followed regarding comparability of companies. Application of turnover filter of ₹ 1 crore to ₹ 200 crore for selecting comparables is justified. Functionally dissimilar companies cannot be taken as comparables. Where company is engaged in varied lines of businesses, segmental profits of comparable line of business should be taken. Companies having related party transaction in excess of 15 per cent of total receipts cannot be taken as comparable. Where margin of assessee was well within +/- 5 per cent range of arithmetic mean of comparables, no TP adjustment was required. (AY. 2007-08)

Witness Systems Software India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 61 SOT 64 (URO) (Bang.) (Trib.)

1437 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – proper and legible details of comparable were not provided – Matter set aside**

Assessee an engineering design service provider, rendered design services to its Associated Enterprises (AEs) to support execution of overseas offices turnkey project. TPO rejected comparables selected by assessee except one and selected its own comparable and on basis of average markup on cost, he made corresponding transfer

pricing addition to income of assessee. TPO selected other comparables. Assessee raised objection that proper and legible details of comparable were not provided to assessee and that one of comparables of assessee. Matter was to be set aside to file of TPO to address these issues and pass a speaking order in accordance with law. (AY. 2008-09) *Bechtel India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 733 (Delhi)(Trib.)*

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Comparable – Small company – Cannot compared with giant company engaged in development of various niche products 1438

Assessee engaged in development of softwares for its associated enterprise (AE). TPO rejected some of comparable companies considered by assessee and adopted some other companies whose data was collected by resorting to provisions of section 133(6). Assessee objected to comparables adopted by TPO. Tribunal held that since assessee was a small company, it cannot compared with giant company engaged in development of various niche products. where AO noted functional dissimilarity between assessee and comparable company, same cannot be compared without making adjustment for dissimilarities. (AY. 2005-06, 2007-08)

Intoto Software India (P) Ltd v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 360 / 30 ITR 504 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Order was passed without considering the objections – Matter remanded 1439

Assessee filed detailed objections regarding functional comparability of comparables chosen by TPO were not considered by Dispute Resolution Panel, Objections raised by assessee, find that DRP has not considered and merely held that Info Edge (India) Ltd. and Overseas Manpower Corporation Ltd. Are functionally same as the assessee. In AY 2007-08 the matter has already been restored back to the file of the DRP and, therefore, entire conspectus of the case and in the light of the submissions made by the assessee and the findings recorded by the DRP, in the interest of justice the order of DRP / AO was restored back for readjudication and passing a speaking order. (AY. 2008-09)

Genpact Mobility Services (India) (P) Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 706 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Expenditure incurred in connection with sales – Cannot be within the ambit of advertising / marketing and promotion – Matter set aside 1440

Expenditure incurred in connection with sales which does not lead to brand promotion, cannot be brought within ambit of advertisement, marketing and promotion expenses for determining cost/value of international transactions. The TPO shall examine the veracity of description and quantification of the amount of selling expenses. After deducting the selling price from the AMP expenses as mentioned, the TPO shall decide the issue of AMP expenses by applying the proper comparables determining cost/value of international transactions. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

Haier Appliances India (P) Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 730 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – International Transaction – Assignment of onshore contract by AE to assessee company – Opportunity of being heard 1441

The Tribunal held that the provisions of section 95 were applicable to the assignment of portion of onshore contract by AE to the assessee, however, PGCIL (Govt. Co.)

neither being part of a prior agreement as stipulated in the first limb of section 92B(2) nor having in substance determined the terms of the transaction with the assessee as stipulated in the second limb of section 92B(2), it cannot be held that there is a deemed international transaction within the meaning of section 92B(2) between the assessee & AE.

Further, the Tribunal held that the assessee has not been afforded a proper opportunity of presenting its case, therefore, the impugned orders of the CIT(A) are set aside and the issue of determination of ALP is remanded to the AO who is directed to make a reference to the TPO. (AY. 2003-04, 2004-05)

Tellabs India (P) Ltd v. ACIT (2014) 150 ITD 97 / 159 TTJ 215 / 61 SOT 200 (Bang.)(Trib.)

1442 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Application of cost plus method**

The TPO took the cost relating to charter live activity as 50 per cent of total cost whereas the assessee took the actual cost relating to the charter live activity, the cost plus method can be applied only by taking the actual cost of the activity and once the figures used in the calculation made by the TPO are replaced by actual figures, the payments made by the assessee is at ALP and, therefore no adjustment is called for. (AY. 2002-03)

Reliance Industries v. Addl. ACIT (2013) 55 SOT 8 (URO) / (2014) 159 TTJ 349 (Mum.)(Trib.)

1443 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Interest – free loans – Corporate guarantee – Export turnover adjustments – CUP method**

The Tribunal had to consider the law on transfer pricing adjustments for the following three issues:

- (i) Interest free loans to AEs: We have no issue of the TPO applying the CUP method. But the problem arises when in the name of applying CUP method; a wholly inapplicable comparable model applied which leads to distorted results. A significant sector of multi-national corporate set up involves creation of subsidiaries and associate enterprises for advancement of their overseas business. They help them in terms of finance by offering soft loans and subsidiary loans; they are primarily focused to spread the business of the principal unit. It would have been very reasonable, judicious and appropriate on the part of the TPO to have looked into such type of transactions and applying it as uncontrolled transactions. Re-course straightaway to CRISIL, which deals in hardcore institutional finance transactions that too with clear commercial object of earning out of loans bereft on other considerations, is wholly inapplicable. While the real income theory has no application to a fictional working as provided by section 92 but this being part of the Income-tax Act, the valid consideration for properly assessing a transaction cannot be given a go by. Every fiction has limits to its application. In view thereof, the rate of 13.49% applied solely relying upon a third party opinion by applying on uncontrolled set of transaction is factually not correct and cannot be accepted. The correct comparable which can be applied is of LIBOR rate which is internationally recognised. It is the most appropriate comparable for the relevant periods and being reasonable and scientific uncontrolled comparable to be applied to the assessee's loan transactions;

- (ii) Adjustment for corporate guarantee: The TPO's action, in first going to SBI and then further enhancing it for mark-up, is based on surmises and conjectures. His adjustment has no basis or corroboration whatsoever from any authentic source. In Reliance Industries Ltd. and Nimbus Communications Ltd., the ITAT Mumbai has adopted the rate of such inter group guarantees at 0.38% and 0.5% respectively. The assessee itself has charged guarantee fee of 1% from one AE. Accordingly, the guarantee commission adjustment under TP at the rate of 1% is fair and reasonable;
- (iii) Export Turnover Adjustments: The main controversy on the export turnover adjustment pertains to the method to be adopted for adjustment. The TPO, having earlier adopted the TNMM method, should not have reviewed his own report in the first place without giving cogent reasons. The business model, agreement, relationship of parties remaining the same, there is no justification in switching to CUP method. The reasons given by the TPO for applying CUP method are totally vague and bereft of any cogent reasons. There is a perceptible difference in the risk between the sales made to related parties as the surety of repayments is within the control of the assessee and in case of sales to unrelated parties, the recovery of repayment of goods bears potentially high risk. In our view, the TNMM method as adopted earlier by TPO is the most appropriate method which deserves to be first applied. (AY. 2002-03, 2008-09.)

Kohinoor Foods Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 67 SOT 108 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Share application money, though not allotted into shares for a long time, cannot be treated as a “loan” for taxing notional interest

1444

The TPO has not disputed that the transactions were in the nature of payments for share application money, and thus, of capital contributions. The TPO has not made any adjustment with regard to the ALP of the capital contribution. He has, however, treated these transactions partly as of an interest free loan, for the period between the dates of payment till the date on which shares were actually allotted, and partly as capital contribution, i.e. after the subscribed shares were allotted by the subsidiaries in which capital contributions were made. No doubt, if these transactions are treated as in the nature of lending or borrowing, the transactions can be subjected to ALP adjustments, and the ALP so computed can be the basis of computing taxable business profits of the assessee, but the core issue before us is whether such a deeming fiction is envisaged under the scheme of the transfer pricing legislation or on the facts of this case. We do not find so. We do not find any provision in law enabling such deeming fiction. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)

Allcargo Global Logistics Ltd v. ACIT (2014) 150 ITD 651 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – TNMM – Total cost – Matter remanded

1445

While applying the Rule 10B of 1962 Rules provides for base for 'cost incurred' it has to be total cost and not any fraction thereof. When TPO embarks upon determination of ALP by consider in denominator of 'total cost', all aspect of 'total operating cost' such as cost of goods sold administration, selling distribution expenses and depreciation etc., are

required to be considered both for assessee and comparables as well. Matter remanded. (AY. 2008-09)

POSCO Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. ADIT(2014) 148 ITD 527 / 31 ITR 255 / 162 TTJ 689 / 102 DTR 257 (Delhi)(Trib.)

1446 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Addition on the basis of notional interest was held to be not valid**

Assessee is engaged in business of manufacturing and trading of pharmaceutical goods. It entered in agreement with its foreign subsidiary, for grant of a convertible loan of US \$ 27 million. As per terms of loan agreement, no interest was payable if amount was converted into equity, however, if same was redeemed, interest was payable at LIBOR Plus 290 bps and interest was to be computed at annual rates and payable at maturity which was 5 years from date of first disbursement. During relevant year, assessee filed its return wherein no income was shown from aforesaid loan. Foreign subsidiary had not opted for conversion of loan during year, and therefore it was loan for year and as per terms of agreement, no interest or income accrued from amount of loan. TPO considered Optionally Fully Convertible loan as debt, computed interest chargeable to tax. CIT(A) held that funds were provided by assessee as per RBI guidelines and in immediately next year, entire loan given to subsidiary was converted into equity shares of foreign company. Held that since loan had been converted into equity in immediate next year, there was no question of taxing notional interest. Tribunal also confirmed the order of CIT(A) by observing that assessee has converted the loan into equity in the immediate next year, there was no question of taxing notional interest. Order of CIT(A) was confirmed (dt. 11-10-2013) (AY. 2008-09).

Dy. CIT v. Cadila Healthcare Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 502 / (2015) 67 SOT 188 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

1447 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Advertisement, marketing and sales promotion expenses for its foreign associate enterprise – Matter was set aside**

Daikin Air-conditioning India Pvt. Ltd. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Daikin Industries Ltd, Japan (DIL). Assessee is engaged in distribution of air-conditioners in India. The assessee imported finished goods from DIL and resold them to dealers and end users in India. Besides the main activity of distribution of air conditioners, the assessee was also engaged in import of compressors and air-conditioner parts from other associated enterprises for sale in India and in the provision of maintenance services for the products sold in India. The assessee company had infrastructure like branch offices, warehouses and dealer network at all important towns throughout the country. The issue of consideration in both the appeals as the transfer pricing adjustment made in regard to advertisement, marketing and sales proportion expenditure. Following the ratio of Tribunal in *LG Electronics India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 140 ITD 41 (Delhi) (SB)*. ITAT set aside the issue to the AO for fresh adjudication as per provision of law. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)

Daikin Airconditioning India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 335 (Delhi) (Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Financial advisory support service – Merely functional advisory consultancy service without any risk was not accepted – Assessee’s services to be treated as marketing services

1448

Where assessee company provided marketing support services to its associated enterprise, engineering companies providing end-to-end solutions the comparables will not be applicable due to functional incomparability. Appeal was partly allowed. Tribunal directed to exclude Vapi and WAPCOS comparables. (AY. 2008-09)
Actis Advisers (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 314 (Delhi) (Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Benefit of 5 per cent allowed as deduction under second proviso to section 92C(2) was not sustainable as it is only a tolerance range and not a standard deduction. [Rules.10B, 10D]

1449

Assessee manufactured product under contract with its AEs in Singapore and USA. TPO rejected comparables selected by assessee as they were international companies, unlike assessee and took four other comparables. CIT(A) included three comparables taken by assessee as they had been taken as comparables for two subsequent years by TPO, and allowed 5 per cent standard deduction by invoking second proviso to section 92C(2). On appeal by revenue Tribunal held that since comparability of each case is tested independently and separately for each year, comparables added by CIT(A) were to be rejected on grounds of functional dissimilarity and fact that one company was persistently loss making. Benefit of 5 per cent allowed as deduction under second proviso to section 92C(2) was not sustainable as it is only a tolerance range and not a standard deduction. (AY. 2003-04)
Advance Power Display Systems Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 761 / 165 TTJ 648 / 30 ITR 481 / 105 DTR 269 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – TNMM – Companies in ITES cannot be classified into low-end BPO services and high-end KPO services for comparability analysis but have to be classified based on the functions performed. Comparables with abnormal profit margins cannot be discarded *per se* but must be examined to determine whether the high margins are due to normal business conditions or not. [R.10B(3)]

1450

The Special Bench had to consider two issues: Whether, for determining the ALP under TNMM, (i) a company performing (high-end) KPO functions is comparable with a company providing (low-end) back office support services, given that both are in the “ITES” sector & (ii) companies earning abnormally high profit margin have to be discarded from the list of comparables? HELD by the Special Bench:

- (i) As regards Q. 1, in view of the peculiarity of the ITES sector, the problem of performing a comparability analysis has to be solved by splitting the exercise into two steps in order to attain relatively equal degree of comparability, the first being to select the potential comparables at ITES sector level by applying the broad functionality test. By applying a broad functionality test, all entities providing IT enabled services can be taken as potential comparables;
- (ii) In the second step, though further classification of IT enabled services may be required to be done, it cannot be on the basis of BPO (low end) and KPO (high end) services because the line of difference between them is very thin. There are

- a large number of services falling under ITES with significant overlap and it is difficult to classify these services either as low-end BPO services or high-end KPO services;
- (iii) Instead, the purpose of attaining a relatively equal degree of comparability can be achieved by taking into consideration the functional profile of the tested party and comparing the same with the entities selected as potential comparables on broad functional analysis taken at ITES level. The principal functions performed by the tested party should be identified and the same can be compared with the principal functions performed by the entities already selected to find out the relatively equal degree of comparability. If it is possible by this exercise to determine that some uncontrolled transactions have a lesser degree of comparability than others, they should be eliminated. The examination of controlled transactions ordinarily should be based on the transaction actually undertaken by the AE and the actual transaction should not be disregarded or substituted by other transaction;
 - (iv) As suggested in the OECD Guidelines on Transfer Pricing, determining a reliable estimate of arm's length outcome requires flexibility and the exercise of good judgment. It is to be kept in mind that the TNMM may afford a practical solution to otherwise insoluble transfer pricing problems if it is used sensibly and with appropriate adjustments to account for differences. When the comparable uncontrolled transactions being used are those of an independent enterprise, a high degree of similarity is required in a number of aspects of the AE and the independent enterprise involved in the transactions in order for the controlled transactions to be comparable. Given that often the only data available for the third parties are company-wide data, the functions performed by the third party in its total operations must be closely aligned to those functions performed by the tested party with respect to its controlled transactions in order to allow the former to be used to determine an arm's length outcome for the latter. The overall objective should be to determine a level of segmentation that provides reliable comparables for the controlled transaction, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The process followed to identify potential comparables is one of the most critical aspects of the comparability analysis and it should be transparent, systematic and verifiable. In particular, the choice of selection criteria has a significant influence on the outcome of the analysis and should reflect the most meaningful economic characteristics of the transactions compared. Complete elimination of subjective judgments from the selection of comparables would not be feasible but much can be done to increase objectivity and ensure transparency in the application of subjective judgments;
 - (v) On facts, the assessee is a captive contract service provider mainly rendering back office support services and incidental services involving some degree of special knowledge and expertise. It is not comparable to Mold-Tek & eClerx which are engaged in providing high-end services involving specialised knowledge and domain expertise in the field;
 - (vi) As regards Q. 2, potential comparables cannot be excluded merely on the ground that their profit is abnormally high. In such cases, the matter would require further investigation to ascertain whether earning of high profit reflects a normal business

condition or whether it is the result of some abnormal conditions prevailing in the relevant year. The profit margin earned by such entity in the immediately preceding year/s may also be taken into consideration to find out whether the high profit margin represents the normal business trend. The FAR analysis in such case may be reviewed to ensure that the potential comparable earning high profit satisfies the comparability conditions. If it is found on such investigation that the high margin profit making company does not satisfy the comparability analysis and or the high profit margin earned by it does not reflect the normal business condition, the high profit margin making entity should not be included in the list of comparable for the purpose of determining the arm's length price of an international transaction. Otherwise, the entity satisfying the comparability analysis with its high profit margin reflecting normal business condition should not be rejected solely on the basis of such abnormal high profit margin. (AY. 2008-09)

Maersk Global Center (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 101 DTR 1 / 161 TTJ 137 / 31 ITR 1 / 147 ITD 83 (SB)(Mum.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Business expenditure – After TPO determines the AMP expenditure incurred for benefit of AE, balance is deemed to be incurred for assessee's business & is automatically allowable u/s. 37(1) [S.37(1)]

1451

The avowed object of the TP adjustment on account of AMP expenses is to first find out and attribute the amount spent by the assessee towards promotion of its foreign AE's brand/logo etc., and then make addition for such amount with appropriate mark-up. By this exercise, the total AMP expenses get segregated into two classes, viz., one benefiting the assessee's business and two, benefiting the foreign AE by way of promotion of the brand. Whereas the first amount is deductible in full subject to the regular provisions, the second amount is added to the total income with suitable mark-up by way of the TP adjustment. Once the total amount of AMP expenses is processed through the provisions of Chapter X of the Act with the aim of making TP adjustment towards AMP expenses incurred for the foreign AE, or in other words such expenses as are not incurred for the assessee's business, there can be no scope for again reverting to section 37(1) *qua* such amount to make addition by considering the same expenditure as having not been incurred 'wholly and exclusively' for the purposes of assessee's business. If the amount of AMP expenses is disallowed by processing under both the sections, that is 37 and 92, it will result in double addition to the extent of the original amount incurred for the promotion of the brand of the foreign AE de hors the mark-up. (AY. 2008-09)

Whirlpool of India Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 30 ITR 29 / 162 TTJ 328 / 102 DTR 369 / (2015) 153 ITD 341 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arms' length price – Prior to the amendment to S. 92CA(4) w.e.f. 1-6-2007, AO was not bound to accept ALP as determined by TPO – TPO cannot make adjustment to the ALP by merely following order passed in earlier year [S.92CA]

1452

The AO proceeded to compute the total income of the assessee u/s. 92C(4) on the basis of the arm's length price worked out by the TPO. On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal observed that the AO is not bound to accept the ALP as determined by the TPO but has to determine the ALP, only after giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The Tribunal observed that in the case before it the AO had not given any

such opportunity. Accordingly, the Tribunal restored the matter back to the AO with the direction that the AO will determine the computation of income having regard to the ALP after giving due and effective opportunity of hearing to the assessee. (AY. 2004–05). *Abacus Distribution Systems (India) (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 1 / 159 TTJ 156 (Mum.)(Trib.)*

1453 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Where TPO made adjustment to ALP by merely following order passed in earlier year without going into merits of case, order was not sustainable**

While deciding the appeal for the subsequent year, the Tribunal observed that the TPO has duplicated the same order as passed by the TPO for the earlier year except for the variation in the figures. It also noted that the assessee’s explanations and all its objections and documents have not been considered at all, which were specific to the issues involved for that particular year and that this shows that the TPO has passed the order without application of mind, which he is required to do under the provisions of law and equity. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that such an order shows an unprecedented bias and pre-determined mind without going into the merits of the case and therefore such an order passed by the TPO and confirmed by the CIT(A) cannot stand and the entire matter needs to be remanded back to the file of the TPO/AO for passing fresh order, in accordance with provisions of law and after giving due and effective opportunity of hearing to the assessee and also considering the entire material and evidence including explanation filed. (AY. 2005–06)

Abacus Distribution Systems (India) (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 1 / 159 TTJ 156 (Mum.)(Trib.)

1454 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – TPO cannot determine ALP under TNMM by relying upon multiple year data where current year data of comparable companies are available on public domain [R.10B(4)]**

The assessee charged its AE with ALP by adopting TNMM and operating profit/total cost (OP/TC) as the profit level indicator (PLI). The assessee selected six companies as comparables with average OP/TC margin based on multiple year data worked out at 10%. Since the assessee’s OP/TC margin of 11.03% for the current year was higher than the average margin of 10% of the comparables, thus it concluded that the price charged to its AE was within ALP. The TPO, however, rejected one of the comparables and relied on the data for the immediately preceding 2 years and arrived at the average OP/TC at 19%, thereby proposing an upward adjustment of ₹ 1,72,49,399/- for which an addition was made by the AO. The CIT(A) decided in favour of assessee by relying on the data of the relevant financial year.

On appeal by the tax department, the Tribunal held that the TPO’s method of relying on multiple year data was contrary to Rule 10B(4) of IT Rules. The said rule makes it clear that only the data relating to the relevant financial year has to be relied upon for computing the OP/TC margin of the comparable company. The Tribunal observed that, when the current year data of the comparable companies were available on public domain, and since the assessee’s OP/TC margin 11.03% is much higher than the OP/TC margin of the comparable companies by using the current year data being 8%, no adjustment can be made to the ALP declared. (AY. 2003-2004)

ACIT v. Infotech Enterprises Ltd. (2014) 29 ITR 67 / 41 taxmann.com 335 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Adjustment of guarantee fee – Same rate as applied in the earlier year was to be applied as there were no change in facts and circumstances – Adjustment on notional interest – AO to decide on the basis of LIBOR prevalent at the relevant point of time

1455

The AO has made addition on account of guarantee fee of ₹ 1,77,61,212 and towards notional interest of ₹ 2,03,02,396 on the directions of the DRP. On appeal to the Tribunal, it is observed that in light of the earlier years' orders of the Tribunal, insofar as the application of rate of 4.66% by the TPO on account of guarantee fee is concerned, the same cannot be upheld as in the earlier year, it has been held that the rate of 3% should be applied for the guarantee fee. In fact, there are many cases of the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal where guarantee fee commission between 0.20% and 0.5% have been upheld. Thus, under the facts and circumstances wherein 3% has been upheld in the earlier year in case of the assessee, the same rate should be applied in this year also as a matter of consistency without there being any change in the facts and the circumstances.

For the disallowance of interest after applying the interest on the advance given to the AE, the Tribunal in the earlier year has restored this issue back to the file of the AO to deal and decide on the basis of LIBOR rate prevalent at the relevant point of time. Therefore, for the current year also the Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the AO to apply LIBOR rate with a direction that, in case LIBOR rate is less than 6%, then the charging of interest rate of 6% by the assessee should be taken at ALP. (AY. 2008-09) *Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 40 taxmann.com 522 / (2014) 29 ITR 95 (Mum.)(Trib.)*

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arms' length price – Contract manufacturer of jewellery entitled for making charges – cannot be compared with full-fledged independent manufacturers-availability of internal CUP method would outwit TNMM.

1456

The assessee was engaged in the activity of purchasing cut and polished diamonds, colour stones, etc. from its AEs and sold jewellery to same AEs as per designs supplied by said AEs. The assessee was simply a job worker or a contract manufacturer who was entitled to making charges based on cost incurred by it and not based on value of material supplied by its AEs. The assessee failed to carry out any comparability analysis by following any of the prescribed methods and therefore its international transactions with its AEs had not been benchmarked by the assessee. The TPO applied the TNMM and made an adjustment, which was confirmed by the DRP.

On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal held that if there is a direct method of CUP available, then there was no requirement of resorting to TNMM. If any of the direct methods, like CUP, RPM or CPM can be adopted for bench marking then they should be given preference and once these traditional methods are rendered inapplicable only then, the TNMM should be resorted to as a last measure. It observed that that the argument of applicability of internal CUP had not been taken up either before the TPO or before the DRP, and therefore, the order of the TPO/AO was set aside and the entire matter was remanded back to the file of the AO/TPO to examine whether the CUP could be considered as the most appropriate method or not. The Tribunal also directed that Cost Plus Method could also be examined with some external comparabilities by

carrying out FAR analysis, if CUP method failed. Thus the entire matter of transfer pricing adjustment was remanded to the file of TPO/AO to consider the applicability of internal CUP and carry out comparability analysis afresh with the unrelated parties. (AY. 2008-09)

Twilight Jewellery (P.) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 296 / 147 ITD 89 / 106 DTR 367 / 164 TTJ 814 (Mum.)(Trib.)

1457 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Assessee and the TPO accept a particular company as functionally comparable – Assessee did not agitate on such comparable before CIT(A) – The same cannot be excluded from the list of comparables**

The assessee, the Tribunal held that under Rule 10B(2) comparability of international transactions with uncontrolled transactions has to be judged with reference to functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed (FAR analysis). It noted that the assessee has not contested that due to any of the above, such company is functionally not similar, its objections are only on the basis of high turnover or even low turnover in some cases. The Tribunal therefore observed that it would not be appropriate to apply turnover filter, when in fact assessee has accepted very low turnover company as comparable and since the assessee is in the service sector, scale of operations do not have any effect on margins unlike in manufacturing companies. The Tribunal held that this filter can only be considered in the light of the facts and cannot be applied in every case uniformly on the basis of decisions in other cases. Accordingly, the Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A) and observed that it was appropriate to include the companies selected by the assessee as comparable for the purpose of determining the average PLI in the relevant assessment year. (AY. 2004-05)

IVY Comptech (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 328 / 61 SOT 93 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

1458 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Segmental results – To be accepted even if not included in audited accounts**

The Tribunal observed that the reason given by the TPO and DRP for not accepting the segment results was that the assessee had not shown the same in the audited financial accounts and that the segment reporting was done only for transfer pricing purposes. It noted that the, TPO / DRP have also stated that allocation of expenses between the contract manufacturing segment and non AE local/domestic segments are abnormal. Deciding on these, the Tribunal held that in so far as the reason that the assessee has not shown the segmental report/results in audited financial accounts and therefore, such segmental results cannot be accepted for ALP has not been accepted by the Tribunal in the case of *3i Infotec Ltd. v. ITO [2013] 35 taxmann.com 582 (Chennai)* wherein it has been held that even though segmental reports were not shown in audited financial accounts, they had to be accepted. Deciding on the issue of allocation of expenses, the Tribunal observed that the TPO / DRP have rejected the segmentals alleging that the assessee could not substantiate as to how ‘other expenses’ were allocated to contract manufacturing segment and local manufacturing segment and that the low employee cost combined with higher depreciation in contract manufacturing segment indicates that the assessee did not apportion the employee cost to contract manufacturing segment appropriately. The Tribunal noted that, the figures adopted by the TPO/DRP in their orders in analysing these facts and coming to the decision/conclusion to reject the segmental results of the assessee are wrong. It also noted

that the TPO has accepted the segmental results of the assessee in the earlier years on the contract manufacturing transactions with the AE for arriving at ALP while computing the relief under section 10A of the Act and the TPO/DRP has not given any reason as to why segmental results shall not be considered for determining ALP for transactions with AE having accepted very same segmental results of the assessee for the purpose of computing deduction under section 10B of the Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that there is no valid reason for not accepting the segmental reports in determining the ALP on the AE sales for assessment year in question having accepted the segmentation approach for the earlier assessment years and especially when there was no change in the facts and circumstances of the case in year. (AY. 2007-08)

Honeywell Electrical Devices and Systems India Ltd v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 347 / 64 SOT 118 (URO)(Chennai)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Diamonds of similar description sold to both AEs and third party – Price of transactions with both AEs and third party can be compared – Internal CUP method available [R.10B(1)(a)].

1459

The assessee engaged in the business of manufacturing of cut and polished diamonds and selling them to AE as well as to the third parties. TPO made an adjustment as there was difference of price by more than 5% as price charged from AEs were less than the price charged from non-AEs. TPO observed that since for diamonds, properties of the product are very different the application of CUP method becomes very difficult. Even a minor changes in the properties of the products, renders the applicability of CUP method inapplicable. The CIT(A) deleted the addition.

On appeal by the department, the Tribunal observed that though it is to be held that in the sale of diamonds, it is very difficult to benchmark the price by applying the CUP method, however, on the peculiar facts of the present case, it is seen that in the nature of sale transaction undertaken by the assessee and price which has been charged from the AE appears to be on similar description of diamonds which have been sold to the third party. Accordingly, the Tribunal upheld the findings of the CIT(A) that there was internal CUP available in the case of the assessee for determining the transfer price. It held that once a direct method of internal CUP is available then there is no need to resort to the TNMM method. (AY. 2007-08)

Livingstones v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 362/41 taxmn.com 499 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arms’ length price – AE purchased huge quantity and marketing expenses and risk of bad debt in case of AE are comparatively less – No upward adjustment permissible

1460

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacturing of cut and polished diamonds and selling them to AE as well as to the third parties. The assessee’s sales with its AE aggregated to ₹ 126.43 crores, whereas in case of non-AE it was only 70 lakhs. The assessee argued that, in the case of third party there is always a risk of bad debt which is not there in the case of the AE and also the marketing expenses in the case of the AE are less. The TPO and the CIT(A) rejected this contention.

On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal held that the reasoning given by the CIT(A) cannot be upheld, because these factors do have affect in the negotiation of price. The difference on account of factors affecting the prices have to be given adjustment with

the comparables. Since, in a CUP method a very high degree of comparison of business conditions, products and other physical attributes of the products and services are to be examined, therefore, more often it becomes very difficult to have such comparable transactions. Difference of volume, definitely has a bearing on the negotiation of the prices and, therefore, adjustment on this factor has to be made. Accordingly, the Tribunal deleted the upward adjustment made. (AY. 2007-08)

Livingstones v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 362 / 41 taxmn.com 499 (Mum.)(Trib.)

1461 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arms’ length price – Delay in payment is normal – No notional interest to be levied on delayed payment by AEs**

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacturing of cut and polished diamonds and selling them to AE as well as to the third parties. The TPO observed that average days of realisation in respect of sales to AE was 210 days, whereas in respect of non-AEs was 126 days and thus made an adjustment on account of notional interest on delayed collection of payment on sale invoices from AEs. The CIT(A) observed that there had been several instances when the unrelated parties also had made payments beyond the credit period granted and in such cases also the assessee had not charged any interest on such delayed payment. The CIT(A), while deleting the adjustment noted that in the diamond industry, payment beyond the credit period is a usual business practice and none of the entities charge any interest on such delayed payments.

On appeal by the department, the Tribunal observed that in the case of AE the volume of sale is very huge as compared to the volume of sale in case of 3rd party and such delay in realization of payment should not be adversely viewed on the basis of average working of days. The average days of delay in payment as worked out by the TPO is also inappropriate as the number of sale transactions with AE is far more than the non-AE. Accordingly, the Tribunal while dismissing the ground of the department held that such notional interest cannot be charged for the purpose of making adjustment in ALP (AY. 2007-08)

Livingstones v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 362 / 41 taxmann.com 499 (Mum.)(Trib.)

1462 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Comparable data which was not available to assessee at time of preparing TP documentation can be used by TPO – only if it is made available to assessee for its objections**

The assessee reported international transactions with its AE. The TPO recommended certain adjustments which were confirmed by the DRP.

On appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee challenged the adjustment on the ground that the comparables were not available with the assessee during the TP documentation. The Tribunal held that if comparables were available with the TPO/public domain and the same were made available to the assessee who was given an opportunity to raise its objections, then adjustment can be made by the TPO. (AY. 2007-08)

Avineon India (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 404 / 150 ITD 543 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

1463 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Different segmental activities, which are independent of each other – Required to be analysed on transaction-to-transaction basis – Cannot be combined**

The assessee has 3 business verticals, GIS (STPI unit), IT (non-STPI unit), Engineering (STPI unit). Books of account were maintained with each unit as a separate profit centre

and the common expenses were allocated on the basis of revenue. The TPO rejected segment result on the ground that segmental data is not audited. The AO, however, neither raised any objection on the profit computation nor made any adjustments to the working given by assessee. The DRP confirmed the decision of the TPO.

On appeal the Tribunal held that for the purpose of Transfer Pricing, each segment is a different activity and FA analysis will have to be distinct for each segment and the AO / TPO should consider each service separately for benchmarking and should not combine all of them into one. (AY. 2007-08)

Avineon India (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 404 / 150 ITD 543 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Companies having supernormal profit – To be excluded

1464

On appeal to the Tribunal the assessee objected adjustments made by the TPO and confirmed by the DRP as wrong comparables were used. The Tribunal held that as per rule 10B if there are any differences between comparables, relevant transactions should be taken and differences to be adjusted to arrive at the ALP for the reason that after taking number of companies as comparables, the TPO should allow adjustments towards differences in depreciation, differences in risk perceptibility, of working capital adjustments, etc., depending on the facts of the case. The Tribunal also held that selecting a company, which is not comparable at all or which affects comparison due to unusual features cannot be taken as a comparable company. Thus if there are certain extraordinary events or different business models, such companies cannot be used as comparables. (AY. 2007-08)

Avineon India (P) Ltd v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 404 / 150 ITD 543 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Direct comparables available – segmental result of companies engaged in other business – Should not be taken as a Comparable

1465

The assessee is engaged in providing technical and administrative services relating to oil and gas exploration and drilling activities. It entered into international transactions with its AEs. The assessee chose TNMM with operating profit to total cost (OP/TC) ratio as the Profit Level Indicator (PLI) to benchmark its international transaction with the AEs at 8.30%. The assessee chose 14 comparables and used 3 years data. The PLI ratio of the comparable selected by the assessee was computed at 11.25% and thus, the assessee contended that its transactions with the AEs were at ALP. The TPO, however, adopted the current year data and rejected the search process undertaken by the assessee to identify the comparables. The TPO selected seven comparables with the mean PLI of 31.9% and accordingly made certain adjustment after re-computing the ALP of international transactions. The action of the TPO was confirmed by the DRP.

On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal held that when direct comparables are available then segmental results of companies engaged in other business should not be taken as comparable. (AY. 2008-09)

Premier Exploration Services (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 29 ITR 427 / 162 TTJ 125 / 146 ITD 580/102 DTR 240 (Delhi)(Trib.)

1466 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Foreign exchange fluctuation in case of exporter – to be regarded as operating income – To be included while working out the PLI**

The assessee is engaged in providing technical and administrative services relating to oil and gas exploration and drilling activities. It entered into the international transactions with its AEs. The assessee had included foreign exchange difference income from the operating income while comparing ALP. The same was rejected by the TPO.

On appeal, the Tribunal following the decision of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of *SAP Labs India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2010) 8 taxmann.com 207* directed the TPO to include the foreign exchange income as operating income while working out the PLI. (AY. 2008-09)

Premier Exploration Services (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 29 ITR 427 / 162 TTJ 125/146 ITD 580/102 DTR 240 (Delhi)(Trib.)

1467 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Risk adjustment – Can be made – Only if difference in risk results in deflation or inflation of financial results**

The assessee is engaged in providing technical and administrative services relating to oil and gas exploration and drilling activities. It entered into the international transactions with its AEs. The assessee made appropriate adjustment for varying risk profiles and difference in working capital vis-à-vis comparables. The same was rejected by the DRP. On appeal, the Tribunal observed that no risk adjustment can be allowed when the same has not been quantified. It noted that the assessee has failed to bring any evidence on record to show that there was any difference in risk profile of comparable companies. Accordingly, it held that the risk adjustment cannot be allowed as a thumb rule and since the assessee has also failed to establish any working capital difference the same too was not allowed. (AY. 2008-09)

Premier Exploration Services (P) Ltd v. ITO (2014) 29 ITR 427 / 162 TTJ 125 / 146 ITD 580 / 102 DTR 240 (Delhi)(Trib.)

1468 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Selection of comparables – Functionally different**

High profit margin of a company cannot be a factor for exclusion from comparables. Companies functionally different and persistently loss making cannot be considered as comparables. (AY. 2008-09)

Syscom Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 98 DTR 45 (Mum.)(Trib.)

1469 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Data of relevant year. [Rs.10B(4), 10D(4)]**

In the absence of any exceptional circumstances influencing the determination of transfer prices the data relating to the financial year in which the international transaction has been entered into shall be used. (AY. 2008-09)

Syscom Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 98 DTR 45 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Tolerance range** 1470
 Assessee is entitled to benefit of proviso to section 92C(2) if the prices of the international transaction of the assessee are within the tolerance range of + 5 per cent of the arithmetic mean of more than one comparable prices. (AY. 2008-09)
Syscom Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 98 DTR 45(Mum.)(Trib.)
- S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Relevancy of financial results of AE** 1471
 Financial results of the AE are not at all relevant for the purpose of determination of ALP in relation to the international transaction entered into. (AY. 2008-09)
Syscom Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 98 DTR 45 (Mum)(Trib.)
- S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Selection of comparables – Assessee not prevented from pointing out why comparables chosen by it are not correct** 1472
 Assessee had included two companies in its transfer pricing study, not being functionally comparable. In the course of transfer pricing proceedings, assessee cannot be prevented from pointing out cogent reasons and give proper analysis as to why the comparables chosen are not correct. (AY. 2008-09)
Tata Power Solar Systems Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2014) 98 DTR 250 / 30 ITR 1 / 62 SOT 93 / 159 TTJ 713 (Mum.)(Trib.)
- S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Selection of comparables – Absence of proper segmental details** 1473
 A comparable cannot be included in the absence of proper segmental details for the working of the margin and the operating expenses. (AY. 2008-09)
Tata Power Solar Systems Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2014) 98 DTR 250 / 30 ITR 1 / 62 SOT 93 / 159 TTJ 713 (Mum.)(Trib.)
- S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Sale transactions with AE vis-à-vis entire sales** 1474
 ALP has to be determined on the international transactions undertaken by the assessee and not in relation to the assessee’s entire sales turnover. (AY. 2008-09)
Tata Power Solar Systems Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 98 DTR 250 / 30 ITR 1 / 62 SOT 93 / 159 TTJ 713 (Mum.)(Trib.)
- S.92C : Transfer pricing –Arm’s length price – Interest on loan advanced to AE.** 1475
 Interest charged by assessee from it AE on loan advanced in the foreign currency should be benchmarked by interbank rate. Assessee charged interest from its AE at a rate higher than LIBOR, therefore, transfer pricing adjustment is not warranted. (AY. 2008-09)
Hinduja Global Solutions Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 145 ITD 361 / (2014) 98 DTR 266 / 164 TTJ 280 (Mum.)(Trib.)
- S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Price paid for import of LPG from AE [R.10B(1)(a)]** 1476
 DRP found that the prices paid by the assessee for import of LPG from its AE in respect of two shipments were in excess of the ALP by computing the freight charges on the

basis of distance between the port of origin and port of destination as suggested by the assessee itself. The finding of the DRP was based on the most appropriate method under the given circumstances and warranted no interference. (AY. 2008-09)

SHV Energy (P) Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 432 / 98 DTR 177 / 160 TTJ 737 (Hyd.) (Trib.)

1477 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Bank guarantee – Rate was modified to 0.5% as against 0.25% adopted by the CIT(A)**

The assessee was not charging bank guarantee commission from AE. The Tribunal held that the same is liable to adjustment towards ALP on transaction and rate of guarantee commission modified to 0.05% as against 0.25% adopted by the CIT(A). (AY. 2005-06)

ACIT v. Nimbus Communications Ltd. (2013) 145 ITD 582 / (2014) 100 DTR 259 / 30 ITR 349 / 160 TTJ 717 (Mum.)(Trib.)

1478 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Argument, based on BMW, that the AMP adjustment law laid down in L. G. Electronics (SB) does not apply to a full-risk distributor is not correct**

In *LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 152 TTJ (Del) (SB) 273* the Special Bench held by majority that incurring of AMP expenses towards promotion of brand, legally owned by the foreign AE, constitutes a 'transaction'. The contention that no disallowance could be made out of AMP expenses by benchmarking them separately when the overall net profit rate declared by the assessee was higher than other comparable cases also came to be specifically rejected by the Special Bench. Resultantly, the transfer pricing adjustment in relation to such AMP expenses was held to be sustainable in principle. In the eventual order, the Special Bench restored the matter to the file of the AO/TPO for fresh determination of Transfer Pricing Adjustment in relation to AMP expenses. In order to enable the determination of correct ALP of AMP expenses, the Tribunal listed out 14 parameters in Para 17.4 of its order which should be examined by the AO/TPO before reaching the final conclusion about the warrant for a TP Adjustment on this score. It is relevant to note that there were 22 interveners in this case, some of which were distributors, while others were licenced manufacturers. While setting out 14 parameters, the Special Bench has held *vide* first parameter that the AO/TPO should ascertain as to whether the Indian AE is simply a distributor or is holding a manufacturing licence from its foreign AE. The second parameter talks of examining as to whether or not the Indian AE is a full fledged manufacturer and whether it is selling the goods purchased from the Foreign AE as such or is making some value addition to the goods purchased from its Foreign AE before selling it to customers. Thus there is not even a slightest doubt that the Special Bench order not only applies to a 'Manufacturer', but also extends to a distributor, whether he is a bearing full risk or least risk. Thus, such tests are applicable with full vigor to the extent applicable, to the distributors. There is nothing in the Special Bench order which restricts its operation only to the 'Manufacturers'.

The argument, based on *BMW India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT (Del.)* that as the assessee was a full fledged distributor and as such the benefit of AMP expenses did not spill over to the foreign AE is not acceptable because the Special Bench order in *L. G. Electronics* is applicable with full force on all the classes of the assesseees, whether they are licensed manufacturers or distributors. The Bench in *BMW* did not have any occasion to bestow

its attention to the correctness of the application by the TPO of the aforesaid parameters laid down in the Special Bench order as these were naturally not considered by the Officer since he passed his order much before the advent of the Special Bench order. There is no prize for guessing that Special Bench order has more force and binding effect over the Division Bench order on the same issue. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)
ACIT v. Casio India Co. Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 30 ITR 577 / 62 SOT 110 / 166 TTJ 633 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Profit split method – Law for applying Profit Split Method as per Rule 10B(1)(d) explained – Matter remanded [R.10B]

1479

The Profit Split Method as provided under Rule 10B(1)(d) is applicable mainly in international transactions: (a) involving transfer of unique intangibles; (b) in multiple international transactions which are so inter related that they cannot be valued separately. The method specified in clause (ii) of Rule 10B(1)(d) that the relative contribution made by each of the associated enterprise should be evaluated on the basis of FAR analysis and on the basis of reliable external data. Thus, benchmarking by selection of comparables is mandatory under this Method. The profits need to be split among the AEs on the basis of reliable external market data, which indicate how unrelated parties have split the profits in similar circumstances. For practical application, we are of the view that, benchmarking with reliable external market data is to be done, in case of residual profit split method, at the first stage, where the combined net profits are partially allocated to each enterprise so as to provide it with an appropriate base returns keeping in view the nature of the transaction. The residual profits may be split as per relative contribution of the Associated Enterprise. In our view at this stage of splitting of residual profits, no benchmarking is necessary, as it is not practicable. Nevertheless, for splitting the residuary profits a scientific basis for allocation may be applied. Matter remanded. (AY. 2004-05)
ITO v. Net freight (India) P. Ltd. (2014) 30 ITR 441 / 63 SOT 67 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – RBI approval – TPO cannot sit in judgment on commercial expediency – RBI approval means the payment is at ALP. If overall TNMM analysis done, royalty cannot be analysed separately

1480

The TPO is not entitled to sit in judgment on the business and commercial expediency of the assessee in paying royalty to its parent company as per the provisions of the Act as laid down clearly by the Delhi High Court in *CIT v. EKL Appliances Ltd. (2012) 345 ITR 241*. It is also noted that various Tribunals such as *DCIT v. Sona Okegawa Precision Forgings (ITA No. 5386/Del/2010)*, *Hero Motocorp (ITA No 5130/Del/2010)*, *Thyssen Krupp Industries (ITANo6460/Mum/2012)*, *Abhishek Auto Industries (ITA No. 1433/Del/2009)* have taken a view that RBI approval of the Royalty rates itself implies that the payments are at Arm's Length and hence no further adjustment needs to be made viewed from this angle too. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that once TNMM has been applied to the assessee company's transaction, it covers under its ambit the Royalty transactions in question too and hence separate analysis and consequent deletion of the Royalty payments by the TPO seems erroneous. We draw support from *Cadbury India (ITANo7408/Mum/2010 and ITA No.7641/Mum/2010)* wherein the ITAT upheld the use of TNMM for Royalty. (AY. 2005-2006)
DCIT v. Air Liquide Engineering India (2014) 31 ITR 20 5/ 152 ITD 157 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

1481 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – CUP method – No bar on reliance of private database u/r. 10D(3) – Nuances of the CUP Method under Rule 10B(1)(a)(i) explained – Most appropriate method – Export of rice – Matter remitted to the AO for fresh determination of ALP under the CUP method**

Rule 10D(3) is only illustrative in nature and merely describes the information required to be maintained by the assessee under section 92D “shall be supported by authentic documents, which may include the following ...”. The logic employed by the Transfer Pricing Officer that since databases compiled by private entities is not included in rule 10D(3), such databases cannot be relied upon by the assessee is clearly fallacious in as much as an item not being included in illustrative list of required documents does not take outside the ambit of ‘acceptable document’ for the required purposes. It was also open to the TPO to, if he had any doubts, call for further information from this database supplier and examine authenticity of the data so furnished. His summary rejection of the data as unreliable on a technical ground is not tenable in law.

If there are minor variations in prices of generic goods, such factors are adequately taken care of by average in the case of large size of comparables;

The expression ‘the international transaction’ referred to in rule 10 B(1)(a)(iii) is used in singular and does not permit taking into account, unlike rule 10B(1)(a)(i), ‘a number of such transactions’. While averaging is thus permissible for the uncontrolled transactions, each international transaction is to be taken on standalone basis. It is not open to the assessee to compare the average price in his transactions with AEs with average price in uncontrolled transactions;

Also, the CUP method does not allow exclusion of high priced sale instances unless such high prices could be explained by differences of product or commercial terms. In any event, exclusion of extreme cases, such as in quartile ranges, is normally not permissible under the scheme of determination of ALP under the CUP method. (AY. 2008-09)

Tilda Riceland Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 101 DTR 89/ 161 TTJ 213/64 SOT 61 (Delhi)(Trib.)

1482 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – TNMM – Unaudited segmental accounts can be relied upon for comparing profitability of controlled transactions with uncontrolled transactions – While size is relevant in entity level comparison, it is not relevant in transaction level comparison within the same entity.**

- (i) In applying the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) under Rule 10B(1) (e) it is not necessary that the net profit computations, in the case of internal comparables (i.e. assessee’s transactions with independent enterprise), have to be based on the audited books of accounts or the books of accounts regularly maintained by the assessee. All that is necessary for the purpose of computing arm’s length price, under TNMM on the basis of internal comparables, is computation of net profit margin, subject to comparability adjustments affecting net profit margin of uncontrolled transactions, on the same parameters for the transactions with AEs as well as non AEs, i.e. independent enterprises, and as long as the net profits earned from the controlled transactions are the same or higher than the net profits earned on uncontrolled transactions, no ALP adjustments are

warranted. It is not at all necessary that such a computation should be based on segmental accounts in the books of account regularly maintained by the assessee and subjected to audit;

- (ii) The size of the uncontrolled transaction being smaller, by itself, does not make it incomparable with the transaction in controlled conditions. Size of the comparable does matter in entity level comparison because scale of operations substantially vary and so does the underlying profitability factor, but in a transaction level comparison within the same entity, mere difference in size of the uncontrolled transactions does not render the transaction incomparable. If the size of uncontrolled transaction is too big, it may call for an adjustment for volume business. If the size of the uncontrolled transaction is too small, it may provoke an inquiry by the TPO to ensure that it is not a contrived transaction outside the normal course of business or with regard to other significant factors surrounding smallness of such transaction. However, in none of these cases, a comparable can be rejected on the basis of its size *per se*. (AY. 2008-09)

Lummus Technology Heat transfer BV v. DCIT (2014) 162 TTJ 263 / 64 SOT 47 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Adjustment to profit margin for “capacity underutilisation” can be made. In choosing comparables, there cannot be a cherry picking for deciding parameters of rejection. All comparables must face the same test

1483

- (i) Under Rule 10B (1)(e)(ii), an adjustment to the net profit margin has to be made for “capacity underutilisation”. Capacity underutilisation by enterprises is an important factor affecting net profit margin in the open market because lower capacity utilisation results in higher per unit costs, which, in turn, results in lower profits. Of course, the fundamental issue, so far as acceptability of such adjustments is concerned is reasonable, accuracy embedded in the mechanism for such adjustments, and as long as such an adjustment mechanism can be found, no objection can be taken to the adjustment. On facts, the CIT(A)’s approach is reasonable and the adjustments are on a conceptually sound basis;
- (ii) In view of *Dy. CIT v. Quark Systems (P) Ltd.(2010) 132 TTJ 1 SB* there is no estoppel against an assessee changing his stand as regards the acceptance or rejection of a comparable. However, there cannot be a cherry picking for deciding parameters of rejection of a comparable, and the parameters have to be broad enough of being general application. In the scheme of things envisaged under the TNMM, it is inevitable that there will be some differences between the comparables and the tested party but the impact of these differences is substantially mitigated by the averaging. If a comparable is being sought to be rejected on the ground of its differences *vis-à-vis* the tested party, similar criteria must be adopted for deciding suitability of other comparables as well. It cannot be open to any judicial authority to reject a comparable on the ground that the comparable has significant differences *vis-à-vis* the tested party, unless the differences are broad enough of general application, are such as materially affecting the profitability, as not being capable of reasonably accurate adjustments to eliminate the impact of such differences, and as are also not found in other

comparables. All the comparables must face the same test on which comparability of a particular comparable is being sought to be rejected. (AY. 2004-05)
DCIT v. Panasonic AVC Networks India Co.Ltd. (2014) 63 SOT 121 (URO)(Delhi)(Trib)

1484 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Comparables – Adjustments to be restricted only to purchases made from Associated Enterprise and not to entire turnover of assessee-company – Matter set aside**

Assessee is a company incorporated in Israel and was a tax resident in Israel. It is in the business of purchase and sale of rough diamonds. Indian branch imported goods from various parts of world and sold it in local market. TPO held that diamonds purchased from Associated Enterprise and non-Associated Enterprise were mixed in course of business. Hence, while determining ALP for international transactions A.O. applied net profit margin at 2.25 per cent to calculate ALP of purchases from Associated Enterprise. Accordingly, additions were made. In appeal CIT(A) rejected assessee’s contention holding that assessee had not maintained separate account for controlled transactions, hence, net profit margin had to be applied for entire turnover and only on that basis ALP of controlled transactions could be found out. Tribunal following earlier orders passed by Co-ordinate Bench in assessee’s own case, it was to be concluded that impugned adjustment made to assessee’s ALP by considering entire purchases of assessee in assessment years under consideration was not in accordance with law. impugned order was to be set aside and matter was to be remanded back for disposal afresh with a direction that adjustment, if any, was required to be made to determine ALP, it should be restricted only to purchases made from Associated Enterprise and not to entire turnover of assessee-company. (AY. 2002-03, 2003-04)
Penfort (Israel) Ltd. v. Dy. DIT (IT) (2013) 99 DTR 121 / 163 TTJ 124 / (2014) 146 ITD 14 / (Mum.)(Trib.)

1485 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price Comparables – General submissions without filing profit and loss account and balance sheet in support of comparables chosen by it, such comparables were liable to be rejected – There is no limit fixed in Act or in Rules on number of comparables which can be used – Assessing Officer is directed to allow the benefit of +/-5 per cent benefit to the assessee**

The assessee is engaged in manufacturing of diamonds studded gold jewellery and trading of diamonds. The assessee sold diamonds studded jewellery manufactured by it to AE and had also imported diamond from the AE. The assessee in the transfer pricing study selected TNMM as the most appropriate method for bench marking the transactions. In relation to manufacturing segment, the assessee selected 7 comparables out of which 4 were rejected by the TPO. The TPO thereafter added nine more comparables selected by him and computed the arithmetic mean margin of 12 comparables including the three comparables selected by the assessee. For the trading segment, the assessee selected seven comparables for carrying out the transfer pricing study. The TPO held that these comparables were not comparable to the trading business of the assessee which was dealing in diamonds. He, therefore, rejected all the seven comparables and selected his own 10 comparables. The assessee objected to six of the comparables selected by the TPO, which was not accepted, and TP adjustment was

made. Before the DRP, the assessee also objected to rejection of its claim of abnormal expenses in relation to the manufacturing segment. The assessee also claimed that there was lower capacity utilisation in its case. However, DRP confirmed the order of TPO. Tribunal held that where assessee only made general submissions and did not file profit and loss account and balance sheet in support of comparables chosen by it, such comparables were liable to be rejected. There is no embargo on Transfer Pricing Officer to carry out a fresh search when some comparables chosen by assessee are found unreliable, as there is no limit fixed in Act or in Rules on number of comparables which can be used where segmental data was not available in respect of a comparable chosen by assessee, and it also had related party transactions in excess of 16 per cent, such company could not be taken as a comparable. The objection raised in relation to comparables is therefore rejected. However there is substance in the additional ground raised by the assessee requesting for benefit of +/-5 per cent margin. Therefore, the Assessing Officer is directed to allow the benefit of +/-5 per cent benefit to the assessee. (AY. 2008-09)

Royal Star Jewellery (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 1 / 161 TTJ 503/99 DTR 396 (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Comparables – Reimbursement of mark up cost – Matter remanded. 1486

AO levied markup of 5 per cent on reimbursement of cost recovered by assessee from its Associated Enterprises. In AY 2005-06, there existed an arrangement for markup on cost at 2 per cent and 5 per cent, whereas TPO applied 5 per cent mark up on flat basis. Tribunal restored the matter to the AO for restricting transfer pricing adjustment to agreed mark up as per arrangement between assessee and its AEs. In view of order passed by Tribunal in assessee’s own case for assessment year 2005-06, impugned order was to be set aside and matter was to be remitted to AO/TPO for deciding in accordance with directions given by Tribunal. (AY. 2007-08)

Tecnimont ICB Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 30 ITR 199 / (2014) 146 ITD 219 (Mum) (Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arms’ length price – Comparables – Recover of expenses from AE beyond credit period allowed – Matter remanded to AO to consider the interest beyond agreed period 1487

Assessee recovered expenses from AEs. TPO noticed that in some cases expenses incurred on behalf of AEs were recovered after a delay of substantial period without charging any interest, therefore proposed adjustment on that score which finally came to be made in assessment order. Contention of assessee was that computation of delay by TPO was not correct inasmuch he ignored credit period allowed by assessee as agreed. Impugned order was to be set aside and matter was to be remitted to Assessing Officer /TPO for restoring amount of adjustment on account of interest to period beyond agreed credit period. (AY. 2007-08)

Tecnimont ICB Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 219 (Mum.) (Trib.)

- 1488 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arms’ length price – TNMM – Comparables – when overall price of assessee was within tolerance limit of 5 per cent, in terms of proviso to section 92C(2) no adjustment to ALP determined by assessee was permissible**

The Assessee company is engaged in the business of manufacturing and dealing in textile machinery and its spare. The assessee is a joint venture between M/s. ATE Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Saurer Gmbh. M/s. Saurer Gmbh & Com. KG holds 70% shares in assessee’s company. During the year under consideration, the assessee has undertaken international transaction relating to purchase and sale of components, payment of royalty and reimbursement (payment) with its AE. The assessee bench marked the International transaction relating to purchase of components valuing ₹ 22.93 crores by using Cost Plus Method (CPM) as most appropriate method. For the international transaction relating to sale of components and payment of royalty, the assessee has used (TNMM) as the most appropriate method. TPO made adjustment only with respect to royalty payment by treating ALP of royalty at nil. Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed adjustment made by TPO in respect of royalty payment and he also enhanced assessment by making adjustment in respect of purchase of components. Commissioner (Appeals) determined ALP by taking TNMM as most appropriate method but at entity level of assessee. He arrived at arithmetic mean of comparables’ operating profit at 8.33 per cent against operating profit at entity level of assessee at 4.71 per cent. Tribunal held that Commissioner (Appeals) determined arm’s length price by considering entity level results of assessee which included all international transactions, in such a case, when overall price of assessee was within tolerance limit of 5 per cent, in terms of proviso to section 92C(2) no adjustment to ALP determined by assessee was permissible. (AY. 2007-08) *Zinser Textile Systems (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 30 ITR 675/ (2014) 146 ITD 222 (Mum.) (Trib.)*

- 1489 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Comparables and adjustments/CUP method – Assessee seconded its employees to foreign AEs – cost of deputation of employees – Not seconded employees to any independent enterprise – CUP method could not be applicable**

The CUP method could not be applied under the facts of the case, as the Assessee has not transferred/seconed employees to any other independent enterprises. The similar transaction on the basis of which the TPO determined ALP was not with an independent enterprise and the said transaction was also with an Associated enterprise. In such circumstances, even the determination of ALP by the TPO was not proper. (AY. 2003-04, 2006-07) *3i Infotech Ltd. v. Add. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 405 / 162 TTJ 184 (Mum.) (Trib.)*

- 1490 **S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – TNM Method – subsidiary of NNML – TPO rejected three out of seven comparables adopted by assessee – Arithmetic mean of remaining four comparables which were accepted by TPO-determination of ALP was to be restored to file of TPO for *de novo* consideration**

The assessee adopted transactional net margin method (TNMM) to establish the arm’s length price of its International Transaction with overseas group of companies. It adopted operating profit over operating revenue (OP/OR) as the profit level indicator

(PLI). In its transfer pricing analysis the assessee identified seven comparables. The TPO accepted the TNMM method adopted by assessee and held that three comparables were not comparable. Certain adjustments were made in ALP determined by assessee, which were confirmed by the DRP. On appeal the Tribunal held that no details were provided as regards claim of assessee in respect of AMP expenses provision for warranty and prior period expenses matter could not be concluded. Matter restored the file of TPO for *de novo* consideration. (AY. 2006-07)

Networks India (P) Ltd. v. Add. CIT (2013) 33 ITR 97 / (2014) 146 ITD 463 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Information Technology (IT) enabled back office services and contract software development services – Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM)

1491

TPO rejected some of the comparables adopted by assessee and at same time TPO selected four new comparables. On the basis of fresh list of comparables TPO made certain adjustment to ALP determined by assessee. In appeal CIT(A) held that comparables selected by TPO owning software products and undertaking R&D, command a premium return as compared to any routine contract software development service provider like assessee and thus they could not be taken as comparables. Accordingly adjustments were set aside. On appeal by revenue in absence of four comparables searched by the TPO were not comparable with the assessee, the order of CIT(A) was confirmed. (AY. 2005-06)

ITO v. Colt Technology Services India (P) Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 468 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C : Transfer pricing – Notional interest on share application money paid to Associated enterprises – Addition on the basis of hypothesis basis was held to be not legal

1492

Assessee made payments towards share application money to its foreign subsidiaries. AO treated the said transaction as interest free advances and made adjustment on the basis of notional interest. Tribunal held that payment of share application money by the assessee to its AES could not be treated as partly in the nature of interest free loans and accordingly ALP adjustment made on the basis of hypothesis was not legally sustainable. (AY. 2008-09)

Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. ADCIT (2014) 101 DTR 154 / 161 TTJ 428 / 63 SOT 113 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.92C(1) : Transfer Pricing – Companies which are functionally similar to the assessee cannot be excluded merely because of high or low turnover

1493

When a company is functionally similar to that of the assessee company, the same cannot be excluded merely because of its turnover at a higher or lower level. Here it is important to mention that section 92C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides for the computation of Arm’s Length Prices by one of the methods prescribed therein. First proviso to section 92C(2) clearly provides that when more than one price are determined by the most appropriate method, then the Arm’s Length Prices shall be taken to be the arithmetic mean of such prices. It does not talk of excluding the companies with high or low turnover or high or low profit rate. (AY. 2007-08)

Calibrated Healthcare Systems India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 54 taxmann.com 53 (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

1494 **S.92CA : Transfer Pricing – TPO is to conduct a transfer pricing analysis to determine ALP and not to determine – Matter remanded [S.144C]**

TPO is to conduct a transfer pricing analysis to determine ALP and not to determine whether there is a service or not from which assessee benefits, therefore, TPO cannot determine ALP of payments made by assessee to its AE at nil taking a view that assessee did not derive any benefit from services rendered by AE. Matter remanded.

CIT v. Cushman and Wakefield (India) (P) Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 730 / 46 taxmann.com 317 / 269 CTR 16 (Delhi)(HC)

1495 **S.92CA : Transfer Pricing – Jurisdiction of TPO is distinct than that of AO under section 37(1). [S.37(1)]**

It was held that jurisdiction of Assessing Officer under section 37 and TPO under section 92CA is distinct and therefore, a referral made by Assessing Officer to TPO for limited purpose of determining ALP does not take away power of Assessing Officer to determine as to whether payment made by assessee to its AE for services rendered was basically an expenditure incurred for purpose of business so as to allow same under section 37(1). It was also held that authority of TPO is to conduct a transfer pricing analysis to determine ALP and not to determine whether there is a service or not from which assessee benefits. Therefore, TPO cannot determine ALP of payments made by assessee to its AE at nil taking a view that assessee did not derive any benefit from services rendered by AE.

CIT v. Cushman and Wakefield (India) (P) Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 730 / 269 CTR 16 / 104 DTR 249 / 225 Taxmann 8 (Delhi)(HC)

1496 **S.92CA : Transfer pricing – Arm's length price – Comparable – Tribunal deleting the addition on ground that unit compared by TPO was not comparable to assessee – Matter remanded**

Dispute Resolution panel directed the TPO to make proportionate adjustment on the total sales to the associated enterprise alone and not on the other sales. Tribunal deleted the addition on the ground that unit compared by TPO was not comparable to the assessee. On appeal by revenue the Court held that whether there was any other comparable unit or any other method, might be a question to be considered by TPO once the matter was remanded to him. It was not a proper exercise of discretion on the part of the Tribunal to have given quietus to the matter after deleting the addition. The matter was remanded to the TPO.

CIT v. Manaksia Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 56 / 224 Taxmann 48 (Cal.)(HC)

1497 **S.92CA : Transfer pricing – To apply the “Cost Plus Method”, there must be a “comparable uncontrolled transaction”. The fact that the same product is sold by the assessee to its AEs as well as to third parties does not mean that the two sets of transactions are comparable if the business model, marketing, sales promotion etc. is different**

The assessee, an Indian company, manufactured chewing gum etc. which has sold to the Associated Enterprises (AEs) and also to independent enterprises (non AEs). The distinction in respect of these transactions with AEs and non AEs is that while the transactions with the AEs are in the capacity as limited risk contract manufacturer,

its transactions with the domestic independent enterprises is a business transaction with regular entrepreneurship risks. The assessee applied TNMM to claim that the transactions with the AEs are at arm's length (the TP study report has been criticised by the ITAT). The TPO rejected TNMM and adopted the "Cost Plus Method" with gross markup on costs as the profit level indicator, and adopted the internal comparable as gross mark up realised on the domestic sales. In other words, the TPO held that the arm's length price of the products exported to the AEs can be arrived at by adopting the same markup on costs of such products as was achieved on the domestic sales. This was upheld by the CIT(A). Before the Tribunal.

- (i) The fundamental input for application of CPM method, next only to ascertainment of historical costs, is ascertainment of the normal mark-up of profit over aggregate of such direct costs and indirect costs in respect of same or similar property or services in a "comparable uncontrolled transaction" or, of course, a number of such "comparable uncontrolled transactions". When compared with CUP method, as against the "price" of a comparable uncontrolled transaction, one has to find out "normal mark up of profit" in a comparable uncontrolled transaction. Whether it is "price" or "normal mark up of profit", the starting point of both these exercises in the CUP and the CPM is finding a "comparable uncontrolled transaction". In order for such comparisons to be useful, the economically relevant characteristics of the situations being compared must be sufficiently comparable. It is only elementary, as is also noted in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, that "to be comparable means that none of the differences (if any) between the situations being compared could materially affect the condition being examined in the methodology (e.g. price or margin), or that reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the effect of any such differences";
- (ii) The question that arises is whether the transactions with the AEs can be compared with the sales of similar product to distributors or other entities in the domestic market and particularly in a situation in which not only the market is geographically different but also entire business model is different *vis-à-vis* transactions with the AEs, in as much as the sales in domestic market necessitates substantial expenditure by the assessee for marketing support and sales promotion strategy. In other words, whether "export price of product simplicitor, without any marketing support in the related market" can have a "comparable uncontrolled transaction" in "domestic sale price of a product in a situation in which entire marketing function and sales promotion is seller's responsibility". The answer has to be an emphatic 'No'. The two situations, i.e., sale simplicitor of a FMCG product for an overseas AE without any costs being incurred on the marketing and sales promotion amongst the end users, and sale of a FMCG product to a domestic independent enterprise with full responsibilities for marketing and sales promotion amongst the end users, are not 'comparable transactions' in the sense that profitability in the latter cannot be a proper benchmark for profitability in the former. It is not only in the marketing and sales promotion that the difference lies, but it extends to the fundamental business model itself particularly as the sale is not to an end user, such as in the cases of plant and equipment etc, but to an intermediary who, in turn, has to sell it to, through yet another tier or tiers of intermediaries, the end user. The sale of products to the non-resident AEs is

more akin to contract manufacturing arrangement, while the sale of products to independent enterprises domestically is a regular business entrepreneurial venture. Whether contract manufacturing or not, as long as the business models of sales to AEs and sales to non AEs are different, the transactions under these business models cannot be “comparable transactions” for the purposes of transfer pricing. In the first business model, creation of market in the end users is not the responsibility of the vendor, but in the second business model, it is job of the vendor to create and maintain the market of end users as well. The product may be the same but the FAR profile is materially different and it is this FAR profile which governs the profitability. The basic notions of transfer pricing recognise the impact of FAR profiling on the profitability. When profitability levels in two business situations, due to significant differences in FAR profiles of two situations, are expected to be different, such transactions cease to be comparable transactions for the purposes of transfer pricing analysis;

- (iii) On facts, the comparability analysis has been confined to the first segment itself, i.e. characteristic of the property transferred. Undoubtedly, the product comparability is an important factor but its certainly not the sole or decisive factor. The assessee was producing the same products for its AEs as it was producing for independent enterprises but that was all so far as similarities were concerned. The FAR profile was not the same, the contract terms were not the same, the economic circumstances were not the same and the business strategies were not the same. Viewed thus, necessary precondition for application of CPM, i.e., finding normal mark up of profit in comparable uncontrolled transactions, could not have been fulfilled. When uncontrolled transactions were not comparable, the normal mark up on profit on such transactions could not have been relevant either. Accordingly, the authorities below were not justified in holding that the cost plus method was the most appropriate method on the facts of this case. One of the necessary ingredient for application of CPM, i.e. normal markup of profit in the comparable uncontrolled transactions-whether internal or external, was not available as no comparable uncontrolled transactions were brought on record by the authorities below. What was brought on record as an internal comparable uncontrolled transaction, i.e. manufacturing for the domestic independent enterprises, was uncomparable as the FAR profile was significantly different. Undoubtedly, direct methods of determining ALP, including cost plus method, have an inherent edge over the indirect methods, such as TNMM, but such a preference can come into play only when appropriate comparable uncontrolled transactions can be identified and analysed accordingly. That has not been done in the present case. There is, therefore, no good reason to disturb the TNMM method adopted by the assessee. (AY. 2003-04, 2006-07)

Wrigley India Ltd. v. ACIT (TP) (2015) 114 DTR 1 / 167 TTJ 561 / 67 SOT 205 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)

Section 93 : Avoidance of income-tax by transactions resulting in transfer of income to non-residents.

S.93 : Avoidance of income-tax by transactions resulting in transfer of income to non-residents – Section has no application to transactions of dividend distribution tax as the same applies only when there is a transfer of assets by virtue or in consequence whereof, any income becomes payable to a non-resident. [S.48]

1498

The assessee, a non-resident company had sold equity shares of its wholly owned subsidiary company in India to a related party. The sale transaction was part of the overall reorganisation of the business of the assessee. The subsidiary company had just prior to the sale of shares declared dividend to its non-resident shareholders. The AO concluded that the assessee group had resorted to the dubious method of declaration of payment of dividend to avoid payment of tax on long-term capital gains. He therefore, increased the value of the shares sold by the assessee after disallowing the deduction claimed on account of distribution of dividend. On appeal, the Tribunal as also the CIT(A) did not agree with the finding of the AO that the distribution of dividend was a colourable device to avoid tax on long-term capital gains of the assessee and liable to be ignored in computation of long-term capital gains. On further appeal, the HC held that no substantial question of law arose. (AY. 2006-07)

DIT(IT) v. Maersk Line UK Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 358 / 270 CTR 545 (Cal.)(HC)

Section 94 : Avoidance of tax by certain transactions in securities.

S.94(7) : Transaction in securities – Short term loss – Proviso would be applicable only from AY. 2006-07. [S. 43(5)]

1499

Where the assessee during AY 2004-05 suffered loss on account of the sale of shares and claimed that loss was to be treated as short-term capital loss in view of proviso (d) to section 43(5), loss could not be considered as short-term capital loss, since said proviso would be applicable from AY 2006-07 (AY. 2004-05)

Lachmi Narain Gupta & Sons v. CIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 356 / 263 CTR 615 (P&H)(HC)

S.94(8) : Transaction in securities – Units – Bonus stripping – Portfolio Management System (PMS) – Claim for set off of loss could not be rejected

1500

In course of assessment proceedings, AO found that shares of two companies were purchased in quick succession, at time when bonus shares were due to be allotted i.e. assessee bought these shares cum-bonus and immediately after allotment of bonus shares, original shares whose value had reduced to almost 50 per cent due to allotment of bonus shares were sold at reduced market price – As a result thereof, assessee incurred a loss even though his wealth remained intact. AO treated said transactions as trading activities and, thus, loss incurred in respect of those transactions was rejected to be set off against long-term capital gain on sale of other shares. CIT(A) held that these share transactions to be ‘bonus stripping’ in investors’ parlance and held them to be covered under section 94(8) CIT(A) further opined that since section 94(8) covered only ‘units’ and not ‘securities’, assessee’s claim for set off of loss could not be rejected. Tribunal affirmed the order of CIT(A). (AY. 2007-08)

Dy. CIT v. B. G. Mahesh (2014) 64 SOT 39 (URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)

Section 111A : Tax on short-term capital gains in certain cases

- 1501 **S.111A : Tax on short term capital gains – Business income – Capital gains – Equity shares – Transaction tax is chargeable – Claim of earlier year assessing the income as capital gain will not apply res judicata for the following year when facts of the case are not identical. [Ss.2(42A), 2(42B), 28(i)], 45]**

The assessee claimed STCG from sale of shares during the year. The AO held that in view of the large number of transactions during the year and short holding period, the intention of the assessee was to earn profit on resale and not to hold them as investment and thus treated the income as 'business income'. The CIT(A) however allowed the claim of the assessee following the stand in the previous assessment years.

On appeal by the department, the Tribunal observed that the assessee had offered a portion of its income as 'speculative' and thus the observation of the CIT(A) to that extent was contradictory and the facts of the current year were not absolutely identical to the previous years. Accordingly, the Tribunal set-aside the order of the CIT(A) and held that the principles of *res judicata* do not apply for taxation as each assessment year is a separate unit and has to be assessed on the peculiar facts of the case for that assessment year. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)

ACIT v. Hitesh S. Bhagat (2014) 29 ITR 660 / 151 ITD 650 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 112 : Tax on long-term capital gains

- 1502 **S.112 : Tax on long term capital gains – Non-resident – Rate of tax – Sale of shares in Indian company listed on stock exchange and held for more than 12 months – Tax leviable at lower rate of 10.56% inclusive of surcharge and cess – DTAA – India-Mauritius. [S.195, Art. 13]**

Applicant Mauritian company proposed to purchase ₹ 1.83 crore listed shares of an Indian company 'P' from 'IS' a US based company–Applicant sought advance ruling to determine rate at which tax ought to have been deducted under section 195 on long-term capital gain arising to such non-resident as per proviso to section 112(1). As per jurisdictional High Court's decision in *Cairn UK Holdings Ltd. v. DIT [2013] 359 ITR 268 (Delhi)* tax is required to be withheld by applicant under section 195 on purchase of 1.83 crore equity shares as well as bonus equity shares of 'P', being listed security, from 'IS' a US based company at 10.56 per cent (inclusive of surcharge and cess) of amount of long-term capital gains as per proviso to section 112(1). (9th May, 2014)

Pan-Asia iGate Solutions, Mauritius, (2014) 364 ITR 331 / 268 CTR 413 / 225 Taxmann 3 (AAR)

Section 113 : Tax in the case of block assessment of search cases

S.113 : Tax – Block assessment – Search cases – Surcharge – Proviso inserted by Finance Act, 2002 w.e.f. 1-6-2002 to impose surcharge in search assessments is not clarificatory or retrospective – Not to apply to block assessments pertaining to period prior to 1-6-2002 – Intention of legislature not to give it retrospective effect. [Ss.132, 158BA]

1503

A search and seizure operation u/s. 132 was conducted on 10-2-2001 pursuant to which an assessment order for the block period from 1-4-1989 to 10-2-2000 was passed on 28-2-2002 at a total undisclosed income of ₹ 85 lakhs. Tax was charged at the rate prescribed in section 113. Subsequently, a Proviso was inserted in section 113 by the Finance Act 2002 w.e.f. 1-6-2002 to provide for the levy of surcharge at 10%. The AO took the view that the said amendment was clarificatory in nature and he levied surcharge by passing an order u/s. 154. However, the Tribunal and High Court upheld the assessee's claim that the said amendment was prospective in nature and did not apply to block periods falling before 1-6-2002. However, the plea of the assessee was rejected by the Supreme Court in *CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta(2008) 297 ITR 322 (SC)* (followed in (Rajiv Bhatara (SC)) and it was held that the said proviso is clarificatory in nature and applied to earlier block periods. When the present case reached the Supreme Court, the Bench was of the view that the issue ought to be referred to a larger Bench of 5 judges. HELD by the Full Bench of the Supreme Court:

- (i) Chapter XIVB comprehensively takes care of all the aspects relating to the block assessment relating to undisclosed income, which includes section 156BA(2) as the charging section and even the rate at which such income is to be taxed is mentioned in section 113. Though section 4 is also a charging provision, it does not apply to Chapter XIVB;
- (ii) On the application of general principles concerning retrospectivity, the proviso to section 113 cannot be treated as clarificatory in nature, thereby having retrospective effect. The rule against retrospective operation is a fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication;
- (iii) An assessment creates a vested right and an assessee cannot be subjected to reassessment unless a provision to that effect inserted by amendment is either expressly or by necessary implication retrospective;
- (iv) There cannot be imposition of any tax without the authority of law. Such a law has to be unambiguous and should prescribe the liability to pay taxes in clear terms. If the concerned provision of the taxing statute is ambiguous and vague and is susceptible to two interpretations, the interpretation which favours the subjects, as against there the revenue, has to be preferred. This very principle is based on the “fairness” doctrine as it lays down that if it is not very clear from the provisions of the Act as to whether the particular tax is to be levied to a particular class of persons or not, the subject should not be fastened with any liability to pay tax.

- (v) Though the Chief Commissioners in their Conference suggested that there should be a retrospective amendment to section 113, the legislature chose not to do so even though other amendments were made with retrospective effect. The CBDT circular No.8 of 2002 dated 27-8-2002 (2002) 258 ITR (St.)¹³ also makes it clear that the amendment to section 113 is prospective;
- (vi) Consequently, the conclusion in *CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta*(2008) 297 ITR 322 (SC) treating the proviso to section 113 as clarificatory and giving it retrospective effect is not correct and is overruled.

CIT v. Vatika Township (2014) 367 ITR 466 / 271 CTR 1 / 109 DTR 33 (FB)(SC)

Editorial: *CIT v. Suresh Gupta* (2008) 297 ITR 322 (SC) and *CIT v. Rajiv Bhatara* (2009) 310 ITR 105 (SC) overruled.

1504 **S.113 : Tax – Block assessment – Search cases – Surcharge**

When there was no provision to levy surcharge on date of search and when proviso to section 113 was not with retrospective effect, surcharge under section 113 could not be levied in respect of block period 29-5-1991 to 29-5-2001. (*BP 29-5-1991 to 29-5-2001*) *CIT v. K. Raheja Hotels & Estates (P) Ltd.* (2014) 227 Taxmann 268 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

1505 **S.113 : Tax – Block assessment – Search cases – Surcharge – No levy of surcharge in case of block assessment where search was conducted prior to insertion of proviso to section 113. i.e. 1-6-2002.**

High Court held that, no levy of surcharge in case of block assessment where search was conducted prior to insertion of proviso to section 113. i.e., 1-6-2002.

CIT v. K. Raheja Hotels & Estate (P) Ltd. (2014) 51 taxmann.com 257 (Karn.) (HC)

Editorial: *SLA (C) No. 1376 of 2009 dated 29-10-2014 filed by the revenue was dismissed, CIT v. K. Raheja Hotels & Estate (P) Ltd.* (2015) 228 Taxmann 5(SC)

1506 **S.113 : Tax – Block assessment – Search cases – Surcharge – Surcharge is payable even prior to introduction of proviso to section 113 of the Act. However, the AO directed to await the outcome of the Hon'ble Apex Court on the issue [S.158BC]**

Surcharge is payable even prior to introduction of proviso to section 113 of the Act. However, as the issue of levy of surcharge prior to 1-6-2002 was referred to a larger Bench by the Apex Court in the case of, *CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd.* (2009) 314 ITR 338 (SC) the High Court directed the AO to await the decision of the Larger Bench of the Apex Court and may proceed subject to the outcome of the decision.

(BP 1-4-1989 to 28-6-2000)

CIT v. B.Suresh Baliga (2014) 364 ITR 560 / 102 DTR 83 / 225 Taxmann 228 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

1507 **S.113 : Tax – Block assessment – Search cases – Surcharge – Whether valid – AO was directed to await the decision of the Larger Bench of Apex Court. [Ss.132, 158BC]**

Supreme Court in case of *CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta* (2008) 297 ITR 322 (SC) held the levy of surcharge in respect of block period valid. However, in *CIT v. Vatika Township P. Ltd.*

(2009) 314 ITR 338 (SC) the Larger Bench of the Apex Court held that the issue needs to be considered by a Larger Bench. Assessing Officer directed to await the decision of the Apex Court.

CIT v. B. Nagendra Baliga (2014) 363 ITR 410 (Karn.)(HC)

Section 115A : Tax on dividends, royalty and technical service fees in the case of foreign companies

S.115A : Foreign companies – Tax – Dividends – Royalty – Technical services fees – Provisions of section 115A(1)(b)(AA) do not debar assessee to enter into new agreement after change of situation resulting in reduced rate of royalty

1508

As per provisions of section 115A(1)(b)(AA), the rate of tax on licence fee has to be taxed at the rate of 10 per cent at the strength of the agreement. It is undisputed that the assessee was having earlier agreement dated 12-7-2004 with GKN Metals Ltd. and the same has been renewed from 1-1-2007. It is undisputed that the new agreements entered into on 29-5-2007 between the assessee and GKN Metals Ltd. and in the same year with GKN Driveline (India) Ltd. are independent agreements. The assessee can manage its affairs within the framework of statute. The revenue authorities cannot sit into the business decisions of the assessee. By no stretch of imagination, the new agreement entered into in 2007 can be said to be the extension of old agreements entered into between the parties. Even if the assessee had entered into new licence agreement with GKN Sinter Metals Ltd. and in the same year with GKN Driveline (India) Ltd. to take advantage of lower rate of tax of 10 per cent, the same could not be denied to the assessee on the ground that it was nothing but extension of old agreement which is not correct otherwise. Accordingly, licence fee income should be taxed at 10 per cent. (AY. 2009-10)

GKN Holdings Plc v. DDIT(IT) (2014) 66 SOT 54 (URO) / 167 TTJ 408 (Pune)(Trib.)

Section 115J : Special provisions relating to certain companies

S.115J : Book profit – Computation – Additional depreciation debited in accounts for earlier years because of change in method of providing depreciation – Change in accordance with accounting standards of Institute of Chartered Accounts of India – Additional depreciation allowable [S.32]

1509

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the Tribunal was right in upholding the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) deleting the addition made by the Assessing Officer to the book profits on account of additional depreciation debited in the accounts for the earlier years because of change in the method of providing depreciation retrospectively. (AY. 1989-90)

Dy. CIT v. Gujarat Filaments Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 384 (Guj.)(HC)

- 1510 **S.115J : Book profit – Depreciation – Assessee entitled to adopt rates as provided under Income-tax Rules in drawing profit and loss account – AO is not entitled to redraw profit and loss account. [S.32]**

Allowing the appeal of the assessee the Court held that the assessee, was entitled to adopt the rates of depreciation as provided under the Income-tax Rules, 1962, in the process of drawing up the profit and loss account as required to be done under sub-section (1)(a) of section 115J of the Act and the action of the AO in redrawing the profit and loss account for the purpose of sub-section (1)(a) of section 115J was totally unauthorised. Followed the ratio in *Apollo Tyres Ltd v. CIT (2002) 255 ITR 273 (SC)*. (AY. 1990-1991)

Deccan Tools Industries P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 295/52 taxmann.com 55 (AP)(HC)

- 1511 **S.115J : Book profit – Amount to be carried forward – Carried forward of loss – CIT(A) ought to have dealt with the grounds of appeal in respect of determination of loss**

Assessee filed return of income disclosing 'nil' income after setting off unabsorbed investment allowance and disclosing income under provisions of section 115J. Assessing Officer determined income of assessee at 'nil' after allowing set-off of investment allowance. He also computed book profit. On appeal CIT(A) held that determination of amounts to be carried forward had to be under normal provisions of Act and not under section 115J(1) and there had to be a separate determination of same in accordance with other provisions of Act, either in form of a separate order or note to be communicated to assessee, still, CIT(A) dismissed assessee's appeal in respect of amounts to be carried forward on grounds that computation of book profit and computation of carry forward loss, are two separate and independent processes. Tribunal confirmed the Order of CIT(A). On appeal by assessee the Court held that CIT(A) ought to have dealt with grounds raised by appellant in relation to determination of loss in accordance with other provisions of Act. (AY. 1988-89 and 1989-90)

Deccan Cements Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 100 / 225 Taxmann 164 (Mag.) (AP)(HC)

- 1512 **S.115J : Book profit – Profit from exports claimed as a deduction – To be reduced while calculating book profit. [S.80HHC]**

The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80HHC on profits earned from exports made. It also reduced such profits from book profits while calculating profit u/s. 115J. The Tribunal confirmed the working of the assessee.

On appeal, the High Court dismissing the departmental appeal followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *CIT v. Bhari Information Technology Systems (P.) Ltd.* (2012) 340 ITR 593 and held that where the assessee had claimed deduction of profit from export under section 80HHC, such amount was to be reduced for working out book profit under section 115J.

Dy. CIT v. Atul Products Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 130 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.115J : Book profit – Change in method of depreciation – Straight line method to written down value – No prohibition 1513

There is no prohibition on changing in method of charging depreciation from straight line method to written down value method.

CIT v. Hindustan Pipe Udyog Ltd. (2013) 255 CTR 389 / 214 Taxmann 9 (Mag.) (2014) 360 ITR 437 (All.)(HC)

Section 115JA : Deemed income relating to certain companies

S.115JA : Book profit – Computation-Generating power and using such power in its industrial units – Entitled to reduce from its book profits the profits derived from its captive power plants, in determining the tax payable for the purposes of section 115JA. [S.2(13)] 1514

The question before the Supreme Court was whether while computing the tax under section 115JA of the Act, the assessee, which, in addition to its fertiliser, chemicals and textile divisions, had four industrial undertakings engaged in captive power generation, was entitled to deduct from its book profits the profit derived from the captive power plants set up by the assessee, the High Court held that the principle of apportionment of profits resting on disintegration of ultimate profits realised by the assessee by sale of the final product by the assessee had to be applied, that the profit derived by the assessee on transfer of energy from its captive power plants to its other units was “embedded” in the ultimate profit earned on sale of its final products, that the assessee had been authorised by the State Electricity Boards to generate electricity, that the generation of electricity had been undertaken by the assessee by setting up fully independent and identifiable industrial undertakings, that these undertakings had separate and independent infrastructures, which were managed independently and whose accounts were prepared and maintained separately and that, therefore, the assessee was entitled to reduce from its book profits, the profits derived from its captive power plants, in determining the tax payable for the purposes of section 115JA of the Act. On appeal to the Supreme Court affirmed the view of High Court. (AY. 1997-1998, 2000-2001)

CIT v. DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 720/(2015) 230 Taxmann 190 (SC)
Editorial : Decision in CIT v. DCM Sriram Consolidated Ltd. [2010] 322 ITR 486 (Delhi) affirmed.

S.115JA : Book profit – Prima facie adjustment merely after examination of return and documents enclosed with return cannot be sustained. [S.143(1)(a)] 1515

The assessee was a company. It had filed its return of income declaring ‘nil’ income. It claimed that provision of minimum alternate tax under section 115JA was not applicable to it. The Assessing Officer computed the taxable income under provisions of minimum alternate tax i.e. section 115JA. The High Court held that, since computation of minimum alternate tax was cumbersome which was not possible by merely examining return or documents enclosed with return itself as several aspects were required to be examined, *prima facie* adjustment under section 143(1)(a) could not be made. (AY. 1998-99)

Ester Industries Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 159 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

1516 **S.115JA : Book profit – Book profit cannot be increased on the ground that a part of the stock has been valued at cost price and not at market price**

The AO made addition of defective stock valued at market price while making computation under Section 115 JA on the ground that it was an unascertained liability. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal deleted the addition. On appeal, the High Court held that closing stock has to be valued at lower of the cost price or market price. This is not a liability in the books. Thus it cannot be considered to be contingent or unascertained liability. The book profit cannot be enhanced on the ground that the part of the closing stock has been valued at market price and not at cost price. (AY. 1999-2000)

CIT v. Samsung India Electronics Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 158 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

1517 **S.115JA : Book profit – Adjustment, refund of admitted tax – No provision under the Act to refund the amount which had been admitted and which had been paid by the assessee as MAT. [S.115JB, 226]**

The petitioner company had admitted certain tax liability in the return of income under section 115JB which was to be paid on or before October 2007. Admitted tax was not deposited. An intimation order under section 143(1) was passed creating tax liability on the assessee and thereafter an order was passed under section 226(3) attaching bank account of assessee. According to the assessee, as profits were worked out on the basis of book profits under section 115JAA and 115JB, it was entitled to a credit of tax to be paid for up to the next seven years. Therefore it filed a writ, praying for the notice under section 226(3) to be quashed, for a refund of the unadjusted balance (since the liability of tax as a MAT company was much lower than the normal tax paid by the assessee in the subsequent year and thus there was no question of adjustment of tax in those years of the amount to be paid for the current assessment year and permission to make payments of demanded tax in 4 quarterly installments.

The High Court held that since liability was admitted, there was no question of giving time to pay tax by giving installments for which there was no provision under the Act or Rules. The Court also held that there was no provision under the Act to refund the amount which had been admitted and which had been paid by the assessee as MAT and therefore no relief could be granted to the assessee. (AY. 2007-2008)

B.R.K. Finance & Inv. Company Ltd v. ITO (2014) 220 Taxmann 145 (All.)(HC)

1518 **S.115JA : Book profit – Lease equalisation charges would be added**

Tribunal held that after amendment to section 115JA by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with retrospective effect from 1-4-1998 lease equalisation charges would be added for computation of book profit under section 115JA. (AY. 1999-2000, 2000-01)

Dy. CIT v. Citi Financial Retail Services India Ltd. (2014) 34 ITR 92 / (2015) 152 ITD 235 (Chennai)(Trib.)

Section 115JAA : Tax credit in respect of tax paid on deemed income relating to certain companies.

S.115JAA : Book profit – Calculation of tax – Tax payable-Surcharge and cess – Gross tax payable – Credit under section 115JAA deductible from gross tax payable – Computation of surcharge is on amount reflected in entry 5 in ITR-6-Tribunal justified in accepting calculation of tax. [S.143(1), 154, I.T. Rules, 1962, Form No. ITR-6] 1519

Held, dismissing the appeal, that tax payable under Entry 5 is to be arrived at by deducting the credit under section 115JAA (under entry 3) from the gross tax payable (under entry 4). The surcharge is computed on the amount reflected in entry 5. The Tribunal had noted that from the next assessment year, i.e., the assessment year 2012-13, the position was materially altered but, in the assessee's case, since the dispute related to the Assessment Year 2011-12, the method of computation, as directed by the Commissioner (Appeals), was plainly in accordance with the methodology as provided in ITR-6. The Tribunal was right in confirming the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). (AY. 2011-2012)

CIT v. Vacment India (2014) 369 ITR 304 / (2015) 116 DTR 62 / 230 Taxmann 18/ 275 CTR 413(All.) (HC)

Section 115JB : Special provision for payment of tax by certain companies

S.115JB : Book profit – revaluation reserve is created after 1-4-1997 – amount withdrawn from said reserve after 1-4-1997 would not be reduced from book profits unless book profits of such year had been increased by those reserves 1520

The proviso provides that, where section is applicable to an assessee, the amount withdrawn from reserves created or a provision made in a previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing after 1-4-1997 shall not be reduced from the book profit unless the book profit of such year has been increased by those reserves or provisions. In the present case when the reserve was created not before 1-4-1997, the exclusion clause from the amount withdrawn from such reserve, proviso would apply only if the assessee satisfies the proviso to said clause. Admittedly, this essential requirement was not fulfilled. In that view of the matter, the assessee could not have claimed benefit of such exclusion clause, even if the contention of the assessee was that it was not possible to satisfy such a requirement.

Alembic Ltd. v. ACIT (2014)222 Taxmann 131(Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

S.115JB : Book profit – Calculations to be made with respect to adjusted book profit and not with respect to income assessable under head 'profits and gains of business and profession' 1521

High Court held that for computing deduction under clause (iv) of section 115JB(2), calculations are to be made with respect to adjusted book profit and not with respect to income assessable under head 'profits and gains of business and profession'.

CIT v. Aarvee Denims & Exports Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 35 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

- 1522 **S.115JB: Book profit – Lease equalisation charges cannot be disallowed**
That lease equalisation charges could not be deleted from the profit and loss account for the purposes of computing book profits under section 115JB. (AY. 2001-02)
CIT, Large Taxpayers Unit v. India Railway Finance Corporation Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 548/226 Taxmann 184 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)
- 1523 **S.115JB : Book profit – Provision for diminution in value of assets which has been debited to profit and loss account is not required to be increased as per clause (i) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB to compute book profit under section 115JB – Similarly, provision for doubtful debts debited to profit and loss account is not required to be increased as per clause (c) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB to compute book profit under section 115JB**
The issue of provision for diminution in the value of assets and provision for doubtful debt, the High Court dismissed the appeal of the revenue after relying on the decision of *CIT v. Yokogawa India Ltd.* (204 Taxmann 305) wherein it was held that if the adjustments of provision for bad and doubtful debts is reduced from the loans and advances or the debtors from the assets side of the balance sheet, the Explanation to section 115JA and 115JB is not at all attracted. (AY. 2002-2003)
CIT v. Kirloskar Systems Ltd (2014) 220 Taxmann 1 (Karn.)(HC)
- 1524 **S.115JB : Book profit- Share of profits from AOP – Includible in book profits to determine MAT. [S.10, 11, 12, 86]**
Share of profits from AOP, which may be exempt from taxation in hands of members by virtue of section 86, and it cannot be excluded while computing book profits of members of AOP, under any of Explanations under section 115JB. As per S. 86 an assessee is exempted from paying tax on his share of income from AOP; but the share of income from AOP is not excluded from his total income as is done under section 10, if any such amount is credited to the profit and loss account should be excluded from the Book profits. The share profits of the AOP is exempt under sec 86 Of the Act and not under sections 10, 11 or 12 of the Act. Hence the share of income from AOP, which has been credited to the P&L account of the Assessee cannot be excluded from Book profits unless the same has been exempted under section 10. (AY. 2002-2003)
ACIT v. B. Seenaiiah & Co. Projects Ltd. (2014) 150 ITD 189 (Hyd.)(Trib.)
- 1525 **S.115JB : Book profit – AO entitled to tinker with P&L A/c. if assessee's claim not permitted by accounting principles. [S.145, Companies Act, 1956]**
The question that had arisen was whether the Assessing Officer was entitled to disturb the net profit shown by the assessee in the Profit and Loss account prepared as per the Companies Act, 1956. In order to enable anybody to understand the implication of such deviation, it was made mandatory for the companies to disclose the financial implications of such deviation. Such kind of deviations are acceptable under the Companies Act, however, they are not always acceptable to the income-tax authorities. Under the income-tax, the Assessing officer is entitled to examine the said deviations, particularly when it has an impact on the book profit. There cannot be any dispute that it is the responsibility of the assessee to substantiate the legality of any item of expenditure/income found debited/credited in the profit and loss account by drawing

support from any document or business practices or accounting requirements. It was evident that the assessee had passed the entry for prior period credits/charges in the assessment year only to ensure that the final book profit (surplus) was to be reduced. On making careful observations of the facts of the case, the said intention of the assessee was very much apparent and glaring. Besides, the assessee also could not substantiate the said claim with a legally tenable explanation. It was also not shown that the booking of such kind of entries are permitted under the accounting principles. When the assessee could not furnish legally tenable explanation and also could not show that it was in accordance with established accounting principles, then it could not be said that the financial statements had been prepared in accordance with the provision of the Companies Act, even if the management/auditors were silent on that point (ITA No. 375/ Coch/2014, dated 17/10/2014.) (AY. 2005-06)
Padinjarekara Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (Cochin)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.115JB : Book profit – MAT provisions do not apply to foreign companies. [S.90]

1526

Intention of legislature was very clear that the MAT provisions are applicable only to domestic companies and not to the foreign companies. Even if for sake of argument Id. CIT(DR)'s contention is accepted still in view of the provisions of section 90(2), the assessee's claim for lower impost of tax will have to be accepted because the provisions of section 115JB are subordinate to section 90(2) and have no overriding effect on the said section.

The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd. v. ADIT (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.115JB : Book profit – Provision for doubtful debts-Added back while computing book profit

1527

Tribunal held that in view of the amendment made by Finance (No. 2) Act 2009 with retrospective effect by inserting clause (i) in Expl.1 to Section 115JB, the provision for doubtful debts and advances has to be added back while computing book profit under section 115JB. (AY. 2002-03)

Reliance Industries v. Addl. ACIT (2013) 55 SOT 8 (URO)/ (2014) 159 TTJ 349 / (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.115B : Book profit – Carbon credit – Receipt being capital in nature to be excluded in computation of book profit. [Ss.2(24),4]

1528

Receipt of carbon credit being capital in nature to be excluded in computation of book profit. (AY. 2007-08, 2009-10)

Shree Cement Ltd. v. ACIT (2014)100 DTR 33 2015)152 ITD 561(Jaipur)(Trib.)

S.115JB : Book profit – Sales tax deferred scheme – Benefit arising on premature payment of deferred sales tax at net present value could not be excluded while computing book profit. [S.41(1)]

1529

The assessee did not include benefit arising on premature payment of deferred sales tax at net present value while computing book profit under section 115JB. The ITAT held that said amount cannot be excluded by applying Clause-(viii) in II Part to Explanation-1 of Section 115JB(2). (AY. 2004-05)

ACIT v. Spicer India Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 272 / (2013) 38 taxmann.com 317(Pune)(Trib.)

Section 115V-I : Relevant shipping income

- 1530 **S.115VI : Shipping companies-Shipping income–Recruitment of personnel on foreign ships is incidental to core shipping business, recruitment fees received on same is includible in shipping income. [S.33AC, R.11R]**

Assessee company is engaged in business of shipping operation also operated an agency division engaged in recruitment of Indian food and beverages personnel for foreign principals owning and operating cruise ships. It claimed said activity as incidental to its core shipping business and thus, included recruitment fees received in its shipping income. AO disallowed claim on ground that said activity did not have any linkage with running operation of ships and therefore taxed same as income from other sources. Whereas per Rule 11R, maritime education or recruitment fees is prescribed as an incidental activity for purpose of relevant shipping income, recruitment fees received by assessee was includible in shipping income u/s. section 115VI(5). Where scope of Chapter XII-G, including section 33AC, was extended with effect from 1-4-2005 to include profit from incidental activities, in profits from core activities of operating qualifying ships, assessee was eligible for said benefit. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07) *Varun Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 308 (Mum.)(Trib.)*

Section 115W : Definitions

- 1531 **S.115W : Fringe benefits – Port Trust–Amounts collected from stevedores as fringe benefit tax for benefits provided to labour – No demand from Income–tax Department and no amount paid on that account – No justification to withhold amount – Undue enrichment theory has no application – Port Trust to refund amount after satisfaction of identity. [S.12,115W to 115WL]**

The Visakhapatnam Dock Labour Board was constituted with a view to regulate the work force needed for loading and unloading ships. It granted licences to individuals or agencies to act as stevedores, and on being so recognised, the stevedores were supplied the work force by the Board. Over the period, the Board was merged with the Visakhapatnam Port Trust. The Board felt that it was under obligation to pay the fringe benefit tax in respect of the workers on its rolls. Since the wages of the workers were paid by the stevedores, it was resolved to collect the fringe benefit tax for the employees, from the respective stevedores. The tax was on the fringe benefits paid to each employee. However, a formula was evolved to collect ₹ 1 for each metric tonne of material handled by the stevedore for onward payment of fringe benefit tax, to the Income-tax Department. Between the years 2005 and 2009, a sum of ₹ 7 crores was collected towards fringe benefit tax from the stevedores, i.e., the members of the petitioner-association. On a writ petition contending that the Board and the Port Trust were registered under section 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and, accordingly, they stood exempted from the obligation to pay tax and still the fringe benefit tax was collected, that whatever the justification for collecting the amount, when there was some uncertainty as to the liability of the Port Trust to pay the fringe benefit tax, at least when the Tribunal decided finally in the year 2010 that the Port Trust was not liable to pay the fringe benefit tax, the amount ought to have been refunded, especially when it was not remitted to the Income-tax Department :

Held, allowing the petition, that neither was there any demand by the Income-tax Department against the Port Trust for payment of fringe benefit tax nor was in fact any amount paid on that account. The amount recovered from the members of the petitioner-association was deposited in a separate account, from time-to-time, and it was also earning interest. Once there was no demand, much less payment of the fringe benefit tax by the Port Trust to the Income-tax Department, there did not exist any justification to withhold the amount. When the amount was collected from a specified stevedore contractor, and the contractor in turn had undertaken the work with the owner of a ship, for loading or unloading, on a lump sum, the theory of undue enrichment did not have any application.

[The Port Trust would have the liberty to undertake proper verification, and only on full satisfaction of the Port Trust, about the identity of the agency, could the relevant amount be refunded.]

Visakhapatnam Stevedores Association v. UOI(2014) 369 ITR 371/ 230 Taxmann 172 (T&AP) (HC)

Section 115WB : Fringe benefits

S.115WB : Fringe benefits – Conveyance – Internal transport expenses incurred by assessee for movement of staff from office to factory and back could not be considered as fringe benefit 1532

The assessee was a private limited company engaged in the manufacture of different packing material required in food processing and beverages industry. The expenses were incurred on advertisement and publicity and therefore, such expenses were covered under section 115WB(D). The internal transport expenses were deemed fringe benefits u/s. 115WB. Internal transport expenses incurred by assessee on account of shuttle service for movement of staff from office to factory and back were not come under the preview of fringe benefits and will not liable to FBT. (AY. 2006-07, 2008-09)

Tetra Pak India (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 175 / 164 TTJ 356 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.115WB : Fringe benefits – Employer-employee relationship – Airport pick-up and drop-Guests – Employees pick-up and drop residence to place of work – Not liable to be treated as fringe benefit 1533

Where airline crew members for whom airport pick-up and drop had been incurred were not employees of assessee, expenditure incurred for same could not be treated as liable for fringe benefit tax under section 115WB(2)(D). Similarly, visiting guests of assessee could not be treated as employees of assessee and complementary pick-up and dropping charges incurred on account of visiting guests also did not fall under purview of fringe benefit tax under section 115WB(2)(B). Further, expenditure on account of pick-up and drop of employees from their residence to place of work and returning them to their residence was not liable to be treated as fringe benefit Circulars & Notifications, Circular No. 8 of 2005, dated 29-8-2005. (AY. 2009-10)

Peerless Hotels Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 26 ITR 151 / 39 taxmann.com 171/ (2014) 61 SOT 24 (URO) (Kol.)(Trib.).

Section S119 : Instructions to subordinate authorities

- 1534 **S.119 : Central Board of Direct Taxes – Return – Delay in filing return – Application to CBDT to condone delay – Rejection of application without recording reasons – Not justified – Speaking order. [Ss.80AC,80IB,139]**

The order passed by the Board did not contain the reasons for it. It was, therefore, not valid. The matter was remanded to the Board to decide afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties in accordance with law by passing a speaking and reasoned order.(AY 2006-2007)

Bal Kishan Dhawan (HUF) v. UOI (2014) 366 ITR 639 (P&H)(HC)

- 1535 **S.119 : Central Board of Direct Taxes – Instructions – Condonation of delay – Matter was set-aside. [S.234A, 234B, 234C]**

The Petitioners had challenged orders of second respondent rejecting the petitions for waiver of interest u/s.s 234A, 234B, and 234C and order issued by Commissioner of Income tax refusing to condone the delay in filing of the returns for AY. 1990–91 to 1992–1993. The Court held that, on perusal of Circular No. 670 dt. 26th Oct, 1993, it appears that when the Commissioner of Income-tax is satisfied that the returns were not filed due to reasons beyond the control of the assessee, he may refer the matter to the Board for reconsideration. In the instant case, for one year the Commissioner of Income-tax was satisfied that the delay in filing the return were not attributable to the petitioners. Therefore, he is not justified in extending the same to other years. The Court set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter to the Commissioner of Income-tax to decide whether he will condone the delay or refer the matter to the Board for consideration. (AY. 1990-91, 1992-93, 1994–95)

V. N. Parameswaran v. ITO(2013) 356 ITR 348 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 85 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)

- 1536 **S.119 : Central Board of Direct Taxes – Instructions – Circular – Assessment – Notice – Circular prescribing the time limit of three months from date of filing of return is binding on the Assessing Officer – Notice issued beyond prescribed period was held to be invalid. [S.14(2),143(3)]**

Return was filed by the assessee on 29-10-2004 and notice under section 143(2) was issued on July 14, 2005. Notice was not issued within the period of three months. Assessee contended that as the notice was issued beyond the limitation prescribed by the CBDT circular the assessment was bad in law. However the Tribunal held that the notice was issued within the prescribed period under section 143(2) hence the assessment was valid. On appeal by assessee the Court held that the CBDT Circular Nos. 9 and 10 prescribing time limit of three months from date of filing return for issuance of scrutiny notice is binding on income-tax authorities. Since the return was filed on 29-10-2004 and notice u/s. 143(2) in July 2005, the notice was not within a period of three months, and hence, not in legal exercise of jurisdiction. Order of Tribunal confirming the assessment was held to be not valid. Appeal of assessee was allowed. Court also made observation that when the department has set down a standard for itself, the department

is bound by the standard and cannot act with discrimination. In case, it does that, the act of the Department is bound to be struck down under Article 14 of the constitution. (AY. 2004-05)

Amal Kumar Ghosh v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 458 / 105 DTR 351 / 269 CTR 213 / 225 Taxmann 229 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)

S.119 : Central Board of Direct Taxes – Instructions – Refund application – Refusal of condonation of delay and denial of refund adopting hyper technical view was held to be not proper. [S.10(10C), 237]

1537

In the return of income the assessee did not claim refund of tax deducted at source. The CBDT issued the circular/letter on May 8, 2009, clarifying that the employees of the Reserve Bank of India who have opted for an early retirement scheme during year 2004-05 would be entitled to the benefit of exemption under section 10(10C) of the Act. Supreme Court also held that the amounts received by retiring employees of the Reserve Bank of India opting for the scheme were eligible for the exemption under section 10(10C). The assessee filed revised return on September 8, 2011 claiming the benefit. However there was no response. The assessee filed application for condonation of delay under section 119(2)(b) for claiming refund. The Commissioner dismissed the application in view of Instruction No. 13 of 2006 dated 22-12-2006, on the ground that application was filed beyond six years from the end of the assessment year for which the application was made. The assessee filed writ petition. Allowing the petition the Court held that the application for condonation of delay was rejected adopting a hyper technical view. The assessee's case revised return filed should be considered as application for condonation of delay under section 119(2)(b) and revenue was directed to grant the refund. (AY. 2004-05)

Devdas Rama v. CIT (2014) 362 ITR 335 / 104 DTR 73 / 222 Taxmann 56 / 272 CTR 310 (Bom.)(HC)

Section S124 : Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers

S.124 : Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers – Order passed without making reference to Commissioner is not nullity-Curable defects. [Ss.120, 127]

1538

Where an assessment order was passed without making reference to Commissioner under section 124 is not a nullity for want of jurisdiction but it results in an irregularity which can be rectified by order of remit and directing Assessing Officer to continue with proceedings from stage where error had occurred.

CIT v. S. S. Ahluwalia (2014) 225 Taxmann 131 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.124 : Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers – Not following the procedure need not result in annulment of assessment – Matter remitted for fresh decision. [Ss.124, 127, 143(3)]

1539

Allowing the appeal of revenue the Court held that sections 120, 124, 127 govern the process of procedure for assessment and not the subject matter or its purpose. Irregularity in procedure need not result in annulment. Appellate authorities have right to put the clock back and direct the AO to follow the procedure notwithstanding the difference between mandatory & directory procedural norms. There was failure on the

part of the AO, Delhi & ITO, Dimapur in not following the procedure prescribed u/s. 124, but those would not make the assessment in the first round a nullity. Assessment order passed should have been set aside and assessment was remitted for fresh decision. (AY. 1985-86, 1987-88)

CIT v. S. S Ahluwalia (2014) 267 CTR 185 (Delhi)(HC)

1540 **S.124 : Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers – Procedural irregularity, can be directed to be rectified by following the procedure. [S.120, 127]**

Sections 120, 124, 127 govern the process of procedure for assessment and not the subject matter or its purpose-irregularity in procedure need not result in annulment. Appellate authorities have right to put the clock back and direct the ITO/AO to follow the procedure notwithstanding the difference between mandatory and directory procedural norms. It was held that where an assessment order was passed without making reference to Commissioner under section 124 it was not a nullity for want of jurisdiction but it results in an irregularity which can be rectified by order of remit and directing Assessing Officer to continue with proceedings from stage where error had occurred.

ACIT v. S.S. Ahluwalia (2014) 101 DTR 292 (Delhi)(HC)

1541 **S.124 : Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers – Provisions of sub-section 3 of section 124 bar an assessee from raising question of jurisdiction before First Appellate Authority or Tribunal if such an objection has not been raised before Assessing Authority at very first stage**

The assessee's case was transferred from the jurisdiction of Lalitpur to Jhansi. The assessee was neither served nor issued any notice under section 127 of the Act nor was any such notice served upon the assessee before the case was transferred from Lalitpur to Jhansi. The assessee appeared before the Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle 1, Jhansi who was the Assessing Officer (AO) in response to the notices issued by him under section 143(2) and 142(1) of the Act. The AO then passed the assessment order aggrieved by which the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) (CIT (A)), Agra who partly allowed the appeal. On appeal to the Tribunal, the latter dismissed the appeal *vide* the impugned order. The assessee then appealed before the High Court which made an observation from a reading of the Assessment Order that no objection regarding jurisdiction was raised by the appellant before the AO at Jhansi. The assessee proceeded to challenge the same before the First Appellate Authority at the first instance. The High Court held that the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 124 of the Act are thus attracted and the assessee is barred from raising the question of jurisdiction before the First Appellate Authority or the Tribunal if such an objection had not been raised before the assessing authority at the very first stage. (AY. 1997-98)

Bal Chand Jain & Sons v. DCIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 123 (All.)(HC)

S.124 : Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers – The Tribunal is not a competent authority to adjudicate upon the jurisdiction of the AO when it is not raised before the Assessing Authority

1542

The assessee had filed its return of income in response to the notices under section 142(1) and section 148. Its case was transferred to the Deputy / Joint Commissioner (Asstt.) as the return of loss for the assessment year 1997-98 was more than ₹ 10 lakhs. During the assessment, the assessee claimed exemption under section 11 and subsequently under section 10(22) of the Act. The AO denied the exemption and the assessment was completed by determining a positive income. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the order of the AO. On second appeal, the Tribunal held that the AO who framed the assessment/reassessment proceedings was not the competent authority and the reasons recorded for initiating the reassessment proceedings were unfounded. On appeal before the High Court, it was observed that the question of jurisdiction could have been raised before the AO within the prescribed period under section 124(3)(a), but it was not raised. Even after assessment before the First Appellate Authority, any such plea was not put forward. Thus, it held that the Tribunal was not the competent authority to adjudicate upon the issue of jurisdiction for the first time when it was not raised in terms of section 124 before the assessing authority. (AY. 1993-94, 1995-96, 1997-98)

CIT v. All India Children Care & Educational Development Society (2013) 357 ITR 134 / (2014) 221 Taxmann 5 / 264 CTR 532(All.)(HC)

S.124 : Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers – Assessee appeared in proceedings before Assessing Officer as well as Commissioner (Appeals) without any protest – Assessee is not entitled to question jurisdiction of Assessing Officer in appeal before Tribunal. [S.148, 254(1)]

1543

The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal held that assessee has appeared in proceedings before Assessing Officer as well as Commissioner (Appeals) without challenging jurisdiction of Assessing Officer. In such cases the Assessee is not entitled to question the jurisdiction of Assessing Officer in appeal before Tribunal according to section 124(3)(a)

(AY. 1996-97, 1997-98)

DCIT v. Chemm Finance Ltd. (2014) 35 ITR 167 / (2015) 67 SOT 156(URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.124 : Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers –Notice – After participating in the assessment proceedings – Jurisdiction cannot be challenged latter on. [S.143(2)]

1544

Once a notice under section 143(2) is issued by a particular officer and if assessee wishes to object to such jurisdiction then objection has to be raised in terms of section 124(3)(a) within 30 days of issue of such notice and, in absence of such objection, assessee cannot challenge jurisdiction later on. (AY. 2003-04, 2008-09)

ACIT v. Punjab Urban Development Authority, Mohali (2014) 64 SOT 65 (URO) / 32 ITR 481 / 161 TTJ 553(Chd.)(Trib.)

- 1545 **S.124 : Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers – Where assessee objects about jurisdiction, AO cannot decide himself the jurisdiction He has to refer the question Director General or Chief Commissioner**

Where assessee objects about jurisdiction and AO is not satisfied, AO is bound to refer question of jurisdiction to Director General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, in case it relates to same Director General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, but in case of question of jurisdiction relating to areas within jurisdiction of different Director Generals or Chief Commissioners or Commissioners, Assessing Officer is bound to refer it to Director General, Chief Commissioner or Commissioner concerned and if those people are not in agreement, then it should be decided by Board or by such Director General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner as Board may specify by notification in Official Gazette; in no case Assessing Officer can decide issue of jurisdiction himself. (AY. 2009-10)

Sekhar Kumar Goenka v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 170 (URO)(Cuttack)(Trib.)

Section S127 : Power to transfer cases

- 1546 **S.127 : Power to transfer cases – Failure to appear in response to summons issued by Assessing Officer at Tanjore – Wife not co-operating with Department and avoiding further enquiry – Application by wife for transfer of case from Tanjore to Chennai – Order rejecting application was held to be justified**

Assessee moved the application to transfer the case from Tanjore to Chennai. The application was rejected on the ground that there were several sale transactions in respect of properties situated at Tanjore but no return filed by assessee's late husband. Return filed by wife at Chennai only after issuance of notice. Assessee also not appeared in response to summons issued by AO at Tanjore She was not co-operating with Department and avoiding further enquiry. Therefore application by wife for transfer of case from Tanjore to Chennai was rejected On writ petition by the assessee the Court held that order of rejection of application was held to be justified. (AY. 2007-2008, 2010-2011)

Dv.Mercy v. ITO (2014) 368 ITR 616/ 52 taxmann.com 519 / (2015) 121 DTR 105 (Mad.) (HC)

- 1547 **S.127 : Power to transfer cases – Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers – Procedural irregularity – Order set aside – Irregularity in procedure need not result in annulment. [Ss.120, 124, 143, 148, Wealth Tax act, 1957, S. 11]**

Respondent Assessee was subjected to search by the CBI. It was the case of the revenue that the assessee had acquired 18 commercial properties in Delhi, 370 acres agricultural land in and around Delhi and had substantial unaccounted/undisclosed deposits in form of fixed deposits receipts. The assets/properties were in names of the respondent and family members. The AO at Delhi issued notice u/s. 148 in respect of AYs:1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87 & 1987-88. CIT, Delhi by order transferred the case of the respondent assessee to AO to ACIT. The respondent assessee did not file returns pursuant to the above notices for the AYs. 1985-86, 1986-87 & 1987-88 u/s. 148 of the Act. In this present case proceedings were initiated both by the AO Delhi &ITO,

Dimapur. Remanding the case the High Court held that sub-s (4) & (6) of S/124 and for that matter sub-ss. (20 & (4) of S/124 after amendment w.e.f 1/4/1988 are procedural sections. They relate to administrative & exercise of powers/authority by the AO and are not part of the substantive law. sections 120/124/127 govern the process of procedure for assessment and not the subject matter or its purpose, irregularity in procedure need not result in annulment, Appellate authorities have right to put the clock back and direct ITO/AO to follow the procedure notwithstanding the difference between mandatory and directory procedural norms, there was failure on the part of AO, Delhi & ITO, Dimapur in not following the procedure prescribed u/s. 124, but round a nullity, assessment order passed should have been set aside and assessments remitted for a fresh decision. (AY. 1985-86, 1987-88)

CIT v. S. S. Ahluwalia (2014) 267 CTR 185 (Delhi)(HC)

CWT v. S. S. Ahluwalia (2014) 267 CTR 185 (Delhi)(HC)

S.127 : Power to transfer cases – Each year is separate and distinct case – Not necessary to pass order when assessee shifted the residence – Order of assessment cannot be said be nullity. [Ss.120, 124]

1548

Each year is separate and distinct year and in case assessee shifts his residence or place of business or work etc., Assessing Officer of place where assessee has shifted or otherwise, will have jurisdiction and it is not necessary that in such a case, an order under section 127 is required to be passed.

CIT v. S. S. Ahluwalia (2014) 225 Taxmann 131(Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

S.127 : Power to transfer cases –Investigations – Group companies – Transfer of case of Managing Director was held to be valid. [Art. 226]

1549

Petitioner was Managing Director of XAPL, which in turn, provided advisory services through a chain of companies to XIH III and IV, which were part of ED Group of Companies. Pursuant to investigations of Revenue into ED Group of Companies, show cause notice was issued to petitioner under section 127 proposing transfer of his case from one circle to another for ‘co-ordinated investigation. Petitioner contended that in absence of any incriminating material suggesting any possible undisclosed income in hands of petitioner and absence of any link between ED Group of Companies and petitioner, rationale of ‘co-ordinated investigation’ could not sustain order of transfer under section 127. The Court held that from facts, it was clear that petitioner was linked, in some business capacity, with ED Group of Companies, and very purpose of section 127 order in this case was to ensure that an orderly and co-ordinated investigation took place while conducting assessment of various (and possibly related) entities involved. Petitioner would have an opportunity to present his case, and be subject to a regular assessment, in front of Assessing Officer to whose jurisdiction his case had been transferred and thus no prejudice would be caused by mere fact of a section 127 order. Order of transfer of case was held to be valid .

Vishal Kumar v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 203 / (2015) 121 DTR 345 (Delhi)(HC)

- 1550 **S.127 : Power to transfer cases – Natural justice – Failure to comply summons – Order passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to assessee, it was to be set aside and matter was to be remanded back for disposal afresh**

Commissioner passed an order under section 127 transferring assessee's case from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction on ground that assessee failed to respond to summons issued under section 131(1A). Principles of natural justice require that assessee should be given an opportunity to explain whether or not responding to summons issued under section 131(1A) was sufficient reason to transfer its assessment from one place to another. Since Commissioner passed impugned order without giving an opportunity of hearing to assessee, it was to be set aside and matter was to be remanded back for disposal afresh

Amin Manilal & Co. (P.) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 159 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

- 1551 **S.127 : Power to transfer cases – Order must be communicated – Mere passing of order is not sufficient – Appearance of assessee would not be considered as an estoppel – CIT was directed to pass reasoned order. [S.153]**

Petitioner's file was transferred from one income-tax authority to another. Show-cause notice was issued and petitioner was provided an opportunity to make objections and after considering objections, this impugned order of transfer was made. However, order had not been communicated. Non-communication of an order to opposite party is a good ground to interfere on ground of administrative lapses as an affected party should know about order that causes hardship to him. Order is to be communicated and it should be a reasoned order and it should assign reasons as to why case of petitioner is not considered, mere appearance of petitioner and furnishing files in response to notice issued by Income-tax office under section 153 would not be considered as an estoppel. Commissioner was directed to pass fresh order and the reasons to be assigned as to the rejection of the objections.

Madeeha Enterprises v. ITO (2014) 225 Taxmann 294 / 112 DTR 340 (Karn.)(HC)

- 1552 **S.127 : Power to transfer cases – Reasons – Reliance on report, contents whereof unknown to assessee – Transfer was held to be not valid**

Held, order of transfer of case from Kolkata to Kanpur was not valid as no reasons in support thereof had been given. Also, since the Commissioner had relied on a report, the contents whereof were not made known to the assessee, the order could not be accepted.

Chirag Vincom P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 273 / 227 Taxmann 64 (Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)

- 1553 **S.127 : Power to transfer cases – Valid and cogent reasons – Transfer order stated that in above search operation, cash amount was found from petitioner's room and same was seized. (S.132, 153C)**

Petitioner being daughter-in-law was living at residence of her in-laws in Meerut. The said premises was covered under search and seizure operation. Petitioner's case was ordered to be transferred from Kanpur to Meerut for integrated assessment. Transfer order stated that in above search operation, cash amount was found from petitioner's

room and same was seized. Held, such reason could not be said to be irrelevant or not germane to issue; that was valid and cogent reason and hence transfer order was held to be valid.

Preeti Elhence v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 268 / 49 taxmann.com 59 (All.)(HC)

S.127 : Power to transfer cases – ‘Opportunity of hearing-Breach of principle of natural justice – Order was set aside

1554

Assessee had been filing his returns in Mumbai. A search and seizure was conducted on ‘S’ group at Hyderabad. As the searched group was assessed at Hyderabad the assessee’s case was proposed to be transferred to Hyderabad for purpose of co-ordinated investigation and administrative convenience. Assessee by a letter forwarded his objections to the proposed transfer of jurisdiction. Assessee also requested concerned authority to provide material and documents seized during search from possession of ‘S’ group of companies. Revenue authorities, without giving any response to said letter passed impugned order transferring jurisdiction of assessee’s case. Assessee challenged the said order by filing the writ petition. By allowing the petition the court observed that, the impugned order was clearly in breach of natural justice and thus same deserves to be set aside.

Sachin Joshi v. CIT (2014) 224 Taxmann 331(2015) 370 ITR 598 (Bom.)(HC)

S.127 : Power to transfer cases – Co-ordinated investigation – Transfer from Mumbai to Delhi was held to be valid

1555

After considering the objections of assessee the CIT transferred the assessee’s case from Mumbai to Delhi for co-ordinated investigation on the request of Dy. CIT at Delhi. The assessee challenged the said order by filing writ petition. Dismissing the petition the Court held that, transfer of case was held to be valid.

Aamby Valley Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 270 CTR 57 / 106 DTR 457 / 221 Taxmann 458 (Bom) (HC)

S.127 : Power to transfer cases – Co-ordinated investigation-Without giving any reasons, and without giving personal hearing – Transfer of case was held to be breach of natural justice and held to be invalid

1556

Court observed that the assessee does not have a right to be assessed at a particular place, nevertheless the power to transfer proceedings from one place to another under section 127 cannot be exercised arbitrarily. In the present case neither any notice was issued to the assessee nor was any personal hearing granted to the assessee before passing the impugned order simply stating that the order of transfer is issued for the sake of “coordinated investigation and assessment”. On writ petition filed by the assessee the court held that, without giving any reasons, and without giving personal hearing, transfer of case was held to be breach of natural justice and held to be invalid.

Sunisha Impex (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 220 / 270 CTR 63 / 221 taxman 454 (Bom.)(HC)

- 1557 **S.127 : Power to transfer cases – Co-ordinated investigation – Held to be valid.**
It was held that reason for transfer of a case for effective and co-ordinated investigation can never be said to be a vague nor insufficient reason, particularly in the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case wherein a proper show cause notice was issued, hearing was granted and a final order has been passed in the matter and, therefore, the impugned order cannot be said to be cryptic order or a vague order.
Ambika Solves & Ors v. CIT (2014) 101 DTR 1 / 267 CTR 258 / 231 Taxmann 508 (MP) (HC)
- 1558 **S.127 : Power to transfer cases – Reasons – Assessee to be given opportunity – Order passed without giving an opportunity was liable to be set aside**
The reasons for transferring the assessee's case from Mirzapur to Allahabad had to be spelt out in the order which had been passed u/s.127(2), which was not the case here. Therefore, the order transferring the case of the assessee was to be set aside and the assessee was to file her reply to the proposed transfer.
Chandra Prabha Kushwaha (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 66/225 Taxmann 130 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)
- 1559 **S.127 : Power to transfer cases – Moving court only after issue of notice – Assessee guilty of laches – Interim relief was held to be not maintainable. [S.148, Art. 226]**
The assessee's case was transferred from Mumbai to Hyderabad *vide* order dated August 31, 2012. The assessee filed a writ petition on February 11, 2013 but did not move the court for interim relief. Held, its conduct was indicative of its having accepted the order of transfer dated August 31, 2012. It was only when the Assessing Officer at Hyderabad issued four notices dated July 23, 2013, under section 148 seeking to reopen the earlier assessments that the petition was mentioned on August 12, 2013, and placed on board on August 20, 2013, for urgent interim relief and amendment. This was a clear case of laches on the part of the assessee. Therefore, no occasion arose to examine the assessee's grievance on the merits. (AY. 2009-2010, 2012-2013)
Patel KNR JV v. CIT (2014) 362 ITR 351 / 102 DTR 172 / 267 CTR 514 / 227 Taxmann 62 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

Section S132 : Search and seizure

- 1560 **S.132 : Search and seizure – Reason to believe – High Court appointed an advocate Commissioner to take inventory of goods – No reason was given how the search and seizure action was illegal – Order passed by High Court was set aside**
Court observed that how the High Court appointed an advocate Commissioner to take inventory of goods in respect of which restraint order was passed by revenue. Court also observed that High Court had not even remotely tried to see the reasons whether or not the competent authority had formed the opinion on the basis of any acceptable material, the High Court had totally misdirected itself in quashing the search and seizure on the basis of the principles of non-traverse. The High Court ought to have perused the file to see whether or not reasons had been recorded and whether they met the requirement of law. (Order set aside and matter remanded to High Court for disposal)

afresh in accordance with law.) Reasons, needless to say, can be recorded on the file and the Court can scrutinise the file and find out whether the authority has appropriately recorded the reasons for forming of an opinion that there are reasons to believe to conduct search and seizure. As is evincible the High Court has totally misdirected itself in quashing the search and seizure on the basis of the principles on non-traverse. Order of High Court was set aside and remanded to the High Court to decide in accordance with law.

UOI v. Agarwal Iron Industries (2014) 272 CTR 313 / 112 DTR 137/(2015) 370 ITR 180 / 229 Taxmann 124(SC)

Editorial : Decision in Ravi Iron Industries v. Director of Investigation (2003) 264 ITR 28 (All.)(HC) is set aside

S.132 : Search and seizure – Validity – Unless valuable article or thing found – Search & seizure invalid. [Constitution of India, Art. 14]

1561

The Petitioner's premises was subjected to search and his immovable properties, namely, agricultural lands and plots total 14 in number were placed under deemed seizure on the strength of second proviso to section 132(1). The Petitioner, being aggrieved, filed applications requesting for release of the attached immovable property but the revenue authorities did not pay any heed to his prayer. On writ in High Court, the court allowed the writ petition and held that where it was not revenue's case that there was any valuable article or thing described in clause (iii) of section 132(1) such as books of account, other documents, money, bullion, jewellery and other valuable article or thing found as a result of search which was of a nature that it was not possible or practicable to take physical possession of same and remove to a safe place due to its volume, weight or other physical characteristics or due to its being of a dangerous nature necessitating seizure of immovable properties, action of revenue of seizure of petitioner's immovable properties which were in nature of agricultural lands and open plots was wholly without any authority of law and could not be sustained.

Rajendra Singh Nayak v. DCIT (2014) 268 CTR 484 / 227 Taxmann 13 (Mag.)(MP)(HC)

S.132 : Search and seizure – No addition in respect of gold sovereigns can be made when assessee's explanation *vis-à-vis* "jewellery" found at the time of search has been accepted by the revenue authorities.

1562

The AO conducted a search in the premises of the assessee and conducted a block assessment for various assessment years. During the search certain documents, loose papers, cash, jewellery, etc. were found. The assessee submitted that the jewellery belonged to his mother and wife and had been acquired over a period of more than 40 years. The AO accepted the explanation given by the assessee but contended that gold sovereigns were not jewellery and since no explanation was given by the assessee in that respect, the AO added it to the income of the assessee. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal confirmed the findings of the AO.

The High Court observed that when the jewelry was being inventoried, the gold sovereigns had been included in it and that the term 'jewellery' was used as a loose

term. The High Court accordingly held that since the explanation regarding jewelry had been accepted by the department, the remaining part relating to gold sovereigns which were a part of 'jewellery' did not belong to the assessee and explanation thereof had to be accepted. (AY. 1988-1998, 1997-1998)

Tilak Raj Sharma v. Dy. CIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 123(Mag.)(All.)(HC)

1563 **S.132 : Search and seizure – Validly – The warrant of authorisation was issued merely on hypothecated grounds, which is not sustainable under the law**

Search and seizure proceedings were conducted in premises of a Government Officer on warrant issued by Director, Investigation. The satisfaction note was centered in respect of search conducted in premises of Dr. Yogi Raj Sharma about 9 months ago, from where a document had been found. During search, all documents, books and vouchers of assessee were taken away without verification. On writ, assessee challenged the issuance of warrant of authorisation and contended that subsequent search and contended seizure proceedings were *mala fide* and out of prejudice. The High Court observed that the satisfaction note was in respect of three officers including assessee and the entire satisfaction note was centered in respect of the search conducted in the premises of Dr. Yogi and on the basis of a document it was recorded that petitioner had invested money in house and land property. The aforesaid money was received by him in respect of supply orders of medicines, medical equipments etc. The Court noted that the entire basis of recording satisfaction was the search conducted in the premises of Dr. Yogi. The said document does not bear the name of the petitioner, but on the basis of word 'ch', a conclusion had been recorded that it indicated the assessee. In absence of name, what evidence was there before the revenue to indicate that the word 'ch' indicated the petitioner, is not clear. The Court further observed that the search was carried out in the premises of Dr. Yogi in September 2007. At the relevant time, assessee was the Chief Health Secretary and this fact was within the knowledge of the respondents, but there is no explanation why the search was conducted after a period of near about 9 months. The document was seized from the premises of Dr. Yogi, but until and unless there was corroborating evidence, the respondents could not have formed the basis of issuing warrant of authorization. If there was some material with the Department that the assessee had purchased some house or land property, then there could have been definite evidence in this regard, but for a period of 8 months no information was collected and all of a sudden the warrant of authorisation was issued. From the perusal of panchnama prepared during seizure, it appears that no objectionable document or undisclosed property was found except those which were declared in the earlier return. There is no other evidence available on record that the document related to the petitioner and the word 'ch', of which correctness is disputed by the assessee, indicted him. The Court held that, in absence of any cogent reasons in the present matter, warrant of authorization could not have been issued. Issuance of warrant of authorisation is a serious action and for this authorisation officer should have recorded his satisfaction. Though normally Court does not look for the reasons of satisfaction, but in the present case it appears that the warrant of authorisation was issued merely on hypothecated grounds, which is not sustainable under the law.

Rajesh Rajora v. UOI(2014) 220 Taxmann 146 (Mag.)(MP)(HC)

S.132 : Search and seizure – Authorisation of search – No mention of assessee HUF – Addition was liable to be quashed

1564

A search was conducted at premises of assessee HUF and another HUF consisting of brothers and other relatives of assessee. Assessee challenged impugned search proceedings contending that warrant of authorisation for impugned search was issued against 'KS', which belonged to other HUF and since assessee had no relation with 'KS', search proceedings initiated against assessee was invalid. Documents on record showed that before issuing warrant of authorisation, department considered information which was available in respect of 'KS' and other associates and there was no mention of name of assessee. The Court held that merely because originally members of family of other group were engaged in electrical business of larger HUF and that assessee in its business of electrical goods was supplying goods to other group company, assessee could not be implicated. Further, issuance of authorisation of search and seizure warrant without there being any information in possession about assessee and without recording satisfaction about not producing relevant books of account and other documents could not be sustained. Thus, in absence of compliance of requirement of section 132, authorisation for search and seizure and consequent search and seizure in respect of assessee's properties was liable to be quashed.

Tejram Omprakash (HUF) v. DIT (2013) 262 CTR 82 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 85 (Mag.) (MP)(HC)

S.132 : Search and seizure – Warrant of authorisation – Reason to suspect need not be stated in notice – Notice valid. [S.131(1A)]

1565

Reason to suspect that income had been concealed or was likely to be concealed by assessee need not be stated in notice under S.131(1A). Writ petition was held to be not valid.

Sumermal Jain v. DCIT (2014) 360 ITR 553 / 225 Taxmann 282 / 108 DTR 150 / 270 CTR 625 (Cal.)(HC)

S.132(8) : Search and seizure – Order for retention of documents – Retention of seized documents beyond 15 days by officer other than Income-tax Officer having jurisdiction over assessee – Not valid. [Ss.132, 132(9)]

1566

The authorised officer was required, to hand over the seized articles to the Income-tax Officer having jurisdiction over the assessee within a period of 15 days of such seizure and thereupon the powers exercisable by the authorised officer under section 132(8) or section 132(9) would be exercisable by such Income-tax Officer. On a writ petition contending that the retention of the seized articles beyond 15 days was illegal and handing over the seized articles to the Income-tax Officer having jurisdiction over the assessee thereafter could not entitle the officer to exercise powers under section 132(8). Held, allowing the petition, that the Department was directed to return the seized articles as detailed in the panchnama dated August 21, 1998.

Mahesh Kumar Goyal v. DIT (Inv.) (2014) 366 ITR 15 / 272 CTR 329 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 50 (Cal.)(HC)

- 1567 **S.132(9A) : Search and seizure – Delivery of seized assets to jurisdictional AO – Retention of assets beyond 15 days was held to be in valid. [Ss.132, 132(8)]**

Articles seized by the authorised officer must be handed over to the AO having jurisdiction over assessee, retention of assets beyond period of 15 days became invalid and the assessee became entitled for return of such articles.

Mahesh Kumar Goyal & Ors.v. DIT (I) (2014) 366 ITR 15 / 272 CTR 329 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 50 (Cal.)(HC)

Section 132B : Application of seized or requisitioned assets

- 1568 **S.132B : Application of seized or requisitioned assets – Release of seized assets – Proviso – Release only if source of acquisition of asset is explained satisfactorily – Contradictory stands regarding acquisition of asset – Refusal to release asset was held to be justified**

Dismissing the petition, the Court held that the petitioner had been taking contradictory stands regarding the source of the amount. Before the police authorities, he had stated that the amount was out of his personal savings and income from brokerage of diamonds. Later on, before the Department, he changed his version and stated that the amount was received from his father and other relatives to enable him to set up his business and that his relatives had raised these amounts by selling their jewellery and ornaments. The source of cash had not been explained satisfactorily. Refusal to release the cash was justified.

Jinkal Dineshbhai Virvadiya v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 713 / 223 Taxmann 26 /107 DTR 389 (Guj.)(HC)

- 1569 **S.132B : Application of seized or requisitioned assets – Search and seizure – Block assessment – Seizure of gold bars – Adjustment of tax liability by sale of gold bars only after completion of assessment and determination of tax demand. [Ss.132, 153A]**

The Assessing Officer rejected the request made by the petitioners for the sale of seized gold bars for adjustment towards the automatic tax liability of the first petitioner, stating that such action could be taken only after the assessment was completed and a demand had been quantified against the petitioners, on a writ petition :

Dismissing the petition, the Court held that in the case of the present assessee, the conditions specified in the first proviso, were clearly not attracted. The Assessing Officer was justified in his conclusion that it was only when the liability was determined on the completion of the assessment that it would stand crystallised and in pursuance of which a demand would be raised and recovery could be initiated.

Hemant Kumar Sindhi v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 555 / 224 Taxmann 70 (Mag.) / 272 CTR 166 (All.)(HC)

- 1570 **S.132B : Application of seized or requisitioned assets – Expl. 2 to S. 132B, though Inserted w.e.f. 1-6-2013, is retrospective and seized cash cannot be adjusted against advance-tax liability**

(i) As per provisions of section 132B of the Act the assets seized u/s. 132 or requisitioned u/s 132A may be adjusted towards the amount of any “existing liability”. The Explanation 2 to section 132B of the Act inserted by the Finance Act, 2013 w.e.f.

1-6-2013 clarifies that for removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the “existing liability” does not include “advance tax” payable in accordance with the provisions of part C of Chapter XVII of the Act. In the Memorandum of Explanation the provisions of Finance Act, 2013 it has been stated that the amendment for insertion of Explanation-1 and Explanation-2 to the provisions of section 132B of the Act are proposed to amend the aforesaid section was as to clarify the existing liability does not include advance tax payable in accordance with the provisions of part ‘C’ of Chapter XVII of the Act.

(ii) Therefore, the Explanation-2 to section 132B of the Act is a clarificatory provision which was inserted to clarify the intention of the legislature that the “existing liability” does not include advance tax payable in accordance with the provisions of Part ‘C’ of Chapter XVII of the Act. Explanation-2 attached to section 132B of the Act, is a clarificatory provision which is of retrospective effect, even if, the same was stated to be applicable from a particular date. We also hold that Explanation-2 to section 132B of the Act is retrospectively effective from the date of insertion of provision of section 132B of the Act w.e.f. 1-6-2002.

(iii) On the basis of foregoing discussion, we reach to a legal conclusion that the assets or cash seized u/s. 132 of the Act is adjustable against the amount of any “existing liability” under the Act which does not include “advance tax” payable in accordance with the provisions of Part ‘C’ of Chapter XVII of the Act.

DCIT v. Spaze Tower Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

Section 133 : Power to call for information

S.133(6) : Power to call for information – No proceeding pending – Notice to call information from bank was held to be valid

1571

Power to call for information can be exercised in course of enquiry even where no proceedings are pending. Therefore, notice to banks calling for information as regards persons having cash transactions of over Rs. 1 lakh or having time deposits over ₹ 1 lakh was held to be valid.

Kathiroom Service Co-op Bank Ltd v. CIT (CIB)(2013) 263 CTR 129 / (2014) 360 ITR 243 / 220 Taxmann 41(SC)

S.133(6) : Power to call for information–Notice to bank calling for information as regards persons having deposits Held to be valid.

1572

The petitioner challenged the notice issued by the ITO by way of writ. Dismissing the petition the Court observed that the Co-operative Bank should not feel shy to furnish the information sought by the Income tax department in order to ensure that transaction of the depositors are wholly transparent. The petitioner-bank had to furnish the information sought for by the Income-tax Department in order to ensure that the transactions of the depositors were wholly transparent. The petitioner was, however, free to move the authority for granting extension of time to furnish the particulars which shall be dealt with in accordance with law. Petition was dismissed.

Kulathupuzha Service Co-op Bank Ltd. v. ITO (Int) (2014) 361 ITR 200 / 47 taxmann. com 290 (Ker.)(HC)

- 1573 **S.133(6) : Power to call for information – Notice to credit co-operative society to furnish information relating to depositors with cash deposits exceeding five lakhs of rupees – Notice valid**

A notice was issued to under section 133(6) whereby the societies were required to furnish details of the entire cash deposits in savings bank accounts where the aggregate cash deposits were rupees five lakhs and above in a year for the last three previous years. On writ petitions the notices were held to be valid and held that the information sought related to account holders or depositors who had cash deposits of rupees five lakhs and above in any year for the last three previous years. Therefore, it was in the nature of a general enquiry by the authorities in order to ascertain whether any person who had taxable income had failed to comply with the provisions of the Act. The information sought was under section 133(6) and had nothing to do with any of the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act. The notices were held to be valid.

Kodur Service Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. DIT(2014) 367 ITR 22 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 497 / 273 CTR 67(Ker.)(HC)

Section 133A : Power of survey

- 1574 **S.133A : Survey – Voluntary surrender of sum as income at time of survey – Lower sum offered in return – Assessing Officer not controverting explanation of assessee for restriction of surrender – Tribunal justified in deleting addition. [S.68]**

Assessee surrendered ₹ 5 crores during course of survey, however in the return of income he offered only ₹ 3 crores. AO made the addition of ₹ 2 crores. Tribunal deleted the addition. On appeal by revenue the Court held that if the assessee did not adhere to the surrender made during the course of survey, it was for the Assessing Officer to bring on record cogent material and other evidence to support the addition rather than rely on the statements simpliciter. Therefore, there was no infirmity or perversity in the order of the Tribunal. (AY. 2008-2009)

CIT v. Ashok Kumar Jain (2014) 369 ITR 145 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 65 (Raj.)(HC)

- 1575 **S.133A : Survey – Explanations of entries to be made at the time of survey itself or the Assessing Officer – Reasons given before the Commissioner prevented Assessing officer to satisfy himself – Matter Remanded**

In course of survey conducted at assessee's premises, certain loose papers were found. Since assessee failed to explain entries written on said papers, at the time of survey as well as assessment proceedings, Assessing Officer made additions to assessee's income. Before CIT(A), assessee explained those entries and was granted relief. The Tribunal remanded matter back to Assessing Officer in order to find out as to whether the explanations were worthwhile or not. Against the said order of the Tribunal, assessee filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court held that explanation pertaining to entries made by assessee was to be tendered at time survey was conducted and also before the Assessing Officer. Since assessee made explanation before First Appellate Authority and thereby prevented Assessing Officer to satisfy himself that explanation was worthwhile, in such circumstances, Tribunal had not erred in law in remanding matter back for disposal afresh. (AY. 2004-05)

Manohar Lal Kalra v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 132(Mag.) (Uttarakhand)(HC)

S.133A : Survey – Assessment without giving impounded documents – Matter remanded to the AO. 1576

A survey was carried out at assessee's premises wherein certain documents were impounded. Thereupon, assessee filed a return declaring certain income. Assessee's claim was that return was filed on insistence of department and did not truly reflect its income for year under consideration. Assessee thus filed a revised return. Assessee also filed an application for supplying copies of impounded documents. Assessing Officer directed assessee to visit his office personally on a particular date and take copies of documents impounded. However, before date so fixed, Assessing Officer passed assessment order on basis of original return of income filed by assessee. Assessee thus filed instant petition challenging validity of assessment order. The Court held that, on facts, Assessing Officer passed impugned assessment order in undue haste which was not sustainable in law. Therefore, matter was to be remanded back for disposal afresh. *Purvash Mansukhbhai Shah v. Addl.CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 154 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)*

S.133A : Survey-Surrender – No addition can be made on the basis of a surrender simplicitor even if the surrender is during the course of survey proceedings. [S.143(3)] 1577

The issue raised is infructuous in as much as even if the surrender is in order but the addition was not warranted on merits, it is only elementary that merely because the assessee has, under misconception of facts or law, surrendered an income, no addition can be made in respect of the same. We have also noted that as evident from the observations of the AO, there were no specific reasons for making the addition of ₹ 10,00,000 save and except for the alleged surrender made by the assessee. The issue in appeal is also covered, in favour of the assessee, by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in *ACIT vs. Satya Narayan Agarwal (2004) 91 TTJ 481* wherein it is held that no addition can be made on the basis of a surrender simplicitor even when surrender is made during the course of survey proceedings under section 133 (AY. 2008-09). *ITO v. Ram Prakash(2014) 164 TTJ 7(UO) / (2015)67 SOT 126 (URO)(Agra)(Trib.)*

S.133A : Survey – Undisclosed income–Statement on oath – No corroborative evidence found to substantiate undisclosed income – stock increased by tampering with inventory sheet – Report of handwriting experts not considered – Video of survey proceedings not submitted – Income from undisclosed income to be re-estimated. [S.69,131, Evidence Act, 1881, S. 34] 1578

The assessee was in the business of handicraft items. A survey was conducted u/s. 133A and statement of one of the partners was recorded. The stock was physically verified and a difference of ₹ 5 crore was found which was added to the total income of the assessee. On appeal to CIT(A), the addition was reduced to ₹ 3 crore.

On cross appeals to the Tribunal, it was observed that statement taken on oath cannot be the final basis for making an addition to the income of the assessee. The department had in the previous two assessment years accepted the trading records of the assessee and hence the same closing stock was the opening stock of the current assessment year which could not be disputed. There was tampering in the trading account which was

confirmed by the handwriting experts but the report was neither considered by the AO or CIT(A). In absence of there being corroborative evidence with the department to substantiate the undisclosed income, the addition was deleted. (AY. 2008-09)
Unique Art Age v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 547 (2015) 152 ITD 600 (Jaipur)(Trib.)

Section S139 : Return of income

- 1579 **S.139 : Return of income – Best judgment assessment – Additional evidence – Long-term capital gains – Huge unaccounted deposits in bank account – Assessee not filing return despite several opportunities-Tribunal directing fresh assessment after grant of opportunity – No issue decided by Tribunal – In case of failure by assessee to place materials for assessment, Assessing Officer entitled to pass appropriate order. [S.144, 148, 260 A,R. 46A]**

The Tribunal set aside the assessment order and directed the Assessing Officer to pass an order afresh in accordance with law after providing due and reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. On appeal :

Held, dismissing the appeal *in limine*, that the approach of the assessee was callous, non-co-operative and even the basic document in pursuance of the notice under section 148, i.e., the return, was not filed. The Tribunal as the final fact finding authority had not decided any issue. Thus, the assessee had to place all material on which he wished to rely consequent to the order of the Tribunal. If the assessee failed again after adequate opportunity was granted by the Assessing Officer, the Assessing Officer had again opportunity to pass an order in accordance with law. (AY. 2007-2008)

CIT v. Gopi Ram Choudhary (2014) 369 ITR 355 / (2015) 57 taxmann.com 279 (Raj.)(HC)

- 1580 **S.139 : Return of income – Refund-Delay in filing return – Condonation of delay – Deduction of tax at source – Assessing Officer directed to decide in accordance with law after subjecting return to scrutiny assessment. [Ss. 11992)(b), 139(1), 139(4)]**

Assessee could not file the return within the time specified under section 139(1) of the Act. Thereafter the assessee filed return of income and claimed a refund of ₹ 6,34,929, there was delay of 22 months. The AO did not act upon the return. The assessee filed an application under section 119(2)(b) before the CBDT for condonation of delay. CBDT rejected the application. The assessee filed writ petition. Allowing the petition the Court held that assessee has not benefited by resorting to delay and the Assessing Officer is directed to decide in accordance with law after subjecting return to scrutiny assessment. (AY. 1997-98)

Artist Tree Pvt. Ltd. v. CBDT (2014) 369 ITR 691 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 108 / 273 CTR 14 / 113 DTR 370 (Bom.)(HC)

- 1581 **S.139 : Return of income – Interest – Due date for filing return – Non-Extension of due date for filing ROI will cause “substantial hardship“. CBDT must look into practical difficulties & take “just and proper” decision before 30-09-2014. [Ss.44 AB,119]**

The petitioner filed a writ petition claiming that the action of the CBDT/ Government in issuing Notification dated 25-7-2014 to exercise the due date for filing the tax audit report u/s. 44 AB but in not extending the due date for filing Income Tax Returns from

30-9-2014 to 30-11-2014 was arbitrary. It was pointed out that great prejudice was being caused to the taxpayers by the said action of the CBDT. HELD by the High Court: In view of the fact that the Madras High Court has already directed the CBDT to examine the representation of the assesseees in general, before 30-09-2014, we feel it appropriate that the above representation of the Petitioners is also considered by the CBDT. Though we do not wish to express any view of the legalities of various issues involved, it does appear to us, from the arguments advanced, that there will be substantial hardship caused to the assesseees, if the date of filing Return is not suitably extended. We hope and trust that CBDT will look into all these practical difficulties enumerated above and take a just and proper decision on the matter, before 30-09-2014, as already directed by the Madras High Court. In case the petitioners are entitled to any further relief in view of the orders passed in various petitions filed in other High Courts, this order would not preclude the petitioners from claiming the same. (AY. 2014-2015) *The Chamber of Tax Consultants v. UOI*(2014) 271 CTR 155/109 DTR 219 / 227 *Taxmann* 143 (Mag)(Bom.)(HC)

S.139 : Return of income – Interest-Due date for filing return extended – Strictures passed against the CBDT for seeking to take advantage of its own wrong and disregarding genuine hardship of taxpayers. Due date for filing ROI extended to 30.11.2014 subject to charge of S. 234A interest. [Ss.44AB,119, 234A]

1582

The petitioner filed a writ petition claiming that the action of the CBDT/ Government in issuing Notification dated 25.07.2014 to exercise the due date for filing the tax audit report u/s 44 AB but in not extending the due date for filing Income Tax Returns from 30-9-2014 to 30-11-2014 was arbitrary. It was pointed out that great prejudice was being caused to the taxpayers by the said action of the CBDT. HELD by the High Court:

(i) We are not impressed by the stand taken by the Revenue urging *inter alia* that the format of the tax audit report nowhere requires certification of the Tax Consultants or Tax Auditors in relation to the information to be furnished for which Tax Audit is conducted. Though the filing of the return of income is the responsibility of the taxpayer, that in no manner would make the Tax Auditors and the Consultants who are professionals any less concerned for correct computation of the income and true presentation of entire material before the Tax authorities;

(ii) The change of utility and non-availability of the new version till 20.08.2014 is the cause for the issue to have cropped up. The assesseees cannot be put to the hardship nor can the professionals be made to rush only because the department chose to change the utility during the mid-year;

(iii) One of the main objectives of the computerisation programme is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the tax administration. If the very computerisation has caused genuine hardship to one and all concerned, CBDT ought to have paid heed to the repeated requests of all concerned in exercise of its statutory powers;

(iv) It would have been desirable for the CBDT to have considered the request for extension of the due date as a very peculiar situation has arisen portraying the genuine hardship to the assessee and the tax consultants;

(v) Non-collection of tax for a period of two months and possible loss of ₹ 220 crore in terms of interest for a period of two months in the event the self-assessed tax not paid, appear clearly as the reasons in the foundation for CBDT to deny such extension. The Revenue cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own error or delay, by putting forth magnified figures of loss and thereby also possibly in the process gaining interest for late filing of return in complete disregard to requirement of efficient management;

(vi) The CBDT ought to have responded to the representation. Instead, it chose not to respond but later before this Court in no uncertain terms has termed such a request impermissible on the ground that the grievances are not sustainable. Therefore, considering the larger cause of public good and keeping in mind the requirement of promotion of justice, we chose to exercise the writ of mandamus directing the CBDT to extend the date of filing of return of income to 30-11-2014, which is due date for filing of the TAR as per the Notification dated 20-8-2014. Such extension is granted with the qualification that the same may not result into non-charging of interest u/s. 234A. *All Gujarat Federation of tax Consultants v. CBDT (2014) 271 CTR 113 / 109 DTR 177 / 226 Taxmann 210 (Guj.)(HC)*

1583 S.139 : Return of income – Revised return – Rejection of revised return was held to be not justified. [Ss.40(a)(ia), 139(5), 139(9)]

In the revised return, the assessee disallowed advertisement charges under section 40(a)(ia) for non-deduction of tax at source and also made a fresh claim for deduction of 'loss on clearance sale'.

The AO taking a view that the filing of revised return itself was an afterthought, did not consider the revised return. However, he disallowed the advertisement expenses under section 40(a)(ia). Where assessee filed a revised return in accordance with provisions of section 139(5), revenue authorities were not justified in rejecting said return without following procedure prescribed under section 139(9) by merely taking a view that revised return was an afterthought and it was filed only to reduce assessee's tax liability. (AY. 2006-07)

K. Kasi Vishwanathan & Bros. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 154 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)

Section S142 : Inquiry before assessment

1584 S.142 : Inquiry before assessment – Amalgamation of companies – Scheme of amalgamation providing for effective date of merger – Notice under section 142 on transferor – company after date of amalgamation – Transferor-company not in existence on date of notice – Notice was held to be not valid

A notice was issued on the transferor-company under section 142 on June 20, 2012. On a writ petition against the notice.

Held, allowing the petition, that the High Court by the order dated March 18, 2011, sanctioned the scheme as presented to it. Significantly in such order, the court did not make any deviation in the appointed date as defined in the scheme itself. Clause 6 of the amalgamation scheme referred to two dates, namely, appointed date and the effective date. It clarified that the scheme would be operative from the appointed date but would become effective from the effective date. This did not alter the position of law. The

term “appointed date” as defined in clause 1(ii) itself envisages April 1, 2009, as the appointed date unless, of course, any other date as may be approved by the High Court. The High Court made no change in this respect. The appointed date for the scheme, therefore, must be held to be April 1, 2009. The transferor-company would no longer be amenable to assessment proceedings for the assessment year 2010-11. The notice for producing documents for such assessment would, therefore, be invalid. (AY. 2010-2011) *Khurana Engineering Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (OSD) (2013) 217 Taxmann 75 (Mag.) / (2014) 364 ITR 600 (Guj.) (HC)*

S.142(2A) : Inquiry before assessment – Special audit – Complexity of accounts – Direction for special audit was held to be justified. [S.80IAB, 142, 145]

1585

The assessee was a real estate developer engaged in creation, execution and sale of residential and commercial projects. It also earned income from projects in a special economic zone on which it claimed deduction under section 80IAB. AO directed the assessee to get its recounts audited by a chartered accountant who was nominated as per the provisions relating to conduct of special audit under section 142(2A). The assessee filed writ petition, High Court upheld direction for special audit on ground that accounts of assessee did not contain narration of some entries and assessee had failed to submit comparative details of expenditure in SEZ and non SEZ units and affairs of company were not transparent. (AY. 2010-11)

DLF Ltd. and another v. Addl. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 390 / 225 Taxmann 258 / 271 CTR 43 (Delhi) (HC)

Editorial: SLP of assessee is dismissed. SLP Nos. 10481 of 2014 dated 25-4-2014. DLF Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 210 (St) / 227 Taxmann 379 (SC)

S.142(2A) : Inquiry before assessment – Special audit – AO need not examine books of account before directing special audit. Question whether accounts are “complex” has to be decided by AO & Court can interfere sparingly – Reference was held to be valid. [S.92CA]

1586

(i) The contention that the books of account were not called for and examined by the AO and therefore the direction for special audit is bad in law is without merit. Sub-section (2A) of Section 142 does not require the “books of account” to be examined by the AO. It empowers the AO with the previous approval of the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner of Income Tax, to direct the assessee to get the accounts audited if he is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so “having regard to the nature and complexity of the accounts of the assessee and the interests of the revenue.....”. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in *Rajesh Kumar, Prop. Surya Trading vs. Dy. CIT (2005) 275 ITR 641, (Del)* that the expression “accounts” used in the section does not refer merely to “books of account” of the assessee; it could include the books of account, balance sheets and all other records which are available to the A.O. during the assessment proceedings. It refers to the other records available with the A.O. not only in the course of the assessment proceedings but also at any stage subsequent thereto. It was held that the expression “accounts” cannot be confined to books of account as submitted by the assessee, as it would amount to giving an interpretation which completely defeats the very object of the section. It was further held that the fact that the accounts of the

assessee are subject to audit under some other statute is also no ground to hold that in such a case the AO cannot direct a special audit. It was observed that in addition to the books of account, the AO may also take into consideration such other documents related thereto and which would be part of the assessment proceedings. This judgment was followed by another Division Bench of this Court in Central Warehousing Corporation. In the light of these authorities, it is not possible to accept the contention that the AO cannot direct a special audit unless he examines the books of account. Writ petition was dismissed. (AY. 2008-09)

AT & T Communication Service India (P) Ltd. v. CIT(2014) 362 ITR 97 / 100 DTR 161 / 266 CTR 457 / 226 Taxmann. 381 (Delhi)(HC)

1587 S.142(2A) : Inquiry before assessment – Special audit – Complexity of accounts and opportunity of being heard

Proposal for special audit dated 23-12-2011 sent by the AO did not disclose the consideration of the reply of the assessee. Approval of CIT also did not reflect application of mind to the facts of the case. Audit was also not communicated to the assessee. It was held that order of approval dated 23-12-2011 and the letter dated 29-12-2011 be set aside and AO and the CIT were directed to reconsider the matter for directions for special audit under s. 142(2A) in accordance with law.

Kaka Carpets v. CIT (2014) 101 DTR 33 / 224 Taxmann 335/ 266 CTR 485 (All.)(HC)

Section 142A : Estimate by Valuation Officer in certain cases

1588 S.142A : Estimate by Valuation Officer – Reference to Departmental Valuation Officer – Assessing Officer not rejecting books of account – Reference to Departmental Valuation Officer and addition on account of differential amount as unexplained investment not sustainable

Held, dismissing the appeal, that it is only when the Assessing Officer did not take the contents of the books of account, on their face value, that he could have resorted to an independent valuation. The Tribunal maintained the distinction and held that even before ordering the valuation of any property by independent valuer in respect of an assessee, who has maintained the books of account, the Assessing Officer must, as a first step, express his lack of confidence in the books of account. That not having been done, the very reference to the Valuation Officer could not be sustained in law. Though section 142A was amended in the year 2004 with retrospective effect from 1972, the exercise undertaken by the Assessing Officer could not be sustained on the touchstone of that provision. Added to that, the assessee-firm had been wound up in the year 1992 itself. (AY. 1991-1992)

CIT v. Lakshmi Constructions (2014) 369 ITR 271 / (2015) 116 DTR 86 / 230 Taxmann 78(T&AP)(HC)

1589 S.142A : Estimate by Valuation Officer – Assessing Officer cannot make reference to DVO without first rejecting books of account of assessee. [Ss.69B,144]

The assessee was a developer engaged in the business of construction and sale of buildings. It incurred expenses towards cost of construction of various projects undertaken by it. The AO referred matter to District Valuation Officer (DVO) to give

an estimate of cost of construction. As cost of construction estimated by the DVO was higher than that shown by the assessee, the AO made addition under section 69B treating difference as unexplained investment. On appeal, the CIT(A) deleted addition. The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal, holding that the AO had not pointed out any specific defect/discrepancy in the books of account regularly maintained by the assessee relating to the cost of construction of the building in question. The HC observed that u/s. 69B a reference could be made to the DVO where the assessee had made investments, or is found to be the owner of any bullion, jewellery or other valuable article, and the AO finds that the amount expended on making such investments or in acquiring such bullion, jewellery or other valuable article exceeds the amount recorded in this behalf in the books of account maintained by the assessee for any source of income and the assessee offers no explanation about such excess amount or the explanation offered by him is not in the opinion of the AO satisfactory, the excess amount could be deemed to be the income of the assessee for such financial year. The AO, without rejecting the account, straightaway referred the matter to the DVO and adopted an easier course for arriving at the fair market value of the properties constructed by the assessee. Before making reference to the DVO, the AO neither expressed any doubt over the correctness of the account books, nor rejected the account books. Hence, the revenue appeal was dismissed. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Tulsiani Constructions & Developers Ltd. (2014)222 Taxmann 133 (Mag.)(All)(HC)

S.142A : Estimate by Valuation Officer – No Addition can be made on the basis of report of DVO

1590

Assessee disclosed a sale consideration of ₹ 39 lakhs for sale of its 50% share in the property. On reference, the DVO opined that the value of the property as ₹ 2,84,72,600/- and thus addition was made. The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. On appeal by revenue to High Court held that no addition could be made solely on the basis of the report of the DVO. (AY. 1999-00)

CIT v. Lahsa Construction (P) Ltd. (2013) 357 ITR 671 / (2014) 222 Taxmann 132 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

S.142A : Estimate by Valuation Officer – Books of account not rejected – Reference to valuation officer was not valid. [S.144]

1591

The AO could not refer a matter to the Departmental Valuation Officer ('DVO') without books of account being rejected. (AY. 1998-99, 1999-00)

Tikaula Sugar Mills Ltd. v. (2014) 223 Taxmann 117 (Mag.) (All) (HC)

S.142A : Estimate by Valuation Officer – To be referred for valuation only after sections 69, 69A, 69B are invoked first – During pendency of assessment or reassessment, AO has jurisdiction to refer to valuation Officer.

1592

It was held that it is only when on basis of material available on record, Assessing Officer forms an opinion that provisions of sections 69, 69A or 69B would apply to assessee's case, he can resort to section 142A for estimating value of such investment or expenditure, however, Assessing Officer cannot first call for report of valuer under section 142A merely to determine whether there has been any unexplained investment

or expenditure. It was further held that matter can be referred to Valuation Officer under section 142A only during pendency of assessment or reassessment proceedings and not afterwards and as time limit for assessment was not over AO had the jurisdiction to refer matter for valuation. (AY. 2002-03)

Me & Mummy Hospital v. ACIT (2014) 107 DTR 209 / 224 Taxmann 65 / 272 CTR 1 (Guj.) (HC)

1593 S.142A : Estimate by Valuation Officer – AO is empowered to refer the matter to DVO

The assessee company made an investment in the shopping complex and shown the investment value on the basis of report of an approved valuer. The AO referred to DVO and made addition for the difference in the values. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal deleted the addition in view of the decision of *Smt. Amiya Bala Paul v. CIT 262 ITR 470 (SC)*. On appeal the High Court observed that the ratio of the above case has been nullified by the retrospective amendment made u/s. 142 A and remanded the issue back to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication. (AY. 1992–93, 1993–94, 1994–95)

CIT v. Sangam Builders (2014) 220 Taxmann 149 (Mag.) (All.) (HC)

1594 S.142A : Estimate by Valuation Officer -Reference to DVO without rejecting books of account is not justified

During the assessment years under consideration, the A.O noticed that the assessee had constructed a building, where the cost of the building was shown on the basis of report of the approved valuer. The A.O. referred the matter to the DVO who estimated the cost. The A.O. made an addition u/s 69B being, difference between the reports of two valuers for both the assessment years under consideration. The said additions were deleted by the CIT(A) as well as by the Tribunal. The High Court observed that the assessee society was a beneficiary of sections 11 and 12A of the Income-tax Act. The assessee submitted the books of accounts, vouchers, bills of buildings etc. to the AO which were examined by him with due application of mind but were never rejected. The reference to DVO without rejecting the books of account was not desirable. It stated that estimation was a question of fact and the Tribunal is a final fact finding authority. Hence there was no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal (AY. 2003-04, 2004-05)

CIT v. Institute of Literacy Development (2014) 220 Taxmann 37 (Mag.) (All.) (HC)

1595 S.142A : Estimate by Valuation Officer -Section introduced w.e.f. 15-11-1972 – Proviso - could not validate reference already made in respect of assessments made before 30-9-2004.

Assessee constructed hospital at a cost of ₹ 18 Lakhs. AO referred the matter of valuation to DVO and made certain additions. High Court held that at the time assessment was made, law as laid down by Supreme Court in case of *Smt. Amiya Bala Paul v. CIT (216 ITR 407)* was applicable. Further, section 142A though introduced w.r.e.f 15-11-1972, proviso to section 142A clearly specifies that section 142A would not validate the action taken to refer the matter to DVO in respect of assessments completed prior to 30-9-2004. High Court relied upon the order of Allahabad High Court in case of *CIT v. Dr. A. V. Kent*

CIT v. Dr. Renu Mahesh (Smt.) (2014) 220 Taxmann 36 (Mag.) (All.) (HC.)

S.142A : Estimate by Valuation Officer – Search & seizure – Surrender of amount as cost of construction – Reference to Valuation Officer was justified. [Ss.69,69B, 153A]

1596

When during search proceedings, assessee surrendered certain amount utilised by him towards cost of construction of building, it implied that cost of construction shown in the books was due to the fact that they were not properly maintained. Once that is so, the reference by AO to DVO u/s. 142A was justified. (AY. 2007-08)

Dr. Raghuvendra Singh v. CIT (2014) 98 DTR 255 / 267 CTR 376 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 554 (P&H)(HC)

Section S143 : Assessment**S.143(1) : Assessment – Completion of assessment – Intimation under section 143(1) – Not completion of assessment – Assessee entitled to file revised return. [S.139(5)]**

1597

Allowing the appeal the Court held that intimation under section 143(1) is not completion of assessment, hence the assessee is entitled to file revised return u/s. 139(5). (AY. 1999-2000)

Tata Metaliks Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 643 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 655 / 121 DTR 235 (Cal.)(HC)

S.143(1)(a) : Assessment – Intimation – Adjustments – Debatable issue. [S.154]

1598

Assessee kept certain security deposits and earnest money deposits, in order to ensure performance of timely supply of equipments. Security deposit, in most cases, was being adjusted towards various claims by customers and, accordingly, debit entry or credit entry was made. However, in case of disputed claims, receipts and payments were being debited or credited to profit and loss account as and when claims were settled. While processing assessment under section 143(1)(a), Assessing Officer made certain additions in respect of expenses and income relating to earlier year. The assessee filed a petition under section 154 of the Income-tax Act and requested the AO to rectify the assessment, on the ground that the adjustments made were not in order. The claim made under section 154 of the assessee was rejected. The CIT(A) stated that the assessee had made claims relating to earlier years and under mercantile system of accounting expenses relating to earlier year was not admissible in the subsequent year.

Hence the appeal was rejected. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the claim of the assessee as regards the credit, expenses and income, being the subject matter of a debatable question, the claim could not be settled by way of a *prima facie* adjustment under Section 143(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act. It therefore allowed the appeal. The High Court observed that the nature of deposit maintained by the assessee and the claims from the customers were settled after protracted litigation and arbitration. It held that the relief on the merits of the claim could be considered only through the process of reasoning, given the limited scope of section 143(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, which is only a *prima facie* adjustment on a non-debatable issue. The High Court therefore agreed with the reasoning of the Tribunal that the AO was not correct in considering the claim under section 143(1)(a). Thus, the matter could be gone into in the course of regular assessment. The High Court therefore rejected the plea of revenue and confirmed the order of the Tribunal. (AY. 1989-90)

CIT v. Hackbridge Hewittic & Easun Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 171 (Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

1599 **S.143(2) : Assessment – Notice – Block Assessment – Non-issue of notice under section 143(2) – Block assessment was held to be invalid. [S.143(3), 158BC]**

In order to make an assessment under section 143(3) read with section 158BC of the Income-tax Act, 1961, notice should be issued under section 143(2). Omission to issue such a notice is not a procedural irregularity and is not curable. Held accordingly, allowing the appeal, that having regard to the fact that admittedly no notice was issued under section 143(2) to the assessee for the block assessment period April 1, 1985, to September 15, 1995, the orders passed by the Tribunal as well as the AO were liable to be set aside. [BP 1-4-1985, 15-9-1995]

R Romi v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 311 (Ker)(HC)

1600 **S.143(2) : Assessment – Notice – Speed Post – Notice u/s. 143(2) being served on assessee on next working day – Last day being Sunday – Due date for serving such notice considered valid. [S.282, General Clauses Act, S.10]**

Notice u/s. 143(2) was served upon the assessee on 1-10-2012 though it had to be served by 30-9-2012 and consequently, assessment order was passed. The assessee filed petition and submitted that notice was invalid having been served beyond period prescribed in proviso to section 143(2). Accordingly, it prayed that consequent assessment be quashed and set aside. The department submitted that notice was in fact issued on 26-9-2012 by speed post and 30-9-2012 being Sunday, it was served upon assessee on very next working day and that, relying upon section 10 of General Clauses Act, notice was served within the period prescribed in section 143(2).

The High Court noted that the notice was in fact issued on 26-9-2012 which was sent by Speed Post and the last date for service of the notice under section 143(2) was 30-9-2012 which was postal holiday - Sunday and therefore, notice under section 143(2) came to be served upon the assessee on the very next working day, i.e., on 1-10-2012 – Monday and, therefore, applying the logic of section 10 of the General Clauses Act and the relevant decisions, it cannot be said that the notice is barred by the period stipulated in section 143(2). Accordingly, dismissing the assessee's petition the High Court held that in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, it can be said that there is sufficient compliance of section 143(2), more particularly, first proviso to section 143(2) and therefore, it cannot be said that the notice under section 143(2) is invalid and, consequently, it cannot be said that the assessment order is bad on the aforesaid ground. (AY. 2010-2011)

Gujarat State Plastic Manufactures Association v. Dy. CIT (2013) 359 ITR 516 / (2014) 222 Taxmann 182 (Mag.) (Guj.) (HC)

Editorial : SLP of assessee was dismissed. CC No. 21644 of 2013 dated 2-01-2014 Gujarat State Plastic Manufacturers Association v. Dy. DIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 380 (SC)

1601 **S.143(2) : Assessment – Notice which was sent through post with in prescribed time to correct address – It is not open to the assessee to say that the said post was received by some other person – Appeal of assessee was dismissed. [S.282]**

The assessee has filed the appeal and raised the question that one notice was not served under section 143(2) within the prescribe time of one year. The Tribunal held that if the notice is sent through post and delivered with the statutory time limit at the correct

address it is a proper service and in such a case it is not open to the assessee to say that the said post was received by some other person. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. (AY. 2001-02)

P. A. Chako Muthalaly v. ACIT (2014) 151 ITD 166 / (2015) 168 TTJ 640 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.143(2) : Assessment-Issue of notice – Validity – Notice under section 143(2) issued after expiry of 12 months from end of month in which return was filed but before expiry of time limit provided under proviso to section 148 would be deemed as valid. [S.148]

1602

The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal held that the notice under section 143(2) issued after expiry of 12 months from end of month in which return was filed but before expiry of time limit provided under proviso to section 148 is deemed to be valid notice and therefore, consequential assessments are also valid. (ITA No. 680 of 2011 dated 22-08-2014) (AY. 1996-97, 1997-98)

DCIT v. Chemm Finance Ltd. (2014) 35 ITR 167 / (2015) 67 SOT 156 (URO)(Bang.)(Trib.)

S.143(2) : Assessment – Notice under section 143(2) issued beyond time limit – Assessment was held to be bad in law

1603

The Tribunal held that the assessment made on the basis of invalid and time barred notices is bad in law and barred by limitation and deserves to be quashed and cancelled. The Tribunal quashed the assessment order. (AY. 2007-08)

Jodhpur Sahkari Bhoomi Vikas Bank v. ITO (2014) 164 TTJ 17(UO) (2015) 68 SOT 105 (Jodh.)(Trib.)

S.143(2) : Assessment – Block assessment – Non-service of s.143(2) notice does not render s. 158BC assessment order is in valid,if return is belated and assessee participated in assessment proceedings. [Ss.148,158BC, 292BB]

1604

In the instant case, undisputedly the return was not filed under section 139(1) of the Act, it was rather a belated return as it was filed on 19-1-1995 and due date for filing of return was 31-10-1993. The return of the assessee was, however, processed under section 143(1) of the Act on 22.2.1995. Thereafter notice under section 148 of the Act was issued on 20.5.1998 and in response thereto the return was filed on 10-8-1998. Therefore, the return of income was not filed within the period specified under section 148 of the Act and as per aforesaid order of the Patna Bench of the Tribunal, the Assessing Officer was not under any obligation to get the notice served under section 143(2) of the Act. Moreover, the assessee has joined the assessment proceedings and represented its case by putting appearance before the Assessing Officer on different dates, therefore, it cannot be said that the Assessing Officer has framed assessment without affording valid opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Since the issue of issuance of notice under section 143(2) of the Act in the case of reassessment or the block assessment has already been examined by the Tribunal in the light of various judicial pronouncements and legal provisions of the Act, we find no justification to re-adjudicate the issue afresh. (AY. 1993-94)

Bharat Sewa Sansthan v. DCIT (Luck.)(Trib.);www.itatonline.org

1605

S.143(2) : Assessment – Scrutiny – Notice – Fact that case is selected for scrutiny under CASS does not mean s. 143(2) notice & assessment order are void for non-application of mind by AO

The assessee's case was picked up for scrutiny under CASS ("Computer Assisted Scrutiny Selection") and the requisite notice u/s. 143(2)(ii) was issued. The assessee claimed that u/s. 143(2)(ii) it was incumbent upon the AO to apply his own mind and form "reason to believe" before issuing the notice and as this had not been done, the notice and the resultant assessment order were void. The CIT(A) rejected the claim. On further appeal to the Tribunal HELD by the Tribunal dismissing the ground.

The entire jurisprudence in respect of tax administration such as principle of natural justice etc. are with the sole object of ensuring that the taxpayer is not unduly harassed by the tax department having almighty power of state. In order to make tax administration and collection friendly to taxpayer, some steps have been taken by the tax administration/Government although much work is still to be done in this regard. Some of these steps are that it is made a rule that tax returns can be filed in a paper less manner in order to improve voluntary compliance by the taxpayer and also to reduce the burden of filing voluminous documents along with the tax return. This is a big relief to the taxpayer but this has to be ensured that there are some deterring measures so that no undue advantage is taken by any taxpayer of this liberal policy of the Government. Even these deterring measures are to be such that they cause minimum harassment to the taxpayer. Therefore, scheme had been devised that only very small percentage of total tax returns will be scrutinised by the department and generally it is about 2% to 3% of the total tax returns filed in a year. When it is seen that the return is to be filed by the assessee in paperless manner and still there has to be some deterring measure to prohibit the taxpayer from adopting the habit of tax evasion/avoidance, it was decided that there should be scrutiny in a small number of cases. Since the returns filed are paperless, some system has to be devised for selecting the case for scrutiny. When the return is filed without any paper, certain guidelines have to be formed for selecting some cases for scrutiny as deterring measure. These guidelines may be such that the person having income above a prescribed limit will be scrutinised in larger percentage compared to small taxpayers. It may be a policy that very small taxpayers will not be scrutinised at all. If such a system is devised by the Department in a general manner without targeting a particular assessee, it cannot be said that such system of selecting a case for scrutiny is interfering with the independent decision of the Assessing Officer who is to select the case for scrutiny. In spite of such guidelines, the ultimate decision is of the AO that a particular case is falling in such guideline and in this process, if the AO is taking help of computer in analysing data disclosed by the taxpayer in the return of income then it cannot be said that the decision for selecting the case for scrutiny is not independent decision of the AO. This is not the case of the assessee that there is any specific direction of any higher authority to select the case of this particular assessee for scrutiny. The guideline may be this as to what should be percentage of the cases to be selected for scrutiny in several different types of taxpayers. The guideline may be that where search or survey has taken place, the number of cases to be selected should be high in percentage. Similarly, the guideline may be that if the assessee is claiming exemption/deduction of certain amount then also

the percentage may be higher compared to those assesseees who are not claiming any exemption/deduction. Such guidelines formed by the Department as a whole in general manner for the assesseees all over the country, it cannot be said that such guideline is interfering with the independent decision of the AO for deciding the cases to be selected for scrutiny. If this view is taken then the departmental administration will be forced to adopt old system of selecting almost all cases for scrutiny which was causing very undue harassment to all the taxpayers and wastage of the energy and efforts of the Department also. In the present system, the thrust is on voluntary compliance of the taxpayer and by ensuring that some deterring measures are taken that too in a taxpayer friendly manner of promoting the assessee to file returns without attaching any paper and then selecting only very small number of cases for scrutiny with the aid of computer and certain generally formed guidelines. In our considered opinion, it cannot be said that the decision of the AO to select the case for scrutiny in this system is not an independent decision of the AO. (AY. 2007-08)

U.P. State Industrial Development Corp.(UPSIDC) v. DCIT (Lucknow)(Trib.)www.itatonline.org

S.143(2) : Assessment – Notice – Time limit for issue of notice as per proviso to 143(2) not followed - assessment order passed would be null and void 1606

On appeal, the Tribunal noted that the assessee, as early as on 23-11-06 had *vide* its letter dated 22-11-2006 intimated the AO of the change of address and had also raised a specific objection at the very first instance before the AO, that the notice u/s. 143(2) had not been served on it within the statutory time and hence it was barred by limitation. Accordingly, the ITAT held that the assessment order passed by the AO is void *ab initio* as the same was passed without the mandatory requirement of serving the notice u/s. 143(2) within the stipulated time provided. Consequently, the entire assessment and consequent additions made by the AO was quashed. (AY. 2006 – 07)

Abacus Distribution Systems (India) (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 1/159 TTJ 156 (Mum) (Trib.)

S.143(3) : Assessment – Estimation of income – Question of fact. [S.260A] 1607

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of bidis. For relevant assessment year as in preceding years. Dismissing the appeal of assessee the Court held that estimation of average gross profits after comparison with gross profit rates in preceding years, estimating gross profit rate at ten per cent. Proper. (AY. 1986-87)

Shyam Biri Works v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 511 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 188 (All.)(HC)

S.143(3) : Assessment – Addition of only 20 per cent of total purchases from a party as bogus, due to absence of substantial question of law 1608

The Assessing Officer passed the assessment order and added sum amount as bogus purchases. Before the High Court issue was that the Tribunal on appreciation of evidence and in exercise of discretion vested in it, has reduced the addition to the extent of 20% of the purchases booked. It is required to be noted that so far as the Assessing Officer is concerned, while passing the assessment order the Assessing Officer added the entire amount of the purchases booked and considered the same as the

income of the assessee. However, in appeal, CIT(A) reduced the addition to the extent of 25% of the purchases booked observing that the Assessing Officer was not justified in making the addition of the total amount of the purchases booked. The CIT(A) also observed that as far as the goods were actually delivered to the reputed parties and there is complete quantitative tally between goods shown to be purchased. The order passed by the ITAT is on facts and considering the facts and circumstances of the case. As such, no question of law much less substantial question of law arises in the present appeals. And the appellant is not in a position to satisfy the Court how the suggested question of law can be said to be question of law. Under the circumstances, as no substantial question of law arises in the present appeals. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07) *CIT v. American Steel (P) Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 181(Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)*

1609 **S.143(3) : Assessment – Amalgamation – Successor – Non existent entity – Estoppel**
Assessment on amalgamating company is a nullity – U/s 170(2) assessment
has to be on successor – Mistake cannot be cured u/s 292BB, participation by
amalgamating company is irrelevant as there is no estoppel against a statute.
[S.143(2), 153A, 153C, 170, 176, 292B, Companies Act, S.481]

The Court held that Section 481 of the Companies Act provides for dissolution of the company. The Company Judge in the High Court can order dissolution of a company on the grounds stated therein. The effect of the dissolution is that the company no more survives. The dissolution puts an end to the existence of the company. It is held in *M. H. Smith (Plant Hire) Ltd. v. D.L. Mainwaring (T/A Inshore), 1986 BCLC 342 (CA)* that “once a company is dissolved it becomes a non-existent party and therefore no action can be brought in its name. Thus an insurance company which was subrogated to the rights of another insured company was held not to be entitled to maintain an action in the name of the company after the latter had been dissolved.

After the sanction of the scheme, the amalgamating company ceases to exit. Even if the amalgamating company had filed the returns, it became incumbent upon the Income tax authorities to substitute the successor in place of the said “dead person”. When notice under section 143(2) was sent, the appellant/amalgamated company appeared and brought this fact to the knowledge of the AO. He, however, did not substitute the name of the appellant on record. Instead, the Assessing Officer made the assessment in the name of the amalgamating company which was non-existing entity on that day. In such proceedings and assessment order passed in the name of the amalgamating company would clearly be void. Such a defect cannot be treated as procedural defect. Mere participation by the appellant would be of no effect as there is no estoppel against law. This is not a mistake that can be cured u/s. 292BB. (AY. 2003-04 to 2008-09)

CIT v. Dimension Apparels Ltd. (2014) 52 taxmann.com 356 / (2015) 370 ITR 288(Delhi) (HC)

1610 **S.143(3) : Assessment – Scrutiny – CBDT instructions – After recording reasons the**
case was selected for scrutiny – Writ is not maintainable. [Ss.119, 142(1), 143(2)]

AO after recording reasons and approval of authority case was selected for scrutiny. The assessee filed writ petition, dismissing the petition the Court held that there was no violation of CBDT’s guidelines for selection of cases. (AY. 2010-11)

Ajay s/o Shantilal Lalwani (HUF) v. Dy. CIT (2014) 270 CTR 588 (Bom.)(HC)

S.143(3) : Assessment – Method of accounting – Addition on the basis of e-mails recovered in the course of search proceedings of third party was held to be not valid. [Ss.132, 145]

1611

AO made addition on the basis that the assessee received additional sale consideration against sale of land on the basis of an e-mail recovered during the course of search action of third party. CIT (A) and Tribunal deleted the addition on the ground that no independent material was available to support such a claim. On appeal by revenue the Court held that finding recorded by Appellate Authorities did not suffer from any perversity, it did not require any interference. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Alpha Impex (P) Ltd. (2014) 224 Taxmann 211(Mag) (Bom.)(HC)

S.143(3) : Assessment – Breach of principles of natural justice – Reasonable opportunity – Alternative remedy – Show cause notice to comply less than 24 hours – Where there is a serious flaw in the decision-making process or prejudice is caused to a party on account of breach of principles of natural justice the Court enjoined to exercise writ jurisdiction. [Ss.80IA, 246A, Constitution of India, Article 226]

1612

A show cause notice was issued to the assessee, calling upon to show cause as to why its claim for deduction under section 80IA should not be disallowed. The denial of benefit under section 80IA was upon various grounds, such as commencement of business and fulfilling the eligibility criteria etc., u/s. 80IA. The assessee was given less than 24 hours to respond to the notice. The contention of the assessee is there was a breach of natural justice as in the present case there is no fear of the assessment getting time barred. In such circumstances it is incumbent upon the authority issuing such notice to grant reasonable opportunity to the assessee to respond to the notice. The court held that granting of an opportunity to respond to the show cause notice in less than 24 hours is a flaw in the decision making process and therefore amenable to judicial review. The courts also observed that it has been times without number that justice must not be done but appear to have been done. The non consideration of the assessee's response to the notice by making it impossible for the assessee to file a reply for the consideration of AO does cause prejudice to the assessee leading to palpable injustice, thereby warranting to exercise of writ jurisdiction. Impugned order passed by the AO under sec. 143(3) in breach of natural justice was set aside by the Hon'ble Court and restored to the AO for fresh disposal after considering the assessee's reply and granting assessee a personal hearing. The Court also observed that in fact non-exercise of writ jurisdiction in appropriate cases would amount to abdication of Court's obligation to ensure that justice is done. Therefore, the alternative remedy would not by itself bar the exercise of writ jurisdiction, if the facts of the case so deserve. ss(AY. 2005-06)

Vodafone India Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 97 DTR 441/ 221 Taxmann 88 / 265 CTR 42 (Bom.)(HC)

S.143(3) : Assessment – principals of natural justice – Opportunity to cross examine
Assessing Officer initiated reassessment proceedings and made addition to assessee's income based on a sales tax assessment order which was restored back by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal found that no authenticated document providing information was collected from car manufacturer, nor was same furnished to assessee nor assessee was given opportunity of cross examining the officer. The High Court

1613

upheld the order of the Tribunal holding that where an assessee was not provided with opportunity to cross examine person providing information that lead into addition to income, and hence fresh adjudication was required.

Panchvati Motors (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 39 (Mag.) (P&H)(HC)

- 1614 **S.143(3) : Assessment – No additions can be made on the basis of disclosure regarding on-money receipt in the subsequent years – In absence of any other incriminating material. [S.132]**

A search u/s. 132 was carried out at the premises of the son of the assessee and a diary containing details vis-à-vis sale of the plots of land was found which were disclosed by the assessee in the returns of income for AYs. 2006-07 and 2007-08. Subsequently the AO reopened assessment for the A.Y. 2005-06 with respect to sale of plots of land in AY. 2005-06 and applied the same ratio of profit to sales as that of AY. 2006-07 and 2007-08 and made additions to the profits as disclosed by the assessee. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO.

The High Court dismissing the departmental appeal noted that while confirming the order passed by the CIT(A), the Tribunal has observed that evidence found regarding the receipt of the on-money is in respect of subsequent year although, the project is same. If extra prices were commanded by the assessee in the assessment years 2006-07 and 2007-08, it cannot be valid basis to say that the same price was commanded by assessee in assessment year 2005-06 also without any incriminating material or corroborating material. This should also be kept in mind that the present year is the first year of the project and subsequent years are second and third year of the project, the project commands extra price in the market and therefore, it may be possible that in the first year i.e. in the present year, the assessee sold some of the plots on a lower prices. (AY. 2005-2006)

CIT v. Jayaben Ratilal Sorathia (2014) 222 Taxmann 64 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

- 1615 **S.143(3) : Assessment – Survey – Retraction of statement-Commissioner (Appeals) – Powers – Lawyer cannot improve the case of the litigant on the facts unlike the case of a question of law-Addition deleted by the CIT(A) was held to be not valid – Order of Tribunal confirming the addition was upheld. [S.133(1), 132(4),133A]**

Retraction of an admission is purely a matter of fact, which must be made available before the court or Tribunal which then can consider it. Admission is a very important piece of evidence, unless it is explained or retracted. When a case is not made out before the Commissioner (Appeals), he should not make his own case basing on a lawyer's argument. A lawyer cannot improve the case of the litigant on the facts unlike in the case of a question of law. Such an act is without jurisdiction. The assessee had not made any attempt before the Commissioner (Appeals) to explain why its admission should not be accepted. Instead of retracting the admission, the assessee had invited the Assessing Officer to act upon it to pass assessment order and, accordingly it was done and the tax was duly paid. This was a voluntary act of the assessee and if the assessee accepted the liability, there was no scope to collect further evidence or make any enquiry. Thus, the exercise of power by the Commissioner (Appeals) of evaluating

the legal implication of admission was not called for because no case was made out factually. The Tribunal had taken a correct decision in restoring the addition of Rs. 20 lakhs. Order of Tribunal was upheld. (AY. 1998-99)

Kermex Micro Systems (India) Ltd. v. Dy.CIT (2014) 362 ITR 13 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 168(AP)(HC)

S.143(3) : Assessment – Appellate Tribunal – Addition ground-Power to allow claim not made in the return – Claim by way of revised computation claiming exemption dividend from mutual fund-Entitled to claim – Assessment proceedings not adversarial. [Ss.10(33), 73, 139(5), 251, 254(1)]

1616

The assessee did not claim deduction or business loss in the return of income declaring taxable income of Rs. 1,72,910. Subsequently, notice for scrutiny assessment under s. 143(2)(ii) was issued. During the course of the assessment proceedings, the assessee filed a revised computation of income claiming that dividend of ₹ 80,48,977 from the units of mutual fund was exempt under s. 10(33) and loss on sale of units amounting to ₹ 85,18,583 was a business loss and not speculative loss. The claims were rejected by the AO and CIT(A). Held, the Tribunal was justified in reversing the order of lower authorities.

Courts have taken a pragmatic view and not a technical view as what is required to be determined is the taxable income of the assessee in accordance with the law. In this sense, assessment proceedings are not adversarial in nature. Tribunal has power to allow a claim which is not made in the return. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Sam Global Securities Ltd. (2013) 38 taxmann.com 129 / (2014) 360 ITR 682 / 105 DTR 41 / 272 CTR 290(Delhi)(HC)

S.143(3) : Assessment – Bogus purchases – Merely because a party has admitted to indulging in sham/accommodation transactions does not mean that all his transactions with the assessee should be treated as sham. [S.69]

1617

It is not in dispute that the survey action was conducted on a third party. It is also not in dispute that the assessee had business relation with Moxdiam Group, like so many other parties. It is also a fact that there is not even a iota of evidence with the AO, to prove that the assessee did not have straight dealings with the Moxdiam Group. It is also a fact that, that the assessee entered each of its transaction in its primary books, comprising of ledger and stock register. From the order of the AO, the DR could not establish before us that the transaction as recorded in the books was sham. We cannot accept a bald statement made by the AO that any transaction/business done with a party would be sham, simply because the opposite party besides doing regular business was also indulging in providing accommodation entries. Simply on the basis of statement given by the third party, that they were also providing accommodation entries as well, the conduct of the assessee cannot be doubted and held to be sham. (ITA No. 2239/Mum/2012, dated 5-12-2014) (AY. 2007-08)

ACIT v. G. V. Sons (Mum.)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org

- 1618 **S.143(3) : Assessment – AIR information – Additions made solely on the basis of AIR information are not sustainable in law. The AO has to prove that assessee has received income from a particular source. The assessee cannot be expected to prove the negative**

It has been held time and again by this Tribunal that the additions made solely on the basis of AIR information are not sustainable in the eyes of the law. If the assessee denies that he is in receipt of income from a particular source, it is for the AO to prove that the assessee has received income as the assessee cannot prove the negative. Reliance can be placed in this respect on the decision of the Tribunal in the case of “*DCIT vs. Shree G. Selva Kumar*” in ITA No.868/Bang/2009 decided on 22-10-2010 and another case in the case of “*Aarti Raman v. DCIT*” in ITA No.245/Bang/2012 decided on 05.10.12. (5181/M/2012, dated 5-12-2014) (AY. 2008-09)

ANS Law Associates v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.) www.iatonline.org

- 1619 **S.143(3) : Assessment – Order giving effect to quashed order of Commissioner – AO’s action of giving effect to a quashed s. 263 revision order termed “assault on rule of law”&“contempt of court” – AO ought to have taken advice from his seniors. [S.147, 263].**

The CIT passed an order u/s. 263 and held that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. This was set aside by the Tribunal. However, despite being aware of the Tribunal’s order quashing the s. 263 order, the AO passed an assessment order to give effect to the s. 263 order. The CIT(A) quashed the assessment order. On appeal by the department to the Tribunal HELD dismissing the appeal:

By the by, we are very much astonished to observe that the AO has passed a revised assessment order even after knowing that the revision order passed by the CIT has been set aside by the Tribunal. The action of the AO could be treated as assault on the rule of law. His action amounts to contempt of court as well. The Revenue could have preferred to file an appeal before the High Court against the order of the Tribunal setting aside the revision order passed by the CIT. If such an appeal has been already filed, well and good. Otherwise, Revenue has no remedy when the Tribunal has set aside the revision order of the CIT. The said order no more exists and the AO has no substratum to build a second round of revised assessment. We do not think that all these matters are unknown to the Assessing Authority. But giving due consideration to the explanations offered by the learned senior officers appearing for the Revenue and also for the reason that the AO might have prompted to act in haste, only in public interest, we do not proceed further in this matter. But we wish that before jumping into such controversial games, the AO ought to have taken advice from his seniors. (AY. 2002-23)

DCIT v. SAP Labs India Pvt. Ltd. (2011) 130 ITD 471 / 136 TTJ 503 (Bang.)(Trib.)

Section S144 : Best judgment assessment

S.144 : Best judgment assessment – Revision – Assessee uneducated persons not properly represented before Assessing Officer – Commissioner dismissing revision petitions from assessments and refusing to recall his order – High Court affirming – Supreme Court – No interference with assessment but no interest or penalty to be charged. [S.264]

1620

The assessee having failed to appear before the assessing authority, the latter completed the assessments under section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee did not file an appeal, but instead filed a memorandum of revision under section 264 of the Act before the Commissioner who dismissed it as no one attended the office on the fixed date. An application to recall the order was dismissed on the ground that there was no provision under the Act for recalling an order passed under section 264 thereof. On a writ petition contending that the Commissioner should have considered the matter on the merits, the High Court dismissed the petition holding that in the absence of any material to show that the assessment order was not correctly framed, the Commissioner, in the absence of the assessee, was left with no option but to dismiss the revision petition. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that the assessee, who was not very educated person, unfortunately could not be properly represented before the Assessing Officer and, therefore, the assessment was made for the assessment years 1998-99. The assessment for the assessment year 1998-99 was over and the assessment order had become final. In these circumstances, the court would not interfere with the assessment order. However, no penalty proceedings were to be initiated and no interest was to be recovered from the assessee if the tax was paid within 60 days. (AY. 1998-99) *Tripal Singh v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 511 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 54 (SC)*

S.144 : Best judgment assessment – Books of account not rejected for failure to produce books of account – Best judgment was held to be not justified – Matter was remanded. [S.44AD]

1621

Assessee, a construction contractor, failed to produce its books of account on the ground that its books were impounded by police in criminal proceeding against husband of one of its directors. It offered to be assessed at rate of 8 per cent net rate. AO made addition which was confirmed by CIT(A) Tribunal applied a net profit rate at the rate of 5.25 per cent as against the net profit at the rate of 8 per cent on the gross receipts. On appeal by assessee the Court held that its accounts were audited by Chartered Accountant on basis of books of account and on that basis, return was filed. Moreover said books were not rejected in assessment proceedings. The Court also held that the authorities ought to rely upon auditor's report to compute its income. Matter was to be remanded to decide it afresh. (AY. 2005-06)

Pragati Engineering Corpn. v. ITO (2014) 225 Taxmann 231 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

1622 **S.144 : Best judgment assessment – Limitation – Failure to issue notice under section 143(2) – Assessment was held to be bad in law. [Ss.143(2), 251, 260A]**

The Court held that there was failure to issue notice of hearing before making best judgment assessment and concurrent finding that assessment ante-dated and time barred. Court held that conclusion reached by Tribunal based on appreciation of pure questions of fact. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 1977-78)

CIT v. Amarchand Sharma and Udani (2014) 364 ITR 203 / (2015) 114 DTR 76 / 231 Taxmann 51(AP)(HC)

1623 **S.144 : Best judgment assessment – Cash credits – Civil construction-Assessment on reasonable basis – Outstanding balances of creditors – Deletion was held to be justified.[S.44AB,68]**

Since the assessee failed to produce its books of account, the AO issued a notice to show cause why addition should not be made of unconfirmed credits and proposed to disallow 50 per cent of the expenses. Accordingly, the AO made addition of ₹ 1.25 crores as unconfirmed creditors and disallowed 50 per cent of the expenses in the sum of ₹ 9.16 crores. The Commissioner (Appeals) called for a remand report from the AO and noted that most of the balances of the creditors were verified and confirmed. He held that the AO was justified in carrying out a best judgment assessment u/s 144 but the best judgment assessment should be based on pragmatic and reasonable considerations and that the AO had acted unreasonably in adding the entire sundry creditors' balances and disallowing 50 per cent of the expenses which would result in an unreasonable profit margin of 50 per cent. Moreover, the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 2005-06 had been completed u/s. 143(3) at a net profit rate of 3.1 per cent and for the assessment year 2008-09, the net profit declared by the assessee was 4.5 per cent. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, he held that a net profit rate of seven per cent would be fair, having regard to the rate adopted in the case of the assessee itself and the nature of the civil construction business. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Jogendra Singh and Co. (2014) 361 ITR 78 /222 Taxmann 113 (All.)(HC)

1624 **S.144 : Best judgement assessment – Adjournments over four years – Ex-parte order was held to be justified**

Tribunal held that the assessee sought adjournment after adjournment for over a period of four years before CIT(A) on false pretext but not attending the hearing. In the circumstance the Assessing Officer was justified in passing ex parte assessment under section 144 and CIT(A) was justified in confirming the same no interference is called for in the order of CIT(A). (AY. 2005-06)

Shivangi Steel Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 164 TTJ 134 / 147 ITD 166 (Agra)(Trib.)

1625 **S.144 : Best judgment assessment – Disallowance of interest, salary etc. paid by a firm to partners cannot be made if the Best Judgment assessment is due to incompleteness of accounts & not due to failures referred to in s. 144. [S.184(5)]**

The Tribunal had to consider whether disallowances for payments in respect of remuneration and interest on capital paid to the partners, in computation of taxable

income of the firm, can be made under section 184(5) when even though assessment is completed under section 144 but the assessee has not committed any such failure as is set out in section 144. HELD:

The disallowance under section 184(5) comes into play not as a result of the assessment under section 144 but as a result of the lapses as mentioned in section 144. In other words, the disallowance under section 184(5) does not have a cause and effect relationship with assessment being framed under section 144. Section 184(5) categorically states that when “there is, on the part of a firm, any such failure as is mentioned in section 144, the firm shall be so assessed that no deduction by way of any payment of interest, salary, bonus, commission or remuneration, by whatever name called, made by such firm to any partner of such firm shall be allowed in computing the income”. This disabling provision comes into play only when the assessment is framed under section 144 only as a result of the assessee’s committing any such failure as is contemplated under section 144. However, in a situation in which the assessment is completed in the manner as prescribed in section 144 but such a course of action has been adopted because of “the Assessing Officer is not satisfied about the correctness or completeness of the accounts of the assessee”, referred to in section 145(3), clearly the disabling provisions of section 184(5) do not come into play. On facts, the assessment under section 144 has been upheld on the basis of section 145(3) even as it is not disputed that the failures enumerated in section 144 itself were not committed. In these circumstances, section 184(5) cannot be invoked to make disallowances for interest and salaries paid to the partners. (AY. 2005-06)

Vijay Veer Singh v. ITO (2015) 153 ITD 506 (Agra)(Trib.)

Section S144C : Reference to dispute resolution panel

S.144C : Reference to dispute resolution panel – Transfer Pricing Officer – Reference to TPO – AO has to pass draft order and not final order – Violation of procedure-Order was set aside. [S.92CA, 143(3)]

1626

Where pursuant to order of TPO, Assessing Officer passed a final order under section 143(3) instead of passing a draft assessment order under section 144C, there being violation of procedure prescribed under Act, impugned order was to be set aside and, in such a case, even corrigendum issued by Assessing Officer modifying final order of assessment to be read as a draft assessment order, could not cure defect existing in original order

Vijay Television (P.) Ltd. v. DRP (2014) 369 ITR 113 / 270 CTR 505 / 225 Taxmann 35 (Mad.)(HC)

S.144C : Reference to dispute resolution panel – Transfer pricing – Alternative remedy – Writ is not maintainable [S.92CA, Article 226]

1627

A reference was made by AO to TPO under section 92CA. Following a determination by TPO, AO issued a draft order to which assessee raised objections. DRP issued directions under section 144C(5) - Following said instructions, AO passed assessment order. Assessee filed instant writ petition challenging assessment order so passed. Since assessee had remedy of an appeal against order of assessment in which all issues, *inter*

alia, including addition made by TPO in return could be addressed to Tribunal, instant petition was to be disposed of by relegating assessee to remedy of appeal against order of assessment. Matter remanded

Lionbridge Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT(2013) 358 ITR 599 / (2014) 225 Taxmann 130(Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

1628 **S.144C : Reference to dispute resolution panel – Transfer pricing – Non-passing of draft assessment order after adjustments made by the TPO renders proceedings null & void. [S.92CA]**

Under section 144C(1) of the Act, with effect from 1st October 2009, the Assessing Officer has to mandatorily issue a draft assessment order if there is a proposed variation to the return which are prejudicial to the eligible assessee. The fact that the petitioner is an eligible assessee is not in dispute. While so, under section 144C(2) of the Act, the eligible assessee has the option, either to accept the variation or to file their objections before the DRP and such option has to be exercised within 30 days. On such objections filed by the assessee, the DRP shall issue appropriate direction for the guidance of the Assessing Officer under section 144C(5) of the Act. It is only thereafter, the AO is bound to pass a final order of assessment in compliance with the directions issued by the DRP under section 144C(3) of the Act. In the present case, without following the above mandatory procedures, the AO has passed the order of assessment on 26-3-2013 and subsequently issued a corrigendum on 15-4-2014 to rectify the mistake committed in passing the final order of assessment *inter alia* to treat it as a draft assessment order. This course of action adopted by the second respondent is contrary to the mandatory provisions contained in the Act and the corrigendum issued by the AO could not cure the defect. The very fact that the Assessing Officer has signed the order of assessment and also assessed the amount payable by the assessee has become complete and it cannot be simply treated as a draft assessment order or rectified by issuing the corrigendum. In fact, pursuant to the order of assessment under Section 143(3), demand was also made for payment of the amount and such demand has not been withdrawn by the second respondent even after issuing the corrigendum. Even as per the website of the department, the demand made to the petitioner company continues till date and therefore, the final order as well as the corrigendum issued by the second respondent are vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record and they are legally not sustainable.

Vijay Television Pvt. Ltd v. DRP (2014) 369 ITR 113 / 107 DTR 96 / 270 CTR 505 / 225 taxman 35 (Mad.)(HC)

1629 **S.144C : Reference to dispute resolution panel – Transfer Pricing Officer – Draft assessment order – Order passed without passing draft order was held to be illegal. [S.92CA, 92C]**

Where AO did not furnish to assessee a draft assessment order, before passing a final assessment order, assessee was deprived of an opportunity of approaching DRP under section 144C(15) and hence assessment order passed by AO illegal and liable to be

quashed. Show cause notice issued by AO before making ALP adjustment cannot be treated as a draft assessment order, nor assessee could have approached DRP against same. (AY. 2007-08)

Capsugel Healthcare Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 152 ITD 142 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.144C : Reference to dispute resolution panel – Transfer Pricing Officer – Arm’s length price – DRP failed to consider assessee’s contention on issue of adjustment of low capacity utilization, determination of PLI and selection of comparables – Matter required fresh adjudication. [S.92C]

1630

Assessee’s international transactions during the year related to import of raw materials, consumables and export of Switch Mode Power Supplies with its AEs. Method of determining PLI and computed PLI margin which differed. Dispute Resolution Panel failed to consider/examine assessee’s contention on issue of adjustment of low capacity utilisation and determination of PLI as well as objections with regard to certain comparables, Matter remanded back for fresh adjudication. (AY. 2006-07, 2008-09)

Advance Power Display Systems Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 150 ITD 257 / 30 ITR 481 (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.144C : Reference to dispute resolution panel – The DRP shall give clear and speaking directions to the AO for passing the assessment order and the statute ensures that the said power is not delegated to the AO

1631

A perusal of the above shows that the provisions of section 144C provides the entire mechanism for making a reference to the DRP; the power of the DRP and also the procedures which have to be followed to issue the direction to the AO are fully set out therein. On a perusal of the statutory provisions it can be seen that (a) where the objections have been filed by the assessee the DRP has to issue directions to the AO for his guidance so as to enable him to complete the assessment; (b) such directions can be given after considering the various factors which have been elaborated in sub-section (6); (c) the DRP has also been conferred with the power to make an enquiry and to issue any directions as per sub-section (7); (d) sub-section (8) places a limitation on the powers of the DRP to either confirm, reduce or enhance the variation proposed by the AO in the draft assessment order. The statute does not stop there, it further clarifies that the DRP does not have any power to set aside any proposed variation or issue direction for further enquiry and passing of the assessment order thereby meaning the DRP has to come to a clear cut direction to be given to the AO; (e) sub-section (9) address the procedures where the DRP members differ we are not concerned in the present proceedings with the same; (f) sub-section (10) makes the direction given by the DRP binding on the AO; (g) sub-section (11) enunciates the rules of fair play and natural justice by ensuring that in the eventuality a direction under sub-section (5) which is pre judicial to the interests of the assessee or the Revenue has been given in such an eventuality an opportunity of being heard has to be granted to the assessee or the AO by the DRP; (h) the sub-section 12 gives the limitation within which the direction under sub-section (5) is to be given effect to by the AO; (i) sub-section (13) mandates the AO to pass an order in conformity with the direction of the DRP without providing an opportunity to the assessee. (AY. 2008-09, 2010-11)

PGS Geophysical v. ADIT (2014) 50 taxmann.com 392 (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

1632 **S.144C : Reference to dispute resolution panel – Transfer pricing – Rule of natural justice** **DRP was required to adjudicate objections filed by assessee – Matter set aside. [S.92C]**

Assessee raised objections before DRP against addition made in draft assessment order on account of TP adjustment. Assessee filed application before DRP to withdraw objections raised before it. DRP rejected application for withdrawing of objections and directed A.O. to pass assessment order in consonance with draft assessment order. Tribunal held that since DRP was of view that assessee did not have option to withdraw objections, as per rule of natural justice DRP was required to adjudicate objections filed by assessee. Matter was set aside to the DRP with a direction to adjudicate all the issues on the objections filed by the assessee as per law by way of speaking order after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing. (AY. 2006-07)
Truetzschler India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. SCIT (2014) 146 ITD 679 (Mum.)(Trib.)

1633 **S.144C : Reference to dispute resolution panel – Non-Speaking order – Matter set aside.**

It is obligatory for DRP, a quasi-judicial authority, to ascribe cogent and germane reasons for arriving at a conclusion, when its order is called in question before a superior or an appellate forum. DRP dismissed the appeal of assessee by way of non speaking order, matter was remitted back to DRP. (AY. 2007-08, 2009-10)
Starwood Asia Pacific Hotel and Resorts (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 790 (Delhi)(Trib.)

1634 **S.144C : Reference to dispute resolution panel – NO debit to Profit and loss account still addition was confirmed by DRP – Tribunal deleted the addition – Accountability-ITAT hauls up AO & DRP for “blatantly frivolous & unsustainable” additions. Suggests that accountability mechanism be set up to put a check on AO. Rationale for existence of ineffective DRP questioned.**

Pursuant to a scheme of arrangement the assessee transferred its telecom infrastructure assets to Bharti Infratel Ltd for Nil consideration with the result that the WDV of the said assets amounting to Rs. 5,739 crore was written off by debiting the P&L A/c. A corresponding amount was credited to the P&L A/c from the ‘business restructuring reserve’ with the result that there was no net debit to the P&L A/c. The AO & DRP noted that there was no effect on the P&L A/c but still held that an addition of Rs 5,739 crore had to be made to the assessee’s income. On appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal, HELD by the Tribunal allowing the appeal:

... if an action of the AO is so blatantly unreasonable that such seasoned senior officers well versed with functioning of judicial forums, as the learned DRs are, cannot even go through the convincing motions of defending the same before us, such unreasonable conduct of the AO deserves to be scrutinized seriously. At a time when evolving societal pressures demand greater degree of accountability in the governance also, it does no good to the judicial institutions to watch such situations as helpless spectators. If it is indeed a case of frivolous addition, someone should be accountable for the resultant undue hardship to the taxpayer -rather than being allowed to walk away with a subtle, though easily discernable, admission to the effect that yes it was a frivolous addition,

and, if it is not a frivolous addition, there has to be reasonable defence, before us, for such an addition.

... Whichever way one looks at these entries, the inescapable conclusion is that the addition made by the AO is wholly erroneous and devoid of any legally sustainable merits.

.... The fact that even such purely factual issues are not adequately dealt with by the DRPs raises a big question mark on the efficacy of the very institution of Dispute Resolution Panel. One can perhaps understand, even if not condone, such frivolous additions being made by the AOs, who are relatively younger officers with limited exposure and experience, but the Dispute Resolution Panels, manned by very distinguished and senior Commissioners of eminence, will lose all their relevance, if, irrespective of their heavy work load and demanding schedules, these forums do not rise to the occasion and do not deal with the objections raised before them in a comprehensive and effective manner.

... While we delete the impugned addition of ₹ 5739,60,05,089, we also place on record our dissatisfaction with the way and manner in which this issue has been handled at the assessment stage. Let us not forget that the majesty of law is as much damaged by not rendering justice to the conduct which cannot be faulted as much it is damaged by a wrongdoer going unpunished; not giving relief in deserving cases is as much of a disservice to the cause of justice and the cause of nation as much a disservice it is, to these causes, by granting undue reliefs. The time has come that a strong institutional check is put in place for dealing with such eventualities and de-incentivizing this kind of a conduct. (AY. 2008-09)

Bharti Airtel Limited v. ACIT(2014) 101 DTR 154/161 TTJ 428(Delhi)(Trib.)

Section S145 : Method of accounting

S.145 : Method of accounting-Rejection of books – Application of gross profit rate of 11 per cent instead of 11.4 per cent shown in preceding year justified. [S.145(3)] 1635

Court held that, when the AO found deficiencies and these were approved by the two appellate authorities the provisions of section 145(3) had rightly been invoked and then what should be a reasonable gross profit rate was a finding of fact on the basis of appreciation of evidence. (AY. 2006-07)

Venus Arts and Gems v. ITO (2014) 369 ITR 161/(2015) 274 CTR 177/ 58 taxmann.com 19 (Raj.) (HC)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Rejection of accounts – Estimate of income – Liquor business – Non-maintenance of sales vouchers and stock register – Rejection of accounts was justified – No substantial question of law. [S.260A] 1636

When the sale vouchers had not been maintained or issued then certainly the provisions of section 145(3) could be invoked and accounts rejected.

(ii) That while the Assessing Officer applied the gross profit rate on the basis of certain comparable cases ; the assessee also cited cases where the gross profit rate was applied by the Revenue and after appreciation of evidence on record, the Commissioner (Appeals) applied an average gross profit rate as declared by the assessee and the other

comparable cases relied upon by the assessee as well as the Assessing Officer. When it was a finding based on appreciation of evidence and was a pure finding of fact then no question of law much less substantial question of law arose. (AY.1997-1998)

Trilok Chand Girdharilal and Party v. ITO (2014) 369 ITR 751/226 Taxmann 30 (Mag.) (Raj.)(HC)

1637 S.145 : Method of accounting – Rejection of accounts – Deficiencies and discrepancies in accounts – Rejection of accounts justified. [S.145(3)]

In the books of account maintained by the assessee, the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal were justified in rejecting the books of account of the assessee. (AY. 2007-08)

Pramod Kumar v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 237 / (2015) 58 taxmann.com 41 (P&H)(HC)

1638 S.145 : Method of accounting – Valuation of stock – Discrepancies in valuation – Addition was held to be justified.

Dismissing the appeal of assessee the Court held that finding that there were discrepancies in valuation, hence additions to income was held to be justified. (AY. 2005-06)

Shakuntla Thukral (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 644 (2015) 230 Taxmann 166 (P&H)(HC)

1639 S.145 : Method of accounting – Rejection of accounts – Flat rate assessment – Rejection of accounts justified – Flat rate assessment on the basis of evidence was held to be justified.

Court held that the Tribunal having given its consideration and having adopted the gross profit rate of 2 per cent. giving its own reasons, no question of law, much less any substantial question of law, arose. (AY. 2005-06)

Rajmoti Industries v. JCIT (2014) 363 ITR 467 / 44 taxmann.com 491 (Guj.)(HC)

1640 S.145 : Method of accounting – Assessing Officer rejected the books as gross profit was on lower side – Tribunal deleted the addition – No substantial question of law arose from the order of Tribunal. [S.260A]

During the assessment year under consideration, Assessing Officer contended that the assessee has disclosed the G.P. rate on lower side hence, books of account are rejected and made the addition on estimate basis which was upheld by CIT(A). However, the Tribunal has deleted the addition. Before the High Court, When the books of account were rejected, then there was no option left to the AO to make the addition on estimate basis which was upheld by the First Appellate Authority, but the Tribunal by its impugned order has deleted the said addition by relying a number of case laws. Without going through the merits of the addition, it may be mentioned that the addition was made on estimate basis and estimation is the question of fact as per the ratio laid down following the cases. No substantial question of law is emerging from the impugned order. Hence, Department appeal is dismissed at the admission stage. (AY. 2009-10)

CIT v. Kamlesh Kumar Jaiswal & Co. (2014) 222 Taxmann 180 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Estimation of Profit – Question pertaining to net profit rate on estimation basis is a question of fact

1641

The assessee had shown “nil” income but the AO has completed assessment on the positive income of ₹ 19,49,07,850/-; and ₹ 5,16,04,798/- respectively. Being aggrieved, the assessee filed appeals before the first appellate authority who allowed the relief to the assessee on various grounds. Not being satisfied, the department filed the second appeal before the Tribunal, who *vide* its impugned order set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back to the AO for fresh adjudication on all the issues except one where the addition pertaining to N.P. rate was deleted in each assessment year under consideration. The only ground taken by the appellant-Department related to the addition of ₹ 4,07,22,749/-; and ₹ 61,16,188/- respectively for the assessment years under consideration, made by the AO on estimate basis by applying the net profit rate of 1% on total transport/service charges etc. The same was deleted by the Tribunal *vide* its impugned order. Being aggrieved, the department filed the present appeal. The HC observed that the department has filed both the appeals against the additions, which were deleted/restricted by the Tribunal pertaining to N.P. rate, which were made on estimate basis. HC stated that estimation was a question of fact as per the ratio laid down in the case of *Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Stoneman Marble Industries [2011] 2 SCC 758*. Since there was no question of law involved, both the appeals were dismissed at the admission stage. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07)

CIT v. U.P. Co-operative Federation Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 179 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Quantity of consumption – Comparing with earlier year – Addition was deleted. [S.37(1)]

1642

Assessee consumed Heptene and Catalyst for its manufacturing process. AO having noticed that during previous year assessee consumed larger quantity of Heptene and Catalyst compared to earlier years made matching addition in income of assessee. CIT (A) following order of Tribunal made in assessee's own case for earlier assessment years 1994-95 and 1995-96 deleted impugned addition. Tribunal upheld order of CIT(A). Revenue had not carried order of Tribunal made in earlier assessment years in further appeal. On appeal by revenue the Court upheld the order of Tribunal. (AY. 1996-97)

CIT v. Indu Nissan Oxo Chemical Industries Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 104 / 225 Taxmann 2 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Rejection of accounts-Books of account cannot be rejected on the ground that only one consolidated cash memo was issued. [S.145 (3)]

1643

Court held that it is not necessary that a cash memo is required to be issued for each and every sale and, consequently, books of account could not be rejected on the sole ground that only one consolidated cash memo was issued at the end of the day. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Prayag Wines (2014) 364 ITR 660 / 49 taxmann.com 528 (All.)(HC)

1644 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Rejection of accounts – Quantitative details available – Held to be not valid [S.260A]**

In course of the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer found that there were some defects in the books of account of the assessee and doubting the correctness of the books of account of the assessee rejected the same under section 145(2). Such action of the Assessing Officer had resulted in an addition to assessee's income. The Commissioner (Appeals) found that the assessee was maintaining the accounts at regular basis and there was no deviation from any known system of accounting during the year under consideration as well as in the earlier years. He deleted the addition on ground that the addition had been made by the Assessing Officer entirely on mere suspicion. The Tribunal confirmed the Commissioner (Appeals)'s order. On further appeal it was held that all the quantitative details were available in the books of account and that the accounts were regularly maintained and on those factual findings CIT(A) deleted the addition made by Assessing Officer, which was confirmed by the Tribunal and thus, no substantial question of law arises in respect of deletion of addition made under section 145(2). (AY. 1996-97)

CIT v. Anand Kumar Modi (2014) 104 DTR 139 / 44 taxmann.com 21 (Jharkhand)(HC)

1645 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Rejection of books of account – Assessing Officer is not entitled to reject books of account in a casual and high – handed manner. [S.144]**

The Court held that the Assessing Officer has been faulted for not following section 145(3) of the Act. The Tribunal has held that before the assessing officer records satisfaction about the correctness or completeness of the accounts of the assessee, he ought to have given proper opportunity to the assessee. The books of account could not have been rejected casually. The Tribunal has held that rejection of books of account was not itself correct. It was not done by giving proper opportunity to the assessee. The rejection is high handed. There was an affidavit filed even before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the revenue did not controvert the contents thereof. However, the Assessing Officer made addition of gross profit and that was a matter clarified by the assessee in this Affidavit. The Commissioner of Income Tax has not upheld this gross profit addition. The comparison by the Assessing Officer and by looking at the very document, namely, the profit and loss account was improper. The Tribunal has termed the approach of Assessing Officer as unfortunate. It is termed as arbitrary, high handed and cannot be sustained. Without examining the basic parameters for rejection of the books of accounts the revenue goes in appeal before the Tribunal, this is what is faulted by the Tribunal. To our mind, the complaint of the assessee before the Tribunal was wholly justified. Not only did the Assessing Officer fail to record the requisite satisfaction in terms of section 145(3) but proceeded to make addition and that was estimate which was also not sound. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Teletronics Dealing Systems P. Ltd.(2015) 228 taxman 194 (Bom.)(HC)

1646 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Profit being low cannot be a ground for rejection of books of accounts**

The assessee company was engaged in the manufacture and sale of sugar. The assessee conducted its business through commission agents and made necessary entries in books of account only on receipt of sale consideration. The AO rejected the books of account

on the ground that the assessee had shown a low sale/profit amount. The CIT(A) upheld the Assessment Order however the Tribunal deleted the same.

The High Court observed that the books of account were properly audited, checked and no specific error was detected and that the sales were fully verifiable since the copies of challans, mandi tax vouchers, transport bills, etc. were also made available to the AO. The High Court following other decisions on the subject held that profit being low by itself cannot be a ground for rejection of the books of account and thereby dismissed the departmental appeal.

Dy. CIT v. Hanuman Sugar (Khandsari) Mills (P) Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 156 (All.)(HC)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Rejection of books of account – Finding of fact and no question of law arises.

1647

Assessee during the relevant year assesses Gross Profit rate was 4.73% as against 8.14% in the immediately preceding year and assessee failed to produce stock register of production & sale of mustard cake. AO rejected the trading results by applying GP rate @ 6% invoking the provisions of S. 145(3). Both CIT(A) & Tribunal sustained the addition. On further appeal in HC, HC held contentions of lower authorities as findings of fact and held that all the authorities had categorically pointed out that assessee did not maintain stock register and further specific finding of lower authorities could not alter the position by the contrary observation of the Chartered Accountant in its Audit Report cannot said to be correct. Further AO had pointed out several deficiencies while making the assessment coupled with the fact for which there was no appeal explanation. Rejection of books of account after invoking provisions of S. 145(3) was clearly a finding of fact and no substantial question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal.

Mukesh Oil Mills (P) Ltd. v. ITAT (2014) 264 CTR 196 / 49 taxmann.com 410(Raj)(HC)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Cash basis – FDRs interest – Mutual funds – Offering the income on receipt basis was held to be justified. [S.5]

1648

Assessee was maintaining accounts on actual receipt basis. He had shown interest income from fixed deposit receipts and mutual funds on receipt basis. Tribunal observed that interest income must be taken on receipt basis. Order of Tribunal was held to be justified. (BP 1987-88 to 1995-96)

CIT v. Singh K. P. (Dr.) (2014) 97 DTR 289(All) (HC)

CIT v. Sudha Singh (Dr.)(Smt.) (2014) 97 DTR 289 (All) (HC)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Rejection of Accounts – Non maintenance of stock register – Rejection was held to be not justified. [S.145(3)]

1649

The assessee is engaged in manufacturing and trading of bed sheets, cotton clothes, general clothes and quilts. During the year under consideration, he had shown gross profits of ₹ 8,28,531 and a total turnover of ₹ 1,11,55,235 while giving GP rate at 7.43%. The AO proceeded to complete the assessment while taking the total income at ₹ 17,42,360/-as against the returned income of ₹ 2,30,830. The AO observed that the assessee has not maintained the stock register and quantified and qualified details of the goods could not be verified and sales were also not verifiable. The AO rejected the books of accounts and invoked the provisions of section 145(3) of the Act, estimated the

gross profit per cent on the estimated turnover of ₹ 1.20 crs., resulting into the trading addition of ₹ 1,91,439. Court held that when the CIT(A) has deleted the addition in the trading result on the relevant consideration and finding was affirmed by Tribunal, no substantial question of law arises. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Babulal Agarwal (2014) 97 DTR 284(Raj.) (HC)

1650 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Valuations of stocks – small and numerous stock items.**

The AO made addition of ₹ 9,04,632/- as the value of tools and spares for one month since such stock was not reflected in the closing stock of the previous year. The assessee has taken a stand that the items of spares are small in nature and numerous and, that the valuations takes long time. The assessee had been following the same method of accounting since the assessment year 1983-84. It also pointed out that stock of the company is of 15 days. The CIT(A) reduced to the stock of 15 days instead of one month & reduced to 50% of ₹ 9,04,632/-. Tribunal deleted the total addition made. The High Court held that the items may be small in nature, may be numerous but each item which is in stores of the assessee is required to be valued, therefore, the assessee cannot be permitted to assert that the stock of spares is not required to be valued in the closing stock. The High Court therefore stated that the valuation by the CIT(A) was in tune with the reply filed by the assessee i.e. maintaining average stock of 15 days. Therefore the order passed by Tribunal was unjustified and the same was set aside. (AY, 1994-95, 1995-96)

CIT v. Majestic Auto Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 41 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

CIT v. Majestic Auto Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 42 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

1651 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Undisclosed investments – Unaccounted consumption of raw materials – Estimation of profit at 35% of extra consumption was held to be reasonable. [S.69B]**

There was unaccounted consumption of raw materials. However, there was no direct evidence of unaccounted sales outside the books of account. Profit estimated at 35% of such extra consumption of raw materials. Order of Tribunal was confirmed. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)

CIT v. Leo Formulations P. Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 322 / 225 Taxmann 386 (Guj.)(HC)

1652 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Business loss – Securities held by bank – Valuation of securities – Loss on account of depreciation in value of securities held as stock is not notional & is allowable as business loss. [Ss.28(i), 263]**

A method of accounting adopted by the taxpayer consistently and regularly cannot be discarded by the Departmental authorities on the view that he should have adopted a different method of keeping the accounts or on valuation. Financial institutions like bank, are expected to maintain accounts in terms of the RBI Act and its regulations. The form in which, accounts have to be maintained is prescribed under the aforesaid legislation. Therefore, the account had to be in conformity with the said requirements. The RBI Act or the Companies Act do not deal with the permissible deductions or exclusion under the Income-tax Act. For the purpose of the Income-tax Act, the method of valuation followed by the assessee was to value the investments at cost or market

value whichever was lower. The assessee was entitled to claim a deduction for the depreciation in the value of the securities held by it. The fact that the securities were not sold to a third party did not mean that the loss was notional. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. HDFC Bank Ltd(2014) 368 ITR 377 / 107 DTR 395 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 350 (Mag) (Bom.)(HC)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Method of valuation accepted by department for earlier assessment years cannot be disallowed for current year.

1653

The assessee made provisions for defective stock at the end of the year at varying rates based on the type of stock. The AO did not accept the assessee's contention and held that there was no method to justify the reduction in the value of the stock as was done by the assessee. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal however, deleted the addition made by the AO.

The High Court dismissing the departmental appeal observed that the revenue had accepted similar claims in the previous assessment years and a consistent valuation method was adopted by the assessee which was also accepted by the revenue. The High Court therefore held that it would be improper to allow the revenue to change its position only for one year, which would upset the method of valuation of the stock for a particular year thereby resulting in a distorted version of the profits and also that the method of valuation of closing stock could be disturbed only if it is found that the method followed is such that true profits and gains cannot be deduced therefrom. (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Samsung India Electronics Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 21 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Rejection of accounts – Special audit – Audited books of account not rejected or matter not referred to special audit – AO not entitled to compute average interest on advances and make additions. [S.142(2A)]

1654

The assessee a co-operative bank is incorporated under the Regional Rural Bank Act, 1976. During the course of the assessment proceedings, the assessee had produced audited books of account before the AO, which were examined by him. The assessee was further asked to give details of the interest received from various categories of borrowers on advances given in a particular proforma. The assessee, however, did not submit the reply in the proforma due to which the AO averaged the interest on an *ad-hoc* basis arbitrarily on all kinds of advances. The Tribunal observed that the AO did not examine the books of account before arriving at the finding of charging of lower interest and also did not refer the matter for special audit.

The High Court dismissing the departmental appeal held that unless the audited books of account were rejected or the matter was referred to special audit the AO was not entitled to average the interest on the advances and to add difference of the interest averaged by him on such advances. (AY. 2009-10)

CIT v. Regional Kisan Gramin Bank (2014) 222 Taxmann 134 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)

- 1655 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Valuation of stock – Merely because two different methods had been employed, one for the valuation of stock and the other for costs of production, books of accounts could not be rejected if the methods adopted had been followed consistently.**

The assessee had been valuing finished goods at market value taking sale price of items in month of April of following accounting year while raw material and semi-finished goods were valued on a cost basis in its books of account. The AO rejected the books of account as the assessee was following two different methods. On an appeal before the High Court, the latter held that there was no other discrepancy in accounts; hence, the books of account could not be rejected. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Sanspareils Greenlands (P) Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 193 (All.)(HC)

- 1656 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Valuation of closing stock – Cess paid – Not includible in value of closing stock.**

Valuation of closing stock was to be made excluding the amount of cess paid by the assessee.

CIT v. McLeod Russel (India) Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 663 / 55 taxmann.com 102 (Cal.)(HC)

- 1657 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Valuation of closing stock – Land in dispute before civil court – Adverse impact on market value – Addition on account of undervaluation of closing stock was not proper.**

Land purchased by assessee was in dispute before civil court. The dispute had an adverse impact on market value of land. Assessee reduced the value of closing stock and there was no change in method of valuation. The Department accepted the value as value of opening stock in subsequent year. Held, addition on account of undervaluation of closing stock is not proper. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Satish Estate P. Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 451 / 106 DTR 100 / 226 Taxmann 11(Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

- 1658 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Estimation of profits – Depreciation is not allowable on estimated net profit. [S.32, 144]**

When the net profit is determined on estimate basis after rejecting the books of account, then no deduction including depreciation is allowed. (AY. 1994-95, 2003-04)

CIT v. Sahu Construction P. Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 609 / 222 Taxmann 167 (Mag) (All.)(HC)

- 1659 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Valuation of stock – Change in method – Undervaluation of stock – Method followed consistently – Deletion of addition was held to be valid.**

No addition could be made on account of undervaluation of stock in the current year due to finding by Tribunal that changed method was more scientific and that no addition was made in prior years on account of undervaluation of stock. The changed method was more scientific and did not result any evasion of payment of tax. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 82 / 222 Taxmann 24 (Mag)(All.)(HC)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Valuation of stock – Drugs in stock not saleable – Nil valuation was held to be justified. 1660

Assessee sold its drug manufacturing unit but retained certain stock. On finding that drugs in stock were not saleable, valuation of stock at “nil” was held to be justified. (AY. 2001-02]

CIT v. Wintac Ltd. (2014) 360 ITR 614 / 221 Taxmann 87 (Karn.)(HC)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Rejection-Estimate of income – Tribunal has to pass reasoned order after dealing with arguments of both the parties. [S.254(1)] 1661

Court observed that arguments advanced /points urged deserve to be dealt with, reasons from affirmation have to be indicated though in appropriate cases they may be briefly stated. Recording of reasons is part of fair procedure and reasons are harbinger between the mind of the maker of the decision in the controversy and the decision or conclusion arrived at and they always substitute subjectivity with objectivity. Court set aside 81 matters to Tribunal by observing that the judgements of Tribunal being stereo typed, non speaking, unreasoned, arbitrary and whimsical. The court also observed that the authorities should make an honest and fair estimate of the income even in a best judgment assessment and should not act arbitrarily. Reduction by Tribunal of estimated addition by AO without any facts or comparable cases or past history was not sustainable; Matter is remanded for reconsideration. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. Ram Singh and others (2014)363 ITR 417 / 266 CTR 122/99 DTR 217 / 43 taxmann. com 21 (Raj.)(HC)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Custom clearing agent – Income – Reimbursement of expenses – No element of income – Addition was deleted.[S.5] 1662

The assessee is a custom clearing agent and incurred expenses on behalf of its clients. The Assessing Officer added the expenses as income of the assessee. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition. The Tribunal deleted the addition and held that there is no element of income in the reimbursement of expenses. (AY. 2008-09)

Jaguar Enterprises v. Dy. CIT (2014) 151 ITD 376 / 33 ITR 483 / (2015) 168 TTJ 792 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Estimation of GP – Suppression of sales – Tribunal deleted the addition. 1663

The Assessing Officer rejected the books of account of the assessee by invoking the provisions of section 145(3). In appeal CIT(A) estimated G.P. rate at 22 per cent as against 18 per cent declared by assessee. He did not consider past history and G.P. rate declared by any comparable case. Tribunal held that addition made by applying said rate was not justified particularly when it was not brought on record as to how and in what manner GP rate declared by assessee was on lower side. Whereas per total capacity of Kiln, assessee could have manufactured maximum of 22,50,000 bricks and assessee had declared 24,40,000 bricks, estimation of bricks to be manufactured at 35 lakhs was very excessive, particularly when nothing was brought on record to substantiate that assessee had suppressed sales. (AY. 2009-10)

ITO v. Bharat Int Udhyog (2014) 159 TTJ 1/ (2015) 152 ITD 85 (Jodh.)(Trib.)

1664 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Mere decline in gross profit – Books of account cannot be rejected.**

Where assessee maintained regular books of account which were duly audited, decline in gross profit and disproportionate increase in expenses in certain heads, by itself, would not empower revenue to reject book results; said reason can, at best, present a case where Assessing Officer ought to have verified books with caution and make due inquiries. (AYs. 2008-09, 2009-10)

Century Tiles Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (2014) 33 ITR 230 / (2015) 152 ITD 327 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

1665 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Trading liability as reflected in regular books of account could not be rejected unless proved bogus or fictitious. [S.68]**

Where assessee explained procedure adopted for accounting freight and route expenses payable in books of account and neither AO nor auditor has recorded any adverse finding regarding mercantile system of accounting employed and regularly followed by assessee, addition made by AO by observing that assessee could not prove genuineness of creditors is not justified. (AY. 2008-09)

ACIT v. Swastik Roadlines (P) Ltd. (2014) 61 SOT 74 (URO)(Agra)(Trib.)

1666 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Cash system – Hire purchase agreement – Installment received was to be included as income. [S.4]**

Where assessee, following cash system of accounting, sold certain flats under 'hire purchase agreement', amount of instalments received during relevant year was to be included in its income after allowing corresponding expenditure expended by assessee in cash or cheque. (AY. 2003-04, 2008-09)

ACIT v. Punjab Urban Development Authority, Mohali (2014) 64 SOT 65 (URO) / 32 ITR 481 / 161 TTJ 553 (Chd.)(Trib.)

1667 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Stock in trade – Change of method of accounting to value the stock of its investments / securities at lower of cost or market value is valid. [S.28(i)]**

A premise which can be drawn is that for the purposes of valuation of the closing stock it is permissible for the assessee to value it at the cost or market value, whichever is lower. In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *Chainrup Sampatram v. CIT*, (1953) 24 ITR 481 (SC) held that the assessee is entitled to value the closing stock either at cost price or market value, whichever is lower. In the present case, Revenue does not dispute that the method of the valuation adopted by the assessee, namely, valuing the stock either at cost price or market value whichever is lower, is a generally accepted method of valuation. No doubt, there are no statutory rules for the valuation of closing stock but the ordinarily accepted method of commercial accounting support the valuation of closing stock based on the lower of the cost or market value. Therefore, the departure from the erstwhile method of valuation of closing stock by the assessee is quite appropriate, and in fact is line with a method approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *Chainrup Sampatram* (supra). In-fact, the only basis for the Revenue to challenge the bona fides of the change is that the change has been effected only for the purpose of assessment of taxable income and is not incorporated in the account books. The aforesaid plea of the Revenue, in our view, is quite misplaced because it

is well understood that assessee is a banking company and is statutorily mandated to maintain its books of account in terms of the RBI guidelines. On the other hand, the assessment of taxable income has to be based on the principle of law and cannot be guided merely by the treatment meted out to a particular transaction in the account books. In fact, this aspect of the controversy has also been answered by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Corporation Bank Ltd. (supra) by relying on the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1971) 82 ITR 363 (SC). (AY. 2005-06)

ACIT v. Bank of Maharashtra (Pune) (Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.145 : Method of accounting – Even if assessee is following mercantile system, income cannot be assessed if its collection/receipt is not certain – “real income” v. “hypothetical income” .

1668

The assessee advanced funds to various parties on which it was entitled to receive interest. However, owing to the financial difficulties of the borrower, the assessee did not receive any interest. It accordingly did not offer any interest income to tax. However, the AO & CIT(A) held that as the assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting, the said interest had accrued to it and was chargeable to tax notwithstanding the inability of the borrower to pay the same. On appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal HELD allowing the appeal:

(i) To arrive at the real income, accrual basis cannot be a justifying factor and the commercial and business realities of the assessee, should be considered. The interest income has been recognised in the books of account only to the extent of actual collection, which is the recommended/recognized method as per Accounting Standard 9 of ICAI which lays down that when uncertainties exist regarding the determination of the amount or its collectability, the revenue shall not be treated as accrued and hence shall not be recognized until collection. The recognition of revenue on accrual basis presupposes the satisfaction of two conditions (a) The revenue is measurable (b) The revenue is collectable with certainty. The interest income has been admittedly recognised only on receipt basis. The contention of the revenue that the loan agreements have interest clause permitting the assessee to charge interest at the rate of 14% is not tenable. The terms of the agreements, which enabled the assessee company to demand interest were only enabling provisions and those enabling provisions did not guarantee the collection of overdue interest. They only gave a cause of action to the applicant;

(ii) The method of accounting, as followed by the assessee, does not create any income. The method of accounting only recognises income. Income cannot be taxed on hypothetical basis, and it is only the real income that is to be brought to tax. When the principal itself is overdue and not collected, there is no basis for making out a case that interest income would be collectable with certainty. Even where an assessee is following the mercantile system of accounting, it is only accrual of real income which is chargeable to tax, that accrual is a matter to be decided on commercial belief having regard to the nature of business of the assessee and character of the transaction. Accordingly, for the purpose of determining whether there has been accrual of real income or not, recourse is to be made to ascertain the nature of business and character of the transaction and the realities and peculiarities of the situations. (AY. 2005-06)

Maruti Securities Ltd. v. ACIT (Hyd.)(Trib.)www.itatonline.org

- 1669 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Search and seizure – Books of account not rejected – Unaccounted cash consideration found in the courses of search and credited by the assessee in the books of account was to be assessed as income and not the net profit of 20% offered by the assessee. [Ss.132, 145(3)]**

Assessee was engaged in business of real estate development. During search conducted at business and residential premises of assessee, incriminating documents were found evidencing receipt of sale consideration in cash for sale of plots, which was duly accepted by assessee. Assessee credited impugned sum to its profit and loss account which was accepted by auditor. However, in its return of income, assessee first excluded impugned sum from net profit and thereafter added 20 per cent thereof. AO taxed entire sum credited as income of the assessee. Books of account was not rejected. In appeal CIT (A) directed AO to apply net profit rate of 30 per cent. On appeal by revenue the Tribunal held that there was no evidence to establish that the assessee firm had incurred any expenditure to earn the impugned sum, CIT(A) still allowed 70 percent of the impugned sum as expenditure ignoring the fact that the claim for such deduction was not only inconsistent with the assessee's own audited books of account but also the statutory provisions contained in the income-tax Act. CIT(A) assumed that the assessee must have spent unaccounted money for purchasing land and developing it before selling them. No evidence was found even at the time of search that the assessee had incurred any expenditure over and above reflected in the books. The Tribunal also observe that it is an open shut case of bogus claim for deduction to the extent of 80 per cent of the impugned sum to evade payment of legitimate tax due to the State. Order of CIT(A) was reversed and the order of AO was affirmed. (AY. 2010-11)
ACIT v. Rushabh Vatika (2014) 149 ITD 46 (Rajkot)(Trib.)

- 1670 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Estimation of production.**

The assessee had produced sale bill of minimum rate whereas the AO took sale bill of maximum rate for working out the gross profit. The CIT(A) applied rate of 22 per cent as against 18 per cent shown by assessee and directed to allow interest and remuneration to the partners. The Department and the assessee both challenged the order of CIT(A). The Tribunal deleted the addition sustained by the learned CIT(A) on account of estimation by applying the GP rate at the rate of 22 per cent. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the Department and allowed the appeal of the assessee. (AY. 2009-10)
ITO v. Bharat Int. Udhyog (2014) 159 TTJ 1 (UO) / (2015) 152 ITD 85 (Jodh.)(Trib.)

- 1671 **S.145 : Method of accounting – Mercantile – Accrual of income – Income is taxable in the year when right to receive accrues-Commission [S.4].**

It further observed that though the Schedule VI requires income accrued but not due as part of profit, for income tax purpose 'income accrued but not due' is a contradiction terms, since what was not due could not have accrued. What is not due cannot be subjected to legal action to enforce recovery and hence, income in legal sense could not be treated as accrued so as to require its inclusion in taxable income. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 2009-10)

ACIT v. Vinay Vasudeo Kulkarni (2014) BCAJ-June P 26 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Advance/token money received during an earlier year -to be considered as income only in the year in which work was performed.

1672

The assessee, a proprietor was in the business of sale of rights. The AO disallowed an amount of ₹ 10 lakhs shown in 'current liabilities' which was an advance received for purchase of negative rights which was to be adjusted on signing a formal agreement, on the ground that the assessee was following cash system of accounting. The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal observed that the amount of advance could not partake the character of income and was to be returned by the assessee. Accordingly, the Tribunal allowing the appeal held that if advance received was considered as income of the assessee in the year of receipt, the AO was to verify whether the work was completed in the year under consideration, and thus remanded the matter back to the file of the AO. (AY. 2008-09)

Robin Nanabhai Bhatt v. ACIT (2014) 29 ITR 531 / 65 SOT 167 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Rejection of accounts – Unverifiable expenses and non-maintenance of stock register – Provision for foreseeable losses is allowable as deduction. [S.37(1)]

1673

Assessee, engaged in numerous construction projects throughout the country, successfully explained the discrepancy pointed out by AO regarding non-maintenance of day-to-day stock register and the same was accepted by the CIT(A); its books of account could not be rejected. The volume of expenses had increased during the relevant year vis-à-vis earlier year or that some of the balances remain un-reconciled could not be a ground for rejecting the books of account.

Though AS-7 is not notified by the Central Government, it does not preclude assessee from following the same. Assessee made provision for foreseeable losses as per AS-7. The same is allowable as deduction in computing business profits. (AY. 2004-05)

ACIT v. ITD Cementation India Ltd. (2014) 98 DTR 452 / 146 ITD 59 / 160 TTJ 628(Mum.)(Trib.)

S.145 : Method of accounting – Rejection of accounts – Audited account books maintained consolidated books of account in electronic form cannot be rejected without pointing out specific defects.

1674

Assessee was in the business of infrastructure development. It maintained the consolidated books of account in electronic form. Which were audited. AO rejected books of account of assessee by invoking provisions of section 145(3), by observing that (i) assessee was not maintaining day-to-day stock register, (ii) it had not furnished details of closing stock, (iii) there was substantial increase in all expenses debited to profit and loss account, (iv) expenses claimed by assessee were unverifiable, and (v) true and correct income of assessee could be ascertained only after assessee produced complete books of account with supporting documents Books of account were audited. Auditor had not given any adverse comments in maintenance of books of account or stock register. Maintenance of books is accordance with provisions of law. (AY. 2004-05)

ACIT v. ITD Cementation India Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 59 / 160 TTJ 628/98 DTR 452 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section S145A : Method of accounting in certain cases**1675 S.145A : Method of accounting – Obligation on assessee – Include excise duty in closing stock and then claim deduction.**

Obligation is cast on the assessee to include the excise duty in the closing stock and thereafter claim deduction. As the excise duty is not included in the purchase price and therefore, assessee has not claimed any deduction, same requires to be remitted back to assessing authority to consider the contentions of the assessee. (AY. 1999-2000)

CIT v. Jayanthilal Surana (2014) 222 Taxmann 180 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

1676 S.145A : Method of accounting – Since there was an apparent contradiction in proposed draft order and final order without explaining any reason for same, matter required examination. [S.144C]

Assessing Officer in draft assessment order had proposed to decrease income of assessee by difference of addition made under section 145A in closing stock of earlier assessment year and unutilised CENVAT credit for assessment year under consideration. DRP directed AO. to make corresponding adjustment on account of CENVAT credit in opening stock as well. AO made an addition as against it was proposed to be decreased in total income in draft order. ITAT held that since there was an apparent contradiction in proposed draft order and final order without explaining any reason for same, required examination of the same. There is an apparent contradiction in the proposed draft order and the final order without explaining the reasons for the same. Further, the assessee is following exclusive method of accounting and not including the amount taxed in the purchase as well as in sales. Matter remanded. (AY. 2006-07)

Cabot India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 158 TTJ 840 / (2014) 149 ITD 802 (Mum.)(Trib.)

1677 S.145A : Method of accounting – Valuation – CENVAT credit – Inclusive method – Method of valuation is explained. [S.43B]

Assessee submitted that it followed inclusive method of accounting, which is tax neutral. AO made addition of outstanding balance in unutilised CENVAT credit account which was confirmed by CIT(A). On appeal Tribunal held that whether provision was tax neutral was no argument for not observing same, as tax neutrality would have to be established with reference to accounts as being maintained. Only booking of profit against excess recovery of excise through sales would have brought outstanding balance in UCC account at par with excise components in closing inventory. Provision became tax neutral only when duty was paid on value addition under section 43B. To bring it in conformity with section 145A the Tribunal observed as under (i) Increase the value of opening stock by the amount of excise duty, if any, suffered thereon; (ii) State the closing stock, similarly at values inclusive of excise duty thereon and not by adding the debit amount outstanding in the UCC and (iii), carry forward the closing stock, so valued as, the value of the opening stock for computing the profits u/s. 145 r.w.s. 145A for the following year. (AY. 2007-08)

Hercules Pigment Industry v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 31 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section S147 : Income escaping assessment

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Information from CBI that loans accepted as genuine in original assessment were bogus – Reassessment was held to be valid. [S.69, 148]

1678

The assessment was completed under section 143(3). On the basis of information received from CBI that loans accepted as genuine in original assessment were bogus the AO reopened the assessment after four years. The assessee challenged the said notice by filing writ petition. Dismissing the petition the Court held that where the AO forms his belief on the basis of subsequent new and specific information that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment on account of omission on the part of the assessee to make full and true disclosure of primary facts, he may start reassessment proceedings. On facts since the assumption of jurisdiction on the part of the AO was based on fresh information, specific and reliable and otherwise sustainable under the law, the reassessment proceedings warranted no interference. Notice for assessment was held to be valid. (AY. 2006-07)

Yogendrakumar Gupta v. ITO (2014) 366 ITR186 / 46 taxmann.com 56 (Guj.)(HC)

Editorial : SLP of assessee is dismissed. SLP. Nos. 15381 of 2014 dt. 26-9-2014. Yogendrakumar Gupta v. ITO (2014) 227 Taxmann 374 (SC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Accumulation of income – Change of opinion – Reassessment was held to be invalid. [S.11(i)(a), 147, Form No.10]

1679

The assessee, a registered trust, The assessment was completed under section 143(3). Subsequently, a notice under section 148 was issued by the AO which was beyond the period of four years from the end of relevant assessment year. According to the AO since amount was set apart by way of expenditure on general objects of trust, claim of deduction by assessee under section 11(2) being irregular, same was required to be treated as income of trust. The Court observed that recorded reasons did not indicate anywhere that assessee had not truly and fully disclosed all material facts nor had any material brought to reveal such non-disclosure. The assessment previously framed was scrutiny assessment and the reassessment was due to mere change of opinion and, hence, impugned notice of reassessment was quashed. (AY. 2007-08)

Friends of WWB India v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 9 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Fresh material during assessment proceedings for assessment year 2009-10 – Loan taken by assessee for purposes of residential property utilised for purchase of debentures – Reasonable belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for year 2005-06 – Notice was held to be valid. [S.24(b), 57, 143(1), 148]

1680

During the assessment year 2009-10 the AO came to know that loan taken by the assessee for the purpose of residential property was utilized for purchase of debentures but the assessee claimed the interest as deductible u/s.24(b) for the assessment year 2005-06. AO issued the reassessment notice. The assessee challenged the reassessment

proceedings. Dismissing the petition the Court held that the reassessment proceedings was held to be valid. (AY. 2005-06)

Nishith Madanlal Desai v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 649 / 227 Taxmann 41 (Bom.)(HC)

Editorial : The Supreme Court had dismissed the special leave petition filed by the assessee against this judgment. (SLP Nos. 21899 of 2014 dt. 22-8-2014)

- 1681 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection–Deduction of tax at source – Reassessment was quashed – DTAA-India-USA. [S.9(1)(i),40(a)(i), 148, 195, Art.7]**

Assessee, engaged in business of printing and publishing books, magazines and compact discs, made certain payment to an American company for promotion of its website outside India. It explained that American company had no permanent establishment in India and, therefore, payment made to said company was not liable to deduction of tax at source. AO accepted assessee's explanation and did not make any disallowance for such expenses. Thereafter, on 28-3-2012, AO issued notice under section 148 on ground that payment made to American company was to be disallowed for non-deduction of tax at source. Since reasons supplied by AO did not disclose that there was any failure on part of assessee to provide all material facts, jurisdictional requirement for carrying out reassessment, after expiry of period of four years, was not fulfilled. Reassessment proceedings were quashed. (AY. 2005-06)

Tao Publishing (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 370 ITR 135 / 228 Taxmann 371 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

- 1682 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Return after income-tax survey showing undisclosed income including undisclosed stock – Scrutiny assessment – Notice to re-compute valuation of stock-No failure to disclose material facts necessary for assessment – Notice not valid. [S.133A, 148]**

Held, allowing the petition, that if the Assessing Officer had any doubt or dispute pertaining to valuation of the undisclosed stock and, consequently, about the disclosure of additional income by the assessee, he ought to have pursued the issue further during the assessment itself. It could not be said that the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment due to failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts. The notice was not valid. (AY. 2006-07)

Rajendra Kantibhai Patel (HUF) v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 232 / 226 Taxmann 13(Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

- 1683 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Transfer pricing report submitted by assessee clearly mentioning entire process – Reassessment on the ground that the assessee was doing job work was held to be not valid. [S.148]**

Assessee categorically stating in original assessment that it undertook coating, polishing, stringing and knotting, etc., of raw beads on job work basis. There was no failure on part of assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts necessary for assessment–Reassessment on ground assessee carrying out its activities on job work basis was held to be not valid. (AY. 2005-06)

Swarovski India P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 601 / 226 Taxmann 162(Mag.)(Delhi.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Commission – No allegation in reasons recorded that there was any failure on part of assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment – Reassessment not permissible. [S.37(1), 148]

1684

Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that in the reasons recorded by the AO for reopening the assessment it was not the contention of the AO that there was any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the material facts truly and correctly. There were concurrent findings recorded by both the authorities below that the reassessment proceedings were initiated beyond a period of four years and unless and until it was alleged or established that there was any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the material facts truly and correctly, it was not permissible to the AO to reopen the assessment under section 148. (AY. 2005-2006)

CIT v. Ankit C. Maheshwari (2014) 366 ITR 146 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 73 (Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Failure to disclose material facts necessary for assessment – Fresh information – Information from CBI that loans accepted as genuine in original assessment were bogus – Notice valid. [S.148]

1685

Dismissing the petition, that at the time of the original scrutiny assessment, a specific query was raised with regard to the unsecured loans and advances received from the company B. These being transactions through the cheques and drafts, there would arise no question of the AO not accepting such version of the assessee and not treating them as genuine loans and advances. Since the assumption of jurisdiction on the part of the AO was based on fresh information, specific and reliable and otherwise sustainable under the law, the reassessment proceedings warranted no interference. The notice for reassessment for the assessment year 2006-07 was valid. (AY. 2006-07)

Yogendrakumar Gupta v. ITO (2014) 366 ITR 186 / 46 taxmann.com 56 (Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Claim accepted in first year in scrutiny assessment – Notice in fifth year on ground that claim was excessive – No failure to disclose material facts – Notice was not valid. [S.35D, 147]

1686

On writ allowing the petition the Court held that sole ground on which the notice was based was the assessee's claim of deduction under section 35D of the Act. According to the AO there was excess deduction under this head. This was the fifth year of the assessee's claim for deduction under section 35D. Under section 35D of the Act, the expenditure qualifying for deduction would be spread over a span of 10 assessment years. In the four preceding years, such claim was made. The claim was accepted in a scrutiny assessment for the first year of the claim and the rest was a matter of computation. The assessee had disclosed all the material facts and the notice of reassessment was not valid. (AY. 1999-2000)

Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 677 / 52 taxmann.com 49(Guj.)(HC)

- 1687 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Claim accepted in first year in scrutiny assessment – Notice in fifth year on ground that claim was excessive – No failure to disclose material facts – Notice was not valid. [S.35D, 147]**

On writ allowing the petition the Court held that sole ground on which the notice was based was the assessee's claim of deduction under section 35D of the Act. According to the AO there was excess deduction under this head. This was the fifth year of the assessee's claim for deduction under section 35D. Under section 35D of the Act, the expenditure qualifying for deduction would be spread over a span of 10 assessment years. In the four preceding years, such claim was made. The claim was accepted in a scrutiny assessment for the first year of the claim and the rest was a matter of computation. The assessee had disclosed all the material facts and the notice of reassessment was not valid. (AY. 1999-2000)

Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 677 / 52 taxmann.com 49(Guj.)(HC)

- 1688 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Recording of reasons – Change of opinion – Subsequent decision of Supreme Court in favour of assessee – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.80HHC, 148]**

The reasons for reopening of an assessment are required to be examined as recorded at the time of issuing of notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. No substitution, deletion or addition to the reasons recorded at the time of issuing notice can be made to support the notices either by affidavit or in the order disposing of objections. The reopening notices would stand or fall by the reasons recorded at the time when the notices were issued. Reassessment was held to be bad in law. That Courts do not make law when rendering decisions but only declare what law always was. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court would be correct position of law even when the notices were issued. Therefore, no reasonable belief that that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and the notices were not valid. (AYs. 1998-99, 1999-2000)

Aventis Pharma Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 368 ITR 498 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 169 (Bom.)(HC)

- 1689 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Capital gains – Sump sale – No failure to disclose any material relevant to assessment – Notice was held to be invalid. [S.2(42C), 50B, 148]**

An agreement was entered into between assessee and a company (TEPL) whereby assessee had transferred its lift field operations business to TEPL against shares and bonds of TEPL. Assessee claimed that transfer was by way of exchange and not sale and not within purview of section 2(42C). However, AO came to conclusion that transaction fell under definition of 'slump sale' and was taxable as per provisions of section 50B and taxed same accordingly. Tribunal held that transfer of undertaking in exchange for preference shares and bonds was a case of exchange and not sale and, consequently, neither provisions of section 2(42C) nor section 50B were applicable. Thereafter, notice under section 148 was issued by AO on same set of facts. Queries raised and information sought by AO and assessee's response thereto in assessment proceedings

clearly indicated that all material facts were not only disclosed but were also considered by AO. It was held that in these circumstances, re-opening on same set of facts was unjustified. Notice was held to be in valid. (AY. 2005-06)

Bharat Bijlee Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 364 ITR 581 / 105 DTR 157 / 223 Taxmann 418 (Bom.) (HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Deduction at source – Commission – Payment to non-resident – Less than full disclosure – Reassessment was justified. [S.40(a)(i), 143(3), 195]

1690

Assessment was reopened on the ground that assessee had made payment of commission to foreign agent without deducting tax at source and thus, said payment was liable to be disallowed under section 40(a)(ia). Assessee contended that there was no failure to make a full and true disclosure of all material facts necessary for assessment, initiation of reassessment proceedings after expiry of four years from the end of relevant assessment year was not sustainable. The Court held that it was noted from records that commission paid to foreign party was not shown separately but added to cost of purchase while commission paid on local purchases had been shown in profit and loss account and not added to costs. In view of aforesaid facts there had been less than full disclosure of all material facts during assessment proceedings and therefore, reopening of assessment was held to be justified in law. (AY. 2005-06)

Rosy Blue (India) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 89 (Bom.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Disallowance of expenditure – Exempt income – Deduction at source – No allegation that failure of assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts – Reassessment was bad in law. [S.14A, 40(a)(ia)]

1691

On verification of records available during scrutiny assessment, Assessing Officer issued notice for reopening after expiry of four years from end of assessment year on ground that interest on loan and depreciation were not allowable, no disallowance had been made under section 14A and that disallowance was required for non deduction of tax at source. Notice for reopening was issued beyond four years on basis of verification of material available during scrutiny assessment, and Assessing Officer had not alleged failure of assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts, reopening was not sustainable. (AY. 2006-07)

Patel Alloy Steel (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 84 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.147: Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Decision regarding failure must be based on law applicable on date of filing return – Subsequent retrospective amendment of law would have no effect. [S.80IA, 115]B, 148]

1692

Allowing the petition the Court held that ; an amendment in law, even with retrospective effect, would not authorise the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessment previously framed after scrutiny beyond the period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the conditions laid down under the proviso to section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, are fulfilled. For the purpose of deciding the question

under section 147 whether the assessee had disclosed fully and truly all material facts necessary for the relevant assessment year, the law applicable would be the law as it stood on the date of filing of the return. (AY. 2006-07)

Ranjit Projects P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 223 Taxmann 227 (Mag) / (2015) 372 ITR 529 (Guj.)(HC)

1693 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Bio-degradable waste – Collecting and processing – Change of opinion-Reassessment was not valid.[S. 80IB, 80JJA, 148]**

The assessee was engaged in business of manufacturing of Enzyme. He filed return of income along with tax audit report. The case was selected for scrutiny and notice under section 143(2) was issued to assessee. The assessee declared income at nil after claiming deduction under sections 80-IB and 80-JJA The Assessing Officer passed assessment order, allowing the deductions claimed by assessee and assessing total income at nil.

After period of four years from the end of assessment year, notice under section 148 was issued to assessee for re-assessment of his income with respect to claim made under section 80-JJA. On writ allowing the petition the court held that, it was found that assessee's case was selected for scrutiny assessment in which specific query was raised *vide* a notice with respect to claims made by assessee. Assessee replied same and Assessing Officer allowed deductions, after due application of his mind. It could not be said that there was any concealment/or non-disclosure of true facts by assessee .therefore, original assessment could not be permitted to be reopened/re-assessed merely on change of opinion. (AY. 2006-07)

MAPS Enzymes Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 160 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

1694 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Allocation of common expenditure between section 80-IB unit and non-section 80-IB unit disclosed – Deduction allowed after considering material – Notice was held to be not valid. [S.80IB, 148]**

Court held that the material which formed the basis of reason to believe that income had escaped assessment was the allocation of expenditure between the two units of the assessee leading to higher deduction under section 80-IB of the Act. During the assessment proceedings, the AO had examined the claim for deduction under section 80-IB of the Act and for that purpose had called upon the assessee to file details of expenses claimed in its profit and loss account. Therefore, there was no tangible material to lead to a reason to believe that income had escaped assessment, it was only a change of opinion on the part of the AO on the material available. There had been disclosure of material facts truly and fully for purposes of assessment. The notice of reassessment was not valid. (AY. 2006-07)

Lalitha Chem Industries P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 213 / 225 Taxmann 225 (Mag.) / 265 CTR 348(Bom.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Scrutiny assessment based on material submitted by assessee – Notice after four years to re-compute income – Notice not valid. [S.148]

1695

Where a notice of reassessment is issued after four years it would have to be ascertained whether there was any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all necessary facts for the assessment.

Held accordingly, allowing the petition, that in the reasons, the Assessing Officer had recorded that “on verification of computation of income it was noticed that”. Full facts were there before the AO in the form of declarations made in the returns filed as well as through correspondence during the course of scrutiny assessment. The notice of reassessment after four years was not valid. (AY. 2006-07)

Ferromatik Milacron India P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 217 Taxmann 136 (Mag.) / (2014) 363 ITR 461 / (Guj.) (HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Investment in companies subsequently found to be bogus – Sanction of Commissioner was obtained – Reassessment was held to be valid. [S.148, 149(1)(b), 151(2)]

1696

Assessment accepting assessee's investments shown as funded by three companies. Companies found subsequently to be bogus. Disclosure rendered untrue. Reopening after four years permissible. Requirement that AO should specify that income escaping assessment exceeds ₹ 1 lakh. Met if such statement recorded while placing reasons for approval of Commissioner prior to issuance of notice. Sanction of Commissioner, merely stating “yes”. No inference that Commissioner did not apply mind while granting sanction. (AY. 2006-07)

Lalita Ashwin Jain v. ITO (2014) 363 ITR 343 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 107 (Mag.) (Guj.) (HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Business expenditure – Repairs – All material facts disclosed which are necessary for assessment – Reassessment invalid. [S.37(i)]

1697

There was no failure on part of assessee to disclose all material facts necessary for assessment and initiation of reassessment proceedings was based on mere change of opinion, proviso to section 147. when neither there is any allegation of failure nor the AO has brought any material on record to suggest escapement of income then it is only a change of opinion and therefore assessment cannot be reopened after expiry of four years. Under these circumstances, the assessment made u/s. 147 is invalid.

CIT v. Neptune Textile Mills (P) Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 74 (Mag.) (Guj.) (HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Assessee is being an agent of State Government, was not required to offer any income to tax from development of NTP – no reassessment proceedings after expiry of four years – Merely on basis of change of opinion – Reassessment is invalid. [S.4]

1698

The assessee company was fully owned by the Government of Maharashtra. It had been appointed as the New Town Development Authority for the relevant year, the assessee had not offered any income to tax in the return of income contending that it was acting as an agent of the State Government. There can be no doubt that there was no failure

on the part of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts in relation to it being appointed as an agent of the Government of Maharashtra for the Navi Mumbai Project. The AO in his order came to a finding that the assessee was the agent of the Government of Maharashtra for the said project. He did so after considering the material disclosed and produced by the assessee. therefore no income chargeable to tax had escaped from assessment for the year, any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment and also that the AO had applied its mind to the issue under consideration. Therefore, reopening was void. (AY. 2005-06)

City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 203(Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

1699 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – With in four years – Licence fee-Change of opinion – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.37(1), 148]**

Payment of licence fee to assessee's group company. Material and details already available with Assessing Officer at time of original assessment. Factum of payment licence fee was disclosed in return. Reassessment was held to be not valid on the ground that the notice was based on change of opinion. (AY. 1996-97, 2001-02)

CIT v. RPG Transmissions Ltd. (2013) 359 ITR 673 / (2014) 266 CTR 533 / 100 DTR 338 / 48 taxmann.com 57 (Mad.)(HC)

1700 **S. 147: Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Condition precedent – Material facts disclosed in return – Reassessment was held to be invalid.**

A notice of reassessment was issued beyond four years on the ground that the assessee had set off the loss of MEK and Foods division against profit on sale of assets of the assessee from which the assessee received ₹ 7.51 crores and the remainder was credited to the P&L account instead of taking the entire amount. Held, the in the notes to return, the assessee clearly stated the reason for doing so. Thus, there was no failure on part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts. Also, there was no hint in the recorded reasons that there was any such failure on part of the assessee. Hence, notice was liable to be quashed. (AY. 1997-98)

Gujarat Carbon & Industries Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 464 (Guj.)(HC)

1701 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Reasons recorded – The reasons must specifically indicate as to which material fact was not disclosed by the petitioner in the course of its original assessment – Notice based on reappraisal of same material on record was held to be not valid. [S.148]**

In the reasons supplied to the petitioner, there is no whisper, what to speak of any allegation, that the petitioner had failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment and that because of this failure there has been an escapement of income chargeable to tax. Merely having a reason to believe that income had escaped assessment, is not sufficient to reopen assessments beyond the four year period indicated above. The escapement of income from assessment must also be occasioned by the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts, fully and truly. This is a necessary condition for overcoming the bar set up by the proviso to section 147.

If this condition is not satisfied, the bar would operate and no action under section 147 could be taken. We have already mentioned above that the reasons supplied to the petitioner does not contain any such allegation. Consequently, one of the conditions precedent for removing the bar against taking action after the said four year period remains unfulfilled. (AY. 2006-07)

Global Signal Cable (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT(2014) 368 ITR 609 / 229 Taxmann 608 (Delhi) (HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – If “reasons to believe” are not based on new, “tangible materials”, the reopening amounts to an impermissible review. [S.68.148]

1702

In AY 2006-07 the AO passed an assessment order u/s. 143(3). Thereafter, after the expiry of four years from the end of the AY, he issued a notice u/s. 148 reopening the assessment on the ground that the records showed that an amount of ₹ 25 lakh had to be added to the capital account for which the assessee had offered no explanation and that the same constituted undisclosed income u/s 68. The assessee challenged the reopening on the ground that there was no failure on its part to make a disclosure of material facts and the reopening was based on change of opinion. The department relied on the Full Bench verdict in Usha International 348 ITR 485 and argued that as the AO did not apply his mind at all to the question regarding the said capital contribution, it could not be said that there was a “change of opinion”. HELD by the High Court allowing the Petition:

(i) In the recorded reasons, no details are provided as to what such information is which excited the AO's notice and attention. The reasons must indicate specifically what such objective and new material facts are, on the basis of which a reopening is initiated u/s. 148. This reassessment is clearly not on the basis of new (or “tangible”) information or facts that which the Revenue came by. It is in effect a re-appreciation or review of the facts that were provided along with the original return filed by the assessee;

(ii) The foundation of the AO's jurisdiction and the *raison d'être* of a reassessment notice are the “reasons to believe”. Now this should have a relation or a link with an objective fact, in the form of information or facts external to the materials on the record. Such external facts or material constitute the driver, or the key which enables the authority to legitimately re-open the completed assessment. In absence of this objective “trigger”, the AO does not possess jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. It is at the next stage that the question, whether the re-opening of assessment amounts to “review” or “change of opinion” arises. In other words, if there are no “reasons to believe” based on new, “tangible materials”, then the reopening amounts to an impermissible review. Here, there is nothing to show what triggered the issuance of notice of reassessment – no information or new facts which led the AO to believe that full disclosure had not been made. (AY. 2006-07)

Madhukar Khosla v. ACIT(2014) 367 ITR 165/(2015) 55 taxmann.com 391 / 122 DTR 171 (Delhi) (HC)

- 1703 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Recording of reasons – No failure on the part of assessee – Export business – Subsequent Court decisions by itself would not give jurisdiction to the AO to reopen an assessment beyond four years unless coupled with a failure to disclose truly and fully all material facts – Reassessment was quashed. [S.80HHC, 148]**

Deduction claimed under section 80HHC was allowed under section 143(3). Reassessment notice was issued on the ground that since the assessee did not have profit from export and deduction on incentives was not available. The said notice was challenged by writ petition. Allowing the petition, the court observed that reasons recorded do not indicate even remotely any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose any material facts which is necessary for assessment. Subsequent Court decisions by itself would not give jurisdiction to the AO to reopen an assessment beyond four years unless coupled with a failure to disclose truly and fully all material facts. Reassessment was quashed. (AY. 1998-99)

Allanasons Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 648 / 107 DTR 62 / 225 Taxmann 166 (Mag) (Bom.)(HC)

- 1704 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Survey – Bogus purchases – Unexplained expenditure – Writ petition was held to be not maintainable. [S.69C,133A,148, Constitution of India, Art. 226]**

The assessee is in the business of trading in various industrial products. The assessment for the relevant year was completed under section 143(3). During scrutiny assessment for the assessment year 2008-09 it was noticed that suppliers were proved to be bogus biller during the course of search/ survey by the investigation wing. Additions were made by the AO which is pending before the CIT(A). For the relevant assessment year after recoding the reasons, the AO issued the notice under section 148. The notice was challenged by way of writ petition. The Court dismissed the petition by observing that it was only on account of survey proceedings under section 133A and also during assessment proceedings for the assessment year 2008-09 that information was obtained that certain purchases were made from non-existing /bogus dealers and satisfaction of the AO to form a reasonable belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment is not unreasonable. The court also observed that one would necessarily have to read the reasons as a whole to find out whether or not there has been a failure to disclose truly and fully all necessary facts for assessment, hence writ petition was not maintainable. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08)

Nickunj Eximp Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. ACIT(2014) 107 DTR 69/270 CTR 494/ 229 Taxmann 99 (Bom.)(HC)

Nickunj Eximp Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2015)228 Taxmann 95(Mag) (Bom)(HC)

- 1705 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Weighted deduction – Change of opinion – Reassessment was held to be not justified. [S.35(2AB), 37(1),148]**

The assessment was completed under section 143(3) allowing the claim of the assessee for deductions claimed towards legal and professional charges incurred for filing patent applications. Reassessment notice was issued on the ground that these expenses were capital in nature and thus the assessee had failed to disclose fully and truly all

material facts. The assessee challenged the said notice by filing writ petition. Allowing the petition the court held that it was found that all material facts with reference to deductions claimed by assessee were disclosed in original assessment proceedings and the same were duly considered by Assessing Officer. Further, no details were presented as to which fact or material was not disclosed by assessee that led to its income escaping assessment, thus reassessment was based on mere change of opinion. (AY. 2005-06)

Lupin Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 224 Taxmann 225 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Allocation of expenses – Industrial undertakings – There was full and true disclosure reopening was based on change of opinion – Held to be not valid. [S.80IB]

1706

Assessee, engaged in business of manufacturing of chemicals, had two manufacturing units-one at Tarapur and another at Silvassa. Assessee claimed deduction under section 80-IB in respect of its Silvassa unit. Said claim had been examined and reduced by Assessing Officer in assessment. Thereafter, assessment was sought to be re-opened on ground that assessee had suppressed expenses incurred in respect of Silvassa unit by debiting expenses to its Tarapur unit which had resulted in increasing profit of Silvassa unit and, thus, assessee had enjoyed excessive deduction under section 80-IB. The assessee challenged the said reassessment notice, allowing the petition the Court held that issue of allocation of expenditure was very much available before Assessing Officer while examining quantum of deduction under section 80-IB in original assessment, initiation of reassessment was bad in law. Reassessment was based on change of opinion which was not permissible. (AY. 2006-07)

Lalitha Chem Industries (P).Ltd. v. Dy.CIT (2014) 364 ITR 213 / 97 DTR 107 /225 Taxmann 225 (Mag.) / 265 CTR 348 (Bom.)(HC)

S.147 : Reopening – After the expiry of four years – Deduction at source – Failure to disclose material facts – Reassessment was bad. [Ss.40(a)(iii), 143(3)]

1707

Assessment was completed u/s 143(3). After four years from the end of the assessment year, assessment was reopened on the ground that assessee had made payments of salary to its employee rendering services abroad without deduction of tax at source and thus, salary was not allowable in view of section 40(a)(iii). High Court held that from the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment as well as the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the CIT(A) and ITAT, it is evident that there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. As per the proviso to section 147 of the Act, assessments beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year can be reopened only if there is failure on the part of the assessee to disclose all material facts. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, the decision of the Tribunal in holding that the reopening of the assessment was bad cannot be faulted. (AY. 1989-90)

CIT v. Petroleum India International (2014) 220 Taxmann 11 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC.)

1708 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – No failure on part of assessee to disclose truly and fully all relevant material facts – Reassessment was not valid. [S.80HHC, 143(3), 148]**

Assessment order u/s 143(3) of the Act was passed wherein deduction u/s. 80IB and 80HHC of the Act claimed by the assessee-company was duly considered upon by AO and was allowed. On the premise that assessee could not have claimed deduction both under section 80HHC as well as 80IB of the Act, notices for both the assessment years were issued for reopening the assessment under section 148 of the Act. Thereby, reassessment order was passed denying the deduction. On appeal CIT (Appeals) set aside the orders on the contention that the reopening was invalid as there was no failure on part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all relevant material facts. The Tribunal held that, reopening u/s 147 is invalid in view of the proviso to the section after the expiry of four years from the end of relevant assessment year as there is no omission or failure on the part of the assessee company in putting fourth its claim in its entirety before the AO. On appeal by revenue to High Court, Tribunal's order was upheld. (AY. 2000-01, 2001-02)

CIT v. Bilag Industries (P.) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 162 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

1709 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – No failure to disclose material facts necessary for assessment – Re-opening not valid. [S.44BBB, 148, 151]**

Income from offshore supply contracts were considered and accepted to be exempt in the original assessment proceedings. Notice was issued u/s.148 after four years. No allegation that there was any failure to disclose material facts necessary for assessment. Re-opening held to be invalid (AY. 2004-05)

Atomstroy export v. Dy. DIT (IT)(2012) 210 Taxmann 137/ (2013) 363 ITR 612 (Bom.)(HC)

1710 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Failure by assessee to file return – Conditions must be reflected in notice itself. [S.148]**

Before any notice is issued after the expiry of four years, the officer concerned must be satisfied that there has been an escapement in assessment of income, which is chargeable to tax and that this is because of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return u/s 139 of the or in response to a notice issued u/s. 142(1)/148 for not disclosing the material facts. These conditions must be reflected in the notice itself. In the absence of the conditions, exercise of jurisdiction in issuance of the notice under the provision is patently illegal. On a writ petition challenging the notice issued after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year 2005-06:

Held, allowing the petition, that nothing had been disclosed or shown even in the subsequent stages to satisfy the conditions. Therefore, the first notice dated March 30, 2012, was set aside as well as the consequential steps being order dated January 15, 2013, issued by the Deputy Commissioner. However, it would be open for the Revenue, if so advised, to proceed in accordance with law taking impartial decision by taking note of the records, if there existed a strong ground for issuance of such notice. (AY. 2005-06) *Tecumseh Products India P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 429 / 47 taxmann.com 121 (AP) (HC)*

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Profits on sale of shares assessed as capital gains – No failure on part of assessee – Reassessment was not valid. [S.28(i), 45, 148] 1711

Beyond the period of four years, if any notice of reopening of assessment is issued in the absence of any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts, it would have no validity. In the original assessment proceedings, if the Assessing Officer, had examined the claim in detail after raising queries which were fully answered by the assessee, such action of reopening cannot be sustained in such circumstances. (AY. 2006-07)

Vinod Dhudalal Shah v. ACIT (2014) 362 ITR 345/229 Taxmann 23 (Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Write back of amount – No failure on part of assessee – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.41(1), 148] 1712

Assessee created a provision at a time when its income was exempt from tax which was subsequently written back and this fact was disclosed in the return. Held, notice seeking to tax the amount after four years was not valid. (AY. 2005-06)

National Dairy Development Board v. DCIT (2013) 356 ITR 413 / 215 Taxmann 392 / (2014) 362 ITR 79 (Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – No finding that assessee failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts – Notice was not valid. [S.148] 1713

Since no satisfaction was recorded by AO that income has escaped assessment by reason of failure on part of assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment, notice was not valid. (AY. 2005-06)

General Motors India P. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 360 ITR 527 / 226 Taxmann 80 (Mag)(Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – All materials were on record – Reassessment was not valid. [S.44AB, 148] 1714

Allowing the writ petition the court held that all material on the basis of which the AO formed a reasonable belief that income has escaped assessment were on record during the assessment proceedings and assessment was completed under section 143(3). Details were also furnished under section 44AB along with the return. As there was no failure on the part of assessee to disclose material facts necessary for assessment, reassessment was held to be in valid. (AY. 2006-07)

Talati & Panthaky Associated (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 102 DTR 259 / 362 ITR 362 / 227 Taxmann 257 (Mag.) / 268 CTR 94 (Bom.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Department seeking to re-examine accounts of assessee – Notice not indicating failure on part of assessee to disclose fully and truly all facts for assessment – Notice was held to be invalid. [S.148] 1715

Allowing the petition the Court held that there was no failure on the part of assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. Reassessment

proceedings which were initiated after four years seeking reexamine accounts of assessee was held to be not valid. (AY. 1998-99, 1999-2000)

Sadhna Nitro Chem Ltd. v. A.B. Koli, ACIT (2014) 368 ITR 505 / 52 taxmann.com 170 (Bom.)(HC)

- 1716 **S.147 : Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Reason must indicate material facts – Intimation – Even S.143(1), Intimation cannot be reopened in the absence of new information. [S.143(1), 148]**

The reassessment is not on the basis of new information or facts that have come to the fore now, but rather, a re-appreciation or review of the facts that were provided along with the original return filed by the assessee. The record does not show any tangible material that created the reason to believe that income had escaped assessment. Rather, the reassessment proceedings amount to a review or change of opinion carried out in the earlier A.Y. 2005-06, which amounts to an abuse of power and is impermissible. In response, it is argued that since the return was processed under Section 143(1) for the A.Y. 2005-06, which involves a mere intimation, rather than an application of mind or true assessment of the return, a less stringent threshold must be taken in terms of 'reasons to believe' that income has escaped assessment or not. This precise argument, however, has been considered and rejected by this Court in *CIT v. Orient Craft Ltd. [2013] 354 ITR 536 (Delhi) (AY.2005-06.)*

Mohan Gupta (HUF) v. CIT(2014)366 ITR 115 / 104 DTR 186/225 Taxmannn 216 (Delhi) (HC)

- 1717 **S.147 : Reassessment – Failure to assess income due to mistake by Assessing Officer – Reassessment was held to be valid – DTAA–India–U.K. [Ss.143(1), 148, Article 14.]**

Dismissing the appeal of assessee, the Court held that where, in the original assessment, income liable to tax has escaped assessment due to oversight or advertence or a mistake committed by the Income-tax Officer, the Income-tax Officer has the jurisdiction to reopen the original assessment. It is not necessary that for such reopening of such assessment the information is to be derived from an external source of any kind or disclosure of new and important matters subsequent to the original assessment. Even if the information is obtained from the record of the original assessment after a proper investigation from the material on record or the facts disclosed thereby or from any enquiry or research into facts or law, reassessment is permissible.

The assessee along with his return enclosed a note stating that he was liable to pay capital gains tax on sale of shares in the United Kingdom according to the domestic law and not in India. Acting on the note, when the return was processed under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Assessing Officer accepted the return. However, he subsequently issued a notice under section 148 on the ground that the capital gains were liable to be taxed in India.

Though the assessee gave a note along with the return the Assessing Officer did not apply his mind and moreover, it was an assessment under section 143(1). All the three authorities had concurrently held that it was not a case of change of opinion. The notice was valid. (AY. 2000-2001)

B. S. Shantharaju v. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 51(Mag.) / (2015) 370 ITR 617 (Karn.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Failure to take steps under section 143(3) will not render AO powerless to initiate reassessment proceedings even when intimation u/s. 143(1) has been issued. [S.80HHC, 143(1), 143(3), 148]

1718

In the assessment order, the AO considered the merits of the claim under section 143(1) (a) and made adjustments thereby disallowing assessee's claim of deduction under section 80HHC. On appeal, the assessee submitted that there could not be any *prima facie* adjustment on the disputed question of law and on facts. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's objection and set aside the intimation. Thereupon, the issue was taken up by issuing notice under section 148. Since there was no response from the assessee, notice under section 143(2) was issued. Since the assessee could not produce necessary document in support of claim, the assessment was completed after rejecting assessee's claim. On appeal, the CIT(A) agreed with the assessee that there was no ground for reopening the assessment. There was no new fact recorded permitting the AO to take up reassessment proceedings. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A). The High Court observed that reading of section 147 revealed that it concerns not only about the reassessment, but it also concerns about the escaped assessment being brought under section 147, as original assessment, which means the assessment not having been done under the regular assessment procedure under section 143, the Officer could resort to original assessment as an escaped assessment. Such assumption of jurisdiction would arise in a case where, the assessee fails to make a return under section 139 or fails to disclose fully and truly all material facts leading to an escaped assessment. Sub-section (b) of section 147 provides for a case where, even when there has been no omission on the part of the assessee while making or disclosing all material facts, consequent on information in his possession leading to formation of belief that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, the officer could take up proceedings for assessing or reassessing such income or recompute the loss of depreciation subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153. The intimation sent to the assessee under section 143(1)(a), is deemed to be a notice of demand under section 156. Therefore, there being no assessment under section 143(1)(a) the question of change of opinion does not arise for the purpose of section 147. Thus, the case herein is covered by the main provision and not the proviso. So long as the ingredients of section 147 are fulfilled, the Assessing Officer is free to initiate proceeding under section 147 and failure to take steps under section 143(3) will not render the AO powerless to initiate reassessment proceedings even when intimation under section 143(1) had been issued. (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Shamlal Bajaj (2014) 222 Taxmann 173 (Mag.) (Mad.) (HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Income from house property – Intimation – Reassessment was held to be valid. [S.143(1)]

1719

The Court held that even though return has been accepted under section 143(1), if ingredients of section 147 are satisfied the AO is empowered to initiate proceedings, even though no proceedings were taken under section 143(3) of the Act. Reassessment proceedings were held to be valid. (AY. 2002-2003)

Rayala Corporation P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 363 ITR 630 / 264 CTR 282 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 250 (Mag) (Mad.) (HC)

- 1720 **S.147 : Reassessment – Within four years – Assessee declaring its book profits after reducing amount of deduction under section 10AA during original proceedings – Both issues not subject matter of consideration in original assessment proceedings – Reasonable belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment – Reassessment was held to be valid. [S.10AA, 143(3), 148]**

Court held that the non-receipt of convertible foreign exchange within a period of six months from the end of the assessment year was not the subject matter of consideration nor the fact that the assessee had declared its book profits after reducing the amount of deduction under section 10AA during the original proceedings. Both these issues were not the subject matter of consideration during the original assessment proceedings leading to the assessment order in relation to the assessment. Thus, it was permissible for the AO to have a reasonable belief that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment and it did not stem from a change of opinion. Only a *prima facie* view of the Assessing Officer is necessary to issue notices and not a cast iron case of escapement of income. Therefore, no fault could be found with the notice issued under section 148. (AY. 2008-09)

Eleganza Jewellery Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 232/269 CTR 475 / 52 taxmann.com 46 (Bom.)(HC)

- 1721 **S.147 : Reassessment – Within four years – Retrospective amendment – Works contract – Reopening, even within 4 years, solely on the basis of a clarificatory retrospective amendment, is not permissible. [S.80I A(4)]**

In AY. 2005-06 the assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80IA(4) which was allowed u/s 143(3). Thereafter, within 4 years, the AO reopened the assessment on the basis that the retrospective amendment to s. 80IA(4) w.e.f. 1.4.2000 prohibited deduction to an assessee who was carried on business is in the nature of a works contract. The assessee challenged the reopening on the ground that the retrospective amendment was merely clarificatory of the existing law and amounted to a 'change of opinion'. HELD by the High Court allowing the plea:

In *Katira Construction Ltd. v. UOI (2013) 352 ITR 513 (Guj)* it was held that the Explanation to s. 80IA(4) was purely explanatory in nature and did not mend the existing statutory provisions. If an Explanation is added to a statute for the removal of doubts, the implication is that the law was same from the beginning and the same is further explained by way of addition of the Explanation. Therefore, it is not a case of introduction of new provision of law by retrospective operation, but when all the materials regarding activities of the assessee are available on record and the benefit of the provision is already made available to such assessee, reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated only on account of addition of such Explanation. On facts, as the AO had conducted a detailed scrutiny before allowing the s. 80-IA(4) deduction, the reopening based only on the retrospective insertion of the Explanation is on mere "change of opinion" (AY. 2005-06)

Sadbhav Engineering Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 223 Taxmann 229(Mag.) / 105 DTR 33(Guj) (HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Within four years – Infrastructure development – Road bridge – Change of opinion – Reassessment was quashed. [S.80IA (4)(ia)] 1722

Petitioner, a company, entered into agreement with Gujarat State Road Development (GSRD) corporation for construction of four-lane-rail over bridge for which it was allowed to collect toll at a specified rate for a certain period. It claimed deduction under section 80IA with respect to its income of toll collection which was allowed by Assessing Officer in original assessment. Assessing Officer reopened assessment on ground that assessee had not entered into any agreement with Central Government or State Government or local authority or any other statutory body as required in section 80IA(4)(i)(a). However, it was found that during original assessment several questions were raised by Assessing Officer and only upon being satisfied by replies of petitioner said claim was accepted. Further, said claim was sole claim made by petitioner. Since assessee's claim was granted after thorough examination and only upon being satisfied that assessee was entitled to such claim, any subsequent attempt on part of Assessing Officer to revisit such a claim would be based on a mere change of opinion, therefore, impugned notice for assessment was required to be quashed. (AY. 2008-09)

Ranjit Projects (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 176 (Mag.) / (2015) 115 DTR 217(Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Within four years – Change of opinion – Disallowance of claim partly in assessment proceedings – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [Ss.80IB (8A)], 143(3), 148] 1723

During original assessment, assessee's claim was processed at length and after calling for detailed explanation from him, same was accepted. Merely because a certain element or angle was not in mind of Assessing Officer while accepting such a claim, could not be a ground for issuing notice under section 148 for reassessment. Mere failure of AO to raise such a question would not authorise him to reopen assessment even within period of 4 years from end of relevant assessment year, any such attempt on his part would be based on mere change of opinion, therefore, notice issued under section 148 was liable to be quashed. (AY. 2007-08)

Cliantha Research Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 102 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Within four years – Windmill – No opinion expressed – Change of opinion – Reopening of assessment on premise that deduction wrongly allowed – Merely because issue was not discussed in assessment order would not lead to reopening of assessment. [S. 80IA(4), 148] 1724

In the original assessment a deduction under section 80IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was allowed in computing the income on account of its windmill project. Thereafter, under sections 147 / 148, the Assessing Officer reopened the assessment on the ground that the deduction under section 80IA was wrongly allowed and reduced the deduction under section 80IA and, consequently, re-determined the total income. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment for the assessment year was bad in law. This was on account of the fact that the reopening of assessment was on a mere change of opinion. The Assessing Officer during the course of the original assessment proceeding

had specifically enquired into the claim of the assessee for deduction on account of the windmill project made under section 80IA(4). On appeal :

Held, dismissing the appeal, the Revenue did not dispute the fact that the issue with regard to which the reopening was sought to be done was the subject matter of discussion and deliberation before the Assessing Officer during the original proceedings. Thus, the Assessing Officer did have occasion to apply his mind to the deduction claimed by the assessee before allowing the deduction. The objection of the Revenue that there was no opinion formed during the original assessment proceeding and it did not deal with the deduction was unsustainable. The mere fact that the assessment order did not discuss the issue of deduction under section 80IA(4) would not lead to the conclusion that the Assessing Officer had made no opinion with regard to the issue. The Tribunal had reached a finding of fact that the question with regard to the claim for deduction under section 80IA was raised by the Assessing Officer and responded to by the assessee. This position was also not disputed by the Revenue. Merely because the issue was not discussed in the assessment order would not lead to a conclusion that no opinion was formed as to the subject of the query. Therefore, the reassessment was invalid. The power to reopen an assessment is not a power of review and a mere change of opinion would not justify the reopening of an assessment. This would apply even when the assessment is sought to be reopened within four years from the end of the assessment year. (AY. 2001-2002)

CIT v. Prima Paper and Engineering Industry (2014) 364 ITR 222 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 677 (Bom.)(HC)

1725 **S.147 : Reassessment – Within four years – Change of opinion – Issue examined in original assessment and order passed – Succeeding Assessing Officer taking a different view – Notice not valid. [S.148]**

Assessing Officer had taken the return of the assessee in the scrutiny assessment and had particularly raised a query with regard to the exclusive method of accounting for CENVAT followed by the assessee. The Assessing Officer also called for details from the assessee in this regard. Such details had already been furnished. He could not be permitted to raise the very same ground even within the period of four years, in the absence of any tangible material that existed already before the Assessing Officer, the notice for reopening issued by the Assessing Officer should be held to have been based on a mere change of opinion. The notice under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was not valid and was liable to be quashed. After April 1, 1989, the Assessing Officer has power to reopen, provided there is “tangible material” to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. (AY. 2008-2009)

Heavy Metal and Tubes Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 609 / 50 taxmann.com 48(Guj.)(HC)

1726 **S.147 : Reassessment – Within four years – Change of opinion – Original assessment completed after raising queries on the issue reopened – Reopening suffers from change of opinion – Held reopening invalid. [S.115WG, 115WH]**

Where the Assessing Officer proposed to reopen the assessment of the assessee within four years from the end of the assessment year, on the very same issues on which he had raised queries while framing the original assessment. Reopening was held to

be invalid as the reopening suffered from change of opinion. Further, the Court held that a fringe benefit assessment can be reopened only under the special provisions of sections 115WG and 115WH and not under general provisions of section 147 of the Act. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. P. G. Foils Ltd. (2013) 356 ITR 594 / 215 Taxmann 104 (Mag.) / (2014) 102 DTR 26(Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Within four years – Reassessment at the instance of audit party – AO convinced with reasons – AO applied his mind – Reassessment was valid
Held, ground for reopening assessment was brought to the notice of the Assessing Officer by audit party but the Assessing Officer, on application of mind, was convinced with such reason. Therefore, it could not be said that the Assessing Officer acted at the instance of the audit party. There was no dispute that the issue in reassessment required reconsideration. Hence, reassessment was held valid. (AY. 2001-02)
N. K. Industries Ltd. v. ITO(OSD) 362 ITR 502 / 226 Taxmann 64 (Mag) (Guj.)(HC)

1727

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Depreciation – Unabsorbed depreciation – Period of carried forward – When ground on which notice was founded was held to be in validin law – Reassessment notice would not survive – Guidelines laid down to streamline procedure for reopening of assessments – Commissioner was directed to issue circular to all the Assessing Officer of Gujarat State to follow the guidelines laid down by Gujarat High Court. [S.32, 148]

1728

High Court quashed the reassessment proceedings and also laid down the following guidelines;

(i) In large number of cases pertaining to reopening of assessments, we have noticed that different stages of the assessee's demanding reasons recorded by the AO, supplying of such reasons, the assessee's raising objections and the AO disposing of such objections, consume considerable time. In many cases, the last stage of disposing off the objections raised by the assessee is reached only a few weeks, and in some cases even days, before the assessment would be time-barred. This situation is quite unsatisfactory, both from the point of the assessee as well as the department. In the last minute rush, the AO frames assessment in a most hurried manner. In the process, important and valid grounds raised by the assessee are often times lost sight of. Additions are thus made which could have been avoided forcing the assessee to prefer appeal which could have been avoided, further creating needless strain on the system. On the other hand, sometimes additions were made without full and proper scrutiny. The additions which should have otherwise stood the test of appellate scrutiny fail the test.

(ii) It can thus be seen that there are four important stages once the AO issues notice for reopening of the assessment. Such stages are: (i) the assessee if he so wishes, may demand the reasons recorded by the AO after filing return in response to notice u/s. 148 of the Act, (ii) the AO supplying such reasons to the assessee, (iii) the assessee raising objections to the notice for reopening and (iv) the AO disposing of the objections raised by the assessee. With a view to streamlining this procedure, and to ensure, as far as possible, the AO is not faced with the unenviable task of completing the assessment proceedings in a few days left before the same became time barred, we would like to

give certain directions of general implication which, we would expect, are followed by all concerned. While doing so, we are conscious that these stages are provided by the Supreme Court in *GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd v. ITO (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC)* and we would be giving directions only to the extent the said judgment already does not provide for. We have noticed that considerably long time is consumed sometimes by the assessee demanding the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer and sometimes the AO complying with such a request of the assessee. It is an accepted proposition that the reasons recorded by the AO are not confidential and the assessee whose assessment is being reopened has a right to know such reasons. We therefore thought that these two stages can be substantially eliminated by giving suitable directions. The further stage is of the assessee raising objections which often times is done after much delay and the last stage comes where the AO deals with such objections. This is yet another problem area where unduly long time is consumed by the AO. Under the circumstances, following directions are issued:

(1) Once the AO serves to an assessee a notice of reopening of assessment u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and within the time permitted in such notice, the assessee files his return of income in response to such notice, the AO shall supply the reasons recorded by him for issuing such notice within 30 days of the filing of the return by the assessee without waiting for the assessee to demand such reasons.

(2) Once the assessee receives such reasons, he would be expected to raise his objections, if he so desires, within 60 days of receipt of such reasons.

(3) If objections are received by the AO from the assessee within the time permitted hereinabove, the AO would dispose of the objections, as far as possible, within four months of date of receipt of the objections filed by the assessee.

(4) This is being done in order to ensure that sufficient time is available with the AO to frame the assessment after carrying out proper scrutiny. The requirement and the time-frame for supplying the reasons without being demanded by the assessee would be applicable only if the assessee files his return of income within the period permitted in the notice for reopening. Likewise the time frame for the AO to dispose off the objections would apply only if the assessee raises objections within the time provided hereinabove. This, however, would not mean that if in either case, the assessee misses the time limit, the procedure provided by the Supreme Court in *GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd.* would not apply. It only means that the time frame provided hereinabove would not apply in such cases.

(5) In the communication supplying the reasons recorded by the AO, he shall intimate to the assessee that he is expected to raise the objections within 60 days of receipt of the reasons and shall reproduce the directions contained in sub-para as 1 to 4 hereinabove giving reference to this judgment of the High Court.

(6) The Chief Commissioner of Income-tax and Cadre Controlling Authority of the Gujarat State, shall issue a circular to all AOs for scrupulously carrying out the directions contained in this judgment. (AY. 2008-09)

Sahkari Khand Udyog Mandal Ltd. v. ACIT(2014) 106 DTR 182/ 225 Taxmann 51 (Mag.) (2015) 370 ITR 107 (Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Order after enquiry – Capital gains and business income – Assessment order did not record reasons for accepting assessee's stand is not relevant – Reassessment was not valid. [Ss.28(i), 45, 148]

1729

Assessment was completed after full enquiry and after calling for explanation of assessee why income from sale of plots should be treated as capital gains and not business income. Held, reopening of assessment to assess income as business income was not permissible and that the assessment order did not record reasons for accepting assessee's stand was not relevant. (AY. 2008-09)

Spunpipe and Construction Co. v. ACIT (2014) 362 ITR 559 / 224 Taxmann 25 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – When material is available before the A.O. while framing assessment under section 144 read with section 153 A of the Act – It is assumed that all the material was examined and verified by the AO – Notice issued by the A.O. thereafter on mere suspicion amounts to mere change of opinion. [Ss.144, 148, 153A]

1730

When material is available with the AO while passing assessment order under section 144 read with section 153 A of the Act, it is assumed that the AO while assessing the income of the assessee had examined and verified the material collected during the search operation. Thereafter, notice under section 148 of the Act issued by the AO simply for his verification and to clear his doubts and suspicions and to re-examine the material available on record while passing original assessment order was liable to be quashed. (AY. 2010-11)

Mukesh Modi v. Dy. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 418 / 102 DTR 273 / 267 CTR 409 / 224 Taxmann 362 (Raj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Matter examined – Reassessment was not valid. [S.40(a)(ia),148]

1731

The Assessing Officer framing a scrutiny assessment had not overlooked TDS aspect of the matter but, having enquired with the assessee and having concluded that deduction of tax at source though required, was not deducted, for some reason did not apply the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) but instead made an ad hoc disallowance. Whatever be the legality of such assessment, the fact remained that, in the scrutiny assessment, the Assessing Officer had thoroughly and fully scrutinised the assessee's claim. Any re-examination of such a question at this stage would only amount to change of opinion. The notice was not valid and was liable to be quashed. (AY. 2007-08)

Transwind Infrastructure P. Ltd. v. ITO (2013) 215 Taxmann 111 (Mag.) / (2014) 362 ITR 67 (Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Estimate by Valuation Officer-Investment in construction of building – Reference to Valuation Officer – Opinion of valuation officer not information for reopening assessment – Reassessment was not valid.[S.142A, 148]

1732

During assessment proceedings, matter of valuation of property was referred to Valuation Officer but assessment order was passed before receipt of his report. After receipt of

report, reassessment proceedings were initiated on the basis of the valuation report. Held, the reasons recorded were contrary to facts on record which showed non-application of mind. Hence, reassessment notice was held not valid. (AY. 2005-2006, 2006-2007)

Mahashay Chunnilal Charitable Trust v. DCIT (2014) 362 ITR 314 / 101 DTR 209/225 Taxmann 250 / 267 CTR 334 (Delhi)(HC)

1733 S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Non application of mind – Matter remanded. [S.10(29), 148]

Assessee, a statutory warehousing corporation, allowed exemption in original assessment. Notice pursuant to subsequent ruling of Supreme Court in *Orissa State Warehousing Corporation v. CIT [1999] 237 ITR 589 (SC)* that exemption available only to that part of income which is derived from letting of godowns or warehouses and not income derived from any other source. High Court remanding matter to Tribunal to consider question as to whether “reasons to believe” based upon mere change of opinion. Non-application of mind to directions. Matter remitted to Tribunal for fresh consideration. (AY 1995-1996) *Central Warehousing Corporation v. CIT (2015) 228 Taxmann 169 / (2014) 364 ITR 503 (Delhi)(HC)*

1734 S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Failure to disclose material facts – Bald statement that assessee has failed to make a full & true disclosure of material facts not sufficient. Details must be given as to which fact was not disclosed. [S.148]

It is true that the reasons for initiating re-assessment proceedings do in fact state that there was a failure on the part of the Petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment. However, merely making this bald assertion was not enough. In *Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. R. B. Wadkar (2004)268 ITR 332* it was held that the AO must disclose in the reasons as to which fact or material was not disclosed by the assessee fully and truly necessary for assessment of that assessment year, so as to establish the vital link between the reasons and evidence. On facts, there are no details given by the AO as to which fact or material was not disclosed by the Petitioner that led to its income escaping assessment. There is merely a bald assertion in the reasons that there was a failure on the part of the Petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts without giving any details thereof. This being the case, the impugned notice is bad in law and on this ground alone the Petitioner is entitled to succeed in this Writ Petition. (AY. 2005-06)

Bombay Stock Exchange (No.2) v. DDIT(E)(2014) 365 ITR 181 / 228 Taxmann 195 (Mag) / 106 DTR 121 (Bom.)(HC)

1735 S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Writ – Petition challenging lack of jurisdiction to issue notice on the ground that it is based on ‘change of opinion’ & preconditions of section are not satisfied is maintainable – Mere issuance of notice by revenue is no bar for assessee to move writ jurisdiction – Reassessment on same issue is change of opinion hence not valid. Assessment completed after enquiry and replies furnished by assessee could not be reopened. [S.148, Constitution of India Art. 226]

The assessee filed a Writ Petition to challenge a notice issued u/s. 148 to reopen the assessment. The department relied on the judgement of the Madras High Court in *JCIT*

vs. *Kalanithi Maran* and argued that a Writ Petition to challenge a notice issued u/s 148 was not maintainable. HELD by the High Court rejecting the plea:

The argument, based on *JCIT vs. Kalanithi Maran*, that this Court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the petitioner should be left to avail of the statutory remedies available under the Act is not acceptable. The decision of the Madras High Court in *Kalanithi Maran* proceeded on the basis that the dispute urged before it were with regard to adjudicatory facts and not with regard to jurisdictional facts as raised in this petition. The Madras High Court itself points out that that when an assessment sought to be reopened by an Officer who is not competent to do so or where on the face of it would appear that the reopening is barred by limitation or lacks inherent jurisdiction, the court would certainly entertain a challenge to the reopening notice in its writ jurisdiction. The Madras High Court itself drew a distinction between the adjudicating facts and jurisdictional facts. It was in the above context that challenges to the reopening notice u/s. 147 and 148 of the Act was not interfered with by the Madras High Court as the challenge before it appears to have been with regard to adjudicating facts as contrasted with the jurisdictional facts raised in this case. Jurisdictional facts are those facts which gives jurisdiction to enter upon enquiry, while adjudicatory facts come up for consideration after validly entering upon enquiry i.e. having jurisdiction. In this case, the challenge is based on lack of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned notice by the AO on the ground that the pre-condition for issuing notice u/s. 147 of the Act is not satisfied i.e. notice should not be on account of the change of opinion. It is only when jurisdictional facts are satisfied will the AO acquire the authority to deal with the matter on adjudicatory facts. The decision of the Madras High Court is of no avail in the facts of the present case. It may be pointed out that there could be occasions where jurisdictional facts could itself be a matter of factual enquiry. i.e. leading of evidence and appreciation of facts. In such a case even if the challenge is with regard to jurisdictional facts, yet the Court in its discretion may not entertain the petition as it could be best left for determination before the authorities under the Act. Assessment completed after enquiry and replies furnished by assessee could not be reopened. (AY. 2007-08)

Aroni Commercials Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 405 / 270 CTR 483 / 108 DTR 81/ 52 taxmann.com 113 (Bom.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Deduction claimed u/s. 80IA allowed in assessment made u/s. 143(3) – Reopening of assessment for purpose of ‘verifying’ or ‘verification’ – Reassessment is not valid.[S. 80IA]

1736

Assessee was engaged in the business of construction of infrastructure facilities. Assessee claimed deduction under section 80IA which was allowed in assessment completed under section 143(3). Assessing Officer reopened the assessment on the ground that during the assessment proceedings, it remained to be verified whether the assessee was owner of the infrastructure facility for which the deduction under section 80IA was claimed. On filing writ petition, High Court allowing the writ petition held that, once the Assessing Officer on the basis of material before him had applied his mind and granted deduction in the assessment order, it was not permissible for him to exercise powers under section 147 on the same material on the ground that certain

aspects were not considered. The connotation of word 'to be verified', 'verification' is to re-examine the existing material. Verification is always with reference to the details already considered once. When one wants to verify his decision, it means that one reviews the decision. Re-assessment powers cannot be exercised to merely review the earlier assessment on the special ground that something was omitted from consideration or particular conclusion was imprecisely or wrongly arrived at. (AY. 2007-08)

J. V. Agrawal. v. ITO(2013) 257 CTR 112 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 32 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

1737 **S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Cash credits-Notice was issued without application of mind – Reassessment was bad in law. [S.68,133(6), 143(3),148]**

The assessment of the assessee for assessment year in question was completed under section 143(3). Subsequently, the assessment was reopened on the grounds that the assessee was part of a racket providing bogus accommodation entries which was allegedly masterminded by one Tarun Goyal and that the assessee had introduced his own money in the garb of share application money/share capital etc. through above accommodation entry provider companies. The High Court observed that, in the course of assessment proceedings under section 143(3), a questionnaire had been issued by the Assessing Officer to the assessee on 18-2-2009 to furnish details of share capital introduced and share money received. There was no response by the assessee of this questionnaire till December, 2009. It is an admitted position that the said information had been circulated to all the Assessing Officers on 30-4-2009 which included the Assessing Officer of the assessee. In other words, the Assessing Officer of the assessee had received the said information with regard to the alleged accommodation-entry providing companies. Thereafter, on 9-11-2009 the assessee furnished a reply to the earlier questionnaire which had been issued on 18-2-2009. In that reply, the assessee gave details of share capital raised by it. Those details included the sums received from the aforesaid alleged accommodation entry providers. Along with the said reply dated 9-11-2009, confirmation from the said parties were also furnished. A similar reply was again furnished on 27-11-2009. Despite the furnishing of these details, the Assessing Officer, in order to further verify and confirm the said facts, issued notices under section 133(6) to the said companies directly, on 27-30-11-2009. All the aforesaid five parties responded to those notices and reaffirmed their respective confirmations, which they had earlier provided to the Assessing Officer. It is only subsequent thereto that the assessment was framed on 30-12-2009. In the backdrop of these facts, it is difficult to believe the plea taken in the purported reasons that the said information was 'neither available with the department nor did the assessee disclose the same at the time of assessment proceedings'. From the aforesaid facts it is clear that the information was available with the department and it had been circulated to all the Assessing Officer. There is nothing to show that the Assessing Officer did not receive the said information. There is nothing to show that the Assessing Officer had not applied his mind to the information received by him. On the contrary, it is apparently because he was mindful of the said information that he issued notices under section 133(6) directly to the parties to confirm the factum of application of shares and the source of funds of such shares. Therefore, the very foundation of the notice under section 148 is not established even

ex facie. Consequently, it cannot be said that the Assessing Officer had the requisite belief under section 147 and, as a consequence, the impugned notices are liable to be quashed. (AY. 2007-2008)

Pardesi Developers Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2013) 351 ITR 8 / 258 CTR 411 (2014) 220 Taxmann 18 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Housing project – Reassessment on same material was held to be not valid. [S.80IB(10)] 1738

High Court held that the AO has allowed the claim after making detailed enquiries hence he could not have initiated the reassessment proceedings on basis of same material. Accordingly the reassessment proceedings were quashed. (AY. 2009-10)

Sarala Rajkumar Varma v. ACIT (2014) 43 taxmann.com 372 (Guj.)(HC)

Editorial : SLP of Revenue was dismissed. SCA No. 125 of 2014 dt. 8-10-2014. ACIT v. Sarala Raj Kumar Varma (2014) 227 Taxmann 377 (SC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Reassessment was held to be invalid. [Ss.14A, 37(1), 148] 1739

All the facts were available before the AO at the time of framing the original assessment order; and the AO having taken one of the possible views, the same AO or his successor AO could not have taken a different view as it would amount to a change of opinion- Reassessment was held to be in valid. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Vaishali Avenue (2014) 268 CTR 207 / 226 Taxmann 78 (Mag) /103 DTR 13 (Raj) (HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Subsequent discreet enquiry by AO – Cash credit – Unsecured loan. [S.148] 1740

Reassessment notice was issued under section 148 for all three assessment years i.e. Assessment years 2007-08, 2009-10 and 2011-12. As far as AY 2007-2008 was concerned the notice was beyond 4 years, AY 2009-10 was completed u/s. 143(3) and AY 2011-2012 the time for completion of assessment was not over. Assessee contended that reassessment notice had been issued only on mere change of opinion and there was no material to have any reason for belief that income had escaped assessment. He further submitted that all relevant facts including details of unsecured loans were mentioned in return hence, Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to issue notice under section 148. It was held that on perusal of reasons recorded revealed that Assessing Officer had referred to discreet enquiry, which revealed that companies from whom unsecured loans were received were paper companies and were mere entry providers having no identity, genuineness and creditworthiness and thus it could be inferred that sufficient material had been referred to for forming belief that income had escaped assessment and it could not be termed to be mere change of opinion. It was also held that when figures for unsecured loan had been noted, submission that since notice did not mention that escaped income was ₹ one lakh or more, notice was beyond jurisdiction, was unacceptable. (AY. 2007-08, 2009-10, 2011-12)

Ghaziabad Ispat Udyog Ltd. v. Dy.CIT (2014) 107 DTR 321 / 224 Taxmann 82 (All.)(HC)

- 1741 **S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Business income or income from other sources – Income from lease of building, machinery and plant assessed from 1980 as business income – Notice bringing it to tax as income from other sources – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.28(i), 56, 148]**

Dismissing the appeal of Revenue the Court held that in the 1980's because of the labour problem as the assessee found it difficult to carry on the business, it leased its entire business as a going concern with the licence in favour of the lessee M and, thus, treated the income from lease under the head "Profits and gains of business or profession". The assessee was so assessed. Without any justification whatsoever, notices were issued for reopening of the assessments for the assessment years 1997-98 and 1998-99. A mere change of opinion would not be a ground for reopening of the assessment especially when from 1980 onwards the assessment was made on the very same basis. The notices of reassessment were not valid. (AY. 1997-1998, 1998-1999)

CIT v. Mysore Wine Products Ltd. (2014) 226 Taxmann 132(Mag.) / (2015) 370 ITR 102 (Karn.)(HC)

- 1742 **S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Survey – Reason must be based on new and tangible materials – Assessment after considering documents impounded during income-tax survey-Notice based on same documents – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.133A, 148]**

Court held that a perusal of the original assessment order made it abundantly clear that the AO had not only referred to the documents and records found in course of the survey under section 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, from the business and office premises of the assessee but also those were test checked and evaluated in undertaking that exercise. The endeavour on the part of the Assessing Officer to initiate a reassessment proceeding under sections 147 / 148 of the Act on the purported ground that the same records/documents disclosed that the amount had escaped assessment was unconvincing and untenable as well. The notice of reassessment was not valid as it was based on mere change of opinion of the AO. (AY. 2003-2004)

CIT v. Vardhman Industries. (2014) 363 ITR 625 / 224 Taxmann 68 (Mag.) / 264 CTR 580 (Raj.)(HC)

- 1743 **S.147 : Reassessment – Subsidy treated as a capital receipt in section 263 proceedings for assessment year 2003-04 and matter within knowledge of Department – Reopening of assessments for subsequent years on ground receipt of subsidy not fulfilling requirement of capital receipt – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.148, 263]**

Allowing the petition the Court held that: it was gross indiscipline on the part of the Income-tax Officer to refer to the Supreme Court decision in *Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd v. CIT* (1997) 228 ITR 253(SC), which did not decide whether this subsidy was to be taken as capital receipt or revenue receipt but laid down a broad proposition as to how on factual enquiry subsidies were to be treated. That the subsidy was treated as a capital receipt in section 263 proceedings for the assessment year 2003-04 was within the knowledge of the Department. Therefore, there was no ground for the Revenue to contend that the receipt of subsidy in relation to the assessment years

2006-07 and 2010-11 did not fulfil the requirement of a capital receipt and income had escaped assessment and proceed to invoke the extraordinary provisions of sections 147 and 148. Reassessment proceedings was quashed..(WP NO 64 / 14 dated 29-8-2014) (AY. 2006-2007)

Man Mohan Kedia v. ITO(2014) 227 Taxmann 132 / (2015) 370 ITR 649 (Cal.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Reason to believe – Notice to verify genuineness of expenses – Notice not valid. [S.148]

1744

In the present case the “reasons to believe” nowhere revealed as to what tangible material which the Assessing Officer came to obtain to justify the reassessment notice. The ground had been made out, i.e., that of expenses incurred abroad which had not been revealed. This was an aspect which was known to the Assessing Officer at the time of the original assessment, the explanation by the assessee appeared to have been taken into account. Moreover, an assessment cannot be reopened merely to verify the genuineness of the expenses. The notice of reassessment was not valid. (AY. 2006-2007) *Le Passage to India Tours and Travels P. Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 109 / 54 taxmann.com 138 (Delhi)(HC)*

S.147 : Reassessment – Amortisation of expenses – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [Ss.35D, 148]

1745

On writ petitions against the notices, Held, allowing the petitions, that if the Assessing Officer’s reason to believe lacks validity, the reopening of the assessment would not be permissible. In the present case, additions sought to be made by the Assessing Officer through this process of reopening of the assessment previously closed after scrutiny had not been approved by the Court. The Tribunal’s judgment that even at the first instance in regular assessment, such addition could not be made was confirmed by the High Court. The notices of reassessment were not valid. (AYs. 2001-2002, 2002-2003)

Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 763/223 Taxmann 109 (Guj.)(HC)

Editorial: SLP of revenue was dismissed. SLA (C) NO 17450 OF 2014 dated 18-11-2014 Dy. CIT v. Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co Ltd (2015) 229 Taxmann 220 (SC) SLP of revenue was dismissed. (SLA (C) No. 19202 of 2014 dt 1-12-2014 dated 1-12-2014) Dy. CIT v. Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co Ltd. (2015) 230 Taxmann 267 (SC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Retrospective amendment – Subsequently retrospective amendment held invalid in an appeal filed by another assessee – Consequent appeal against reassessment after five years – Challenging the reassessment proceedings after five years was held to be not maintainable. [S.80HHC, 148].

1746

In view of the Taxation (Amendment) Act, 2005, a modification was introduced in the working of deductions under the third proviso to section 80HHC(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, introduced with retrospective effect from April 1, 1998, as well as the fifth proviso introduced with retrospective effect from April 1, 1992. In accordance with the amendment, the AO completed reassessment proceedings in respect of the assessee for the three assessment years 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04 by orders dated September 19,

2007 and March 1, 2006 respectively. The amendment was challenged subsequent to the Assessing Officer's orders and the Gujarat High Court in *Avani Exports v. CIT [2012] 348 ITR 391 (Guj)* by judgment delivered on July 2, 2012, held that the retrospective nature of the amendment was unconstitutional and that the amendment would be valid only so far as it was applied prospectively. The assessee appealed from the orders of the AO before the Commissioner but the appeals were dismissed *in limine* on ground of delay of 5-6 years. On second appeal, the Tribunal after condoning the delay in filing the appeals on the ground that there was sufficient and reasonable cause, held in favour of the assessee relying on the decision in *Avani Exports v. CIT [2012] 348 ITR 391 (Guj.)* On appeal :

Held, that the reassessment orders of the Assessing Officer were made on March 1, 2006, and September 19, 2007 on the basis of the retrospective amendment. Thus, the orders of the Assessing Officer had attained finality, given that the assessee neither promptly filed an appeal against the orders (i.e., within the 30 days requirement under section 249(2) of the Act) nor moved writ proceedings against the retrospective amendment. Moreover, the assessee was also paying tax under the orders. The assessee only appealed against the AO's orders after a period of 5-6 years i.e., on July 23, 2012. It was clear that this appeal was moved on this date only in order to take advantage of the Gujarat High Court decision in *Avani Exports v. CIT [2012] 348 ITR 391 (Guj.)*. In these circumstances the reassessment orders could not be sought to be indicted inasmuch as the finality which attaches itself to the reassessment orders could not be affected, merely because a later judgment of the Gujarat High Court held the amendment to be arbitrary, to the extent of its retrospectivity. The orders of reassessment were valid.

CIT v. Kultar Exports (2014) 369 ITR 440 / 47 taxmann.com 417 (Delhi)(HC)

1747 **S.147 : Reassessment – Assessment as investment company – No new facts discovered – Notice to treat loss as speculation loss-Notice not valid. [S.73,148.]**

Court held that a reading of the reasons given for reopening of the assessment showed that it was nothing but a review of the orders passed under section 143(3) relating to the assessment years 1996-97 and 1997-98. Consequently, even though the assessment was reopened within the limitation period of four years, there being no fresh material to disturb the reasoning arrived at for the assessment years, the reassessment proceedings were not valid. (AY. 1997-1998, 1998-1999)

CIT v. Ashley Services Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 209 / 229 Taxmann 620/105 DTR 166(Mad.) (HC)

1748 **S.147 : Reassessment – Survey – Valuation of intangible assets and**

bogus claim-Higher depreciation-On the basis of statement of managing director and chartered engineer- Reassessment was held to be valid. [S.32, 143(3)]

The assessment was completed under section 143(3). Survey proceedings took place thereafter. During the survey proceedings statement of managing director and as well as chartered engineer who valued the intangible assets were recorded. In the statement managing director stated that he was ready to withdraw 50% of the claim for depreciation, subject to fresh valuation on the intangible assets. Chartered engineer in his statement stated that he has valued the intangible assets only for internal use

of the company and not for claiming depreciation. On the basis of the statement the AO issued reassessment notice. The assessee challenged the said notice by filing writ petition. Dismissing the petition the Court held that reopening on the basis of statements of managing director and chartered engineer during survey showing higher valuation of intangible assets and / or bogus claim was sustainable. Petition of assessee was dismissed. (AY. 2009-10, 2010-2011)

Powerdeal Energy Systems (I) (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 112 DTR 409 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 227 (Bom.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Notice – Conversion of lease land into freehold land – The reasons recorded do not indicate that the assessee has failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment and that the escaped income was likely to be ₹ 1 lakhs or more – Reassessment notice was quashed. [S.45,148, 149]

1749

The petitioner along with four other persons had obtained a lease deed. The lease deed permitted transfer of succession, sale, assignment, etc. with the previous approval of the State Government. The State Government introduced a policy for conversion of lease land into free hold. The petitioner applied for conversion of leasehold land into free hold land and, thereafter, a freehold sale deed was executed. The petitioner sold a portion of the property. The Assessing Officer issued the impugned notice under section 148. The reasons indicated that the petitioner after converting the lease land into freehold sold off the property within three years resulting into short-term capital gain. On writ petition, the Court held the difference between ‘short-term capital asset’ and ‘long-term capital asset’ is the period over which the property has been held by the assessee. It has nothing to do with the nature of the title over the property. The petitioner already had rights as owner of the property subject to the covenant of the lease for all purposes such as transfer of the leasehold rights of the property with the previous consent of the lessor. The petitioner’s father was the lessee since 1958. The conversion of the rights of the lessee in the property from leasehold to freehold was only an improvement of the rights over the property, which the petitioner enjoyed and this would not have any effect on the taxability of capital gains from such property. Since the property was held by the petitioner for more than three years, short-term capital gains would not be applicable. The conversion from leasehold to a freehold being an improvement of the title, does not have any effect on the taxability of profits as short-term capital gains. For the reasons stated aforesaid, the notices issued under section 148 does not comply with the proviso to sections 147 and 149. The reasons recorded does not indicate that the assessee has failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment and that the escaped income was likely to be ₹ 1 lakhs or more. Consequently, the notice issued under section 148 cannot be sustained and is quashed. (AY. 2000-01)

Amar Nath Agrawal v. CIT (2014) 371 ITR 183 / 227 Taxmann 126 (Mag.) / 273 CTR 344(All.)(HC)

- 1750 **S.147 : Reassessment – Capital gains – Unexplained investment-Based on guidance value of circular – Reassessment was held to be valid – Matter remanded. [S.69, 148]**
 Reassessment proceedings were initiated on the ground that the value of the land shown in the return filed in the year 1999-2000 was ₹ 300 per sq. ft. and the cost of construction was shown at ₹ 100 per sq. ft. As against this, the Government circular dated November 10, 1982, prescribing the guidance value for stamp duty on the basis of which, the assessment was reopened, showed the guidance value of the residential plot in the locality was around ₹ 30.22 sq. ft and as per the senior registered valuer, cost of the construction was ₹ 70 per sq. ft. In view thereof, the assessment was reopened by the Assessing Officer. Order of AO was confirmed by CIT(A).The Tribunal did not go into the merits of the case and allowed the appeal solely on the ground that the Assessing Officer was wrong in reopening the assessment order on the basis of the circular dated November 10, 1982. On appeal to the High Court:
 Held, that the view taken by the Tribunal was wrong. Though the circular was issued 16 years ago, it showed the guidance value prevailing at the relevant time. Having regard thereto and considering the difference between the guidance value and the value of the land shown by the assessee in the return, the Tribunal ought to have recorded its finding on the merits also. The assessee did not and could not produce on record any authentic material to show the purchase price of the property in the year 1981 or when he actually purchased the property. He quoted the value of the land at ₹ 300 per sq. ft on the basis of the valuer's report obtained by him. The Tribunal, therefore, ought to have considered the case on the merits also to find out whether the valuer's report was authentic and acceptable. Matter remanded to the Tribunal. (AY. 1999-2000)
CIT v. M. L. Sridhar (2014) 366 ITR 267 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 516 (Karn.)(HC)
- 1751 **S.147 : Reassessment – Capital gains – Agricultural land – Exemption – Change of opinion – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.54B,143(3), 148]**
 Allowing the petition the Court held that, claim of exemption was thoroughly examined in original assessment, hence denying the exemption in reassessment proceedings on ground what assessee sold was not an agricultural land is a change of opinion hence reassessment proceeding was quashed. (AY. 2009-2010)
Deepakbhai Ramjibhai Patel v. ITO (2014) 366 ITR 134 (Guj.)(HC)
- 1752 **S.147 : Reassessment – Notice issued but proceedings dropped due to technical reasons – Second notice could be issued – subsequent enquiry showing expenditure shown in accounts false – Notice of reassessment was held to be valid. [S.133(6), 143(1), 148]**
 The assessee was engaged in the manufacture and sale of yarn. He purchased raw materials from various sources. the original assessment order was passed under section 143(1)(a) of the Act, However, the Department received information that the assessee had escalated its liability to reduce the tax burden. So notices were issued under section 133(6) of the Act to U. P. State Spinning Mills Ltd. and U. P. State Trading Ltd. to verify the liability shown by the assessee in its books of account. After receiving information, the Department found that there were discrepancies in the books of account of the assessee. A notice of reassessment was issued. On a writ petition to quash the notice it was contended that the second notice was not valid :

Held, (i) that the first notice was withdrawn for technical reasons, as reasons to believe were not mentioned. There was no bar for issuing the second notice. The second notice was valid.

(ii) That from the record it appeared that the assessee *prima facie* had reduced its tax liability by escalating the *debit* and other expenses in the books of account. For the purpose, the Department had verified the information under section 133(6) of the Act. After receiving the information, the discrepancies were recorded in detail and mentioned in the notice which came to the tune of ₹ 24,65,238. The amount of liability did not tally with the accounts of creditors and debtors for the assessment year under consideration, and no scrutiny was made ever. The discrepancies had to be explained by the assessee. Till date, no explanation had been filed. Hence, the notice was valid. (AY. 1988-1989, 1989-1990)

Chokhani Brother v. JCIT (2014) 367 ITR 230/226 Taxmann 51 (All.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Power to make additions on grounds other than those on which assessment reopened – AO assessing income which come to his notice subsequently in course of proceedings under section 147 – Reassessment valid. [S.68, 148, Explanation 3.]

1753

Reassessment proceedings were initiated against the assessee for the assessment year 2000-01. The reason for reassessment was that various finance companies managed and controlled by chartered accountants of Amritsar were found to be providing accommodation entries to various companies of which the assessee was one. During the proceedings the AO noticed that fresh share application money amounting to ₹ 47 lakhs could not be explained by the assessee and treated the amount as unexplained cash credits under section 68. The appellate authorities cancelled the reassessment. On appeal :

Held, allowing the appeal, that the reassessment proceedings could not be held to be vitiated. The matter was remanded to the Tribunal to adjudicate the issue afresh on the merits in accordance with law. Explanation 3 to section 147 was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, retrospectively with effect from April 1, 1989. Under this provision, the AO is empowered to make additions even on a ground on which reassessment notice might not have been issued where during the reassessment proceedings, he concludes that some other income has escaped assessment which comes to his notice during the course of the proceedings for reassessment under section 148 of the Act. The provision nowhere postulates or contemplates that the AO cannot make any additions on any other ground unless some addition is made on the ground on which reassessment had been initiated. (AY. 2000-01)

CIT v. Mahak Finvest P. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 769/52 taxmann.com51 / (2015) 274 ITR 189 (P&H)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Notice – Failure to issue notice under section 143(2) – Notice not valid. [S.143(2), 148]

1754

Held, dismissing the appeals, that both the CIT(A) and the Tribunal had held that the procedure prescribed of issuance of notice under section 143(2) of the Act, had not been followed at all. In the absence of fulfilment of the mandatory requirement of

issuance of notice under section 143(2) both the authorities rightly held that the notice of reassessment was not valid. Ratio in *CIT (Asst.) v. Hotel Blue Moon [2010] 321 ITR 362 (SC)* is applied. (AY. 1996-1997)
CIT v. Sukhini P. Modi (2014) 367 ITR 682/52 taxmann.com 50 (Guj.)(HC)

1755 **S.147 : Reassessment – Search and seizure – Block assessment – Reassessment proceedings not applicable in case of block assessment. [S.148, 158BC, Chapter-XIV-B]**

Court held that S.147 of the Act, has not used the word “the block period”. The reason is simply that the block assessment itself is the reassessment proceedings. There was no necessity for providing reassessment of the reassessment proceedings. sections 147 / 148 of the Act for reassessment are not applicable to the assessment under Chapter XIV-B of the Act. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (BP. 1-4-1989 to 17-11-1999)
ACIT v. Sunil Kumar Jain (2014) 367 ITR 370 / 266 CTR 354 / 42 taxmann.com 376 (Chhattisgarh)(HC)

1756 **S.147 : Reassessment – Audit objection – Notice on basis of audit objection that excess payment as consideration for acquiring copyright should be treated as deemed gift was held to be not valid. [S.143(3), 147(b), 148]**

Assessment was completed under section 143(3) and after detailed discussion the expenses for acquiring copyright was allowed. Assessment was reopened on the basis of audit objection. Allowing the petition the Court held that, consideration paid for purchase of copyright was disclosed in the original assessment proceedings. AO discussing issue and passing a detailed order. AO cannot later form another opinion on same primary facts that income had escaped assessment, therefore notice on basis of audit report that excess payment should be treated as deemed gift was held to be not valid. (AY. 1997-1998)
Jagran Prakashan Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 534 / 226 Taxmann 36(Mag.) / (2015) 122 DTR 43 (All.)(HC)

1757 **S.147 : Reassessment – Notice to withdraw excess depreciation – Valid – Grounds not taken in the petition cannot be urged. [S.32, 148, 151]**

The Court held that in the original assessment was not framed after scrutiny. The issue of depreciation on meters and capacitors, therefore, was never examined by the AO. The question of change of opinion would not arise, therefore notice to withdraw excess depreciation was held to be valid. The assessee raised two additional contentions that in terms of section 151 of the Act sanction of the competent authority was not obtained before issuing notice and that subsequently, the issue of depreciation, on meters and capacitors had been decided in favour of the assessee. However, neither of these grounds found any place in the petition. The additional contentions could not be considered. The notice of reassessment was valid.
Torrent Power Sec. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 276/(2015) 55 taxmann.com 90 (Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Recorded reasons – No addition was made on the basis of recorded reasons – Other income cannot be assessed. [S.148] 1758

Quashing the notice issued under section 148, the Court held that if no additions were made in respect of original reasons given for reopening of assessment, it was not open to AO to make additions on some other ground without first issuing a notice under section 148. (AY. 2005-06)

Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Addl. CIT (2014) 272 CTR 56 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 25 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Notice on ground sale consideration less than value of property for stamp duty – Assessee while computing capital gains adopting circle rate which was higher than sale consideration – No escapement of income – Notice was held to be not valid. [S.45, 148.] 1759

Dismissing the appeal of Revenue the Court held that the assessee while computing capital gains adopting circle rate which was higher than sale consideration, there cannot be reason to believe that income has escaped assessment. Accordingly the Order of Tribunal was affirmed. (AY. 2009-2000)

CIT v. Samraj Krishan Chaudhary (2014) 368 ITR 638 / (2015) 57 taxmann.com 224 (All.)(HC)

S. 147 : Reassessment – Deduction of tax at source – Commission and brokerage – High Court in assessee's case for subsequent years holding no need to deduct tax at source – Supreme Court dismissing Department's special leave petition from order of court for subsequent years – No reason to believe that income escaped assessment – Notice was held to be not valid. [S.40(a)(ia), 148, 194H] 1760

Notice under section 148 of the Act was issued against the assessee for reopening the assessment on the ground that the assessee had paid commission without deducting tax at source to the advertising agents as required under section 194H and, consequently, had made default under section 40(a)(ia). Held, allowing the petition, that since the special leave petition against the judgment of the Court in the case of the assessee had been dismissed, the sole basis on which the assessment for the assessment year 2005-06 was sought to be reopened under section 148 had been nullified. The notice under section 142(1) also proposed the disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) on the same ground which had been held against the Revenue in the judgment of the Court in the assessee's case. Therefore, the Assessing Officer would have no reason to believe that the income has escaped assessment on the ground that there was a disallowance liable to be made under section 40(a)(ia) for non-deduction of the tax at source under section 194H. The notice of reassessment under section 148 as well as the notice under section 142(1) were liable to be quashed and set aside. (AY. 2005-2006)

Jagran Prakashan Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 368 ITR 687 / 230 Taxmann 652 (All.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Notice – Non-resident – Permanent-establishment – Tax deduction at source – Survey – DTAA–India–Korea – Reassessment proceedings was held to be valid – Fixation of price by Transfer Pricing Officer not conclusive. [S.148] 1761

The assessee, a tax resident of Korea, was engaged in the business and manufacture of sale of refrigerators, washing machines, air-conditioners and other household electronics

appliances. The assessee had a wholly owned subsidiary company in India known as LGIL and had entered into several transactions relating to sale of raw materials finished goods and received royalty income, fees for technical services, etc. For the assessment year 2004-05, the assessee was in receipt of royalty income and fees for technical services from which the tax due was duly deducted and deposited. The assessee, however, did not file a return for the assessment year 2004-05 since full tax as per the provisions of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and Korea (DTAA) had been deducted by the Indian subsidiary on such payments. On June 24, 2010 a survey was carried out by the Income-tax Department on the premises of the Indian subsidiary under section 133A. The Assessing Officer concluded that from the extracts of statements and documents impounded during the survey operation that the assessee not only had business connection but had a permanent establishment in India and since no returns were filed, its income had escaped assessment as per the provisions of section 147 read with section 148. The Assessing Officer found that the total value of the transaction was ₹ 2,41,14,53,972 and if a profit of 25 per cent was applied the income from these transaction would come to ₹ 60,28,63,493 which had escaped assessment. He issued a notice of reassessment. On a writ petition to quash the notice:

Held, dismissing the petition, that once the Assessing Officer was satisfied that a permanent establishment of the assessee existed in India and business was being conducted from this permanent establishment, the attribution of profits was a necessary consequence. The order of the Transfer Pricing Officer would not come in the way. Where the transfer pricing analysis did not take into account all the risk taking functions of the enterprise and it did not adequately reflect the function performed and the risk assumed by the assessee, the situation would be different and, in such a situation, there would be a need to attribute profits to the permanent establishment for those functions/risks that had not been considered. Further, the survey was made much after the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer, and the documents so impounded revealed the existence of a permanent establishment of the assessee and its business operations in India through its permanent establishment without disclosing its taxable income. Thus, the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer was not binding at the stage of issuance of notice. The notice of reassessment was valid. (AY. 2004-2005)

Principal Officer, L.G. Electronics Inc. v. ADIT (IT)(2014) 368 ITR 401/226 Taxmann 204/271 CTR 663 (All.)(HC)

1762 **S.147 : Reassessment – Transfer of cases – Proceedings initiated by AO, prior to transfer of jurisdiction was held to be invalid and quashed. [S.127, 148]**

Proprietorship concern of assessee was situated at Suratgarh. On 3-4-2006 AO, Suratgarh issued on assessee a notice under section 147/148 for assessment year 2003-04. Assessee objected notice contending that he along with his family was residing at Chennai for last 25 years and was filing returns of income with AO Chennai. AO Suratgarh rejected objections by his order dated 5-7-2007. About 15 months after initiation of reassessment proceedings, AO Suratgarh started proceedings under section 127 for transfer of assessee's case from Chennai to Suratgarh. Jurisdiction over assessee's case was finally transferred on 21-8-2007 from Chennai to Suratgarh. Thereupon AO completed assessment of assessee under section 147 read with section 148 on 27-11-2007. It was

held that since proposal for transfer of jurisdiction over assessee from Chennai to Suratgarh materialised only on 21-8-2007, proceedings initiated by AO, Suratgarh prior to this date could not be considered authorised and competent. Hence, reassessment proceedings were quashed. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Poonam Chand Surana (2014) 105 DTR 332 / 221 Taxmann 151 (Raj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Eligible business- No power of review – Reassessment was held to be bad in law. [S.36(1)(viii), 143(3), 148]

1763

AO allowed assessee's claim for deduction under section 36(1)(viii). Subsequently, AO sought to initiate reassessment proceedings taking a view that there was an excess grant of benefit under section 36(1)(viii). The assessee challenged the said notice by filing writ petition. Allowing the petition the Court held that AO has no power to review assessment order under shelter of re-opening of assessment under sections 147/148, therefore, it was not open for AO to re-look at same material only because he was subsequently of view that conclusion arrived at earlier was erroneous. Reassessment proceedings were quashed. (AY. 1999-2000)

Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd. v. J. P. Janjid (2014) 225 Taxmann 81 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Search and seizure – Gift – Reassessment proceedings were held to be valid. [S.68, 132, 139,143(2), 148, 15BC]

1764

During post search enquiry, it became known that gift cheques shown in return filed under section 139 were a sham transaction. Court held that material found in post search enquiries could form a 'reason to believe' that income had escaped assessment by issuance of a notice under section 143(2), since period under section 143(2) had expired, AO having genuine reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment, could issue a notice under section 148. Accordingly the AO was justified in forming an opinion, that income had escaped assessment and was, therefore, justified in issuing notice under section 148. (AY. 1999-2000, 2001-2002)

Anand Prakash Agrawal v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 526 / 225 Taxmann 40 (Mag.) / (2015) 121 DTR 227 (All.)(HC)

Usha Agrawal (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 526 / (2015) 121 DTR 227 (All.)(HC)

Mohit Agrawal v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 526 / (2015) 121 DTR 227 (All.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment– Premium notes – Interest – Capital or revenue – Pendency of appeal before Tribunal – Reassessment was held to be bad in law. [S.37(1)]

1765

Assessee issued secured premium notes and claimed interest liability and other related expenditure. AO held impugned expenditure as capital in nature and made addition to income. CIT(A) allowed the said expenditure as revenue. Revenue went in appeal before Tribunal. Pending appeal, AO issued notice for re-opening on ground that liability in respect of said expenditure did not accrue during relevant period. On appeal CIT (A) and Tribunal held that reassessment was bad in law. On appeal by the revenue, confirming the order of Tribunal the Court held that such plea could not be taken by revenue in pending appeal before Tribunal and thus, intimation of re-assessment was bad in law. (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Nirma Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 49 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

- 1766 **S.147 : Reassessment – Dealers commission – Business expenditure – Attempt to revisit for third time – Nothing but the tax authorities effort to overreach the law and resultantly a sheer harassment of the petitioner – Reassessment was quashed. [S.37(1)]**
 The assessee, a telecom service provider filed its return and claimed commission expenses. During assessment proceedings and first reassessment proceedings questions regarding dealer's commission as well as TDS on those amounts were replied to AO. Revenue considering same, disallowed certain portion. Notice was issued once again on the same issue. Allowing the petition the Court held that an attempt of AO to revisit same issue for third time without any tangible or fresh material could not be held as valid reassessment. Action of AO was nothing but the tax authorities effort to overreach the law and resultantly a sheer harassment of the petitioner. (AY. 1997-98)
Vodafone South Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 363 ITR 388 / 225 Taxmann 46 (Mag.) / 112 DTR 227 (Delhi)(HC)
- 1767 **S.147 : Reassessment – Business of electricity – Separate report of each undertaking was not filed along with the return-Interest earned on late payment of sales – Reassessment was not justified. [S.80IA,148]**
 Assessee engaged in business of generation of electricity, claimed deduction under section 80IA. AO initiated reassessment proceeding on ground that separate report as required to be submitted at time of filing return by each undertaking and enterprise of assessee claiming deduction, had not been furnished and that interest earned on late payment of sale was eligible for deduction. The assessee challenged the notice on writ .allowing the petition the Court held that, it was found that required report was filed during assessment proceedings and that interest issue is settled by Supreme Court that interest from trade debtor is not required to be excluded from profits for purpose of section 80IA deduction. Since neither of grounds was sustainable, permitting notice for reassessment to be pursued would be an exercise in futility. (AY. 2004-05)
Gujarat Paguthan Energy Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 70 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)
- 1768 **S.147 : Reassessment – Industrial undertakings – Merger – Quantum of deduction – Reassessment was held to be not valid [S.80IB]**
 Assessee, engaged in business of contracts for erection, commissioning and pressure die casting, claimed deduction under section 80IB which was disallowed. CIT(A) granted relief to assessee and said order was subsequently given effect to by AO. Thereafter, department sought to reassess order passed by Assessing Officer questioning quantum of deduction. Meanwhile, Tribunal had confirmed order passed by CIT(A). Since order passed by AO got merged with order of Tribunal which also had attained finality, department would not be justified to reassess said order. Reassessment was quashed. (AY. 2001-02)
CIT v. Flothern Engineers (P) Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 223 (Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Unutilised CENVAT – Exclusive method of accounting – Change of opinion – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.145, 148] 1769

Where issue of accounting treatment in respect of unutilised CENVAT credit for purpose of valuing closing stock was already examined by Assessing Officer during scrutiny assessment, reopening of assessment on same issue without any tangible material was mere change of opinion and hence not sustainable. (AY. 2008-09)

Heavy Metal & Tubes Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 86 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Bad debts – Capital account – Change of opinion – Reassessment was held to be bad in law. [S.36(1) (vii), 143(3)148] 1770

During scrutiny assessment, Assessing Officer had asked for details regarding bad debts written off, but had not made any disallowance for same. Subsequently assessment was reopened and bad debts written off was disallowed on account of it being on capital account. On writ the Court held that where Assessing Officer had raised a specific query with regard to bad debts written off, it could be concluded that he had examined issue at time of making original assessment and had formed an opinion by not making any addition in respect thereof. Therefore, reopening of assessment on issue of bad debts written off was nothing but a mere change of opinion, and hence, not permissible. (AY. 2003-04)

Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 356 ITR 209 / (2014) 225 Taxmann 104 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Deduction at source – Freight – Time allowed to assessee to submit details – Natural justice – Request for extension of time – Order without considering request and without hearing assessee – Not valid – Matter was set aside. [Ss.40(a)(ia), 148] 1771

For relevant assessment year, AO passed assessment order after scrutiny. Subsequently, assessment proceedings were reopened by issuing a notice under section 148. Assessee challenged initiation of reassessment proceedings. In meantime, AO issued notice calling upon assessee to explain why freight payment should not be disallowed under section 40(a)(ia). In response assessee wrote a letter seeking extension of time to collect necessary details. AO without communicating refusal of adjournment to assessee, proceeded to pass order of disallowance on very same day on which hearing was fixed. The Court held that on facts, AO acted in undue haste and order passed by him resulted into violation of principles of natural justice hence impugned order was to be set aside and, matter was to be remanded back for disposal afresh. (AY. 2006-07)

Shree Palani Transport Co. v. AO (2014) 368 ITR 524 / 225 Taxmann 1 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Subsequent assessment year – Tangible material – Reopening of assessment was held to be valid. [S.37(1), 148, 195(2)] 1772

Assessee-company claimed deduction on account of business support charges, guarantee fees and other service charges paid to its holding company and it was allowed deduction accordingly. However, Assessing Officer noticed that in assessment proceedings for assessment year 2007-08, business support charges and guarantee fees paid to holding company were disallowed being not for business expediency. On basis of said order,

Assessing Officer reopened assessment for assessment year 2006-07 - Records revealed that Assessing Officer for assessment year 2006-07 did not evaluate or consider said issues. Moreover, assessment order for assessment year 2007-08 could be said to be tangible material to form belief that income had escaped assessment. Reopening was justified. (AY. 2006-07)

Rabo India Finance Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 356 ITR 200/ (2014)225 Taxmann 92 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

1773 **S.147 : Reassessment – Infrastructure development – Within four years – Change of opinion – Contractor and not developer – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.80IA(13)]**

Assessee, a contractor claimed deduction under section 80IA. Assessing Officer issued notice under section 147 on ground that assessee was a contractor and not developer and, thus, it was not entitled to claim deduction under section 80IA. Only ground which had made Assessing Officer to initiate proceedings of reassessment was amendment by way of insertion of Explanation to sub-section (13) of section 80IA by Finance Act, 2009 which substituted earlier Explanation giving retrospective effect to said provision from 1-4-2000. Since such provision being always there on record and Assessing Officer having already scrutinized entire issue thread bare, issuance of such notice had to be held as nothing but a change of opinion on part of Assessing Officer. Reassessment was bad in law. (AY. 2006-07)

Classic Network Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 174 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

1774 **S.147 : Reassessment – Power – Discovery – Production of evidence – Reference to District valuation officer – No assessment was pending – No authority to issue commission – Reassessment notice was held to be bad in law. [Ss.131(1)(d), 148]**

Assessee, had been constructing a commercial complex in which substantial investment was made. Assessing Officer in order to ascertain cost of construction, referred case to District Valuation Officer (DVO) under section 131(1)(d). Subsequently, on basis of report of DVO, notice was issued under section 148 for initiating reassessment proceedings. Assessee filed writ petition raising objection to initiation of reassessment proceedings. Since there was no assessment proceedings pending against assessee, Assessing Officer did not have authority to issue commission to DVO under section 131(1)(d). therefore, impugned proceedings initiated against assessee deserved to be quashed. (AY. 1990-91, 1998-99)

CIT v. Baldev Plaza (2014) 225 Taxmann 276 (All.)(HC)

1775 **S.147 : Reassessment – Reasons recorded before issuance of notice for reopening assessment quashed by High Court – Supplementary reasons recorded after issue of notice have no validity – Notice not valid. [S.148]**

The validity of notice for reopening must be judged on the basis of the reasons recorded. Such reasons in terms of section 148(2) have to be recorded before issuance of the notice.

Held accordingly, allowing the petition that the original assessment was not made after scrutiny. The validity of the Assessing Officer's belief that income chargeable to tax had

escaped assessment on the strength of the reasons recorded before issuance of the notice for reopening had already been set aside in the case of the very assessee by the High Court. The supplementary reasons were recorded well after issuance of the notice. The Assessing Officer, therefore, could not support the notice of reopening on the basis of any reasons recorded subsequent to the notice itself. Therefore, the notice was liable to be quashed. (AY. 1999-2000)

India Gelatine and Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT (No.2) (2014) 364 ITR 655 / 52 taxmann.com 141 (Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Undisclosed investment – Received information from Investigation Wing after expiry of 10 years – Reassessment invalid as details already disclosed in return filed [S.69B]

1776

Assessing Officer received information from Investigation Wing that assessee has purchased a plot and thereby constructed a house on the said plot.

The re-assessment proceeding for the AY. 1987-88 was initiated in 1997-98 and in between the period of 10 years the jurisdiction of AO might have changed. The figure furnished in the return filed for the AY. 1987-88 were acted upon even though the loans/other amounts said to have been stated in the return has been added. The CIT(A) allowed the appeal by stating that, the assessment has not been validly reopened and the AO has simply acted on the information of Investigation Wing without application of his mind. Once the assessee has disclosed all the particulars in the original return, it is not correct to reopen the assessment to find out as to whether these particulars have been disclosed or not i.e. purchase of land and construction thereupon, no matter who has given the information, without correlating the information with the original return. This precisely has been done by the Assessing Officer. The AO himself accepted the stated profit and loss account, capital account and balance sheet as filed by the appellant along with account and balance sheet as filed by the appellant along with original return as correct. This show that the assessment has not been validly reopened. There was no application of mind at the time of reopening of assessment. On receipt of the information from Investigation Wing, assessments were mechanically reopened without any reference of the original returns. therefore, no assessment because of action u/s 148 does not lie. The Tribunal has accepted the reasons given by the CIT(A) and is perfectly justified in quashing the order of reassessment proceedings as the action was mechanical in nature and without ascertaining. The High Court held quashing the reassessment proceedings that action of Assessing Officer was mechanical in nature and reassessment was made without ascertaining as to whether the assessee had disclosed the factum of purchase of plot and cost of construction in the original return. (AY. 1987-88)

CIT v. Laxmi Mehrotra(Smt.)(2014)222 Taxmann 111(Mag.)(All)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Where no assessment order was passed either u/s. 143(1)(a), 143(3) or 144, re-assessment order u/s. 147 could not be passed. [S.139(9), 143(1)(a), 143(3), 148]

1777

The assessee has filed his return of income. A notice was however issued by AO for deficiency. The AO has completed the assessment under Section 147 of the Act. The CIT(A) declared that the assessment year as annulled. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal

filed by the Department, not being satisfied. Before High Court the revenue appeal, HC observed that the assessee had voluntarily filed his return u/s. 139, a notice u/s. 139(9) was issued for the removal of the defects. These defects were not removed. So, again, a notice was sent. Ultimately, the defects were removed. But, there was no reference to this effect in the assessment order passed by the AO for the assessment year under consideration. A notice under Section 148 was issued and the assessee submitted that original return may be treated as return in response to the notice under Section 148. Thereafter, the AO made the additions under section 147 of the Act. However, no assessment order was passed either under sections 142(1)(a); 143(3); or 144 of the Act. The High Court held that without passing the assessment order, there was no occasion to pass the re-assessment order under Section 147 of the Act. When it is so, then there was no reason to interfere with the impugned order. (AY. 1998-99)
CIT v. P.N. Sharma (2014) 222 Taxmann 178 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)

1778 S.147 : Reassessment – AO allowed deduction under Sections 80-IB & 80JJA after due application of mind in the original assessment – Reassessment mere change of opinion and held bad in law. [S.80IB, 80JJA]

Assessee was engaged in business of manufacturing of Enzyme and declared nil income after claiming deduction under section 80IB and under section 80JJA. Assessment was completed accordingly. Subsequently, Assessing Officer noticed that relevant year was seventh year of claim of deduction under section 80JJA and deduction under section 80JJA is admissible for a period of five years from commencement year and therefore, observed that assessee was not entitled to deduction under section 80JJA and that deduction under section 80IB was to be restricted at rate of 30 per cent of eligible profit. Thus, he sought to reopen assessment after expiry of period of four years. The assessee filed a writ petition against the reopening notice. The High Court held that in the original assessment, Assessing Officer had dealt with said issues and after due application of mind, had allowed both deductions. Reassessment being based on change of opinion was held to bad in law. (AY. 2007-08)
MAPS Enzymes Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 128 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

1779 S.147 : Reassessment – Reasons recorded before issuance of notice for reopening – assessment quashed by High Court – Supplementary reasons recorded after issue of notice have no validity – Notice not valid. [S.148]

The validity of notice for reopening must be judged on the basis of the reasons recorded. Such reasons in terms of section 148(2) have to be recorded before issuance of the notice. On writ allowing the petition, the Court held that, the validity of the Assessing Officer's belief that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment on the strength of the reasons recorded before issuance of the notice for reopening had already been set aside in the case of the very assessee by the High Court. The supplementary reasons were recorded well after issuance of the notice. The Assessing Officer, therefore, could not support the notice of reopening on the basis of any reasons recorded subsequent to the notice itself. Therefore, the notice was liable to be quashed. (AY. 1999-2000)
India Gelatine and Chemicals Ltd. (No.1) v. ACIT (2014) 364 ITR 649 / 224 Taxmann 187(Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Return of income – Filing an income-tax return with an office which has no concern or connection with the assessment of income of the assessee, in law, would amount to non-filing of return – Reassessment was held to be valid. [S.127, 132, 139, 148]

1780

The assessee was being regularly assessed to income tax. Search operations under section 132 of the Act were also carried out. Thereafter, case of the assessee was centralised under section 127 of the Act by the CIT, Chandigarh to the office of the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner, Chandigarh. The assessee was thus well aware of the fact that the jurisdiction over her case was with the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner, Central Circle, Chandigarh. In fact, for the last many years, assessment was being finalised under section 143(3) of the Act by the said officer. Moreover, the assessee during the course of search assessment proceedings before the Settlement Commissioner had also impleaded the said officer as the second party. When the return for the AY. 2006-07 was not furnished by the due date, a notice under section 142(1) of the Act was served upon the assessee on 2.1.2007 requiring the assessee to file the return of her income for the AY 2006-07 on or before 2.1.2007 but no compliance was made by the assessee and in fact, return was not filed. Consequently, recording reasons for re-opening the case, a notice under Section 148 of the Act was issued to the assessee on 24.3.2008. In response to the notice, the assessee came up with a plea that the return of income for the AY 2006-07 had already been filed by her on 30-10-2006 with Range-IV, Chandigarh. It was found that the return had been filed surreptitiously to an office which had no connection with assessment of income of the assessee.

On appeal the HC held that the filing of return by the assessee with an office having no concern or connection with assessment of income of the assessee, in law, would amount to non-filing, justifying action under section 147 read with section 148 of the Act. (AY. 2006-07)

Sujata Grover v. CIT (2014) 223 Taxmann 44(Mag.) (P&H)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – DVO's report – Reassessment was held to be bad in law. [S.148]

1781

Reopening an assessment could not be upheld based upon an incomplete report of DVO wherein the DVO had only raised doubts on the methodology adopted by the assessee for the valuation of earth work. (AY. 1998-99, 1999-00)

Tikaula Sugar Mills Ltd. v. (2014) 223 Taxmann 117 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Limitation – No express findings or direction – Reassessment was held to be valid. [S.149, 150, 153(3)]

1782

As per the provisions 153(3)(ii), a case may be reopened at any given period notwithstanding the time limitation as prescribed under section 149 when it is in consequence of direction of appellate authority. Even in a case having no express finding or direction that escaped income can be reassessed under explanation 2 to section 153 or in the alternative by section 153(3)(ii) of the Act. (AY. 1996-97)

CIT v. Glass Equipment (India) Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 59 / 269 CTR 363 / 225 Taxmann 65 (Cal.)(HC)

- 1783 **S.147 : Reassessment – Survey – Notice on the basis of survey statement – No independent material – Statement retracted later – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.133A, 148]**

The sole basis for issuance of the notice was the statement made during the course of survey by the son of the assessee. The reasons did not give any further details as to what was the amount which had been accepted by the son of the assessee and how the statement would bind the assessee. In the absence of any independent material, the record did not reveal how such statement of the son of the assessee would form a valid basis for reopening the assessment of the assessee. Any notice of the reopening issued under section 148 would be required to be tested at the touchstone of the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer. As could be noticed from the record, the very basis on which the Revenue had sought to reopen the assessment was not sustainable. (AY. 1999-2000)

CIT v. Shardaben K. Modi (2013) 217 Taxmann 89 (Mag.) (2014) 365 ITR 169 (Guj.)(HC)

- 1784 **S.147 : Reassessment – Audit objection – If AO contests the audit objection but still reopens to comply with the audit objection, it means he has not applied his mind independently and the reopening is void. [S.148]**

To satisfy ourselves, whether the reassessment proceedings have been initiated at the instance of the audit party and solely on the ground of audit objections. On a perusal of the files, the noting made therein and the relevant documents, it appears that the assessment is sought to be reopened at the instance of the audit party, solely on the ground of audit objections. It is also found that, as such, the AO tried to sustain his original assessment order and submitted to the audit party to drop the audit objections. if the reassessment proceedings are initiated merely and solely at the instance of the audit party and when the Assessing Officer tried to justify the Assessment Orders and requested the audit party to drop the objections and there was no independent application of mind by the Assessing Officer with respect to subjective satisfaction for initiation of the reassessment proceedings, the impugned reassessment proceedings cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. (AY. 2009-10) *Raajratna Metal Industries Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 371 ITR 222 / 227 Taxmann 133 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)*

- 1785 **S.147 : Reassessment – Recorded reasons – Cannot be improved in the affidavit – Change of opinion – The formal reasons given in support of reopening the case cannot be added to or subtracted from or improved in the affidavit-in-opposition. [S.148]**

In *Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. R. B. Wadkar*, Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax And Others (No. 1) reported in 268 ITR 322 (Bombay) and *Aroni Commercial Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax and another* reported in (2014) 362 ITR 403(Bom.) both Division Bench judgments of the Bombay High Court hold that the formal reasons given in support of reopening the case cannot be added to or subtracted from or improved in the affidavit-in-opposition. In this case also the reasons dated 5-2-2013 have been sought to be improved in the affidavit-in-opposition which is not permissible on the basis of the above decisions. Furthermore, what is more important is that the assessment was sought to be reopened on a mere change of opinion, the change of opinion being with

regard to estimation of the indexed cost of acquisition on 1st April, 1981. It has been declared in the formal reasons that the justification for reassessment was to be found in the view of the Income-tax Officer Chennai. On the face of the records the department was acting on a change of opinion. It is settled law that an assessment cannot be reopened on a change of opinion. (dt. 29-9-2014) (AY. 2006-07)
Asiatic Oxygen Limited v. DCIT (2015) 372 ITR 421 (Cal.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – “Escapement of income” should be given a strict construction. [S.148] 1786

In my opinion “escapement of income” should be given a strict construction. Not only should it not be used to justify a change of view it should not be used to reopen an assessment on facts, information, documents which were before the Assessing Officer or could have been easily found by him while making the assessment. Otherwise, there would be no finality of assessment. It will go on and on and might become a tool in the hands of the department to cause harassment to the assessee. (AY. 2009-10)
Debashis Moulik v. ACIT (Cal.)(HC); www.itatonline.org

S.147 : Reassessment – Reason to believe – Absence of new tangible material – Tangible material that can lead to ‘reason to believe’ must be material that is attributable to the assessee and not material that is attributable to change opinion of the AO in respect of the material already available prior to the original assessment. 1787

The AO framed original assessment proceedings after taking into account all the materials which were called for by him, after the search proceedings taken against the assessee, including details of investment made in various companies. Thereafter, assessment proposed to be reopened alleging undisclosed investments made by the assessee. On writ filed by the assessee the High Court held that, reason recorded did not constitute valid reason for reopening assessment in form of tangible material discovered by the Revenue authorities after completion of original assessment. (AY. 1991-92)
Ralson India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 103/ 102 DTR 234 / 231 Taxmann 884 (Delhi) (HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Reason to believe – Explanation submitted by the assessee that the receipt disclosed in return for earlier year which was furnished after issuance of notice under section 147 for the year – Held reassessment valid. 1788

Explanation of the assessee that the receipt of Japanese Yen alleged to have been escaped assessment for the current year had been disclosed in the return for earlier year filed after issuance of notice under section 148 for the year, could not invalidate the reassessment proceedings. (AY. 2006-07)
Canon India (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. ACIT(2013) 218 Taxmann 405/ (2014) 102 DTR 420 (Delhi) (HC)

S.147:Reassessment – International taxation – Fact that TPO has examined international transactions in payer’s hands and found them to be at arm’s length does not mean the PE of payee cannot be assessed. [S.148] 1789

The assessee, a South Korean company, entered into transactions with its wholly owned subsidiary named LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. relating to sale of raw materials,

finished goods and received royalty, fees for technical services, etc. The assessee did not file any return of income. The subsidiary deducted TDS as per the provision of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and Korea (DTAA) on such payments. The AO conducted a survey which according to him showed that the Indian subsidiary company did not function as an independent corporate entity and is totally dependent on the assessee. He found that the employees of the assessee were using the office of the subsidiary as a front for conducting their own business and, consequently, held that the office of the Indian company was functioning as a permanent establishment and was a fixed place of business available to the assessee as per Article 6(1) of the DTAA. He accordingly issued a notice u/s. 148 seeking to assess the income of the assessee. The assessee filed a Writ Petition to challenge the s. 148 notice *inter alia* on the ground that (i) as the Indian subsidiary had disclosed the international transactions and the same had been evaluated for transfer pricing purposes the AO was barred from, --- there was no fresh material and (iii) there was no application of mind by the AO before issuing the s. 148 notice. HELD by the High Court dismissing the Petition:

(i) There is a rational and live nexus between the reasons recorded and the belief that income had escaped assessment. Once the AO comes to the conclusion that the assessee has a permanent establishment and is carrying out its business activities through this permanent establishment for the purpose of supply of raw materials and finished products and that the permanent establishment was available to the employees of the assessee, who were either permanently stationed or came to India for business purposes, we are of the view that the AO has given valid reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment;

(ii) The contention that there was no fresh material before the AO is patently erroneous. The analysis made from the survey report and the documents so impounded has led the AO to reasonably believe that income had escaped assessment on account of the fact that the petitioner was carrying on business operation in India through a permanent establishment. The contention that there was no application of mind is also patently erroneous because the reasons clearly show that an in-depth study and analysis was made and reasons were recorded in detail;

(iii) The contention that as the Indian subsidiary had, in terms of s. 92E, disclosed all the transactions with the assessee relating to purchase of raw materials, finished goods etc and the TPO had found then to be at arm's length, the AO was precluded from drawing any inference that any further income of the assessee from the same transactions was chargeable to tax had escaped assessment is erroneous and cannot be accepted. The TPO's order will not come in the way for the reason that the TPO's order is in relation to the transactions between a subsidiary company and the petitioner. The situation becomes different when the subsidiary company also works as a permanent establishment of the petitioner. Once a permanent establishment is established, the petitioner becomes liable to be taxed in India on so much of its business profits as is attributable to the permanent establishment in India. The order of the TPO is in relation with the subsidiary company and not in relation with the permanent establishment of the petitioner. The transfer pricing analysis is to be undertaken between the petitioner and its permanent establishment which has not taken place as yet. Once a

transfer pricing analysis is done, the computation of income arising from international transaction has to be done keeping in mind the principle of arm's length price. Once this is done, there is no further need to attribute profits to a permanent establishment. However, where the transfer pricing analysis does not take into account all the risk taking functions of the enterprise and it does not adequately reflect the function performed and the risk assumed by the petitioner, the situation would be different and, in such a situation, there would be a need to attribute profits to the permanent establishment for those functions/risk that have not been considered. This is precisely what was considered in DIT (international Taxation) Morgan Stanley & Co. (2007) 292 ITR 416 (SC)

LG Electronics Inc. v. ADIT (All.) (HC) www.itatonline.org

S.147 : Reassessment – Recording of reasons is mandatory before issue of notice – Commission – Information – Statement recorded – Parties denied – Reassessment was held to be valid on the basis of information received in the assessment year 2010-2011. [Ss.37(1), 148]

1790

During the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 2010-11, AO noticed that of some of the parties who have received the payments denied the services rendered. On the basis of said information after recording reasons the AO issued notice under section 148. Reasons were recorded before issue of notice, however the recorded reasons were furnished after four and half months. Court held that no prejudice has been caused to the assessee on account delay in supplying the reasons for reopening the assessment. The Court held that facts revealed to the AO during the assessment proceedings for 2010-11 constituted 'information' contemplated by section 147 and said information has direct nexus and/or link with the tax liability for assessment year 2006-07 and assessment year 2008-09, that the material in the hands of AO is *prima facie* sufficient for him to form a belief that income has escaped assessment, therefore the issue of notices were not an outcome of change in opinion of the successor AO but is based on tangible material received during assessment proceedings in subsequent year. Notice for reassessment was held to be valid. (AY. 2006-07, 2008-09)

Debashu Services (P) Ltd. v. Dy.CIT (2014) 107 DTR 41 / 270 CTR 36 / 49 taxmann.com 41 (Bom.) (HC).

S.147 : Reassessment – No new material to hold that income has escaped – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.115JB, 143(3)]

1791

Assessment had been framed u/s 143(3) of the Act. Subsequently, case was reopened on account that assessee has wrongly claimed depreciation which was lower than brought forward loss while as per the provisions as contained in section 115JB of the Act the same was required to be adjusted from the lower of brought forward loss or unabsorbed depreciation. Assessment order was re-framed. CIT(Appeals) and Tribunal allowed the appeal on account that assessee has disclosed all material facts and Assessing Officer after considering the material facts passed assessment order u/s. 143(3). On appeal by revenue to High Court, held that

It is a case in which after filing of the return by the assessee the matter was scrutinised and on thorough examination of the facts, the initial assessment order was passed.

There was no new material before the Assessing Officer to record a finding that on the basis of some new material, he had formed an opinion that it was a case of escaped assessment and the assessee had not disclosed the fact truly and rightly. On the basis of the material on which the assessment order was passed, the Assessing Officer could not form another opinion that the original assessment order was an escaped assessment and case deserves to be reassessed under section 147, then it was a case of change of opinion and not a case for reassessment (AY 2001-02, 2002-03)

CIT v. Fujistu Optel Ltd. (2013) 359 ITR 67 / 261 CTR 446 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 34 (Mag.) (MP)(HC)

1792 S.147 : Reassessment – Housing projects – Earlier year in favour of the assessee – Assessing Officer could not reopen assessment on merit on same ground in succeeding assessment year. [S.80IB (10)]

Assessee claimed deduction under section 80-IB(10) which was allowed by Assessing Officer. Assessing Officer reopened assessment beyond period of four years from end of relevant assessment year on ground that as per amendment inserted subsequently in section 80-IB(10) deduction claimed by assessee was not allowable. In assessee's own case for assessment year 2006-07 in tax appeal No. 1119 of 2011, High Court held that deduction allowed under section 80-IB could not be withdrawn on basis of amendment to section 80-IB introduced subsequently with prospective effect. Following same, Tribunal deleted disallowance made by Assessing Officer. Revenue contended that Tribunal had not dealt with aspect of reopening of proceedings. The Court held that non-dealing of Tribunal with legality of reassessment did not lead to raising any substantial question of law. Where issue was squarely covered in favour of assessee for preceding assessment year, Assessing Officer could not reopen assessment as same ground in succeeding assessment year (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Kalpatru Sthapatya (P.) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 157 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

1793 S.147 : Reassessment – Export oriented Unit – Transfer of business and assets to sister concern – Reason to believe – Reassessment notice was valid. [Ss.10B, 148]

The assessee purchased the assets and business of a sister concern who could not claim 10B deduction after the specified period and claimed deduction under section 10B. The AO reopened the assessment holding that he had reason to believe that on account of transfer of business and assets to the undertaking, no new undertaking had come into being and the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of section 10B. In a earlier writ before the High Court, the observed that where the revenue rejected elaborate written objection filed by assessee against reasons recorded by AO for initiating reassessment for disallowing claim of deduction under section 10B by merely saying that reasons already attributed were just and reasonable, reassessment would be unsustainable and directed the AO to pass an order assigning reasons in accordance with law. Thereafter the AO passed a detailed order considering the objections. In the second writ petition before the High Court, the assessee submitted that the testimony given by an employee of the assessee had retracted from his statement, and hence not a relevant material. The Court held that since the Deputy Commissioner has applied his mind to that aspect of the matter and held that it is a question of fact as to whether there was any coercion or

otherwise when the statement was recorded it could be answered only after an enquiry. Further 'Reason to believe' did not mean that the AO should have finally ascertained the fact by legal evidence. It only meant, the examination that was required to be made on the basis of information that the AO had received and if he discovered or found satisfaction that the taxable income had escaped assessment, he would have 'reason to believe'. The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the assessee. (AY. 2006-07) *Jeans Knit (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT* (2013) 112 DTR 414 / (2014) 367 ITR 773 / 220 Taxmann 130 (Mag.) / (2015) 274 CTR 361 (Karn.)(HC).
Jeans Knit (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 127 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC).

S.147 : Reassessment – Income from House Property – Failure by assessee to clarify why rental income was shown as business income – Reassessment was held to be valid. [S.22, 28(i)] 1794

Till assessment year 2007-08 the assessee reflected rental income as business income, but from assessment year 2008-09 declared the rental income as income from house property. The Assessing Officer sought to reopen the assessment for the relevant assessment years. The High Court held that in spite of many opportunities assessee had failed to clarify as to why rental income had been shown as business income till 2007-08 and as income from house property thereafter, and hence reopening of assessment could not be held to be contrary to law. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)
Crimson Properties (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 220 Taxmann 112 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Reason to believe – Absence of new tangibles material – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [Ss.143(3), 148] 1795

Where Notice under section 148 is based upon stale information which was available at the time of the original assessment and in fact appears to have been used by the AO during the completion of proceedings under section 143(3) – it was held that Reopening was not sustainable. (AY. 2005-06)
Rasalika Trading & Investment Co. (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014)365 ITR 447 / 101 DTR 28 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 60(Delhi)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Retrospective amendment – Rectification of mistake – In case of retrospective legislative amendment, rectification under section 154, as well as reopening of assessment under section 147 are permissible as they are not mutually exclusive. [S.154] 1796

On a writ filed by the assessee, the High Court held that the retrospective legislative amendment constitutes tangible material permitting reopening of assessment. Also, the amendment of law can even permit action for the rectification of an assessment on the ground of a mistake apparent from record.
Ester Industries Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 221 Taxmann 22 (Delhi)(HC)

1797

S.147 : Reassessment – Writ – Alternative remedy – Order passed by AO on the objections of assessee would in effect be a challenge to a notice issued under section 148 and such preliminary order, which does not have a statutory flavour not deciding the disputes between the parties, cannot be challenged by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court, hence notice and order on objections cannot be challenged in a Writ Petition. [S.148, Art. 226]

The Court had to consider whether an order passed by the AO on the objections of an assessee can be assailed before the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. HELD by the High Court in the negative:

(i) A challenge to an order passed on the objections of the assessee is in effect a challenge to a notice u/s 148 of the Act. Such an order passed by the AO is only at the stage of process of determination and not a determination by itself. The process of assessment is not required to be challenged before Court of law, as it is a still born child. Therefore, the assessee cannot have a legal right as there is no legal injury suffered by them at that stage. A Writ can be filed to the limited extent in cases where an assessment is sought to be reopened by an Officer who is not competent to do so or where on the face of it would appear that the reopening is barred by limitation or lacks inherent jurisdiction i.e. cases where no adjudication is required on facts (*CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal (2014) 1 SCC 603*) followed;

(ii) As held in *G.K.N. Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC)*, once a notice u/s 148 is issued, the assessee has to file a return and can seek the reasons for issuing notice. The AO is bound to furnish the reasons within a reasonable time and the assessee is entitled to file objections over which the AO has to pass a speaking order. The Supreme Court adapted a novel method to make way for the statutory authorities to deal with the adjudication covering assessments. In other words, in clear terms, the Supreme Court has indicated that an assessee is not required to run to the Court before the passing of the assessment order by challenging a notice issued u/s. 148. However, in order to provide an element of fairness in the process of adjudication and create an atmosphere of transparency, a mechanism, which was not found in the Statute was evolved by asking the AO to pass a reasoned order. It is only a part of the procedural law. Such an order is only a preliminary order, which can only be said to be an expansion of the reasons which are supposed to be assigned u/s. 148(2) of the Act. It neither creates a right nor takes away the one accrued. It is not an adjudication in the strict sense of the term. It is only meant for the purpose of understanding the basis of the notice. Therefore, GKN Driveshafts has to be understood to mean that a pre-adjudication proceedings not deciding the issues shall not be put into challenge while exercising the discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which in the process, takes away the right of the AO to proceed further. Therefore, the Order passed, as directed by the Supreme Court, cannot be termed as a substitute to the assessment order. To put it differently, it does not take away the power of the AO to decide the issue on the plea of the assessee or on a consideration of the records. It is to be remembered that the AO was directed to pass orders only on the objections given by the assessee. The further fact that such an order is required to be passed before proceeding with the assessment would make the said position clear. Furthermore, if the order on the objections can be entertained, then the Supreme Court would not have

directed the appeals to be disposed of by the appellate authority instead of setting them aside. This also indicates that the assessee could raise all the pleas including those considered against him by the AO while passing orders on his objections. Hence, such a preliminary order, which does not have a statutory flavour not deciding the dispute between the parties, cannot be challenged by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction before us. The Supreme Court merely provided safeguards to the assessee at the pre-adjudicative stage. The decision has been given to make sure that the AO complies with s. 148(2) in letter and spirit. There is no certainty in the order passed by the AO. If the order passed is set aside, it would only mean the notice issued u/s 148 is liable to be interfered with. The object of the decision of the Supreme Court is not only to avoid interference by the Courts but not to give way for it. Any other interpretation would make the entire remedial mechanism provided under the Act as redundant.

(iii) *Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO (1961) 41 ITR 191 (SC)* was rendered was much prior to the judgment in *G.K.N. Driveshafts (India)Ltd. v. ITO (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC)*. Further, the then fact situation at the time of rendering the said judgment is no longer in existence today.

(iv) The legislative intent is to allow the AO to go through the process of assessment. Even u/s 147, a Court of law cannot presume a lack of jurisdiction, when a fact in issue requires an adjudication. It has to be exercised in terms of sections 139, 143(2) and 143(3). Therefore, considering the scheme of the enactment, particularly, with reference to sections 147 to 153 of the Act, we are of the view that an order passed on the objections of the assessee over adjudicating facts is not open to challenge by way of filing a writ petition. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

Kalanithi Maran v. JCIT (2014) 366 ITR 453 / 107 DTR 1/270 DTR 296(Mad.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Objections – Assessee was to be directed to file objections before AO and in case objections were rejected, it would be open to it to approach High Court – Direct writ petition against issue of notice is not maintainable. [S.148, Article 226]

1798

When a notice under section 148 is issued, the proper course of action for the noticee is to file a return and if he so desires, to seek reasons for issuing notices. The Assessing Officer is bound to furnish reasons within a reasonable time. On receipt of the reasons, the notice is entitled to file objections to issuance of noticee and the Assessing Officer is bound to dispose of the objections by passing a speaking order. (AY. 2006-07)

Samsung India Electronics P. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 362 ITR 460 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 32 (Mag)(Delhi)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Audit objection – AO not convinced with reasons – Reassessment was not valid. [S.148]

1799

The audit party objected that non-charging of interest on advances resulted in short levy of tax. However, the Assessing Officer did not accept the objections but still issued notice solely on basis thereof. Held, notice was not valid. (AY. 2001-02)

N.K. Roadways P. Ltd. v. ITO (OSD) (2014) 362 ITR 522 / 226 Taxmann 64(Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

- 1800 **S.147 : Reassessment – Absence of tangible material – Audit objection – Resjudicata – Principle of consistency – Assessee as business income – Assessed as capital gains – Reassessment was not valid. [S.28(i), 45, 148]**

Original assessment of profits on sale of shares was completed as capital gains. Similar assessments were completed even for prior and subsequent years. Held, notice on the basis of audit objection to assess the amount as business income was held not valid. Though the principle of res judicata is not applicable to tax matters as each year is separate and distinct, nevertheless where the facts are identical from year to year, there has to be uniformity and consistency in treatment. High Court decision binding on Income-tax authorities under its jurisdiction. Ratio of *CIT v. Gopal Purohit* (2011) 336 ITR 287 (Bom)(HC) is followed. (AY. 2008-09)

Aroni Commercial Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 362 ITR 403/ 267 CTR 228/ 224 Taxmann 13 (Mag) (Bom.)(HC)

- 1801 **S.147 : Reassessment – No limitation on number of times notice can be issued – Notice to tax guaranteed return and bonus on key man insurance – Proceedings dropped – Second notice to tax same sum – Two notices on same ground – Not permissible. [S.148]**

In the return of income the assessee stated that guaranteed return and bonus on key man insurance being contingent receipts were not offered to tax. Notice was issued under section 148. The assessee filed detailed reply and after considering the reply proceedings were dropped. Once again notice was issued to tax the said sum. The assessee once again made the detailed representation to drop the proceedings. The AO did not drop the proceedings. The assessee filed the writ petition. Allowing the writ the court held that Subject to limitation of not being permissible on change of opinion, there is no limitation on the number of times notice u/s. 148 can be issued. When earlier reassessment proceedings were dropped, it amounts to inference that the AO is of the view that the additions are not sustainable, and hence, notice u/s. 148 on the same ground is not permissible. The second notice was quashed. (AY. 1997-98)

Kunal Organics P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 362 ITR 530 / 225 Taxmann 403 (Guj.)(HC)

- 1802 **S.147 : Reassessment – Return accepted u/s. 143 (1) – Notice under section 148 on the basis of same material and nothing more – Reassessment was not valid. [Ss.143(1), 148]**

Along with the return filed the assessee also attached the note forming part of the return filed clearly mentioned and described the nature of the receipt under non – compete agreement. The return was processed under section 143(1). Subsequently notice under section 148 for reopening of the assessment. On appeal Tribunal held that there was no tangible material and that it was mere circumstances that advance tax paid by assessee did not amount to admission by the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the appeal of assessee and held that reopening was not valid. On appeal by revenue the Court upheld the order of Tribunal. The court held that the reasons for notice u/s. 147 nowhere mentioned that the revenue came up with any other fresh material warranting reopening of assessment. The Court held that mere conclusion of the proceedings u/s. 143 (1) *ipso facto* did not permit invocation of powers for reopening the assessment. (AY. 1999-00) *CIT v. Atul Kumar Swami* (2014) 362 ITR 693 / 52 taxmann.com 47 (Delhi)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Arbitration award – Denial of exemption u/s. 10A – Issue was subject matter of appeal – Reasons to believe were silent and there was no mention thereof or allegation in the grounds recorded by the AO – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.10A, 148]

1803

The AO denied the exemption under s. 10A in respect of the arbitration award of ₹ 43.49 crores. The assessee filed an appeal against the order and the matter was pending before the Tribunal at the impugned time. The AO issued notice under s. 148 was issued to the assessee on the ground that in the audit note the narration given under the head legal expenses, i.e., purchase of stamp papers for arbitration work on March 29, 2007, and invoice dated March 30, 2007, of ₹ 43.49 crores clearly indicated that the receipts of ₹ 43.49 crores were with regard to arbitration award and not for the purposes of sale of software. The assessee objected that the purchase of stamp paper had nothing to do with the invoice dated March 30, 2007, for payment of ₹ 43.49 crores and the payment against the invoice was received by the assessee in advance in the month of January, 2007. On a writ petition:

Held, allowing the petition, that the receipt of ₹ 43.49 crores it was claimed by the assessee was for sale of source code. The payment was from a related enterprise. The transaction clearly was a subject matter of the original assessment order dated December 31, 2010, and an addition of ₹ 43.49 crores was made by the AO. The CIT (A) had observed that there was no connection between the arbitration award and the receipt. It was not indicated or stated in the reasons to believe that the stamp paper purchased for arbitration work was connected with the receipt. The reasons to believe were recorded on March 28, 2012, which was after the order passed by the CIT (A) on March 15, 2011. Questions did arise about the genuineness of the receipt as the company making the payment was a related party incorporated in the USA. However, on these issues, the reasons to believe were silent and there was no mention thereof or allegation in the grounds recorded by the AO. Hence, the reassessment notice was quashed. (AY. 2007-08) *Nuwave E Solutions (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 360 ITR 351/226 Taxmann 181 (Mag) (Delhi.) (HC)*

S.147 : Reassessment – Assessee engaged in business of marketing agricultural produce within notified area of Market Committee – Punjab Mandi Board finding assessee concealed its sales – Reassessment was held to be valid. [S.148]

1804

The assessee was engaged in the business of marketing agricultural produce within the notified area of the Market Committee. The assessment of the assessee was reopened by issuance of notice under s. 148 on the basis of information that the Punjab Mandi Board had passed an order that the assessee had concealed its sales. The AO made an addition of ₹ 61,42,981. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that as the order passed against the assessee by the Punjab Mandi Board had been set aside the order passed by the AO was not warranted. The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee.

Held, that the order passed under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (PAPM Act), which was the foundation of the order passed by the AO had been set aside. Therefore, there was no reason to hold that the orders passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Tribunal setting aside the order passed by the AO suffered from any error of law or jurisdiction as would require interference. However, fresh proceedings under the PAPM Act had led to the passing of a fresh order against

the assessee holding them liable for payment of additional market fee, interest, etc. The AO would be required to reconsider these orders to ascertain whether any income had escaped assessment or the assessee was guilty of evasion of tax. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Piara Lal Kashmiri Lal (2013) 219 Taxmann 160 (Mag) (2014) 360 ITR 190 (P&H) (HC)

CIT v. R. J. Traders (2013) 219 Taxmann 160 (Mag) / (2014) 360 ITR 190 (P&H)(HC)

1805 **S.147 : Reassessment – Proviso – Failure to disclose material facts – Reassessment was justified. [S.148]**

Assessee was registered u/s. 12AA & S.80G of the Act. The assessment for AYs. 2003-04 & 2006-07 were completed u/s. 143(3) of the Act. The assessee's contention in writ petition was that the trust was engaged in imparting & spreading education by establishing various educational institutions & running hospital to give treatment & relief to the weaker section of the society. The AO reopened the assessment for 2 yrs and has recorded satisfaction for 'reason to believe' based on information received that donations and expenditure on salary and other expenses were not genuine, those were fictitious expenditures to be taxed, as they are not for the purposes and object of the trust and has thus escaped from assessment to tax. Dismissing the writ petition, the court held that the AO had material and had rational connection and relevant bearing on such formation of belief for issuing valid notices for reassessment, the sufficiency of which was not justifiable issue at that stage and was to be examined in the proceedings of reassessment and for the AY. 2003-04, the additional ground of limitation also did not merit consideration, as AO had material available with him that on the failure of the assessee to have disclosed fully and truly all material facts, the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. AO was having sufficient material to form belief on good faith that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. (AY. 2002-03 to 2006-07)

Rohilkhand Educational Charitable Trust v. Chief CIT (2014) 365 ITR 233 / 99 DTR 115 / 222 Taxmann 243 (All.)(HC)

1806 **S.147 : Reassessment – Court can examine existence but not adequacy of reasons. AO is only required to provide material on which he relies to reopen the assessment. [S.148]**

(i) It is important to restate an accepted, but often neglected, principle, that in its writ jurisdiction, the scope of proceedings before the Court while considering a notice under sections 147/148 is limited. The Court cannot enter into the merits of the subjective satisfaction of the AO, or judge the sufficiency of the reasons recorded, but rather, determine whether such opinion is based on tangible, concrete and new information that is capable of supporting such a conclusion. This was recognised by the Supreme Court in *Phool Chand Bajrang Lal and Ors. v. ITO* (1993) 203 ITR 456 (SC);

(ii) The law only requires that the information or material on which the AO records his or her satisfaction is communicated to the assessee, without mandating the disclosure of any specific document. While the 2G Spectrum Report has not been supplied in this case on grounds of confidentiality, the reasons recorded have been communicated and do provide – independent of the 2G Report – details of the new and tangible information

that support the AO's opinion. These facts are capable of justifying the satisfaction recorded on their own terms, as discussed above. In this context, there is no legal proposition that mandates the disclosure of any additional document. This is not to say that the AO may in all cases refuse to disclose documents relied upon by him on account of confidentiality, but rather, that fact must be judged on the basis of whether other tangible and specific information is available so as to justify the conclusion irrespective of the contents of the document sought to be kept confidential. In cases such as the present, however, where the information and facts communicated by the AO are themselves in accordance with the minimum requirement under sections 147/148, the petitioner cannot compel the disclosure of other documents that the assessee may have also relied upon. (AY. 2009-10)

Acorus Unitech wireless Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 362 ITR 417 / 223 Taxmann 181 (Mag.) / 102 DTR 177(Delhi)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Full and true disclosure – Quantum of receipt was disclosed – Change of opinion – Reassessment was not valid.

1807

Assessee had made full and true disclosure at the time of original proceedings about the method of accounting adopted by him and the quantum of receipts disclosed. There was change of opinion. Therefore, reopening was not sustainable. (AY. 2006-07)

Select Vacations (P) Ltd v. ITO & Anr. (2014) 98 DTR 137 / 221 Taxmann 159(Delhi)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Settlement of cases – Maintainability of application – Pendency of assessment before AO – No assessment proceedings were pending – Abatement of proceedings before Settlement Commission – Rejection of application – Reassessment notice was valid. [S.148, 153, 245A(b), 245C & 245D]

1808

Time-limit to make assessment order in regular proceedings for AYs. 2007-08 to 2009-10 had already expired before the date on which the application for settlement was made. On the date of filing of the application before the Commission no assessment proceedings was pending with AO. Therefore, the application was not maintainable.

The decision of the Settlement Commission rejecting the application for AYs. 2007-08 to 2009-10 was upheld. In view of s. 245A, proceedings before the Commission abated in respect of those years. AO was entitled to issue notices u/s.148. (AY. 2007-08 to 2009-10) *Shriniwas Machine Craft (P) Ltd. v. ITSC & Ors. (2014) 361 ITR 313 / 98 DTR 161 / 265 CTR 113 / 43 taxmann.com 326 (Bom.)(HC)*

S.147 : Reassessment – When there was detailed scrutiny with regard to an issue – Reassessment of the same issue was not possible. [S.40(a)(ia), 148, 194C, 194H]

1809

The assessee was engaged in manufacture and sale of tea. It had filed its return of income, which was selected for scrutiny. During the scrutiny assessment, the AO raised a specific query for selling and distribution expenses incurred by the assessee and the details of trade discount given under the incentive scheme. The AO concluded the assessment without making any disallowance. Thereafter, the AO issued notice u/s. 148 and passed an order holding that the discount given under the scheme was nothing but commission and tax should be deducted, and, accordingly, disallowed the expenses u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act. The tribunal upheld the action of the AO. On an appeal, the High

Court held that at the time of the original assessment u/s. 143(3) detailed scrutiny of the very same issue was made and hence amounted to a change of opinion and was therefore liable to be quashed. (AY. 2006-07)

Gujarat Tea Processors & Packers Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 426 (Guj.)(HC)

1810 **S.147 : Reassessment-Business expenditure – Year of allowability – “In absence of “reason to believe” the reassessment initiated by the AO was set aside. [S.143(3)]**

The Assessee filed its return of income which was duly scrutinised u/s 143(3) of the Act. Thereafter, the AO issued a notice for reassessment recording reason to believe that the assessee had debited a sum in profit and loss account on account of prior period expenses which had not been crystallised during the relevant year and that, as a result, these expenses should be disallowed. The Assessing Officer placed reliance on notes to accounts filed along with the return. On writ filed by the assessee, the High Court held that the words ‘reason to believe’ indicated that the belief had to be that of a reasonable person based on reasonable grounds emerging from direct or circumstantial evidence and not on mere suspicion, gossip or rumour. The reason to believe recorded did not refer to any material that came to the knowledge of the Assessing Officer from which the Assessing Officer could have formed a reasonable belief that the expenditure referred to had not crystallised during the relevant year. The recorded reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment were not based on any direct or circumstantial evidence and were in the realm of mere suspicion. Therefore, in absence of adequate reason to believe, the reassessment was set aside and the proceedings initiated pursuant to notice u/s. 148 were quashed. (AY. 2002-2003)

SMCC Construction India Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 354 (Delhi)(HC)

1811 **S.147 : Reassessment – Business expenditure – R&D expenses – Notice – Reassessment based on internal audit objection not valid. [S.35AB, 37(1), 148]**

The AO allowed R&D expenses incurred by the assessee in respect of in-house research as revenue expenditure. Subsequently, the audit party raised the objection that the assessee should only be allowed to claim 1/3rd of the R&D expenses in the year as per section 35AB. The High Court held that reassessment proceedings were initiated solely at the instance of the audit party; the same was a colourable exercise of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer and therefore, could not be sustained. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Shilp Gravures Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 382 (Guj.)(HC)

1812 **S.147 : Reassessment – Direction of CIT(A)-Direction in another assessment year – Reopening was held to be bad in law. [S.148]**

The court held that notice for reassessment was issued only on the account of the directions contained in the order passed by the CIT(A) in the appeal filed by the assessee pertaining to another year cannot be sustained. (AY. 2007-08)

Pramod Kumari Singal v. ITO (2014) 99 DTR 386 (MP)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Non. filing of return – Reassessment was held to be valid – Failure to communicate reasons not prejudicial to assessee and does not affect validity of proceedings. [S.90]

1813

Assessee had not filed returns of income and were not subjected to regular assessment under section 143(3). Assessee adopted MAP procedure and income of the two assessments has been partly taxed in India, therefore the reassessment was held to be valid. Failure to communicate reasons not prejudicial to assessee and does not affect validity of proceedings. (AY. 2000-01, 2006-07)

CIT v. Funds IT Solution (2014) 364 ITR 256 / 99 DTR 257 / 266 CTR 1 / 226 Taxmann 44 (Delhi)(HC),

DIT(IT) v. Funds Corporation & Ors (2014) 99 DTR 257 / 266 CTR 1 / 226 Taxmann 44(Delhi)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Tax evasion petition – Abuse of law to settle personal vendetta between top-level IRS officers cannot be the reason for reopening of assessment. [S.148]

1814

Surprisingly one month after the first respondent wrote to the petitioner conceding that there was no basis for the tax evasion petition, he invited the petitioner to cross-examine the complainant, if so advised. Such a procedure is unknown to the Act. Instead of terminating the proceedings initiated under section 148 of the Act by dropping them the first respondent chose inexplicably to keep those proceedings alive. This is illegal and impermissible in law. This amounts to nothing but harassment of the petitioner. There appears to be some vested interest in keeping the proceedings against the petitioner pursuant to the notice dated 31-3-2011 alive. The tax evasion petition and the present proceedings seem to be the result of a personal vendetta between two officers of the Indian Revenue Service (IRS) (the complainant being one of them). This unfortunately has resulted in multiple proceedings before this Court. The respondents have to act in accordance with law and not under any pressure. The AO, being a responsible officer should not be party or pressurized by someone to personal vendetta. Being statutory officers they have to act independently and in accordance with law. (AY. 2004-05)

Pradyot K. Misra v. ACIT (2014) 101 DTR 59 / 362 ITR 24/ (2015) 231 Taxmann 885 (Delhi)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Objection not raised before the AO – Cash credits – New issues raise first time before the Court – Assessee is not entitled to challenge validity of reopening on a ground not stated in objections to AO. [S.68,148]

1815

Just as the revenue cannot improve upon its case for reopening before the Court but must stand or fall by the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment, the same test would be applicable in case of an assessee i.e. it must stand or fall by its objection to the grounds for reopening of assessment. It is not open to the assessee to urge fresh objections before the Court which the AO had no occasion to deal with, unless of course the notice to reopen is ex-facie without jurisdiction not requiring consideration of any argument such as beyond limitation. (AY. 2007-08)

Crown Consultants Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT(2014) 362 ITR 368 / 102 DTR 77 / 224 Taxmann 81 (Mag)(Bom.)(HC)

1816

S.147 : Reassessment – Proceedings of original records were not found – High Court alarmed at shoddy record – Keeping by department and allegations of tampering –Reopening was quashed – Direction was given to keep proper records. [S.148, 149]

(i) We have examined the original record but did not find the proceedings or order sheets relating to original proceedings on record. This is a serious lapse, and it is apparent that the proceeding sheets in the respondents custody and charge, have been removed. The record belongs to the respondents and was in their custody and charge. It was/is their duty and obligation to maintain the records properly and as per law and to ensure their sanctity and accuracy. The records cannot and should not be interpolated or changed. This High Court has in some cases earlier adversely commented about record maintenance by the Revenue as it is unacceptable and faults on the principle of good governance. Facts mentioned above do not disclose a commendable situation and in fact the situation appears to be alarming and perilous. This requires urgent effective remedial steps. Failure to maintain records has resulted in serious allegations being made that the papers/documents have been tampered or removed etc. The papers/documents on record are not serially numbered and indexed. We also note that it is not a practice of the department to give acknowledgement of papers submitted during the course of assessment proceedings;

(ii) In the present case reassessment proceedings have been initiated after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year and as per the first proviso to section 147 of the Act, it has to be shown that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all facts necessary for the assessment. In the “reasons to believe” it is mentioned that absence of “crucial information” relating to income and expenditure on account of activities of the petitioner in India had resulted in improper computation of income for the assessment year 2003-04. Thus, as per the reasons to believe itself, in case the petitioner had furnished statement showing income and expenditure from Indian activities in the course of the original assessment proceedings, there was no lapse or failure on the part of the assessee i.e. the petitioner. Once it is held that the said details were furnished *vide* letter/reply dated 22nd March, 2006, the reassessment notice, would fail and falter. Letter/reply dated 22nd March, 2006 enclosing the details would go to the very root and falsify the averments made in the reasons to believe. The said reasons would be factually incorrect and reassessment notice bad and contrary to the first proviso to section 147 of the Act. The Court also observed as under “ It is the duty and obligation of the Department to maintain the records properly and in accordance with law and to ensure their sanctity and accuracy. The records could not should not be interpolated or changed. When proceedings or hearing are held, orders or proceedings sheets should be available. Failure to maintain records results in serious allegations being made that the papers and documents have been tampered with or removed.the papers and documents on record must be serially numbered and indexed.” (AY. 2003-04) *BBC World News Limited v. ADIT* (2014) 362 ITR 577 / 226 Taxmann 122(Mag.) / 267 CTR 460 (Delhi)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Short term capital gains – Omission and failure on part of assessee to disclose short term capital gains – Reassessment was held to be valid. [S.2(42A), 147(a), 148]

1817

Tribunal held that sale of bonus shares ought to be taxed as short term capital gains as the date of acquisition to be taken from the date of allotment and from the date of allotment of original shares. The Court held that following the ratio in *CIT v. Chunilal Khushaldas (1974) 93 ITR 369 (Guj.)(HC)* and *Maneklal Premchand (Deceased) v. CIT (1990) 186 ITR 554 (Bom.)(HC)*, affirmed the view of Tribunal. View of Tribunal on reassessment and merit was upheld. (AY. 1978-79)

CIT v. D. V. Paranjape (2014) 367 ITR 173 / 226 Taxmann 169 (Bom.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Recorded reasons – Validity to be determined with reference to recorded reasons – Exemption from capital gains granted under section 54 in original assessment – Notice to withdraw exemption under section 54E – Reference to section 54E in notice not a typographical error – Notice not valid. [S.54, 54E, 148]

1818

The assessee, sold a residential property and claimed exemption under section 54 of the Act which was granted. A notice of reassessment was issued on the ground that exemption under section 54E had been wrongly allowed. A writ petition was filed to quash the assessment. Through an affidavit it was pointed out that reference to section 54E was a typographical error and the intention was to refer to section 54. Allowing the petition the Court held that the fact that the reference under section 54E was not an error was manifest from the reasons recorded. It referred to the requirement of investing the surplus fund for a minimum period of 36 months. Such requirement flowed from section 54E of the Act and not section 54. Section 54E of the Act was neither applicable nor sought to be applied by the assessee. The question of denying any such claim under the provision for breach of condition therein, therefore, simply did not arise. The notice was not valid. A notice for reopening the assessment has to be sustained and supported only on the basis of reasons recorded by the AO and not with the help of extraneous ground, material or possible improvement. (AY. 2008-09)

Dhruv Parulbhai Patel v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 234 /223 Taxmann 415(Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Notice – Shipping business – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Department was seeking to deny partnership benefit of DTAA on the ground partners are not a “Person” as taxable entity Unit in UK – Revenue has to treat partnership as a person with in the definition of person in Indian law – Notice was quashed – DTAA-India-UK. [S.2(31)(i),9(1)(i), 148, 172(2), Article 3]

1819

The petitioners formed a partnership firm under the provisions of law relating to partnership of England and Wales, having its office in the UK to carry on the business of shipping in international waters. It was the petitioner's case in their pleadings the first assessment year subsequent to the formation of the partnership was assessment year 1997-98. Since an incomplete return was originally filed, the petitioner No. 1 filed a revised return. The returns filed resulted in assessment order and demand notice was issued under section 148 on ground that P & O Nedlloyd Partnership, UK (PONP) filed its return of Income arising out of shipping business in India, for the assessment year 2002-03 as 'New case 1st year'. Meanwhile information was received that said partnership Indian income from said business in relevant year was not disclosed to

department. Revenue was of the view that the said partnership should be subject to taxation on ground that same was not a person resident in UK who was entitled to get relief under Indo-UK treaty. The assessee challenged the said notice, allowing the petition the Court held that the said partnership was a firm under section 2(23)(i), hence it became a person under section 2(31)(iv) attracting operation of paragraph 2 of Article 3 of said Convention, therefore revenue's view that said partnership was not covered by said Convention failed. In view of facts and circumstances it would be unjust to compel said partnership to submit themselves to assessment sought by notice under section 148. The notices issued under section 148 to the firm were set aside and quashed.

(AY. 1997-98, 2001-02)

P AND O Nedlloyd Ltd. v. ADIT (2014) 369 ITR 282/ (2015) 228 Taxmann 90 / 274 CTR 50 (Cal.)(HC)

1820 S.147 : Reassessment – Order passed without recording reasons – Liable to be quashed. [S.148]

Where AO passed reassessment order without recording reasons for initiating reassessment proceedings despite repeated requests for same, order so passed being invalid, deserved to be quashed. (AY. 2001-02)

Torrent Power SEC Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 78(Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

1821 S.147 : Reassessment – Third notice for reassessment – Return filed – Participated in the proceedings – Reassessment notice was held to be valid – Matter was set aside to decide on merit. [S.148, 151]

Notice under section 148 was issued to assessee and, consequently, assessee filed return ,however, it was found that said notice did not specify period for which assessee was supposed to file return hence the said notice was dropped. Thereafter, another notice was issued but it was also dropped for want of approval under section 151. Then again third notice under section 148 was issued and assessment completed. Assessee challenged assessment as void *ab initio* on ground that no valid returns were filed. The Court held that since assessee had not only participated in proceedings but accepted his return filed in response to first notice under section 148, as return filed in response to third notice, assessment order could not be said to be void *ab initio* and matter was set aside to file of Tribunal to decide on merit. (AYs. 1998–99,1999-2000)

CIT v. R. Jayavelu (2014) 225 Taxmann 83(Mag) (Karn.)(HC)

1822 S.147 : Reassessment – Notice – Reason for reassessment must be recorded before issuing notice. [S.148]

Sub-section (1) of section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, pertains to a notice to be issued by the Assessing Officer before making the assessment, reassessment or re-computation of income under section 147 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of section 148 provides that the Assessing Officer shall, before issuing any notice under this section, record his reasons for doing so.

Held accordingly, that on the date of issue of the notice under section 148, no reasons for doing so had been recorded. The notice was not valid. (AY. 2007-2008)

Gujarat Borosil Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2013) 217 Taxmann 139 (Mag. (2014) 363 ITR 293 /)(Guj.)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Notice by affixure-Issue of notice straightaway through affixture is not proper & renders proceedings void – On the expiry of the limitation period valuable rights accrue to the assessee – Firm dissolved –Notice affixed on last day at the premises of company, without sending notices to partners was invalid. [S.41(1), 148, 282]

1823

Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that (i) The Tribunal took note of the fact that (a) the issuance of a notice straight away through affixture is not proper; (b) no efforts were made to send the notices to the partners through registered post with acknowledge due; and (c) even in the matter of affixture of notices, two defects have crept in viz., (i) affixture was on a totally incorrect premises; and (ii) the procedure prescribed for affixture was i.e., taking signature of two persons living in the locality, was not followed. The appellant has no answer for all these defects pointed out by the Tribunal.

(ii) The limitation has its own important role to play in the proceedings, that are initiated under the relevant enactments. In case of limitation for institution of the original proceedings, the repercussions are serious enough and if it is about the filing of the appeals, they are relatively less serious. Either way, with the expiry of limitation, valuable rights accrue to the opposite party. For instance, if a person has lent money to another, and failed to institute any proceedings to recover the same, for a period of three years, his right to recover the amount stands taken away, not withstanding the fact that there is no denial of the fact that the amount has been lent and the other person is under obligation to repay. By the same analogy, if the Department was under obligation to initiate proceedings within a stipulated time, on expiry of the same, the assessee gets a valuable right, in this behalf. The rigour in this regard may be less, if it is a case of expiry of limitation for filing appeals, particularly where there exists a facility for condonation of delay. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. Assessee firm stood dissolved long ago and its business was taken over by a company and therefore service of notice on last date by affixture, that too on the premises of company, without sending notices to partners was invalid. (AY. 1987-88)

CIT v. Godavari Electrical Conductors (2015) 120 DTR 84 (AP)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Notice – Block assessment – Notice issued 22 days before expiry of limitation – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.148, 158BC]

1824

In pursuance of search proceedings, assessment was completed for AYs in question. On an appeal by the assessee, the CIT(A) set aside assessment order and remanded matter back to Assessing Officer for disposal afresh. The time limit for completion of subsequent assessment proceedings was to expire on 31-3-1990. The AO issued a notice under section 148 about 22 days before expiry of period of limitation for assessment. The assessee challenged the validity of the reassessment proceedings. The Tribunal opined that a notice under section 148 had been issued merely to obtain an extension of period of limitation for completing the assessment. The Tribunal also noted that since seized material was available with Revenue, there was no reason to hold that the assessee had failed to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for assessment. The HC upheld the order of the Tribunal.

CIT v. Pradeep Iron Industries (P) Ltd. (2014) 223 Taxmann 46 (Jharkhand)(HC)

1825 **S.147 : Reassessment – Non adjudication on objections notice of reassessment was held to be invalid [Ss.127, 148]**

The question of law raised in this appeal before the HC was whether the Tribunal was justified in quashing the order of the AO u/s. 148 in view of the provisions of section 127(2) which stipulates transfer of case at any stage which shall not render reissuance of notice already issued by the earlier AO? The court held that transfer of jurisdiction on the request of AO was invalid since the AO had not decided the objections and the exercise of discretion on the objections would in any case not validate the notice u/s. 148.

CIT v. Deepak Gupta (2013) 219 Taxmann 1 / (2014) 266 CTR 265 (All.)(HC)

1826 **S.147 : Reassessment – Deduction at source – Failure to deduct or pay – If no income arose to the recipient then notices to payer for TDS default u/s. 201 & disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) are bad in law – DTAA-India – South Korea [S.40(a)(ia) 148, 195, 201(1), Art. 7]**

(a) The key to the decision is the answer to the question whether any income arose or accrued to Samsung Electronics Ltd, Korea (“SEC”) through its PE in India in respect of the sales made in India. If the answer is in the affirmative, both the notices would be good notices; if the answer is in the negative, both the notices would be bad. The answer in our opinion should be in the negative, because even as per the revenue, as reflected in the order passed by the DRP in the reassessment proceedings of SEC, no income accrued to SEC in India. In this regard, the DRP rejected the specific request made by that Assessing Officer in his remand report that the petitioner be treated as the permanent establishment (PE) of SEC and the income of SEC be computed on that basis. The DRP however held that as regards attribution of income to the “fixed place PE”, a rough and ready basis would be to 10% of the salary paid to the expat-employees of the petitioner as the mark-up, as was done by the Assessing Officer in the draft assessment order. The remuneration cost in respect of such employees seconded to the petitioner amounted to ₹ 10,72,24,310; this was taken as the base and a mark-up of 10% had been applied by the assessing officer and the income was taken as ₹ 1,07,22,431/-. This was approved by the DRP in its order dated 29-9-2012; the other claims made by the assessing officer in the remand report were rejected;

(b) Thus the basis of both the notices (sections 148 and 201) has been knocked out of existence by the DRP’s order in the reassessment proceedings of SEC for the same assessment year. On the date on which notices were issued to the petitioner under sections 148 and 201(1)/(1A), there was an uncontested finding by the revenue authorities (i.e., the DRP) in the case of SEC that SEC cannot be taxed in respect of the sales made in India through the petitioner on the footing that the petitioner is its PE. If no income arose to SEC on account of sales in India since the petitioner cannot be held to be its PE in India, two consequences follow: (i) the payments made by the petitioner to SEC for the goods are not tax deductible under section 195(2) and hence they were rightly allowed as deduction in the original assessment of the petitioner and (ii) the assessee cannot be treated as one in default under section 201(1) and no interest can be charged under section 201(1A). It needs mention here that the notice under section 201

is a verbatim reproduction of the remand report of the Assessing Officer in SEC's case filed before the DRP. Notices issued to assessee under sections 148 and 201(1) /201(IA) was held to be liable to be quashed. (AY. 2006-07).

Samsung India Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. DDIT (2014) 364 ITR 103 / 105 DTR 106 / 226 Taxmann 196 / 272 CTR 297(Delhi)(HC).

S.147 : Reassessment – Writ – Return – Assessee is bound to furnish a return in response to a section 148 notice. The reasons for reopening can be given only thereafter. A writ involving disputed factual issues cannot be entertained [S.9, 127, 139, 142(1), 148, Constitution of India, Art. 226]

1827

The petitioner did not file any returns of income in response to the notices issued u/s. 148. Even under the judgment of the Supreme Court in *GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO (2003) 259 ITR 19(SC)*, the petitioner would get the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment only upon filing the return of income pursuant to the notice issued u/s 148. The conduct of the petitioner has been one of defiance; it did not file returns in response to the notices issued u/s. 148. The mere filing of the return can never amount to submitting to the jurisdiction. The filing of the return in response to the notice u/s 148 defines the stand taken by the assessee. S. 148 says that the return called for by the notice issued under that section shall be treated as if such a return were a return required to be furnished u/s. 139 of the Act. Under the scheme of the Act, a return of income conveys the position taken by the assessee to the assessing authority – whether he has taxable income or not. It is not a mere scrap of paper. There is a sanctity attached to the return. If the assessing authority calls upon the assessee to file a return of income, the same shall be complied with by the assessee and it is no answer to the notice to say that since in his (assessee's) opinion there is no taxable income, he is under no obligation to file the return. The petitioner, not having made the Noida officer aware that no income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment and having merely told him that he has no jurisdiction to issue reassessment notices, was not acting strictly in accordance with law. The writ remedy being a discretionary remedy, the discretion can be exercised in favour of the writ petitioner only if his conduct has been in conformity with law. If it is not, the Court may refuse to exercise the discretion in favour of the writ petitioner;

(ii) The question whether the initiation of reassessment proceedings by the Noida officer was valid or not would depend upon whether the petitioner had a PE within the jurisdiction of the Noida officer. In the absence of any evidence unmistakably and indisputably establishing the existence or otherwise of the PE, we would hesitate to enter this prohibited arena in writ proceedings. It needs no citation of authority to support the proposition that the Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of cannot enter into disputed questions of fact which is best left to be resolved in the alternative remedies available to the petitioner. In fact the assessment and appellate authorities, including the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, constituted under the Act as fact-finding bodies are best suited to examine whether the petitioner had a PE in Noida or not and the question of jurisdiction would depend upon the findings of those authorities. Moreover, when we are exercising discretionary jurisdiction, it is not impermissible to consider whether any real prejudice has been caused to the petitioner

to justify the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction which is to be sparingly wielded. We do not see any such prejudice to the petitioner. There can be no vested right that escaped income cannot be taxed, provided all the jurisdictional conditions and the procedural requirements of the Act are satisfied. This fundamental question is purely one of fact which ideally should be determined in proceedings relating to assessment and appeal prescribed under the Act. This Court cannot, on the facts of the present case, enter that domain. (AY. 2004-05, 2006-07)

Adobe Systems Software Ireland Ltd.v. ADIT(2014) 363 ITR 174 / 268 CTR 173 / 102 DTR 425/225 Taxmann 347 (Delhi)(HC)

Editorial: SLP of assessee was dismissed (SLA (C) Nos. 22154, 22364& 22367 of 2014 dated 23-2-2015) Adobe Systems Software Ireland Ltd v. ADIT (IT) (2015) 230 Taxmann 360 (SC)

1828 S.147 : Reassessment – Reasons for reopening recorded after issuing notice under section 148 – Notice and reassessment proceedings are in valid. [S.10(23C)(vi), 148]

The assessee trust was running educational institution. For the relevant assessment years, the assessee had declared income “Nil” claiming exemption u/s 10(23C)(vi) of the Act. Assessments were completed allowing the claim. Subsequently the assessments were reopened by issuing notice u/s 148 on 30-1-2004. Tribunal set aside reassessment proceedings on the ground that notice for reassessment was issued without recording reasons as contemplated by section 148(2), which vitiated the whole proceedings. On appeal by revenue the Court held that on perusal of the original records it is clear that the reasons were prepared on 4-2-2004 where as the notice was sent on 30-1-2004. It was also noticed that the contents of draft reasons and the original reasons recorded by the AO do not tally. Accordingly the High Court upheld the order of Tribunal. (AY. 1999-00, 2002-03)

CIT v. Baldwin Boys High School (2014) 364 ITR 637 / 45 taxmann.com 33 /108 DTR 373(Karn.)(HC)

CIT v. Baldwin Girls High School (2014) 364 ITR 637 / 45 taxmann.com 33 / 108 DTR 373(Karn.)(HC)

1829 S.147 : Reassessment – Territorial jurisdiction – In the absence of any information that assessee was being assessed to income – Tax at Rohtak, the authorities at Delhi were legally competent to issue notices u/s. 148 as also u/s. 142(1) – Transfer of cases to rohtak was valid. [S.68, 124, 142(1), 148]

Assessee was residing at Delhi. She was operating her bank Account from Delhi. Her address at Delhi had also been prominently recorded in the record of the bank. Dubious entries of heavy amounts was traced from her bank account. Notice u/s. 148 was issued by the IT authorities to the assessee at her Delhi address. It was followed by yet another notice in terms of 142(1). Immediately on request of the assessee for transfer of her case to ITO, Rohtak (where she was being assessed), such request was accepted & her case was transferred to Rohtak, where subsequent proceedings were conducted HC held that in absence of any information that assessee was being assessee to Income-tax at rohtak, the authorities at Delhi were legally competent to issue notices u/s. 148 as also u/s 142(1). Plea of the assessee that the IT authorities was at Delhi and that they had

no jurisdiction to reopen the case of the assessee at Delhi as she was being assessed to Income-tax at Rohtak and that when the case of reassessment was transferred to Rohtak from Delhi, fresh notice u/s. 148 as also u/s. 142(1) was not necessary and was not sustainable. (AY. 2003-04)

Rajni Gugnani v. CIT (2014) 99 DTR 166/266 CTR 300 / 225 Taxmann 188 (P&H)(HC)

S.147 : Reassessment – Business expenditure – Software annual charges – Reassessment was held to be bad in law. [S.37((i), 143(1), 148] 1830

AO reopened assessee's assessment on ground that expenditure incurred by assessee under head software charges was of enduring nature and, therefore, was to be added to total income of assessee. Tribunal held that expenditure incurred on software charges could not be held tangible material especially when it was an annual expenditure and said fact was disclosed by assessee. Therefore, reopening of assessment was bad in law. (AY. 2005-06)

Dy. CIT v. India Infoline Insurance Services (P) Ltd. (2014) 34 ITR 119 (2015) 67 SOT 45 ((Mum.)(Trib.)

S.147 : Reassessment – Capital gains – Full value of consideration – Stamp valuation – Reassessment was held to be valid – On merit matter was remanded. [S.50C] 1831

AO noticed that sale consideration as mentioned in sale deed submitted by assessee in earlier year was at lower side as compared to FMV adopted by SRO for stamp value purposes. Tribunal held that understatement in terms of section 50C being *prima facie* established, AO was empowered to reopen assessment. On merit, the AO adopted FMV determined by DVO, as deemed sale consideration and computed short-term capital gain and made addition. On appeal the Tribunal held it was found that DVO had considered comparable sale instances of subsequent period and though he accepted specific issues raised by assessee, namely, non-utilisation of part of land, vastu defects etc., but he had not properly given discount towards same, therefore, matter was to be remitted for reconsideration. (AY. 2007-08)

Rupakula Srinivas v. ITO (2014) 35 ITR 245 / (2015) 67 SOT 58(URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – No failure on the part of assessee Reassessment was held to be not valid. [S.148] 1832

The Tribunal held that there was no failure on the part of the assessee in furnishing all the necessary information and material in view of proviso to section 147 of Income Tax Act, the reassessment proceedings of AY. 2005-06 cannot be initiated by issue of notice under section 148 of Income-tax Act. The notice issued by Assessing Officer was thus beyond jurisdiction of Assessing Officer. Reassessment proceedings for the AY. 2007-08 and 2008-09 were not justified on the basis of change of opinion. (AY. 2005-06, 2007-08, 2008-09)

Shree Salasar Overseas P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 164 TTJ 215 (2015) 67 SOT 68 (URO) (Jaipur)(Trib.)

- 1833 **S.147 : Reassessment – Reopening solely on the basis of information received from the investigation wing & without independent application of mind is void. [S.143(1), 148]**
 The AO proceeded to initiate proceedings u/s. 147 of the Act and to issue notice u/s. 148 of the Act on the basis of information received from Investigation Wing of the department in the form of a CD prepared by Shri Sanjay Shah and Shri Vishesh Prakash, ITOs of Unit V, New Delhi. Subsequently, the AO reproduced details gathered from the CD and without application of independent mind, held that the assessee was beneficiary of accommodation entries amounting to ₹ 4,51,000. In the main part of reason to believe, there is no mentioning of nature of transaction to establish and fortify the fact that the impugned transactions were in the nature of accommodation entries. We also observe that there is no mentioning of date therein and it can safely be presumed that the AO had not examined the assessment record of the assessee which was processed u/s. 143(1)(a) of the Act on 15-3-2005 for forming a belief that the income of the assessee had escaped assessment.
 There was no material on record to show that the AO had applied her independent mind in forming a belief which may result in the required reason to believe as per provisions of section 147 and 148 of the Act. We also held that the CIT(A) was right in following the ratio of the decision of apex court in the case of CIT vs Sun Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. and the decision of Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court of *Vipin Khanna v. CIT* (supra), *Amrinder Singh Dheeman v. ITO* (supra) which have been fully re-elucidated and affirmed by subsequent decision of Delhi High Court in the case of *Jai Bharati Maruti Ltd. v. CIT* (supra). In this situation, the CIT(A) was justified and reasonable in quashing the notice u/s 148 of the Act and entire reassessment proceedings conducted thereunder. (AY. 2004-05)
ACIT v. Devesh Kumar (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org
- 1834 **S.147 : Reassessment – Export – Retrospective amendment of law – Assessment on the basis of the retrospective amendment of section 80HHC of the Act by the Taxation Law (Amendment) Act, 2005 is bad as the said amendment is struck down in *Avani Exports vs. CIT* (Guj.)(HC). [S.80HHC, 143(1), 143(3)]**
 The assessment order which was sought to be reopened by the Assessing Officer was only an intimation under section 143(1) of the Act and not a regular assessment under section 143(3) of the Act. Therefore, proviso to section 147 of the Act would not apply, but in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of *Avani Exports v. CIT* through which retrospective amendment was quashed, the assessment cannot be reopened on the basis of the said retrospective amendment. Since the basis for reopening of the assessment has been quashed by the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, the issue of reopening either before or after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year becomes irrelevant. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of *Avani Exports v. CIT*, we hold that reopening, on the basis of the retrospective amendment of section 80HHC of the Act by the Taxation Law (Amendment) Act, 2005, is illegal and we accordingly hold that the assessment framed consequent thereto is also illegal and deserves to be annulled. (AY. 2001-02, 2004-05, 2006-07).
ACIT v. Northern Tannery (Luck.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

1835

S.147 : Reassessment – Non-issue of S. 143(2) notice renders s. 147 assessment void. S. 292BB does not apply. If there is a conflict of judicial opinion, the view in favour of the assessee must be taken. Respondent can raise an additional ground in a Cross – Objection. [S.143(2), 292BB]

In the re-assessment proceedings, after having considered the assessee's submissions, the AO had concluded the re-assessments making certain additions. While doing so, however, no notices u/s. 143(2) of the Act were issued to the assessee, even though notice u/s. 142(1) of the Act was ordered to be issued on 14-11-2011. It is, therefore, explicit that there is always a requirement of issuing of a notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act in a case of an assessment u/s. 147 of the Act. Relaxation has been given for issuance of such a notice where a notice u/s. 148 was issued between 1-10-1991 and 30-9-2005. In other words, notice issued u/s. 148 of the Act on or after 1-10-2005; a notice u/s. 143(2) has to be issued within the time stipulated in 143(2) of the Act.

Further, the provisions of s. 292BB of the Act are not applicable in the case of non-issuance of a notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act.

Further, we notice that there is a judgment of Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in favour of the revenue, namely, *CIT v. Madhya Bharat Energy Corporation Ltd. reported in* (2011) 337 ITR 389 (Del.) which states that the non issuance of notice u/s. 143(2) does not vitiate the assessment. However, there are also two subsequent judgments of Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court directly in favour of the assessee, as regards the service of notice u/s. 143(2). The Hon'ble H.C. held that service of notice u/s. 143(2) is mandatory. The Hon'ble Guwahati High Court in *CIT v. Purbanchal Parbahon Gosthi* (1998) 234 ITR 663 (Gau) has stated that there is no distinction between an appeal and a cross objection except for the time limit for filing the appeal being 120 days and that of CO being 30 days. Therefore, the learned DR's objection that even a pure question of law cannot be taken up in a cross objection is without any merit. Non-issuance of a notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act as alleged by the assessee-firm had vitiated the conclusion of the assessments u/s. 147 read with s. 143(3) of the Act

DCIT v. Silver Line (Delhi) (Trib.);www.itatonline.org

1836

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Failure to record detailed reasons in assessment order does not justify. 147 action. There is a statutory presumption that AO has applied his mind while passing assessment order – Reopening was held to be bad in law. [S.143(3), 148, Evidence Act,1872, S. 114]

Section 147 of the Act, as substituted w.e.f. 1-4-1989 does not postulate conferment of power upon the AO to initiate reassessment proceeding upon his mere change of opinion. Further, if 'reason to believe' of the AO is founded on an information which might have been received by the AO after the completion of assessment, it may be a sound foundation for exercising the power under section 147 r.w.s. 148 of the Act. It cannot be accepted that only because in the assessment order, detailed reasons have not been recorded, an analysis of the materials on the record by itself may be justifying the AO to initiate a proceeding u/s. 147 of the Act. When a regular order of assessment is passed in terms of section 143(3) of the Act, a presumption can be raised that such an order has been passed on application of mind. It is well known that a presumption can also be raised to the effect that in terms of section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872, judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. If it be held that an order which has been passed purportedly without application of mind would itself confer jurisdiction upon the AO to reopen the proceeding without any thing further, the quasjudicial function to take benefit of its own wrong. Reassessment was held to be bad in law. (AY. 2007-08)

Munshi Mini Rice Mill v. ITO (Kol.) (Trib.); www.itatonline.org

1837 **S.147 : Reassessment – Survey – Sale of units without construction – No new material – Reassessment was held to be invalid. [S.80IB(10), 133A, 143(3), 148]**

The assessee is engaged in business of real estate, claimed deduction under section 80-IB in relation to development and construction of a housing project. AO allowed deduction under section 80-IB in scrutiny assessment. Subsequently, post Survey Action on the assessee AO reopened assessment on the ground that survey action revealed that assessee had completed construction of only 28 residential units out of 47 units for which sanction was obtained and that balance plots were sold without construction, which made assessee ineligible for deduction under section 80-IB(10). Tribunal observed that, the AO had allowed the claim of the assessee under s.80-IB(10) of the Act “upon scrutiny”. The AO noticed that the assessee sold houses as well as plots in the instant year as well as in the past year; assessee had executed only one housing project and claim of deduction under s. 80-IB(10) of the Act was with respect to the “eligible profits of business”. As per the discussion made by the AO in the assessment order on the basis of the computation of income and other accompanying documents filed by the assessee, it is quite clear that the AO was aware that in the housing project being executed, assessee had not only sold houses on which the deduction under s. 80-IB(10) of the Act was claimed, but also sold open plots on which no deduction under s. 80-IB(10) of the Act was claimed. In this background, the assertion of the AO in the reasons recorded that the survey action on 28th May, 2008 revealed that assessee had sold certain plots out of the project which therefore led to an inference that assessee violated the condition of s. 80-IB(10) of the Act, is suspect. As noted earlier, AO was aware that assessee had sold open plots also and concluded that the assessee was eligible for the claim of deduction under s. 80-IB(10) of the Act in relation to “eligible profits of business” of “Nath Regency” project, there was no fresh tangible material which came to knowledge of the AO after the completion of assessment on 13th Sept., 2006, which establishes ineligibility of assessee’s claim for deduction under s. 80-IB(10) of the Act. The survey action under s. 133A of the Act on 28th May, 2008 cannot be said to have revealed a fact situation which was not in the knowledge of the AO on the basis of the material before him. Reopening was held to be invalid. (AY. 2003-04, 2005-06)

Nath Developers v. ACIT(2013) 157 TTJ 224 / (2014) 61 SOT 8(URO) (Pune)(Trib.)

1838 **S.147 : Reassessment – Protective assessment – Retracted statement cannot form the basis of reopening – Protective assessment without substantive assessment is not permissible. [S.143(3)]**

(i) The statement of Shri Subodh Gupta, CA. was recorded during the course of survey in his personal capacity. The statement was later retracted. A retracted statement

recorded during survey cannot be a basis of assumption of jurisdiction u/s. 147 of the Act.

(ii) The AO has not made any specific allegations against the assessee. He intended to make a protective assessment on the assessee. However, while there can be a substantive assessment without any protective assessment, there cannot be a protective assessment/addition without a substantive assessment/addition. As no substantive assessment/addition was made in the hands of Subodh Gupta, the protective reassessment assessment on the assessee is not permissible. (AY. 2004-05)

G. K. Consultants Limited v. ITO (Delhi)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – No fresh information – Reopening is bad in law. 1839

The assessee was engaged in the development and sale of computer software. The AO initiated reassessment proceedings and sought to tax the amount which was set off against interest receipts as 'income from other sources', in the absence of declaration u/s. 10A(8) of the Act. The CIT(A) quashed the reopening as the reopening was on a mere change of opinion and no new facts were brought on record to substantiate the same.

On appeal by the department, the Tribunal relying on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of *CIT v. Usha International Ltd.* (2012) 348 ITR 485 held that the CIT(A) was right in quashing the reopening proceedings as there was indeed no new material brought on record and the AO had merely a change in opinion. (AY. 2002-03) *ITO v. Object Connect India Pvt. Ltd.* (2014) 29 ITR 518 / 65 SOT 132 (URO)(Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Absence of new material or information – Reassessment is not valid. 1840

AO reopened the assessments originally completed u/s. 143(3) not on the basis of any new material or information which had come into his possession after the completion of the original assessments but by fresh application of mind to the same material and same set of facts, the initiation of reassessment proceedings was based on a mere change of opinion of the AO which is not permissible in law. (AYs. 2003-04 to 2008-09)

SIRO Clinpharm (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 98 DTR1 / 65 SOT 149 (URO) / 160 TTJ 70 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.147 : Reassessment – Reason to believe – Recovery of pen drive by police forwarded to IT department – Reassessment is valid. [S.148, Evidence Act, 1872, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973] 1841

A pen drive was recovered by police and forwarded to IT department containing various accounting entries having correlation with activities of the assessee. This could validly form the basis for AO to entertain reason to believe the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The assessee has raised various objections regarding irregularities committed by Police while carrying out the search and seizure of the alleged pen drive and taking print outs as per the CrPC, IPC, Indian Evidence Act and cyber laws. Tribunal held that which have no effect on recording of reasons for forming a belief about escapement of income. Income-tax proceedings are non-adversarial in nature and the entire exercise is directed to ensure a fair and proper assessment on the assessee.

It is the trite law that technical rules of Evidence Act AND CrPC are not applicable to these proceedings. Thus the reasons for reopening the assessments were properly recorded by AO. (AY. 2001-02, 2003-04)

Chetan Gupta v. ACIT (2013) 144 ITD 344/(2014) 98 DTR 209/ 160 TTJ 9 (Delhi)(Trib.)

1842 **S.147 : Reassessment – Notice sent wrong address – Not valid. [Ss. 148, 282]**

Notice u/s. 148 sent on a wrong address and served on a person who was neither employee nor authorised agent of assessee was not valid and therefore, the consequent assessment was held to be bad in law. (AY. 2001-02)

Chetan Gupta v. ACIT (2013) 144 ITD 344/(2014) 98 DTR 209/ 160 TTJ 9 (Delhi)(Trib.)

1843 **S.147 : Reassessment – Notice – Jurisdiction of AO was not vested with jurisdiction over assessee – Reassessment proceedings initiated in pursuance of said notice were liable to be set aside. [Ss.120, 148]**

Notice u/s. 148 is required to be issued by AO who is vested with jurisdiction over assessee on basis of criteria of territorial area or classes of persons, or classes of incomes as enumerated in sub-section (3) of S. 120. Therefore, where notice under section 148 was issued by AO. who was not vested with jurisdiction over assessee on basis of any of aforesaid criteria, same was patently illegal and void and, thus, reassessment proceedings in pursuance of said notice were liable to be set aside. (r.w.s.120) (AY. 2003-2004)

Indorama Software Solution Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 150 ITD 252 (Mum.)(Trib.)

1844 **S.147 : Reassessment – Notice – Non – service of notice – Proceedings not valid. [S.148]**

A notice u/s. 148 of the Act was issued, in compliance with the notice, the AO received a letter stating that the notice had not been received by the Company and the reopening was bad in law. The AO passed the reassessment order observing that the notice u/s. 148 of the Act was duly served at the address of the company and it was duly acknowledged and the signature and telephone number of person receiving the notice were taken by the process server while serving notice. The CIT(A) held that there was no valid service of notice u/s. 148 of the Act and therefore the reassessment proceedings were void *ab initio*.

On appeal by the department, the Tribunal observed that though there was signature, date and number on the copy of the notice retained by the process server, neither the time of service, nor the manner of service, nor the name and address of the person identifying the service and witnessing the delivery of the notice were present. Thus, the requirement of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 were not met. The service of the notice was not identified and in the absence of identification of the service, it was impossible to prove that the service was an agent of the assessee. Therefore the Tribunal confirmed the Order of the CIT(A). (AY. 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2003-2004)

DCIT v. Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms P. Ltd. (2014) 29 ITR 279 / 55 taxmann.com 332 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.147 : Reassessment – Reopening on the possibility that the assessee AOP may or may not be a taxable unit is based on surmise and presumption and is invalid – DTAA-India-Denmark. [S.148, Article 14]

1845

(i) The assessee is a FUND and a resident of Denmark. Along with its return of income, in India, the assessee had submitted 'Tax Residency Certificate' issued by the Danish Authorities in order to claim the benefit of Article 14 of India-Denmark DTAA. From the plain reading of the 'reasons recorded', it is seen that the Assessing Officer first of all, is not clear whether the assessee is tax resident of Denmark or not, and secondly, whether AOP-Trust is taxable unit in Denmark or not. This is evident from the reasons where he observes that, there is a possibility that AOP is not a taxable unit under the tax laws of Denmark and because of this, there is possibility of loss of revenue.

The reasons recorded by the AO clearly shows that the reopening has been done merely on some kind of a possibility for which he himself is not sure. There is even no reference to any material that assessee's claim for benefit under Article 14 of DTAA is false or incorrect. He is even not sure whether assessee is a tax resident when TRC was there in the return of income. It appears that the reopening is merely pretence to examine, whether the assessee is a taxable unit or not and whether there could be possibility of loss of revenue. Once the Tax Residency Certificate was there in the record, then there could not have been any ground for presumption that the assessee is not a taxable entity in Denmark. He has not referred to any other information or material that the assessee is not a tax resident of Denmark and there was loss of revenue because the assessee has falsely claimed the benefit under Article 14 of the DTAA. The reasons as recorded by the AO falls in the realm of surmises and presumption *de hors* any material fact having live link nexus with the formation of 'reasons to believe' that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Thus, we are of the opinion that on the face of the "reasons recorded", the Assessing Officer cannot assume jurisdiction to reopen the case in the case of the assessee. Thus, the entire proceedings initiated *vide* notice u/s. 148 is bad in law and deserves to be quashed.

(AY. 2006-07)

Investeringsforeningen Bank Ivest I Afd Indien & Kina v. DDIT (2014) 36 ITR 146 [(2015) 67 SOT 242 (URO)(Mum.)(Trib.)]

S.147 : Reassessment – Change of opinion – Failure to record detailed reasons in assessment order does not justify. 147 action. There is a statutory presumption that AO has applied his mind while passing assessment order – Reopening was held to be bad in law. [S.143(3), 148, Evidence Act, 1872, S.114]

1846

Section 147 of the Act, as substituted w.e.f. 1-4-1989 does not postulate conferment of power upon the AO to initiate reassessment proceeding upon his mere change of opinion. Further, if 'reason to believe' of the AO is founded on an information which might have been received by the AO after the completion of assessment, it may be a sound foundation for exercising the power under section 147 r.w.s. 148 of the Act. It cannot be accepted that only because in the assessment order, detailed reasons have not been recorded, an analysis of the materials on the record by itself may be justifying the AO to initiate a proceeding u/s. 147 of the Act. When a regular order of assessment is passed in terms of section 143(3) of the Act, a presumption can be raised that such

an order has been passed on application of mind. It is well known that a presumption can also be raised to the effect that in terms of section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. If it be held that an order which has been passed purportedly without application of mind would itself confer jurisdiction upon the AO to reopen the proceeding without anything further, the quasijudicial function to take benefit of its own wrong. Reassessment was held to be bad in law. (AY. 2007-08)

Munshi Mini Rice Mill v. ITO (Kol.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

Section 151 : Sanction for issue of notice

- 1847 **S.151 : Reassessment – Notice after the expiry of four years – Sanction for issue of notice – Satisfaction of Commissioner or Chief Commissioner – No sanction or permission of Commissioner obtained – Reassessment not valid. [S.147, 148, Right of Information Act, 2005]**

Held, allowing the petition, that the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 151 was attracted. The counter-affidavit filed by the Revenue indicated that no sanction or permission of the Commissioner was obtained. Thus, the entire exercise of reopening of the assessment under section 148 failed to meet the basic jurisdictional requirement under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 151 since under the proviso no notice can be issued except on the satisfaction of the Commissioner or, as the case may be, the Chief Commissioner and admittedly there was no such satisfaction in the case of the assessee. The notice of reassessment was liable to be quashed and set aside. (AY. 1998-99)

Reliable Finhold Ltd. v. UOI(2014) 369 ITR 419 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 446(All.)(HC)

- 1848 **S.151 : Reassessment – Sanction for issue of notice – Mandatory – Burden is on revenue to establish – Reassessment was held to be bad in law. [S.148]**

In the absence of the order granting approval by the Commissioner under section 151 or in the absence of any indication in the orders passed by the authorities below including the order of the Tribunal or the materials on record that such approval was obtained, it would not be possible to assume that such approval under section 151 was obtained. The provisions contained in section 151 are indubitably mandatory in nature and since compliance thereof was either not made or could be established by the revenue, benefit will have to be given to the assessee. Thus, there is no reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the Tribunal. (AY. 1996-97)

CIT v. H. M. Constructions (2014) / 366 ITR 277 / 227 Taxmann 229(Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

- 1849 **S.151 : Reassessment – Sanction for issue of notice – Recording of satisfaction. [S.143(1), 148]**

After 1st April, 1989, in accepting the returns under section 143(1)(a) the Assessing Officer does not apply his mind and that the acknowledgment is received mostly by ministerial staff. In such case where any material is found and the notice under Section 148 has to be issued, the Assessing Officer is competent to issue the notice except in a case, where more than 4 years have expired. In such cases the satisfaction has to be

recorded by an officer higher in rank. The satisfaction of the Joint Commissioner has to be recorded before the Assessing Officer, who may be an ITO, issues a notice under Section 148. (AY. 1995-96, 96-97, 97-98)

CIT v. Amarjeet Singh (2014) 222 Taxmann 66(Mag.) (All.)(HC)

S.151 : Reassessment – Sanction for issue of notice – Income escaping assessment – Notice issued after obtaining approval of the Commissioner invalid as approval is contrary to provisions of section 151. [S.143(3), 147, 148]

1850

The AO issued notice u/s. 148 and passed an Order u/s. 143 r.w.s. 147 without furnishing reasons recorded for reopening to the assessee. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO. However, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the AO with a direction to communicate the reasons for reopening the assessment and thereafter to pass a fresh Order. Subsequently the reasons were furnished to the assessee. However, the approval required u/s. 151 had not been obtained since the reasons merely directed that the matter be “Put up for approval” for issue of a notice under section 148 and there was nothing on record that indicated that the same was actually put up for approval. The AO in his response stated that the notice was issued with the prior approval of the CIT-2 Mumbai.

The High Court, quashing the reopening observed that there was no approval of the Additional Commissioner or the Joint Commissioner either in the affidavit in reply or even otherwise, although they were granted an opportunity of doing so.

The High Court relied on its own decision in the case of *Ghanshyam K. Khabrani v. Asstt. CIT (2012) 346 ITR 443 (Bom.) (Mag.)* which held that there is no statutory provision by which a power to be exercised by an officer can be exercised by a superior officer and when the statute mandates the satisfaction of a particular functionary for the exercise of a power, the satisfaction must be of that authority. (AY. 1997-1998)

DSJ Communication Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 129 (Bom.)(HC)

S.151 : Reassessment – Sanction for issue of notice – Sanction by the CIT with word “approved” without recording satisfaction note renders reopening invalid. [S.147, 148]

1851

Tribunal held that a simple reading of the provisions of Section 151(1) with the proviso clearly show that no such notice shall be issued unless the Commissioner is satisfied on the reasons recorded by the AO that it is a fit case for the issue of notice which means that the satisfaction of the Commissioner is paramount for which the least that is expected from the Commissioner is application of mind and due diligence before according sanction to the reasons recorded by the AO. In the present case, the order sheet which is placed on record show that the Commissioner has simply affixed “approved” at the bottom of the note sheet prepared by the ITO technical. Nowhere the CIT has recorded his satisfaction. In the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court (supra) that on AO’s report the Commissioner against the question “whether the Commissioner IS satisfied that it is a fit case for the issue of notice under section 148 merely noted “Yes” and affixed his signature thereunder. On these facts, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the important safeguards provided in sections 147 and 151 were lightly treated by the officer and the Commissioner. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the ITO could not have had reason to believe that income had escaped

assessment by reasons of the appellant-firm's failure to disclose material facts and if the Commissioner had read the report carefully he could not have come to the conclusion that this was a fit case for issuing a notice under section 148. The notice issued under section 148 was therefore, invalid.

sections 147 and 148 are charter to the Revenue to reopen earlier assessments and are, therefore protected by safeguards against unnecessary harassment of the assessee. They are sword for the Revenue and shield for the assessee. Section 151 guards that the sword of Sec. 147 may not be used unless a superior officer is satisfied that the AO has good and adequate reasons to invoke the provisions of section 147. The superior authority has to examine the reasons, material or grounds and to judge whether they are sufficient and adequate to the formation of the necessary belief on the part of the assessing officer. If, after applying his mind and also recording his reasons, howsoever briefly, the Commissioner is of the opinion that the AO's belief is well reasoned and *bona fide* he is to accord his sanction to the issue of notice u/s. 148 of the Act. In the instant case, we find from the perusal of the order sheet which is on record, the Commissioner has simply put "approved" and signed the report thereby giving sanction to the AO. Nowhere the Commissioner has recorded a satisfaction note not even in brief. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Commissioner has accorded sanction after applying his mind and after recording his satisfaction. (ITA No.4122/Del/2009, dated 22-10-2014.) (AY. 2001-02)

ITO v. N. C. Cable Ltd. (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

Section 153 : Time limit for completion of assessments and reassessments

- 1852 **S.153 : Assessment – Reassessment – Limitation – Exclusion from limitation – Finding or direction by appellate or revisional authority, etc. – Appellate order that an amount was not assessable in a particular assessment year but was assessable in an earlier year-Order constitutes finding or direction – Consequent order not barred by limitation. [S.147, 148, 150]**

Held, that in view of the order of the Tribunal that the credit entries related to the earlier assessment year 2000-01, the Assessing Officer initiated proceedings by issue of notice under section 147 / 148 of the Act for the year and passed an order dated December 29, 2009, making an addition of ₹ 32 lakhs. The order was not barred by limitation. (AY. 2000-01)

CIT v. PP Engineering Work (2014) 369 ITR 433 / 271 CTR 221 / 49 taxmann.com 321 (Delhi)(HC)

- 1853 **S.153 : Assessment – Reassessment – Limitation – Finding or direction – where no express finding or direction was there, reassessment could be made under section 153(3)(ii). [S.148, 149]**

Whenever an income is deleted or excluded from one year a corresponding inclusion in appropriate year by resorting to reopening of assessment for that year is specifically permitted by Explanation 2 to section 153(3) and therefore limitation provided under sections 148 and 149 has to be considered in light of section 150 and sub-section (3) of section 153, read with Explanation 2 thereof. Thus, reassessment of escaped income,

without any express 'finding' or 'direction' could be made under Explanation 2 to section 153(3) and in a case where no express finding or direction was there, reassessment could be made under section 153(3)(ii). Appeal of revenue was allowed. (AY. 1996-97) *CIT v. Glass Equipment (India) Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 59 / 269 CTR 363 / 225 Taxmann 65 (Mag.) (Cal.)(HC)*

S.153 : Assessment – Revision – Limitation – Assessment consequent upon revisional order – Barred by limitation. [S.153(2A), 263]

1854

Tribunal held that the assessment order passed on 28th March 2011 in compliance of revisional order dated 8th March 2010 was barred by limitation under second proviso to section 153(2A). (AY. 2006-07)

ITO v. Jheendu Ram (2014) 164 TTJ 22(UO) / 34 ITR 97(2015) 53 taxmann.com 80 / 68 SOT 179 (URO) (Luck.)(Trib.)

Section S153A : Assessment in case of search or requisition

S.153A : Assessment – Search – Power to reopen assessments for years comprised in six-year period even where assessments completed or returns processed – Tribunal striking down addition made for gift in assessment completed under section 153A on ground no incriminating material found during search – Not justified – Matter remanded. [S.143(1)(a), 143(3), 147, 148]

1855

Held, allowing the appeal, that the reasons given by the Tribunal that no material was found during the search could not be sustained since the AO has the power to reassess the returns of the assessee not only for the undisclosed income, which was found during the search operation but also with regard to the material that was available at the time of the original assessment. The order of the Tribunal was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal to reconsider the issue afresh on the merits. (AY. 2000-2001)

CIT v. Raj Kumar Arora (2014) 367 ITR 517/52 taxmann.com 172/(2015) 120 DTR 417 (All.)(HC)

S.153A : Assessment – Search – Lose sheets – Admission of undisclosed income by assessee constitutes good evidence. Loose sheets found during search can be relied upon. [S.132(4), 143(3)153C]

1856

The Court held that when there is a clear and categorical admission of the undisclosed income by the assessee himself, there is no necessity to scrutinise the documents. The document can be of some relevance, if the undisclosed income is determined higher than what is now determined by the department. Moreover, it is not the case of the assessee that the admission made by him was incorrect or there is mistake. In fact, when there is a clear admission, voluntarily made, by the assessee, that would constitute a good piece of evidence for the Revenue.

The assessee relied upon a decision of the Delhi High Court in *Commissioner of Income Tax v. Girish Chaudhary, [2008] 296 ITR 619* to plead that loose sheets of papers should not be taken as a basis for determining undisclosed income. However, in the case on hand, loose sheets found during the search are not the sole basis for determining the tax liability. It is a piece of evidence to prove undisclosed income. The printout statements

of undisclosed income is not disputed by the assessee and in his sworn statements it is accepted. The entire exercise by the department to bring to tax undisclosed income, we find has been generous and simple. There appears to be no confusion in the quantification of the tax liability and we uphold the order of the Tribunal.

(AY. 2001-02, 2007-08)

B. Kishore Kumar v. DCIT (2014) 112 DTR 121 / 273 CTR 468 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 614 (Mad.)(HC)

1857 **S.153A : Assessment – Search – No addition can be made in respect of an unabated assessment which has become final if no incriminating material is found during the search. [S.132, 143(3), 263]**

In AY 1998-99, the AO passed an assessment order u/s. 143(3) on 29.12.2000. Thereafter, on 3-12-2003, there was a search action u/s. 132 wherein incriminating documents/articles were seized. Pursuant to the search, the AO passed an order u/s. 153A determining the concealed income at ₹ 89 lakhs. The assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A), who deleted the concealed income computed by the AO. The AO gave effect to the said order of the CIT(A) and recomputed the income at the same figure as it was in the section 143(3) order. The CIT passed an order u/s. 263 stating that as the income computed by the AO in the effect order was less than 30% of the book profit, the AO ought to have computed the total income by invoking section 115JA. He also held that in the said order, the AO had incorrectly computed section 80HHC deduction. The assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal claiming that as the computation of section 115JA book profit and section 80HHC deduction were not the subject matter of the section 153A proceedings, the CIT could not have invoked jurisdiction u/s. 263. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's plea. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal:

(i) On initiation of proceedings u/s. 153A, it is only the assessment proceedings that are pending on the date of conducting search u/s 132 or making requisition u/s. 132A of the Act that stand abated and not the assessments already finalised. This is made clear in Circular No. 8 of 2003 dated 18-9-2003 (See 263 ITR (St) 61 at 107) issued by the CBDT. Therefore, the argument of the revenue, that on initiation of proceedings u/s. 153A, the assessments finalised for the assessment years covered u/s. 153A stand abated cannot be accepted. Similarly on annulment of assessment made u/s. 153A (1) what stands revived is the pending assessment proceedings which stood abated as per section 153A(1);

(ii) In the present case, the assessment for AY 1998-99 was finalised on 29-12-2000 and search was conducted thereafter on 3-12-2003. Therefore, initiation of proceedings u/s. 153A would not affect the assessment finalised on 29-12-2000;

(iii) Once it is held that the assessment finalized on 29.12.2000 has attained finality, then the deduction allowed u/s. 80HHC would attain finality. In such a case, the AO, while passing the independent assessment order u/s. 153A could not have disturbed the assessment order which has attained finality, unless the materials gathered in the course of the proceedings u/s. 153A establish that the reliefs granted under the finalised assessment were contrary to the facts unearthed during the course of section 153 A proceedings. In the present case, there is nothing on record to suggest that any material was unearthed during the search or during the section 153A proceedings which would

show that the relief u/s. 80HHC was erroneous. In such a case, the AO, while passing the assessment order u/s. 153A could not have disturbed the assessment order finalised on 29-12-2000 relating to s. 80HHC deduction and consequently the CIT could not have invoked jurisdiction u/s. 263. Moreover, since the AO had made addition on account of undisclosed income at ₹ 89 lakhs in the section 153A assessment order, there was no question of computing book profits u/s. 115 JA. When the CIT(A) deleted the addition without any direction to compute the book profits, the AO was bound to modify the assessment order as directed by the CIT(A). Therefore, no fault could be found with the AO in giving effect to the order of the CIT(A). Consequently, the CIT could not invoke jurisdiction u/s. 263 on the ground that the assessment u/s 153A was erroneous or prejudicial to the interests of the revenue.

CIT v. Murli Agro Products Ltd. (2014) 49 taxmann.com 172 (Bom.) (HC) www.itatonline.org

S.153A : Assessment – Search – AO is required to assess the “total income” and is not confined only to income which was unearthed during search. [S.132, 143(3), 263]

1858

For AY 2008-09, the AO passed an assessment order u/s. 143(3) on 31-12-2010. A search u/s. 132 was conducted on 12-4-2011 in the course of which incriminating material leading to undisclosed income was seized. The AO initiated proceedings u/s. 153A of the Act calling upon the assessee to file return of income u/s. 153A(1)(a) for six years. The assessee complied with the same. When the said return was under consideration, the CIT passed an order u/s. 263 on the ground that the assessment order dated 31-12-2010 passed u/s. 143(3) was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. The assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal in which it claimed that as the assessments u/s 153A were open, the AO could pass appropriate orders thereon. The Tribunal, relying on *All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2012) 137 ITD 287 (SB) (Mum.)* held that as the section 143(3) order did not abate and had become final, the AO, in the section 153A assessment had to confine himself to the incriminating material found during search and could not take into consideration other materials while making the section 153A assessment. It consequently upheld the CIT's power to revise the section 143(3) order. On appeal by the assessee to the High Court, HELD reversing the Tribunal:

The Tribunal has proceeded on the assumption by virtue of the judgment of the Special Bench in *All Cargo Global*, the scope of enquiry u/s. 153A is to be confined only to the undisclosed income unearthed during search and if there is any other income which is not the subject matter of search, the same cannot be taken into consideration. Therefore, the revisional authority can exercise the power u/s. 263. In the entire scheme of s. 153A of the Act, there is no prohibition for the assessing authority to take note of such income. On the contrary, it is expressly provided u/s. 153A of the Act that the AO shall assess or reassess the “total income” of six assessment years which means the said total income includes income which was returned in the earlier return, the income which was unearthed during search and income which is not the subject matter of aforesaid two income. If the CIT has come across any income that the assessing authority has not taken note of while passing the earlier order, the said material can be furnished to the assessing authority and the assessing authority shall take note of the said income also in determining the total income of the assessee when the earlier proceedings are reopened

and that income also shall become the subject matter of said proceedings. In that view of the matter the reasoning given by the Tribunal is not justified. The CIT did not have jurisdiction to initiate any proceedings u/s. 263 of the Act.

Canara Housing Development Co. v. DCIT (2014) 49 taxmann.com 98 / (2015) 114 DTR 162 / 274 CTR 122 (Karn.)(HC)

- 1859 **S.153A : Assessment – Search – Evidence for all years – Sale bills showing less quantity than estimate slip – No requirement under section 153A and other provisions requiring the department to collect information and evidence for each and every year for the six years under section 153A. [S.132]**

Though the estimate slip reflected the actual purchase and sale of gold made in the business concerns of the assessee, the sale bill was always for a lesser quantity than the details reflected in the estimate slip. By this process the actual sales were not reflected and this was the information gathered during 2006 by the Commercial Tax Department. The search took place in 2007. There was material at least for these two years. Therefore, there was enough information and material to presume the nature of accounting and also the *modus operandi* in maintaining the records by the assessee. There is also no requirement under section 153A and other provisions requiring the department to collect information and evidence for each and every year for the six years under section 153A. Order of Tribunal was confirmed.

Sunny Jacob Jewellers and Wedding Centre v. DCIT (2014) 362 ITR 664/102 DTR 68/ 267 CTR 361/48 taxmann.com 347 (Ker.)(HC)

- 1860 **S.153A : Assessment – Search – Authorization – In the absence of search assessment was held to be invalid. [S.124, 132, 132A]**

The provisions of section 124 clearly concern the territorial jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer and have no relevance in so far as the inherent jurisdiction for passing an order of assessment under section 153A is concerned, when no search authorisation under section 132 was issued or requisition under section 132A of the Act was made. In the absence of search authorization, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessment orders under section 153A could not be passed. (AY. 2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05)

CIT v. Ramesh D. Patel (2014) 362 ITR 492 / 102 DTR 65 / 225 Taxmann 411 / 269 CTR 285 / 225 Taxmann 411 (Guj.)(HC)

- 1861 **S.153A : Assessment – Search – Cost of construction of internal road – Apportionment made by CIT(A) was held to be justified**

Assessee purchased 101.50 acres of land, converted same into small plots and sold them. As total 83.22 acres of plots were sold, AO in computing gains, deducted cost pertaining to 83.22 acres. Assessee's case was that 18.28 acres of land was used for creating internal roads for converting land into plots, hence entire cost of ₹ 101.50 acres was to be deducted. Tribunal held that Since, assessee's claim of compensation of 18.28 acres of land for creating internal roads was not substantiated, CIT(A) deducted an additional amount of section 5 lakhs towards roads. Order of CIT(A) was affirmed. (AY. 2001-02, 2007-08)

M. M. Sulaiman v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 746 (2015) 67 SOT 32 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)

- S.153A : Assessment – Search – Pending assessment also to be considered. [S.139]** 1862
 Tribunal held that where search took place when original assessment of instant year was pending, documents filed along with return of income filed under section 139 also could be considered by Assessing Officer for purpose of making assessment under section 153A. (AY. 2001-02, 2007-08)
M. M. Sulaiman v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 746 / (2015) 67 SOT 32(URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)
- S.153A : Assessment – Search – Natural justice – Quashing of order by CIT(A) for not following the principle of natural justice was set aside** 1863
 CIT(A) quashed assessment order in toto for violation of natural justice as AO did not provide an opportunity to assessee to cross-examine workers who had given statements against assessee. Tribunal held that since power of CIT(A) are co-terminus with that of AO he should have called for a report from AO submitted after providing opportunity of cross examination and also after furnishing relevant documents, accordingly order of CIT(A) was to be set aside. (AY. 2001-02, 2007-08)
M. M. Sulaiman v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 746 / (2015) 67 SOT 32(URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)
- S.153A : Assessment – Search – Amount to be considered as per revocation agreement and not on the basis of receipt.** 1864
 During course of search, a receipt was found, which suggested that assessee would be entitled to receive ₹ 3.95 crore as premium. However, during course of assessment proceeding, assessee filed a copy of revocation agreement entered by assessee with proposed buyers which stated that buyers had given a sum of ₹ 3.42 crores to assessee. Receipt mentioned about ‘payment due’ and not actual payment, where as revocation agreement mentioned about actual payment made. Tribunal held that premium amount had to be taken as ₹ 3.42 crore only, as mentioned in revocation agreement. (AY. 2001-02, 2007-08)
M. M. Sulaiman v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 746 / (2015) 67 SOT 32(URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)
- S.153A : Assessment – Search – Undisclosed income – Assessment completed – No incriminating material – AO is not limited to assessing undisclosed income. [S.132, 143(3)]** 1865
 Even in non-pending assessments where no incriminating material is found, AO is not limited to assessing “undisclosed” income. The Assessing Officer can take note of the income disclosed in the earlier return, any undisclosed income found during the course of search and also any other income which is not disclosed in the earlier return of income OR which is not unearthed in the course of search under section 132 of the Act, in order to find out and determine what is the ‘total income’ of each year and then pass the order of assessment. (AY. 2008-09, 2010-11)
Nandini Delux v. CIT(2015) 37 ITR 52 / 68 SOT 5 (URO) (2015) 167 TTJ 746 (Bang.)(Trib.)

- 1866 **S.153A : Assessment – Search – Abatement of assessment – No addition can be made unless any incriminating material recovered during the search. [S.2(22)(e), 68, 132]**
 When assessments pertaining to six immediately preceding assessment years were complete, AO cannot make any addition thereunder unless there is any incriminating material recovered during search. Assessment was not abated. Assessment was quashed. (AY. 2005-06)
Gurinder Singh Bawa v. Dy. CIT (2014) 150 ITD 40 (Mum)(Trib.)
- 1867 **S.153A : Assessment – Search – If no incriminating documents were found no additions can be made in respect of concluded assessments. [S.143(1) 143(3)]**
 Tribunal held that assessment made by the AO was not based on any incriminating documents found in the course of search. AO could make addition in the case of concluded assessments only on the basis of incriminating materials found during the course of search.
Raksha Chhadwa (Mrs.) v. ACIT (Mum.) (Trib.); www.itat.nic.in
- 1868 **S.153A : Assessment – Search – Income of any other person – Search and seizure – Recording of satisfaction by the AO of the person searched is mandatory and limitation period for issue of notice was not complied with hence the assessments for six years was quashed. [S.153C, 158BD]**
 Tribunal dealing with the issue of recording of satisfaction and limitation held as under; (i) It must not be lost sight of that section 153C of the Act and 158BD of the Act are draconian in nature when accounts of the person or entity other than the person searched are reopened automatically and revenue gets authority to assessee or reassess assessment of six assessment years preceding previous year in which seized material or evidence belonged to the person other than the person searched is handed over to the AO of that other person. Therefore, it is always advisable to the revenue authorities that the proceedings u/s. 153C of the Act should not be initiated and conducted in a casual manner and the motive of statutory provision clearly stipulates that the AO should make himself satisfied prior to initiation of proceedings u/s. 153C of the Act.
 (ii) As per RTI reply, it has been stated and answered to the present assessee i.e. person other than person searched, the AO of the person searched has admitted that no satisfaction note is available in their record/files concerning person other than the present case. The satisfaction note clearly reveals *ex facie* that the same has been recorded by the AO in the capacity of AO of the person other than person searched meaning thereby assessee of the instant appeals. In these circumstances, it can safely be held that no valid satisfaction was recorded by the AO of person searched so as to fulfill requirement of valid assumption of jurisdiction u/s. 153C of the Act which is sine qua non for validly assumed jurisdiction u/s. 153A of the Act.
 (iii) The AO recorded satisfaction and issued notice u/s. 153C of the Act from AYs. 2003-04 to 2008-09 but on the date of recording of satisfaction i.e. 5.7.2010 the relevant previous year is 2010-11. The assessment for AY 2003-04 and AY 2004-05 is time barred as per provisions of section 153(1) of the Act which stipulated that the AO can issue the notice u/s 153A of the Act for six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted and for the

purpose of section 153C of the Act for the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the document or material is handed over. Assessments for all six years were quashed. (AY. 2003-04, 2008-09) *ACIT v. Inlay Marketing Pvt. Ltd (2015) 167 TTJ 273 (Delhi)(Trib.)*

S.153A : Assessment – Search – Assessment cannot be made in the absence of incriminating material found in search. [S.153C]

1869

Tribunal found that it has been held by the ITAT, Kolkata Bench in the case of LMJ International Limited vs. DCIT 119 TTJ (Kol.) 214 where nothing incriminating is found in the course of search relating to any assessment years, the assessments for such assessment years cannot be disturbed u/s.153C of the Act. Thus it is clear that the provisions of section 153C of the Act cannot be invoked automatically in respect of any assessment year unless there exists incriminating documents for that previous year. The provision of section 153C of the Act cannot be invoked on routine information or on income already accounted/disclosed in the original return, the assessment of which is complete. In this regard we may gainfully refer to the decision of the Mumbai Special Bench of the ITAT in the case of *Alcargio Global Logistics Ltd. vs. DCIT*.

(ii) We find that the above interpretation which is with respect to section 153A of the Act should also be extended to assessment u/s. 153C of the Act. It will be a absurd proposition that the person who is searched u/s. 153A of the Act can be assessed only on the basis of incriminating material found and the other person who is assessed u/s 153C of the Act in connection with the same search should be assessed de hors any incriminating material.

(iii) We find that the above view is supported by the amendment to section 153C of the Act w.e.f. 01.10.2014. The provision to section 153C(1) prior to the amendment and sub-section to the amendment are already reproduced in assessee's submission herein above. From the above we find that the provision of section 153C(1) was amended to obviate practical difficulties which arose in its interpretation. To put it simply this amendment to proviso to section 153C(1) of the Act debars the AO from making any assessment de hors any incriminating material found during the search. Thus in our view this amendment supports the view expressed by us.

Trishul Hi-Tech Industries v. DCIT (Kol.) (Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.153A : Assessment – Search – Reassessment made without any incriminating material found during search action was held to be not valid. [S.132, 143]

1870

The return was processed under section 143(1) and the same had attained finality due to expiry of limitation period of 12 months from the end of the month in which the return was filed. Search operation was carried out on 14-08-2008 and no incriminating documents were found. In pursuance of notice u/s. 153A the assessee filed the return of income. The assessee could not produce the books of account and other details as the same were destroyed in the flood. AO completed the assessment under section 144 r.w.s 153A and estimated the net profit In Appeal CIT(A) directed the AO to adopt the net profit at 0.14% as against 0.99% adopted by the AO, however CIT(A) up held the assessment proceedings u/s. 153A. Department has filed appeal against the deletion made by CIT(A) and the assessee has filed cross objection. Allowing the cross objection

of assessee the Tribunal held that reassessments made by the AO u/s. 153A without any incriminating material being found during the search action were not in accordance with law and the order was set aside. (ITA no 2141 to 2144 / Mum / 2012 dated 20-2-2014 (AY. 2003-04, 2006-07)

ACIT v. Jayendra P. Jhaveri (2014)65 SOT 118 (URO) (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 1871 **S.153A : Assessment – Search – Undisclosed income – Sale proceeds of shares as unaccounted income was deleted and directed the AO to accept as capital gains. [S. 45]**

The Assessing Officer treated the sale proceeds received on sale of shares as unaccounted income of the assessee and the same was confirmed by the CIT(A). The Tribunal held that nothing has been made out by the Assessing Officer to show that the claim of the assessee in respect of the sale of shares is not correct. Tribunal held that both the authorities below are not justified in holding that the entire sale proceeds shown by the assessee are out of ham and bogus arranged share transactions. Contract notes are genuine. Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to accept the claim of the long term as well as short term capital gains by holding that all the purchases and sales of shares are the genuine transactions. Addition towards commission at the rate of 6% is based on presumption by the Assessing Officer. The addition is without any merit and the Tribunal deleted the addition. (AY. 2004-05, 2006-07)

Smita P. Patil (Smt.)v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 182/(2015) 55 taxmann.com 346 (Pune)(Trib.)

- 1872 **S.153A : Assessment – Search – Undisclosed income – Unaccounted receipts collected from students – AO was justified in making addition on the basis of seized material – Matter remanded to deleted the double addition.**

The Tribunal sent the matter back to Assessing Officer to quantify the receipt of fees for management quota seats, if any, on the basis of available seized material as well as other material, if any relating to academic years 2003-04 to 2007-08 and not on the basis of seized materials relating to academic years 2008-09 and 2009-10. In other words, instead of estimating the unaccounted receipt for the academic years 2003-04 to 2007-08 on the basis of seized material relating to academic years 2008-09 and 2009-10, the Assessing Officer shall take into consideration the seized material as well as other material what was available during the course of assessment relating to very same assessment years for determining the unaccounted income and further directed that to the extent of unaccounted receipts which were considered in the hands of manager of the assessee (Shri R. K. Rao) the same cannot be treated as unaccounted income in the hands of assessee again. The Assessing Officer shall pass fresh order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. (AY. 2004-05, 2010-11)

JB Educational Society v. ACIT (2013) 28 ITR 284 / (2014) 159 TTJ 236 / 98 DTR 347 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 322 / (Hyd.)(Trib.)

Joginapally B. R. Educational Society v. ACIT (2013) 28 ITR 284 (2014) 159 TTJ 236 / 98 DTR 347 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 322 (Hyd.) (Trib.)

Section 153C : Assessment of income of any other person

S.153C : Assessment – Income of any other person – Search and seizure – Satisfaction – AO of searched person must be satisfied that seized material (which includes documents) does not belong to person referred to in section 153A – Notice was held to be not valid. [S.132, 153A]

1873

A search and seizure operation under section 132(1) was conducted on the Jaipuria Group during which certain documents 'belonging' to the petitioner were found. Consequently, the AO of the Jaipuria Group prepared a satisfaction note to the effect that the documents mentioned therein belonged to the petitioner. Three kinds of documents were mentioned in satisfaction note. First were the photocopies of Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares purchased by the petitioner from TDL and SMV. The second set of documents were unsigned cheques found in the cheque books of the Jaipuria Group companies, which had been written in favour of the petitioner. The third document was a photocopy of a supply and loan agreement made between PDL and petitioner.

Thereafter, the AO issued notices to the petitioner under section 153C seeking to reopen the assessments of the petitioner for the assessment years 2006-07 to 2011-12 and to follow the procedure prescribed under section 153A. In response to the said notices, the petitioner submitted its objections which were rejected by the AO and the petitioner was directed to comply with the assessment proceedings under section 153C.

On writ, allowing the petition the Court held that; before provisions of section 153C can be invoked, AO of searched person must be satisfied that seized material (which includes documents) does not belong to person referred to in section 153A. Finding of photocopies in possession of a searched person does not necessarily mean and imply that they 'belong' to person who holds originals; unless it is established that documents in question, whether they be photocopies or originals, do not belong to searched person, question of invoking section 153C does not arise. On the facts of the case, the ingredients of section 153C have not been satisfied in this case. Consequently, the notices issued under section 153C are quashed. Accordingly, all proceedings pursuant thereto stand quashed. (AY. 2006-07, 2011-12)

Pepsico India Holdings (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 270 CTR 467 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 116(Mag.) / 370 ITR 295 (Delhi)(HC)

S.153C : Assessment – Income of any other person – Search and seizure – Satisfaction – Using word “satisfaction” or words “I am satisfied” – Not satisfaction as used in section – Presumption that documents belong to person from whom seized – Nothing to indicate as to how presumption rebutted by AO – Satisfaction not discernible from satisfaction note – Notice was held to be not valid. [S.132(4A), 292C]

1874

Held, allowing the petitions, that it was evident from the satisfaction note that apart from saying that the documents belonged to the assessee and that the Assessing Officer was satisfied that it was a fit case for issuance of a notice under section 153C, there was nothing which would indicate how the presumptions which were to be normally raised had been rebutted by the Assessing Officer. Mere use or mention of the word “satisfaction” or the words “I am satisfied” in the order or the note would not meet the

requirement of the concept of satisfaction as used in section 153C. The satisfaction note itself must display the reasons or basis for the conclusion that the Assessing Officer of the person in respect of whom the search was conducted is satisfied that the seized documents belonged to another person. On going through the contents of the satisfaction note, no “satisfaction” of the kind required under section 153C could be discerned. Thus, the very first step prior to the issuance of a notice under section 153C had not been fulfilled. Inasmuch as this condition precedent had not been met, the notices under section 153C were liable to be quashed. (AY. 2006-2007, 2011-2012]

Pepsi Foods P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 112(2015) 231 Taxmann 58 (Delhi)(HC)

1875 **S.153C : Assessment – Income of any other person – Search and seizure – Finality of orders passed by Settlement Commission – Subsequent search and seizure operation conducted in premises of third person showing assessee suppressed material before Settlement Commission – Block assessment not permissible [S.148, 245D(4), 245I]**

When the assessee’s premises were searched and notice under section 153A was issued, it approached the Settlement Commission. The Settlement Commission made its final orders determining the assessee’s liability. The Assessing Officer, subsequent to this event, issued a notice under section 148 proposing reassessment proceedings. The High Court quashed the reassessment notice. In the meanwhile, consequent to the search in the premises of a third person, a satisfaction note was recorded by the Assessing Officer of that person for initiating proceedings under section 153C against the assessee for the assessment years 2004-05 to 2009-10. The Assessing Officer issued notices under section 153C seeking to reassess the assessee’s income, inter alia, for the assessment years 2004-05 to 2009-10. Responding to the notice issued under section 153C the assessee objected to assessment/reassessment of income for the assessment years 2004-05 to 2006-07 under the provision since the assessments had already been concluded by the order of the Settlement Commission. On a writ petition :

Held, allowing the petition, that the Settlement Commission was seized of proceedings for the assessment year 2006-07. The subsequent event of the search and seizure operation conducted in the premises of a third person had thrown light on the material that had been suppressed from the Settlement Commission. The Settlement Commission itself should be approached for a declaration that its order was a nullity. Allowing any other authority, even by way of a notice under section 153C, would be to permit multiple jurisdictions which can result in chaos. After all non-disclosure or suppression of information in respect of what is required to be revealed to the concerned authorities is akin to fraud and if it has a material bearing on the outcome of the assessment, it would most certainly be misrepresentation. The term “misrepresentation” would mean failure to disclose material or facts which are germane and relevant, or suppressing facts and materials which are germane and relevant or holding out a falsehood which gives the rise to an assumption that what is so stated or represented is true or correct. The facts of each case would throw light on whether the individual or person concerned was guilty of misrepresentation having regard to the totality of the circumstances, given the nature of duty cast on him or her. Thus, the notice issued to the assessee under section 153C could not be sustained; the notice and all further proceedings were quashed. It was open to the Revenue to move the Settlement Commission for appropriate relief

of declaration that its previous order under section 245D(6) was void, setting out the relevant facts and circumstances. In the event the Revenue approached the Settlement Commission with an application for such relief, it shall be decided on its merits in accordance with law. Once the Settlement Commission has completed proceedings, its order is considered conclusive as regards matters “stated therein” under section 245-I of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and reopening any proceeding in respect of matters covered in the order would be barred. (AY. 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07)

Omaxe Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 423/270 CTR 390/ 46 taxmann.com 14 (Delhi)(HC)

S.153C : Assessment – Income of any other person – Search and seizure – Recording of satisfaction – Recording of satisfaction is necessary even if Assessing Officer of both persons is the same-Notice was held to be invalid and assessment was held to be bad in law. [S.132, 132A, 158BD]

1876

The initiation of proceedings against “such other person” is dependent upon a satisfaction being recorded. Such satisfaction maybe during the search or at the time of initiation of assessment proceedings against the “searched person” or even during the assessment proceedings against him or even after completion thereof, but it must be before issuance of notice to “such other person” under section 153C. Even in a case, where the Assessing Officer of both persons is the same and assuming that no handing over of documents is required, the recording of “satisfaction” is a must, as that is the foundation, upon which the subsequent proceedings against the “other person” are initiated. The handing over of documents, etc., in such a case may or may not be of much relevance but the recording of satisfaction is still required and in fact it is mandatory. The word “satisfaction” refers to the state of mind of the Assessing Officer of the person in respect of whom the search was conducted, which gets reflected in a tangible form, when it is reduced into writing. It is the conclusion drawn or the finding recorded on the foundation of the material available. It was the admitted case of the Revenue before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal that though the Assessing Officer (of the other person) in the assessment order had stated that satisfaction for issuing notice under section 153C was recorded, on examination, recording of such satisfaction alleged to have been recorded by the Assessing Officer was not available. Thus, the notice was not valid. Order Tribunal was confirmed. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. Gopi Apartment (2014) 365 ITR 411 / 270 CTR 447 / 46 taxmann.com 280 (All.) (HC)

S.153C : Assessment – Income of any other person – Search and seizure – Date of receiving seized documents is the “date of initiation of search” and six years period has to be reckoned from that date. An assessment order passed u/s.143(3) instead of u/s. 153C is void. [S.143(3)]

1877

A search in the case of Koutons took place on 19-2-2009 (AY 2009-10). The documents belonging to the assessee which were found during the search were handed over to the AO having jurisdiction over the assessee on 16.06.2009 (AY 2010-11). The date of ‘initiation of search’ in the case of the assessee under the first Proviso to s. 153C would

be 16.06.2009 (AY. 2010-11). The six previous assessment years for which an assessment can be framed u/s 153C is AY 2009-10 to AY 2003-04. However, as for AY 2009-10, the AO passed an assessment order u/s. 143(3) instead of u/s. 153C, the same is void & liable to be quashed. (AY. 2009-10)

Jasjit singh v. ACIT (Delhi) (Trib.); www.itatonline.org

Section S154 : Rectification of mistake

- 1878 **S.154 : Rectification of mistake – Mistake must be apparent – Loss whether can be carried forward – Debatable issue – Benefit of carry forward cannot be withdrawn in rectification proceedings. [S.80, 139(1)]**

The assessee had not violated any of the conditions under section 80 of the Act. The assessee had shown positive income in the returns but in the assessment, the business loss was determined by the Assessing Officer. This being the factual position the assessee was entitled to the benefit of carry forward of business loss. Whether the loss ultimately determined by the Assessing Officer was liable to be carried forward or not was a debatable issue. The order of rectification was not valid. (AY. 1997-1998)

CIT v. Srinivasa Builders (2014) 369 ITR 69(2015) 231 Taxmann 906 / 122 DTR 302 (Karn.) (HC)

- 1879 **S.154 : Rectification of mistake – Additional tax – Appeal – Deletion of disallowance on appeal – Assessing Officer can delete additional tax in rectification proceedings. [Ss.143, 250, 254]**

Section 143(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, provides that where the total income as a result of adjustment made by the Assessing Officer exceeds the total income declared in the return, the Assessing Officer would be obliged to levy additional income-tax. The provision makes it clear that additional income-tax is payable only as a result of adjustment made by the Assessing Officer but where the adjustments so made have been deleted by the appellate authority on the merits, the question of payment of additional tax would not arise under section 143(1A). Additional tax charged under section 143(1A) of the Act could be deleted under section 154 as is clear from a reading of section 143(1A)(b) of the Act. An order passed under section 250 or section 254 of the Act by which the disallowance has been deleted has to be given effect to by a consequential order to be passed by the assessing authority under section 154. (AY. 1990-1991)

CIT v. Redico Khaitan Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 424 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 570 (All.)(HC)

- 1880 **S.154 : Rectification of mistake – Advance tax – Condition precedent for rectification – Mistake must be obvious – Debatable issue – Rectification not permissible. [S.211, 214]**

Only a mistake apparent on the face of the record can be said to be rectifiable. A debatable issue cannot be said to be rectifiable. The question whether interest is payable on excess advance tax where there has been delay in payment of an instalment of tax is debatable. Hence, in such cases there cannot be a direction for payment of interest in rectification proceedings. (AY. 1975-1976)

CIT v. Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 347 (Raj.)(HC)

S.154 : Rectification of mistake – Intimation to assessee – Claim debatable or doubtful – Disallowance part of claim not on basis of settled principles – No notice issued under sub-section (2) of section 143 – Rectification pursuant to direction by Commissioner (Appeals) – Appellate authorities right in deleting disallowance. [S.80HHC, 139, 143(1)(a)]

1881

The assessee, for the assessment year 1996-97, derived income from export profits and claimed deduction under section 80HHC. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the assessee. The assessee filed an application under section 154 for rectification which was also rejected by him. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the claim and the order of assessment was rectified. This was confirmed by the Tribunal. On appeal:

Held, dismissing the appeal, that it is permissible in law that an Assessing Officer to take recourse to section 143(1)(a) even where the claims are made under different provisions of the Act including section 80HHC. However, that would be permissible, if only the claim, in its entirety is accepted. If the Assessing Officer had any doubt about the permissibility of the claim, he is under an obligation to issue a notice to the assessee. In case the explanation offered by the assessee is not correct, an occasion would certainly arise for passing an order under section 143(3). Once a notice is issued, the matter stands taken away from the purview of section 143(1)(a). Therefore, the procedure adopted by the Assessing Officer could not be countenanced. By its very nature, a claim under section 80HHC is surrounded by several uncertainties and debatable questions of fact and law. Before the Assessing Officer disallowed a part of the claim made under that provision, he ought to have issued notice under sub-section (2) of section 143. It was not even asserted by the Revenue that the disallowance of part of the claim was on the basis of settled principles of law and there was nothing debatable about it. There cannot be any hard and fast rule as to when a particular aspect can be treated as debatable and when not. Much would depend upon the nature of claim and the adjudications that have taken place on the subject. Therefore, the view expressed by the Tribunal was sustainable. (AY. 1996-1997)

CIT v. Mekins Agro Products Ltd. (2014)369 ITR 495/(2015) 230 Taxmann 86 (T&AP) (HC)

S.154 : Rectification of mistake – Long term capital Loss – Carry forward and set off – Return was not filed on due date – Rectification was held to be valid. [S.139(1), 139(3)]

1882

The assessee, a director in a limited company, filed his return for the assessment year 1996-97 on December 24, 1996. He claimed certain deductions and set off of loss. AO allowing set off of long-term capital loss of earlier year against long-term capital gains of subsequent year. AO passed the rectification order under section 154 disallowing the claim of the loss. On appeal by assessee dismissing the appeal the Court held that the loss of earlier year not determined in pursuance of return filed under section 139(3) within time allowed under section 139(1) for that year. Permitting set-off of such losses in subsequent years is mistake apparent from record. Rectification valid. A business loss cannot be carried forward unless it has been determined in pursuance of a return filed under section 139(1) of the Act, In order to be entitled to carry forward a business loss, the assessee must submit a return under section 139(3) which is required to be in terms of section 139(1). (AY. 1997-1998)

Rajiv Gupta v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 257 / 227 Taxmann 242 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

- 1883 **S.154 : Rectification of mistake – Refund granted with interest reckoned from assessment year – Rectification without notice to assessee restricting interest to period from date of assessee’s application for rectification – Not proper – AO was directed to issue notice and decide payment of interest. [S.244A]**

Held, allowing the petition, that the figure ₹ 58,90,495 was arrived at by calculating the interest from the relevant date in the assessment year, which was referable to 1996. Once the Assessing Officer allowed the interest from that date, valuable rights accrued to the assessee. If the Assessing Officer wanted to take a different view, in exercise of the power under section 154 he ought to have issued a notice to the assessee. Admittedly, no such notice was issued. Though this ground was not specifically pleaded, such a serious lapse which crept into the proceedings could not be ignored. The exercise can be redone by the Assessing Officer after issuing notice, only on the limited aspect of the interest payable under section 244A. (AY. 1996-97)

TCI Industries Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 425 / 51 taxmann.com 500 (T& AP)(HC)

- 1884 **S.154 : Rectification of mistake – Intimation – Interest waived by creditor was shown as income – Disallowance of interest in earlier year was accepted by subsequent order – Intimation cannot be rectified. [S.143(1)]**

At the time when the assessee had to file the return for the assessment year 2005-06, the assessment proceedings for the earlier assessment year 2004-05 were pending. He declared ₹ 54,40,440 as income in the return on account of waiver of interest by the creditor. The assessee had claimed the interest expenditure of ₹ 54,40,440 for the assessment year 2004-05. The Revenue disallowed the claim and the assessee also did not file an appeal and the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 2004-05 reached finality. The assessee did not file a revised return for the assessment year 2005-06 in spite of the knowledge of disallowance of the interest expenditure of ₹ 54,40,440 for the preceding year 2004-05. The Department computed the tax payable based on the return filed by the assessee on October 27, 2005, and issued demand notice indicating ₹ 93,016. Subsequently, the assessee filed an application u/s. 154(1)(b) seeking rectification of mistake in the intimation sent by the Department demanding tax. Held, the assessee kept quiet till the intimation was sent u/s. 143(1) demanding deficit tax. Assessment by the Department would be based on the material or information indicated in the return filed by the assessee. The demand for deficit tax was also based on the details found in the return submitted by the assessee. Therefore, there was no mistake or error apparent on the face of record in the intimation sent by the Department indicating the exact shortfall of tax to be paid. The mistake on the part of the assessee in not challenging the assessment order for the assessment year 2004-05 and not filing a revised return for the assessment year 2005-06 had led the assessee to this situation. The entire difficulty in which the assessee was put in was on account of his mistake which could not be treated as a mistake apparent on the face of record so far as the intimation sent by the Department and it could not be rectified treating it as a mistake in the intimation of the Department. (AY. 2005-06)

M Far Hotels Ltd v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 442 / 268 CTR 99 / 102 DTR 416 (2015) 55 taxmann.com 103 (Ker.)(HC)

S.154 : Rectification of mistake-Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – "force of attraction" – Debatable – Enhancement of addition by AO without giving notice to assessee was violation of section 154(3) and, therefore, was unsustainable – DTAA-India-UK [S.9(1)(i), Article 7]

1885

Assessee, a British firm, had been providing professional services to certain clients whose operation extended to India. Its assessment was completed holding that receipts from Indian clients were taxable in India. Assessee filed rectification application pointing out mistakes in quantum of receipts, however, by order passed under section 154, AO made addition of amount of bill pertaining to an Indian client without giving any notice to assessee. On appeal CIT(A) deleted the addition by observing that the assessee had rendered services outside India and therefore fees received was not taxable in India. On appeal by revenue the Tribunal held that, in earlier year Tribunal decided issue of taxability of income in India by virtue of "force of attraction", against assessee, however, that decision stood disapproved by Special Bench and, thus, addition made by Assessing Officer was highly debatable hence no addition in rectification was justified. Tribunal also held that enhancement of addition by AO without giving notice to assessee was violation of section 154(3) and, therefore was unsustainable. (AY. 1996-97)

ADIT v. Linklaters (2014) 33 ITR 470/51 taxmann.com 412 / (2015) 67 SOT 18 (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.154 : Rectification of mistake – Export business – Interest received – Computation – Debatable – Rectification was held to be not justified. [S.80HHC]

1886

The AO completed original assessment u/s 143(3) of the Act. Thereafter, notice u/s. 154 of the Act was issued to assessee in relation to computation of deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act alleging that 90 percent interest received was required to be deducted from profits of business as held by Punjab & Haryana High Court in case of *Rani Paliwal v. CIT [208 ITR 220 (P&H)]*. The CIT (A) upheld order of AO. Tribunal held that the nature of interest credited to books of account of assessee was ₹ 6,24,390/- being reimbursement of interest under TUF scheme of Ministry of Textiles Company and balance of ₹ 3,09,802/- being refund of interest excess charged by bank. Where issue of computation of deduction u/s. 80HHC in relation to interest received by assessee was debatable, rectification could not be resorted to u/s. 154 of the Act. The tribunal allowed the Assessee's appeal and set aside the impugned order. (AY. 2003-04).

Stanley Industries v. ACIT (2013) 156 TTJ 25(UO) / (2014) 61 SOT 7(URO) (Chandigarh) (Trib.)

S.154 : Rectification of mistake – Claim for exemption of agricultural income – On the concession of the parties matter was remitted to the CIT(A)

1887

Assessee filed the return but he could not furnish the relevant paper with the return of income. The assessee could not file the revised return and mistake could not be rectified under section 154. On concession of the parties, the Tribunal remitted the matter to the CIT(A) per decision a fresh in accordance with law. (AY. 2008-09)

Rikhab Chand Jain v. ITO (2014) 164 TTJ 4(UO)/(2015) 67 SOT 468 (Jodh.) (Trib.)

1888 **S.154 : Rectification of mistake – Intimation – CPC hauled up for harassing assessee by imposing tax of 60% on LTCG & refusing to rectify – AO was directed to rectify the mistake in the intimation. [S.143(1)]**

An intimation u/s. 143(1) was passed by the ACIT (CPC) in which the long-term capital gains were charged to tax at 60% instead of the applicable rate of 20%. The assessee filed an on-line rectification application. However, no order thereon was passed. Instead, the assessee was informed on telephonic enquiry that the application was rejected. The assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal by raising hypothetical questions and going into irrelevant issues. On appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal HELD:

In the entire Income-tax Act, there is no provision charging a tax rate of 60% on long term capital gains. The Delhi High Court has issued remedial directions to improve hardships faced by taxpayers while processing the e-returns at CPC, Bengaluru. The Court has discussed the background that in order to fasten the processing of returns, the revenue has introduced electronic filing of income tax returns, TDS returns, e-tax payments and it operates Centralised Processing Centre (CPC) at Bengaluru. This is manned by Higher Ranking Officers of Income Tax Department. The problem is faced by taxpayers, when demand is raised or refund reduced on account of either *suomotu* adjustment by the Income Tax Department and refund against tax demands or mismatch of TDS credit or any other adjustment or disallowance of claim made by tax payer in the return and uploaded by the assessee in its e-returns. This is a general grievance among the taxpayers that the AOs do not adhere to the time limit specified for the disposal of rectification applications and taxpayers are invariably called upon to file duplicate application or new application. Further, no record or no receipt counters or registers for receipt of such applications are maintained. Thus, there is no record/register remained with the AO with details or particulars of rectification application made u/s. 154 of the Act as is evident from the present case. Similar directions were issued by the *Delhi High Court in the case of its own motion v. CIT, WP(C) No. 2659/2012* dated 14-3-2013. The Delhi High Court *vide* para 18 has issued dictum as under: “18. Each application under section 154 has to be disposed of and decided by a speaking order. This is the mandate of the Act. The order has to be communicated to the assessee and there is a relevant column to be filled in the register, which is now required to be maintained. The Board should issue specific directions to ensure that there is full compliance of the said requirements and directions by the Assessing Officers, Dak counters and Aayakar Sewa Kendras. This is the first mandamus or direction we have issued in the present judgment“. As the facts in the present case are very clear that charging of long term capital gain can only be @ 20% in assessment year 2011-12 and not @ 60% as charged in intimation u/s. 143(1) of the Act by CPC, Bangalore which according to the provisions of the Income Tax Act is not legal. Hence, we quash the intimation and appeal of assessee is allowed. The jurisdictional AO is directed to amend the intimation issued by CPC, Bangalore, while giving appeal effect to this order. *Mohan Kant Bansal v. ITO (Kol.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org*

S.154 : Rectification of mistake – Tax rebate – Securities transaction tax – If mistake is committed by assessee in ROI same cannot be rectified. [S.88E]

1889

In the intimation, the income by the assessee was accepted but the credit for tax paid was allowed partly and the credit for the TDS claimed by the assessee was not allowed. The assessee filed a letter requesting to rectify the intimation by which demand was raised. The assessee furnished photo copies of advance tax challan with STT certificate and requested to give credit u/s. 88E(2). The AO rejected the letter stating that the rebate u/s. 88E(2) was to be allowed only in case where the same was claimed in the ROI and since the assessee had not claimed the same in ROI his claim could not be considered. On appeal Tribunal held that the mistake, if any, was in the return of income filed by the assessee section 154 cannot be utilised for rectifying the assessee's mistake in filling of the ROI. (AY. 2008–2009)

Pawan Kumar Aggrawal v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 787 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.154(4) : Rectification of mistake – Construction activity – Investment allowance – Subsequent judgment of Supreme Court – AO cannot without modifying order of earlier years disallow unabsorbed investment allowance already allowed – Rectification beyond limitation period hence not valid. [S.32A, 154(7)]

1890

The assessee was in construction activity, claimed investment allowance under section 32A. The AO allowed the claim. Even after the corresponding deductions were made against profits, for the assessment years 1983-84 to 1985-86, there existed substantial amount in the investment allowance. The assessee sustained losses for five years between 1986-87 and 1990-91. Therefore, no deductions were made in those years. It was only in the year 1991-92 that certain profits were made and the deduction to the extent of ₹ 8,62,585 carried forward unabsorbed investment allowance was made, through order dated May 3, 1993. Thereafter, in view of the subsequent Supreme Court decision, the AO sought to reopen the proceedings under section 154 and set at naught, the set off permitted for the assessment year 1991-92. The CIT(A) took the view that neither the facts nor the law allowed the exercise undertaken by the AO. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A). On appeal : Held, allowing the appeal, that even though the order of rectification was within the limitation stipulated under sub-section (7) of section 154, the AO revised and modified the determination made by his pre-decessor in the assessment year 1983-84, as regards the character of the investment allowance claimed by the assessee. That the character so decided had been acted upon was evident from the fact that not only part of it was permitted to be adjusted during that very assessment year but also substantial part of it was allowed to be carried forward and adjusted in the subsequent years. The exercise undertaken by the AO was nothing but one of revising the order passed by the AO in the assessment year 1983-84. Unless the very character of that amount or allowance was changed, the question of disallowing it would not arise. Such a far-reaching exercise was not one of merely correcting a mistake. Since the order of the AO had the effect of altering the nature of the investment allowance, it would dated back to the order passed for the assessment year 1983-84. Thus, it was barred by sub-section (7) of section 154. The determination of the character of investment allowance claimed by the assessee was not only accepted by the AO

in the year 1983-84 but also it had been honoured in the subsequent assessment years. In that view of the matter, it had assumed finality. Order of AO was set aside. (AY. 1991-1992)

Prefab Gratings Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 366 ITR 550 / 52 taxmann.com 488 (T & AP)(HC)

Section 156 : Notice of demand

- 1891 **S.156 : Notice of demand – Interest – If assessment order does not specify charging of interest under a specific section, then it could not be charged or levied under section 156. [S.139,154, 215, 217]**

A perusal of section 156 indicates that tax, interest, penalty or fine is payable in consequence of an order passed under the Act, namely, the assessment order. There has to be a specific order passed by the AO charging interest and only thereafter, a notice of demand levying interest could be issued. A notice of demand is somewhat like a decree in a civil suit, which must follow the order. When a judgment in a civil suit does not specify any amount to be recovered, the decree could not contain such amount. Similarly, when the assessment order does not indicate that interest would be leviable, the notice of demand under section 156 levying interest would be wholly illegal. (AY. 1985-86)

CIT v. Jagan & Co. (2014) 369 ITR 635 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 119(Mag.)(All.)(HC)

Section S158B : Definitions

- 1892 **S.158B : Block assessment – Undisclosed income – Amount shown as credit in the name of third person – Amount not disclosed in the return – Amount assessable as cash credits. [S. 68]**

Assessee showed an amount as credit in name of Mr. G. Ananad. During block assessment proceedings the AO asked the assessee to furnish documentary evidence in respect of this amount. The assessee neither produced the confirmation nor produced the Mr G. Ananad for verification. High Court held that the said amount was assessable as undisclosed income of assessee. (AY.1997-98(BP. 1-4-91 to 29-5-2001))

CIT v. M. J. Siwani (2014) 366 ITR 356 / 105 DTR 265 / 226 Taxmann 394 (Karn.)(HC)

CIT v. H. J. Siwani (2014) 366 ITR 356 / 105 DTR 265 / 226 Taxmann 394 (Karn.)(HC)

Editorial: SLP of assessee is dismissed. SLP Nos. 24007 to 24097 of 2014 dated 10-11-2014) M. J. Siwani v. CIT (2015) 232 Taxmann 335 (SC)

- 1893 **S.158B : Block assessment – Undisclosed income – Wrong claim of depreciation – Assessable as undisclosed income. [Ss. 32,132]**

In regular assessments, assessee had been claiming depreciation year after year on building owned by it which was shown in balance sheet as business asset. In search, it was found that said building had been rented out to third parties and had not been used for business and, hence, no depreciation could be allowed. There was no explanation from assessee for illegally claiming depreciation, building was let out, in regular assessment claim of depreciation was made without any foundation even when there was absolutely no scope for claiming depreciation. Tribunal had not erred in disallowing depreciation under section 32 in block assessment proceedings under section

158BB by treating said amounts as undisclosed income as defined under section 158B(b) even when said depreciation was claimed by assessee in regular assessment for relevant assessment years treating building as business asset; same would no more be a matter to be considered during course of regular assessment and, thus, there was no need for relegating matter for regular assessment. (AY. 1995-96)

Medical Land v. CIT (Appeals) (2014) 363 ITR 81 / 45 taxmann.com 488 (Ker.)(HC)

S.158B : Block assessment – Requisition was made – Period not to be extended to date on which materials received pursuant to requisition – Date on which requisition made to be taken in to account and not date of execution of warrant of authorisation. [S. 132A, 158BE]

1894

The contention of the assessee before the Court was the block period, as defined under section 158B of the Act, means the period comprising previous years relevant to six assessment years preceding previous year in which search under section 132 of the Act was conducted or requisition under section 132A was made and also includes the period up to the date when such requisition was made. It was submitted that the Tribunal erred, while upholding that block period ended on March 21, 2003, as the requisition under section 132A of the Act was made on September, 18 2001 and therefore, the block period must end on September 18, 2001. It was submitted that the date of execution of warrant of authorization under section 132A cannot be held to be the date on which requisition under section 132A was made. It was submitted that both in law and fact there is a difference between the date on which requisition is made and the date on which the authorization for requisition is executed under section 132A of the Act. The Court held that expression as stated in Sec. 158B(a) and Sec. 158BE(1) carries different meanings with its intent and its plain readings. Words and phrase must be read in conformity with the context. Invoking a requisition is not the same as receiving articles which are requisitioned. Sec 158B(a) refers to requisition where as Sec. 158BE(1) refers to execution of authorisation in the context of Sec 132A. The ordinary, natural meaning of the word used under section 158B(a) need not be departed from. There is first of all, no ambiguity in the language. Secondly, the definition of the expression “block period” as understood by the plain language of section 158B(a) also conforms to the scheme of Chapter XIV-B. There was no reason to read expression “requisition was made” not to mean the date when he received the records and assets pursuant thereto. The block n period adopted by the AO was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the assessment made by the AO would also required to be reviewed. The matter was remanded to the AO to assessee the income for the block period April 1, 1995 to September 18, 2001. Matter of levy of penalty was also remanded back to the AO.

Sanjaya Gupta v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 18 / 269 CTR 339 / 49 taxmann.com 179 (Delhi) (HC)

S.158B : Block assessment – Undisclosed income – If the income is already disclosed in return of income or is available in books of account, then it does not fall in category of undisclosed income

1895

A search and seizure operation was conducted at the residential premises of the assessee and additions of four undisclosed income was made by the AO. The High Court observed that the four undisclosed items on which addition was made was available

in the balance sheet or books of account of the assessee and the search did not lead to unearthing of any income. It held that the AO merely had a change of opinion which was neither warranted in law nor could form the basis of invoking the provisions Chapter XIV-B of the Act. Reliance was placed on the decision of *CIT v. Hotel Blue Moon (SC)* (BP 1-4-1985 to 3-1-1996)

CIT v. B. Satyanarayana (2013) 356 ITR 323 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 86 (AP) (Mag.)(AP) (HC)

1896 **S.158B : Block assessment – Undisclosed income – Opening cash balances**

Search was conducted in the premises of assessee and thereafter, Ld. Assessing Officer made addition of opening cash balance as undisclosed income on the ground that assessee was not maintaining personal books of account. Tribunal deleted the addition on account that if closing balance or cash in hand is disclosed income then opening balance cannot be undisclosed income. Even, addition made on the ground that assessee was not maintaining personal books of account is not correct. On appeal by revenue to High Court, Tribunal's order was upheld. (AY. 1986-87)

CIT v. V. P. Singh (2013) 357 ITR 681 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 87 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

1897 **S.158B : Block assessment – Undisclosed income – Gift**

Assessee during the concerned year has received gift to the extent of ₹ 4,00,000/-. Assessing Officer treated the same as undisclosed income. Tribunal deleted the addition made by Assessing Officer on ground that where assessee was filing his return regularly, non-filing of return for assessment year in question on the ground that after allowing deduction under the Act, income remaining below taxable limit could not be a good ground to hold income as undisclosed income for block period. On appeal by revenue to High Court, Tribunal's order was upheld. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. V.P. Singh (2013) 357 ITR 681 / (2014)220 Taxmann 87 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

Section S158BA : Assessment of undisclosed income as a result of search

1898 **S.158BA : Block assessment – Undisclosed income – Return of income – Books of account not maintained – Benefit of exemption was held to be not allowable. [S. 139(1)]**

The premises of the assessee was searched. The Assessing Officer found that the assessee carried out manufacturing activity and had not maintained books of account. Therefore, he assessed the income on total undisclosed income without giving any benefit of the exemption allowed to the assessee in terms of section 139. On appeal, the Tribunal upheld the same. On appeal the Court held that, None of provisions of Chapter XIV-B contemplates that an assessee shall be entitled to exemption even if he has not maintained any books of account or produced documents to satisfy Assessing Officer that income generated is not part of undisclosed income - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, it is entire undisclosed income, which is liable to higher rate of tax and assessee is not entitled to exclude basic exemption granted to assessee under section 139(1) without satisfaction of Assessing Officer regarding genuineness of books of account or other documents in respect of his income. (BP. 1986-87 to 1996-97)

Satpal Singh v. ACIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 204 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

Section S158BB : Computation of undisclosed income of the block period

S.158BB : Block assessment – Undisclosed income – Set-off of losses of year in which search conducted – No return filed by assessee – Assessee not having any unabsorbed loss – Assessing Officer directed to verify books of account of assessee to determine loss if any in assessment year prior to date of search and take it into account in block assessment. [S.132]

1899

On appeals : Held, that since the assessee did not file any returns for the assessment year 1996-97, it was difficult to straightaway conclude whether they had any unabsorbed loss to their credit. They did not have any unabsorbed loss since such a loss did not cross the assessment year 1995-96. Therefore, they had to fall back upon the losses, if any, incurred in that part of the year 1996-97 which preceded the date of search. For this purpose, verification of their books of account was necessary. It was only when the Assessing Officer was satisfied on verification of the books that the assessee incurred loss during the period preceding the search, that an occasion might arise to adjust the loss. If in the course of verification it emerged that the assessee had incurred any losses during that period, such losses did not answer the description of unabsorbed loss. In fact, they were yet to be absorbed. The authorities were to undertake verification of the books of account of the assessee for the assessment year 1996-97 referable to the period preceding the date of search and if the authorities were satisfied that the assessee had incurred loss during that period, they shall take it into account for determining the undisclosed income as well as for passing the block assessment order. [BP. 1986-87 to 1996-97]

Mohan Rao v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 189/ (2015) 57 taxmann.com 18 (T&AP)(HC)

S.158BB : Block assessment – Undisclosed income – Settlement commission – Loss or depreciation relating to block period can be adjusted or set off – Whether there existed any unabsorbed loss or carried forward depreciation that spilled over block period of assessee – Matter remanded. [S.32,158BC, 158BH, 245D]

1900

Sub-section(4) of section 158BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, indicates that if an assessee, who has been subjected to search, has unabsorbed loss or carried forward depreciation, obviously meaning the one which has spilled over the block period, it shall not be available to be adjusted or set off against the undisclosed income. Even while denying such a facility, the Act preserved such unabsorbed loss or carried forward depreciation to be adjusted in the regular assessments.

On the basis of the search conducted in the establishments of the assessee, a block assessment for the period 1985-86 till December 13, 1995, was made. The AO imposed tax upon the undisclosed income. On an application by the assessee, the Settlement Commission determined the undisclosed income for the block period at Rs. 1,36,52,701 and imposed tax at 60 per cent aggregating to ₹ 81,91,620. On a writ petition contending that though the accumulated losses and carried forward depreciations were referable to the block period, sub-section (4) of section 158BB could not have been invoked to disallow them because the provision was attracted only when there existed the unabsorbed losses or carried forward depreciation, that have spilled over beyond the block period and not otherwise:

Held, that it was not clear whether there existed any unabsorbed loss or carried forward depreciation that spilled over the block period of the assessee. If there existed any such components, they were not liable to be adjusted. If, on the other hand, the losses or depreciations were referable to the block period, they were liable to be worked out, as in a regular assessment which, in fact, was the mandate under section 158BH. Matter remanded.

Mahalaxmi Motors Ltd. v. Secretary, ITSC (2014) 368 ITR 724 / (2015) 53 taxmann.com 147 (T&AP)(HC)

1901 **S.158BB : Block assessment – Undisclosed income – Amounts disclosed in books of account forming part of returns for earlier assessment years – Cannot be subject matter of block assessment.**

Allowing the appeal of assessee the Court held that only such adverse material, as was unearthed during the search, can be the basis for the purpose of block assessment and not material disclosed in the books of account in the earlier assessment years. There is no duty cast on the assessee to draw specific attention to each and every item of the books of account and it is for the Income-tax Officer to draw conclusions based on the record and material placed before him and elicit clarifications in the event of doubt.

Held accordingly, that the amounts which were disclosed in the books of account forming part of returns of a particular assessment year cannot constitute the subject matter of block assessment proceedings.

Srinivasa Ferro Alloys Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 368 ITR 424 / 272 CTR 192 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 60 (T&AP)(HC)

1902 **S.158BB : Block assessment – Undisclosed income – Amount seized in search disclosed in return-not to be considered again while completing block assessment as undisclosed income. [S.132A,139, 143(1)]**

A sum was seized by police and action u/s. 132A was initiated. Subsequently, warrant of requisition was executed and money was paid by police to department. In response to a notice, assessee filed his return. Block assessment u/s. 158BC was framed wherein amount was included in assessee's undisclosed income. However, prior thereto assessee had filed its return under section 139(1) for assessment year wherein said sum had been declared. Return so filed by assessee had been processed under section 143(1). In such circumstances, benefit of amount which was disclosed in return filed by assessee under section 139 was admissible to assessee while computing his undisclosed income. High Court held that in view of provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 158BB, amount so disclosed could not be added to assessee's undisclosed income while completing block assessment. (BP. 1-4-1988 to 5-10-1998)

CIT v. Jagpreet Singh (2014)222 Taxmann 135 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

1903 **S.158BB : Block assessment – Assessment of undisclosed income should be based on evidence discovered during search – Report of valuation cell after search – No evidence of undisclosed income during search – Addition based on report of valuation cell – Not valid. [S.132, 132A, 158BC]**

Undisclosed income, can be determined or deduced only on the basis of evidence found at the time of search under section 132 of the Act or as a result of requisition of books

of account or other documents under section 132A of the Act. Material which is not found at the time of search or as a result of requisition of books of account or other document cannot be made the basis for determination of undisclosed income under section 158BB. [BP. 1-4-1985 to 17-10-1995]

CIT v. N. K. Laminates P. Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 211 / 45 taxmann.com 544(All.)(HC)

S.158BB : Block assessment – Assessing Officer not properly examining computer generated account seized during search – Application before Settlement Commission pending but no discussion of this in block assessment – Filing of regular return within knowledge of Assessing Officer but not taken into account while passing block assessment order – Matter remanded

1904

A search and seizure operation was carried out at the business and residential premises of the assessee where some incriminating material was seized. Block assessment for the period September 1, 1996, to September 4, 2002, under section 158BC, was completed on an undisclosed income of ₹ 1,48,94,580. The assessee filed a regular return for the assessment year 2002-03, which fell within the block period, showing income of ₹ 53,27,812. This was accepted by the Assessing Officer. However, the Commissioner passed an order under section 263 and rejected the claim of the assessee for disclosed the income of ₹ 53,27,812 holding that the return was filed belatedly and that full advance tax was not paid. He directed the Assessing Officer not to allow the claim of the assessee for the disclosed income for the year 2002-03 to the tune of ₹ 53,27,812. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee holding that partial advance tax was paid, that the return was filed within the extended time allowed under section 139 and that the assessee was maintaining proper books of account. On appeal : Held, allowing the appeal, that the assessee had filed the return for the assessment year 2002-03 beyond the time allowed under section 139 and the return was, therefore, non est. The Commissioner in his order clearly mentioned that the Assessing Officer did not properly examine the computer generated account for the assessment year 2002-03, which were generated from the computer seized during the course of the search and seizure operation and did not include the undisclosed income reflected from the accounts while completing the block assessment order. The assessee's application was pending before the Settlement Commission but there was no discussion about this issue in the block assessment order. Filing of the regular return for the assessment year 2002-03 was within the knowledge of the Assessing Officer at the time of completing the block assessment order but the Assessing Officer while passing the block assessment order has failed to take into account the correct position of law. Therefore, the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication.

CIT v. Umang Agarwal (2014) 365 ITR 164 / 226 Taxmann 95 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)

S. 158BC : Block Assessment – Amounts disclosed in the return cannot be assessed as undisclosed income. [S.158BB]

1905

Search was conducted in the premises of the company u/s. 132 of the IT Act. Undisclosed income of ₹ 35 lakhs was disclosed by the assessee. The AO took the view that the share certificates pertaining to the company are in the premises or in the custody of the directors, though issued in the name of the some third parties. The AO

disallowed certain perquisites which were claimed by the MD and executive directors and treated that amount as undisclosed income. Block Assessment Order was passed. Tribunal allowed the appeals setting aside the findings recorded by the AO on certain important aspects. On revenues' appeal in HC, HC held that items such as money, bullion, jewellery and other residuary items which constitute the wealth or income would be treated as undisclosed income, provided that such items were not disclosed for the purpose of the Act. Once the items were the subject matter of the returns filed under the Act by the assessee or any other person, they cannot be treated as undisclosed income. Persons in whose name have stated that they belong to them and it was also found in the search itself, that shareholders have submitted their returns that being the case, there was no basis for treating the share certificate as belonging to anybody else. Value of those share certificates could not be treated as undisclosed income of the assessee. (BP. 1986-87 to 1996-97)

CIT v. E. Sudhir Reddy (2014) 111 DTR 233 / (2015) 273 CTR 326 (AP)(HC)

Section 158BC : Procedure for block assessment

1906 **S.158BC : Block assessment – Statement on oath – Retraction – No incriminating material found or recorded – No occasion or basis to record statement-Statement from assessee one and half months thereafter – Cannot be brought under fold of section 132(4) to make block assessment – Evidentiary value – Conclusive proof only when there is no other version from assessee – Plea that statement recorded under threat or coercion – Burden of proof – Assessing Officer to establish his own case [Ss.132(4), 142(2A), Constitution of India, Art 20(3), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, S. 93,162, Evidence Act, 1872, S. 31]**

In a search at the premises of the assessee, no incriminating material was found or recovered. It was only two and half months thereafter a statement was recorded from the assessee under sub-section (4) of section 132. The assessee declared a sum of ₹ 15 lakhs as his undisclosed income. Based upon that, a notice under section 158BC was issued. On receipt of the notice, the assessee pleaded that the statement was forcibly extracted from him and that there was no truth in it. He stated that his undisclosed income was ₹ 65,020 and that he was prepared to pay tax thereon. The Assessing Officer caused a special audit under section 142(2A). The assessee was said to have not extended co-operation. Ultimately, the Assessing Officer determined the undisclosed income of the assessee as ₹ 15 lakhs. A sum of ₹ 9 lakhs was levied as tax thereon. The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. On appeal:

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the search was made on January 9, 1996, and the statement was recorded on March 20, 1996. Such a statement could not be brought under the fold of section 132(4). Nothing was recovered from the assessee during the search. Hence, there was no occasion or basis to record the statement, even if it was done when the search was in progress. Hence, there was a basic infirmity in the very foundation of the case, upon which the Revenue sought to rest its block assessment vis-a-vis the assessee.

Explaining the provision the Court observed that The statement of the assessee under section 132(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is required to be made during the course of search or seizure. Sub-section (4) of section 132 does not permit of any doubt that the statement must be recorded while the search is in progress and before the search is concluded. The question of recording a statement after the conclusion of the search does not arise. There is not even any scope, to explain the delay, once the statement is recorded, after the search. The recording of statement even during the search is not a matter of course. It is only when material such as books of account, documents, money, bullion, jewellery and the like is found or discovered during search, that the statement can be recorded. If the search did not lead to the discovery of any matters there would not be any occasion to record the statement at all. The provision itself is to the effect that the statements recorded shall be treated as evidence in the proceedings under the Act. That would be so, as long as the statement is not retracted. If the assessee comes forward with a plea that his statement was recorded under threat or coercion, the evidentiary value of the statement suffers a serious dent. This is particularly so when the person from whom it is recorded is going to be visited with penal consequences. The provision cannot be taken as a provision laying down any new principle in the law of evidence. The statement recorded under sub-section (4) of section 132 partakes of the character of one recorded by an investigating officer under section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It cannot be ascribed the status of a proven fact. At the most, it would constitute the basis for the prosecution to frame its case and correspondingly be material for the defence to ensure that the prosecution sticks to its version. The question of a statement of that nature being treated as clinching evidence by itself, leading to any penal action does not arise. The circumstances under which a statement is recorded from an assessee in the course of search and seizure are similar to those under section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by operation of sub-section (13) of section 132. Parliament never intended to place the proceedings under the Act on a higher pedestal than those under the criminal enactment.

CIT v. Naresh Kumar Agarwal (2014) 369 ITR 171 / (2015) 53 taxmann.com 306 / 122 DTR 339 (T&AP)(HC)

S.158BC : Block assessment – Assessing Officer justified in issuing notice under section 158BC to person in respect of whom search conducted and under section 158BD to other person – Matter remanded to Commissioner (Appeals) to consider case on merits. [Ss.132,158BD].

1907

Held, dismissing the appeals, that section 158BC prescribes the procedure for making block assessment of the person in respect of whom search was conducted and section 158BD enables assessment of any person. The person in respect of whom search was conducted was HS and, therefore, as far as HS was concerned, the Assessing Officer was justified in issuing the notice under section 158BC and in respect of the assessee, the Assessing Officer was justified in issuing the notice under section 158BD. Thus, the order of remittance by the Tribunal was justified though not for the reasons stated in its order. The Assessing Officer was justified in invoking the provisions of sections 158BC and 158BD in the respective cases. The matter required to be considered on merits by the Commissioner (Appeals).

V. H. Yahiya v. Dy. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 194/(2015) 231 Taxmann 43 (Ker.)(HC)

1908 **S.158BC : Block assessment – Cost of construction of building – Search in house of father of assessee showing cost of construction greater than disclosed – Valuation Officer estimating cost at sum higher than that disclosed-Notice calling upon assessee to file return – Disputed questions – Writ petition not maintainable. [Constitution of India, Art. 226]**

The assessee, for the assessment year 1999-2000, showed the cost of the building constructed by him at ₹ 30,45,318. In a search conducted in the house of the father of the assessee and based upon the discoveries during the search, the Assessing Officer held that the cost of the construction of the house of the assessee was much higher than what was disclosed. He made a reference to the Valuation Officer, who estimated the cost of construction at ₹ 1.14 crores. The Assessing Officer issued a show-cause notice to the assessee under section 158BC requiring him to file a return for the block period under section 158B. On a writ petition :

Held, dismissing the petition, that what was challenged was a notice requiring the assessee to file a block return. As a matter of fact, the assessee filed such a return to contradict the facts alleged against him on the basis of the search. The mere fact that it was filed under protest did not make a difference. The contentions advanced before the court were twofold, that the notice could not have been issued when there was no search in the house of the assessee and that the authority ought to have recorded satisfaction before issuing notice. As regards the first contention, the Revenue stated that the notice was issued under section 158BD. A perusal of that provision discloses that it is intended only to deal with the situations, where the search made in the premises of one assessee has led to suspicion, as regards accuracy of the facts and figures with reference to another assessee. Alternatively, it was also pleaded that the search was conducted in the premises of the assessee also. These were the matters, which could be dealt with before the concerned forum under the Act. When disputed questions were involved and when it was not even alleged that the authority was not conferred with the power to issue notice, the writ petition could not be entertained. The second ground that the satisfaction was not recorded could also be urged in the regular proceedings under the Act. The assessee could certainly insist on compliance with that, as required under law before the assessing authority or in the appeal or in the further appeal. (AY 1999-2000)

G. Venkateswar Rao v. ACIT (2014) 368 ITR 457 / 57 taxmann.com 232 (T&AP) (HC)

1909 **S.158BC : Block assessment – Remand for verification – Ad-hoc addition and disclosure – No flaw in the order of Tribunal. [S.69C]**

On appeal by revenue affirming the view of Tribunal the Court held that remand for verification whether amounts noted on documents reflected contributions being not perverse no interference was called for. Similarly finding of Tribunal that the additions proposed would be covered by disclosure and *ad hoc* additions already made on the finding that certain documents were clear and had expressly mentioned receipts of money there being no flaw in reasoning, order of Tribunal was affirmed.

CIT v. V. K. Bhatnagar (2014) 366 ITR 37 / 47 taxmann.com 366 (Delhi)(HC)

S.158BC : Block assessment – Excess stock of silver – Investment in excess stock of gold jewellery – Tribunal restricting additions based on material – Pure questions of fact. [260A] 1910

Court held that the Tribunal restricted the addition based on material. This being pure question of fact, no question of law arises. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04.)

CIT v. Mangal and Mangal (2014) 366 ITR 478 / 226 Taxmann 21(Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)

S.158BC : Block assessment – Payment of advance tax – Does not absolve assessee of obligation to file return disclosing total income for relevant assessment year – Income can be treated as undisclosed – Matter remanded. [S.154BH] 1911

The payment of advance tax by itself does not absolve the assessee of the duty to file returns. The consequences would be that income for that year would be treated as undisclosed. It is only when a return is filed, that an AO would be in a position to examine the details of income, Expenditure and deductible incomes, etc. [BP. 1986-87 to 1997-98]

CIT v. Vimal Chand Jain (2014) 367 ITR 290/52 taxmann.com 156 (T & AP) (HC)

CIT v. Kishore Chand Jain (2014) 367 ITR 290/52 taxmann.com 156 (T & AP) (HC)

S.158BC : Block assessment – Order of AO was affirmed. [S.69, 132] 1912

Assessee bound to explain source of investment yielding undisclosed income. Failure by assessee to do so. Investment can be treated as income. Assessee to pay tax on undisclosed income at amount suggested by Department in place of amount determined by Tribunal. Appeal of revenue was allowed. (BP. 1993-94 to 1997-98)

CIT v. Jaihind Cycle Co. (2014) 367 ITR 421 / 52 taxmann.com 112 (T&AP)(HC)

S.158BC : Block assessment – Total income – Undisclosed income having effect of reducing losses – Not assessable under Chapter XIV-B – Income-tax Act. Undisclosed income to be treated as part of total income – Depreciation deductible from such undisclosed income. [S.2(45), 32, 158BA, 158BHA] 1913

Searches and seizure action resulted in discovery of undisclosed amount. The AO held that the unearthed income could straightaway be taxed under the relevant provisions of Chapter XIV-B of the Act. The contention of the assessee was two-fold. The first was that the unearthed income did not wipe away the loss, much less, showed any profits. The second was that, even if the amount was treated as independent income, it must be set off against the available and accumulated depreciation. Those contentions were not accepted by the AO and the appeal preferred before the Tribunal was dismissed. On appeal, allowing the appeal the Court held that (i) that the undisclosed income attributed to the assessee did not have the effect of wiping off the accumulated losses. Therefore, whatever may be the character of the undisclosed income, vis-a-vis the “total income”, it could not be treated as “income” within the connotation of Chapter XIV-B. On account of the fact that the aggregate losses were huge, there was nothing to be brought under the tax regime of Chapter XIV-B of the Act. Followed the ratio in *CIT v. Harprasad and Co. P. Ltd. [1975] 99 ITR 118 (SC)*.

(ii) That the undisclosed income ought to be treated as part of the total income and subjected to the same assessment, in the context of deductions and allowances as in the

case of ordinary assessments. If so done, the assessee would have the facility of claiming depreciation. (AYs. 1987-88, 1997-98)

Fenoplast Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 761 / 52 taxmann.com 479 / (2015) 115 DTR 337 (T & AP)(HC)

Editorial : Order in Fenoplast Ltd. v. ACIT (Inv.) [2003] 259 ITR (AT) 33 (Hyd.) is reversed.

- 1914 **S. 158BC : Block assessment – Entries made in the loose sheet – Verification was not made by AO – Matter was remanded – Remand was held to be justified. [Ss.158B(b), 132(4A), Indian Evidence Act, S.34]**

Search was conducted at the premises of assessee. On the basis of seized material in form of loose sheets, AO found that assessee had earned undisclosed salary income and made unexplained payment on account of purchase of property. Accordingly, he made addition to assessee's income. CIT(A) as well as Tribunal had found that proper cross-verification was not made by AO before making such an addition and remanded matter to AO. On appeal in High Court. The assessee submitted that in view of section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act, seizure of loose sheets from the premises of the assessee was not sufficient to charge the assessee with any liability as they had no evidentiary value. Tribunal and the CIT(A) had found that the proper cross verification was not made by the AO before making such an addition and therefore, the matter had been remitted to the AO for proper examination and cross verification. On appeal the Court held that the contention of the assessee was based upon interpretation of section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act which was misconceived and fit to be rejected. In the wake of clear provisions contained in section 158B(b) read with section 132(4A), the addition of undisclosed income on the basis of entries made in the loose sheet is dependent upon the investigation of facts and cross verification by the AO. Remand was held to be justified. [BP. 1-4-1987 to 27-12-1997]

Sanjay Rungta v. CIT(A) (2014) 266 CTR 181 / 99 DTR 18 / 45 taxmann.com 70 (Jharkhd) (HC)

- 1915 **S.158BC : Block assessment – Business income – Undisclosed income – Set off of miscellaneous receipts – No evidence was produced hence set off was not allowed. [S.28(i)]**

Assessee-company was engaged in business of manufacturing rectified spirit. Search was conducted at premise of assessee during which evidences with regard to unaccounted sale of rectified spirit and other discriminating documents were seized. In pursuance to notice under section 158BC, assessee filed return for block period declaring undisclosed income of ₹ 49,47,000 and also set off of ₹ 31,95,000 toward miscellaneous receipt as recorded in books. During course of assessment proceedings, assessee had admitted that except business of rectified spirit, they are not doing any other business. Since assessee had failed to produce any material or evidence to support claim with regards to miscellaneous receipts and also failed to maintain true and correct account, no set off could be allowed. Appeal of revenue was allowed. (BP. 1-4-1991 to 27-4-2001) *CIT v. Sri Lakshmi Narasimha Distilleries (P) Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 573 / 225 Taxmann 343 (Karn.)(HC)*

S.158BC : Block assessment – No incriminating material found during search – Difference between cost of construction estimated by District Valuation Officer and cost shown in accounts less than 15 per cent – Addition to income in block assessment – Not justified. [Ss.132, 158BB]

1916

Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO based on the valuation report of District Valuation Officer. On appeal by the revenue following the ratio in *ACIT v. Hotel Blue Moon [2010] 321 ITR 362 (SC)*, the Court held that there was no material found during the search indicating that there were expenses incurred on construction by the assessee that were not recorded in the books of account. In the absence of any seized material and solely on the basis of the report of the District Valuation Officer, there could not be any finding with regard to the undisclosed income. (BP. 1-4-1989 to 28-1-2000)

CIT v. Vasudev Construction (2014) 363 ITR 247/ 44 taxmann.com 30 (Karn.)(HC)

S.158BC : Block assessment – Addition based on admission by assessee – False claim of depreciation – Assessment as undisclosed income was held to be valid. [Ss.32, 132(4), 158B]

1917

Dismissing the appeal of assessee the Court held that the addition was supported by the voluntary statement given under section 132(4). The statement was not retracted. The addition was valid. As regards claim of depreciation it was held that said claim was made quite without any basis. In view of the amended definition of “undisclosed income” such claim would render it undisclosed income. (AY. 1995-96)

Medial Land v. CIT (Appeals) (2014) 363 ITR 81 / 45 taxmann.com 488 (Ker.)(HC)

S.158BC : Block assessment – Addition only on the basis of material found in search process. [S.55A]

1918

At the time of search the residential house of the appellant assessee was under construction. They had shown investment of ₹ 4,45,000/- up to 31-3-1992. In the diary with rough notes in the handwriting of Smt. Rashmi Agrawal, the entries of payment to labour, contractor and for purchase of material was calculated, after giving adjustment to the duplicate entries at ₹ 6,77,510/-. During the block assessment proceedings, AO referred the valuation of the property to the DVO under section 55A. DVO valued the cost of construction at ₹ 5,04,100/-. AO made the addition based on the valuation of the DVO. Held, that special procedure for assessment of search case, is provided in Chapter XIV-B. The assessment of undisclosed income as a result of search is made under Section 158BA for which procedure for block assessment is provided under Section 158BC. The AO can assess the undisclosed income as a result of search only on the basis of material or information as are available with the Assessing Officer in the search. He is not authorised to refer the matter to the Valuation Officer under section 55A(b) (ii) to assess the fair market value. Such an enquiry is not permissible in respect of search cases.

Dr. Ram Autar Agarwal v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 173 (Mag)(All.)(HC)

- 1919 **S.158BC : Block assessment – Unexplained investments – Credit worthiness of parties who have given old ornaments for repairing was not proved and cash seized was not satisfactorily explained – Addition was held to be justified. [S.69,69A, 158BB]**
 Assessee firm is engaged in the sale and purchase of gold and silver items/ornaments. The assessee firm is also engaged in the remaking and repair of old ornaments. A search and seizure operation was carried at the premises of the firm and residence of the partners. On the basis of seized materials block assessment for the period starting from 10th April, 1987 to 14th May, 1997 under section 158BC was passed. Various additions were made, being aggrieved, the assessee went into appeal before the First Appellate Authority. The CIT(A) directed for deletion of some of the additions. Being aggrieved by the order of the First Appellate Authority, both the department as well as the assessee went to appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal filed by the department and dismissed the assessee's appeal. Not being satisfied the assessee filed the appeal before the High Court. The Court held that the parties were not having the creditworthiness. Most of them are not assessed to tax and even if one or two are assessed to tax, their worth is low, even lower than the jewellery lend by them to the assessee. There is no evidence of genuine transaction with the assessee except in one or two cases. No entry was found in the books of account mentioned by the assessee or party concerned. Nothing was reflected in the books of account of the six creditors. The explanation furnished by the assessee is not found acceptable. Order of Tribunal was confirmed. As regards cash found during search, in spite of ample opportunities given, neither S was produced nor any other documentary evidence was filed in support of the claim. Order of Tribunal was confirmed. (BP. 10-4-1987 to 10-5-1997)
R. C. Jewellers v. CIT (2014) 97 DTR 276 / 223 Taxmann 53 (Mag) (All) (HC)
- 1920 **S.158BC : Block assessment – Block assessment only on basis of evidence found during search. [S.132]**
 Followed the Apex Court in *CIT v. Hotel Blue Moon (2010) 321 ITR 362 (SC)* wherein it was held that assessment for the block period can only be done on the basis of the evidence found as a result of search or requisition of books of account or documents and such other materials or information as available with the Assessing Officer.
CIT v. B. Nagendra Baliga (2014) 363 ITR 410 / 47 taxmann.com 331 (Karn.)(HC)
- 1921 **S.158BC : Block assessment – Issue of notice under section 143(2) is mandatory – Cancellation of block assessment was held to be valid. [S.143(2)]**
 The Tribunal directed the Commissioner (Appeals) to verify from the assessment record whether any notice u/s. 143(2) had ever been issued and served before the limitation period prescribed and in case it was found that no notice u/s. 143(2) had been served upon, he would cancel the assessments as illegal and bad in law. Held, specific directions were given to the Commissioner (Appeals) regarding the question whether such notice u/s 143(2) was issued or not. The Commissioner (Appeals) only followed the direction and when he found that no such notice was issued, he passed the consequential order. If the Revenue was aggrieved by the directions of the Tribunal it should have challenged the order of the Tribunal. Admittedly, this was not done.

Therefore, there was a consequential order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), which was in turn confirmed by the Tribunal. Appeal of revenue was dismissed.
CIT v. Pratapbhai K. Soni (2014) 361 ITR 201 / 222 Taxmann 136(Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

S.158BC : Block assessment – Telescoping – No evidence to support claim – Amount could not be reduced from undisclosed income. [S.28(i)] 1922

Held, that during the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee had admitted that except the business of rectified spirits, it was not doing any other business. It had failed to produce any materials or evidence to support the claim with regard to miscellaneous receipts and also failed to maintain the true and correct accounts. The amount of ₹ 31,95,000 could not be reduced from the undisclosed income. Order of Tribunal was set aside.

CIT v. Sri Lakshmi Narasimha Distilleries P. Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 573 / 225 Taxmann 343 (Karn.)(HC)

S:158BC : Block assessment – Cross examination was allowed to department by CIT (A) – Addition was deleted after examining the documents in detail – Order of Tribunal was confirmed – Cost of ₹ 50000 levied on the AO. 1923

The AO assessed the income as undisclosed income on the basis of documents seized. In appeal the CIT (A) examined the author of document and allowed cross examination to the AO. After examining the documents in details the addition was deleted. Tribunal also upheld the order of CIT(A). On appeal by revenue the dismissing the appeal filed by the revenue the court also imposed cost of ₹ 50,000 on the AO. (BP. 1997-98 to 2002-03)

CIT v. Sairang Developers and Promoters Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 593 / 108 DTR 400/ (2015) 53 taxmann.com 291 (Bom.)(HC)

S:158BC : Block assessment – Presumption – Loose sheets seized are documents within the meaning of S.158B(b) – No evidence was produced by assessee – Addition was justified. [S.132(4A), 158B(b), 34 of Evidence Act.] 1924

Search & seizure operations were conducted at assessee's premises. AO completed the assessment u/s. 158BC and had assessed certain undisclosed income. CIT(A) partly allowed assessee's appeal. Before CIT(A) assessee contended that it is block assessment and that the AO has not been empowered to make addition on estimate basis and the income should have been assessed on the basis of seized document and nothing more. CIT(A) held that it is block assessment and AO has not been empowered to make addition and he could not travel beyond the seized documents while making the assessment of block period & deleted the addition. Tribunal confirmed the order of CIT(A). On further appeal in HC, HC reversed the order and held that loose sheets seized during the search sometimes contain valuable information and those loose sheets are to be regarded as "documents". Since loose sheets seized were documents within the meaning of S/158B, there is presumption raised u/s. 132 (4A) regarding the documents seized. Court further held that the assessee has not adduced any material for rebutting

the presumption and there was no substantial error in the addition made towards undisclosed house rent and expenses.

Mahabir Prasad Rungta v. CIT(A) & Anr. (2014) 99 DTR 11 / 266 CTR 175/ 43 taxmann.com 328 (Jharkhand)(HC)

1925 **S.158BC : Block assessment – Presumptions – Loose sheets – Additions were on the basis of entries made in the loose sheet. [S.132(4A), 158B(b), Evidence Act, S.34]**

Assessee submitted his returns for the block period on the notice issued after a search conducted on his premises u/s. 132(1) of the IT Act. A notice u/s. 158BC of the IT act was issued. A notice u/s. 142(1) of the IT Act was issued in connection with the assessment for the block period asking him to produce books of account and documents. The assessee filed its Return of Income wherein he has declared undisclosed total income representing undisclosed Investment made acquiring relief bonds with the aforesaid sum. On the basis of seized documents assessment have been made on the total income on the basis of undisclosed income CIT(A) held that proper enquiries have not been conducted in this regard by the AO on the basis of paper said to have been seized by the AO. The CIT(A) remitted the issue to the file of AO to re-examine the issue afresh in the light of the direction given. On appeal in Tribunal, the court held that the AO should have cross-verified the same from the society and thereafter, this amount ought to have to be taxed in the hands of the assessee as his undisclosed income, which the AO has failed to do. The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal. On further appeal in HC, the court held that s. 132(4A) draws a presumption in relation to any books of account or other documents, money etc. which are found in possession or control of any person in the course of search the contents of such books of account and other documents are true. The court held that the course is rebuttable presumption which is available to the revenue. Assessee has to rebut the aforesaid presumption. Tribunal and CIT(A) have found that the proper cross verification was not made by the AO before making addition and therefore the matter was remitted to the AO for proper examination and cross verification. Addition is therefore subject to ascertainment of facts & proper verification by the AO. In such circumstances, the contention of the assessee was based on interpretation of S. 34 of the Evidence Act was misconceived and was to be rejected. The court also held that in the wake of clear provisions contained in S. 158 B(b) r.w.s 132(4A), the addition of undisclosed income on the basis of entries made in the loose sheet was dependent upon the investigation and facts and cross verification by the AO.

Sanjay Rungta v. CIT(A) & Anr. (2014) 99 DTR 18 / 266 CTR 181 / 45 taxmann.com 70(Jharkhand)(HC)

1926 **S.158BC : Block assessment – Findings of the Tribunal – Matter remanded to Tribunal to discuss all aspects of the matter. [S.158BB, 254(1)]**

Tribunal deleted the addition of undisclosed income in the block assessment while disregarding the post-search findings of the AO and the CIT(A) that the purchases shown by the assessee from two concerns were bogus transactions and ignoring other

relevant aspects are entirely unjustified and devoid of merits. Matter was remanded to the Tribunal to discuss the entire evidence in detail on all aspects afresh as it had not examined all the evidence and the relevant issues. (BP. 1-4-1989 to 14-7-1999)
CIT v. Arun Malhotra (2014) 363 TTR 195 / 98 DTR 38 / 47 taxmann.com 385 (Delhi)(HC)

S.158BC : Block assessment – Peak of debit and credit entries – Restoring the matter to AO was justified. [S.254(1)]

1927

Tribunal found that the AO had worked out the peak debits/credits from the seized documents on the basis of pick and choose for arriving at the undisclosed income of the assessee. Tribunal was justified in restoring the matter to the AO for recomputation of the peak debit and credit entries. (BP. 1-4-1986 to 13-2-1997)

CIT v. Fertilizer Traders (2014) 98 DTR 323 / 222 Taxmann 162 (Mag.)(All)(HC)

Section 158BD : Undisclosed income of any other person

S.158BD : Block assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – Satisfaction can be (a) at the time of or along with the initiation of proceedings against the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act; (b) along with the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act; and (c) immediately after the assessment proceedings are completed u/s. 158BC of the Act of the searched person. [S.158BC, 158BE]

1928

The result is that for the purpose of s. 158BD a satisfaction note is *sine qua non* and must be prepared by the AO before he transmits the records to the other AO who has jurisdiction over such other person. The satisfaction note could be prepared at either of the following stages: (a) at the time of or along with the initiation of proceedings against the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act; (b) along with the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act; and (c) immediately after the assessment proceedings are completed u/s. 158BC of the Act of the searched person. Where satisfaction was not recorded at all matter was set aside to decide the issue.

CIT v. Calcutta Knitwears (2014) 362 ITR 673 / 101 DTR 217 / 223 Taxmann 115 (Mag) / 267 CTR 105 / (2014) AIR 2970(SC)

S.158BD : Block assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – Since question of lack of jurisdiction of Assessing Officer had never been agitated in first instance at time of assessment before Assessing Officer, that issue could not be raised later in appeal. [S.158BC]

1929

As a result of a search carried out on assessee's husband 'Y', a draft agreement to sell and carbon copy of a receipt were seized. Assessing Officer completed assessment and brought to tax certain amount in hands of assessee. In appeal, assessee contended that a search warrant as issued was limited to locker in her name which yielded nothing. No warrant was issued or panchnama was drawn in her name and hence entire assessment was without jurisdiction. It was found that panchnama drawn pursuant to warrant issued in respect of 'Y' concededly contained signature of assessee. It was held that since search warrant was issued in respect of assessee's locker same would bring her within the ambit of section 158BC. Further since assessee was informed of search and she had signed panchnama, impugned addition could not be considered unauthorised

for not fulfilling conditions prescribed under section 158BD. Moreover, since question of lack of jurisdiction of Assessing Officer had never been agitated in first instance at time of assessment before Assessing Officer, that issue could not be raised later in appeal.

Niti Wadhawan v. Dy. CIT (2014) 105 DTR 286/(2015) 231 Taxmann 879 (Delhi) (HC)

1930 **S.158BD : Block assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – Additional ground – Tribunal was directed to decide the additional ground on merits. [S.254(1)]**

In course of block assessment proceedings, Assessing Officer made certain additions to assessee's income. Commissioner (Appeals) sustained a part of said additions. In appellate proceedings, assessee raised an additional ground challenging validity of notice under section 158BD. Tribunal remitted matter back to file of Commissioner (Appeals) to decide said issue. In view of fact that no additional evidence was required to examine issue relating to validity of notice under section 158BD, Tribunal was to be directed to decide said additional ground itself on merits with remitting it back to Commissioner (Appeals). Matter remanded.

J. B. Construction v. ACIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 194 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

1931 **S.158BD : Block assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – Incriminating material relating to assessee discovered during search of third person – Information forwarded to Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over assessee – Notice under section 158BD is Valid – On merit addition based on project report was deleted. [S.69, 158BC]**

During the search operation incriminating material relating to the assessee had been discovered. The authorised officer did pass on information to the Assessing Officer, who had the jurisdiction and who proceeded to assess. The proceedings under section 158BD were valid.

However the revenue had not discharged the burden of proving unexplained investment in terms of section 69. The addition based on the project report was held to be not justified. [BPs. 1-4-1995 to 20-3-2002]

CIT v. Vinayak Plasto Chem P. Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 596 / 221 Taxmann 439 / 264 CTR 313 (Raj.)(HC)

1932 **S.158BD : Block assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – Assessee participating in assessment – Assessment not invalid on ground no search conducted against assessee. [S.132, 158BC]**

Assessment based on materials gathered in course of search conducted in case of two other assesses residing in same premises as assessee. Assessee understanding this and participating in assessment. Assessment not invalid on ground no search conducted against assessee

Kailash Sarda v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 36/ 44 taxmann.com 407 (Mad.)(HC)

S.158BD : Block assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – Where AO had not granted opportunity to assessee and had not recorded satisfaction prior to initiation of assessment proceedings u/s. 158BD, he would not be permitted to initiate fresh block assessment proceedings. [S.254(1)] 1933

The Tribunal held that Addl. DIT (Inv.) was not authorised at relevant time to issue warrant of authorisation under section 158BD and set aside the assessment orders. The AO passed afresh order giving effect to Tribunal order. The Court held that the Tribunal in earlier order, though accepted assessee's contention that no valid opportunity was granted to assessee before making impugned block assessment order, did not permit the Assessing Officer to initiate fresh assessment order on that ground. While on one hand appeal was filed by revenue against above earlier order of Tribunal, on other hand, Assessing Officer passed fresh order under section 158BD, read with section 254. Since original block assessment order was actually set aside not on ground of failure to follow principles of natural justice but for different reasons and the Tribunal did not permit and allow revenue to initiate fresh block assessment proceedings, fresh assessment order passed by Assessing Officer was to be quashed.

CIT v. Elegant Travels (P) Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 67(Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

S.158BD : Block assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – Matter was set aside. [S.133A] 1934

Tribunal has ignored the revised return filed and the disclosure made in the course of survey, hence the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for considering the same afresh on all grounds.

CIT v. Vinod Kumar Gupta (2013) 351 ITR 253 / (2014) 222 Taxmann 87 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.158BD : Block assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – AO of searched person needs to record satisfaction even when AO of searched person and the other person is same. [S.158BC] 1935

During search conducted on one 'J' group, certain incriminating materials were found in relation to assessee. Therefore, the AO issued notice under section 158BD to the assessee. AO of both, searched persons and the assessee was same. Tribunal quashed and set aside the notice on ground that there was no valid satisfaction recorded by the AO in case of the person searched prior to issuance of the notice to the assessee. High Court held that recording of satisfaction by the AO of the person searched is *sine qua non* for issuing notice u/s. 158BD, even when the AO of the searched person and the other person is common. Since, the satisfaction was not recorded, notice u/s. 158BD quashed.

DCIT v. Lalitkumar M. Patel (2014) 222 Taxmann 96 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

1936

S.158BD : Block assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – No incriminating documents were found – Powers of Assessing Officer – An Assessing Officer cannot carry out the functions of an authority under the Central Excise Act and arrogate to himself the power to determine the quantity of production, or the intricacies of the manufacturing process – He must seek assistance of the concerned authority. [S.132, 132(4)]

The Court held that even where the authorities of the Central Excise Department doubt the accuracy of figures mentioned in the registers, or if they find it difficult to understand the complexity of the manufacturing process, they seek the help of the experts. Sometimes experts are on the rolls of the department itself, and on the other occasions, the service of experts outside the department are availed. The Assessing Officer under the Act can certainly look into various records of the assessee, to satisfy himself about the correctness of the facts and figures, or to come to his own conclusions about the income of the assessee. If it is a case of mere verification of books of account, or the registers that reflect the sale of any product, the Income Tax Officer can undertake the exercise by himself. Where, however, he entertains a doubt about the correctness of the facts and figures that are mentioned in the registers, which are required to be maintained under the Central Excise Act or the Rules made thereunder, the proper course for him would be to take the assistance of the concerned authority under the Central Excise Act. Howsoever anxious or willing he may be to verify the registers, by himself, outcome of the exercise may not be accurate. Just a Superintendent of Central Excise Department, cannot be expected to verify the correctness of the income tax returns, submitted by a manufacturer, it is not at all safe for any Income Tax Officer to undertake verification of the records referable to the department of Central Excise. Unfortunately, this is what exactly has happened in the instant case. A perusal of the order of assessment discloses that the Assessing Officer did not feel any inhibition to express his views on a matter, which does not genuinely fall in his purview. In a way, he has undertaken certain activity, which a Superintendent of Excise Department would have hesitated.

An Income Tax Officer cannot carry out the functions of an authority under the Central Excise Act and arrogate to himself the power to determine the quantity of production, or to utter a final word on the intricacies of the manufacturing process, that too, without referring to any reliable material. The Assessing Officer, in the instant case, was totally unsuited for undertaking the activity of determining the exact production of the material, which itself involves very complicated procedures. (ITA No. 145 of 2003. dated 29-10-2014.) (BP. 1988-89, 1997-98)

CIT v. Shri. Girija Smelters (P) Ltd. (2015) 230 Taxmann 322 (AP)(HC)

S.158BD : Block Assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – Second Notice – No limitation is placed on number of notice to be issued under section 158 BD – However, proceeding under section 158 BD cannot be continued when in case of, searched person, the proceedings initiated for block period under section 158 BC of the Act have resulted into deletion of addition made on the very ground of undisclosed income. [S.158BC]

1937

No limitation is placed on number of times the notice can be issued under section 158 BD of the Act upon the person other than the searched person in whose case the AO satisfies himself to initiate proceedings under section 158BD. This by itself cannot be a ground to permit notice more than once on identical facts and material. Moreso, when in case of searched person proceedings initiated for block period under section 158BC have resulted into deletion.

Narvirsinh Parmar L/H of Late Ramaben D. Zala v. ACIT (2014) 102 DTR 403 / 45 taxmann.com 466 (Guj.)(HC)

S.158BD : Block assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – Satisfaction – No evidence produced to show that the AO of the searched person had arrived at a satisfaction during the course of such proceedings that the undisclosed income belongs to the assessee – The action under section 158BD must fail in absence of such satisfaction. [S.158BC]

1938

Where the Revenue has not produced any evidence to show that the AO of the searched person had arrived at the satisfaction during the course of such proceedings that the undisclosed income belongs to the assessee. Thus, notice issued under section 158BD of the Act was liable to be quashed.

Creative Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. v. Amal Garg, Dy. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 596 / 102 DTR 412 / (2015) 58 taxmann.com 43 (Guj.)(HC)

S.158BD : Block assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – Return was not filed – Assessing as undisclosed income was held to be justified. [S.158BB, 158BC]

1939

Search & seizure was carried out in the premises of assessee. Notice was issued u/s. 158 BD r/w 158BC of the Act as per materials seized. The assessee claimed that the entire income of the assessment years could not be included as undisclosed income for the block period while completing the block assessment on the ground that even before the issuance of notices, the assessee had filed their respective return of income. The AO rejected assessee's contention and included income in block period. On further appeal in CIT(A) confirmed AO's order. Tribunal by common order confirmed CIT(A)'s order. On further appeal in HC, HC dismissed assessee's appeal and held that as far as stat (ca) of Ss.158BB(1) is concerned, when the due date for filing of the return of income has expired and the assessee had not filed the return even as stating that it was "NIL Income, then S.158BB would be of relevance and therefore computation of undisclosed income was sustainable. Accordingly the case of the assessee would certainly fall for consideration under S.158BB S.158BD and the assessment could not be faulted with. (BP. 1990-91, 2000-01)

R. Rangasamy v. DCIT (2014) 264 CTR 410 / 221 Taxmann 206(Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

1940 **S.158BD : Block assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – Recording of Satisfaction – Within two years time period stipulated in section. [S.158BE]**

It was held that AO is bound to record the satisfaction within the meaning of S.158BD within the two years time period stipulated in S.158BE(1). Since the satisfaction was recorded by the AO beyond that period, the assessment proceedings were without jurisdiction.

Raghav Bahl v. CIT (2014)369 ITR 447 / 101 DTR 239/225 Taxmann 195 (Mag.) / 267 CTR 122 (Delhi)(HC)

Editorial: SLP is granted (SPA(C) No. 604 of 2015 dated 19-1-2015) CIT v. Raghav Bahl (2015) 231 Taxmann 230 (SC)

1941 **S.158BD : Block assessment – Undisclosed income of any other person – Satisfaction was not recorded by AO of searched party – Reasonable time – Block assessment was quashed. [S.158BC, 158BE]**

During search operation conducted in case of one ST various documents in respect of sale of plot were found. Said plot was purchased by SPL, a company, promoted by assessee. Proceedings under section 158BD were initiated against SPL but those proceedings were dropped by concerned AO as SPL was not incorporated at relevant time. Thereafter, on information of AO of SPL, a notice under section 158BD was issued to assessee after a lapse of nearly six years and block assessment was framed making certain addition. On appeal Tribunal held that since in instant case satisfaction as required under section 158BD was recorded by AO of SPL and not by AO of searched party, such satisfaction was not valid. Further, even though there is no limitation provided for issuing notice under section 158BD, proceedings should be initiated within reasonable time and issuance of notice under section 158BD after a lapse of six year was unjustified, therefore, block assessment under section 158BD was to be quashed. (BP. 1-4-1990 to 27-4-2000)

Anees Firoz Sarkar v. ACIT (2013) 158 TTJ 650 / (2015) 152 ITD 323 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

Section S158BE : Time limit for completion of block assessment

1942 **S.158BE : Block assessment – Time limit – As soon as order was vacated, limitation will restart and will exhaust itself on period of limitation provided under Act – Order passed was beyond limitation period hence bad in law. [S.158BC]**

A search was conducted at assessee's premises and, accordingly, notice under section 158BC was issued on 29-4-2003. Consequent thereto return was filed by assessee on 16-6-2003. High Court in writ petition filed by assessee, stayed assessment proceedings vide interim order dated 12-2-2004. Subsequently, stay order was vacated on 26-8-2009. AO took date of vacation of interim order to be date, when it was received by him on 9-11-2009, and passed assessment order on 22-6-2010. Tribunal held that once stay was vacated assessee had to revert back to its position as on 12-2-2004 and balance time available for framing assessment was only up to 15-4-2010 and, hence, assessment order passed on 22-6-2010 was barred by limitation. On further appeal in High Court, High Court affirmed findings of Tribunal and held that as soon as order was vacated,

limitation will restart and will exhaust itself on period of limitation provided under Act and, therefore, there was no error of law in judgment of Tribunal holding that assessment was clearly barred by limitation.

CIT v. The Drs. X-Ray & Pathology Institute Pvt. Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 27 / (2014) 268 CTR 85/ 220 Taxmann 88 (Mag)(All)(HC)

S.158BE : Block assessment – Time limit – Block period would begin from date when assets came into possession of Assessing Officer and not from date of requisition. [S.132A]

1943

On 2-4-2000, the police had intercepted a Jeep in which seven persons, including the assessee, were travelling. Large quantity of silver ornaments/silver was recovered from the assessee. The Director of Income-tax, Investigation, on receiving the information, issued a warrant of requisition under section 132A on 3-4-2000, directing the Police to deliver the said silver jewellery / silver to the Income-tax Officer. On 16-2-2001, the jewellery was delivered to the department. The Assessing Officer issued notice under section 158BC to the assessee. The notice disclosed block periods as 1-4-1990 to 16-2-2001. The proceedings for block assessment were initiated in which the assessee replied and led evidence. The AO completed block assessment holding that payments for purchase of silver ornaments were made from income from undisclosed sources. The CIT(A) allowed partial relief to the assessee. On second appeal, the Tribunal held that the block period in the instant case ended on 3-4- 2000, when the summons were issued, and not on 16-2-2001, when the department received the goods, i.e., the summons were deemed to have been executed and, therefore, block assessment notice in which block assessment periods was disclosed as 1-4-1990 to 16-2-2001 was void *ab initio*. HC observed that in the instant case, the assets of silver jewellery/silver were requisitioned on 3-4-2000, but it came into possession of the authorised officer of the department on 16-2-2001, and, thus, in view of Explanation 2(b) to sub-section (2) of section 158BE, the block period would begin on 16-2-2001, and not on the date of issuance of notice under section 132A or on 3-4-2000, or on any previous date when the requisition was made. It was admitted that the assets came into the hands of AO on 16-2-2001 and, thus, block period in the notice was correctly mentioned in accordance with Explanation 2(b) of sub-section (2) of section 158BE from 1-4-1990 to 16-2-2001. Therefore HC held that there was no error in mentioning the block period in the notice, which can be held as invalid. Even if the date of end of block period was wrongly mentioned, the provisions of section 292B would save the notice. The objection taken by the Tribunal was a technical objection to invalidate the assessment. The defect was not incurable especially in view of the fact that the assessee had participated in the assessment proceedings. Further, non-mentioning of status of the assessee, would not invalidate the notice, as it was only a mistake, which was curable.

CIT v. Vinod Kumar (2014) 222 Taxmann 68 (Mag.) (All.) (HC)

S.158BE : Block assessment – Time limit – Limitation period for completion of assessment.

1944

Search proceeding was challenged by the assessee before the High Court by filing writ petition. The assessment proceedings were stayed, *vide* interim order dated February 12,

2004. The interim order was vacated on August 26, 2009. Assessing Officer took the date of vacation of the interim order to be the date, when it was received by him on November 9, 2009, and passed the assessment order on June 22, 2010. Tribunal held that Limitation period for completing assessment would start from date when High Court vacated interim order and not from date when Assessing Officer received such vacation order. Therefore, the balance time available for framing assessment was up to 15-4-2010 and hence, assessment was barred by limitation. On appeal by revenue to High Court, Tribunal's order was upheld.

CIT v. Drs. X-Ray & Pathology Institute (P) Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 27 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 88 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

1945 **S.158BE : Block assessment – Time limit – Error in panchnama – Does not render search invalid – Writ petition was held to be not maintainable. [Ss.132, 153A]**

A lapse or failure in the panchnama neither affect the validity of the search nor nullifies the notice u/s. 153A of the Act. It certainly would not affect the initiation of the search which is the starting point and pre-condition for invoking s. 153A of the Act. A panchnama is drawn up when the search stands concluded finally or temporarily. Alternative remedy against section 153A is available. Writ petition was dismissed. (AY. 2006-07, 2008-09)

MDLR Resorts P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR /265 CTR 356 / 221 Taxmann 83 (Mag) (Delhi)(HC)

1946 **S.158BE : Block assessment – Time limit – Notice beyond reasonable time – Notice was issued after thirty four months after framing the assessment of person against whom search action was conducted – Not valid. [S.132, 158BD]**

Information was given to Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over assessee after completion of assessment of person against whom search conducted. Notice was issued to assessee thirty-four months after framing of assessment of person against whom search conducted. Held, notice was issued beyond reasonable time, and hence, block assessment and additions made thereon not justified.

CIT v. Umesh Chandra Gupta (2014) 362 ITR 1 (Delhi)(HC)

1947 **S.158BE : Block assessment – Time limit – Starting of limitation – Last date of authorization for search to be taken in to – Second authorization issued on 27-08-2003 – Limitation starts from the end of that month – The order of assessment was not barred by limitation. [S.132]**

The search conducted on March 28, 2003, came to an end as far as that authorisation was concerned. However, the second search was admittedly on a fresh authorisation. Thus, in respect of search conducted on March 27, 2003, and March 28, 2003, panchnama was drawn with the observation "search continues", thus, considering the fact that the second search was to be carried out in different premises and materials to be seized, in fitness of things, a fresh authorisation was issued by the Department on August 27, 2003, and under section 158BE of the Act, limitation had to be worked out

from that date, i.e., the end of August, 2003, and not with reference to the first search, i.e., March 27, 2003, and March 28, 2003. The order of assessment was not barred by limitation. Decision of the single judge in *Rakesh Sarin v. Dy. CIT (2011) 333 ITR 451(Mad)(HC)* was reversed. (AY. 1997-98, 2002-03)

Dy. CIT v. Rakesh Sarin (2014) 362 ITR 619/97 DTR 216 / 264 CTR 68 / 222 Taxmann 84(Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)

Aashna Sarin v. TRO(2014) 362 ITR 619 / 97 DTR 216 264 CTR 68 / 222 Taxmann 84 (Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)

S.158BE : Block assessment – Time limit – interim stay granted by the High Court for completion of assessment – Subsequently stay lifted – Time limit for completion of assessment starts from the date of pronouncement of order. [S.158BC]

1948

A search was conducted at the assessee's premises on September 14, 2002 and notice under section 158BC of the Act was issued on April 29, 2003. Consequent thereto return was filed by the assessee on June 16, 2003. The search proceedings were challenged by the assessee before the Hon'ble High Court and the assessment proceedings were stayed *vide* interim order dated February 12, 2004. Subsequently the stay order was vacated on August 26, 2009. The AO passed assessment order on June 22, 2010. The assessee challenged the validity of the order before the First Appellate Authority on the ground that the order vacating stay by the Hon'ble High Court had been communicated to the AO on November 9, 2009, therefore, the remaining period available for framing assessment would start from November 9, 2009. The learned CIT(A) accepted the contention of the assessee and annulled the assessment by holding that the same has been passed beyond the limitation period as provided under S. 158BE. On further appeal by the department, the Appellate Tribunal upheld the order of the learned CIT(A) by observing that the writ petitions are filed as per the High Court Rules or the General Clauses Act where the limitation always starts from the date of pronouncement of the order/judgment. Therefore, once the stay is vacated, the assessee has to revert back to its position as on February 12, 2004 and the balance time available for framing the assessment was only up to April 15, 2010. Since the assessment order was passed on June 22, 2010, it is certainly barred by limitation. (BP. 14-9-2002)

Dy. CIT v. Drs. X-Ray & Pathology Institute (P) Ltd. (2013) 27 ITR 434 / (2014) 61 SOT 25 (URO) (Luck.) (Trib.)

Editorial: Affirmed by the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in [2013] 358 ITR 27 (All) (HC).

Section S158BFA : Levy of interest and penalty in certain cases

S.158BFA : Block assessment – Interest – Charge of interest is mandatory.

1949

Charging of interest under section 158BFA(1) is mandatory ; no authority has power to reduce or waive the interest levied under the said section. (BP. 10-4-1987 to 10-5-1997) *R. C. Jewellers v. CIT (2014) 97 DTR 276 / 223 Taxmann 53 (Mag)(All) (HC)*

- 1950 **S.158BFA : Block assessment – Penalty – Revised return – No provision for filing revised return – Additional undisclosed income in revised return – Penalty imposable. [S.158BC]**
Return filed u/s. 158BC. Later, assessee disclosed additional undisclosed income. No provision for filing revised return u/s. 158BC. It was held that additional undisclosed income is liable for penalty. (BP. 1-4-1989 to 29-10-98)
CIT v. Hitech Chemical P Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 145 / 107 DTR 228/ 271 CTR 173 / 49 taxmann.com 33 (Jharkhand)(HC)
- 1951 **S.158BFA : Block assessment – Interest – Failure of the Department to furnish seized documents – Delay in filing block returns – Interest not to be levied.**
Delay in filing the block returns was due to the delay on the part of the Department in furnishing necessary documents seized during the search. Delay in filing return not attributable to the assessee. Interest cannot be levied. (BP. 1-4-1989 to 28-1-2000)
CIT v. B. Nagendra Baliga (2014) 363 ITR 410 / 47 taxmann.com 331 (Karn.)(HC)
- 1952 **S.158BFA : Block assessment – Interest – Tribunal not justified in directing the deletion of interest charged under section 158BFA (1) of the Act.**
Further, the High Court held that Tribunal was not justified in directing deletion of interest levied under section 158BFA (1) of the Act for delay in filing block return. (Block Periods: 1-4-1989 to 28-6-2000)
CIT v. B. Suresh Baliga (2014) 102 DTR 83 / 364 ITR 560 /225 Taxmann 228 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)
- 1953 **S.158BFA : Block assessment – Penalty – Block assessment – There is a perceptual difference in the operative force of section 271(1)(c) vis-à-vis section 158BFA(2). The charge against the assessee u/s. 158BFA(2) could be, why they failed to compute true disclosed income out of the seized material. [Ss.158BC, 271(1)(c)]**
On a comparative study of the scheme of assessment of undisclosed income for the purpose of block period, penalty impossible u/s 271(1)(c) and penalty impossible on the undisclosed income in the block period, we find that income for the block period has to be determined on the basis of material seized during the course of search. This material was to be supplied to the assessee before he could be asked to submit his return in response to the notice issued u/s. 158BC meaning thereby the material goads any person to compute true undisclosed income. The material is already available with the Assessing Officer. From that very material, true and undisclosed income has to be computed by the assessee and to be disclosed in the block return in response to the notice received u/s. 158BC. Thus there is a perceptual difference in the operative force of section 271(1)(c) vis-à-vis section 158BFA(2). The charge against the assessee u/s. 158BFA(2) could be, why they failed to compute true disclosed income out of the seized material. Whether the assesses have made a deliberate attempt to disclose nil undisclosed income or they have sufficient reasoning for forming belief that no undisclosed income is available in their hands which is to be disclosed in response to the notice received u/s. 158BC.

The question before us is, whether at the time of filing the return, a man of ordinary prudence can form a belief that he has no undisclosed income on the basis of seized material supplied to him. Whether such formation of belief is a *bonafide one* having regard to the material on the record or it is merely a Performa explanation. It is to be kept in mind that if a claim was not made in the return, then the assessee would be foreclosing his right to dispute the claim and would accept the stand of the Revenue. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *Reliance Petro Products Ltd. [2010] 322 ITR 158 (SC)* has observed that making incorrect claim does not amount to concealment of particulars, because the assessee wants to take a particular stand on the given facts. *Mohd. Khasim v. ACIT (Bang.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org*

S.158BFA : Block assessment – Penalty order passed on deceased person – Null and void. [S.292B]

1954

The AO passed the penalty order u/s. 158BFA(2) in the name of the deceased assessee. He wrote the name of the deceased at the top of the penalty order. The son of the deceased was never impleaded as a legal heir of his father. It is well settled that no penalty can be legally imposed on the deceased person and the order imposing penalty on a deceased person shall be null and void. The legal heir was never impleaded or brought on record. The show cause notice for penalty was not issued, as legal heir of the deceased, and therefore, it cannot be said that non-mentioning of the name of the legal heir and writing of name of the deceased at the top of the penalty order is merely a clerical error, where legal heirs of the deceased was brought on record and was impleaded in the proceedings as legal heir, and only mistake is in writing of the name of the deceased on the top of the order passed by the AO, the same shall be simply a clerical error and shall have no adverse effect on the proceedings within section 292B of the Act. However, if the AO has failed to bring the legal heirs on record and the legal heirs has not been impleaded, it cannot be said that it is merely a clerical error to be saved by the provision of section 292B of the Act, and such an order passed on the dead person shall be null and void, and has to be quashed. The facts of the case leaves to only conclusion that the order imposing penalty was passed on the deceased, and therefore, is null and void, and the penalty on the dead person is not leviable. (BPs. 1-4-1986 to 1-8-1996)

Chandrakant A. Gandhi v. ACIT (2013) 162 TTJ 270 / (2014) 146 ITD 346 (Ahd)(Trib.)

S.158BG : Block assessment – Approval – Order passed without approval was held to be bad in law. [S.132, 292B]

1955

The authorised officer conducted a search under section 132 upon D. T. S. Rao on 6-2-1996 and seized cash from his possession. However, 'D.T.S' at the time of search submitted that the said cash belonged to one 'Srinivas Rao'. Thereafter the AO passed a block assessment order on 'Srinivas Rao'. The Joint Commissioner had previously approved the said order under section 158BG. On appeal, the Tribunal set aside the block assessment order on the ground that the Joint Commissioner was not the duly authorised person under section 158BG and therefore, the said order was void. Hence the revenue was in appeal before the HC. The HC observed that it was not in dispute that the search was conducted on 6-2-1996, i.e., before the 1st day of January, 1997

and after 30th day of June, 1995. Therefore, it was the Commissioner, who should have previously approved the order of assessment of the block period, whereas it is the Joint Commissioner, who had previously approved the order of assessment. Therefore, the order of assessment was contrary to section 158BG. The revenue relying on section 292B contended that the said violation is in the nature of a mistake, defect or omission, which shall not invalidate the order. The Court held that having regard to the language employed in the proviso to section 158BG, where the intention of the legislature has been expressed in a negatively couched form, the said provision providing for previous approval is mandatory. If the previous approval is not obtained by the AO before passing the order, the said order could be a nullity. That is the consequence of not obtaining an order. It cannot be construed as a mistake, defect or omission and it also does not fall within the ambit of substantial provisions of the Act.

It was also contended by the revenue that the proceedings for assessment were initiated subsequent to 1st January, 1997, i.e., on 3-1-1997 and, therefore, the previous approval of the Joint Commissioner was in accordance with law. It is not the initiation of the proceedings, which is crucial. It is the initiation of search under section 132, which is crucial. To this, the Court observed that section 158BG was specially inserted into the Act with a specific purpose. Before a block assessment order was passed, certain legal requirements were to be complied. Otherwise, there was no jurisdiction to pass a block assessment order. It is in this background, the legislature consciously provided the aforesaid provision providing for previous approval. In that view of the matter, the said provision could not be said to be procedural and non compliance of said provision could not be construed as a mistake, defect or omission. If the said provision was not complied, the order passed by the AO without the previous approval was no order in the eye of law. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that the block assessment order is one without jurisdiction.

CIT v. Sri D. S. Srinivasan Rao & Brothers (2014)222 Taxmann 80 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

1956 **S.158BG : Block assessment – Approval of Commissioner – No opportunity of hearing is required while giving approval under section 158BG. [S.132, 158BC]**

Assessing Officer as a result of search conducted under section 132 upon assessee passed block assessment order on him and made certain addition to his income. Tribunal observed that no opportunity of hearing was given to assessee by Commissioner while granting approval under section 158BG and so no enhancement could be made out in income of assessee. On appeal by revenue the Court held that no opportunity of hearing was required to be given to assessee by Commissioner while granting approval under section 158BG the approval being administrative action. Whether the observation of the Commissioner amount to enhancement of the addition or not the Tribunal has not gone into the merit of the observations/directions. Order of Tribunal was set aside to the Tribunal with a direction to examine the same on merit and pass a fresh order as per law after providing reasonable opportunity to the assessee. (BP. 1987-88 to 1995-96) *CIT v. Singh K. P. (Dr.)(2014) 97 DTR 1 / 264 CTR 1 / 222 Taxmann 83 (Mag) (All) (HC)* *CIT v. Sudha Singh. (Dr.)(Mrs) (2014) 97 DTR 1 (All) (HC)*

Section 159 : Legal representatives**S.159 : Legal representatives – Dead person – Order passed by Commissioner (Appeals) in name of dead person – Order needed readjudication [Ss.2(29), Civil Procedure Code, S.2(11)]**

1957

During course of appeal proceedings before Commissioner (Appeals), assessee breathed his last breath. Said appeal was dismissed by Commissioner (Appeals). Assessee's son being legal heir of assessee approached Tribunal, wherein it was held that appellant had not succeeded to the estate of the deceased and, consequently, he could not be termed as legal representative of deceased for purpose of proceedings under Act. Thus, appeal was held as legally not maintainable.

On further appeal, it was found that deceased had appointed appellant as his executor, and, thus, appellant was competent enough to represent estate of deceased. Further, the court held that since order was passed by Commissioner (Appeals) in name of dead person, matter was to be remanded to files of Commissioner (Appeals).

Ramesh M. Mehta v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 142 (Mad.) (HC)

Section S161 : Liability of representative assessee**S.161 : Liability of representative assessee – Private specific Trust – Discretionary trust – Entire law on taxation of private specific / discretionary trusts under revocable and irrevocable transfers and AOPs explained. [S.2(31), 61, 63 164(1)]**

1958

(i) Private Trusts could be Fixed or Discretionary Trusts. A fixed trust is a trust in which the beneficiaries have a current fixed entitlement to such income as remains after proper exercise of the trustee's powers. On the other hand, a discretionary trust is one in which the beneficiaries have no such current fixed entitlement, but only a hope (spes) that the trustees in carrying out their duty to consider how much income might be paid to such beneficiaries will in their discretion pay that income to a particular beneficiary or beneficiaries. The beneficiaries have no interest in possession under the trust. There are various reasons why a settlor prefers to establish a discretionary trust rather than a fixed trust. Some of the important one's being – to protect the beneficiary against creditors; to continue to exercise control over young or improvident beneficiaries; to make adjustment according to circumstances. "When a trust is set up, there is no way of knowing how the beneficiaries will fare in the future; which of them will be most in need, which will be deserving, which spendthrift, which inebriate, which will marry millionaires and which missionaries". The trustee can take all these factors into consideration in making their decisions.

(ii) When it comes to tax on income received by the Trust on behalf of the beneficiaries, there are some implications depending on whether the trust is a discretionary trust or a non-discretionary trust. As we have already seen in terms of sec. 164(1) a trust is assessed as a representative assessee in respect of income which it receives on behalf of its beneficiaries and if the beneficiaries are not certain or shares of beneficiaries are indeterminate, tax shall be charged on the relevant income or part of relevant income at the maximum marginal rate. Explanation 1 to sec. 164 deems that in certain situations beneficiaries shall be deemed to be not identifiable or their shares are unascertained

or indeterminate or unknown. These provisions have already been set out in the earlier part of this order and are not being repeated. The legislative history of the above provisions needs to be examined to find out the object of introduction of the Explanation. Sec. 164(1) was in the Act when it was enacted in 1962 but its wording underwent a change, introducing a concept of taxation at marginal rate in 1970 by the Finance Act of 1970 w.e.f. 1st April, 1970. The object and scope of this amendment were elaborated in a circular of the CBDT (Circular No. 45 dated 2nd Sept., 1970).

(iii) Under the existing provisions, the flat rate of 65% is not applicable where the beneficiaries and their shares are known in the previous year, although such beneficiaries or their shares have not been specified in the relevant instrument of trust, order of the Court or wakf deed. This provision has been misused in some cases by giving discretion to the trustees to decide the allocation of the income every year and in other ways. In such a situation, the trustees and beneficiaries are able to manipulate the arrangements in such a manner that a discretionary trust is converted to a specific trust whenever it suits them tax-wise. In order to prevent such manipulation, it is proposed to provide that unless the beneficiaries and their shares are expressly stated in the order of the Court or the instrument of trust or wakf deed, as the case may be, and are ascertainable as such on the date of such order, instrument or deed, the trust will be regarded as a discretionary trust and assessed accordingly.”

(iv) The object of the amendments to the provision was only that the distribution of the income should not be entirely at the discretion of the trustees and that the trust deed should regulate the shares.

(v) The basic scheme of section 61 r/w section 62 and section 63 is as follows : where under a settlement any income arises to the settlor, it has to be assessed in the hands of settlor, whether the settlement is revocable or irrevocable. If under a settlement any income arises to any other person apart from the settlor such income can still be assessed in the hands of the settlor provided the settlement is revocable. Even if a settlement on the face of it is stated to be irrevocable, if the same provides for direct or indirect retransfer of income or assets of the settlement to the settlor or gives the settlor a right to resume power directly or indirectly over such income or asset, the settlement should be deemed to be revocable.

(vi) Sec. 2(31) of the Act defines the term “Person”. The definition includes “Association of Persons” (AOP). There is no definition of the expression AOP occurring in the 1922 Act. By a series of decisions, the meaning of this expression was precisely defined and tests were laid down in order to find out when a conglomerate of persons could be held to be an AOP for the purposes of section 3 of the 1922 Act. While interpreting this expression occurring in section 3 of the Indian IT Act, 1922, the Supreme Court in *CIT vs. Indira Balkrishna* (supra) held “an AOP must be one in which two or more persons join in a common purpose or common action, and as the words occur in a section which imposes a tax on income, the association must be one the object of which is to produce income, profits or gains”. The Supreme Court, however, administered the following caution : “There is no formula of universal application as to what facts, how many of them and of what nature, are necessary to come to a conclusion that there is an AOP within the meaning of section 3; it must depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each case as to whether the conclusion can be drawn or not”. To

the above judicial exposition of what constitutes AOP, there has been a statutory rider added. The Finance Act, 2002 has inserted w.e.f. 1st April, 2003 an Explanation to clarify that object of deriving income is not necessary for AOP, BOI, local authority or an artificial juridical person in order that such entity may come within the definition of "Person" in section 2(31). If income results then they are liable to be taxed as AOP if the other conditions laid down by judicial decisions are satisfied. (AY. 2008-09) *DCIT v. India Advantage Fund-VII (2014) 36 ITR 304/67 SOT 5 (URO)(Bang)(Trib.)*

Section 163 : Who may be regarded as agent

S.163 : Representative assessee – Agent – Non-resident – Relevant period to be considered for treating person as agent of non-resident – Period covering the year of account and not date of appointment – Employee not a non-resident at relevant accounting period – Employer company cannot be appointed as representative assessee. [S.163(2), IT Act, 1922, S.43] 1959

When the relevant accounting year was the previous year ending on March 31, 2003, which pertained to the assessment year 2003-04, F, the employee of the petitioner, was not a non-resident. Therefore, in relation to that accounting period the petitioner could not be appointed as a representative assessee. This was notwithstanding the fact that subsequently F attained the status of a non-resident and that the notice under section 163(2) was issued when he was a non-resident. (AY. 2003-04)

Comverse Networks Systems India P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 40 / 226 Taxmann 108/ 271 CTR 36 (Delhi) (HC)

S.163 : Representative assessee – Agent – shipping line and global freight forwarding business – assessee claimed that it was agent of a UK based company – CIT(A) accepted based on ITAT order in case of group company – Tribunal set aside the matter to consider *denovo* – No interference needed. 1960

Assessee-company was engaged in business of shipping line and global freight forwarding. The department conducted survey operations at the premises of assessee's group. From the report of survey, relevant fact came to light that assessee-company had an agreement dated 01.04.2001 entered with another company by name IAL Container Line UK Ltd. which was also engaged in the same line of business. AO completed assessment u/s. 144. CIT(A) allowed the plea of the assessee that assessee was acting as an agent of the UK company and it was not the business of the assessee and further, under the Indo-UK treaty the same was not taxable in India. CIT(A) relied on the ITAT order in case of other group company. Tribunal restored the matter back to the AO to decide the issue afresh. Held that no interference is needed in the directions of the Tribunal and in the interest of justice *denovo* enquiry would clearly establish the nature of activity conducted by the assessee. (AY. 2009-10)

IAL India Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 82 (Mag.)(Ker.)(HC)

Section 164 : Charge of tax where share of beneficiaries unknown

1961 **S.164 : Representative assesseees – Charge of tax – Share of beneficiaries unknown – Income – Accrual – Discretionary trust or specific trust – Beneficiaries unknown – Settlor having executed the deeds giving discretion to the Trustees to disburse benefits among the beneficiaries and the trustees having retained the income and not disbursed the same among the beneficiaries, the trusts continued to be ‘discretionary trust’ in the relevant assessment years and the value of the assets cannot be assessed on the estate of the deceased settlor. [S.5, Wealth tax Act, 1957 S. 21(3)]**

The ex-Ruler of Gondal Shri Vikramsinji executed three deeds of settlements (trust deeds) in the USA & UK. These trusts were created for the benefit of (a) the Settlor, (b) the children and remoter issue for the time being in existence of the Settlor and (c) any person for the time being in existence who is the wife or widow of the Settlor or the wife or widow or husband or widower of any of them, the children and remoter issue of the Settlor. During his life time, the settlor, Shri Vikramsinji, was including the whole of the income arising from these trusts in his returns of income. The said income was also included in the two returns filed by his son Jyotendrasiniji for the AY. 1970-71. Thereafter, the assessee took the stand that the income from these trusts is not includible in his income. Jyotendrasiniji also took the stand that inclusion of the said income in the returns submitted by his father for the AYs. 1964-65 to 1969-70 and by himself for the assessment year 1970-71 was under a mistake. Clause 3 of the deeds of settlement executed in U.K. leaves at the discretion of the trustees to disburse benefits to the beneficiaries. The endorsement made in the returns, as noted above, shows that income was retained by the trustees and not disbursed. The Tribunal while considering clause 3(2) and Clause 4 of the U.K. Trust Deeds observed that if the trusts were really intended to be discretionary, the trustees had a duty cast on them to ascertain the relative needs and personal circumstances of all the beneficiaries and to allocate the income of the trusts, among them from time to time, according to the objects of the trusts, however, the tell tale facts bring out the intention of the Settlor to treat the trust property as his own. The settlor and after his death his son have been showing the income of foreign trusts in the returns of income filed from time to time. Had the trust deeds been really understood by the trustees and the beneficiaries as discretionary by virtue of the operation of clause 3, one would have expected the state of affairs to have been different. Consequently, the Tribunal held that due to failure on the part of the Maharaja to appoint discretion exercisers as per clause 3(2), clause 4 has become operative and the U.K. trusts have to be held to be specific trusts. The High Court did not agree with the Tribunal's view and held that on interpretation of the relevant clauses of the deeds of settlement executed in U.K., character of the trusts was discretionary and not specific. On appeal by the department to the Supreme Court HELD dismissing the appeal:

A discretionary trust is one which gives a beneficiary no right to any part of the income of the trust property, but vests in the trustees a discretionary power to pay him, or apply for his benefit, such part of the income as they think fit. The trustees must exercise their discretion as and when the income becomes available, but if they fail to distribute in due time, the power is not extinguished so that they can distribute later. They have no power to bind themselves for the future. The beneficiary thus has no more than a

hope that the discretion will be exercised in his favour. Having regard to the above legal position about the discretionary trust which is also applied by this Court in the earlier judgment and the fact that the income has been retained and not disbursed to the beneficiaries, the view taken by the High Court cannot be said to be legally flawed. Merely because the Settlor and after his death, his son did not exercise their power to appoint the discretion exercisers, the character of the subject trusts does not get altered. The two U.K. trusts continued to be 'discretionary trust' for the subject assessment years. The High Court has taken a correct view that the value of the assets cannot be assessed on the estate of the deceased Settlor (Snell's Principles of Equity, 28th Edition, Page 138 followed) (AY. 1984-85 to 1991-92, 1970-1971 to 1976-77)

CWT v. Estate of Late HMM Vikramsingji of Gondal(2014) 268 CTR 232 / 103 DTR 211/363 TTR 679 / 225 Taxmann 166(SC)

S.164 : Representative assessees – Charge of tax – Share of beneficiaries unknown – Trust – Trustees – Charge of tax where share of beneficiaries unknown – Matter remanded to consider the genuineness of Trust. [S.167B]

1962

The assessee trust was formed under the terms of the trust deed, which stated that, future spouse and children would also become beneficiaries with effect from the year of their marriage and birth, respectively. The AO rejected the assessee's claim to be assessed as a trust on the ground that trust was a sham, inasmuch as the beneficiaries were not aware of their share in it and some were not even aware of its existence. The CIT(A) confirmed the finding of the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal also dismissed the assessee's appeal. On further appeal by the assessee, the High Court held that mere reference to a would-be spouse or future child by itself was not enough to reject the assessee's claim of trust status. However, without giving finding on genuineness of trust, the High Court remanded the matter to the Tribunal to pass an order after considering the genuineness of the trust. (AY. 1998-99 to 2000-01)

A. K. K. Specific Family Trust v. CIT (2014) 220 taxman 395 (Mad.)(HC)

S.164 : Representative assessess – Charge of tax – Share of beneficiaries unknown – Trust – Where income from trust had already been assessed in hands of trustees at maximum marginal rate, beneficial share could not be assessed in hands of beneficiary again. [S.10(34)]

1963

Assessee was one of beneficiaries of a private discretionary trust. Trust's income was from dividend which was exempt under section 10(34). Assessee received her beneficial share out of said dividend income and claimed it as exempt having been already taxed in hands of trustees u/s. 164. AO added and taxed beneficial share in hands of assessee, it was found that (i) this income had already been assessed in hands of trustees at maximum marginal rate u/s. 164, (ii) in case of another beneficiary of same trust, same beneficial share had been exempted, (iii) both assessment order in case of Trust and other beneficiary were passed before order passed in case of assessee and the same issue was income from trust had already been assessed in hands of trustees at maximum marginal rate, beneficial share could not be assessed in hands of beneficiary again. (AY. 2009-10)

Alpana Kirloskar (Smt.) v. ACIT (2014) 150 ITD 311 / 165 TTJ 542 / 108 DTR 21 (Delhi) (Trib.)

1964 **S.164 : Representative assesseees – Charge of tax – Share of beneficiaries unknown – Once the income is taxed at maximum rate in the hands of trustees, beneficiaries cannot be taxed once again. [S.10(34), 56(2)(vi),166]**

The assessee is one of the beneficiaries of a private discretionary trust. The assessee received her beneficial share out of dividend income and claimed exemption on the ground that the income was already taxed in the hands of trustees under section 164. AO taxed the beneficial share in the hands of assessee as income from other sources under section 56(2)(vi). On appeal the Tribunal held that the AO was not justified in assessing the amount of beneficial share in hands of assessee once again when the income is already taxed in the hands of trustees at maximum marginal rate. Tribunal also observed that the entire trust income id from dividends which is exempt under section 10(34) of the Act, therefore what comes in the hands as beneficial share retains the same colour and is also exempt under section 10(34). The beneficial share being part of exempt dividend income, same is exempt and is to be excluded while computing the income of assessee. (AY. 2009-10)

Alpana Kirloskar (Smt.) v. ACIT(2014)108 DTR 21 / 165 TTJ 542(Delhi)(Trib.)

Section S170 : Succession to business otherwise than on death

1965 **S.170 : Succession to business other than on death – Liability of successor for tax and penalty of predecessor. [S.271(1)(c), Wealth-tax Act, 1957 S.18(1)(c)]**

Petitioner had taken over all assets and liabilities of brokerage business of one S. C. Mangal & Co. Assessing Officer directed petitioner to pay liabilities and dues of S. C. Mangal & Co under Income-tax Act and Wealth-tax Act as successor of S. C. Mangal & Co. Petitioner contended that Assessing Officer should record a finding under section 170(3) that sum payable in respect of income of such business or profession could not be recovered from predecessor. The revenue contended that the assessee had taken over the liabilities payable by S. C. Mangal & Co and therefore under common law recoveries can be made from the assessee. The assessee filed the Writ Petition challenging the recovery proceedings. Allowing the petition the Court held that recovery proceedings cannot be initiated against the assessee successor for recovery of the dues under the Income-tax Act without the AO first passing an order under section 170(3). If and when any adverse order is passed by the AO the assessee would be entitled to file an appeal as provided under section 246. The Court also observed that the AO has to examine the scope and ambit of section 170(3) and decide whether penalty amount can be recovered from the successor under the said section, though the penalty order was subsequent to the date of succession. Where no order under section 170(3) had been passed by the Assessing Officer, recovery proceedings could not be initiated against assessee as successor of business for recovery of tax dues of predecessor.

As regard the penalty under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, since the Wealth-tax Act did not have any equivalent section as section 170 for recovery of dues of predecessor from successor and recoveries sought to be made in instant case under Wealth tax Act were on account of penalty imposed under section 18(1)(c) of Wealth-tax Act, which were passed after date of transfer, same was not recoverable from petitioner. Court held that

successor cannot be made liable for penalty imposed on predecessor, more so when penalty orders were passed after the date of transfer. (AY. 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1995-96) *Moongipa Securities Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 228 Taxmann 124 / (2014) 97 DTR 241 (Delhi) (HC)*

Section S172 : Shipping business of non-residents

S.172 : Shipping business – Non-resident – Agent – Beneficiary for claiming benefit under the treaty – Assessee was acting as an agent of owner of ship and not “P” therefore “P” was not entitled to get the benefit of DTAA-DTAA-India – Netherland. [S.163, Art. 8]

1966

One ‘P’, a Netherlands-based shipping company, chartered a ship owned by an Iranian company in October 2008. The ship was engaged by the assessee, a ship broker, to carry goods from Mangalore to other countries. The assessee filed a return of income under section 172(3) on behalf of ‘P’ claiming to be an agent of ‘P’ and showed ‘P’ as a beneficiary of its freight. It stated that ‘P’ was entitled to the benefits of the DTAA between India and the Netherlands. The Assessing Officer noticed that under the charter party agreement executed by the Iranian company and ‘P’, the Iranian company was the owner of the ship. He held that the treaty with the Netherlands could be applied only if the owner of the ship was the beneficiary of the freight. He further held that the owner of the ship was the beneficiary of the freight and not ‘P’. He therefore denied the benefit of the DTAA between India and Netherlands. The appellate authorities upheld the action of the Assessing Officer. On appeal to High Court it was held that from clause 14 of the charter party agreement, it was clear that 100 per cent freight charges minus 3.75 per cent commission was payable to the owner’s bank account within four banking days upon completion of last load port by ‘P’. Clause 24 of the agreement further showed that out of the commission of 3.75 per cent, 2.5 per cent would go to ‘P’ and 1.25 per cent to the assessee. In view of the above, High Court observed that the conclusion of the revenue authorities that relief under DTAA was not allowable was justified and was in accordance with law. (AY. 2009-10)

Marine Links Shipping Agencies v. CIT (2014) 360 ITR 709 / 220 Taxmann 198 / 102 DTR 268/267 CTR 509 (Karn.)(HC)

S.172 : Shipping business – Non-residents – Indian agent – Not liable to be assessed under section 172(4). [S.44B, 90, 139]

1967

Respondent company acted as an agent for the UK freight beneficiary which was engaged in the business of transportation of goods by sea. The Respondent Company had filed its return under section 139(1) of the Act. The magnitude of voyages undertaken by freight beneficiary, it could be said that freight beneficiary was not engaged in occasional, but in regular shipping business and further that it’s Indian agent was regularly filing return. In view therefore, Indian agent i.e. Respondent Company was liable to be assessed on basis of return filed under section 139(1) for it’s entire income and thus, order passed by A.O. u/s. 172 (4) was to be quashed. (AY. 2010-2011)

ITO v. Marine Containers Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 61 SOT 260 (Rajkot)(Trib.)

Section 179 : Liability of directors of private company in liquidation

1968

S.179 : Private company – Liability of directors – Recovery of tax – Hotel business run by company – Destruction of hotel building in earthquake – Insurance claim not passed – Sale of property and payment to creditors before passing of assessment order – No evidence of gross negligence in affairs of company – Recovery proceedings against director was held to be not valid

A notice under section 179 was issued on the director of a private company which ran a hotel business. On a Writ Petition against the notice contending that the company in order to set up a five star hotel at Gandhidham. acquired a leasehold land and constructed a building thereon, that before the hotel could be started the building was completely destroyed in earthquake which took place on January 26, 2001, that the company could never recover from such set back and was unable to pay the dues of the creditors, that the insurance claim had still not been passed, that legal disputes between the company and the insurer were pending before the civil court, that financial institutions restructured the debts and allowed the company to dispose of the land and that the sale proceeds were utilised by the company to pay the debts. Held, that the directors pointed out to the Tax Recovery Officer that the entire project ran into heavy losses due to a devastating earthquake. Before the hotel could be inaugurated, the building was destroyed. The project, therefore, never took off. This resulted into heavy losses to the company. The financial institutions restructured the debts and permitted sale of its property. Out of the sale proceeds, the creditors were paid off proportionately. When such payments were made, the assessment order had still not been passed. The insurance claim was not passed by the insurance company and civil disputes were still pending. On such facts and circumstances, the Tax Recovery Officer committed a serious error in applying section 179 of the Act against the directors. In a given case, if the company raises a completely bogus and *mala fide* claim of tax deduction, with the sole purpose of defrauding the Revenue, it may be open for the Revenue to argue that the provisions of section 179 of the Act would be applicable. Before that can be done, there has to be material on record and which material must be disclosed to the director who is likely to face the adversity of the order. In the present case, in the show-cause notice, no such averments or suggestions were made. Nor was there any material in the order which would enable the Tax Recovery Officer to draw such conclusions. The notice under section 179 was not valid.

Court also directed that if at any stage the company receives any amount from the insurance company for the destruction of the hotel building, the directors shall intimate this to the Income-tax Department in writing within four weeks from the date of receipt of such amounts and in any case before utilising such amount for any purpose. (AY. 2010-2011)

Gul Gopaldas Daryani v. ITO (2014) 367 ITR 558 / 227 Taxmann 190 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

S.179 : Private company – Liability of directors – Revenue must establish that recovery could not be made from company – Plea that company was deemed to be a public company – Plea not considered – Recovery proceedings was held to be not justified [Companies Act, 1956, S.43A]

1969

Assessee challenged the proceedings under section 179, allowing the petition, the Court held that; (i) that the recovery demand for the assessment years 1996-97 to 1999-2000 and 2001-02 must fail on two counts. Firstly, there was no notice for recovery of such amounts. More importantly, the only notice to show cause which was issued was dated March 22, 2004. The assessment orders for these assessment years were passed on February 27, 2004. Thus, within less than a month of passing of the assessment orders, the notice came to be issued. The first requirement of application of section 179 is that any tax due from a private company cannot be recovered from such company. When obviously the Assessing Officer could not have made any efforts for recovery of such tax dues, the question of requiring the petitioner as a director of the company to pay up the same amount or else be held liable under section 179 of the Act, would not arise. The recovery proceedings for these assessment years were invalid.

(ii) That the question regarding the company being a deemed public company was a mixed question of fact and law. If the facts as asserted by the petitioner were established, the legal implications flowing thereof must follow. The Assessing Officer, however, had brushed aside this contention and held that whatever be the status of the company for the purpose of the Companies Act, section 179 of the Act would continue to apply. It was not the case of the Assessing Officer that the facts asserted by the petitioner were not correct or that for any other reason, the company had not become a deemed public company under section 43A of the Companies Act, 1956. The recovery proceedings for the AY. 2000-01 were not valid. (AY. 1996-97 to 1999-2000, 2000-01) *Suresh Narain Bhatnagar v. ITO (2014) 367 ITR 254 / 227 Taxmann 193 (Mag.) (Guj.) (HC)*

S.179 : Private company – Liability of directors – No proceedings can be initiated against any director of a company in liquidation for non-payment of tax, being a public limited company – Show cause notice was quashed. [S.264]

1970

Held that the Revenue neither in the show cause notice u/s. 179 nor in the order passed under such provisions of the Act has laid any factual foundation thereby disputing the status of the company of that a public limited company. In the absence of any such foundational facts and in the wake of clear and eloquent evidence reflecting the status of the company as that of a public limited company, the contention of the assessee, though raised in the revision application, shall need to be regarded as in a case of a director of a public limited company, the provisions of section 179 cannot be made applicable. Such being the facts in the present case, the version of the assessee that the issuance of the show cause notice and consequently proceedings u/s. 179 in the case and all the petitions must surely fail, was upheld. (AY. 1996-97)

Gaurav v. Shah v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 265 /227 Taxmann 188 (Mag.) (Guj.) (HC)

- 1971 **S.179 : Private company – Liability of directors – Unless any evidence to indicate any gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on the part of director in relation to affairs of company, provision of section 179 could not be invoked. [S.2(43)]**

Petitioner a director in a private limited company resigned from directorship of Company. Said company had unpaid outstanding tax demands. Assessing Officer proceeded against petitioner on premise that petitioner was a director of said private company and she was liable to discharge such liability under section 179. No effort was made by department to recover tax due of company from trade debtors and shares. The assessee filed writ petition against the said order. Allowing the petition the Court held that, since, petitioner-director had proved that non recovery of tax due against company could not be attributed to any gross negligence, misfeasance or breach of duty on her part in relation to affairs of the company, section 179 could not be invoked against her. (AY. 1984-85)

Pratibha Garg (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 97 DTR 116/ 227 Taxmann 76 (Mag.) / 264 CTR 520(All.)(HC)

- 1972 **S.179 : Private company – Liability of directors – No gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty – Recovery of tax dues of company personally from directors was not permissible**

Since the facts established that there was no neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on part of the directors, recovery of tax dues of company personally from directors was not permissible. (AY. 1998-99)

Jashvantlal Natverlal Kansara v. ITO (2014) 362 ITR 115 / 43 taxmann.com 268 (Guj.) (HC)

Section 184 : Assessment as a firm

- 1973 **S.184 : Firm – Assessment – When assessee firm fails to comply with provisions of section 144, no deduction by way of salary or remuneration paid to partners will be allowable. [S.69C, 144,185]**

The assessee filed its return of income on 30-3-2007. However, the trading account, profit & loss account and balance sheet were filed with the return of income. Deficiency letter was issued but it was not complied with by the assessee to remove the defect in the return of income. Therefore, the return was treated as invalid and was also intimated to the assessee as such. Simultaneously, the notice u/s. 142(1) was issued on 19-3-2008 requiring the assessee to file the return of income for the assessment year under appeal, which was also not complied with by the assessee. Further notice u/s. 142(1) and summon u/s. 131 were issued to the assessee requiring the assessee to appear in the proceedings before the AO and to produce the books of account and supporting documents, but the assessee did not comply with the same. The assessee firm was also subjected to survey action u/s. 133A on 18-12-2008 wherein some documents were impounded, but no regular books of account were found at the premises of the assessee. Statement of the partner of the assessee firm was recorded in which he has accepted that no books of account have been prepared. Thereafter, several statutory notices were issued requiring the assessee to produce complete details, but none have been complied

with by the assessee. Therefore, the AO on the basis of the material on record passed exparte assessment order u/s. 144 of the IT Act. In the absence of valid return, the AO has treated the salary/remuneration paid during the impugned assessment year as unexplained expenditure under section 69C of the Act. On appeal the first Appellate Authority upheld the assessment order. On further appeal the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the assessee by observing that when assessee firm fails to comply with provisions of section 144, no deduction by way of salary or remuneration paid to partners will be allowable. (AY. 2006-07)

Bhatnagar Optical v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 77 (URO)(Agra)(Trib.)

Section 192 : Salary

S.192 : Deduction at source – Salary – Perquisite – Conveyance allowance paid to development officers of LIC is excluded from the purview of S.10(14) – Additional conveyance allowance used exclusively for the purpose of official purposes, may be allowed after substantiating the claim. [S.10(14), 17(2), R.2BB].

1974

Writ Petition was filed by the assessee in this case on the issue that deduction of TDS pertaining to conveyance allowance which was being paid in lieu of actual expenditure incurred in procuring business for the LIC. The assessee contended that section 10(14) was applicable only in respect of a perquisite which was not included or clarified in section 17(2) of the It Act and further the value of perquisite was defined in r. 3 of IT rules. Dismissing the WP, the Court held that conveyance / additional conveyance allowance payable to development officers of LIC was covered by the word “perquisite” and the same was taxable and subject to TDS. Further the Court held that the employer has issued the certificate pertaining to the conveyance allowance / additional conveyance allowance used exclusively and wholly for the official purpose i.e., the procurement of business and therefore members of the assessee federation were at liberty to lodge a claim for deduction or refund before the AO after substantiating their claims.

National Federation of Insurance Field workers of India & Anr. v. UOI & Ors. (2014) 360 ITR 175 / 267 CTR 78 / 219 Taxmann 155 (All.)(HC)

S.192 : Deduction at source – Salary – Professional payments to doctors – No employer and employee relationship – Not salary – Not liable to deduct tax at source as salary. [S.201(1A)]

1975

Mere prohibitory clause that doctors cannot take up any other assignments does not change the basic character of the relationship between parties. Since there was no administrative control over the doctors who were free to come at any time and treat patients. Held, payments to doctors were not salaries. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT (TDS) v. Yashoda Super Speciality Hospital (2014) 365 ITR 356 / 226 Taxmann 168 / 270 CTR 457(AP)(HC)

- 1976 **S.192 : Deduction at source – Salary – Fringe benefit tax – Not liable to deduct tax at source on payment of allowance and subsidy to employees to the extent of amount expended. [S.17(1)(iv), 201, R.3]**

The assessee paid conveyance maintenance reimbursement expenditure (CMRE) allowance to its employees for running & maintenance expenditure of their personal vehicles for official work. It treated the same as non-taxable in the hands of the employees and accordingly no tax was deducted on this amount u/s. 192 of the Act. The AO treated it as additional salary within the meaning of 17(1)(iv) and held that the provisions of section 192 were attracted and since the assessee has not deducted the tax it treated it as assessee in default u/ss. 201(1) / 201(1A) of the Act.

The High Court held that the payment in question if not utilized actually, the same can be held to be taxable salary of the employees. Moreso, in this appeal, what one is considered is the taxable receipt and not the payment of tax by the employer. Moreover till the FBT regime was in existence, the assessee had already paid the FBT u/s. 115WB. Therefore there was no default of the assessee u/s. 201. (AY. 2006-07 to 2009-10) *CIT(TDS) v. Oil & Natural Gas Corporation (India) Ltd.* (2013) 358 ITR 131 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 187 / 267 CTR 498 / 101 DTR 278 (Guj.)(HC)

- 1977 **S.192 : Deduction at source – Salary – Medical expenditure – Reimbursement made prior to incurrence of expenditure would be perquisite – Honest and *bona fide* estimate was made – No penalty could be imposed. [Ss.17(2), 201, 201(IA)]**

Assessee made payment to employee which included a component towards medical expenditure; accordingly, employees were paid a sum every month. Payment of medical reimbursement made prior to incurrence of expenditure up to ₹ 15,000 p.a. satisfied all condition prescribed in proviso (v) to section 17(2) and, therefore, same would be treated as perquisite. Whether, since honest and *bona fide* estimate of salary taxable was made by employer, no penalty under sections 201 and 201(1A) could be levied. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

ACIT v. Cisco Systems Asia Services (2014) 64 SOT 32 (URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)

- 1978 **S.192 : Deduction at source – Salary – Meal coupons – Not perquisite – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.17(2), 201(1)]**

AO disallowed claim of expenditure incurred on food coupons disbursed by assessee-employer to its employees on ground that there was scope for misuse of these coupons as identity of users could not be verified. He held value of food coupons as part of salary liable to TDS under section 192 and raised demand under section 201(1) for non-deduction of TDS. On appeal, CIT(A) reversed order of AO. Tribunal following case of *Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Addl. CIT* [2013] 56 SOT 89 (URO) / 29 taxmann.com 229 (Ahd.), order of CIT(A) was affirmed. (AY. 2008-09 and 2009-10)

ACIT v. Cisco Systems Asia Services (2014) 64 SOT 32 (URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.192 : Deduction at source – Salary – leave travel concession [LTC] – Reimbursement of medical expenses – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.10(5), 17(2)] 1979

Assessee paid to its employee every month certain amount in advance towards leave travel concession [LTC]. Once employee completed his travel, he had to submit evidence for having incurred expenditure and it was on basis of such evidence exemption was worked out by assessee in accordance with provisions of section 10(5) read with rule 2B. Similarly assessee paid to its employee every month an amount of ₹ 1250 [₹ 15,000 per annum] in advance towards medical reimbursement. Said amount was treated as exempt only if supported by bills and whenever bills were not submitted amount was treated as taxable salary. Assessee as employer deducted tax at source under section 192 at end of financial year. In peculiar facts of case assessee was not obliged to deduct tax at source on amount paid in advance towards LTC and medical reimbursement at time of making payment. (AYs. 2007-08 to 2010-11)

ITO v. Goodrich Aerospace Services (P) Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 27 (URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.192 : Deduction at source – Salary – Perquisite – Meal vouchers – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.10(5), 17(2), 201(1A)] 1980

Assessee as part of its plan provided to its employees meal vouchers/coupons, which were useable at centres within campus and also at certain eating joints. Disbursement of meal coupons by assessee to employees did not require tax to be deducted thereon under section 192. (AY. 2007-08, 2010-11)

ITO v. Goodrich Aerospace Services (P) Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 27 (URO)(Bang.)(Trib.)

S.192 : Deduction at source – Salary-leave travel concession (LTC) and medical reimbursement of monthly payments to employee. [S.10(5), 17(2), R.2B] 1981

Assessee Company included component of leave travel concession (LTC) and medical reimbursement in monthly payments to employee irrespective of status of utilisation, which were considered as exempt, and hence, not treated as part of income under head of 'Salaries' for purpose of deducting tax at source under section 192. It was held that under section 192(3) & employer can increase or reduce amount of tax deducted at source for any excess or deficiency on basis of total salary, as on last day of previous year, assessee could not be held to be in default for treating component of LTC and medical reimbursement as exempt, before actual incurring of expenses by employees and not deducting tax thereon, especially when assessee maintained bills / evidence to substantiate subsequent incurring of such expenditure by employees. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)

ACIT v. Infosys BPO (2014)150 ITD 132 / 64 SOT 36(URO) (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.192 : Deduction at source – Salary – Perquisites – Reimbursement of expenses – Meal coupons – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.17] 1982

In the present case, in view of the order passed in case of *Asst CIT v. Infosys BPO (Bang)*, assessee was not required to deduct tax at source in respect of payments made to its employees towards reimbursement and leave travel medical allowance. It was also further held that having regard to the decision in the case of *I.T.O. v. Cadilla*

Health care & CIT v. Reliance Ind, providing meal coupons to employees to be used outside office premises would not give rise to taxable perquisites and the assessee was not required to deduct tax at source while distributing said coupons. (AYs. 2006-09 to 2010-11).

ACIT v. Oracle India (P) Ltd. (2014) 61 SOT 222 (Bang.)(Trib.)

- 1983 **S.192 : Deduction at source – Salary – Approved Superannuation fund – Pension – Perquisite – Not liable to deduct tax at source as the said amount is nor perquisite – DTAA – India – Netherland [S.10(13), Art. 5]**

Applicant is a bank incorporated in Netherlands and it has branches in India. Indian branch of applicant has established a superannuation scheme for purpose of providing pension to its eligible employees. Applicant has filed application seeking ruling on question as to whether tax is required to be deducted at source under section 192 by applicant on contribution to superannuation fund (for an amount exceeding one lakh rupees per employee) as perquisite. Authority for advance ruling held that since employees do not get a vested right at time of contribution to fund by employer, it cannot be regarded as taxable perquisite in their hands and, consequently, applicant is not required to deduct tax at source while making contribution to superannuation fund in question. The ratio of judgment of the Supreme Court in *CIT v. L.W. Russel AIR 1965 SC 49* applied to the facts of the present case. (dated 9-5-2014)

Royal Bank of Scotland (2014) 364 ITR 337 / 268 CTR 406 / 225 Taxmann 51 (AAR)

- 1984 **S.192 : Deduction at source – Salary – Perquisite – Deferred benefit plan – Tax is not deductible on contribution to superannuation fund. [Ss.10(10CC), 17(2), 195A]**

Authority held that when contributions to scheme made by employer for all eligible employees in lump sum calculated on actuarial valuation based on several underlying assumptions, employee does not get vested right at time of contribution to fund by employer hence tax was not required to be deducted at source on contribution to superannuation fund.

Royal Bank of Scotland, N. V. In re (2014) 364 ITR 373 / 268 CTR 406 / 225 Taxmann 51 (AAR)

Section 194A : Interest other than Interest on securities

- 1985 **S.194A : Deduction at source – Interest other than interest on securities – Banks – Fixed deposit – Circular – Liability for deduction of tax at source does not arise if the beneficiary is not ascertainable and the person in whose name the interest is credited is not person liable to pay tax – Banks has no obligation to deduct tax – Circular No. 08/2011 dated 14-10-2011 set aside. [S.4, 190, 199, 201(1), (201(IA), 263]**

The controversy in the present case involves the question whether the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act would be applicable in respect of interest which is payable on the fixed deposits maintained by this Court with the petitioner bank, in the name of the Registrar General. Concededly, money deposited by litigants or at their instance in this Court and kept in fixed deposit with the petitioner bank are not funds or assets of this Court and would be payable to the person as may be ultimately directed in the

concerned proceedings. Any accretion on account of interest on the said deposits also do not inure to the benefit of this Court

The Court held that there are myriad of situations in which this Court directs deposit of money by litigants or at their instance; directions for depositing funds in a case are made after considering the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. The final recipient or the beneficiaries of the funds can be ascertained only after appropriate orders are passed in those proceedings.

In the absence of an assessee, the machinery of provisions for deduction of tax to his credit are ineffective. The expression “payee” under section 194A of the Act would mean the recipient of the income whose account is maintained by the person paying interest. In the present case, although the FD is made in the name of the Registrar General, the account represents funds which are in custody of this Court and the Registrar General is neither the recipient of the amount credited to that account nor the interest accruing thereon. Therefore, the Registrar General cannot be considered as a “payee” for the purposes of section 194A of the Act. The credit by the bank in the name of the Registrar General would, thus, not attract the provisions of section 194A of the Act. Although, Section 190(1) of the Act clarifies that deduction of tax can be made prior to the assessment year of regular assessment, nonetheless the same would not imply that deduction of tax is mandatory even where it is known that the payee is not the assessee and there is no other assessee.

It is relevant to note that there is no assessee to whom interest income from the deposits in question can be ascribed; no person can file a return claiming the interest payable by the petitioner as income. The necessary implication of this situation is recovery of tax without the corresponding income being assessed in the hands of any assessee. The ultimate recipient of the funds from the FD would also not be able to avail of the credit of TDS. It is apparent that in absence of an ascertainable assessee the machinery of recovering tax by deduction of tax at source breaks down because it does not aid the charge of tax under Section 4 of the Act but takes a form of a separate levy, independent of other provisions of the Act. This is, clearly, impermissible.

Circular 8/2011 proceeds on an assumption that the litigant depositing the money is the account holder with the petitioner bank and/or is the recipient of the income represented by the interest accruing thereon. This assumption is fundamentally erroneous as the litigant who is asked to deposit the money in Court ceases to have any control or proprietary right over those funds. The amount deposited vests with the Court and the depositor ceases to exercise any dominion over those funds. It is also not necessary that the litigant who deposits the money would be the ultimate recipient of those funds. As indicated earlier, the person who is ultimately granted the funds would be determined by orders that may be passed subsequently. And at that stage, undisputedly, tax would be required to be deducted at source to the credit of the recipient. However, the litigant who deposits the funds cannot be stated to be the recipient of income for the reasons stated above.

Deducting tax in the name of the litigant who deposits the funds with this Court would also create another anomaly because the amount deducted would necessarily lie to his credit with the income tax authorities. In other words, the tax deducted at source would reflect as a tax paid by that litigant/depositor. He, thus, would be entitled to claim

credit in his return of income. The implications of this are that whereas this Court had removed the funds from the custody of a litigant/depositor by judicial orders, a part of the accretion thereon is received by him by way of Tax deducted at source. This is clearly impermissible because it would run contrary to the intent of judicial orders. (AY. 2005-06, 2010-11)

UCO Bank v. UOI (2014) 369 ITR 335/272 CTR 339/112 DTR 242 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 141 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

1986 **S.194A : Deduction at source – Interest other than interest on securities – Failure to deduct tax at source – Banking finance – Disallowance was held to be justified. [S.40(a)(ia)]**

Assessee was doing banking business and was not fulfilling its primary object of providing financial accommodation to its members for agricultural purposes, assessee would be liable to disallowance under section 40(a)(ia). (AY. 2009-10)

Pinarayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. ITO (2015) 152 ITD 90 (Cochin)(Trib.)

1987 **S.194A : Deduction at source – Interest on deposit in site restoration fund – Not liable to deduct tax at source.**

The Tribunal held that the provision of section 194A are not applicable and the tax is not deductible on accrued interest of Site Restoration Fund account as per provisions of section 33ABA. Deposit with the assessee in SRF is not being for any fixed period is not a time deposit within the meaning of section 194A. (AY . 2010-11 to 2012-13)

Dy. CIT v. State Bank of India (2014) 164 TTJ 1/35 ITR 410 / 49 taxmann.com 293 (Delhi)(Trib.)

1988 **S.194A : Deduction at source – Interest other than interest on securities – Societies wholly funded by Government – Societies which are wholly funded by Government, would qualify for non-deduction of tax. [S.201, 201(IA)]**

Assessee bank did not deduct TDS from payments of interest under section 194A made to societies engaged in promotion of bio-technology and bio-business. It was held to be assessee in default u/s. 201(1) and interest was charged u/s. 201(1A). Societies were wholly financed by Central Governments per Notification No. S.O. 3489, dated 22-10-1970, bank is not liable to deduct TDS on funds belonging to said societies. Assessee bank could not be held as assessee in default. Societies which are wholly funded by Government would qualify for non-deduction of tax.

ITO v. State Bank of Patiala (2014) 146 ITD 497 (Chand.) (Trib.)

1989 **S.194A : Deduction at source – Interest other than interest on securities – Discounting charges of bills of exchange – Expenditure on discounting/factoring charges is not in the nature of interest for purposes of TDS u/s. 194A or disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia). [S.2(28A), 40(a)(ia)]**

The term “interest” relates to a pre-existing debt, which implies a debtor creditor relationship. Unpaid consideration gives rise to a lien over goods sold and not for money lent as held in *Bombay Steam Navigation Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (1963) 56 ITR 52 (SC)* where interest on unpaid purchase price was not treated as interest on loan. It is

clear from the definition that before any amount paid is construed as interest, it has to be established that the same is payable in respect of any money borrowed or debt incurred. According to us, discounting charges of Bill of Exchange or factoring charges of sale cannot be termed as interest. The assessee in the present case is acting as an agent. Now what is this to be seen. A *Del Credere* is an agent, who, selling goods for his principal on credit, undertakes for an additional commission to sell only to persons for whom he can stand guarantee. His position is thus that of a surety who is liable to his principal should the vendee make default. The agreement between him and his principal need not be reduced to or evidenced by writing, for his undertaking is a guarantee. A *Del Credere* Agent is an agent who not only establishes a privity of contract between his principal and the third party, but who also guarantees to his principal the due performance of the contract by the third party. He is liable, however, only when the third party fails to carry out his contract, e.g., by insolvency. He is not liable to his principal if the third party refuses to carry out his contract, for example, if the buyer refuses to take delivery. In the present case before us the assessee has assessed the income as *Del Credere* being trading in goods and merchandise and also dealing in securities and which is assessed as income from business and not income from other sources. The expenditure incurred is also on account of business expenditure and not interest expenditure in the nature of interest falling u/s. 194A of the Act. Accordingly, these discount/factoring charges do not come within the purview of section 194A and assessee is not liable to TDS on these charges. (AY. 2007-08) *ITO v. MKJ Enterprises Ltd.*(2014)62 SOT 71(URO) (Kol.)(Trib.)

Section 194B : Winnings from lottery or crossword puzzle

S.194B : Deduction at source – Winning from lottery – Cross word puzzle – Winnings from advertisement – Provision is not applicable. [S.201 & 201(A)]

1990

The assessee company was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of various consumer goods / products. During the previous year it had conducted certain sale of promotion schemes. The Company advertised in packs/ containers of their products. Some of those coupons indicated that on purchase, the prizes that were offered were Santro car, Maruti Car, Gold Coins, Gold Tables, Silver Coins, emblems etc. The total amount of prizes distributed valued at ₹ 6,51,238 for AY. 2001-02 and ₹ 54,73,643 for AY. 2002-04. AO conducted survey at assessee's premises and thereafter passed an order treating assessee as an assessee in default u/s 201(1) and 201(A) for AY. 2001-02 and treated respondent as an assessee-in-default of its obligations in terms of 194B of the Act as although the customers did not pay anything extra to receive the prize, nevertheless they had participated in the schemes by purchasing the products advertised to take a chance at winning the prize. AO further held that what has been paid as prize in kind in various schemes conducted by the respondent was a lottery on which tax was neither deducted nor ensured payment thereof before the winnings were released. CIT (A) affirmed the order of the AO. Tribunal reversed the decision and held that although there was no element of chance, but as no consideration or payment was made by the customers for the purpose of participation in the lottery with the object of winning the prizes, the schemes conducted by the assessee would not fall within the

ambit of Section 194B of the Act. On further appeal in HC, HC affirmed the order of Tribunal and held that on conjoint reading of Section 201 & 194 would show that if the person responsible fails to pay is deemed to be an assessee-in-default, in respect of tax. Where the payment of the winnings is wholly in kind and not in cash at all, the question of deduction does not arise and in that eventuality, the winner of prize before the prize / winnings was to be released in assessee's favour. Therefore proceedings against the person u/s. 201, such as the assessee in the assessee's case, who failed to ensure payment of tax, as contemplated by proviso to Section 194B, before releasing the winnings were not maintainable or the proceedings against such person were without jurisdiction. (AY. 2001-02, 2002-03)

CIT v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 1 / 264 CTR 93 / 220 Taxmann 177 (Karn) (HC)

- 1991 **S.194B : Deduction at source – Winning from lottery or crossword puzzle – Horse race – Payments made on stake money – Alternative remedy – Appellate authority to determine on examination of record and on appreciation of documents produced by assessee – Assessee cannot invoke writ jurisdiction straightaway. [S.201(1)(201(IA), Constitution of India, Art. 226]**

The Deputy Commissioner passed under section 201(1) and section 201(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, treating the assessee as an assessee in default in respect of the financial years 2007-08 to 2012-13 for failure to deduct tax at source on payments of stake money to horse owners for the six years rejecting the assessee's contention that the stake money was income from the activity of owning and maintaining race horses and not winnings from horse races and thus the assessee was not liable to deduct tax at source on payment of stake money to the owners of horses. On writ petitions.

Held, dismissing the petition, that the Deputy Commissioner arrived at the conclusion on appreciation of various factual aspects relating to the assessee's business activity and the documents furnished along with its explanation. Therefore, it was for the appellate authority to determine on examination of the record and on appreciation of the documents produced by the assessee, whether the Deputy Commissioner had exceeded his jurisdiction in holding the assessee in default. Therefore, the error of jurisdiction which the Deputy Commissioner had allegedly committed in passing the order was not a mere error apparent on the face of the record which could be corrected under Article 226. Hence, the assessee had to pursue the remedy of appeal available under the statute but the assessee could not straightaway invoke the jurisdiction of the court under Article 226

Hyderabad Race Club v. Dy. CIT (2013) 215 Taxmann 664 / (2014) 364 ITR 547 (AP)(HC)

Section S194C : Payments to contractors

- 1992 **S.194C : Deduction at source – Contract – Sub contract – Hiring of buses by school for point to point transportation of its students would be regarded as a service contract governed by the provisions of section 194C and not by 194I. [S.194I]**

The assessee was running a school at NOIDA. The assessee entered into a contract with a transporter for providing facility for the transportation of students from their homes

to the school and return. The assessee deducted tax at source under section 194C while making payments to the transport contractor. The Assessing Officer passed an order under sections 201(1)/201(1A) and held that the assessee had erred in deducting tax at source under section 194C whereas its obligation was to deduct tax at source under section 194-I on the payments made to the contractor. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that provisions of section 194-I were not attracted to the assessee's case. The Tribunal confirmed the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals). On an appeal by the Revenue, the High Court confirming the order of the lower authorities held that firstly, the buses were not for the exclusive use of the assessee. Secondly, the agreement envisaged point to point transportation of the students and staff. Thirdly, the buses were under the control of the operator and not of the assessee. In other words, the main object of the contract was transportation of passengers (in the present case, the staff and students) and not the hiring of a particular vehicle. The agreement envisages that the contractor would provide a stipulated number of buses. The buses would pick up the students and teachers at stipulated points and would depart after school for transporting of students and staff to their homes. The contract naturally contains a stipulation with regard to the time at which the students would be dropped and the time at which the buses would depart and contains provisions for imposition of penalty in default. The conductor and the driver were to be provided by the contractor. The contractor was only entitled to a payment calculated at certain rates per student per month. In other words, the dominant nature of the contract was that it was not a contract for the hiring of the buses or vehicles but a contract which envisaged provision of a service by the contractor under which he performs work of providing a facility for the transporting students and staff to and from the school. Accordingly, the assessee has rightly deducted tax at source u/s. 194C while making payment to the transport contractor.

CIT v. Apeejay School (2014) 226 Taxmann 307 / (2015) 115 DTR 107 / 275 CTR 92 (All.)(HC)

S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Transmission transaction charges to Gas Authority of India for supplying gas – GAIL not only showing transaction as sale in its relevant records but paying due tax thereon-Contract for supply of gas was for sale of goods and not works contract or contract for rendering technical services – Transaction outside purview of sections 194C and 194J – No liability for tax deduction at source. [S.194J, 201(IA)]

1993

Held, dismissing the appeals *in limine*, (i) that GAIL had shown the receipts in the profit and loss account and had not only carried the item into the profit and loss account but also paid tax on the income ultimately earned by it on account of the transaction between the assessee and GAIL and such receipts were included in the relevant returns submitted by GAIL for the two assessment years. The predominant purpose of the contract for supply of gas was for sale of goods and, therefore, the contract was outside the purview of section 194C as well as section 194J. Considering the invoice raised by GAIL *vis-a-vis* reading of the clauses in the agreement it could not be said that the transaction was for technical services or a contract. The price paid by the assessee was the sale price for gas and not for availing of any type of services from GAIL. The transaction charges were one of the elements of price as per the clause entered into by and between the two parties and not charges for any distinct services and it was the

agreement in between the two parties that the seller agreed to deliver and sell to the buyer the gas at the delivery point and the buyer agreed to purchase and take delivery of such gas and pay in accordance with the terms and conditions in this agreement. Thus, the very nature of the agreement showed that it was not in the nature of a works contract or one for technical services. Delivery at the place of the buyer did not mean that it would convert the transaction into one for technical services.

(ii) That under section 194C there should be a contract between two parties and the work should include (a) advertising, (b) broadcasting, (c) carriage of goods or passengers by any mode of transport other than railways, (d) catering, (e) manufacturing or supplying a product. Thus, the agreement was not in the nature of a contract as the assessee and GAIL had not entered into any of the work mentioned in section 194C. Section 194J read with Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) provides that the predominant purpose to fall in “technical services” should be consideration for the rendering of any managerial technical or consultancy services whereas in the assessee’s case it was an agreement in between the two companies to sell/purchase gas and the intention of the parties was sale and purchase and it could not import any reasoning to hold that it could fall in the category of technical services. It would be too much to stretch the plain and simple reading of technical services. Applied,

Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage P. Ltd. v. CIT [2007] 293 ITR 226 (SC) (AY. 2008-2009, 2009-2010)

CIT (TDS) v. Samtel Glass Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 392/271 CTR 581 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 183 (Raj.)(HC)

1994 **S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – “Works contract” – Manufacture of SIM/scratch cards as per requirement of assessee where no material was supplied – Not a works contract – Tax not deductible at source on payment to manufacturer**

The assessees were in the business of providing communication facilities and for that purpose they placed orders for supply of SIM/scratch cards according to their requirement and specifications. Admittedly, the assessees did not supply any material whatsoever to the manufacturers/suppliers of the cards. The AO held that the order to supply SIM/scratch cards along with printing of the assessees’ name and other particulars would amount to “work” since it required specific job to be done by the specialised companies having such plant and machinery. The AO further held that the work order placed by the assessees to the manufacturers/suppliers was covered by the provisions contained in section 194C of the Act. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal held that section 194C was not applicable. On appeal to the High Court :

Held, that the assessees did not supply any material whatsoever to the manufacturers/suppliers for the supply of SIM/scratch cards as per their requirement or specification and, therefore, the transaction could not be treated as a contract for carrying out works within the meaning of the word “work” used in sub-section (1) of section 194C

CIT v. Silver Oak Laboratories P. Ltd. (AY. 2003-2004 to 2005-2006)

CIT v. Spice Telecommunications P. Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 72/224 Taxmann 180 (Karn.)(HC)

CIT v. Hutchison Essar South Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 72/224 Taxmann 180 (Karn.)(HC)

S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Contract for transportation of employees of client – Amount paid for hire of vehicles – No sub-contract – Tax not deductible at source on such amount

1995

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the entire task was assigned to the assessee by IPR for transportation of its employees and the guests; for which the assessee had to maintain certain number of vehicles in good working condition and to deploy necessary staff and for such purpose, IPR agreed to pay rent. The entire task was to be performed by the contractor and could not be assigned to a sub-contractor without the prior permission of IPR. As held by the Tribunal, the Revenue did not bring any material to establish that the owner of the vehicles performed the work of transportation. The assessee had merely hired the vehicles for performing its part of the contract with IPR. The Tribunal was right in setting aside the disallowance. (AY. 2007-2008)

CIT v. Mukesh Travels Co. (2014) 367 ITR 706 / 224 Taxmann 174 / 270 CTR 618 (Guj.) (HC)

S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Freight payment – Failure to deduct tax at source – Amounts disallowable. [S.40(a)(ia)]

1996

Assessee was engaged in business of purchase and sale of LPG cylinders. Main contract of assessee for carriage of LPG was with IOC. Assessee received freight payments from IOC. Assessee, in turn, got transportation of LPG done through three parties to whom he made a part of freight payments received from IOC. Since freight charges were being paid by assessee to three persons in respect of sub-contract under section 194C(2) following its own contract with IOC, assessee was required to deduct tax at source while making freight payments. Since assessee failed to do so, payments in question deserved to be disallowed. (AY. 2006-07)

Palam Gas service v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 44 (Mag.) (HP)(HC)

S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Surcharge – Short deduction – No obligation at relevant time on assessee to deduct surcharge in addition to tax – Assessee not in default for short deduction.

1997

Sections 194C(1) and (2) as existed at the relevant point of time had cast no obligation on the assessee to deduct any surcharge during the relevant years when payments were made to contractors. Section 201(1A) had no application. Assessee cannot be held to be in default for short deduction.

CIT v. Municipal Corporation, Visakhapatnam (2014) 365 ITR 254/(2015) 228 Taxmann 208 (Mag) (AP)(HC)

S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Machinery taken on monthly charges could not be covered by term ‘Work contract’ – No disallowance could be made. [S.40(a)(ia)]

1998

The assessee made payment to LDS Engineers towards ‘Excavation charges’ the AO held that the tax at source was required to be deducted on the payment made to LDS Engineers and the failure to do so attracted the provisions of section 40(a)(ia). He, therefore, made disallowance of the said sum. On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO and treated the amount paid to LDS Engineers as covered under section

194C. On appeal to the Tribunal held that it was found that said payment was made for hiring of machinery for excavation on fixed monthly rent. Machinery taken on monthly rental could not be covered by term 'work contract. Therefore, no disallowance could be made under section 40(a)(ia). (AY. 2006-07)

LDS Engineers (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 35 ITR 262 / (2015) 152 ITD 140 (Delhi)(Trib.)

1999 **S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Agent – Payment made to transporters – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.40(a)(ia), 147, Form No. 15J]**

The assessee was engaged in business of booking tankers that were supplied to its customers. Assessee had entered into contract with different customers to supply tankers. AO held that as the assessee failed to deduct tax at source under section 194C, the payment was disallowed by applying the provisions of section 40(a)(ia). On appeal, the CIT(A) held that since the assessee had furnished said forms in time and as there was nothing on record to show that Forms were not accepted, same would not amount to default under the provisions of section 194 and, therefore, no consequent addition was called for under section 40(a)(ia). It was further held by the CIT(A) that the provisions of section 194C were not applicable to the instant case as the assessee had only hired the trucks from time-to-time. On appeal by revenue the Tribunal held that the assessee was making payment for carriage of goods and there was admittedly no oral or written agreement between the assessee and transporters and in the absence of the same, there is no merit in the order of the AO in holding that the provisions of section 194C had been violated. In the absence of the same no disallowance is warranted under section 40(a)(ia). The order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is upheld.

(AY. 2006-07, 2010-11)

Dy. CIT v. Vikas Sharma (2014) 34 ITR 617 / 165 TTJ 1(UO) / (2015) 152 ITD 181 (Chd.) (Trib.)

2000 **S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Dumpers for executing work – No disallowance could be made. [S.40(a)(ia)]**

Assessee firm was a transport sub-contractor, it took on hire several trucks / dumpers for executing work order undertaken from its contractor. AO disallowed transport hire charges claimed by assessee for failure to deduct tax at source under section 194C. Where revenue had not ascertained whether assessee carried on transportation work order issued by contractor on its own by engaging vehicles and incurred expresses or merely sub-contracted work to vehicle owners, no disallowance could be made as mischief of provisions of section 40(a)(ia), read with section 194C, is attracted in case of contract/sub-contract only. (AY. 2006-07)

Ghosh & Chakraborty Transport v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 88(URO)(Kol.)(Trib.)

2001 **S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Goods were dispatched through non-resident shipping companies or through their resident agents – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.40(a)(ia), 172]**

Assessee had not deducted TDS against Ocean Freight and Inland Haulage Charges and other charges - Assessing Officer observed that nothing had been brought on record by assessee that parties to whom payments of freight were being made were non-resident or

acting as agents of non-resident shipping companies. Accordingly, he held that assessee was liable to deduct TDS under section 194C and invoked provisions of section 40(a) (ia) Tribunal held that provisions of section 194C were not applicable if goods were dispatched through non-resident shipping companies or through their resident agents. (AY. 2008-2009)

ITO v. Bhogal Export(2013) 40 taxmann.com 82/ (2014) 61 SOT 102((URO)(Chd.)(Trib.)

S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Reimbursement of expenses – C&F agents on behalf of assessee – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.40(a)(ia), 194J] 2002

Where expenses were incurred by C&F agents on behalf of assessee and claims were made on actual basis, assessee while making reimbursement of said expenses was not liable to deduct tax at source under section 194C. (AY. 2005-06)

Dy. CIT v. Dhaanya Seeds (P) Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 15 (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Responsibility to deduct tax at source on freight payments would depend upon terms of agreement entered/available between assessee and suppliers – Matter remanded. 2003

Where supplier takes responsibility to deliver goods to door steps of assessee, then it can be inferred that contract exists between lorry owners and supplier and in that case, even if assessee makes payment of freight charges, it would be considered as payment made to concerned supplier. On the other hand, if assessee is responsible to take delivery from doorsteps of supplier, then it can be inferred that contract exists between assessee and lorry owners and in that kind of situation, even if, supplier engages lorry, it has to be construed that supplier is acting as agent of assessee in process of booking of lorry for purpose of transportation of goods to assessee. Where AO took a view that assessee was liable to deduct tax at source on lorry freight payments without examining terms of agreement between assessee and suppliers, matter was to be remanded to AO to consider same afresh. Matter remanded. (AY. 2007-08)

Raja & Co. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 12 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Specific provision would prevail over general one – Maintenance work – Provisions of section 194C is applicable and not section 194J. [S.194J, 201(1), 201(IA)] 2004

Assessee-company had entered into contracts with various parties for maintenance work of its various equipments, installations, viz., air-conditioners, lifts, etc. Same being contractual maintenance work, assessee deducted tax at source under section 194C. Revenue claimed that above work was of technical nature and same would be covered under section 194J and, thus, raised demand for short-fall in tax deducted as well as for interest thereon under sections 201(1) and 201(1A). Since word 'work' is defined under section 194C in an inclusive manner to include certain specified services, viz., advertising, catering, broadcasting and telecasting, etc. present type of maintenance work would also clearly fall within ambit of 'work'. Where it was clarified from bills issued by contractors that work like maintenance of equipments, cleaning and checking of parts, etc. was of routine nature and required less technical skills, assessee had correctly deducted tax at source under section 194C. Where there are two provisions, i.e., section

194C and section 194J, first one is general and other is specific covering a particular transaction, specific provision would prevail over general one. (AY. 2007-08 to 2009-10) *ITO v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 138 (Mum.)(Trib.)*

2005 **S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Hiring of truck would be an independent contract – Hire of trucks was in course of back to back hiring arrangements, it would be a sub-contract. [S.40(a)(ia), 194(2)]**

Assessee was engaged in business of transport, hiring trucks and warehousing. He made payments of truck hire charges without deducting tax at source. AO disallowed payments under section 40(a)(ia). In case assessee used hired truck in course of carrying out his business of transportation of goods, it would be an independent contract and, thus, payments for truck hire could not be treated as payments to sub-contractor, in such a situation, provisions of section 194C(2) would not come into play, however, in case hire of trucks was in course of back-to-back hiring arrangements, it would clearly be a case of sub-contracting and provisions of section 194C(2) would come into play. Since there was no finding on aforesaid aspect, impugned disallowance was to be deleted and matter was to be remanded back for disposal afresh. (AY. 2007-08)

Laxmandas Tolaram Gurnani v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 143 (URO) (Ahd.)(Trib.)

2006 **S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Firm – Partners – Firm could not be considered as contractor and partners as sub contractors – Provisions of section 40(a)(ia) was not applicable. [S.40(a)(ia)]**

Assessee firm was formed by two partners for purpose of carrying business of works contract. It got contracts from various Governments and distributed work among two partners and executed work. received a sum of ₹ 115 crores as contract receipts of which it transferred a sum of ₹ 111 crores to partners. credited balance receipt of ₹ 4 crores and debited corresponding expenses in profit and loss account. It secured contracts and had given it to its partners with a collective responsibilities and liabilities jointly and severally liable towards owners for execution of contracts in accordance with contract conditions. demarcated nature of contracts into principal contracts and sub contracts for purpose of identifying work handled by partners and for purpose of accounting contract receipts and payments, assessee-firm could not be considered as contractor and its partners as sub-contractors of firm to cast liability u/s. 194C(2) on it. Disallowance by invoking section 40(a)(ia) was liable to be deleted. (AY. 2009-10)

Hindustan Ratna JV v. ITO (2014) 149 ITD 443 /166 TTJ 612 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

2007 **S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Transportation contract – Assessee has not hired the truck owners, hence not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.40(a)(ia)]**

Assessee had undertaken contract from a company for transportation of their products. In order to execute assignment given by company, assessee engaged his own truck as well as had hired truck from other owners. AO held that payment made by assessee to truck owners amounted sub-contracting transportation work and disallowed payment under section 40(a)(ia). On appeal Tribunal held that since entire payment of transportation was made by company to assessee after deducting tax, same established that there was no nexus between company and owners of truck engaged by assessee.

Further since, assessee was responsible for entire transportation job assigned by company to assessee and there was nothing on record to show that assessee had sublet his work to other truck owners, it could be construed that assessee had hired trucks along with drivers and executed work himself, and, hence, provisions of section 194C were not attracted. (AY. 2006-07)

Saiyad Saukatali Saiydamiya v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 110 (URO) (Ahd.)(Trib.)

S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Supply of food and security personnel – Not technical services. [S.194J] 2008

Contracts for supply of bread and butter and supply of security personnel would be covered under provisions of section 194C as contract and not technical services under section 194J. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

ITO. v. Accounts Officer, Govt. Medical College, Jammu (2014) 146 ITD 648 (Asr.)(Trib.)

S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Deduction to be made at the time of payment – Debiting the running account of a payee at the yearend cannot be said to be deduction of tax at source as contemplated – Disallowance was held to be justified. [S.40(a)(ia)] 2009

The assessee paid certain amounts to contractor on three different dates, without deduction of tax at source. Assessee claimed that tax was deducted at source on 31-3-2006 i.e. Last date of relevant accounting period by debiting the running account and the same was deposited with the Government before due date specified in sub-section 139(1) and therefore the impugned payments were not hit by section 40(a)(ia). However the AO disallowed the payment. CIT(A) allowed the claim of assessee. On appeal by revenue the Tribunal held that by debiting running account of payee on last date of accounting period could not be said to be deduction of tax at source as contemplated by section 194C. If tax is deducted at any other point of time than at the time when the amount exigible to deduction of tax at source is paid or is deducted out of any other sum than the sum out of which it is mandated to be deducted, such deduction of tax *per se* cannot be said to be at source. Deduction of tax at source, i.e., out of the amount payable in terms of s. 194C r.w.s 40(a)(ia), is one thing and debiting the running account of the payee on the last date of the accounting period is altogether a different thing. Debiting the running account of a payee cannot be said to be deduction of tax at source as contemplated by section 194C r.w.s. 40(a)(ia). Appeal of revenue was allowed. (AY. 2006-07)

ITO v. bhoomi Construction (2014) 146 ITD 639 (Rajkot)(Trib.)

S.194C : Deduction at source – Contractors – Payments to contracts for supply of bread and butter and supply of security personnel would be covered under provisions of section 194C and not under section 194J. [S.194J, 201(1), 201(IA)] 2010

The assessee, a Medical College, had entered into contracts/agreements with various parties for supply of bread and butter and supply of security and personnel. The assessee made payments to the contractors and deducted the tax at source under section 194C. The AO held that the assessee had made payments to the contractors for technical services covered under section 194J and, therefore, it had made a short deduction of

tax at source. He, therefore, treated the assessee as an assessee in default under section 201(1) and raised tax demand upon it. He also levied interest under section 201(1A) upon the assessee. Commissioner (Appeals) held that the contracts under discussion were covered under work or service contracts and the CBDT Circular No. 715, dated 8-8-1995 was clearly applicable to the instant case. Hence, there was no short deduction of tax at source. Tribunal confirmed the order of CIT(A).

ITO v. Accounts Officer, Govt. Medical College, Jammu (2014) 146 ITD 648 (Asr.)(Trib.)

Section S194H : Commission or brokerage

- 2011 **S.194H : Deduction at source – Commission or brokerage – Matter remanded back**
Tribunal assuming that advertising agents with whom assessee was dealing were registered with Indian Newspaper Society, concluded that payments made to them for procuring advertisements were trade discount and not a commission, and, thus, provisions of section 194H did not apply. In view of fact that assessee itself admitted that some of those agencies were not registered with INS, matter was to be remanded back by the High Court for disposal afresh. (AY. 2002-03 to 2004-05)
CIT v. Printers (Mysore) (P.) Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxmann 80 (Mag.) / (Karn.)(HC)
- 2012 **S.194H : Deduction at source – Commission or brokerage – Payments in relation to services relating to securities – Disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) is not warranted. [S.40(a)(ia)]**
Tribunal held that the remuneration paid by the assessee to Tapasya Projects Ltd. (TPL) was for canvassing, inducing or for motivation of investors and was, hence, excluded from the purview of section 194H by the terms of the Explanation. On appeal by revenue :
Held, dismissing the appeal, that once it was an admitted position that TPL had motivated potential investors to invest through the assessee in mutual fund schemes, these services which were rendered in relation to a transaction in “securities” stood excluded from the definition of “brokerage or commission” under section 194H. The services which were rendered by TPL were in relation to “securities”. No other services had been rendered. Consequently, the disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) was not warranted. (AY. 2007-2008)
CIT v. Tandon and Mahendra (2014) 363 ITR 454 / 224 Taxmann 153/(2015) 276 CTR 50 (All)(HC)
- 2013 **S.194H : Deduction at source – Commission or brokerage – Issue of TDS liability not to be decided invoking writ jurisdiction but in appeal under Act. [S.201(IA)]**
The assessee, a newspaper publisher claimed to have paid trade discount to advertisement agencies. However, he did not file required documents to prove that it offered trade discount, and not commission, to advertising agencies. Assistant Commissioner (TDS) raised a tax demand along with interest under section 201(1A). Assessee filed appeal against assessment order before Commissioner (Appeals) raising all grounds on merits. When appeal was still pending, assessee was advised by its counsel not to press grounds on question of deduction of tax at source on trade discount given

to advertising agencies and payment of interest on amount of TDS under section 201(1A) and to raise question which, according to him, is a jurisdictional issue, in writ petition. Held that, At this stage it cannot be said that the facts and circumstances of the case are identical with that of Jagran Prakashan Ltd. (2012) 345 ITR 288(All) in as much as the petitioner did not lead evidence as required by the Assessing Officer. The assessee - petitioner did not file the required documents to prove that the petitioner has offered trade discount and not commission to the advertising agencies. We find that the Assessing Officer did have jurisdiction and that he has not committed any such patent error of jurisdiction, which may entitle the petitioner to file the writ petition, to consider and settle the issues, which are primarily based on facts. The petitioner has already preferred an appeal against the assessing order. The advice given to the appellant not to press certain grounds, would not give the petitioner a right to directly approach the Court, even if similar questions of law have been raised. The petitioner may press the appeal on all the grounds open to them. We expect that the appellate authority will decide the stay application, or hear the appeal expeditiously. Writ petition dismissed on the ground that the petitioner is pursuing the statutory alternative remedy of appeal against the assessment order. (AY. 2009-10, 2010-11)

Amar Ujala Publication Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 70 (Mag.) (All.) (HC)

S.194H : Deduction at source – Commission or brokerage – Petitioner not entitled to file Writ Petition to consider and settle issues which are primarily based on facts for which assessee had already preferred an appeal. [S.250, Constitution of India, Art. 226]

2014

The assessee was engaged in the business of news paper publication, etc. The AO observed that the assessee had paid commission to advertisement agencies without deducting tax at source which the assessee claimed to be trade discount and hence disallowed the same u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act. An appeal was filed against the said Order to the CIT(A). When the said appeal was still pending, assessee was advised by its Counsel not to press grounds on question of deduction of tax at source on trade discount given to advertising agencies and payment of interest on amount of TDS u/s. 201(1A) and to raise question which, according to him, is a jurisdictional issue, in a Writ Petition.

Dismissing the said Writ Petition, the High Court held that the assessee did not file the required documents to prove that the petitioner has offered trade discount and not commission to the advertising agencies. The AO did have jurisdiction and that he has not committed any such patent error of jurisdiction, which entitles the petitioner to file the Writ Petition, to consider and settle the issues, which are primarily based on facts. The advice given to the appellant not to press certain grounds, would not give the petitioner a right to directly approach the Court, even if similar questions of law have been raised. (AY. 2009-2010, 2010-11)

Amar Ujala Publication Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 70 (Mag.) (All.) (HC)

2015 **S.194H : Deduction at source – Commission or brokerage – Trade discount-Incentive to stockists are not commission – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.40(a)(ia)]**

The assessee is engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading of pharmaceutical products. The assessee gave incentive to its distributors/dealers/stockists under different schemes. AO treated the said incentives as commission and disallowed the expenses on applying the provision of section 40(a)(ia) as the tax was not deducted under section 194H. CIT(A) and Tribunal decided the issue in favour of assessee. On appeal by Revenue High Court also affirmed the view of the Tribunal holding that provision of section 194H is not applicable. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Intervet India (P) Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 238 / 103 DTR 98 / 268 CTR 429 / 227 Taxmann 200 (Bom.)(HC)

2016 **S.194H : Deduction at source – Commission or brokerage – TDS does not apply to all sales promotional expenditure. It applies only if relationship between payer & payee is that of principal & agent**

The assessee had undertaken sales promotional scheme viz. Product discount scheme and Product campaign under which it offered an incentive on case to case basis to its stockists / dealers / agents. An amount of ₹ 70 lakhs was claimed as a deduction towards expenditure incurred under the said sales promotional scheme. The relationship between the assessee and the distributor / stockists was that of principal to principal and in fact the distributors were the customers of the assessee to whom the sales were effected either directly or through the consignment agent. As the distributor / stockists were the persons to whom the product was sold, no services were offered by the assessee and what was offered by the distributor was a discount under the product distribution scheme or product campaign scheme to buy the assessee's product. The distributors / stockists were not acting on behalf of the assessee and that most of the credit was by way of goods on meeting of sales target, and hence, it could not be said to be a commission payment within the meaning of Explanation (i) to section 194H of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The contention of the Revenue in regard to the application of Explanation (i) below section 194H being applicable to all categories of sales expenditure cannot be accepted. Such reading of Explanation (i) below section 194H would amount to reading the said provision in abstract. The application of the provision is required to be considered to the relevant facts of every case. (A.Y. 2005-06)

CIT v. Intervet India Pvt. Ltd. (Bom.)(HC); www.itatonline.org

2017 **S.194H : Deduction at source – Commission or brokerage – Discount paid to distributor by cellular operator for selling mobile recharge coupons constitutes commission payment liable for TDS**

Assessee, a cellular operator, appointed distributors for sale of SIM cards and recharge coupons. Under pre-paid scheme, assessee sold prepaid cards, i.e., cards embedded with certain usage value. Assessee-company used to sell prepaid card to its distributor at discounted rate. The difference between face value of pre-paid card and selling rate constitutes commission, which is liable for deduction of tax at source under section 194H. (AY. 2006-07 to 2009-10)

Bharati Airtel Ltd. v. Dy. CIT(2013) 26 ITR 263/ (2014) 61 SOT 111 (URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)

S.194H : Deduction at source – Commission or brokerage – IATA approved agent – Discount – Commission paid to small time agent – Held not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.201, 201(IA)]

2018

Assessee was an IATA approved agent and was engaged in business of booking air travel tickets for various airline companies. AO held that the assessee had been paying commission without deducting tax at source as required under section 194H raised demand. CIT(A) grouped payments in three categories viz., payments made to retail customers, group passengers and small time travel agents and held that only discounts/commission paid to small time agents were liable for TDS under section 194H. Since retail customers or group customers were not providing any service to assessee and were only getting flight tickets at a concession from assessee, such customers could not be considered as 'agent' of assessee and hence amount of commission ceded by assessee partook character of 'discount' only. Commission income ceded by assessee in respect of tickets purchased by small time travel agents on behalf of their respective customers, would partake character of 'discount' only, therefore, such discount payments would not be covered by provisions of section 194H. (AY. 2006-07 to 2009-10)

ACIT v. Al Hind Tours & Travels (P) Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 1 (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.194H : Deduction at source – Commission or brokerage – Discount charges – Retail customer – Not liable to deduct tax at source

2019

The assessee was an IATA approved agent and was engaged in business of booking air travel tickets for various airline companies. Deputy Commissioner (TDS) observed that assessee had been paying commission without deducting tax at source as required under section 194H CIT(A) grouped payments in three categories viz, payments made to retail customers, group passengers and small time travel agents and held that only discounts/commission paid to small time agents were liable for TDS under section 194H. It was held that since retail customers or group customers were not providing any service to assessee and were only getting flight tickets at a concession from assessee, such customers could not be considered as 'agent' of assessee and hence amount of commission ceded by assessee partook character of 'discount' only. Therefore, it was held that such discount payments were not covered under section 194 H & TDS was not deductible in respect thereof. (AY. 2006-2007 to 2009-2010)

ACIT v. Al Hind Tours & Travels (P) Ltd. (2013) 29 taxmann.com 294 (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.194H : Deduction at source – Commission or brokerage – Mutual funds – Sub brokerage – Buying and selling of units of mutual fund is not covered – Not liable to deduct tax at source

2020

Assessee is in the business of Mutual Funds distribution and investment agent. From the details of brokerage received and service tax deducted there from it can be seen that out of the brokerage income. The sub-brokerage is paid in relation to units of Mutual Funds. The sub-brokerage paid is connected with the services rendered in the course of buying and selling of units of Mutual Funds or in relation to transactions pertaining to Mutual

Funds. As per the provisions of section 194H Explanation (i) these are not covered by the provision for deduction of tax at source. There is nothing on record to indicate that the sub-brokerage is paid for any other services other than relating to securities. (AY. 2005-06, 2007-08)

Dy. CIT v. S. J. Investment Agencies (P) Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 691 (Mum.) (Trib.)

2021 S.194H : Deduction at source – Commission or brokerage – Mutual funds – Not covered by section 194H. [S.40(a)(ia)]

Tribunal held that sub-brokerage paid in connection with services rendered in course of buying and selling of units of mutual funds or in relation to transactions relating to mutual funds is not covered by provisions of section 194H. There is no doubt that Mutual Funds are categorised as securities. Therefore the ITAT held that Sub-brokerage paid in connection with services rendered in course of buying and selling of units of mutual funds is not covered by provisions of section 194H. (AY. 2005-06, 2007-08)

Dy. CIT v. S.J. Investment Agencies (P) Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 691 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section S194I : Rent

2022 S.194I : Deduction at source – Rent – Towers – Passive infrastructure services – Tax deduction at source to be at rate prescribed under section 194I(a). [S.194C, 197]

Towers are neutral platform without which the mobile operation cannot operate. Dominant intention is use of equipment or plant or machinery. Amounts to renting of plant and machinery. That equipment housed in the premises incidental and not a renting of premises. Tax deducted at source to be at rate prescribed in section 194I(a). Writ petition of assessee was allowed. (FY. 2013-14)

Indus Towers Ltd. v. ACIT (TDS) (2014) 364 ITR 114 / 220 Taxmann 402/104 DTR 77 / 224 Taxmann 68 (Delhi)(HC)

2023 S.194I : Deduction at source – Rent – Composite contract for loading and unloading and transportation of granites – Provision of section 194I is applicable and provisions of section 194C. [S.40(a)(ia), 194C]

The assessee deducted the tax at source under section 194C instead of section 194I. AO held that the payments are hit by provision of section 40(a)(ia) hence disallowed the expenditure. On appeal the Court held that in case of a composite contract for loading and unloading and transport of granites where the assessee makes use of vehicles and equipment, section 194I will be applicable and not section 194C; contention that for attracting section 194I there must be a lease or other arrangement relating to immovable property is not sustainable. section 194I intends liability to deduct tax in respect of “any machinery or plant or equipment”. The machinery need not be the machinery annexed to immoveable property otherwise under the Transfer of Property Act. Applicability of section 40(a)(ia) the matter was remitted to Tribunal to decide a fresh. (AY. 2007-08)

Three Star Granites (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 98 DTR 9 / 266 CTR 326 / 227 Taxmann 82 (Mag.) (Ker.)(HC)

S.194I : Deduction at source – Rent – Hired vehicle – Vehicle or motor car would stand to be included within purview of words ‘plant’ or ‘machinery’ under section 194-I – Making available services of a chauffeur as well as meeting fuel cost of transportation, same could not be considered towards car rental, and, thus, payment towards such contractual services would be covered by [S.194C. [S.194C]

2024

Assessee-company made payment towards hired vehicle and, accordingly, deducted tax at source under section 194C. According to revenue same was to be covered under section 194-I. Vehicle or motor car would stand to be included within purview of words ‘plant’ or ‘machinery’ under section 194-I. Arrangement for providing vehicle/ cars to assessee’s personnel for their work would stand to be covered under section 194-I. Since arrangement also included making available services of a chauffeur as well as meeting fuel cost of transportation, same could not be considered towards car rental, and, thus, payment towards such contractual services would be covered by section 194C and balance amount would be governed by section 194-I. (AY. 2007-08 to 2009-10)

ITO v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 138 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.194I : Deduction at source – Rent – Lease premium – Not liable to deduct tax at source-Substance of the transaction to be seen. [S.201(1), 201(IA)]

2025

It is the real nature of the arrangement or transaction, and not merely the words or phrases employed, even as cautioned by the Apex Court in Panbari Tea Co. Ltd. i.e., the substance of the transaction, that is relevant and paramount. Lease premium and additional Floor Space Index (FSI) charges paid to MMRDA is not “rent” hence not liable to deduct tax at source. (AY. 2008-09)

ACIT v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.194I : Deduction at source – Rent – Wharfage – Wharfage charge is payment for using land together with structure on shore of navigation water and, thus, would be treated as rent under section 194-I. [S.194J]

2026

Assessee Company, engaged in business of developing, constructing, operating and maintaining port on Build, Own, Operate, Transfer (BOOT) basis, entered into two agreements with GMB, i.e., lease and possession agreement and concession agreement. By concession agreement assessee was granted right to use waterfront against payment of charges to be computed on basis of actual throughputs achieved in month. In pursuance of that agreement assessee paid wharfage charges to GMB after deducting TDS under section 194J. Waterfront was part of land and, therefore, payment made in lieu of its use would fall under definitions of ‘rent’ as given in section 194-I(i), and, hence, assessee was required to deduct tax at source under section 194-I and not under section 194J. (AY. 2006-2007, 2007-2008)

Gujarat Pipavav Port Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2013) 166 TTJ 159 / (2014) 149 ITD 23 (Rajkot)(Trib.)

- 2027 **S.194I : Deduction at source – Rent-Lease premium – Premium was not paid under a lease but was paid as a price for obtaining lease, it preceded grant of lease and, therefore, by any stretch of imagination, it could not be equated with rent which was paid periodically – Payment for additional FSI area could not be equated to rent – Not liable to deduct TDS on both types of payment u/s. 194I. (S.201]**

Assessee took plot of land from MMRD and made payment of lease premium for allotment of plot of land as also payment for additional built up area and fees for FSI. AO held that the assessee was required to deduct TDS u/s. 194-I. The Tribunal held that, the premium is not paid under a lease but is paid as a price for obtaining the lease, hence it precedes the grant of lease. It cannot be equated with the rent which is paid periodically. The records show that the payment to MMRD is also for additional built up area and also for granting free of FSI area, such payment cannot be equated to rent. It is also seen that the MMRD in exercise of power u/s. 43 r.w. Sec. 37(1) of the Maharashtra Town Planning Act 1966, MRTTP Act and other powers enabling the same has approved the proposal to modify regulation 4A(ii) and thereby increased the FSI of the entire 'G' Block of BKC. The Development Control Regulations for BKC specify the permissible FSI. Pursuant to such provisions, the assessee became entitled for additional FSI and has further acquired/purchased the additional built-up area for construction of additional area on the aforesaid plot. Thus the assessee has made payment to MMRD under Development Control for acquiring leasehold land and additional built-up area. Payment of lease premium for allotment of plot of land as also payment for additional built up area and fees for FSI, are not liable to TDS liability under section 194-I. (AY. 2008-09)

ITO v. Wadhwa & Associates Realtors (P) Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 694 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 2028 **S.194I : Deduction at source – Rent – Neither landlord – tenant relationship nor a licensor-licensee relationship – Not liable to deduct tax at source as rent. [S.194C, 201, 201(IA)]**

The assessee company took over the running BPO business of a company at its various locations. It entered in to use of tenanted premises for a period of six months. All the payments were remitted to various parties by other company on behalf of assessee company. The assessee reimbursed said payments and deducted the tax at source in terms of section 194C on the amount of reimbursement on actual basis. AO held that the assessee was required to deduct tax in terms of section 194I from the said payments. The AO raised the demand for short deduction of TDS under section 201 and also levied interest under section 201(1A). In appeal, CIT(A) held that the assessee was under no obligation to deduct tax at source and not liable for interest. On appeal by revenue, the Tribunal held that, revenue has not brought any evidence to demonstrate any tenancy or sub-tenancy agreement between the assessee and other party, the order of CIT(A) was confirmed. (AY. 2009-10)

ACIT v. Serco BPO (P) Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 453 (Delhi)(Trib.)

S.194J : Deduction at source – Fees for professional or technical services – Data collecting charges – Cannot be considered as fees for professional or technical services – Not liable to deduct tax at source

2029

The Assessee paid certain charges for services rendered by individual and firms to the assessee for collecting data. The Court held that data collection charges paid by assessee are not covered by expression 'professional services' as mentioned in Explanation to section 194J. Thus, assessee was not required to deduct tax at source while making payment of said charges. (AY. 2007-08 to 2010-11)

CIT v. Market Probe India (P) Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxmann 85 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

S.194J : Deduction at source – Fees for professional or technical services – Royalty-Satellite television rights of films for a period of 99 years – Sale – Payment made for them would not fall within the definition of royalty as per Explanation 2 to clause (vi) of section 9(1) of the Act. [S.9(I)(vi)]

2030

The assessee had purchased satellite television rights of some Telugu films for a period of 99 years through an irrevocable transfer deed. The AO opined that the said payment amounted to royalty as defined in Explanation 2 to Section 9(1)(vi). Since the assessee had failed to deduct tax at source under section 194J, the payment was disallowed under section 40(a)(ia). The CIT(A) held that the payment was covered by section 28 as trading expenses and thus disallowance was not warranted under section 40(a)(ia). The Tribunal, however, restored the order of the AO. On appeal to the High Court, it was observed that the assessee enjoys the exclusive status, as the World Negative rights (picture and sound) including theatrical rights owner as also the right to assign the said rights, which were transferred in their favour, and the transferor was not entitled to claim any revenue or consideration received by the assessee in respect of the said assignment agreement. It was observed from the various conditions contained in the agreement of transfer that there was a transfer of copyright in favour of the assessee. However, the deed of transfer being irrevocable for a period of 99 years, which was in excess of the prescribed period of 60 years in terms of section 26 of the Copy Right Act, 1957, in the case of cinematographic film, the payment for television/film rights could only be treated as one of sale. Thus, the High Court reversed the order of the Tribunal and upheld the findings of First Appellate Authority that the transfer in favour of the assessee was a sale, which was excluded from the definition of royalty as defined under clause (v) to Explanation (2) of section 9(1). (AY. 2009-10)

K. Bhagyalakshmi (Mrs.) v. DCIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 225 /265 CTR 545 (Mad.)(HC)

S.194J : Deduction at source – Fees for professional or technical services – Medical services – State Government paid the bills for professional services rendered to low income patients through the assessee who acted merely as disbursement officer – assessee is not required to deduct any TDS as per the provisions of section 194J of the Act. [S.201]

2031

The Appellate Tribunal held that where low income group patients were provided aid by State Government under a scheme but bill were raised in name of patients and payment were made by State Government on behalf of such patients, section 194J was not attracted. (AY. 2009-10, 2010-11)

Chief Medical Officer v. ITO(2013) 157 TTJ 281 / 2014) 61 SOT 112 (URO)(Indore)(Trib.)

- 2032 **S.194J : Deduction at source – Fees for professional or technical services. – Fixed salary and guarantee money to consultants cannot be termed as salary – AO was not justified in holding that the assessee was liable to deduct tax as salary. [Ss.192, 201]**
 Assessee-hospital engaged both employee doctors and consultant doctors. While employee doctors were entitled to salary, leave and medical benefit, consultant doctors were entitled only to lump sum monthly payment of guarantee money without above benefit. Along with guarantee money, they were entitled to share of amount collected by hospital. Impugned 'Fixed salary and Guarantee Money to Consultants (FGC's) contract' between consultant doctors and assessee. A survey was carried out in the assessee-hospital and it was found that TDS was not correctly deducted by the assessee-hospital. Thus, an order under section 201 was passed in which tax was imposed alleged to be on account of default under section 192 by the assessee-hospital in respect of engagement of consultant doctors.
 The assessee-hospital claimed that there was no short deduction of tax as TDS was deducted as per provision of section 194J. The AO held that there was employer and employee relationship between said doctors and assessee-hospital, hence the deduction should have been done as per the provision of section 192. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) accepted assessee's claim by holding that payment made to doctors are professional fee for which the assessee-hospital has rightly deducted tax under section 194J. On second appeal Tribunal held that hospital could not be said to be in nature of a 'service contract', it would merely be a contract for medical service. Fee for professional service paid to consultant doctors by assessee-hospital under contract was covered by section 194J. Therefore, the AO was not justified to impute or implicate such a default on the part of the assessee for failure to deduct an adequate tax. (AY. 2007-08)
ITO v. Apollo Hospitals Internationals Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 302 (Ahd.)(Trib.)
- 2033 **S.194J : Deduction at source – Fees for professional or technical services – Maintenance of operation theatre and surgical equipment's system tax to be deducted as per provisions of section 194J and not as per section 194C. [S.9(1)(vii),194C]**
 Assessee, a medical College, entered into contracts with various parties to maintain operation theatre and surgical equipments, RO system, CT scan machine, MRI machine, medical equipments lift sterilisation and as well as to provide services of anti-termite treatment all these services cannot be provided in routine and normal manner, but require technical expertise or professional skills and therefore, provisions of S. 194J attracted to these contracts. Appeal of revenue was allowed. (AY. 2008-09 and 2009-10)
ITO v. Accounts Officer, Govt. Medical College, Jammu (2014) 146 ITD 648 (Asr.)(Trib.)
- 2034 **S.194J : Deduction at source – Fees for professional or technical services – Reimbursement of purchase price – DTAA-India-UK – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [Art.13]**
 Sister concern made purchases of rough diamonds on behalf of assessee. Sister concern made payment after deducting TDS @ 15 per cent as per Article 13. Assessee

reimbursed expenses to sister concern, no element of margin or profit or value addition by sister concern. No TDS was required to be made u/s. 194J at time of payment by assessee to sister concern. (AY. 2006-07 to 2008-09)
ITO v. Vishinda Diamonds (2014) 146 ITD 745 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.194J : Deduction at source – Fees for professional or technical services – Hospitals and Doctors – No employer and employee relation – Provisions of section 192 is not applicable. [S.192]

2035

The Assessee Company was running a hospital. It engaged certain professional doctors to provide full time services to the patients as per contract for service entered with them. The professional doctors shared fees received from the patients, their remuneration was not fixed and they were free to render service to the patients as they considered appropriate in terms of time or duration. The assessee company deducted tax u/s. 194J from the payments made to them treating the payments as professional fees. AO held that there was employer and employee relationship between assessee and doctors and tax was to be deducted at source u/s. 192. The CIT(A) analysed the agreement with doctors and hospital. He found that the doctors enjoyed complete professional freedom, they define working protocol, have free hand in treatment of patients and there was no control of the hospital by way of any direction to the doctors on the treatment of patients. Doctors fixed their own OPD hours and were available on call in case of emergency. They were working in their professional capacity and not as employees. Therefore Commissioner (Appeals) held that AO was not right in concluding that there existed an employer-employee relationship between the hospital and the professional doctors. Thus, invocation of section 192 was not justified. On appeal Tribunal observed and held that there does not exist employer-employee relationship between the assessee appellant and the persons providing professional services. On consideration of the agreement in its entirety evident that it is not a case of employer - employee relationship between the assessee appellant and the doctors. Hence, Tax was to be deducted at source under section 194J as professional charges. (AY. 2009-10, 2010-11)

Dy. CIT (TDS) v. Ivy Health Life Sciences (P) Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 486 (Chd.)(Trib.)

Section 194L : Payment of compensation on acquisition of capital asset

S.194L : Deduction at source – Compensation on acquisition of capital asset – TDS should not be deducted from any payment made on or after 1-6-2000, and, therefore, deduction made by land acquisition officer was illegal and amount so deducted had to be returned to assessee

2036

Assessee's lands were acquired by Land Acquisition Officer. Compensation was paid to assessee in instalments from financial year 2000-01 to 2005-06 after deduction of tax at source. However, TDS certificate was issued in favour of assessee only in financial year 2005-06. Commissioner rejected application filed by assessee for refund of TDS due to alleged delay in filing of application. The Court held that since return were filed by assessee in same year in which TDS certificate was issued and assessee came to know about such deduction, there was no delay on part of assessee. Further, as per second

proviso to section 194L, TDS should not be deducted from any payment made on or after 1-6-2000, and, therefore, deduction made by land acquisition officer was illegal and amount so deducted had to be returned to assessee (AY. 2005-06)
Ashok B. Jadhav v. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 85 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

Section 194LA : Payment of compensation on acquisition of certain immovable property

2037 S.194LA : Deduction at source – Compensation for acquisition of immoveable property – Not liable to be deducted under section 194LA. [S.194LA]

Writ Petition was filed by assessee, contending whether Income-Tax liable to be deducted from the sale consideration at the time of transfer of an immovable property by a resident transfer? The Petitioner was apprehensive of deduction of Income- Tax and has filed the writ Petition for a direction to disburse the whole of the sale consideration without any deduction whatsoever relying on the decision of *Info park Kerala v. DCIT (2010) 231 CTR 479(Ker)* wherein it was held by the Court that such deduction is warranted only when there is compulsory acquisition. The respondent contended that the property agreed to be transferred is not an agricultural land hence provisions of section 194LA is not applicable. Allowing the Writ Petition, the court held that Petitioner was fully justified in his contention that tax was not liable to be deducted @10% of the sum under section 194-LA. The obligation to deduct tax u/s. 194-IA of the Act arises when consideration is payable to a resident transfer or on the transfer of immovable property otherwise than by land acquisition. It is up to petitioner to submit his return before the jurisdictional AO and take proceedings to a logical end in the determination of his tax liability.

M. C. Thomas v. District Collector and Ors. (2014) 264 CTR 437 / 49 taxmann.com 109 (Ker.)(HC)

2038 S.194LA : Deduction at source – Compensation on acquisition of certain immoveable property – The term “any sum” in s. 194LA TDS does not cover a case where there is no monetary consideration but Development Right’s Certificate (DRC) are issued. [S.190(1), 201(1), 201(IA)]

The issue that arises for consideration is as to whether provisions of section 194LA of the Act are applicable to a case where (a) there was no compulsory acquisition; (b) there was no payment of any monetary consideration.

(i) The process of surrender of land for public purpose by owners of land and issue of CDRs has no element of “Compulsory Acquisition” which is necessary to attract application of the provisions of section 194LA of the Act. The meaning of the term “compulsory acquisition” is that land should be taken under statutory powers without the agreement of the owner. It is clear from material brought on record that the surrender of land by owners was voluntary and in exercise of option under a notification laying down conditions for grant of TDR in exercise of powers u/s. 14-B of KTCP. It is also clear that BBMP wherever owners did not respond to offer of CDRs, BBMP has resorted to compulsory acquisition proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In the case of compulsory

acquisition there are procedure for objecting to the acquisition on the ground that the proposed acquisition is not for public purpose, requirement of notice, determination of compensation, payment of compensation and thereafter taking possession and ownership. Such elements are absent when land owners surrender their land to BBMP under the scheme of issue of CDRs. It is also clear that there is no process of quantification or determination of value of land acquired when BBMP takes over land under the CDR scheme. Whenever BBMP does compulsory acquisition of land and pays compensation, it duly deducts tax at source as required u/s. 194LA of the Act.

(ii) The provisions for deducting tax at source and paying it over to the Government on behalf of the recipient of the payment is in the nature of vicarious liability. The said liability can be easily and without any effort can be discharged when payment of compensation in a sum of money i.e., in the form of monetary compensation. At least in cases where the quantification of the sum of money takes place in terms of money but the payment or discharge of the liability is made by adjustment which is otherwise than by payment of monetary compensation, it can be said that there would still be a liability. But where neither there is quantification of the sum payable in terms of money nor actual payment in monetary terms, it would be unfair to burden a person with the obligation of deducting tax at source and exposing him the consequences of such default. The liability to pay tax is that of a third person and not that of BBMP and the spirit behind the provisions of Sec.190 of the Act has been totally lost sight of by the Revenue in the present case.

(iii) section 194LA of the Act would apply only when there is monetary payment. In this regard we find that provisions of section 194LA of the Act applies only when the person making payment should make payment of a “sum of money” which clearly indicates that the provisions of section 194LA of the Act are applicable only when payment is made in terms of money. The expression “any sum” used in section 194LA of the Act is a clear indication that those provisions are applicable only when payment is of consideration in terms of money. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had to interpret whether the expression “any sums paid by the Assessee in the previous year would also include donations in kind. section 194LA of the Act also uses the expression “any sum” which clearly indicates that it is only when payment is made in monetary terms that those provisions are attracted. The expression in section 194LA, “at the time of payment of such sum in cash or by issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode” means that payment can be in the mode of giving cash, or by issuing cheque or draft or any other mode like telegraphic transfer or mail transfer, via money order or postal order, bill of exchange, promissory note, electronic transfer like RTGS, NEFT etc. DRCs cannot be brought within the meaning of the expression “by any other mode” used in section 194LA of the Act. The rule of “*Ejusdem Generis*” in interpretation of statutes, which lays down that where general words follow enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned is fully applicable to the interpretation of section 194LA of the Act. The general word in section 194LA of the Act is “payment of such sum” and the mode of payment qualified is cash, issue of cheque or draft or by any other mode. The expression any other mode has therefore to be confined

only to payment of “any sum” in a mode other than cash, cheque or draft and not to a case where DRCs are issued. Even on this ground the order u/s. 201(1) & 201(1A) of the Act deserves to be quashed and is hereby quashed. (AY. 2010-11, 2011-12)

Chief Accounts Officer, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagar Palike v. ITO(2015) 113 DTR 209 / 167 TTJ 390 (Bang.)(Trib.)

2039 **S.194LA : Deduction at source – Payment of Compensation on Acquisition of Certain Immovable Property – Purchase of land under Chhattisgarh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam (CGNTGNA), 1973 – Not liable to deduct tax at source and consequently, there was no default u/s. 201(1). [S.201(1)]**

The assessee had acquired land for development of new capital city of the State from various landowners and paid compensation to them without deducting tax on the compensation paid to the landowners and hence, AO held that it is in violation of the provisions of section 194LA of the Act which, in turn, mandates that ‘any person responsible for paying to a resident any sum, being in the nature of compensation, shall at the time of payment of such sum, deduct an amount equal to 10 per cent of such sum as income-tax thereon.’

ITAT Held that, it is not in dispute that the CGNTGNA, 1973 has no power to compulsorily acquire the land and in fact, the ban on transfers in the specified zone is not a directive given by the assessee herein but it is the act of the State Government and the assessee has no role to play. In such an event of the matter, it may be inappropriate to assume that the transaction in question amounts to compulsory acquisition of land. As rightly pointed out by the assessee, compulsory acquisition of land is permitted only under the specific enactment whereas, the assessee herein has no power to acquire the land under any law for the time being in force.

If the power of acquisition is vested in the District Collector, the assessee cannot be indirectly assumed to have been vested with such powers in as much as the District Collector, in his capacity as a State representative, cannot be assessed to tax under the IT Act whereas, the assessee in its status as ‘local authority’ can suffer tax. Having regard to the distinction created between the two sets of ‘persons’, it has to be taken into its logical conclusion to hold that the assessee has no power to acquire the land; its duty is limited to entering into mutual settlements which cannot be equated to compulsory acquisition of land. Under these circumstances, the Assessing Officer as well as the Commissioner (Appeals) were not justified in holding that provisions of section 194LA are applicable in the instant case. Consequently, the assessee local authority cannot be treated to be in default under section 201(1) (AY. 2008-09)

Naya Raipur Development Authority v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 244 (Bilaspur)(Trib.)

Section 195 : Other sums

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Contract with non-resident firm for installation of machinery of sophisticated technology – Failure to demonstrate that recipient not taxable – Failure to establish that amount paid by assessee not taxable – Failure to mention in return that contract has separate components of sale of machinery and installation of machinery and consideration for both was specified – Plea as to severality of two components not acceptable – Assessee was held liable to pay tax and interest. [S.201]

2040

The assessee was involved in the activity of filling liquefied petroleum gas. It entered into a contract with a firm from the USA to acquire machinery and installation thereof in the premises of the factory. A sum of US \$ 1,00,000 was paid as consideration. Since the assessee had not deducted tax at source, proceedings under section 201 were initiated and a notice was issued treating the assessee as assessee in default. The reply submitted by the assessee was that the amount was paid to a non-resident and the contract was mostly for supply of goods on purchase and on that account, there was no occasion to effect deduction of tax at source. That plea was not accepted by the Assessing Officer and an order was passed requiring the assessee to pay not only the tax which ought to have been deducted but also interest thereon. The appellate authorities confirmed this. On appeal :

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the assessee was not able to demonstrate that the person or agency whom it paid the amount was the one that was described in the first part of sub-section (1) of section 195 and thereby it was not under obligation to pay tax at all. Secondly, the assessee was not able to establish that the amount paid by it was not taxable. The amount was paid in the context of the installation of a machinery of sophisticated technology. In case the contract had separate components of sale of machinery on the one hand and the installation of machinery on the other hand and the consideration for both was specified, the assessee could have mentioned them in his return, in which case it was possible for the Assessing Officer to address the issue even from the point of view of sections 195 and 201. That not having been done and the plea not having been taken in its correct perspective in the proceedings initiated under section 201, the contention as to the severality of the two components could not be accepted. Therefore, the conclusion was that (i) the recipient of the amount did not qualify under section 195(1);(ii) the amount paid by the assessee was taxable; and (iii) the assessee was under obligation to effect deduction of tax at source. Since that was not done, no exception could be taken to the proceedings under section 201. (AY. 1994-1995)

Shakti LPG Ltd v. ITO (2014) 369 ITR 167 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 164 (T & AP) (HC)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Membership fees paid to International Press Institute(IPI) – IPI had no permanent establishment in India and assessee was not an agent of IPI – Section 9(1)(i) is held not applicable – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.9(1)(i)]

2041

IPI is a non-resident body and has no permanent establishment in India and therefore section 9(1)(i) does not apply at all. The said provision will apply only if there is any property, asset or source of income in India which belong to IPI and such source must

be used for earning income in India. Assessee is not an agent of IPI. The assessee is only a member of IPI and by giving advertisement membership fee or other donation the assessee is not getting any monetary advantage. Therefore, no liability to deduct tax arose u/s. 195. (AY 1999-00)

CIT v. Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 378 (Ker.)(HC)

- 2042 **S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Freight expenses to foreign carrier – Income of a non-resident is not chargeable to tax in India – Not required to deduct tax at source – DTAA – India – Germany. [S.9(1)(i), Art. 8]**

During the year under consideration, the assessee made payments of freight expenses to a foreign carrier located in Germany for the export of goods. The AO disallowed payment of freight expenses on ground that assessee did not deduct tax at source while making said payments. The Appellate Authorities confirmed the order of the AO. On further appeal, the HC observed that, in terms of Article 8 of the India Germany Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement ('DTAA'), payments in question were not chargeable to tax in India. The assessee, therefore, had no obligation to deduct any tax at source. (AY. 2005-06)

Poddar Sons Ex. L (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 476 / 223 Taxmann 94 / 271 CTR 165 (Cal.)(HC)

- 2043 **S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Commission to agent – Circular – Later circular withdrawing the earlier circular operative only from the date of issue – Earlier circular did not oblige assessee to deduct TDS – Expenditure allowable. [Ss.9(1)(vii), 40(a)(i), 119]**

During the relevant year, circular in force not obliging assessee to deduct TDS on commission paid to non-resident agents. Circular issued later withdrawing the earlier circulars operative only from the date of issue. Commission paid to non-resident agents allowable as expenditure. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Allied Exims (2014) 363 ITR 62/(2015) 230 Taxmann 84 (All.)(HC)

- 2044 **S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Agreement for procuring only orders does not involve any managerial services – Explanation to section 9(2) not applicable. [S.9(1)(vii), 40(a)(i)]**

Assessee appointed foreign agents for securing orders. Commission paid to agents disallowed on the ground that it is in violation of provisions of section 195 r.w.s. 9(1)(vii). Agreement was only for procuring orders which did not involve any managerial services. Explanation added to section 9(1)(vii) by Finance Act, 2010 with effect from 1-6-1976 was not applicable in view of fact that agents had their offices situated in foreign country and they did not provide any managerial services to assessee. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Model Exims (2014) 363 ITR 66 / 222 Taxmann 94 / 267 CTR 177 (All.)(HC)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Letter of credit – Assessee had privity of contract only with Indian Bank – No obligation to deduct to deduct tax at source. [S.201]

2045

The assessee paid certain amounts to Allahabad Bank for arrangement of letter of credit in favour of its foreign suppliers. The American Express Bank charged a certain sum as interest on the Allahabad Bank. The Allahabad Bank debited a sum of US \$ 1,16,468-70 + US \$ 3457-66 with certain other payments to American Express Bank which were recouped from the assessee. The amount of US \$ 3,457-66 which was collected by Allahabad Bank was treated as paid by the assessee to American Express Bank towards interest. On such amount, the assessee was treated as the assessee in default for non-deduction of tax at source u/s. 195 and demanded for a sum of ₹ 2,78,639 with further interest of ₹ 44,292 was raised on the assessee. On appeal :

Held, that the assessee had privity of contract only with the Allahabad Bank and the amounts were paid to Allahabad Bank. It was a different matter that Allahabad Bank in turn had made payments to American Express Bank. In that view of the matter, it could not be said that the assessee had any obligation to American Express Bank and in that view of the matter it could not be said that the transaction would fall within s. 195. Thus, there was no obligation on the assessee to make tax deduction at source u/s. 195. (AY. 1995-96)

Sriram Refrigeration Industries v. ITO (2014) 361 ITR 119 / 226 Taxmann 180 (AP)(HC)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Double taxation relief – Technical services – Service PE-Business support Services-Tax implications of employee secondment contracts explained – Payments was held to be taxable in India and Indian company was bound to deduct tax at source – DTAA – India – Canada-UK. [S.9(1)(i), 9(1)(vii), 90, Art.5, 12, 13]

2046

The High Court had to consider whether the consideration for secondment of employees by British Gas Trading Ltd, UK, (“BSTL”) and Director Energy Marketing Limited, Canada (“DEML”) to Centrica, India, for providing “business support services” constitutes “fees for technical/ included services” under Articles 12 & 13 of the India-Canada and India-UK DTAA’s and whether the presence of the seconded employees created a “service PE” in India for the foreign employers. HELD by the High Court:

(i) The overseas entities required the Indian subsidiary, CIOP, to ensure quality control and management of their vendors of outsourced activity. For this activity to be carried out, CIOP required personnel with the necessary technical knowledge and expertise in the field, and thus, the secondment agreement was signed since CIOP did not have the necessary human resource. The secondees are not only providing services to CIOP, but rather tiding CIOP through the initial period, and ensuring that going forward, the skill set of CIOP’s other employees is built and these services may be continued by them without assistance. In essence, the secondees are imparting their technical expertise and know-how onto the other regular employees of CIOP. Indeed, it is admitted by CIOP that the reason for the secondment agreement was to provide support for the initial years of operation, till the necessary skill-set is acquired by the resident employee group. The activity of the secondees is thus to transfer their technical ability to ensure quality control vis-à-vis the Indian vendors, or in other words, “make available[] their know-how

of the field to CIOP for future consumption. The secondment, if viewed from this angle, actually leads to a benefit that transmits the knowledge possessed by the secondees to the regular employees. Indeed, any other reading would unduly restrict the Article 12 of the DTAA, which contemplates not only a formal transfer of intellectual property, but also other techniques and skills (“soft” intellectual property) required for the operation of a business. The skills and knowledge required to ensure that the task entrusted to CIOP – quality control – is carried on diligently certainly falls within the broad ambit of Article 12;

(ii) CIOP’s arguments that it is not liable to deduct income tax u/s 195 on the ground that (i) there is no service PE, since CIOP is the economic employer. Whilst the overseas entities are only the legal employers, (ii) the payment made by CIOP to the overseas entities is only by way of reimbursement, which does not form part of the income of those entities, and in any case, (iii) that payment is not the income of the overseas entities on account of the doctrine of “diversion of income by overriding title” are not acceptable;

(iii) The argument that there is no “service PE” is not acceptable because though CIOP has operational control over these persons in terms of the daily work, and is responsible (in terms of the agreement) for their failures, these are limited and sparse factors which cannot displace the larger and established context that the persons continue to be employees of the foreign parties (Morgan Stanley, OECD Commentary & referred);

(iv) The argument that the payment is a “reimbursement” on the ground that it is described as such in the secondment agreement and that there is no mark-up is not acceptable. It would lead to an absurd conclusion if, all else constant, the fact that no payment is demanded negates accrual of income to the overseas entity. Instead, the various factors concerning the determination of the real employment link continue to operate, and the consequent finding that provision of employees to CIOP was the provision of services to CIOP by the overseas entities triggers the DTAAs. The nomenclature or lesser-than-expected amount charged for such services cannot change the nature of the services. Once it is established that there was a provision of services, the payment made may indeed be payment for services – which may be deducted in accordance with law – or reimbursement for costs incurred. This, however, cannot be used to claim that the entire amount is in the nature of reimbursement, for which the tax liability is not triggered in the first place.

(v) The argument that there is a “diversion of income by overriding title” on the basis that the payment made to the overseas entity is not income that accrues to the overseas entity, but rather, money that it is obligated to pass on to the secondees is also not acceptable for two reasons. One, in view of the findings that: (a) the payment is not in the nature of reimbursement, but rather, payment for services rendered, (b) the employment relationship between the overseas entities and CIOP – from which the former’s independent obligation to pay the secondees arises – continues to hold, no obligation to use money arising from the payment by CIOP to pay the secondees arises. The overseas entities’ obligation to pay the secondees arises under a separate agreement, based on independent conditions, in relation to CIOP’s obligation to pay the overseas entity. Assuming the agreement between CIOP and the overseas entity envisaged a certain payment for provision of services (and not styled as reimbursement). Surely no

argument could be made that such payment is affected by the doctrine of diversion of income by overriding title. If that be the case, then the fact that the payment under the secondment agreement is styled as reimbursement, and limited on facts to that, without any additional charge for the service, cannot be hit by that doctrine either. The money paid by CIOP to the overseas entity accrues to the overseas entity, which may or may not apply it for payment to the secondees, based on its contractual relationship with them. This, at the very least, is independent of the relationship and payment between CIOP and the overseas entity. Reimbursement of salaries was payment for technical services. Payment accrued to overseas entities. On facts this is not a case of diversion of income by overriding title. Payments taxable in India and Indian company is bound to deduct tax at source. (W.P. No. 6807 of 2012, dated 25-4-2014).

Centrica India Offshore Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT(2014) 364 ITR 336 / 104 DTR 33 / 224 Taxmann 122/270 CTR 1(Delhi)(HC)

Editorial: SLP of assessee was dismissed. Centrica India Off shore (P) Ltd. v. CIT (SLA No 22295 of 2014 dated 10-10-2014 (2014) 227 Taxmann 368 (SC)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Tax was not be deducted on remittance of capital gains as it was exempt under Article 13 of India-UAE DTAA. [Art. 13]

2047

Assessee bank remitted sale proceeds on Government securities to foreign nationals. The AO alleged that tax was to be withheld on the same. It was held that the assessee was not liable to deduct tax at source as the capital gains was exempt under Article 13 of the DTAA between India and UAE. (ITA No 341 of 2012 dt. 21-8-2014)

DIT (IT) v. ICICI Bank Ltd. (2014) 226 Taxmann 335 / (2015) 370 ITR 17 / 116 DTR 414 (Bom)(HC)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Artist – Remuneration-Commission paid to an agent for services rendered abroad and payment by way of reimbursement of expenses are not taxable in India-DTAA-India-UK. [S.90, 201, Art. 7, 18]

2048

The assessee paid remuneration to the artists, to the agent and reimbursed the expenses in connection with the visit and performance of the artists in India. The assessee deducted tax at source on fees paid to the international artists in India. Tax was deducted at source on the payment made to artists for performance in India but it was not deducted at source on the commission paid to Mr. Colin Davie who acted as an agent between the assessee and the artists performed in India. Under Article 18 of the India-UK DTAA, the payment made to the artists and by way of reimbursement has been completely misconstrued in as much as the agreements with the artists and the understanding with Mr. Colin Davie would indicate that the payment of commission to him is not covered by Article 18. Mr. Colin Davie never took part in the event organised. He did not exercise any personal activities in India. Mr. Colin Davie did not act as a performing artist or entertainer, all that he was concerned are the services which were rendered outside India. He contacted the artists and negotiated with them for performance in India in terms of the authority given by the assessee. The CIT(A) and Tribunal rightly arrived at the conclusion that Mr. Colin Davie did not perform any

services in India, but they were rendered outside India. Therefore, commission income to the agent is not liable to tax in India and there was no obligation on the part of the assessee to deduct the tax at source at the time of making of payment. In so far as payment or reimbursement of expenses in connection with the visit and performance of the artists in India, the amount reimbursed to them was towards air travel and was supported by documents. On that tax need not be deducted.

DIT v. Wizcraft International Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 227 / 223 Taxmann 250 / 104 DTR 68 / 269 CTR 108 (Bom.)(HC)

2049 **S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Royalty Payment for user of software – Not liable to deduct tax at source – DTAA – India-Singapore. [S.9(1)(vii), 90, Art. 12]**

The Tribunal held that the assessee has acquired a readymade off and shelf computer programme to be used in their business and no right was granted to the assessee to utilize the copyright of the programme and therefore consideration cannot be treated as royalty. It is neither royalty under Art. 12 of DTAA nor fee for technical service under section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act and no tax need to be deducted under section 195 of the Act. The Tribunal dismissed the ground raised by the revenue. (ITA No. 918 / Hyd. / 2010 dated 27-1-14)

ADIT v. Bartronics India Ltd. (2014) 62 SOT 141(URO) / (2015) 168 TTJ 595/ 120 DTR 1 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

2050 **S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Reimbursement of sea freight – Not liable to deduct tax at source – No disallowance can be made. [S.40(a)(ia), 194C]**

Where payment on account of reimbursement of sea freight was made to agents of non-resident ship-owners, no TDS was to be deducted under section 194C or 195 and, accordingly no disallowance could be made under section 40(a)(ia). (ITA Nos. 407 & 540 (Jodh.) of 2007 & 360 (Jodh.) of 2008 dated 9-10-2014) (AY. 2004-05 & 2005-06)

Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 158 TTJ 4 / (2015) 67 SOT 26 (URO)(Jodh.)(Trib.)

2051 **S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Commission – Foreign agent – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.9(1)(i)]**

Commission made by assessee to its foreign agents for rendering services abroad was not taxable in India and, thus, assessee was not required to deduct tax at source while making said payments (AY. 2009-10)

ACIT v. Model Exims (2014) 64 SOT 4 (URO) 140 (Luck.)(Trib.)

2052 **S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Fees for technical services – Marketing agent – Payment made to foreign party was taxable in India – Liable to deduct tax at source. [S.9(1)(vii)]**

Assessee engaged company SR as marketing agent for South East Asian countries. Work of company SR was to identify potential customer and file a report regarding market strategy and developmental studies. Agreement did not enable company SR to

market product of assessee in South East Asian countries. Company SR only had to do survey and file a report so that assessee could market their product after considering report filed by foreign party. Marketing survey and identifying potential customers for assessee's product were only consultancy services and, therefore, payment made to foreign party was taxable in India and, hence, assessee was bound to deduct tax under section 195. (AY. 2004-05 to 2006-07)

English Indian Clays Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 25 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Co-owners – sale consideration was paid to non-resident co-owner, assessee was required to deduct tax at source while making said payment [S.54 F,195(2), 201(1)]

2053

Assessee purchased a property owned by two co-owners. One of co-owners was a non-resident who had executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of other co-owner to execute sale agreement. In course of assessment, Assessing Officer opined that since one of co-owner was a non-resident, assessee was required to deduct tax at source under section 195 while making payment of sale consideration. In view of provisions of section 195, to extent sale consideration was paid to non-resident co-owner, assessee was required to deduct tax at source while making said payment. Therefore, it is held that the assessee can be considered as an 'assessee in default' only to the extent of ₹ 60 lakhs paid to the non-resident. (AY. 2009-10)

R. Prakash v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 10 (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Reimbursement of expenses – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.40(a)(ia)]

2054

AO held that payments made by assessee to UK based company were not in nature of reimbursement of expenses and, hence, liable for deduction of tax under section 195. CIT(A) upheld order of AO. Therefore, reimbursement made by assessee to UK Company was not liable for TDS. (AY. 2008-09)

ITO v. AON Specialist Services (P) Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 78 (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Animation films – Outsourcing Facilities Agreement' – Payment was not for fees technical services – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.5(2)(b), 9(1)(vii),195, 201]

2055

Assessee company was in business of production of 2D and 3D animation films. Assessee got orders from various companies for production of animation films. During relevant years, assessee outsourced a part of project received from some of clients. In that process, assessee made payment to foreign companies as per agreement named as 'Outsourcing Facilities Agreement'. AO opined that payments made to foreign companies fell under 'fees for technical services' and thus said payments were taxable in India. Since there was no element of any technical services in production of animation films nor in production of a part or certain episodes of an animation film, provisions of section 9(1)(vii), read with section 5(2)(b) did not apply. Order of AO was set aside. (AY. 2006-07, 2008-09)

ADIT v. DQ Entertainment (International) (P) Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 152 / 164 TTJ 84 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 2056 **S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Hire charges – Credit entry attracts the provision – Disallowance of expenses was held to be justified. [S.9(1)(i)]**
 Assessee, a tax resident of Thailand, was engaged in execution of hydroelectric-power project of NTPC as a sub-contractor of another Thailand based company ITDL. ITDL provided certain machinery on hire to assessee-company. Assessee's case was that since it did not pay hire charges by cash or cheque and ITDL had merely adjusted hire charges from dues to assessee on account of contract work done for ITDL, there was no obligation to deduct tax at source on account of said expenses. Revenue authorities rejected assessee's claim. Method of settlement of accounts is of no consequence as even a credit entry attracts provisions of section 195. Therefore, impugned disallowance of hire charges on account of non-deduction of tax at source was to be confirmed. (AY. 2005-06 to 2008-09)
Right Tunnelling Co. Ltd. v. ADIT (2014) 64 SOT 109 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)
- 2057 **S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Business connection – Legal charges – Arbitration proceedings at Thailand – Not liable to deduct tax at source. – Article 22 of Model OECD Convention. [S.9(1)(i)]**
 Payment of legal expenses made by assessee to a law firm in Thailand in relation to arbitration proceedings conducted in said country, was not chargeable to tax in India and, thus, assessee was not required to deduct tax at source while making said payments. (AY. 2005-06, 2008-09)
Right Tunnelling Co. Ltd. v. ADIT (2014) 64 SOT 109 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)
- 2058 **S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Sales Commission – Rendering services outside India – Not liable to deduct tax at source. [S.9(1)(i), Model OECD Convention, Art 7]**
 Where assessee paid sales commission to its non-resident agents for services rendered by them outside India, sales commission was not chargeable to tax in India so as to deduct TDS on such payments. (AY. 2005-06, 2008-09, 2010-11)
Dy. CIT v. Farida Prime Tannery (P) Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 145 (URO) / 31 ITR 461 (Chennai) (Trib.)
- 2059 **S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – BSP link services rendered by ADP-GSI France was not in nature of fees for technical services – Not liable to deduct tax at source – DTAA – India-France. [S.9(1)(vii), Art.13]**
 Assessee was a branch office of IATA, Canada, established in India for undertaking certain commercial activities. IATA, Canada entered into an agreement with French company ADP-GSI in terms of which ADP-GSI provided BSP link services whereby manual operations such as issue of debit notes/credit notes, issue of refund, billing statement and all information relating to tickets were carried out electronically. BSP link services were provided among others to agents and Airlines operating in India for which invoices were initially raised by ADP-GSI on IATA, Canada who in turn raised invoices on IATA, India. AO treated payment made to ADP-GSI France for providing BSP link services to Agents/Airlines in nature of 'fees for technical services' as per Article 13 of

India-France chargeable to tax. It was noted from records that BSP link services provided by ADP-GSI did not make available to assessee any technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes so as to enable them to apply said technology. On facts, payment in question made for BSP link services rendered by ADP-GSI France was not in nature of 'fees for included services' within meaning of Article 13 of India-France DTAA, read with clause 7, of Protocol thereto. Therefore, assessee was not liable to deduct tax at source while making payments.

Dy. DIT v. IATA BSP India (2014) 64 SOT 290 / 164 TTJ 484 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Reimbursement of share of costs towards administrative and management support services in connection with technology updates etc is not taxable – Not liable to deduct tax at source.

2060

The assessee company is a member of the international organization of Ernst & Young and its several associate concerns worldwide. Ernst & Young Global Services LLP and Ernst Young UK LLP provide administrative and management support services in connection with technology updates, system and methodology and upgrades, training through webs etc. to the assessee and to other associate concerns of the Group. The assessee and its other associate concerns share the costs. A sum of ₹ 6,88,12,554 was reimbursed to Ernst & Young Global Services LLP and a sum of ₹ 23,78,781 to Ernst & Young UK LLP by the assessee during the current assessment year on account of its share of costs for such services. The said concerns were set up by member firms of Ernst & Young for providing resources to obtain best methodologies at a lower cost which in the present days of globalisation was imperative for any professional firm. Development of such methods by anyone concern would have been cost prohibitive apart from lacking uniformity and mutual compatibility. Accordingly, arrangement was arrived at for such services to be developed in pool by the said two concerns to which the member firms would have access to and reimbursing their respective shares of cost incurred there for. Such reimbursement was agreed on the basis of respective turnover of the member firms. These facts are not denied by revenue even now before us and these are reimbursement of expenses. Once these are reimbursement of expenses the assessee is not liable to deduct TDS u/s. 195 of the Act. (AY. 2003-04)

DCIT v. Ernst & Young Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 32 ITR 639 / 66 SOT 4 (Kol.)(Trib.)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Commission – Not liable to deduct tax at source – DTAA – India-Germany. [S.9(1)(vii), Art. 11]

2061

Assessee, is an 100 per cent export oriented unit, was exporting leather saddler and its accessories. It procured and executed orders through agents outside India and commission was paid to them but it did not deduct TDS from said payment. Assessee submitted that as per Circular No. 23 of 1969, dated 23-7-1969 and Circular No. 786 of 1969, dated 7-2-2000, it was not liable to deduct tax at source from said commission payment. However, AO made disallowance of commission on ground that aforesaid circulars were withdrawn *vide* Circular No. 7 of 2009, dated 22-10-2009 and that payment of commission was made in India. ITAT Held that, Obligation to deduct tax at source under section 195 is attracted only when the payment is chargeable to tax in

India. IT authorities having accepted that the non-resident recipient is not liable to pay any tax in India, the assessee-payer was not liable to deduct tax at source under section 195(1) in respect of the mobilisation and demobilisation costs reimbursed by it to the said non-resident company. Further, there was no element of Technical / Consultancy or Managerial Services in the services rendered by the non-resident agent. The services rendered by the non-resident agent were simply to procure orders from foreign buyers and to receive commission. Under the circumstances, the provision of section 9(1)(vii) are not applicable to the facts of the case and lastly, the payment of commission to non-resident was made outside India for the services rendered outside India and merely an entry in the books of account is made in India, for which it cannot be held that non-resident has received any payment in India. (AY. 2008-09)

Reliance International v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 86 (URO) (Luck.) (Trib.)

2062

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Fees for technical services – Since entire services rendered by foreign company to assessee in respect of phase one and two were outside India, then same would not be chargeable to tax in hands of foreign company in India. The amendment in section 9(1)(vi) by inserting Explanations 5 and 6 by Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect from 1-6-1976 also did not create any liability against the assessee – DTAA – India-UK. [S.9(1)(vi), Explanations 5 & 6] Art. 13]

Assessee had entered into an agreement with Project Orange of London to carry out work of designing, etc. in three phases - Under phase one Project Orange was to prepare project time schedule, scales, design report and other documents which were to be prepared in London. In phase two technical design and drawings so prepared were to be transported to India and these were imported to India under Customs Regulations. According to assessee payment made by it under phase one and two were not chargeable under Act as same did not constitute income in India in the hands of recipient. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that payment made by the assessee to the UK company was in the nature of fees for technical services within the meaning of Article 13(4)(c) of Indo-UK Treaty and taxable in India. The assessee was liable to deduct tax at source under section 195. He had also rejected the claim of the assessee regarding reimbursement and upheld the liability of tax imposed by the Assessing Officer. ITAT. Held that. in view of decision of Supreme Court in the case of *Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries v. DIT (IT) [2007] 288 ITR 408 / 158 Taxmann 259*, it has to be held that the entire services rendered by the foreign company to the assessee in respect of phase one and two was outside India. Therefore, the same cannot become chargeable to tax in the hands of the foreign company in India. If the amount paid by the assessee-company to the foreign company does not become chargeable to tax in India then the question of applicability of section 195 does not arise. Therefore, without considering the amendment made by Finance Act, 2012 it has to be held that there was no liability of the assessee to deduct tax at source on the payment made by it with respect to work relating to phase one and two. In respect of the Amendment by Finance Act, 2012 brought Explanations 5 and 6 into statute w.r.e.f. 1-6-1976, it was held that, issue is covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of the Tribunal in the case of *Channel Guide India Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [2012] 139 ITD 49 (Mum.) (Trib.)*. (AY. 2007-08).

New Bombay Park Hotel (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 61 SOT 105 (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Royalty – Payment for supply of software – Liable to deduct tax at source. [S.9(1)(vi)] 2063

The Tribunal held that the amounts paid for supply of software under a licence agreement is to be considered as royalty under the provisions of the Act and also under DTAA and liable to tax in India and directed the AO to deduct tax under section 195. (AY. 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06 & 2007-08)

Dy. DIT v. Reliance Infocom Ltd. (2014) 159 TTJ 589 / 29 ITR 132 / 64 SOT 137 (Mum.) (Trib.)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Fresh claim before CIT (A) – Refusal of AO to verify 2064

During assessment, AO noticed that assessee paid to one of its directors export commission but did not deduct tax at source u/s 195 and disallowed payment made u/s 40(a)(i). Assessee contended before CIT(A). That disallowance made u/s. 40(a)(i), increased total income but since assessee had claimed 100 per cent deduction u/s. 10B, disallowance so made was also eligible for deduction u/s. 10B or alternatively u/s. 10A. CIT(A) noticed that assessee was not eligible u/s. 10B since it did not satisfy conditions but for claiming deduction u/s 10A, hence, CIT(A) forwarded copy of documents filed by assessee to AO seeking his comments and also for verification of information, however AO declined to examine same with plea that new claims could be made by assessee only through revised return. CIT(A) allowed deduction u/s. 10A to assessee. Held, CIT(A) allowed deduction with observation that AO did not make any adverse comment against allowing deduction u/s. 10A but AO did not examine documents. In that case, naturally, AO would not make any comment, either positive or adverse. Thus, eligibility of assessee to claim deduction u/s. 10A needs to be examined at end of AO. Accordingly, restore matter of deduction before AO. Revenue's appeal partly allowed. (AY. 2009-2010) *ITO v. Device Driven (India) P. Ltd. (2014) 159 TTJ 1 / 97 DTR 53 / 29 ITR 263 (Cochin) (Trib.)*

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Payment for legal consultancy services – Income is not chargeable to tax in India-DTAA – India-Portugal. [S.9(1)(vii)(90, 201(1) & 201(1A); Art. 14 & 15] 2065

Assessee made payment for legal consultancy services to the non-resident who had no fixed base available to her for performing her duty or any PE in India and who was in India for 22 days only. Such payment is not taxable in India either u/art. 14 or 15 of the India-Portugal DTAA. The assessee was under no obligation to deduct TDS u/s. 195. Order passed under section 201(1) and 201(IA) was quashed. (AY. 2011-12)

Cedrick Jordan Da Silva v. ITO (IT) (2014) 98 DTR 314 / 62 SOT 239(Panji)(Trib)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – TDS obligation depends on law prevailing on date of payment and is not affected by retrospective amendment – No disallowance can be made under section 40(a)(i) read with section 9(1)(vii) if that law did not require TDS to be deducted. [S.9(1)(vii), 40(a)(ia)] 2066

In accordance with the law laid down in Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, which was good law at the time of the remittance, unless the services are rendered in India, the same cannot be brought to tax as 'fees for technical services' u/s. 9. Though the

law was amended retrospectively, so far as tax withholding liability is concerned, it depends on the law as it existed at the point of time when payments, from which taxes ought to have been withheld, were made. The tax deductor cannot be expected to have clairvoyance of knowing how the law will change in future. A retrospective amendment in law does change the tax liability in respect of an income, with retrospective effect, but it cannot change the tax withholding liability, with retrospective effect. As there is no material whatsoever to establish that the design and development services were rendered in India, the assessee did not have any liability under section 195 r.w.s. 9(1)(vii) to deduct tax at source from these payments. As a corollary thereto, no disallowance can be made in respect of these payments u/s. 40(a)(i). (ITA No. 256/ Agr/2013. dt. 14-2-2014.) (AY. 2008-09)

DCIT v. Virola International(2014) 162 TITJ 112 / 147 ITD 519(Agra)(Trib.)

- 2067 **S.195 : Deduction at source – Non-resident – Other sums – Film production services – Services rendered by the non-resident company to the applicant company fall under the definition of ‘work’ u/s. 194C & the payments made thereafter by the applicant to the said company were not taxable in absence of any PE of the latter in India & consequently, the said payments would not suffer withholding of tax u/s. 195-DTAA – India-Brazil. [S.9(1)(i), 90, 194C, Art. 7, 12]**

The applicant was a resident company incorporated under the companies Act, 1956. It was engaged in the business of producing & distributing television programmes. The assessee entered into an agreement with the Brazilian country Utopia Films for availing line production services. For the purposes of shooting a programme / show outside India, it engaged a foreign company for receiving line production services under an agreement. The issue was whether line production services provided by the non-resident company to the applicant company fall under the definition of ‘work’ u/s. 194C & payments thereof were taxable or not. The court held that that the services rendered by the non-resident company to the applicant company fall under the definition of ‘work’ u/s. 194C & the payments made thereafter by the applicant to the said company were not taxable in absence of any PE of the latter in India & consequently, the said payments would not suffer withholding of tax u/s. 195. (AAR Nos. 1081/1082 of 2011 dt. 19-2-2014)

Endemol India (P) Ltd. v. (2014) 361 ITR 658 / 99 DTR 397 / 222 Taxmann 67 / 266 CTR 142 (AAR)

Section 197 : Certificate for deduction at lower rate.

- 2068 **S.197 : Deduction at source – Certificate for deduction at lower rate – AO directed to reconsider application u/s. 197 where he rejected the application without assigning any reasons for the same.**

The assessee made an application u/s. 197 for no deduction of tax certificate since it was successively under a loss from the AY. 2010-11 to the AY. 2013-14. The AO without furnishing any reasons, rejected the application of the assessee.

The High Court observed that there were no reasons assigned as to why the application

of the assessee was rejected. Accordingly, the AO was directed to reconsider the application in the light of the various materials which were placed by the assessee on record and in accordance with law. (AY. 2014-2015)

Vodafone Cellular Ltd v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 137 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

S.197 : Deduction at source – Certificate for deduction at lower rate – An application for certificate of deduction at lower rate can be made even before the commencement of financial year. [S.194 C,194I]

2069

The assessee was entitled to file an application for a certificate of deduction at a lower rate even before the commencement of the financial year in which that tax is to be deducted. (FY. 2013-14)

Indus Towers Ltd. v. ACIT(TDS) (2014) 364 ITR 114 / 220 Taxmann 402 / 104 DTR 77 (Delhi)(HC)

Section 197A : No deduction to be made in certain cases

S.197A : Deduction at source – No deduction to be made – Delay in filing declarations – Does not provisions of section 201 and 201(IA) – Not liable to pay interest. [Form No. 15G, 15H, 201,201(IA)]

2070

During the course of survey it was found that the assessee had short deducted tax at source and in some cases it had not deducted the tax at source. The assessee contended that it had obtained the forms 15G and 15H but had not filed the same with CIT. The AO rejected the contentions of the assessee and determined the tax payable under section 201 and interest payable under section 201(IA). On appeal to Tribunal, Tribunal following the decision in *Vipin P. Mehata v. ITO, 11 Taxmannn.com 342 (Mum.) (Trib.)* held that if the assessee has delayed the filing of declaration with the office of the jurisdiction CIT, within the time limit specified in the Act, that is a distinct omission or default for which penalty is prescribed. Merely because there was a failure on the part of the assessee bank to submit these declarations to the jurisdictional Commissioner within time, it cannot be held that the assessee did not have declarations with him at the time when the assessee Bank paid the interest to the payees. Appeal of assessee was allowed. (ITA no 2672 to 2674/Del/2013 dated 14-3-2014). (AY. 2007-08, 2009-10) *Vijay Bank v. ITO (2014) BCAJ-July-P.32(Delhi)(Trib.)*

Section 199 : Credit for tax deducted

S.199 : Deduction at source – Credit for tax deducted – Sub-contract – Assessee not entitled to credit of tax deduction at source on amount paid to sub-contractor. [S.4]

2071

The assessee, a civil contractor, was assessed with respect to the income arising from works executed by it as well as works executed by the sub-contractor on its behalf. The AO initially sought to bring to tax the entire income relating to the contract to the extent it was executed by the sub-contractors and was also assessed in the hands of the sub-contractors, treating it as the receipts of the assessee. The issues were settled by the Tribunal whereby the turnover relating to the sub-contracts corresponding to the tax deducted at source amounts were deleted. Pursuant to the order of the Tribunal, the AO

treated the tax deducted at source as income of the assessee and brought the amount to tax. The CIT(A) held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal restored the order of the AO. On appeal :

Held, dismissing the appeals, that on account of the earlier proceedings, the amount received by the assessee on account of tax deducted at source was treated as part of the commission, which the assessee was entitled to receive under the agreement entered into with the sub-contractor. The amount was rightly treated as income for the respective assessment years. Therefore, the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of treating the amounts initially deducted as tax at source as part of the tax paid by the assessee. (AY. 1988-1989, 1989-1990)

D. Rama Kotaiah and Co. v. ACIT (2014) 368 ITR 441 (T & AP)(HC)

2072 **S.199 : Deduction at source – Credit for tax deducted – Directed to refund the tax deposited on behalf of D credit of such refund was only to be given to D.**

As per the order of tax authorities the tax was TDS was deposited on behalf of D. Against the said order writ petition was filed and the Court held that the such income was not taxable in India and tax authorities were directed to pass fresh orders excluding the income received by D. Subsequently the assessee requested the tax authorities that it is entitled for refund of TDS deposited on behalf of D but the department refuted the claim by holding that since TDS was deposited on behalf of D and D had claimed the credit for such TDS deposited in its return of income. Petitioner company was not entitled for such refund. On writ the Court held that since TDS was deposited by petitioner company on behalf of D, credit of such refund was only to be given to D. Court also directed the respondent to deposit the said amount along with interest in accordance with law in this court. (AYs. 1990-91, 1991-92)

Grasim Industries Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 90 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

2073 **S.199 : Deduction at source – Credit for tax deducted – assessee filed revised return claiming credit of TDS which was not made in original return. [S.139(5), 264]**

Assessee did not claim TDS credit by mistake in original return filed. On receiving the intimation under section 143(1), the assessee came to know that there was a mistake in not claiming credit of the TDS. Thereafter, immediately within a period of two months, the assessee submitted the revised return claiming credit of TDS. The revised return submitted by the assessee is within the prescribed period of limitation as provided under sub-section (5) of Section 139, it cannot be said that revised return submitted by the assessee was not within the limitation period. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, revised return submitted by the assessee was within the period of limitation prescribed and therefore, the same ought to have considered. it is not disputed by the department that in fact tax was not TDS and the same was not deposited with the department and it is not disputed that as such assessee is not entitled to credit for the TDS already deposited with the department, particulars of which are mentioned in form No. 26 (AS). (AY. 2010-11)

Manoharlal Agarwal v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 138 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

2074

S.199 : Deduction at source – Credit for tax deducted-Refund – Assessee cannot be denied credit for TDS on the ground of Form 26AS mismatch because he is not at fault. Non-grant of TDS credit causes harassment, inconvenience & makes the assessee feel cheated. Department to pay interest + costs of ₹ 25,000. [S.154, 237, 243, Form 26AS]

The assessee filed a return in which he claimed a refund of ₹ 2.32 lakhs on account of excess TDS by the Government department. The return was processed by the Central Processing Centre (CPC) of the Income-tax Department at Bangalore and a refund of only ₹ 43,740 was issued. No intimation was given to the assessee as to why the balance amount of ₹ 1,88,630 was not refundable. The assessee filed an application u/s. 154 for rectification of the mistake and asked for refund of the balance amount. As there was no response from the department despite several reminders, the assessee filed a writ petition in the High Court. HELD by the High Court allowing the Petition:

On facts, no effort has been made by the AO to verify whether the deductor had made the payment of the TDS in the Government account. On the other hand, the Income-tax department has shown helplessness in not refunding the amount on the sole ground that the details of the TDS did not match with the details shown in Form 26AS. There is a presumption that the deductor has deposited TDS amount in the Government account especially when the deductor is a Government department. By denying the benefit of TDS to the Petitioner because of the fault of the deductor causes not only harassment and inconvenience, but also makes the assessee feel cheated. There is no fault on the part of the Petitioner. The fault, if any, lay with the deductor. The mismatching is not attributable to the assessee. The department must refund the amount within 3 weeks with interest. The department must also pay costs of ₹ 25,000 to the Petitioner.

Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. UOI (2014) 365 ITR 143 / 225 Taxmann 198 (Mag.) / (2015) 276 CTR 379/ 117 DTR 52 (All.)(HC)

2075

S.199 : Deduction at source – Credit for tax deducted – Refund – Assessee cannot be denied credit for TDS on the ground of Form 26AS mismatch because he is not at fault. Non-grant of TDS credit causes harassment, inconvenience & makes the assessee feel cheated. Department to pay interest + costs of ₹ 25,000. [S.154,237, 243, Form 26AS]

The assessee filed a return in which he claimed a refund of ₹ 2.32 lakhs on account of excess TDS by the Government department. The return was processed by the Central Processing Centre (CPC) of the Income-tax Department at Bangalore and a refund of only ₹ 43,740 was issued. No intimation was given to the assessee as to why the balance amount of ₹ 1.88,630 was not refundable. The assessee filed an application u/s. 154 for rectification of the mistake and asked for refund of the balance amount. As there was no response from the department despite several reminders, the assessee filed a writ petition in the High Court. HELD by the High Court allowing the Petition:

(i) The difficulty faced by the tax payers relating to credit of TDS was considered by the Delhi High Court in *Court On its Own Motion v. CIT (2013) 352 ITR 273* and the CBDT was directed to issue directions with regard to giving credit of unmatched and mismatched TDS certificates. Pursuant thereto, the CBDT issued Instruction No. 5 of 2013 dated 8-7-2013 directing that where the assessee approaches the AO with requisite

details and particulars in the form of TDS certificate as evidence against any mismatch amount the AO would verify whether or not the deductor had made payment of the TDS in the Government account and, in the event, the payment had been made, credit of the same would be given to the assessee.

(ii) On facts, no effort has been made by the AO to verify whether the deductor had made the payment of the TDS in the Government account. On the other hand, the Income-tax department has shown helplessness in not refunding the amount on the sole ground that the details of the TDS did not match with the details shown in Form 26AS. There is a presumption that the deductor has deposited TDS amount in the Government account especially when the deductor is a Government department. By denying the benefit of TDS to the Petitioner because of the fault of the deductor causes not only harassment and inconvenience, but also makes the assessee feel cheated. There is no fault on the part of the Petitioner. The fault, if any, lay with the deductor. The mismatching is not attributable to the assessee. The department must refund the amount within 3 weeks with interest. The department must also pay costs of ₹ 25,000 to the Petitioner. (ITA No. 657 of 2013. dated 6-5-2014.)

Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. UOI (2014) 365 ITR 143 / 225 Taxmann 198(Mag.) (2015) 276 CTR 379(All.) (HC)

2076 **S.199 : Deduction at source – Credit for tax deducted – Rule 37BA (credit for TDS) inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2009 to mitigate hardship to taxpayers has to be treated as being retrospective in nature. [R.37BA]**

Rule 37BA of the Rules clearly mentions that credit for tax deducted at source and paid to the Central Government shall be given to the person provided that the deductee files a declaration with the deductor and the deductor reports the tax deduction in the name of other person in the information relating to deduction of tax referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 37BA of the Rules. Further, sub-rule (3) of Rule 37BA of the Rules provides that for the purpose of giving credit in respect of tax deducted in terms of provisions of Chapter XVII for the purpose of giving credit to a person other than those referred to in sub-section (1) and also the assessment year in which such credit may be given. In view of the above provision of section 37BA of the Rules and the provisions of section 199(1) of the Act, the credit for tax deduction could be given to the person from whose income, tax has been deducted. The Rule as amended by the Amendment Rules, 2009 w.e.f. 1-4-2009 makes it abundantly clear that the credit will be given based on the information by deductor. The proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 37BA of the Rules mitigates the hardship faced by assessee for claiming credit of TDS whereby deductee files a declaration with the deductor and the deductor reports the tax deduction in the name of other person in the information relating to deduction of tax as referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 37BA of the Rules. In such provisions of law, the assessee should have been allowed credit for TDS in the given set of facts and circumstances of the case. The only issue is that the amended provision is applicable w.e.f. 01.04.2009 and the relevant assessment year involved is 2008-09. Whether the amended Rule as amended by Amendment Rules, 2009 is a beneficial provision mitigating the hardship of the assessee and in turn the same can be declared as retrospective and will apply to all pending matters. Similar issue was dealt by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Allied Motors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CIT (1997) 224 ITR 677 (SC), wherein it has been held that “the provisions of the first proviso, which has newly been inserted by the Finance Act, 1987, with effect from 1st April, 1998, to section 43B is remedial in nature, designed to eliminate unintended consequences which may cause undue hardship to the assessee and which made the provision unworkable or unjust in a specific situation, and is of clarificatory nature and, therefore, has to be treated as retrospective with effect from 1st April, 1984, the date on which section 43B has newly been inserted by the Finance Act, 1983.” Similarly, here also the Rule was inserted by the Amendment Rules, 2009 to remove the hardship faced by assesseees and to give true meaning to the provision of section 199 of the Act. In such circumstances, I direct the AO to allow the credit of TDS after verifying declaration to be filed by deductee in term of proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 37BA of the Rules. (ITA No.2417 / Kol / 2013, dated 2-9-2014. (AY. 2008-09) *Parmanand Tiwari v. ITO (2015) 67 SOT 383 (Kol.)(Trib.)*)

S.199 : Deduction at source – Credit for tax deducted – Assessee cannot be denied credit for TDS on the ground of discrepancy in Form 26AS filed by the deductor. [Ss.198, 203AA, 206C(5), Form 26AS]

2077

Though Form 26AS (r/w r.31AB and ss. 203AA and 206C(5)) represents a part of a wholesome procedure designed by the Revenue for accounting of TDS (and TCS), the burden of proving as to why the said Form (Statement) does not reflect the details of the entire tax deducted at source for and on behalf of a deductee cannot be placed on an assessee-deductee. The assessee, by furnishing the TDS certificate/s bearing the full details of the tax deducted at source, credit for which is being claimed, has discharged the primary onus on it toward claiming credit in its respect. He, accordingly, cannot be burdened any further in the matter. The Revenue is fully entitled to conduct proper verification in the matter and satisfy itself with regard to the veracity of the assessee's claim/s, but cannot deny the assessee credit in respect of TDS without specifying any infirmity in its claim/s. Form 26AS is a statement generated at the end of the Revenue, and the assessee cannot be in any manner held responsible for any discrepancy therein or for the non-matching of TDS reflected therein with the assessee's claim/s. Where so, no doubt a matter of concern, is one which is to be investigated and pursued by the Revenue, which is suitably armed by law therefor. The plea that the deductor may have specified a wrong TAN, so that the TDS may stand reflected in the account of another deductee, is no reason or ground for not allowing credit for the TDS in the hands of the proper deductee. The onus for the purpose lies squarely at the door of the Revenue. (ITA No. 4828 / Mum / 2012, dated 27-3-2014.) (AY. 2009-10) *LSG Sky Chef (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT(2014)106 DTR 202/163 TTJ 808 (Mum.)(Trib.)*

S.199 : Deduction at source – Credit for tax deducted – Association of persons – Credit for TDS given to person in whose hands income is assessable. [S.190]

2078

The assessee had claimed TDS on interest on bonds received by her on behalf of the AOP where she was member. Though the funds utilised and invested were of the AOP, the investment being in the name of assessee the TDS certificate was issued in the name of assessee, who then remitted the full amount of interest to the AOP. The AO held that such interest should be assessed in the hands of the assessee. The CIT(A) held that the

AOP being the beneficiary of the interest, the same should be assessed in hands of the AOP, but assessee could claim the credit for TDS.

On appeal by the department, the Tribunal held that since income is assessable in hands of AOP credit for the TDS shall also be granted only to the AOP and cannot be granted to the assessee. (AY. 2008-09)

ITO v. Ameer Hosang Mistry (2014) 29 ITR 397 /149 ITD 503 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 201 : Consequences of failure to deduct or pay

- 2079 **S.201 : Deduction at source – Failure to deduct or pay – Assessing Authority was justified in holding assessee to be “assessee-in-default” and directing it to pay amount so deducted with interest.**

In terms of section 201, it is Assessing Authority who is competent person to pass order holding assessee as ‘assessee-in default’ on account of non-deduction of tax at source or non-payment of tax so deducted to account of Central Government. Where assessee company having deducted tax at source from salaries paid to its employees, did not remit same to Central Government account, Assessing Authority was justified in holding assessee to be “assessee-in-default” and directing it to pay amount so deducted with interest. (AY. 2009-10 to 2011-12)

CIT v. Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxmann 134 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

- 2080 **S.201 : Deduction at source – Failure to deduct or pay – Recipient has paid the taxes – Revenue cannot recover from the deductor. [S.201(IA)]**

Where the deductee, recipient of income, had already paid taxes on amount received from deductor, the Department once again cannot recover tax from the deductor on the same income by treating the deductor to be the assessee-in-default for the shortfall in its amount of TDS. Further, the deductor’s liability to pay interest u/s. 201(1A) is to be determined considering the date of payment of tax by the concerned deductees. (AYs. 2008-09 to 2010-11)

CIT v. D. P. Vekaria (2014) 227 Taxmann 92 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

- 2081 **S.201 : Deduction at source – Failure to deduct or pay – Alternative remedy is available – Writ is not maintainable. [S.194H, Article 226]**

Assessee, a company, failed to deduct TDS and, hence, treated as assessee-in-default under section 201(1). Assessee filed writ petition against such order of Dy.CIT. Dismissing the petition the Court held that where assessee had statutory alternative remedies available in form of filing an appeal before Commissioner and further appeal to Tribunal if required. Invoking jurisdiction of High Court was disallowed. (AY. 2012-13)

Jagran Prakashan Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 39 (Mag.)(All)(HC)

S.201 : Deduction at source – Failure to deduct or pay – Limitation – Reasonable time – Even if the statute does not lay down a time limit, proceedings must be completed within a limitation period – Passing of order has to be within one year from the end of financial year in which proceedings under section 201(1) is initiated same time limit will apply for passing order under section 201(1A). [S.195, 153(1)(a), 201(1A)]

2082

In the context of a GDR/Euro issue by the assessee, the department claimed that the assessee ought to have deducted TDS u/s 195 on payment of fees to the fund managers etc. The Special Bench [*Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2009)122 TTJ 577(Mum) (SB)*] allowed the assessee's appeal *inter alia* on the ground that a time limit for initiation and completion of proceedings u/s. 201(1) & (1A) had to be read into the statute. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal: section 201 of the Act does not prescribe any limitation period for the assessee being declared as an assessee in default. If no period of limitation is prescribed, a statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What should be the reasonable period depends upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. Insofar as the Income-tax Act is concerned, section 153(1)(a) prescribes the time limit for completing the assessment, which is two years from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable. It is well known that the assessment year follows the previous year and, therefore, the time limit would be three years from the end of the financial year. This seems to be a reasonable period as accepted u/s. 153 of the Act, though for completion of assessment proceedings. Even though the period of three years would be a reasonable period as prescribed by s. 153 of the Act for completion of proceedings, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has taken the view that four years would be a reasonable period of time for initiating action, in a case where no limitation is prescribed. The rationale for this seems to be quite clear if there is a time limit for completing the assessment, then the time limit for initiating the proceedings must be the same, if not less. Nevertheless, the Tribunal has given a greater period for commencement or initiation of proceedings. Though section 201 does not prescribe any limitation period for the assessee being declared as an assessee in default yet the revenue will have to exercise the powers in that regard within a reasonable time. (AY. 1998-99)

DIT(IT) v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.(2014) 365 ITR 560 / 106 DTR 337 / 270 CTR 105 / 225 Taxmann 306 (Bom.)(HC)

DIT (IT) v. Larsen & Toubro (I) Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 560 / 106 DTR 337 / 270 CTR 105 (Bom.)(HC)

Editorial: SLP is granted (SLA (C) NO 1434 of 2015 dated 30-1-2015,) DIT (IT) v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. (2015) 231 Taxmann 231 (SC)

S.201 : Deduction at source – Failure to deduct or pay – Order passed by the AO without addressing various contentions – Matter remanded. [S.133, 197, Form No 15G, 15H]

2083

The assessee was two branches of a bank. During survey, it was noticed that the bank has failed to deduct tax at source under section 194A.

The AO held that the assessee had delayed in furnishing copy of the declarations by the depositors in Form 15G/15H to the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner in terms

of rule 29C(3) of the Income-tax Rules on or before the seventh day of the month, next following month in which the declaration is furnished by the depositors to the assessee. The AO also observed that Form 15G/15H filed with branch 'M' in most of the cases, were defective as all the columns were not filled up. The Assessing Officer treated both the assessee's as assessee-in-default under section 201(1). He raised demand and levied interest. CIT(A) confirmed the order of AO. On appeal the Tribunal held that, declarations furnished by depositors in Form 15H/15G were filed with Chief Commissioner. Nothing was available on record to show that Commissioner did make any comment about deficiency, if any, found in declarations filed in Form 15G/15H. AO made generalised observations without bringing supporting materials on record that assessee-bank had failed to remit TDS amount. AO passed impugned orders raising demand and charging interest without properly addressing various contentions of assessee hence the matter required fresh examination. Matter remanded.

(AY. 2010-11, 2011-12)

Ernakulam District Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. ITO (TDS) (2014) 34 ITR 662 / (2015) 152 ITD. 301 (Cochin)(Trib.)

- 2084 **S.201 : Deduction at source – Failure to deduct or pay – Limitation – Order passed by AO was prior to 31-3-2011 would not be a case of retrospective operation of provision of section 201(3)**

Legislature introduced limitation for passing order under section 201 by Finance Act, 2009 with effect from 1-4-2010. In respect of financial year before 1-4-2007 a period was prescribed saying that order may be passed on or before 31-3-2011. For relevant assessment years, order passed by AO was prior to 31-3-2011 would not be a case of retrospective operation of provision of section 201(3); it was only a regular operation of law. (AY. 2004-05, 2006-07)

English Indian Clays Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 64 SOT 25 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)

- 2085 **S.201 : Deduction at source – Failure to deduct or pay – Rent-Wharfage – First proviso to section 201(1) which had been made effective from 1-7-2012 could be applied retrospectively – Matter remanded [S.194I]**

First proviso to section 201(1) was applicable to pending matters also notwithstanding fact that it had been made effective from 1-7-2012. On facts stated under heading 'Deduction of tax at source - Rent', assessee would not be treated as assessee in default in case AO. was satisfied after due verification, that conditions stipulated by first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 201 had been fulfilled by assessee. However, in that situation also, assessee would be liable to pay interest under section 201(1A) at prescribed rate from date on which such tax was deductible under section 194I to date of furnishing of return of income by payee. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

Gujarat Pipavav Port Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2013)166 TTJ 159 / (2014) 149 ITD 23 (Rajkot)(Trib.)

S.201 : Deduction at source – Failure to deduct or pay – The payer is not liable for TDS default if the Dept. does not show that the tax could not be recovered from the recipient. [S.194A, 201(IA)]

The assessee, a bank, was held liable u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A) r.w.s. 194 A for failure to withholding TDS on interest paid by it to customers on deposits placed by them with the assessee. The assessee claimed that it could not be treated as an assessee-in-default as no steps had been taken to determine whether the recipients of the interest had paid tax thereon. HELD by the Tribunal allowing the appeal:

(i) A short deduction of tax at source, by itself does not result in a legally sustainable demand u/s. 201(1) and u/s. 201(1A). As held in *Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages vs. CIT(2007) 293 ITR 226*, taxes cannot be recovered once again from the assessee in a situation in which the recipient of income has paid due taxes on income embedded in the payments from which tax withholding requirements were not fully or partly, complied with. In *Jagran Prakashan v. DCIT 21 TM.com 489 (All)* it was held that the deductor cannot be treated an assessee in default till it is found that assessee has also failed to pay such tax directly. Thus, to declare a deductor, who failed to deduct the tax at source as an assessee-in-default, condition precedent is that the recipient has also failed to pay tax directly;

(ii) S. 201(1) seeks to make good any loss to revenue on account of lapse by the assessee tax deductor. However, the question of making good the loss of revenue arises only when there is indeed a loss of revenue and the loss of revenue can be there only when recipient had a liability to pay the tax and he has not paid tax;

(iii) The onus is on the revenue to demonstrate that the taxes have not been recovered from the person who had the primarily liability to pay tax, and it is only when the primary liability is not discharged that vicarious recovery liability can be invoked. Once all the details of the persons to whom payments have been made are on record, it is for the AO, who has all the powers to requisition the information from such payers and from the income tax authorities, to ascertain whether or not taxes have been paid by the persons in receipt of the amounts from which taxes have not been withheld;

(iv) As regards the levy of interest u/s. 201(1A), though the interest is compensatory in nature and is applicable whether or not the assessee was at fault, it is applicable for the period from the date on which tax was required to be deducted till the date when tax was eventually paid. In a case in which the recipient of income had no tax liability embedded in such payments, there will obviously be no question of delay in realisation of taxes and section 201(1A) will not come into play at all. (AY. 2001-02, 2007-08) *Allahabad Bank v. ITO (Agra)(Trib.),www.itatonline.org*

Section 204 : Meaning of “person responsible for paying

- 2087 **S.204 : Deduction at source – Person responsible for paying – Bar against direct demand on assessee – Upon issue of Form 16A TDS certificate, TDS credit has to be given to the payee even if there is Form 26AS mismatch or deductor is at fault for non-deposit of TDS with the Governmental in the form No. 26AS downloaded from the department site only partial credit was shown – Deducted shall be entitled to credit of the same, notwithstanding the fact that deductor may not have deposited the tax with department. [Ss.192, 198, 199, 201, 205, 221, Forms 16, 16A, 26AS]**

The tax was deducted by the employer from whom the assessee received both salary and consultation fees and the Form No. 16 & 16A were issued. In the Form No. 26AS down loaded from the department site only partial credit was appearing in favour of the assessee was shown. AO did not give full credit and raised the demand u/s. 221(1) of the Act, which was challenged by the assessee by way of Writ petition, allowing the petition the court held that Deductee is entitled to credit of tax deducted at source for which Form No. 16 or 16A were issued though in the Form No. 26AS downloaded from the department site only partial credit was shown. Court also held that if the department is of the opinion that deductor has not deposited the said amount of tax deducted at source, it will always open for the department to recover the same from the deductor. Deductee shall be entitled credit of the same, notwithstanding the fact the deductor may not have deposited the tax with the Government. (AY. 2010-11)

Sumit Devendra Rajani v. ACIT (2014)369 ITR 673 / 108 DTR 51 / 271 CTR 89 / 227 Taxmann 204 (Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

Section 206C : Profits and gains from the business of trading in alcoholic liquor, forest produce, scrap, etc

- 2088 **S.206C : Collection at source – Liquor business – Meaning of “buyer” – Licensee under State Act – Not a buyer – Tax cannot be collected from such a licensee. [U.P. Excise Act, 1910, S.41(e)(iii)]**

Held, that all the petitioners, who were retail vendors, were granted licence under the U. P. Excise Act, 1910, at the relevant time and since the maximum retail price was fixed by the Excise Commissioner in exercise of the powers conferred on him under section 41(e)(iii) of the U.P. Excise Act, 1910, the petitioners were excluded from the provisions of section 206C in view of Explanation (a)(iii) as the petitioners could not be termed “buyers”. Therefore, the demands created by the Assessing Officer against the distilleries on the basis that they had committed default in collecting tax at source in terms of section 206C from the petitioners could not be sustained and the distilleries were restrained from collecting any tax at source in view of the provisions of the Act. Licensee under State Act is not buyer. Tax cannot be collected at source from such a licensee.

Prateek Kumar v. UOI (2014) 362 ITR 444 / 98 DTR 128 (All.)(HC)

Ragavendra Prasad Mishra v. UOI (2014) 362 ITR 444 / 98 DTR 128 (All.)(HC)

Sankatha Shukla v. UOI (2014) 362 ITR 444 / 98 DTR 128 (All.)(HC)

S.206C : Collection at source – Scrap – Cotton waste – Not scrap within the meaning of Explanation (b) to section 206C – Not liable to collection at source – Form no 27C obtained from buyer filed in appellate proceedings – Technical breach liable to be condoned. [S.154, Form No. 27C]

2089

The Tribunal had specifically found that in the process of manufacture of cotton yarn, cotton waste came to be generated and the use of the waste by another manufacturer showed that it was used as raw material by the purchaser. Even the Revenue stated before the Tribunal that the cotton waste disposed of by the assessee was reused as raw material for manufacture of lower count of cotton yarn and it did not come under the definition of “scrap” as defined in Explanation (b) to section 206C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The conclusion of the Tribunal having been reached as a finding of fact, there was no question of law much less a substantial question of law to be considered in the appeal.

(ii) That the Tribunal had noted that the assessee had obtained Form 27C from the buyers of the cotton waste. In the course of the appellate proceedings, Form 27C was also filed before the assessing authority by applying the provisions of section 154. The Tribunal held that the assessee having filed the statutory form, viz., Form No. 27C, the technical breach was liable to be condoned. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Adisankara Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 233/226 Taxmann 44 (Mag) (Mad.)(HC)

S.206C : Collection at source – Scrap – Molasses produced during course of manufacturing of sugar is by-product and does not fall within meaning of scrap – Not liable to deduct collection at source.

2090

Molasses produced during course of manufacturing of sugar is by-product and does not fall within meaning of scrap as defined in Explanation (b) to section 206C. Assessee is not liable to deduct collect tax at source. (AY. 2007-08, 2010-11)

Nawanshahar Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 523 (Asr.)(Trib.)

Section S209 : Computation of advance tax

S.209 : Advance tax – Proviso to sub-section (1) of section 209 is prospective in nature and cannot be applied retrospectively – Interest u/s. 234B is not leviable. [S.234B]

2091

The language used in section 209(1) is regarding payment of advance tax in the financial year, therefore, the proviso is not attracted for the assessment year. The assessee was held to be not required to deposit any advance tax. In view of this fact, it was held that interest u/s 234B is not leviable. Since the assessee is not liable for advance tax, therefore it cannot be charged interest for failure to pay advance tax. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07)

Dy. DIT v. MGB Metro Group Buying HK Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 343 (Delhi)(Trib.)

Section 214 : Interest payable by Government**2092 S.214 : Interest payable by Government – Interest on refunds – Interest payable on the interest only in case of inordinate delays. [S.244A]**

Doubting the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *Sandvik Asia Ltd. v. CIT (2006) 280 ITR 643*, a bench of two learned Judges had referred the following question of law for consideration and authoritative pronouncement of a larger (3 judge Bench) by order dated 28-8-2012:

“The question which arises in this case is, whether interest is payable by the Revenue to the assessee if the aggregate of installments of Advance Tax of TDS paid exceeds the assessed tax?”

Answering the aforesaid question, the 3. judge Bench of the Supreme Court observed that in the case of *Sandvik Asia Ltd.’s (supra)* the Court was considering the issue whether an assessee who is made to wait for refund of interest for decades should be compensated for the great prejudice caused to it due to the delay in its payment after the lapse of statutory period. The Bench observed that in the facts of that case, the Court had come to the conclusion that there was an inordinate delay on the part of the Revenue in refunding certain amount which included the statutory interest and therefore the Supreme Court had directed the Revenue to pay compensation for the same not an interest on interest.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that only interest provided for u/s. 244A of the Act may be claimed by an assessee from the Revenue and no other interest on such statutory interest.

CIT v. Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals (2013) 358 ITR 291 / 262 CTR 269 (2014) 222 Taxmann 349 (SC)

2093 S.214 : Interest payable by Government – Interest on refund – Advance tax paid in excess of tax as assessed – Delay in paying – Interest on interest – Payable on such interest as compensation. [S.244A]

The assessee, paid advance tax which was excess of tax as tax assessed. There was delay in refund. Allowing the petition, the Court held that revenue was directed to pay simple interest at 9 per cent per annum for the period, i.e., from March 31, 1987, to December 22, 1998, to the assessee within a period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order, failing which the Revenue shall pay the penal interest at 15 per cent. per annum for that period. (AY. 1984-85)

Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 598 / 270 CTR 371 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 362 (AP)(HC)

2094 S.214 : Interest payable by Government – Interest on interest is not entitled as the payment was made as per direction of Court.

Where once refund of the amount collected towards advance tax and corresponding interest have been paid in compliance with direction issued by a Court, an assessee cannot claim interest on interest, independent of the order on the basis of which such payments are made. (AY. 1979-80)

CIT v. Sirpur Paper Mills (2014) 227 Taxmann 206(Mag.) / (2015) 118 DTR 326 (AP)(HC)

Section 215 : Interest payable by assessee**S.215 : Interest payable by assessed – Default in payment of advance tax – Delay in completion of assessment by the AO – Interest cannot be charged to the assessee [R.40]**

2095

Assessee filed its return of income and thereafter revised return on 29-7-1985 and 13-1-1986 respectively. Assessing Officer issued notice with regard to assessment on 9-6-1987. During assessment proceedings, second revised return was filed by assessee on 18-1-1988. Assessment was completed on 18-2-1988 and interest under section 215 was levied on assessee. The High Court held that since revised return was filed by assessee only on account of his omission or wrong statement made in initial return, period between filing of original return and filing of revised return could not enure to the benefit of assessee and thus, starting point for computing period of one year referred to in rule 40(1) would be date on which first revised return was filed. As the Assessing Officer did not complete assessment within a period of one year, any interest liability for period beyond that one year could not be foisted on assessee unless delay in not completing assessment within period of one year was clearly attributable to the assessee. Since filing of second revised return caused a delay in assessment, waiver of interest would be in respect of period commencing at end of one year from date of filing first revised return up to date of filing of second revised return. (AY. 1985-86) *Kelvinator of India Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 149 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)*

Section 217 : Interest payable by assessee when no estimate made**S.217 : Interest – Interest payable when no estimate filed – Levy of interest was held to be justified. [S.215, 217(IA)]**

2096

Held that sections 217(1) and (1A) both use the expression “on the making of the assessment”. Therefore, the interest could be imposed after income of an assessee stands computed pursuant to the assessment. The interest component had to be calculated in the computation form. The assessment order determines and decided disputes and quantifies the income. The computation form is not the assessment order but quantifies the tax demand/tax payable, interest payable under different sections by the assessee or in case of refund, refund and interest payable by the Revenue. In fact an order under section 217 should be passed after regular assessment has been made, when order get finality. (AY. 1988-89)

CIT v. R. R. Holdings P. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 445 /(2015) 231 Taxmann 659 (Delhi)(HC)

S.217(1A) : Interest payable by assessee when no estimate made–no interest leviable on failure to send estimate of advance tax when difference between returned income and assessed income due to ITO making estimation u/s. 145(2). [S.145]

2097

When there is a difference between the returned income and the assessed income due to Income-tax Officer making estimation under section 145(2) of the Act, levy of interest for failure to send estimate of advance tax would not be permissible u/s. 217.

DCIT v. Amol Dicalite Ltd. (2014)222 Taxmann 140(Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

Section 220 : When tax payable and when assessee deemed in default**2098 S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – Similar stay against Excise Department – Stay was granted by depositing 10 per cent of total demand.**

During pendency of appeal against demand, assessee applied for stay. It was noticed that in case of assessee during pendency of appeal before CESTAT, Division Bench of instant High Court stayed demand raised by Excise Department on condition that assessee had to deposit 10 per cent of total demand raised by Excise Department. It would be appropriate to direct assessee to deposit 10 per cent of total demand raised by Income-tax department in this matter also and on such deposit assessee's appeal should be heard (AY. 2005-06, 2010-11)

Belgium Glass & Ceramics (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 209 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

2099 S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – Directed to pay 50% of demand in installments – Financial strength of assessee was very sound – Writ dismissed.

Writ petition of assessee was dismissed on the ground that the AO granted installment and directed to pay only 50% of demand and the financial position was very sound. The writ petition was dismissed. (AY. 2010-11)

CHW Forge (P) Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 227 Taxmann 213 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)

2100 S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – High pitched assessments – Installments were granted.

The petitioners were individual assesses. The grievance expressed by the petitioners was that the Assessing Officer completed high pitched assessment hastily, without due and proper application of mind. The Assessing Officer added the amount transferred from assessee's own bank account from Delhi to Chennai, under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, as 'unexplained credit'. The other petitioner, who is the wife of the first petitioner, also took a similar stand. According to the petitioners, in these writ petitions, by no stretch of imagination, the transfer of fund from their own bank accounts cannot be termed as 'unexplained credit' and high pitched assessments were made ranging from 2.76 times to 11.24 times, which resulted in the huge tax demand of ₹ 1,71,92,770/- for the assessment years 2006-07 to 2011-12 and a sum of ₹ 91,07,655/- for the assessment years 2005-06 to 2011-12. The petitioners challenging the legality of the assessment orders, filed appeals before the appellate authority. They also moved applications for stay before the assessing officer, who found that the respective assessee have not furnished substantial explanation for the liquidity crunch/financial hardship and have not made out a case for stay and therefore, rejected the petitions for stay. The writ petitions allowed and the assessment orders are stayed on the condition that first petitioner shall deposit 15% of the tax demand of ₹ 1,71,93,770/- and the second petitioner shall deposit 25% of the tax demand of ₹ 91,07,655/- in five equated monthly instalments. (AY. 2006-07)

Akilan Ramanathan (Dr.) v. Jt. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 98 (Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Penalty – Concealment – Stay – Direction to deposit 50% of penalty was held to be proper. [S.220(6)] 2101

On the basis of documents seized in the course of search and seizure action, penalty order was passed. On application by the assessee for seeking stay of penalty order, appellate authority directed the assessee to pay 50% amount of total penalty as a condition of stay to coercive recovery. On writ the Court held that instruction No. 96 F dated 21-8-1969 does not consider cases where concealed income is unearthed because of search or other similar proceedings hence the assessee's reliance upon said instruction was not relevant, therefore direction of Appellate Authority did not require any interference. (AY. 2009-10)

Bhaskar Infrastructure & Developers v. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 210 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Stay – CIT (A) has the power to deal with stay application – Respondents are restrained from taking any coercive measure till the disposal of stay application by CIT (A).[S. 220(6)] 2102

When the appeal was pending before the CIT(A), the tax recovery officer passed an order attaching bank accounts of assessee. The assessee filed the Writ petition. Allowing the petition the Court held that it would be appropriate for the CIT(A) to dispose the stay application of assessee. Till such time the respondents are restrained from adopting any further coercive measures for recovery of its due. (AY. 2010-11)

Haresh Ravji Majithiya v. ACIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 211(Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Stay-CIT (A)-AO must deal with the prima facie merits – On merits if the order is favour of assessee by decision of superior forum, issue of financial hardship may not arise – Assessee was Directed to deposit 10% of demand and balance stayed till the disposal of appeal by CIT(A). [S.2(15), 220(6)] 2103

Court held that in view of introduction of proviso to section 2(15) earlier decision of assessee may not apply; however while rejecting the stay application AO must deal with the *prima facie* merits of the assessee's case in appeal and if the same is covered against the revenue in view of a decision of superior forum then the question of considering the issue of financial hardship may not arise. Financial hardship is relevant only when the assessee is unable to make out a case on merits for an unconditional stay of demand. On the facts assessee was directed to deposit 10% of demand and balance is stayed till the disposal of appeal by CIT (A). (AY. 2011-12)

Slum Rehabilitation Authority v. DIT (E) (2014) 112 DTR 209 / (2015) 275 CTR 40 (Bom.)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Stay of Demand – Writ – *Prima facie* case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss – Stay was granted by depositing 10 Crores as deposit. [S.226] 2104

The assessee was a wholly owned subsidiary of DHPL and all the shares of DHPL were held by Shroff group. For purpose of restructuring the group organization, certain equity shares in companies UPL and UEL transferred to assessee by Shroff group without any monetary consideration. The assessee treated said transaction as gift and same being capital receipt claimed to be not taxable. The Assessing Officer taxed under the head

'Income from other sources', a sum representing the market value of shares of UPL and UEL in hands of assessee holding that said transaction was transfer and not by way of gift and thereafter, he sought to tax same under section 28(iv). The assessee filed an appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) against the said assessment order. In the meantime, the Assessing Officer served a notice of demand. The assessee filed appeal against the said assessment order. The Commissioner (Appeals) after hearing the assessee disposed of the stay application and directed the assessee to pay 25 per cent of the demand in four equal monthly installments and directed for the stay on the recovery of the balance amount. On writ, the assessee prayed to set aside the order of Commissioner (Appeals). It was held that he assessee has more than just a strong *prima facie* case in this regard. The assessee case is supported by an order of the Tribunal in the case of *D. P. World (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2013] 140 ITD 694/[2012] 26 taxmann.com 163 (Mum.) (Trib.)*. The transaction involved a transfer of the shares which entitled the holder of the shares to the said flats. The Tribunal had held that simply because both the donor and the donee happened to belong to the same group cannot *ipso facto* establish that they have any business dealings and it is a case of a valid gift which is to be treated as capital receipt in the hands of the assessee, in the absence of any specific provision taxing a Gift as a deemed business income, provisions of section 28(iv) cannot be applied on the facts of the case. In view of the judgment of the Tribunal, the assessee has more than just a strong *prima facie* case for a stay. Prior to the transfer of the said shares the assessee held 1.59 per cent and 1.44 per cent of the equity shares of UPL & UEL respectively. After the transfer the assessee holds 21.35 per cent and 47.88 per cent of the equity shares in UPL & UEL. A refusal to grant a stay would in all probability entail a sale of the said shares to meet the demand. Upon a sale of the shares, the Shroff group would lose a substantial benefit of such a large share holding in both the companies. The Shroff group always held the shares. They transferred the shares to the assessee only for administrative convenience. If the assessee succeeds, ultimately the damage caused by the sale of the shares would be irreversible. They would lose the benefit of a large shareholding in both the listed companies permanently and irreversibly. Thus, if the stay is not granted, the assessee will suffer irreparable harm and injury. On the other hand, the conditions upon which we the stay will be granted will protect the revenue. The balance of convenience is also therefore, in favour of the assessee. Balance of convenience and the question of irreparable injury are relevant factors while considering an application for stay even in proceedings under the Income-tax Act. This would be by restraining the assessee from parting with possession of, selling, disposing of or in any manner whatsoever encumbering its shareholdings in UPL & UEL to an extent of ₹ 1000.00 crores pending the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) and with deposit ₹ 10.00 crores. (AY. 2010-11) *Nerka Chemicals (P) Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 103 DTR 249/272 CTR 143 / 226 Taxmann 272/ (2015) 371 ITR 280 (Bom.)(HC)*

2105 **S.220 : Collection and recovery tax-Stay – Income not chargeable – 23 percent of total tax demand was recovered – Demand for balance amount was stayed.**

Assessee filed stay petition against the Director (Exemption). Authority directed to pay the tax in ten equal installments. Assessee filed the writ petition and contended that

it was an agent of State Government and thus income earned in said capacity was not chargeable to tax. It was found that by way of adjustment of refund the revenue had already recovered 23 per cent of total tax demanded. In the interest of justice balance amount was stayed. (AY. 2010-11)

Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority v. Dy. DIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 104 (Mag.) / 112 DTR 210 / (2015) 273 CTR 317 (Bom.)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – Assessee in default – Stay on arrest of assessee company’s director – Stay granted for 15 days more for filing appeal to Tribunal 2106

High Court granted stay on the arrest of the assessee company’s director for 15 more days on the condition that the appeal against the penalty order passed by CIT(A) be filed before the Tribunal within 15 days.

Eqbal Inn & Hotels Ltd. v. CCIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 71(Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – Bank Account attached – assessee eligible for refund in subsequent years – Assessee agreed not to press for refund – Stay granted and also attachment lifted till disposal of appeal. [S.201(1), 201(IA)] 2107

Assessee filed an appeal before CIT(A) assailing order passed under section 201(1) and 201(1A). During pendency of appeal, ACIT (TDS) issued a communication to assessee to remit 50 per cent of demand, or else appropriate steps for recovery would be initiated under provisions of the Act. Further, Bank accounts of assessee were attached by revenue. Assessee was eligible for refund in subsequent years and it agreed that it would not press for refund of the said amount till the disposal of the appeal. High Court directed the AO to not take any precipitative action in regard to the outstanding dues. Further, it also directed to lift the attachment in respect of other bank accounts forthwith.

Hosmat Hospital (P) Ltd. v. CIT (TDS) (2014) 222 Taxmann 71(Mag) (Karn.)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – Adjustment of tax liability against refund – Right to refund not crystallized at the time of assessment – Interest charged for delay in payment of tax justified 2108

Assessee prayed for adjustment of its tax liability of assessment year 2006-07 against refund of income-tax for assessment year 2008-09. Assessing Officer accepted its claim, however, refund could not be computed as delay occurred in processing of return for assessment year 2008-09. Assessing Officer sought to charge interest for said delay on tax payable by assessee. The assessee challenged the demand of interest through a writ petition before the High Court. Rejecting the claim of the assessee, it was held that since right to refund was not crystallised at time of assessment and there was no unreasonable delay on part of department, charge of interest was justified. (AY. 2006-07)

Montecarlo Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 145((Guj.)(HC)

- 2109 **S.220 : Collection and recovery-Assessee deemed in default – Interest – Original assessment – Interest shall be computed with reference to the date reckoned from original demand notice and with reference to tax finally determined. [S.234B, 234C]**

For the year under consideration, the assessment was completed by the AO making certain additions. The CIT(A) granted substantial relief to the assessee. However, the Tribunal withdrew substantial relief granted by the CIT(A). Consequent to the Tribunal order, the AO passed the revised assessment order calculating interest under sections 234B, 234C and 220(2) from the date of original demand notice. Against the said assessment order, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A) who partly allowed the appeal with respect to interest u/s. 220(2) of the Act. The Tribunal reversed the order of the CIT(A). On appeal before the HC, the latter held that, in view of CBDT Circular no. 334 dated 3-2-1982, the interest under sections 234B, 234C and 220(2) shall be computed with reference to the date reckoned from the original demand notice and with reference to the tax finally determined. (AY. 1993-94)

Lenoleum House vs. Income-tax Officer (2014) 223 Taxmann 83(Mag.) (All.)(HC)

- 2110 **S.220 : Collection and recovery of tax – Stay of demand – When issue was decided in favour of assessee by an order of appellate authority for earlier years, assessee would not be considered to be assessee in default – Stay against demand of tax should be granted.**

The Court held that in spite of the order of the Tribunal and CIT(A) on identical issues for the earlier assessment years 2005-06 to 2011-12, the AO in its order for the assessment year 2012-13 has ignored them. Court held that in hierarchical system of jurisprudence, it is not open to lower authority to ignore the binding decision of a superior authority unless the order of the superior authority has been stayed. When issue was decided in favour of assessee by an order of Appellate Authority for earlier years, assessee would not be considered to be assessee in default – Stay against demand of tax should be granted. (AY. 2012-13)

ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 226 Taxmann 74 (Mag.)/272 CTR 82(Bom.)(HC)

- 2111 **S.220 : Collection and recovery – Stay of demand in high-pitched assessments should be considered as per observations in *Soul v. DCIT 323 ITR 305 (Delhi)*(HC).**

This writ petition is directed against the order dated 6-8-2014 passed by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax with the approval of the CIT, Delhi-I, New Delhi. By virtue of the said order dated 06.08.2014 the stay application filed by the petitioner has been rejected. We have gone through the impugned order dated 6-8-2014. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also taken us through the instruction No. 96 of 1969 as well as instruction No. 1914 of 1993. We have also examined the decision of this court in the case of *Soul v. DCIT: 323 ITR 305 (Delhi)* and, in particular, paragraph 8 thereof where the above mentioned two instructions have been considered as also the earlier decision of this court in *Valvoline Cummins v. DCIT: 307 ITR 103 (Delhi)*. Considering the same, we feel that it would be appropriate if the ACIT reconsiders the application of the petitioner for stay in the light of the observations contained in the said decision [*Soul v. DCIT* (supra)]. This is so because according to the petitioner the assessment is a high pitched one inasmuch as it is approximately 17 times of the returned income.

Consequently, we set aside the impugned order dated 6-8-2014 and remit the matter to the ACIT, Range-3, New Delhi for a fresh consideration of the stay application filed by the petitioner after taking into account the above mentioned decision of this court. *Charu Home Products Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2015) 229 Taxmann 610 (Delhi)(HC)*

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – Recovery of tax demand is to be stayed till disposal of assessee's appeal if department has sufficient amount for assessee to satisfy amount of tax.

2112

The total demand outstanding against the assessee was ₹ 18,02,71,254/-. The amount of money of the assessee which was already held by the department was ₹ 16,46,82,156/- post which the assessee had paid a sum of ten crores for the very same assessment year. The High Court held that since the interests of the department were sufficiently safeguarded there was no reason for the department to recover any additional sums from the assessee and therefore the stay would be extended till the date of disposal of the appeals filed before the CIT(A). (AY. 2010-11)

Pragathi Gramin Bank v. ACIT (2014) 221 Taxmann 125(Mag.) (Karn.) (HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – Stay of 50% of demand was held to be appropriate

2113

Stay of 50% demand is appropriate when the Writ Petition is pending for disposal against the Order of Settlement Commission.

Mayura Prime Estates Ltd v. ITSC (2014) 265 CTR 419 / 99 DTR 4 / 227 Taxmann 15 (Raj.)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Stay – Deemed in default – Not disclosed three bank accounts in the return, declining stay and permitting to pay the tax in installments was held to be justified

2114

Order passed by the Assessing Officer discloses that the assessee was maintaining three bank accounts, which were not disclosed in the return. Total deposits in the bank accounts during the relevant year were about ₹ 5.47 Cr. The Appellate authority applied his mind to the stay application and found that no prima facie case is made out by the assessee. It was also observed that it was not a case where income was enhanced merely on guess work. The grievance raised by the assessee in a writ petition was that the in the order rejecting the stay application, merits have been gone into which has vitiated the said order. The Hon'ble Court by dismissing the petition held that, the submission on behalf of the assessee cannot be accepted as it is inevitable that while deciding the stay application, to consider the *prima facie* case, merits and such consideration is only for the purpose of deciding whether the case of interim stay has been made out. The Hon'ble Court further held that the assessee having not disclosed in his return three bank accounts maintained by him, in which total deposits of ₹ 5.47 Cr were deposited during the relevant previous year, there has been no patent illegality or irregularity in the order passed by the Appellate Authority declining stay and permitting the assessee to pay the assessed tax in installments on the ground that the assessee has not made out a case for absolute stay.

Bimal Paul v. CCIT (2014) 97 DTR 254 / 266 CTR 592 / 51 taxmann.com 423 Gau)(HC)

2115 **S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – High Court directed CIT(A) to dispose the appeal. [S.201, 201(IA)]**

The assessee had filed an appeal before the CIT(A) against Order u/ss. 201 and 201(1A) passed by the AO. During pendency of the appeal the AO issued communication to remit 50% of the demand and attached the bank accounts of the assessee.

The assessee filed a petition before the High Court *inter-alia* contending that it had pending refunds for AYs. 2012-13 and 2013-14 the assessment of which years were pending and that it would not press for refunds of the said amounts till the disposal of the appeal before the CIT(A) and hence no coercive action should be initiated.

The High Court disposing the petition directed the department to lift the attached bank accounts of the assessee and directed the CIT(A) to dispose of the appeal on or before a particular date and also directed the assessee not to press for refunds till then. (AY. 2012-13, 2013-14)

Hosmat Hospital (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 71 (Mag.)(Karn.)(HC)

2116 **S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – Stay – CIT(A) – Coercive action should not be taken till decision of CIT(A) on assessee's stay application. [S.251]**

The assessee filed an appeal against the Order of the AO before the CIT(A) along with a stay application against recovery proceedings. The appeal however was pending before the CIT(A). Before the disposal of which the AO initiated recovery proceedings and by attaching the bank accounts of the assessee, transferred the demand amount into the account of the revenue authorities.

The High Court held that during the pendency of the appeal the assessee should not be treated as defaulter and hence no action can be taken by the revenue authorities during the pendency of the stay application before the CIT(A).

Sanjay Kumar Sahu v. ITO (2013) 354 ITR 177 / (2014) 222 Taxmann 140 (Mag.) (MP) (HC)

2117 **S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default-Stay – Without speaking order – Rejection of application is bad in law. [S.220(6)]**

Application for stay was rejected mechanically without advertent to the facts and without considering the true impact of the Instruction No. 1914 issued by the CBDT. Writ Petition was filed challenging the recovering proceedings. High Court allowed writ petition & held that it appeared from the impugned order that the assessee was not afforded the opportunity of hearing. Therefore the impugned order was set aside and the first respondent was directed to pass a reasoned order on the application filed u/s. 220(6) after giving assessee an opportunity of hearing. Till decision on the assessee's application, the respondent was directed not to take coercive steps against the assessee for recovery of the demand raised against it and also court held that because the assessee has filed a stay application along with memo of appeal, the respondents cannot content that the application u/s 220(6) was not maintainable and the assessee was directed to seek the remedy of stay from the higher authority.

Madhya Pradesh Paschim Kshetra Vidyut Vitaram Company Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 99 DTR 7 /265 CTR 423 (MP)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – Stay – Power of stay to be exercised by the AO. when assessee preferred an appeal. [S.220(6)] 2118

DCIT passed assessment order against which Petitioner preferred an appeal before CIT (A). After filing an appeal, Petitioner moved a stay application u/s. 220(6) of the Act before AO/DCIT making a prayer not to treat as being in default in respect of amount in dispute in the appeal which was rejected by the AO. On writ the court held that, it is only when assessee has presented an appeal; the power in respect u/s. 220(6) can be exercised by the AO. Therefore impugned order was quashed with a direction to the AO. to reconsider the assessee's application and pass a fresh reasoned order, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

Kanchanbag v. UOI (2014) 99 DTR 10 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 502 / 265 CTR 425 (MP)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – Stay – Pendency of rectification application before AO – Appeal before Tribunal – During Pendency of appeal – Stay was granted. [S.220(6)] 2119

Writ Petition was filed for staying recovery of tax demand till the pendency of the appeal before the Tribunal during pendency of rectification application before AO. HC allowed Writ Petition and held that apart from the rectification application filed by the assessee before seeking depreciation as already granted by the CIT, appeal filed by the assessee before the Tribunal against withdrawal of exemption/ cancellation of registration was also pending for adjudication. AO was directed to decide the rectification application filed by the assessee within 1 month after it with the copy of this order. Further the court directed assessee to file application for interim relief before the ITO who may pass appropriate order on the said application subject to verification of the fact that the order passed by the IT allowing benefit of depreciation was not been stayed by any interim order. Further the court directed that recovery made in the addition to the above, if any, shall remain subject to final outcome of the appeal pending before the Tribunal. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

Rajasthan Cricket Association v. ITO (2014) 99 DTR 5 / 221 Taxmann 483 / 265 CTR 420(Raj)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – After rejecting stay application AO must give reasonable time before taking steps for coercive recovery. [S.226(3)] 2120

Assessee filed an application for stay on payment of tax demand under section 220(3) - Assessing Officer rejected said application and on same day, he issued garnishee order under section 226 to bank and recovered tax demand. Assessee filed stay application on said demand before Tribunal and he filed present application on ground that Assessing Officer was not justified in recovering tax demand - Whether though technically no fault could be found with Assessing Officer, still there was an element of impropriety in his action in issuing garnishee order on same date when stay application was rejected and, therefore, it would be appropriate to direct Assessing Officer to deposit said sum in assessee's account till Tribunal would decide said application. (AY. 2009-10)

Sony India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014)363 ITR 330 / 266 CTR 225 (Delhi)(HC)

Sony Mobile Communications (India) P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 363 ITR 330 (Delhi)(HC)

- 2121 **S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed to be in default – AO must pass a speaking order and extend a opportunity of personal hearing while disposing of the stay application filed by the Assessee – Matter was remanded to AO for decision afresh.**

The Assessee filed a stay application praying for stay of demand before the AO. This was rejected by him without giving any sufficient opportunity. On a writ filed by the Assessee, the High Court held that while examining an application for stay of demand under section 220(6), the AO had to pass a speaking order and extend an opportunity of personal hearing, if one was sought by the assessee. The matter was remitted for fresh adjudication. (AY. 2009-10)

Joshna Rajendra (Smt.) v. CIT(A) (2014) 220 taxman 360 /268 CTR 462 / 103 DTR 259(Karn.)(HC)

- 2122 **S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – AO is required to pass a speaking order for rejecting stay application. [S.226]**

The Assessee filed an application u/s. 220(6) before the AO requesting a stay of demand since it had disputed the AO's demand in appeal. The AO rejected the application by passing a non-speaking order and attached bank accounts. On a writ filed by the Assessee, the High Court held that where an appeal was pending against the assessment order, the assessee was not to be treated as an assessee in default in respect of the amount in dispute in appeal, in the discretion of the AO on such conditions as he thinks fit to impose. The AO is, thus, required to pass a reasoned speaking order. The High Court quashed the order of the AO for attaching the assessee's bank accounts of the assessee and gave the AO the liberty to pass a fresh speaking order in accordance with law. (AY. 2009-10)

Lalita Wadhwa v. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 420 (P&H)(HC)

- 2123 **S.220 : Collection and recovery – Stay – Power of Tribunal – Recovery of money before expiry of time limit for filing an appeal was held to be not justified – Tribunal has inherent powers to direct the revenue to refund the amount collected without following due process of law – Revenue was directed to refund amount to assessee. [S.156, 220(6), 254(2A)]**

The assessee is a statutory corporation engaged in the activity of constructing and providing accommodation to economic weaker sections of society. The AO denied exemption under section 11 read with section 2(15) of the Act. The Appeal of the assessee was dismissed by CIT(A). Assessee preferred an appeal and stay before the Tribunal. In the meantime AO recovered the tax by attaching the bank account. Tribunal directed the revenue to refund the amount recovered by attaching the bank account. Revenue filed the writ petition against the order of Tribunal. Dismissing the petition the court held that Recovery of money before expiry of time limit for filing an appeal was held to be not justified. Tribunal has inherent powers to direct the revenue to refund the amount collected without following due process of law. (AY. 2010-11).

DIT (Exemption) v. ITAT (2014) 361 ITR 469/99 DTR 73 / 265 CTR 337 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 129 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Stay – Appeal to Tribunal – Not to take any coercive steps for recovery against the petitioner, till the appeal time is exhausted – Assessee deemed in default – AO cannot exercise coercive measures to recover tax during the period available for filing an appeal. [S.253]

2124

Against the assessment order, further appeal lies to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal u/s 253 of the Act and the time for moving the Tribunal is 60 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. As the appellate remedy is available to the petitioner, it could be accepted and the authority may thereafter proceed with the matter. However, in the absence of any legal impediment, the respondents have initiated recovery proceedings against the petitioner, when there is reasonable time for him to prefer an appeal. In view of the above, respondents are directed to not to take any coercive steps for recovery against the petitioner, till the appeal time is exhausted. Thereafter, the respondents are at liberty to act in accordance with law for recovery of the amount as per the order of the appellate authority.

Dishnet Wireless Limited v. ACIT (2014)361 ITR 449 / 105 DTR 262/225 Taxmann 202(Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Stay – *Prima facie* case – Tribunal considering the facts of the assessee's case directing the assessee to pay fifty percent of demand – Held not perverse. [S.220(6)]

2125

Where the assessee was not able to make out prima facie case to opine that assessment of the liability determined by the A.O. is wholly untenable or illegal. The Tribunal upon the stay application filed by the assessee directed it to deposit fifty per cent of tax liability. The order held to be logical, met the interest of justice and not perverse. (AY. 2008-09, 2012-13)

Dy. DIT (IT) v. Vodafone South Ltd. (2014) 102 DTR 145 / 267 CTR 544 (Karn.)(HC)

S.220 : Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – “Innovative” method of department of forcing hapless assessee to give “consent letters” for tax recovery deplored and warning issued. [S.92C]

2126

At this time it came to the light that the AO has followed an innovative method of collecting taxes despite specific directions of the Bench. Therefore we had called the AO who had collected the revenue by flouting the directions of the Bench. Shri Vishal Makawane, DDIT (Inv), Unit-VII(1), Mumbai appeared before us and tendered an unconditional apology for his conduct and submitted that it was collected with the consent given by the appellant *vide* letter dated 23-4-2014. The hapless Representative of the assessee had no other alternative but to admit that he has given the consent letter. It deserves to be clarified that neither the assessee nor the Revenue has the right to flout the decision of the Tribunal and being an officer functioning under the Government of India it is his obligation to follow the directions of the superior authority and even if there is consent he should not have collected the amount. We have recently come across in few other cases where similar consent letters were obtained or the Department has collected tax despite the stay order passed by the ITAT. We deplore this practice and direct the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax to issue a letter to all the concerned Assessing Officers not to adopt this kind of approach of obtaining consent letters and to

respect the order passed by the Tribunal as otherwise the Tribunal would be constrained to view the conduct of the Department adversely. AO is directed to refund the amount collected contrary to the stay order passed by the ITAT along with interest within 15 days. (AY. 2009-10)

Johnson & Johnson Ltd. v. ACIT (2015) 67 SOT 127 / 119 DTR 279(Mum.)(Trib.)

- 2127 **S.220 : Collection and recovery – Stay – When tax payable and when assessee deemed in default – Recovery proceeding initiated without expressly rejecting stay application filed by assessee and without giving assessee an opportunity of being heard, was not sustainable. [S.226]**

During assessment proceeding AO determined income of assessee at ₹ 14.49 crore as against returned income of ₹ 8.29 crore and accordingly, raised demand which included tax component as well as interest segment. Assessee filed an application for stay of recovery, while said application was pending, AO initiated recovery proceedings and passed an order under section 226(3) attaching bank account of assessee. Recovery proceeding initiated without expressly rejecting stay application filed by assessee and without giving assessee an opportunity of being heard, was not sustainable, stay application filed by assessee was to be allowed subject to payment of tax component of demand in installments. (AY. 2007-08)

Capital IQ Information Systems India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 149 ITD 809 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

Section 222 : Certificate to Tax Recovery Officer

- 2128 **S.222 : Collection and recovery – Certificate to Tax Recovery Officer – Priority of claim – The claim of the stock exchange against the defaulter member has priority over Government claim. [S.226, Sch. 11, Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, S, 8,9, Bombay Stock Exchange Rules, R.5, 9, 16(iii),(43)]**

The moment a member of the Bombay Stock Exchange is declared a defaulter, his right of nomination ceases and vests in the Exchange as even the personal privilege given to him is taken away at that point of time. As per rule 16(iii) of the Bombay Stock Exchange Rules, whenever the Governing Board exercises the right of nomination in respect of membership which vests in the Exchange, the ultimate surplus that may remain after the membership card is sold by the Exchange comes only to the Exchange and not to the member. As per Rule 43, the security provided shall be first and paramount lien for any sum due to the Exchange, such Lien is only compatible with the member being owner of the security. Lien possessed by the Bombay Stock Exchange makes it a secured creditor, therefore the claim of the stock exchange against the defaulter member has priority over the Government dues.

Stock Exchange of Bombay v. V. S. Kandalgaonkar & Ors. (2014) / 368 ITR 296 / 271 CTR 192/109 DTR 225 / 187 Com cas 143(2015) 230 Taxmann 365 (SC)

S.222 : Collection and recovery – Attachment and sale of property – Assessee during pendency of proceedings alienating her rights over property in favour of another person – Assessee not person interested for purpose of maintaining appeal – Order of commissioner was held to be valid. [Sch.II, R.63, 86]

2129

During the pendency of proceedings assessee alienating her rights over property in favour of another person. Tax Recovery Officer auctioned the property. Assessee has not challenged the order passed under rule 63 confirming the sale. Assessee filed writ petition, dismissing the petition, the Court held that the findings of the Chief Commissioner were that the assessee was not a person interested, for the purposes of maintaining the appeal since the assessee had during the pendency of the proceedings alienated her rights over the property in favour of another person. By selling her interest over the property to a third person, the assessee effectively lost her right to maintain a challenge against the actions of the Department in an appeal preferred under rule 86 of the Second Schedule. Thus, the order of the Chief Commissioner was legally unassailable. Writ petition was dismissed.

Amravathy Somasundaram v. Chief CIT (2014) 369 ITR 601 / 230 Taxmann 176 (Ker.)(HC)

S.222 : Collection and recovery – Certificate to Tax Recovery Officer – Where representation had been submitted by petitioner before TRO prior to notice of attachment, petition filed against order of TRO was premature.

2130

The petitioner was a statutory body created under the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. It received a communication from Tax Recovery Officer (TRO) to furnish details in respect of a property on the ground that it belonged to a defaulter trust. The petitioner replied to the same contending that the said property belonged to it and was in its possession of the petitioner. Thereafter, the TRO passed the attachment order whereunder petitioner was prohibited and restrained until further orders of the TRO from transferring or creating charge of the property by attaching the said property. The petitioner filed the instant petition contending that the TRO had not considered clarification issued by the petitioner in proper perspective; he had no power or jurisdiction to attach the property belonging to the petitioner and neither the said trust nor the TRO had proved that property in question belonged to the said trust. It was further contended that TRO had erroneously arrived at the conclusion that scheduled property belonged to the said trust. Hence, the impugned order passed by the TRO was illegal and arbitrary and was in violation of principles of natural justice.

Held that, under Second Schedule namely, rule 11(1) when a claim is preferred to, or any objection is made to the attachment or sale of any property in execution of a certificate on the ground that such property is not liable to attachment, it is required to be investigated by the revenue by examining the said claim or objection. Averments made in the writ petition and the documents produced would not indicate that petitioner has in fact filed such objections to the notice of attachment. Reply given by the petitioner is appended to the objection lodged with the TRO and on account of its non-examination it is contended that attachment is in violation of principles of natural justice. The said contention cannot be accepted inasmuch as, order of the attachment issued by the TRO is dated 5-2-2013 and the representations said to have been submitted by the petitioner before TRO is 18-10-2012 which is lodged prior to

notice of attachment. In that view of the matter, instant petition is premature and cannot be entertained and it is liable to be rejected. However, rejection of the instant petition would not come in the way of petitioner filing claim or objection to the order of attachment by adducing evidence if so advised.

Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v. TRO (2014) 222 Taxmann 72(Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

2131 **S.222 : Collection and recovery – Certificate to Tax Recovery Officer – Attachment and sale of immoveable property – Unless the assessee is in default or is deemed to be in default a certificate cannot be issued by the TRO. [S.156, 220, Schedule 11, Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, S.19, 29]**

In this petition the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) and sought a declaration that it is entitled to commission @ 3% of the value of the guarantee issued by it in favour of the Prothonotary and Senior Master at the request of M/s. Shah Thakur & Sons. By an order DRT held that petitioner is entitled to commission for the year 2004-05 till the date of the sale of the property. While dealing with various issues of recovery the Court held that the Recovery Officer under the RDDB Act also cannot adjudicate upon the claims of any party in proceedings instituted under the RDDB Act. That can be done by the DRT. Under S.19 of the RDDB Act, a bank or financial institution is entitled to make an application “to the Tribunal”. S.19 then provides a detailed procedure for the adjudication of the claim filed under S.19(1) “to the Tribunal”. On this basis the Recovery Officer directed the release in favour of the petitioner from the balance sale process. An amount can be said to be recoverable from an assessee under the Act only after necessary orders are passed, steps are taken and events occur under sections 156, 220 and 221. Schedule 11 comes into play upon issuance of a certificate by TRO under section 222. Mere assessment order does not entitle the TRO to start recovery proceedings. Unless an assessee is in default or is deemed to be in default, a certificate cannot be issued by the TRO. Thus, the words “any other amount recoverable from the assessee under the Act” occurring in rule 8(1)(b) means the amounts payable in consequence of any order passed under the Act, therefore TRO cannot utilise the balance amounts for the satisfaction of any amounts other than the amounts payable in consequence of any order passed under the Act. Writ petition of the petitioner was dismissed.

Canara Bank v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (2014) 271 CTR 233 (Bom.)(HC)

Section 225 : Stay of proceedings in pursuance of certificate and amendment or cancellation there of

2132 **S.225 : Collection and recovery – Stay of proceedings – Capital gains – Agricultural land – Within specified urban limits – Stay was granted on payment of 50% of tax in dispute. [S.10(37), 194LA]**

Assessee received compensation on account of acquisition of land out of which TDS was deducted as per provisions of section 194LA. Assessee showed long-term capital gain on amount of compensation in Income-tax return and claimed said amount as exempt under section 10(37). AO rejected claim of assessee and created a tax demand of ₹ 1.28 crores. Assessee filed an application for stay of demand. The Court observed that the

assessee was unable to dispute that land was falling within limits of Municipality of Amritsar, it could not be conclusively held that agricultural activities were being carried on land and thus, petitioner was entitled for benefit under section 10(37). Under the circumstances the petition for stay of recovery was rejected for stay of entire demand however, in the interest of justice, it is appropriate to direct that there shall be interim stay of recovery of 50 per cent of the tax liability during the pendency of the appeal, which is stated to be fixed for hearing on 9-4-2014.

Kanav Khanna v. CIT (2014) 366 ITR 386 / 225 Taxmann 13 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

Section 226 : Other modes of recovery

S.226 : Collection and recovery – Stay of demand-Co-operative society – Decision relied on by assessee was not considered – *Prima facie* case-Stay was granted till the disposal of appeal. [S.80P(4)] 2133

Allowing the petition the Court held that guidelines for staying demand issued by CBDT is binding on Income-tax authorities. Decision relied on by assessee was not considered. *Prima facie* case established. If decision said to be applicable to the case of assessee balance of convenience is in its favour. Assessee operating within strict parameters in accordance with State Act and Rules. If entire tax remitted assessee would be put to irreparable hardship.-Stay of demand till disposal of appeal. (AY. 2008-2009, 2011-2012) *Katpadi Co-op Township Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 368 ITR 632 / 52 Taxmann.com 474 (Mad.)(HC)*

S.226 : Collection and recovery – Modes of recovery – Commissioner (Appeals)-Inherent power to grant stay – Application for stay was pending recovery proceedings was held to be not valid. [S.250] 2134

Assessing Officer passed assessment order raising demand - Assessee filed appeal before Commissioner (Appeals). Pending said appeal, Assessing Officer initiated recovery proceedings and passed an order under section 226(3) attaching bank account of assessee calling upon bank to pay assessee's dues. Assessee filed application for granting stay. Assessing Officer should not be allowed to withdraw any amount from assessee's bank account, till Commissioner (Appeals) decided assessee's stay application. However, attachment of bank account would continue till Commissioner (Appeals) would decide stay application.

Nikhil Kelkar v. ITO (2014) 225 Taxmann 196 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

S.226 : Collection and recovery – Modes of recovery – Writ petitioners could not challenge orders and notices without challenging Tribunal's decision against which remedy of appeal under section 260A is available – Writ is not maintainable [S.260A, Article 226] 2135

Orders and notices under section 226(3) were issued. Same was challenged before Commissioner (Appeals) and Tribunal respectively who dismissed appeals. Writ petitioners could not challenge orders and notices without challenging Tribunal's decision against which remedy of appeal under section 260A is available. Writ petition was not maintainable.

State of Himachal Pradesh v. CCIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 197 (Mag.)(HP)(HC)

2136 **S.226 : Collection and recovery – Stay-Non-compete fees received – Part of the amount not non-compete fees held Tribunal – Stay of Demand – Conditional stay granted. [S.260A]**

Assessee received certain amount from Rasna Pvt. Ltd. ('R') under an agreement as non-compete fee and such amount was claimed as a capital receipt not chargeable to tax by the assessee. Tribunal however, while reversing the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), held that the agreement was not a pure and simple non-compete agreement but assessee had granted a certain licence to 'R'. Tribunal, thus observed that merely because of reason that along with rendering of services, or allowing user of an asset or for sale of an asset, if assessee agreed for non-competition and no separate amount as consideration for same was charged, it could not be concluded that entire amount received by assessee was for such non-competition agreement. Accordingly, Tribunal concluded that part of consideration received by assessee which was not of a non-compete nature, was liable to be taxed. Tribunal thus raised certain tax demand against assessee. Assessee filed an application before the High Court seeking stay of demand. After hearing the parties and going through the orders of the lower authorities and the Tribunal, the High Court *prima facie* agreed with the Tribunal's view but also had certain reservations and therefore, granted a stay on demand subject to a condition that the assessee would deposit 50 per cent of amount demanded in three equal monthly installments with revenue authorities. (AY. 2002-03)

Piruz A. Khambhatta v. ACIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 33 (Mag)(Guj.)(HC)

2137 **S.226 : Collection and recovery-Stay-Tribunal-Demand based mainly on enhancement of assessment by Commissioner (Appeals – Prima facie case against enhancement – Stay to be granted in respect of entire demand. [S.40A(2), 220(2)]**

The assessee had acquired a running business by way of a slump sale. It claimed depreciation on tangible and intangible assets. The Assessing Officer disallowed the depreciation in respect of the intangibles. On appeal the Commissioner (Appeals) not only upheld the disallowance but added under section 40A(2) of the Act. A demand was raised pursuant of order of CIT(A). On an application by the assessee the Tribunal directed stay of 50 per cent of the demand and payment of the balance in installments of ₹ 1 crore per month. On a writ petition against the order, it was contended that the sum added by the CIT(A) could not any event added to the income of the assessee as the assessee had never claimed the said amount an expenditure, therefore question of applying the provisions of section 40(A)(2) would not arise. Court held that *prima facie* the contention of assessee was valid hence the assessee was entitled to a stay of the entire demand. (AY. 2007-08)

Saipem Triune Engineering P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 364 ITR 154 (Delhi)(HC)

2138 **S.226 : Collection and recovery – Modes of recovery – public provident fund ('PPF') account of the assessee cannot be attached for recovery of income-tax dues. [R.10, Schedule, II, Public Provident Fund Act, 1968]**

The Tax Recovery Officer ('TRO') sought to attach the PPF account of the assessee u/s. 226(3). The assessee filed a writ petition before the HC placing reliance on section 9 of the Public Provident Fund Act, 1968 to contend that the amount outstanding in his

PPF account could not be attached for the recovery of tax dues. The assessee also relied on rule 10 of Schedule II to the Income-tax Act, 1961. The department opposed said petition placing reliance on Circular date 7-11-1990. The HC, considering the benevolent provisions of the PPF Act, 1968 and taking the harmonious construction of the relevant provisions of the PPF Act, 1968 read with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and the provisions contained in the Income-tax Act, 1961 for recovery of the tax dues, held that as long as an amount remained invested in a PPF account of an individual, the same would be immune from attachment from recovery of the tax dues.

Dineshchandra Bhailalbhai Gandhi v. TRO (2014) 362 ITR 380 / 223 Taxmann 268 / 267 CTR 243 (Guj.)(HC)

S.226 : Collection and recovery – Garnishee proceedings – Fixed deposit with bank – TRO has the power to attach fixed deposit in the bank. [S.226(3)]

2139

As per proviso u/s. 226(3), the TRO has the power to issue notice and attach fixed deposits of the Assessee lying in a bank. Fixed deposits of unaccounted money of the Assessee were kept in SM-co-operative Society, which the society invested further in AS Society Ltd. Hence, issue of notice & attachment of the fixed deposits are within the jurisdiction.

Shree Aashrayar Souhard Credit Society Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 269 CTR 82 / 51 taxmann. com 420 (Karn.)(HC)

S.226 : Collection and recovery – Garnishee proceedings – No challenge to debts in existence-Project halted by litigation on validity of agreement – Applies only to future liability – Garnishee proceedings valid.

2140

The assessee was engaged in the business of construction and land development for industrial projects and residential townships, and entered into a development agreement with EHTPL, for the development of 258.36 acres of land owned by EHTPL. However, the project was halted owing to litigation on the validity of the agreement. The Tax Recovery Officer directed the assessee to pay ₹ 32,82,79,787 towards the outstanding demand of EHTPL. The assessee challenged the order by filing writ petition. Held, dismissing the writ petition of the assessee, that the entries in the assessee's ledger account details as enclosed with the notice of the Tax Recovery Officer to the assessee against the dates April 30 to October 31, 2012, indicated that the assessee admitted a liability to EHTPL, each month, as part of the 25 per cent consideration owed under the development agreement. The existence of this liability was also admitted in the note to the accounts for the year ending March 31, 2013, referring to "EHTPL's share of ₹ 482.62 million". There was no challenge to the existence of the debt itself since it was nobody's case that the agreement stood cancelled. Thus, the assessee's debt to EHTPL was in existence, and the fact that the project had been brought to a standstill could only negate the future liability to make payments, since no collections were being made on the project. A potential or possible cancellation of an existing debt, depending on the outcome of on-going litigation was too distant a contingency to make the dues unenforceable. With any agreement, there are several contingencies that can come to fruition in the future, to affect an existing debt. Within the realm of the law of contracts, the ramifications of any such contingency are several and diverse, and not open to prediction by a court not called upon to pronounce upon issues that might arise in the

future in relation to those particular facts. That an existing debt may cease to exist at some point in the future if one of several contingencies plays out, cannot affect the debt in praesenti. Writ petition was dismissed.

Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v. TRO (2014) 365 ITR 293 / 269 CTR 217 /46 taxmann.com 151 (Delhi)(HC)

2141 **S.226 : Collection and recovery – Stay – Power of Tribunal – Certain amount of consistency was expected in working of statutory Tribunal – Dismissal of stay application was held to be not justified. [Ss.253, 254(1)]**

While disposing off the stay petition, one bench of the Tribunal held that the assessee had a *prima facie* case and directed that the assessee's appeal shall be heard on out of turn basis along with the Department's cross-appeal. At the time of hearing the appeal, the assessee requested for an adjournment. However, another bench of the Tribunal took a diametrically opposite view and dismissed the stay petition and rejected the adjournment request. Notwithstanding the change of composition of the Bench, a certain amount of consistency was expected in the working of a statutory tribunal like the Income tax Appellate Tribunal. If the Tribunal had formed an opinion, albeit tentatively, in the matter, it should have heard and decided the appeal itself. Having regard to the fact that the Tribunal had earlier observed that the assessee had an arguable case, the Tribunal was to finally hear and decide the appeal.

Unique Artagev. UOI (2014) 360 ITR 467 / 102 DTR 350 / 267 CTR 456 / 226 Taxmann 55 (Mag.)(Raj.)(HC)

2142 **S.226 : Collection and recovery – Modes of recovery – Stay – AO warned of contempt action for seeking to overreach ITAT's stay order – Revenue should lift attachment and enure that amounts recovered are deposited back in assessee's account. [S.221, 254(1)]**

The assessee filed a stay application before the Tribunal and informed the AO about the same. Thereafter, the Tribunal heard the matter on 14-2-2014 and granted stay of the demand. Despite this, the AO attached the assessee's bank account on 19-2-2014 and withdrew the proceeds. The assessee filed a Writ Petition to challenge the attachment. The AO defended his action on the ground that he was not present during the hearing of the stay application and was not intimated of the stay granted by the Tribunal. HELD by the High Court allowing the Petition:

The income tax authorities were represented by the CIT-DR, before the Tribunal. The order on the stay application was also pronounced in open Court on that date. In these circumstances, the submission of the revenue that the concerned AO was not intimated cannot be accepted. If such an argument was made before this Court, where orders are pronounced in Court in the presence of counsel, it would certainly not be accepted, and in fact would be seriously viewed. In the facts of this case, it clearly amounts to overreach of the interim order of the Tribunal; in a similar situation, this Court itself would possibly be initiating contempt proceedings. In these circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that the respondent should lift the attachment and ensure that the amounts recovered are deposited back in the petitioner's account within a week from today. A copy of the present order shall be marked to the Central Board of Direct Taxes separately and communicated. (AY. 2007-08)

A. T. Kearney India Pvt. Ltd v. ITO(2014) 363 ITR 172/227 Taxmann 150 (Mag)(Delhi)(HC)

S.226 : Collection and recovery – Modes of recovery – Recovery of excess payments made to government employees could be recovered from them and mere fact that said payment was not due to any fraud or misrepresentation on part of employee would make no difference – Principle of natural justice.

2143

The assessee's filed writ petition against the impugned recovery, whereby a certain amount paid to them as a salary was sought to be recovered from them. The allegation being that they had been paid the amount in excess of their entitlement. The assessee's case was that they had not been paid any amount in excess, inasmuch as whatever was actually due and payable had been paid; therefore the proposed recovery was improper. Further, the impugned recovery had been initiated without issuing any show-cause notice or giving the assessee's any opportunity to be heard. The High Court held that the excess money received by the assessee's had come from the public exchequer; it was public money contributed by the taxpayers. The administration, whether executive or judiciary, held public funds in trust and with the responsibility of spending it strictly in the proper manner, without wasting it or distributing it wrongly or illegally. If an amount was paid to an employee in excess of what he was entitled, it could be recovered from him and the mere fact that the said payment was not due to any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of employee would make no difference. Since no opportunity was granted in this case it violated the principles of natural justice, and, accordingly, the writ petition was allowed. The impugned orders insofar as they related to the assessee's were quashed. However, the respondents were at liberty to pass a fresh order after giving an opportunity for hearing to the assessee.

Janardan Yadav v. State of U.P. (2014) 220 Taxmann 218 (All.)(HC)

S.226 : Collection and recovery – Modes of recovery – During the pendency of the Mutual Agreement Procedure with the competent authorities demand cannot be recovered – DTAA-India-USA. [S.90, Art. 27]

2144

The assessee was a subsidiary of Motorola Solutions Inc. USA and had filed a return declaring certain taxable income. The Assessing Officer, having made certain additions to this income, raised a tax demand. The assessee filed an appeal before CIT (appeals) and a further demand was raised through a rectification order. The Assessee, however, invoked the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) between India and USA by filing an application before the competent authority in the USA. The invocation of MAP was brought to the notice of the competent authority in India, i.e. the Joint Secretary (FT & TR-1), CBDT. Simultaneously, the assessee also filed an application for stay before the Assistant Commissioner. For the purposes of stay, the assessee was directed to furnish a certain amount of bank guarantee. Subsequently, the Revenue, took a view that MAP proceedings were not pending and, moreover, that the assessee had failed to renew its bank guarantee, appropriated a certain amount from the assessee's bank account towards the alleged demand of tax. The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the validity of this appropriation. It was noted that controversy with respect to admission or pendency of MAP stood conceded in favour of the assessee by an affidavit filed by the Joint Secretary (Foreign Tax and Tax Research Division), Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Central Board of Direct Taxes wherein it was clarified that MAP Proceedings were pending and discussions were held between the competent authorities

in Indian and the USA. With regard to the bank guarantee, the concerned bank had not sent any communication to the Revenue that the assessee had not renewed its guarantee, and, therefore, the bank guarantee stood automatically renewed for a further period of three years. The High Court allowed the assessee's petition, holding that where in respect of the tax liability of assessee, Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) proceedings were pending and, moreover, the assessee had also furnished a bank guarantee in terms of stay of demand, during the pendency of those proceedings; therefore the Revenue was not justified in appropriating funds from the assessee's bank account towards their demand of tax. In view of this, the writ petition was allowed, demand notices were quashed and the respondents were directed to refund the tax appropriated to the petitioner. (AY. 2005-06)

Motorola Solutions India (P) (Ltd.) v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 663 / 220 Taxmann 164 (P&H) (HC)

2145

S.226(3) : Collection and recovery – Garnishee participating in proceedings subsequently – Non-service of notice deemed to be cured – Garnishee objecting to payment and filing affidavit in this regard-No further proceeding for recovery can be made against garnishee – Tax Recovery Officer cannot discover on his own that statement on oath made on behalf of garnishee was false – Provision applies only an admitted liability not disputed liability – Attachment of properties as also liable to be quashed. [S.292BB]

Allowing the petition the Court held that (1) the proceedings under section 226(3) could not be quashed at the present stage on the ground of non-service of notice under section 226(3) inasmuch as the invalidity of the notice was cured and the defect, if any, was removed by the petitioner by participating in the proceedings subsequently.

(ii) That the assessee asserted that it had advanced certain sums of money to the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner was its debtor but the petitioner had denied this assertion. No steps had been taken by the assessee for recovery of that amount before any forum or any appropriate court of law. Pursuant to the affidavit filed by the petitioner before the Tax Recovery Officer denying its liability to pay any amount and further denying that any sum is or was payable to the assessee, no steps had been taken by the Tax Recovery Officer to cross check with the assessee or inquire into the genuineness of the affidavit filed by the petitioner. Since the petitioner had appeared and participated in the proceedings, the order of the Tax Recovery Officer treating the petitioner as an assessee in default could not continue any longer. In view of the categorical denial by the petitioner to pay any amount, the attachment made by the Tax Recovery Officer could not continue any further, especially as till date no inquiry had been made by the Revenue into the genuineness of the affidavits filed by the petitioner. The Income-tax Department was restrained from alienating the shares, which were transferred to the demat account of the Tax Recovery Officer. Therefore, the order of the Tax Recovery Officer treating the petitioner as an assessee in default could not be sustained and was quashed.

Uttar Pradesh Carbon and Chemicals Ltd. v. TRO (2014) 368 ITR 384/(2015) 230 Taxmann 639 / 119 DTR 158 / 278 CTR 82 (All.)(HC)

S.226(3) : Collection and recovery – Garnishee order – When company in liquidation-AO and Bank to submit their claim before Official liquidator. 2146

Assessee-company taking loan from bank for purchase of plant and machinery. Assessee entering into a hire purchase agreement with another party. Consideration stipulated at equivalised monthly installments. Assessee executing power of attorney enabling bank to receive installments from that party. Assessee going in liquidation. Assessing authority and bank to submit their claims before official liquidator.

Vijaya Bank v. JCIT (2014) 367 ITR 441 (T & AP)(HC)

S.226(3) : Collection and recovery – Modes of recovery – Public Provident Fund Account-Amount remaining in account would be immune from attachment for recovery of tax due. [Public Provident Fund Act, 1968, S.9, 10, Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, S.60(1)] 2147

As long as an amount remains invested in a public provident fund account of an individual, the amount would be immune from attachment for recovery of the tax dues. The situation may change as and when such amount is withdrawn and paid over to the subscriber, which is not the situation in the case of the present assessee. The clarification issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes does not take into account the provisions of rule 10 of the Second Schedule to the 1961 Act and the provisions of section 60(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The clarification is contrary to such statutory provision. Thus, the action of the Tax Recovery Officer in first attaching and thereafter, unilaterally withdrawing a sum of ₹ 9,05,000 from the public provident fund account of the assessee was liable to be quashed.

Dineschandra Bhailalbhai Gandhi v. TRO (2014) 362 ITR 380 / 223 Taxmann 268 / 267 CTR 243 (Guj.)(HC)

Section 234A : Interest for defaults in furnishing return of income

S.234A : Advance tax – Interest – Order levying interest should be specific – Order directing levy of interest as per rules – Not sufficient. [Ss.234B, 234C] 2148

If interest is leviable under section 234A, section 234B or section 234C of the Act, such levy of interest is mandatory and compensatory in nature but in order to levy interest under these sections, the Assessing Officer is specifically required to mention the specific section of charging interest, failing which, no interest could be levied under those sections. (AY. 1990-1991)

CIT v. Oswal Exports (2014) 369 ITR 630 (All.)(HC)

S.234A : Interest – Default in furnishing return of income – Advance tax – Interest – Deduction of tax at source – Stock appreciation rights – Employer bound to deduct tax at source – No question of employee paying advance tax – Employee entitled to take into account amount of tax deductible though not actually deducted. [S.234B, 234C] 2149

Since the entire amount received by the assessee were taxable under the head 'Income from salaries', the assessee shall be entitled to take into account the amount of tax deductible though not actually deducted. Accordingly, we direct the Assessing Officer to delete the interest levied under section 234B of the Act. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Anil Kumar Nehru (2014) 364 ITR 26/(2015) 55 taxmann.com 100 (Bom.)(HC)

- 2150 **S.234A : Interest – Default in furnishing return of income – Liability to pay – Properties attached – Attachment of properties by operation of statute – Notified person under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992. [S.234B, 234C]**

Even though the assessee was a notified person under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, it was liable to pay interest u/s. 234A, 234B, 234C. Merely because the assets and properties were attached did not mean that liability to pay interest would not arise. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Cascade Holdings P. Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 84 / 45 taxmann.com 228 (Bom.)(HC)

Section 234B : Interest for defaults in payment of advance tax

- 2151 **S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Assessment order refers to interest to be charged as per Rules – No error in charging of interest. [S.234C]**

Where in assessment order, it was clearly held that interest be charged as per rules, interest charged under sections 234B and 234C could not be challenged.

Ramesh Prasad Dhahayat v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 191 (Mag.) (MP)(HC)

- 2152 **S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Mandatory – Shortfalls taxable – Levy of interest justified**

Section 234B provides that shortfalls have to be taxed under section 43(3). Interest contemplated under sections 234A, 234B and 234C is mandatory in nature. Therefore, interest under section 234B was rightly levied. (AY. 2005-06)

South Indian Bank Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 111 / 226 Taxmann 130 (Ker.)(HC)

- 2153 **S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Computation of interest – Minimum Alternate tax – Credit of Minimum Alternate tax must be given before charging interest. [115]AA, 234C]**

Credit for minimum alternate tax should be given to the assessee before charging of interest under sections 234B and 234C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. B.PL. Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 544 / 49 Taxmann.com 542 (Karn.)(HC)

- 2154 **S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Book profit-Interest u/s. 234B can be charged only after allowing credit of MAT**

The High Court following the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of *CIT v. M. A. Prestressed Works (1996) 220 ITR 226* held that interest u/s. 234B had to be calculated after allowing credit of MAT. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 155 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

- 2155 **S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Non resident – Non resident cannot escape the liability for interest on the ground that it was for the Indian payers to have deducted the tax and if they had not done so the assessee cannot be Liable to pay interest – Held liable to pay interest. [S.195]**

Assessee filed Return claiming its income not taxable in India as it had no PE in India and equipment were sold outside India, but accepted its taxability before

the CIT(A), the issue before the HC was whether Tribunal was correct in holding that assessee was not liable to pay interest in terms of Section 234B of the IT Act . Allowing the revenue's appeal, the court held that it could not escape the liability for interest u/s. 234 B on the ground that it was for the Indian payers to have deducted the tax and if they had not done so, the assessee cannot be held liable for the interest. Further the Court held that revenue has been deprived of the use of the monies and thereby put to loss for no fault on its part and where the loss arose as a result of vacillating stands taken by the assessee, it is not expected of the assessee to shift the responsibility to the Indian payers. (AY. 2004-05 to 2008-09)

DIT(IT) v. Alcatel Lucant USA, INC (2014) 264 CTR 240 / 223 Taxmann 176 (Mag.)(Delhi) (HC)

S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Partners – Partnership firm – Depreciation of firm cannot be allocated to benefit of partners personally and it shall revert to firm – Advance tax not paid – Partners are liable to pay interest.

2156

While completing the assessments of the assesseees for the years 1991-92 and 1992-93, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of set off of unabsorbed depreciation pertaining to the firm and determined the tax payable, and levied interest under section 234B for non-payment of advance tax. The claim of waiver of interest by the assesseees was rejected. On a writ petition the single judge held that for no fault of the assesseees, if the assesseees did not pay the tax payable by them, they shall not be saddled with the liability to interest under section 234B.

Held, the returns pertaining to 1991-92 were filed on October 30, 1991, and for 1992-93 on October 30, 1992. The judgment of the Supreme Court *Garden Silk Weaving Factory v.CIT (1991) 189 ITR 512 (SC)* was rendered on March 22, 1991, much prior to the submission of returns for both assessment years by the assesseees. Once the Supreme Court had laid down the law that depreciation of a firm cannot be allocated to the benefit of the partners personally and it shall revert to the firm. In the light of such observation of the Supreme Court the returns ought to have been filed showing the correct income. Apparently, advance tax was not paid, and automatically the assesseees were liable to pay interest chargeable under section 234B. Decision of the single judge reversed. (AY. 1991-92, 1992-93)

CCIT v. George P. Mathews (2014) 362 ITR 660 / 222 Taxmann 373 (Ker.)(HC)

S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Interest under sections 234B and 234C cannot be levied for default in payment of advance tax in case where tax is paid under MAT [Ss.115JB, 234C]

2157

The High Court relied on one of its own decisions in the matter of *CIT v. Jupiter Bio-Science Ltd. [2013] 352 ITR 113/[2011] 202 Taxmann 80/13 taxmann.com 161 (Kar.)* wherein it was held that the assessee was liable to pay advance tax under the amended provisions of section 115JB of the Act for the relevant period, however he was not liable to pay interest on the amount due under the amended provisions, since there was no default of the assessee. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Kirloskar Systems Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 1 (Karn.)(HC)

- 2158 **S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Additional income disclosed in the course of search – Liable to interest. [S.132, 234C]**
 The contentions of the assessee that the additional income voluntarily disclosed in the course of search proceedings and such additional income was not related to any incriminating document or material found during search action under section 132 of the Act and that since the additional income was offered in the course of search action, the assessee was not aware of the income at the time of payment of advance tax and therefore interest under section 234B and 234C of the Act is not acceptable. (AY. 2008-09, 2010-11)
Nandini Delux v. CIT (2015) 37 ITR 52 / 68 SOT 5(URO)/167 TTJ 746 (Bang.)(Trib.)
- 2159 **S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Denmark was not liable to Indian taxes – No liability to pay interest**
 Assessee being tax resident of Denmark was not liable to Indian taxes, no interest could be levied on it u/s. 234B. (AY. 2006-07)
A. P. Moller Maersk v. Dy. DIT (2014) 149 ITD 434 (Mum.)(Trib.)
- 2160 **S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Where assessee was not liable to deposit advance tax, no interest under section 234B could be charged. [Ss.202, 209]**
 The language used in section 209(1) is regarding payment of advance tax in the financial year, therefore, the proviso is not attracted for the assessment year. The assessee was held to be not required to deposit any advance tax. In view of this fact, it was held that interest u/s. 234B is not leviable. since the assessee is not liable for advance tax, therefore, cannot be charged interest for failure to pay advance tax. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07)
Dy. DIT. v. MGB Metro Group Buying HK Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 343 (Delhi)(Trib.)
- 2161 **S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Adjustment of cash recovered during search as advance tax. [S.234C]**
 Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to credit of cash recovered during search as advance tax and held that amended explanation w.e.f. 1-6-2013 is prospective and not retrospective. Tribunal followed decision in the case of Shreeji Prints (P) Ltd. (AY. 2007-08)
Kanishka Prints (P) Ltd. ACIT (2013) 143 ITD 716 / (2014) 159 TTJ 699 (Ahd.)(Trib.)
- 2162 **S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Non-resident – Deduction at source [S.195]**
 The Tribunal following the decision of Hon'ble High Court in the case of *DIT v. NGC Network Asia LLC (2009) 313 ITR 187 (Bom.)* held that the levy of interest is mandatory but in the instant case, the income of the assessee is liable for deduction of tax at source under section 195, it is consequential. (AY. 2005-06)
Addl. DIT v. Valentine Maritime (Gulf) LLC (2014) 159 TTJ 706 / 66 SOT 6 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Non-resident – Deduction at source. [S.195] 2163
 The Tribunal held that since the amount was covered by TDS which was already made while paying to the assessee, question of levy under section 234B does not arise.
Addl. DIT v. Lucent Technologies GRL LLC (2014) 159 TTJ 589 / 29 ITR 132 (Mum.)(Trib.)
Dy. DIC v. Reliance Infocom Ltd. (2014) 159 TTJ 589 / 29 ITR 132 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.234B : Interest – Advance tax – Proviso to sub-section (1) of s. 209 as inserted by Finance Act, 2012 is prospective in nature and cannot be applied retrospectively – Where assessee was not liable to deposit advance tax, no interest u/s. 234B could be charged. [S.133A, 202, 209] 2164

A survey operation u/s. 133A was conducted at the business premises of the assessee. During survey, mainly computers were found, prints were collected therefrom, which were inventorised. The claim of the assessee of exemption u/s. 9(1)(i) was rejected and the assessee's income was computed as 15.29% mark up on the total expenses incurred. Such working was claimed to be based on Rule 10B(1)(e) considering the transactional net margin method. Interest u/s. 234A, 234B and 234C was also held to be leviable by the AO Commissioner (Appeal) following the decisions held that the interest u/s 234B is not leviable. Revenue is in appeal before the Tribunal, the contention regarding amendment inserted by the Finance Act, 2012, is prospective in nature and not with retrospective effect. Proviso was brought into operation w.e.f. 1-4-2012 whereas the AYs. involved are 2005-06 and 2006-07, therefore, said proviso is not retrospective in nature. S.209(1) is regarding payment of advance tax in the financial year, the proviso is not attracted for the impugned assessment year. Assessee was not liable to deposit advance tax no interest under section 234B could be charged. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07)
Dy. DIT v. MGB Metro Group Buying HK Ltd. (2014) 146 ITD 343 (Delhi)(Trib.)

Section 234C : Interest for deferment of advance tax

S.234C : Interest – Deferment of advance tax – Book profit – Interest can be charged. [S.115JA] 2165

Interest can be charged on tax calculated on book profits. (AY. 1997-98)
Hotel and Allied P. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 184 (Ker.)(HC)

S.234C : Interest – Deferment of advance tax – Liability to pay interest-on advance tax payable on returned income and not on assessed income 2166

The Tribunal directed the AO to recalculate the interest u/s. 234C of the Act for deferment of advance tax based on the advance tax payable on the 'returned income' and not on the 'assessed income'. (AY. 2004-05 to 2008-09)
SAP India (P) Ltd v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 469 / 104 DTR 82 (Bang.) (Trib.)

Section 234D : Interest on excess refund**2167 S.234D : Interest on excess refund – Explanation 2 – section is applicable to all the assessments completed after 1-6-2004. [Explanation 2]**

Assessment was completed before 1-6-2003. The court held that Explanation 2 to Section 234D clarifies that section is applicable only in respect of assessments completed after 1-6-2003. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Reliance Energy Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 371 / 262 CTR 272 (2014) 220 Taxmann 89 (Mag.)(SC)

2168 S.234D : Interest on excess refund – In view of retrospective amendment, s. 234D will apply to assessment orders passed after 1-6-2003. [Ss.143(1), 143(3)]

It can also be noted that the Bombay High Court (*Commissioner of Income tax v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., reported in 2010 Taxmann 466*) has in terms held that the decision of the Tribunal in *ITO v. Ekta Promoters (P) Ltd., reported in (2008) 113 ITD 719 (Delhi) (SB)* was not correct, by holding that till such time, the assessment proceedings are completed in respect of relevant assessment year, the Amended Act would be applicable to the pending proceedings. For all the pending proceedings in regard to which the refund has been provided under section 143(1) of the Act, which are not concluded and finalised, the refunds are held to be granted under section 143(1) of the Act as finally determined when final assessment is passed under section 143(3) of the Act. Explanation 2 to section 234D of the Act applies thus to the pending proceedings, where the assessment in respect of assessment year is not completed on June 1, 2003. The Court held that the provision for charging interest in every case was a part of substantive law and not an arbitrary provision and though in those cases where the refunds have been granted prior to June 1, 2003, section 234D was not applied for not having any retrospective operation, however, in all pending proceedings, where the assessment had not been completed on June 1, 2003, the same has been made applicable. In other words, explanation (2) to section 234D of the Act has been made applicable to even the assessment year commencing before June 1, 2003. The only requirement in such a case would be that the assessment has to be completed after June 1, 2003. Therefore, after insertion of Explanation 2, the operation of section 234D of charging interest on the excess refund paid to the assessee is not restricted, making operation of such section effective from June 1, 2003. In other words, the refund granted under section 143(1) of the Act in respect of a particular assessment year, is subject to the final determination under sub-section (3) of section 143 of the Act. Addition of Explanation 2 to section 234D of the Act when is being held declaratory amendment, what would be relevant for the purpose of charging interest on the refund granted under section 143(1) of the Act is the date of completion of assessment. If the assessment is framed after June 1, 2003, the said provision shall have applicability. (ITA No. 936 of 2011, dated 17-2-2014.) *CIT v. Gujarat State Financial Service Ltd. (Guj.)(HC); www.itatonline.org*

S.234D : Interest on excess refund – Assessment completed on March 28, 2005– Assessee is liable to pay interest

2169

Since the regular assessment of the assessee for the AY 2002-03 was completed on March 28, 2005, and section 234D came into operation on and from June 1, 2003, prior to the completion of the regular assessment, the assessee was liable to pay interest on the excess refund amount received as contemplated u/s. 234D.

CIT v. Fisher Sanmar Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 296 / 47 taxmann.com 364 (Mad.)(HC)

Section 234E : Fee for defaults in furnishing statements**S.234E : Fee for default in furnishing statements – Deduction at source – High Court grants adinterim stay against operation of notices levying fee for failure to file TDS statements**

2170

S.234E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 provides for levy of a fee of Rs. 200/- for each day's delay in filing the statement of tax deducted at Source (TDS) or Tax Collected at Source (TCS). A Writ Petition to challenge the validity of section 234E has been filed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court. HELD by the High Court by an ad-interim order:

Issue notice to the respondents on interim relief. Additionally issue notice to Attorney General of India as the validity of the Central enactment is put in issue.

By way of ad interim relief, we direct the respondents not to take coercive action against the petitioner with regard to the subject matter referred to in the impugned Annexures P/2 to P/5. We are inclined to grant this order *ex parte* keeping in mind the orders passed by other High Courts (High Court of Kerala, High Court of Rajasthan, Bombay High Court and High Court of Orissa). (W.P. No. 11831 / 2014, dated 11-8-2014)

Shree Builder v. UOI (MP)(HC) www.itatonline.org

S.234E: Fee for default in furnishing the statements – High Court grants adinterim stay against operation of notices levying fee for failure to file TDS statement.

2171

section 234E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 provides for levy of a fee of ₹ 200/- for each day's delay in filing the statement of Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) or Tax Collected at Source (TCS). A Writ Petition to challenge the validity of s. 234E has been filed in the Bombay High Court. The Petition claims that assessee who are deducting tax at source are discharging an administrative function of the department and that they are a "honorary agent" of the department. It is stated that this obligation is onerous in nature and that there are already numerous penalties prescribed for a default. It is stated that the fee now levied by section 234E is "exponentially harsh and burdensome" and also "deceitful, atrocious and obnoxious". It is also claimed that Parliament does not have the jurisdiction or competence to impose such a levy on *tax-payers*. The Bombay High Court has, *vide* order dated 28-4-2014, granted adinterim stay in terms of prayer clause (d) i.e. stayed the operation of the impugned notices levying the fee.

Rashmikant Kundalia v. UOI (2015) 373 ITR 268/ 229 Taxmann 596 (Bom.)(HC)

- 2172 **S.234E : Fee for default in furnishing the statements – High Court issues notice on challenge to notices for levy of fee for failure to file TDS statement. Recovery of fee is subject to outcome of Petition**

S.234E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 provides for levy of a fee of ₹ 200/- for each day's delay in filing the statement of Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) or Tax Collected at Source (TCS). A Writ Petition to challenge the validity of section 234E has been filed in the Jodhpur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court. *Vide* an order dated 15-4-2014 the High Court has directed that notice should be issued to the CBDT and the UOI as to why the Petition should not be accepted. It has also been held that in the meanwhile, if any recovery is made from the Petitioner, that shall be subject to the final decision of the Writ Petition. (WP No. 1981 of 2014. dated 15-4-2014) *Om Prakash Dhoot v. UOI (Raj)(HC)*; www.itatonline.org

- 2173 **S.234E : Fee for default in furnishing the statements – High Court grants interim stay on enforcement of notices for levy of fee for failure to file TDS statement**

S. 234E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 provides for levy of a fee of ₹ 200/- for each day's delay in filing the statement of Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) or Tax Collected at Source (TCS). The constitutional validity of section 234E has been challenged in the Karnataka High Court. *Vide* an interim order dated 19-2-2014 the High Court held as follows:

Petitioners have questioned the Constitutional validity of the provision of section 234E of the Income-tax Act and a notice to the petitioner levying fee *vide* annexures A1 to A21 and Annexure-B. Pending consideration of the grounds in the Writ Petition, it is desirable that enforcement of notices referred to above issued by the 4th respondent are stayed until further orders.

Adithaya Bizorp Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI (Kar.)(HC), www.itatonline.org

Section S237 : Refunds

- 2174 **S.237 : Refunds – Claim for refund filed belatedly – Condonation of delay – Return was filed in pursuance of notice u/s. 148 – Court directed the CIT to consider the claim on merits. [S.148]**

The assessee had not filed the returns for the assessment years 1996-97 and 1997-98 voluntarily but filed them in response to the notice issued under s. 148. Inasmuch as the claim for refund of advance tax had been filed belatedly and without any valid reasons for the delay, the authorities rejected the claim as laid down in the Act. The Chief Commissioner rejected the assessee's request for refund of the advance tax. On a writ petition: Held, allowing the petition, the delay even though due to the fault of the assessee, should liberally be condoned. Therefore, the delay in filing the application for refund was condoned and the matter was remitted to the Chief Commissioner to consider the application afresh on the merits in accordance with law and pass appropriate orders. (AY. 1996-97, 1997-98)

Vasco Sales and Marketing Corporation v. DCIT (2013) 216 Taxmann 250 / (2014) 360 ITR 578 / (Ker.)(HC)

S.237 : Refunds – Rejection of application – Matter was remanded to AO. [S.143(1), 154]

2175

Where assessee's appeal against assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) for claiming refund, was rejected only on ground that its claim of refund had already been rejected in rectification application filed against assessment made u/s. 143(1) matter was remitted to AO in interest of justice. (AY. 1999-2000)

Siel Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 730 (Delhi)(Trib.)

Section S239 : Form of claim for refund and limitation**S.239 : Refunds – Delay in filing return-Change in management cannot be the grounds for condonation of delay. [S.139(1)]**

2176

Audit of assessee was done and audit report was submitted well in time. Change of management cannot be a ground to condone delay. Application filed belatedly for claim of refund which was not condoned by the Commissioner was affirmed by the single judge and Division Bench of High Court. (AY. 2009-10)

Learning Curve Technologies Bangalore P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 183 / 227 Taxmann 151 (Mag)(Karn.)(HC)

Section S244 : Interest on refund where no claim is needed**S.244 : Refunds – Interest on when no claim is made – Matter remanded. [Ss,214, 243(1)(b)]**

2177

High Court allowed the claim of assessee relying upon the order in *Sandvik Asia Ltd v. CIT (2006) 280 ITR 643 (SC)* for interest on delayed payment of amount refunded by revenue which was wrongly withheld, order passed was set aside and the matter was remanded back for disposal afresh in light of observations made by Supreme Court in *CIT v. Flouro Chemicals (2013) 358 ITR 291 (SC)*

CIT v. Gujarat Fluro Chemicals (2014) 222 Taxmann 233 (Mag.)(SC)

S.244 : Refunds – Interest on refund – Can be withdrawn while giving effect to appellate order

2178

Amount paid to assessee as interest under section 244 can be withdrawn, while giving effect to an appellate order which has led to variation of amount being lesser amount chargeable under section 244.

Vipin Kumar Sudesh Kumar, HUF v. ITO (2014) 225 Taxmann 200 (Mag.) (P&H)(HC)

S.244 : Refunds – Delay in paying interest – Interest on interest is not payable. [S.244A]

2179

While paying interest on delayed payment of refund, interest on interest was not payable u/s. 244. Relying on *CIT v. Gujarat Flouro Chemicals Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 291 (SC)* in view of section 244A with effect from 1-4-1989, revenue is not obliged to pay on any amounts except what is provided in statute. (AY. 1991-92)

CIT v. Brakes India Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 424/98 DTR 285 (2015) 231 Taxmann 898 (Mad.)(HC)

2180 **S.244 : Refunds – Time of accrual – Date of passing order – Chargeable to tax in respective year for which interest was paid. [S.237, 240, 244(IA)]**

The assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1982-83 was completed with substantial additions. The assessee paid the tax. Tribunal granted substantial relief to the assessee on June 16, 1989. Thereafter the AO gave effect to the order of Tribunal by orders dated September 18, 1989 refunding the amount paid and along with the interest up to October 31, 1995. The assessee received the of ₹ 79 950 for the period October 30 1985 to August 31, 1989. The AO brought to tax the interest in the assessment year 1990-91 ignoring the claim of assessee to spread over the assessment years 1985-86 to 1988-89. Claim of assessee was allowed in appeal by the Appellate Commissioner. On appeal by revenue the Tribunal restored the order of the AO. On appeal to High Court allowing the appeal held that the income has legally accrued to the assessee, i.e., the assessee has acquired a right to receive the income, though its valuation may be postponed to a future date, the determination or quantification of the amount does not postpone the accrual. Held, interest u/s. 244(1A) on the refund due did not accrue on the date when the appellate authorities passed order and it accrued from the previous year relevant to the assessment year and interest was chargeable to tax in the respective year for which interest was paid. Appeal of assessee was allowed. (AY. 1990-91)

M. Jaffer Saheb (Decd.) v. CIT (2014) 361 ITR 25 (AP)(HC)

Section S244A : Interest on refunds

2181 **S.244A : Refunds – Interest – Deduction at source – Deductor entitled to interest on refund of excess TDS from date of payment. [S.156, 195, 240, 244]**

The assessee made an application u/s. 195(2) for permission to remit technical service charges and reimbursement of expenses to a foreign company without deduction of tax at source. The AO passed an order directing the assessee to deduct TDS at the rate of 20% before making remittance. The assessee effected the deduction and filed an appeal before the CIT(A) in which it claimed that the said remittance was not subject to TDS. The CIT(A) upheld the claim with regard to the reimbursement of expenses with the result that the TDS thereon was refunded to the assessee. However, the AO declined to grant interest u/s. 244A on the said interest by relying on Circular Nos. 769 dated 6-8-1998 and 790 dated 20-4-2000 issued by the CBDT. The CIT(A) upheld the AO's stand though the Tribunal and High Court upheld the assessee's stand. On appeal by the department to the Supreme Court HELD dismissing the appeal:

(i) A “tax refund” is a refund of taxes when the tax liability is less than the tax paid. When the said amount is refunded it should carry interest in the matter of course. As held by the Courts while awarding interest, it is a kind of compensation of use and retention of the money collected unauthorisedly by the Department. When the collection is illegal, there is corresponding obligation on the revenue to refund such amount with interest in as much as they have retained and enjoyed the money deposited. Even the Department has understood the object behind insertion of Section 244A, as that, an assessee is entitled to payment of interest for money remaining with the Government which would be refunded. There is no reason to restrict the same to an assessee only without extending the similar benefit to a deductor who has deducted tax at source

and deposited the same before remitting the amount payable to a non-resident/ foreign company;

(ii) Providing for payment of interest in case of refund of amounts paid as tax or deemed tax or advance tax is a method now statutorily adopted by fiscal legislation to ensure that the aforesaid amount of tax which has been duly paid in prescribed time and provisions in that behalf form part of the recovery machinery provided in a taxing Statute. Refund due and payable to the assessee is debt-owed and payable by the Revenue. The Government, there being no express statutory provision for payment of interest on the refund of excess amount/tax collected by the Revenue, cannot shrug off its apparent obligation to reimburse the deductors' lawful monies with the accrued interest for the period of undue retention of such monies. The State having received the money without right, and having retained and used it, is bound to make the party good, just as an individual would be under like circumstances. The obligation to refund money received and retained without right implies and carries with it the right to interest. Whenever money has been received by a party which *ex ae quo et bono* ought to be refunded, the right to interest follows, as a matter of course;

(iii) The said interest has to be calculated from the date of payment of such tax. (AY. 1997-98)

UOI v. Tata Chemicals Ltd (2014) 363 TTR 658 / 267 CTR 89 / 101 DTR 193 / 222 Taxmann 225 (Mag.) (SC)

DIT v. Reliance Infocom Ltd. (2014) 363 TTR 658 / 267 CTR 89 / 101 DTR 193 (SC)

DIT v. Set Satellite (Singapore) Pte Ltd. (2014) 267 CTR 89 / 101 DTR 193 (SC)

S.244A : Refunds – Interest on refund – Book profit – Deduction of tax at source – Entitle to interest on refund. [S.115]AA] 2182

The assessee was engaged in the business of offshore oil well drilling. In respect of the claim for credit of minimum alternate tax under section 115]AA the Tribunal, directed the Assessing Officer to give credit of minimum alternate tax before tax deduction at source and advance tax. While giving effect to the order, the Assessing Officer did not allow any interest on refund under section 244A. The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee for interest on refund. On appeal by revenue the Court held that the assessee is entitled to refund consequent upon deduction given on minimum alternate tax credit and tax deduction at source. AO was directed to work out interest on refund. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 483 / 46 taxmann.com 422 (Mad.) (HC)

S.244A : Refunds – Interest-Interest on refund is allowable on all kinds of tax payment-not confined only to tax paid on demand 2183

The AO classified the excess tax paid under two categories i.e., self-assessed tax under Section 140A and tax *vide* notice under Section 156 of the Act. and held that no interest under section 244A is payable by the department on tax paid by way of self-assessed tax and there is no provision for the same. The argument is that going by the Explanation to section 244A(1)(b) the liability to pay interest is only in respect of the tax paid after a demand is made under section 156 of the Act. We do not think that such

a differentiation can be made to the aforesaid provision and Explanation does not give a different meaning at all. Any amount due to the assessee under the Act mentioned in section 244(1) clearly takes in all forms of refund, either self-assessed tax or tax paid as per notice under section 156 of the Act. As far as the explanation is concerned it only indicates the date on which the interest is liable to paid. That being the position, we do not think that there is any illegality or perversity in the judgment of the learned single judge. (AY. 1990-91)

ACIT v. Kerala Transport Co. (2014) 222 Taxmann 149 / 270 CTR 214 (Ker.)(HC)

2184 S.244A : Refunds – Interest – Refund of Self – Assessment tax is also entitled to interest

The Tribunal held that a refund on account of self-assessment tax was entitled to interest u/s 244A(1)(b). On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD by the High Court dismissing the appeal:

In view of the judgement of the Madras High Court in *CIT v. Cholanmandalam Investment and Finance Ltd. (2011) 294 ITR 438* (Special Leave Petition dismissed by the Supreme Court) and *CIT v. Sutlaj Industries Ltd. (2010) 325 ITR 331 (Del)* and the fact that there is nothing contrary, the appeal of the department is dismissed.

CIT v. Indian Oil Corporation (2015) 229 Taxmann 437 (Bom.)(HC)

2185 S.244A : Refunds – Interest – Refund of self assessment tax – Interest is payable from the date of assessment order and not from the date when the date when assessee paid the self assessment tax. [Ss.140A, 244(IA)]

The court held that prayer on delayed refund of interest of ₹ 6,76,002 from 1st April 1988 till payment could not be granted to the assessee, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The assessee's claim for compensation is outside the statutory provisions. Even if the principle of moulding of relief is to be applied by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the same can be done only within statutory framework and not otherwise. Accordingly the assessee is entitled to interest on refund attributable to payment of self assessment tax, however, interest is payable from the date of assessment order and not from the date when the assessee paid the self assessment tax. Interest on delayed payment of interest is not payable. (AY. 1986-87)

Merck Ltd. v. Tarakehwar Sigh, CIT (2014) 270 CTR 355 / 108 DTR 35 (Bom.)(HC)

2186 S.244A : Refunds – Interest – Deduction at source – Department is liable to pay interest on the refund of TDS made to the assessee from the date of assessment of ITC in respect of the TDS till the date of refund

Petitioner filed Writ Petition requesting the department to refund the TDS amounts remitted to the account of the ITC, since the ITC had already paid the tax liability in making the TDS amounts remitted by the Petitioner. Thereafter department has refunded TDS amounts to the Petitioner; however, the Petitioner has claimed interest on TDS amounts from the date of remittance till refund. Department contended the petitioner is not an assessee and that the liability to pay interest on the refund arises only in respect of an assessee and in these transactions, the Petitioner is not an assessee and hence is not entitled to interest. Allowing the WP, the Court held that assessee having deducted

TDS from the payments made to the ITC & remitted the same to the department, it is an assessee and also a deemed assessee and the said TDS being excess payment of tax liability of ITC, department is liable to pay interest on the refund of TDS made to the assessee from the date of assessment of ITC in respect of the TDS till the date of refund. *Raj & Company v. UOI (2014) 264 CTR 209 / 42 taxmann.com 184 (Gau.)(HC)*

S.244A : Refunds – Interest – When refund is pending delay cannot be held to be attributable to assessee 2187

Where the refund is pending before the authorities, failure to apply for the refund cannot be treated as delay attributable to the assessee within the meaning of section 244A(2). (AY. 1992-93)

CIT v. Sahara India Savings & Investment Corp Ltd (2014)101 DTR 93 (All.)(HC)

S.244A : Refunds – Interest – MAT credit – Entitled to interest [S.115JB] 2188

Assessee is entitled to interest under section 244A on refund arising to it under MAT credit. (AYs. 2007-08 to 2009-10)

Shree Cement Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 100 DTR 33 / 2015)152 ITD 561 (Jaipur)(Trib.)

S.245A : Settlement Commission – Case – Pendency of assessment proceedings – Time to make assessment on return filed by assessee for assessment years 2007-08 to 2009-10 was barred by limitation when settlement application was filed – Assessment proceedings were not pending before Assessing Officer – Dismissal of application by Settlement Commission was valid – Writ Petition of assessee was dismissed. [S.147, 148, 153, 245D, 245HA] 2189

The exclusion clause in section 245A(b) comes into play only on the issue of a notice u/s. 148 which was admittedly not done up to March 7, 2013, when the application for settlement was filed by the assessee with the Settlement Commission. However, the proceedings u/s. 147/148 by their very nature would only lie where the earlier assessment proceedings were not pending. This is self-evident as the jurisdictional requirement u/s. 147/148 is that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Therefore, where the assessment was still pending (in case where returns have been filed) no occasion of income escaping assessment can arise. The assessment will cease to be pending when the assessment proceedings are terminated. This termination can be either when the assessment is made or when the time to make the assessment comes to an end u/s. 153. Thus, the period within which assessment could be made for the assessment years 2007-08 to 2009-10 had admittedly expired u/s. 153. The time limit to make an assessment order in regular proceedings for the assessment years 2007-08 to 2009-10 had already long expired before March 7, 2013, when the application for settlement was made by the assessee to the Settlement Commission. Therefore, on the date of filing of the application, i.e., March 7, 2013, before the Settlement Commission there were no assessment proceedings pending with the AO as they stood terminated by efflux of time. Writ Petition of assessee was dismissed. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10)

Shrinivas Machine Craft P. Ltd. v. ITSC (2014) 361 ITR 313 /98 DTR 161/265 CTR 113(Bom.)(HC)

Section 245BA : Jurisdiction and powers of Settlement Commission**2190 S.245BA : Settlement Commission – Powers – No power of rectification – Waiver of interest. [S.234A, 234B, 234C, 245D(6A)]**

The Settlement Commission provided for partial waiver of interest under sections 234A, 234B and 234C. The Revenue thereupon approached the Settlement Commission and requested for rectification of the order in connection with the interest portion. The Settlement Commission modified its direction with regard to charging of interest exercising powers of rectification. Held, that the Settlement Commission had no power of rectification as the statute stood at the relevant time. Therefore, the order of the Settlement Commission was quashed leaving it open to the Revenue to follow its remedies against the original order of the Settlement Commission.

Kakadia Builders P. Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 362 ITR 342 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 92 (Guj.)(HC)

Section S245C : Application for settlement of cases**2191 S.245C : Settlement Commission – Full and true disclosure of income – Manner in which the income has been earned – Additional disclosure of income by way of goodwill measure – Does not establish original application did not contain a full and true disclosure of income – Petition of Revenue was dismissed. [S.245D(2C)]**

The Petitioner filed WP challenging on the ground that the impugned order of the commission was passed ignoring the statutory requirement of making full and true disclosure by respondents before the Settlement Commission. Dismissing the Petition court held that there was full and true disclosure of all receipts and all facts in the very first application. Further additional income was made only with a view to put an end to the dispute at the instance of the commission. At the instance of Commission and without altering the gross receipts, the assessee offered to compute income @ approximately 30% & rounded off the additional income of ₹ 150 crores. Further revenue has not led evidence to show that there has not been a full and true disclosure by the assessee before commission of its income in its application. Also Commission on considering the issues involved has come to a conclusion that the proceedings before it involved complex facts. There was no requirement that for application to be entertained by the Commission, the assessee must declare a new source of income from that disclosed earlier to the Department. The Court also observed that the Court would be slow to exercise its power of judicial review of orders of Settlement Commission, interim or final unless there has been a basic flaw in the decision making process which would include ignoring statutory provision, setting aside the order would only delay the proceedings. Petition of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 2000-01, 2006-07)

DIT v. ITSC (2014) 365 ITR 108 / 267 CTR 18 (Bom.)(HC)

S.245C : Settlement Commission – Pre-requisite for valid application – Full and true disclosure – Additional disclosure by way of goodwill measure – Does not establish original application did not contain a full and true disclosure – The court would be slow to exercise its power of judicial review of orders of the Settlement Commission interim or final unless there has been a basic flaw in the decision – Making process which would include ignoring the statutory provisions. [S.245A, 245D(2C), 245D(4)]

2192

At the conclusion of hearing before the Settlement Commission, the assessee made an additional offer of ₹ 150 crores with an intention to buy peace and avoid protracted litigation. It was particularly mentioned in the application that the income disclosed in the applications represented true and full disclosures and that additional income was declared without any evidence and with an intention to put quietus to the matter. The Special Bench of the Commission was of the view that *prima facie* that the disclosure was true and full.

Held, that the assessee in no way detracted from their earlier application representing full and true disclosure of its income. This further amount was offered as goodwill gesture and did not establish that the original application did not contain a full and true disclosure of its income by the assessee. The Revenue had not led any evidence to show so. Thus, the further disclosure would not be hit by section 245C to make the entire exercise bad for failure to make full and true disclosure unless a specific finding to that effect is arrived at by the Commission at the time of final hearing stage u/s. 245D(4). The court would be slow to exercise its power of judicial review of orders of the Settlement Commission interim or final unless there has been a basic flaw in the decision making process which would include ignoring the statutory. Petition of Revenue was dismissed.

DIT(IT) v. ITSC (2014) 365 ITR 108 / 267 CTR 18 (Bom.) (HC)

Section S245D : Procedure on receipt of an application under section 245C

S.245D : Settlement Commission-Case-Effect of CBDT Circular dated 12-3-2008 – Application made after time-limit for issue of notice u/s. 143(2) had elapsed but before completion of assessment – Valid. [S.143(2), 245A(b)].

2193

The Supreme Court in *Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. v. CIT [2012] 343 ITR 270 (SC)* held that circulars issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes which are beneficial to the assessee must be applied and observed that circulars can be issued by the Board to explain or tone down the rigours of law and to ensure fair enforcement of its provisions. These circulars have the force of law and are binding on the income-tax authorities, though they cannot be enforced adversely against the assessee. Normally, these circulars cannot be ignored.

Circular No. 3 of 2008, dated March 12, 2008, clarifies that it is immaterial for the purpose of filing an application before the Settlement Commission whether the time limit for issuing a notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, has expired or not. The entire purpose and objective of Chapter IX-A of the Act providing for settlement is to give an opportunity to a tax defaulter to surrender and pay up the taxes in consideration of immunity from prosecution and penalty (either wholly or in part). Thus, a beneficial interpretation to the word “case” in section 245A(b) of the Act given

by the Circular dated March 12, 2008, issued by the Board is understandable so as to mitigate/lessen the rigour of the definition of the word “case”. Hence, an application for settlement of case made after the time for issue notice under section 143(2) had expired but before completion of assessment would be valid. (AY. 2010-11)

CIT v. ITSC (2014) 364 ITR 410 / (2013) 262 CTR 28 (Bom.)(HC)

2194 **S.245D : Settlement Commission – Jurisdiction of Settlement Commission – Time barred assessment – Commission has jurisdiction**

It was held that contention of the assessee that assessments were to be completed within a time bound manner which was to expire on 29th February 2000 and that in the absence of any order by the Settlement Commission admitting the matter or proceeding further, the AO had lost the authority to pass any orders and consequently, the Commission itself did not possess jurisdiction was not sustainable.

Ashwani Kumar Goel v. ITSC (2014) 364 ITR 492 / 101 DTR 139 / 43 taxmann.com 421 / 267 CTR 1 (Delhi)(HC)

2195 **S.245D : Settlement Commission – Duty-Settlement Commission must consider contentions of assessee and Revenue and reach an objective decision – Rejection of application without considering issues – Not valid. [S.245DC, 245D(2B)]**

Under section 245D of the Income-tax Act, 1961, once an application is filed, the application must be dealt with in accordance with law, i.e., the Commission must refer to the contentions of the assessee, the contentions of the Revenue and then take an objective, considered and a reasoned decision. This is only when the stand of the two sides are fully noticed and considered before an order under section 245D(2C) is passed. The assessee must be honest and admit its faults and cannot but declare its true and full undisclosed income. However, its plea and explanation that its declarations are genuine and truthful, cannot be rejected without a legitimate and fair consideration. Held, that the order of the Settlement Commission was cryptic and was not focused on the issues and contentions, which were raised by the assessee and by the Commissioner. The Settlement Commission's order had not referred to any specific issues and documents or made references to the contentions of the Commissioner. The order of the Settlement Commission was not valid and was liable to be quashed. (AY. 2005-2006, 2012-13).

MARC Bathing Luxuries Ltd. v. ITSC (2014) 364 ITR 64 (Delhi)(HC)

MARC Sanitation P. Ltd. v. ITSC (2014) 364 ITR 64 (Delhi)(HC)

2196 **S.245D : Settlement Commission – Settlement of cases – Pre-requisite for valid application – Full and true disclosure – Recording of satisfaction before proceeding further – Requirement of full and true disclosure satisfied cannot be postponed to later stage [S.245C, 245DC, 245D(4)]**

The error in the order of the Settlement Commission lay in permitting the application to proceed without that satisfaction being recorded by it, which is a fundamental aspect which goes to the root of its jurisdiction to entertain an application u/s. 245C. The Settlement Commission had proceeded on the basis that at this stage it could not hold a view that the income offered in the statement of facts was not a true and full disclosure.

In holding so, the Settlement Commission had moved over to the stage of section 245D(4) without entering upon the fundamental issue as to whether the application was or was not invalid. The Settlement Commission was completely in error in holding that unless it was established by a competent authority that the purchases were all bogus, the application at this stage could not be held to be invalid, though the Department may have in its possession certain evidence indicating the fact that the income had not been truly and fully disclosed. (AY. 2005-06, 2009-10) (AY. 2005-06, 2012-13)

CIT v. ITSC (No.1) (2013) 35 taxmann.com 443 / (2014) 365 ITR 68 / (2015) 116 DTR 301 / 267 CTR 7 (Bom.)(HC)

CIT v. ITSC (No.2) (2014) 365 ITR 87 (Bom.)(HC)

S.245D(4) : Settlement Commission – Application for settlement-Interest under sections 234B and 234C not chargeable beyond stage of section 245D(1) – Delay in filing writ petition – Reasonable cause for delay – Petition cannot be rejected. [S.215, 217, 234B, 234C, 245D(1), Constitution of India, Art. 226]

2197

The assessee, for the assessment years 1988-89 to 1995-96, applied for settlement of the assessment to the Settlement Commission in terms of the provisions contained in the Act. The Commission assessed the tax liability of the assessee. The Commission gave directions for charging interest under section 215/217, section 234B and section 234C except in respect of the assessment year 1993-94 in the case of the firm. The assessee paid up the remaining tax in terms of the order of the Commission within the time permitted. Based on the order of the Commission, the AO calculated the interest under section 234B and section 234C of the Act up to the stage of the Commission passing the final order of settlement as envisaged under section 245D(4). Contending that the interest under section 234B and section 234C could not have been charged beyond the stage of section 245D(1) of the Act, the assessee moved an application for rectification before the Commission for rectification of its order to the effect that no interest under section 234B was chargeable in respect of the assessment year 1988-89 ; and the interest under section 234B be ordered to be calculated only up to the date of the order of the Commission under section 245D(1). The Commission passed its order in which in addition to holding that the Commission had no power to rectify its own order, also observed that there was no mistake apparent on the record in the order passed by the Commission. On a writ petition against the order:

Held, allowing the petition, (i) that the petition could not be dismissed on the grounds of delay because the application for rectification remained pending before the Commission for a number of years. There was nothing on record to suggest that the assessee was responsible for such delay nor had any such ground been raised by the Revenue.

(ii) That in the meantime, the Supreme Court in *Brij Lal v. CIT [2010] 328 ITR 477 (SC)* held that interest beyond the stage of section 245D(1) under section 234B and section 234C, could not be charged. The orders passed by the Commission were quashed to the extent that they provided for charging interest from the respective assessee under section 234B and section 234C of the Act beyond the stage of section 245D(1) thereof.] (AY. 1993-94)

C. M. Smith and Sons v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 701 / 43 taxmann.com 412 (Guj.)(HC)

- 2198 **S.245D(4) : Settlement Commission – Order is held to be final unless the arbitrary or perversity is established. [S.245C, Art. 226]**

Settlement Commission interpreting receipt found in the course of search as principal of loans taken by assessee. Revenue contending the said receipts as interest. Revenue challenged the order passed under section 245D(4) by filing writ petition. Dismissing the petition the Court held that when two interpretations are possible, High Court cannot substitute its view in place of that of Settlement Commission. Interpretation not so outlandish as to be categorised as arbitrary or perverse. (AY. 2003-04, 2009-10.)

CIT v. Gopal Gupta (2014) 364 ITR 446 / 270 CTR 128 / 46 taxmann.com 312 (Delhi) (HC)

- 2199 **S.245D(4) : Settlement Commission – Finality of order – Opportunity given to Department and representative of Department both at stage of admission and also at stage of passing final order – Order of admission within discretion of Settlement Commission – No judicial review**

Dismissing the Writ Petition of revenue against the order passed by the Settlement Commission both at the stage of admission and also at the stage of passing of the final order, as a matter of fact, ample opportunity was given to the Department to file its objections and the representatives of the Department were heard before passing the orders and in that view of the matter, it could not be said that the order was vitiated on account of violation of the principles of natural justice. In as much as it was within the discretion of the Settlement Commission at the stage of section 245D(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to admit a case for consideration based on the *prima facie* view, the aspect of admission of a case by the Settlement Commission except in exceptional circumstances cannot be the subject matter of a judicial review.

CIT v. ITSC (2014) 364 ITR 625 / 49 taxmann.com 165 (AP)(HC)

- 2200 **S.245D(4) : Settlement Commission – Finality of orders – Undisclosed income – Investment in property – Settlement Commission finding assessee accounted for full value of one-third share in property – No perversity in finding. [S.69B]**

Dismissing the petition of the Revenue the Court held that the fact that the directors of the infrastructure company had together declared a sum of ₹ 16 crores as undisclosed income could not bind the assessee and her husband. The assessee and her husband were not privy to the settlement application filed on behalf of the directors of the infrastructure development company. The Settlement Commission did not fix any figure as to the amount of undisclosed amount. It only stated that since the amount declared by the directors was much more than what had been surrendered by the assessee's husband and what had been computed by the Department, the disclosure made by them needed no disturbance. There was no dispute that the property was valued at ₹ 130 crores. In addition to registration charges of ₹ 3 crores the property would be worth ₹ 133 crores. One-third of the value of the property comes to ₹ 44.34 crores. The assessee and her husband had declared ₹ 36.73 crores as investment in the property leaving a balance of ₹ 7.61 crores which they declared as undisclosed amount in its

settlement application. Thus, the full value of the one-third share in the property had been accounted for. There was no evidence to indicate that the value of the property was anything but ₹ 130 crores. There was no perversity in the order passed by the Settlement Commission. (AY. 2003-04, 2009-10)

CIT v. Vineeta Gupta (2014) 364 ITR 440 / 270 CTR 122 / 225 Taxmann 180 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

S.245D(4) : Settlement Commission – Additional income – Writ challenging order of Settlement Commission – Jurisdiction concerned with decision-making process adopted by Settlement Commission and not decision itself – Accounting standard not prohibiting last-in-first-out of valuation – Accounting standard not mandatory for purpose of Income-tax-Settlement Commission finding declaration of assessee was full and true disclosure was held to be justified. [Art. 226]

2201

Held, dismissing the petitions, (i) that the power of judicial review is not to be exercised to decide the issue on facts or on an interpretation of the documents available before the court. Therefore, the enquiry by the court can only be with regard to whether or not the Settlement Commission exercised a jurisdiction that it did not have or, alternatively, if it did have the jurisdiction, whether it erred in the exercise of that jurisdiction. In the latter event, the court would also have to bear in mind the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Settlement Commission, which is akin to a statutory arbitration. Court also held that accounting standard not mandatory for purpose of Income-tax. Settlement Commission finding declaration of assessee was full and true disclosure was held to be justified. (AY. 2006-07, 2012-13]

CIT v. ITSC (2014) 369 ITR 606 / 228 Taxmann 215(Mag.) / 273 CTR 559 (Ker.)(HC)

Section 245F : Powers and procedure of Settlement Commission

S.245F : Settlement Commission – Procedure – Natural justice – Addition was made on the basis of affidavit without giving an opportunity to confront – Order was set aside. [S.245C]

2202

Addition was based on statement and affidavit received after conclusion of arguments. The Settlement Commission failed to confront the assessee with statement and affidavit. Order of Settlement Commission set aside as there was violation of natural justice. Matter was directed to be decided afresh.

Avtar Singh (Dr.) v. ITSC(2013) 40 taxmann.com 434 / (2014) 360 ITR 588 (P&H)(HC)

Section S245N : Definitions

S.245N : Advance ruling – There has to be either a transaction undertaken or proposed transaction to be undertaken by a non-resident to fall under the purview of AAR

2203

The assessee was a company registered in the UAE and was engaged in the business of developing and investing in the infrastructure and real estate sector. It intended to invest in a 100% subsidiary company in India under the prevailing FDI regulations. This Indian subsidiary company of the applicant intended to setup a consortium by way of partnership firm under the Partnership Act, 1932 with another Indian Company. The

partnership firm would be engaged in the business of operating and maintaining various bridges and collecting toll from 5 entry points. The present undertaking is eligible for tax deduction of 100% of its profits and gains from such undertaking for a period of 10 consecutive assessment years out of the 20 assessment years as per provisions of section 80IA(4)(i).

The appellant sought rulings on various questions raised in connection with the above matters.

The AAR observed that there is no transaction or proposed transaction with the Indian companies mentioned in the question and in order to bring in the question within the scope of section 245N of the Act, there has to be either a transaction undertaken or proposed transaction to be undertaken by the non-resident applicant. The AAR held that the question relates to proposed setting up of the subsidiary and the partnership firm with the Indian company and as to whether the subsidiary or the partnership firm will be eligible to 100 per cent deduction u/s. 80IA of the Income-tax Act and hence does not come under the purview of the AAR.

Trade Circle Enterprises LLC, In re (2014) 222 Taxmann 52 / 266 CTR 65 / 99 DTR 344 (AAR)

2204 S.245N : Advance ruling – Undertaken or proposed to be undertaken – Subsidiary not set up – Application was held to be not maintainable as question posed did not fall under the purview of the Authority

The non-resident applicant was intending to invest in 100 per cent subsidiary company in India to be set up as a consortium by way of partnership with another Indian company. Ruling was sought on questions relating to allowability of deduction u/s. 80-IA to the undertaking. Held, the 100 per cent subsidiary company must exist in reality and firm set up in order to make transaction or proposed transaction of applicant with Indian subsidiary. Thus, the questions posed were held not under purview of the Authority.

Trade Circle Enterprises LLC, In re (2014) 361 ITR 673/ 266 CTR 65/ 222 Taxmann 52 (AAR)

Section 245R : Procedure on receipt of application

2205 S.245R : Advance ruling – Procedure on receipt of application for Issue pending adjudication. [S.143(2)]

It was held that in Mitsubishi Corporation, Japan, In re [2013] 40 taxmann.com 335/ [2014] 222 Taxmann 47 (AAR), AAR has held that question raised in advance ruling application will be considered as pending for adjudication before Income tax Authorities, only when issues are shown in return and notice under section 143(2) is issued and, thus, an application for advance ruling is to be admitted which is filed prior to issue of notice under section 143(2). Hence in light of same, since both parties agreed to, impugned order of High Court in *NETAPP B. V. v. Authority for Advance Rulings* [2012] 24 taxmann.com 174 (Delhi) was to be set aside and, matter in GTB Invest ASA, In re [2012] 18 taxmann.com 262 (AAR) was to be restored to file of AAR for fresh ruling.

Sin Oceanic Shipping ASA Norway v. AAR (2014)104 DTR 281 / 223 Taxmann 102 / 269 CTR 15 (SC)

S.245R : Advance ruling – Evasion of tax – Transaction of sale in Mauritius of shares of Indian company to a foreign company – Consideration to be paid partly in a lump sum and partly as an “earn-out” – Commercial reasons for such transaction – No evasion of tax – Section 245R not applicable

2206

Revenue has challenged the common ruling dated July 31, 2012 in *Moody's Analytics Inc, USA in re (2012) 348 ITR 205 (AAR)* passed by the Authority for Advance Rulings. Dismissing the writ petitions the Court held that the banks and financial institutions which held shares in Copal-Jersey also participated in the dividends that were distributed from the funds received from the sale proceeds of the sales of CRIL and Exevo-US. This could not have been commercially achieved if the overall transaction had been structured in the manner as suggested by the Revenue i.e., by simplicitor sale of shares of Copal Jersey. Thus, the contention of the Revenue that the transaction as presently structured had been done only for the purposes of avoiding tax and as an alternative to sale of shares by shareholders of Copal-Jersey (which would not be as tax friendly) was not sustainable. The Revenue contended that the entire structure of investments to hold the companies in India had been evolved only with the object of avoiding tax and intermediary companies in M had been incorporated only with a view to avoid tax in the event of a future sale. This contention was also devoid of any merit. The investment structure evolved over a period of time and it also could not be ignored that 92 per cent. of the share capital of the CRIL was subscribed by CRL. Section 245R was not applicable.

Ruling of the AAR in *Moody's Analytics Inc., USA, In re [2012] 348 ITR 205 (AAR)* is affirmed. (WP(C) No. 2033 of 13 dated 14-8-2014)

DIT (IT) v. Gopal Research Ltd. (2014) 226 Taxmann 226 / 270 CTR 223 / (2015) 371 ITR 114 (Delhi)(HC)

DIT (IT) v. Copal Market Research Ltd. (2014) 226 Taxmann 226 / 270 CTR 223 / (2015) 371 ITR 114 (Delhi)(HC)

DIT (IT) v. Moody's Group Ltd. (2014) 226 Taxmann 226 / 270 CTR 223 / (2015) 371 ITR 114 (Delhi)(HC)

DIT (IT) v. Moody's Analytics (2014) 226 Taxmann 226 / 270 CTR 223 / (2015) 371 ITR 114 (Delhi)(HC)

S.245R : Advance ruling – The relevant date for considering question seeking an advance ruling is the date of filing the application; filing a return prior to filing the application for Advance Ruling would lead to a rejection of the application

2207

In the present case the transaction based on which rulings on various questions were sought, was entered into on 1-10-2006. The application for Advance Ruling before this Authority was filed on 14-3-2011. In the meantime applicant had already filed returns of income from AYs 2007-08 to 2010-11 and assessments were pending in respect of those returns. The Authority rejected the application holding that:

As per the proviso to section 245R(2) an application can be rejected when the question on which a ruling is sought, is already pending before any Income-tax Authority or Appellate Tribunal or any court. By filing a return, an assessee invites an adjudication on all the questions arising out of that return. Sub-section (2) of section 245R only speaks of the question arising before the Authority. So if an answer to that question

would be involved in the return filed or would arise out of the return filed, it would be a case where the bar is attracted. The relevant date for considering the question seeking advance ruling is the date of filing of the application and filing a return prior to filing the application for Advance Ruling would lead to a rejection of the application. Consistent with the purpose sought to be achieved, emphasised on behalf of the applicant, it is for an applicant, eligible in that behalf, to move this Authority at the earliest opportunity, and not to wait until after it invokes the jurisdiction or is obliged to invoke the jurisdiction of the AO, by filing a return of income. The obligation to file a return can well be fulfilled after moving this Authority and the AO will have to await for a Ruling by this Authority and take shelter under section 153 to complete the assessment. Since the return was filed before filing of application with the Advance Ruling, the application was rejected. (AY. 2007-08, 2010-11)
Red Hat India (P) Ltd., In re (2014) 223 Taxmann 274 (AAR)(HC)

2208 S.245R : Advance ruling – Procedure on receipt of application – Only when issues are shown in return and notice u/s. 143(2) is issued, question will be considered as pending for adjudication before Income-tax Authorities. [S.143(2)]

The assessee was a resident company of Japan which had established a Branch Office in India. It filed its return of income on 30 November 2011 post which it filed an application before the AAR seeking ruling on taxability of its income. The AO, however, contended that since the assessee filed the application after filing its return of income the assessment was already pending adjudication before the Income-tax Authorities and hence the application was barred by proviso to section 245R(2).

The AAR, dismissing the stand of the AO followed its own ruling in the case of Hyosung Corporn. Korea and held that only when the issues were shown in the return of income and notice u/s. 143(2) were issued the case would be considered as pending adjudication before the Income-tax Authorities and hence the present case would be admitted before the AAR.

Mitsubishi Corporation, Japan, In re (2014) 222 Taxmann 47 / 360 ITR 704/ 264 CTR 113 (AAR)

2209 S.245R : Advance ruling – Procedure – Application – An application seeking ruling of the Authority for Advanced Ruling (AAR) cannot be admitted when a return is filed and issues raised in the application are shown in return and a notice under section 143(2) is issued. [S.143(2)]

The applicant, a foreign company, is manufacturer and merchant of sewing threads and yarns. It has entered into a Master Global Framework Agreement with another foreign company which provides data connectivity to Coats group companies and raises invoices on applicant who, in turn, recoups the cost incurred to its Coats group company. The applicant has also entered into an Applications Support and Wide Area Network Support Services Agreement with MCPL, an Indian company. Accordingly, the applicant raises periodic debit notes on MCPL for recovering a portion of the amount charged by said company to the applicant. The applicant approached the AAR to seek a ruling on whether a cost recouped by the applicant from MCPL would be in the nature of reimbursement of expenses and, hence, not subject to tax in India. Revenue objected

to the admissibility of the application stating that return of income was filed before filing the application and, therefore, the matter is already pending before the Income Tax Authority before filing the application and the application is barred by proviso to section 245R(2).

The AAR, after hearing both the parties held that when the issues are shown in the return and a notice under section 143(2) is issued, the question raised in the application will be considered as pending for adjudication before the Income-tax Authorities. In the present case, not only the return of income was filed but even notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1) were already issued before filing the application and hence, the application cannot be admitted.

J & P Coats Ltd., In re (2014) 360 ITR 686 / 264 CTR 494 / 221 Taxmann 106/97 DTR 409 (AAR)

S.245R : Advance ruling – Procedure – Application - Where a return is filed but notice for assessment is issued after filing an application before the AAR, application is to be admitted under section 245R.

2210

The applicant, a foreign company, filed its return declaring income from management support services rendered to its wholly owned subsidiary in India. Thereafter; it approached the AAR to seek a ruling on whether fees received against said services are Fees for Technical Services (FTS) or royalty as per Article 13.

The AAR, after hearing both the parties held that only when the issues are referred in the return and notice under section 143(2) is issued, the question raised in the application will be considered as pending for adjudication before the income-tax authorities. In the present case, the question cannot be said to be already pending before the income-tax authorities, as no notice under section 143(2) was issued before filing the application before AAR though return was filed. The application, therefore, was admitted under section 245R(2).

Aircom International Ltd, United Kingdom, In re (2014) 360 ITR 693 / 264 CTR 499 / 221 Taxmann 110 (AAR)

S.245R : Advance ruling – Application – Pending-Notice-Return filed before filing application but notice issued after date of application – Application is maintainable. [S.139, 143(2)]

2211

The applicant, a Korean entity, sought ruling of the AAR in respect of taxability of offshore supply of equipment and material having regard to the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the India-Korea Tax Treaty. Return for assessment year 2011-12 was by the applicant and a notice under section 143(2) was issued after the application before AAR was filed. Revenue objected admission of the application on the ground that notice under section 143(2) was already issued. The AAR held that a question cannot be said to be already pending for adjudication before AAR unless notice under section 143(2) is issued before application seeking advance ruling is filed.

LS Cable & System Ltd., Korea Hyderabad Project, In re (2014) 362 ITR 18 / 222 Taxmann 39/ 266 CTR 75 (AAR)

2212 **S.245R: Advance ruling – Application – Return filed but notice u/s. 143(2) not issued – Application was not barred. [S.139, 143(2)]**

When return of income is filed before application for advance ruling but notice under section 143(2) issued thereafter, question cannot be said to be already pending before income-tax authorities. Hence, advance ruling application is not barred. (AY. 2010-11, 2011-12)

Aircorn International Ltd. United Kingdom, In re (2014) 360 ITR 693 / 221 Taxmann 110 / 264 CTR 499 / 97 DTR 414(AAR)

2213 **S.245R : Advance ruling – Jurisdiction – Return filed and notice u/s. 143(2) issued – Application was barred. [Ss.139, 142(1), 143(2)]**

When return of income and revised return are filed and notice under s. 143(2) issued, question can be said to be pending before income-tax authorities. Hence, advance ruling application is barred. (AY. 2008-09)

J P Coats Ltd. In Re (2014) 360 ITR 686 / 221 Taxmann 106 / 264 CTR 494 / 97 DTR 409 (AAR)

Section 246 : Appealable orders

2214 **S.246 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Appealable orders – Order of AO granting refund along with interest is held to be appealable. [S.244(1A)]**

The AO based on the order of the CIT(A) granted the refund, but no order for payment of interest under section 244(1A) on refund amount was passed. Aggrieved by the order omitting to grant interest, the assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal holding that an appeal for claiming interest under section 244(1A) was not entertainable in a case where the order giving the appeal effect itself was not being challenged on any ground. Tribunal held that order of AO granting refund but not interest under section 244(1A) is in fact an order under section 143(3) and appeal to CIT(A) was maintainable. (AY. 1986-87)

CIT v. Biswanath Pasari (2014) 364 ITR 404 / 101 DTR 133 / 44 Taxmannn.com 128 / 267 CTR 290 (Cal.)(HC)

2215 **S.246 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Claim not made in the return – Return – Assessment – Deduction was not claimed in the return – Claim first time before CIT(A) was held to be valid. [S.80HHC, 80IB, 139]**

Though the assessee did not raise a claim in the return for deduction u/s. 80IB & 80HHC, it was entitled to raise the claim before the CIT(A) for the first time. If a claim though available in law is not made either inadvertently or on account of erroneous belief of complex legal position, such claim cannot be shut out for all times to come, merely because it is raised for the first time before the appellate authority without resorting to revising the return before the AO. Courts have taken a pragmatic view and not a technical one as to what is required to be determined in taxable income. In that

sense assessment proceedings are not adversarial in nature. The decision in *Goetze (India) Ltd. vs. CIT (SC)* is confined to the powers of the AO and accepting a claim without revised return and does not affect the power of the CIT(A) or the Tribunal to entertain a new ground or a legal contenti on. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Mitesh Impex (2014) 367 ITR 85 / 104 DTR 169/270 CTR 66 / 225 Taxmann 168(Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

Section 246A : Appealable orders before Commissioner (Appeals)

S.246A : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Appealable orders – Tribunal – Levy of penalty – Appealable to CIT (A) and not Tribunal. [S.253, 272A(2)(c)] 2216

JCIT levied penalty under section 272A(2)(c) upon assessee. Against penalty order, assessee directly filed appeal before Tribunal. Tribunal held that penalty order passed by JCIT, who was lower in rank than CIT(A), was appealable before CIT(A) section 246A(1) (q), therefore, assessee had to file appeal before CIT(A) instead of directly filing before Tribunal. (AY. 2011-12)

Branch Manager, Punjab National Bank v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 24 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)

Section 249 : Form of appeal and limitation

S.249 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Amount belonging to assessee available with revenue was far more excess of tax payable in terms of return and demand created – Adjustment against amount seized – Appeal was held to be maintainable. [S.132B, 249(4)(a), 250] 2217

Amount belonging to assessee available with Revenue was far in excess of tax payable in terms of return and demand created u/s. 143(1)(a). Therefore, requirements of section 249(4)(a) were met. Held, assessee cannot be denied hearing on ground of non-payment of tax due on returned income. Appeal was held to be maintainable. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 1996-97)

CIT v. Pramod Kumar Dang (2014) 361 ITR 137 / 98 DTR 33 / 265 CTR 1 (Delhi)(HC)

S.249 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Admitted tax – The only requirement of Section 249(4) is payment of tax due on returned income. There is no time limit prescribed for payment of such taxes. The delay in filing an appeal after payment of SA tax can be condoned. [S.249(4)] 2218

(i) The only requirement of section 249(4) is payment of tax due on returned income and there is no time limit prescribed for payment of such taxes. Therefore, if an appeal is filed after making of payment, it cannot be said that the requirement of section 249(4) has not been complied with. The CIT(A) can use his discretionary power and admit the appeal if he is satisfied about the liquidity crunch or any other reasonable cause for non payment of taxes. Section 249(3) prescribes the CIT(A) may admit the appeal after the expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the assessee had Sufficient cause for non-presenting the appeal within the prescribed period. While sub section (3) of section

249 pertains to those assesseees who have filed return and paid the tax but belatedly filed an appeal. On the other hand, sub-section (4) of section 249 pertains to those assesseees who have defaulted in payment of tax or did not file the return. (AY. 2008-09) *Kanchenjunga Greenlands Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (Hyd.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org*

2219 **S. 249 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – limitation – Financial crises – Multiple legal proceedings – Condonation of delay – Delay of 100 days was condoned.**

Where assessee company was facing acute financial crisis and multiple legal proceedings, assessee may not be in a position to concentrate on business and prosecute income tax matters and this would constitute a reasonable cause in delayed filing of appeal before Commissioner (Appeals). Delay of 100 days was condoned. (AY. 2007-08) *Kaikara Construction Co. v. JCIT (2014) 64 SOT 22(URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)*

Section 250 : Procedure in appeal

2220 **S.250 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Doctrine of merger – Rejection of revision petition by Commissioner – Order of AO merging in that of Commissioner – Appeal not maintainable to CIT(A) from order of AO. [S.264]**

When the assessee had already invoked the revisional jurisdiction under section 264 of the Act, and the revision petition has been rejected, the order of the AO has merged into the order of the revisional authority, and an appeal under section 250(6) by the assessee is not maintainable before the CIT(A) from the order of the AO. (AY. 2005-06) *Jaskaran Singh v. UOI (2014) 366 ITR 158 / 227 Taxmann 266(Mag.) (P & H)(HC)*

2221 **S.250 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Procedure – CIT(A) cannot decline to condone delay in filing appeal and still decide it on merits – Matter was set aside to decide on merit. [S.246, 249]**

Tribunal held that in case CIT(A) chose not to condone the delay, he has no business to adjudicate the appeal on merits. For this, we are of the view that first of all, the appeal should be admitted for making a decision on merits because the right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi-judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant. If the statute gives a right to appeal upon certain conditions, it is upon fulfillment of those conditions that the right becomes vested in and exercisable by the appellant. Here the assessee's appeal is delayed as alleged by CIT(A) and without admitting the appeal he has adjudicated the same on merits. Once the appeal is not admitted nothing is pending before him. (AY. 2004-05)

Dr. Murai Mohan Kokey v. ITO (Kol.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

Section 251 : Powers of the Commissioner (Appeals)

S.251 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Power to admit additional evidence – Evidence of third parties summoned under sections 131 and 133 – Assessing Officer not given an opportunity to rebut evidence-order of Tribunal was set aside. [S.131(1), 133(6) R.46A] 2222

The Appellate Authority proceeded to reverse the assessment orders on the basis of documentary evidence – documents allegedly submitted by persons to whom notices under sections 133(6) and 131 – of which neither the existence nor the contents were proved. Moreover, the so-called additional evidence was permitted to be adduced without giving any opportunity to the Assessing Officer to examine them in gross violation of the principles of natural justice as also the provision contained in sub-rule (3) of Rule 46A. The order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal based on inadmissible evidence was not valid. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

CIT v. Trimline Vyapaar P. Ltd. (2014) 224 Taxmann 324 / (2015) 370 ITR 373 / 274 CTR 156 / 114 DTR 171 (Cal.)(HC)

S.251 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Powers – Additional evidence – AO was given opportunity to consider such evidence – Admission of additional evidence valid. [IT. Rules 46A] 2223

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the CIT(A) committed no error and the admission of additional evidence be stated to be in breach of the requirement of Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, particularly when the interests of the Revenue were safeguarded by calling for the remand report and permitting the AO to comment on such additional evidence.

CIT v. Kamlaben Sureshchandra Bhatti (2014) 367 ITR 692 / 44 taxmann.com 459 (Guj.)(HC)

S.251 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Powers – Directions for subsequent years is not binding on the AO – AO was directed to decide in accordance with law without following the directions/observations. [S.10A] 2224

CIT(A) upheld disallowance of deduction under section 10A to assessee for relevant year and also directed AO to take remedial action for withdrawal of claim for subsequent assessment years 2008-09 to 2011-12. Assessee claimed that direction pertaining to assessment years 2008-09 to 2011-12, years which were not subject matter of appeal were without jurisdiction. On filing Writ Petition in High Court, the Court held in favour of assessee and held that directions contained in impugned order pertaining to subsequent assessment years shall not be construed to be of binding nature and it will be open for AO to proceed with assessment proceedings in accordance with law uninfluenced by said impugned observations/directions contained in impugned order. (AY. 2007-08)

Computer Science corporation of India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 268 CTR 110 / 49 taxmann.com 107(MP) (HC)

2225 **S.251 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Powers – Recovery – Stay – Jurisdiction – Inherent jurisdiction to deal with application for stay. [S.220(6)]**

The Jurisdiction of the CIT(A) to deal with applications for stay of the order in appeal before him is inherent as an Appellate Authority. The exercise of this jurisdiction is to be exercised on examining the order in appeal. As against this, jurisdiction with the Assessing Officer of staying the demand under section 220(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and that of the Commissioner to stay the demand are different considerations, i.e., including other factors over and above the order. The AO and the Commissioner do not stay the order in appeal but only stay the demand issued consequent to the order which is in appeal. This is only to ensure that the assessee is not deemed in default. The jurisdiction of CIT(A) as an appellate authority ought not to be confused with that of either AO under section 220(6) of the Act or the Commissioner in his administrative capacity. The Court directed the CIT(A) to dispose of the stay application as expeditiously as possible. In the mean time the revenue was directed not to adopt coercive proceedings against the assessee till the disposal of stay application by the CIT(A). (AY. 2011-12)

Cera Realities v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 366/ (2015) 274 CTR 358/ 114 DTR 212 / (2015) 56 taxmann.com 165 (Bom.)(HC)

2226 **S.251 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Powers – Show cause notice was held to be in excess of jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed. [S.2(17), 2(26), Constitution of India, Art. 226]**

The CIT(A) issued show cause under section 251(1)(a) of the Act directing the company raising doubts regarding the status of the assessee company as a ‘company’. The assessee challenged the said show cause notice by way of writ petition. While admitting the petition the Court held that it is well settled that writ petition challenging the show cause notice is not to be entertained in taxation matters, but in exceptional cases, where the authority goes beyond the statutory power or acts in excess of its jurisdiction, in those facts and circumstances, the writ petition can be entertained. The case in hand is one such exceptional case, warranting entertainment of the writ petition. The Court observed that the tenor of the show cause notice does not appear to be a notice merely for verification of the status of the assessee company. The CIT(A) issued impugned show cause notice raising doubts regarding the status of the assessee as a ‘company’. By a careful reading of the impugned show cause notices, it is seen that CIT(A) has expressed the view that assessee company, a public sector company will not be a company either under the Companies Act or under the Income tax Act, 1961. The CIT(A) has not only expressed the doubt regarding the status of the assessee company but also expressed the view that the assessee is not a company and the assessee had been incorrectly and unlawfully assessed in the status of a company. The CIT(A) by expressing the reasoning, indicates that CIT(A) has predetermined the matter that the assessee is not a company, had committed a serious error and exceeded jurisdiction in upsetting the settled status of the assessee company. Since the CIT(A) has expressed

doubts that the assessee is not a company and is seeking to reopen assessment of the assessee company over the years, for which appeals are not pending, the impugned show cause notices are in excess of jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed. (AY. 2002-03 to 2009-10),

Central Coalfields Ltd. v. CIT (A) (2014) 97 DTR 130 (Jharkhand)(HC)

Central Mine Planning & Design Institute Ltd. v. CIT(A) (2014) 97 DTR 130 (Jharkhand)(HC)

S.251 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Powers – Remand proceedings – When order of CIT (A) became final, in pursuance of remand proceedings, the AO could not make addition to that extent again to the assessee’s taxable income

2227

During the course of assessment, the AO made certain additions to the assessee’s income in respect of cash purchases which remained unexplained. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted a part of the said addition. Against partial relief thus granted, Revenue did not file an appeal. On the assessee’s appeal, the Tribunal remanded matter back to the AO. In remand proceedings, the AO again confirmed the entire addition. The assessee contended that since Revenue had not filed appeal against the relief granted by the Commissioner (appeals), the addition was, thus, deleted could not be confirmed again in the second round of proceedings. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s contention and, accordingly, the impugned addition was deleted. The High Court held that the Tribunal was seized only of the appeals filed by the assessee against the additions sustained by the CIT(A) in the first round of proceedings and, therefore, the restoration of the matter to the AO for fresh disposal was confined only to the additions sustained by the CIT(A) in those proceedings. Matters which have attained finality cannot be re-agitated. The Revenue has not failed to file appeals before the Tribunal challenging the relief granted by the CIT(A) in the first round of proceedings and therefore, that part of the assessment order, was merged with the order of the CIT(A), which became final. Therefore, it was held that it is not open to the AO to tamper with its finality, so far as the relief granted by the CIT (A) was concerned.

CIT v. JRM Steel (P) Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 198 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

S.251 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Powers – Additional evidence – Adjournments – Hundred per cent export – Merits of claim not looked into – Matter remanded. [S.10B, Rule 46A]

2228

Assessee sought to produce documents in support of claim for exemption as EOU. Remand report was called for from Assessing Officer which did not deal with the merits of claim but only referred to adjournments sought by the assessee. Held as there was no dispute as regards assessee’s status as a 100% EOU for earlier year and that return filed within due date and copy of green card and certificate from chartered accountant produced, failure to go into merits of claim and dismissal of appeal on technical ground of lack of vigilant prosecution was not proper. Thus the orders of the Tribunal and the CIT(A) was set aside and the matter was remanded back to AO for considering the merits of the claim of assessee based on the documents filed before the CIT(A). (AY. 2008-09)

Venture Metal Products P. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 362 ITR 122 / (2014) 101 DTR 403 / 222 Taxmann 209 / 267 CTR 342 (Mad.)(HC)

- 2229 **S.251 : Appeal – Commissioner (Appeals) – Powers – Appellate authority has powers to give appropriate directions to AO only in regard to assessee before him and this power cannot relate to a third person, whose appeal is not pending before him. [Ss.69A, 150]** While deciding the appeal the Appellate Authority may give appropriate directions to the AO either in regard to the assessee in appeal before him or otherwise. However, these directions cannot travel outside the assessment year to which the appeal relates. In the same way the directions cannot relate to a third person, whose appeal is not pending before him. The policy of law is that there must be a point of finality in all legal proceedings, that stale issues should not be reactivated beyond a particular stage. (AY. 2003-04)
Vijay Kumar Sarda v. Dy. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 553 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 252 : Appellate Tribunal

- 2230 **S.252 : Appellate Tribunal – Appointment of members – Union of India has continued the process of appointment of Tribunal members without amending the Rules, the petitioner, who was wait-listed in 2007, deserves to be considered for appointment within 30 days**
 The Selection Committee finalised a list of 18 persons, 13 for the post of Accountant Member and 5 for the post of Judicial Member. The Petitioner, Inturi Rama Rao, was placed in a 'Waiting List' appointment as Accountant Member. The Select List was approved by the Appointment Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) and 11 vacancies of Accountant Members were filled up whereas 5 vacancies of Judicial Members were also filled up. Two vacancies of Accountant Members remained vacant as the two candidates who were selected were not cleared by the Vigilance. The Petitioner, who was in the Waiting List, perceived a right to be appointed against one of the vacant posts of Accountant Member. As appointment was not forthcoming, the Petitioner moved the Central Administrative Tribunal. Appropriate relief was granted by the CAT. The order of the CAT was affirmed by the Delhi High Court. However, the appeals filed by the UOI against the said order of the CAT and High Court were allowed by the Supreme Court on the ground that there was a difference between the main list of selected candidates and the wait-listed candidates. As appointments of the candidates in the main list (16 in number) had already been made, the Supreme Court thought it proper not to affirm the directions for appointment of the wait-listed candidates as made by the CAT and the High Court. It accepted the contentions made by the UOI that further appointments would be made only after amendment of the Rules pertained to the eligibility of the candidates. However, as the amendment to the Rules has not been effected till date and instead, the UOI initiated fresh selection process in the year 2013 on the basis of the unamended Rules and the selection process was completed and the appointments are awaited, the Petitioner filed a fresh Writ Petition. HELD by the Court allowing the Petition:
 What we find is that notwithstanding the statement made on behalf of the Union of India before this Court that vacancies in the future will be made only after the amendments in the Rules are carried out, the Union of India has initiated a process to make further appointments without amending the Rules. If persons eligible under the

then existing Rules which are in force even today are to be considered for appointment, surely, the petitioner, who is a wait-listed candidate, will also have to be considered for appointment by consideration of his entitlement for appointment as in the year 2007 when the appointments on the main-list were made and the two vacancies arose giving rise to the issue of operation of the waiting list. What follows from the above is that even accepting the order dated 17-11-2011 passed by this Court, in view of the subsequent facts and events that have occurred, namely, action of the Union of India in resorting to a fresh process of selection and appointment without amendment of the Rules, the right of the petitioner to be considered for appointment on the basis of his position in the Waiting List has once again come to fore which needs to be resolved by an appropriate order. We, therefore, allow this writ petition and direct consideration of the case of the petitioner for appointment on the basis of his position in the Waiting List against one of the two vacancies that had arisen on account of two of the candidates in the merit list not having been granted the vigilance clearance. This will be done by the concerned Authority within 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. *Inturi Rama Rao v. UOI (2015) 228 Taxmann 159(SC)*

S.252 : Appellate Tribunal – Members – Promotion – Guidelines laid down regarding procedure for promotion of ITAT Members to avoid arbitrariness. Suggestion made that there should be a mechanism to oversee the quality of orders passed by ITAT Members

2231

Shri R. P. Tolani & Shri. S.K. Yadav, Judicial Members of the ITAT, filed a claim before the Central Administrative Tribunal (“CAT”) challenging their non-appointment as Vice-Presidents at the time that four other Members (S/Shri K. L. Karwa, O. K. Narayanan, Bhartvaja Shankar & G. C. Gupta) were appointed Vice Presidents. While several contentions were raised before the CAT (including that the appointment of Vice-President was by way of direct recruitment, rather than promotion, and, therefore, the obligation to reserve posts in favour of the OBC group was violated) the principal contention was that the petitioners were senior to some of the members appointed as Vice-Presidents and have equally good, if not better, Annual Confidential Reports (“ACRs”) in their favour. The CAT rejected the contentions. On a Writ Petition by M/s. Tolani & Sunil Yadav to challenge the said decision of the CAT HELD by the High Court dismissing the Petitions:

(i) The Selection Committee did not conduct interviews or meet the candidates at any point in the selection process, nor were orders written by the candidates in their capacity as members of the ITAT placed before the Selection Committee. The only material before the Selection Committee was the Annual Confidential Reports (“ACRs”) of the candidates. It is on this basis that the selection of five candidates was made, as the minutes of the Selection Committee records, on the basis of “available character rolls, knowledge and suitability”

(ii) The Selection Committee, as an administrative body, does not have to give reasons for accepting the five candidates in question, and rejecting the two writ petitioners. Nevertheless, the decision-making process should be fair and reasonable, and ensure that promotions are made on the basis of the statutory criteria, and through a fair consideration of the relative merit of the candidates to the posts in question. The Selection Committee was not bound by the ACRs; however, it adopted some other

consideration in the absence of any material. The Selection Committee could have adopted the view that the petitioners were not merited, if it formed this opinion on the basis of other material present before it, as for example, sample judgments of the members, their disposal rates, cases turned on appeal etc. If such a course had been followed, the assessment of the Selection Committee would lie outside the Court's limited power of judicial review. Yet, since no material was before the Selection Committee which could testify as to those factors, and since none of the candidates were interviewed by the Selection Committee (which did not have any occasion to interact with them), the comparative merit as judged by the ACRs leads to a conclusion contrary to that returned by the Selection Committee;

(iii) However, the Court has to be cautious in ensuring that its inquiry does not translate into a 'merit review' of the decision of the Selection Committee. The fact that no mala fides were urged or proved against anyone in this case, or in respect of the process, is an important circumstance. Once that aspect is accepted, the further circumstance that the Chairman (Justice Kapadia, who later became the Chief Justice of India) had vast experience in income tax matters, would have had occasion to consider some of the orders of the candidates was relevant. He was aided by the President of ITAT, who in turn would have provided inputs in respect of the functioning of each contender to the post. If these aspects are kept in mind, it cannot be said that there was any unfairness in the selection process or that the committee's decision is vitiated by non-application of mind, or that relevant material was withheld from consideration;

(iv) To allay any future apprehensions, it would be necessary for the Central Government, in consultation with all concerned, including the President of ITAT, to evolve some guidelines applicable for future cases. This could be in the form of some minimum information about each candidate who applies for the post of Vice President, Senior Vice President and President, in regard to the last three years or five years' performance, such as the number of orders written or delivered, each year; the units/appeals disposed of; a certain number of orders, i.e., about five or ten (may be chosen in advance by the Chairman of the Committee) to assess their quality, and personal interaction. The committee might, for its own assistance, in accordance with such guidelines, evolve an appropriate marking mechanism. This would lend objectivity and a greater degree of scrutiny of the quality of candidates and avoid the odium of arbitrary or unfair procedure;

(v) Members of Tribunals such as the ITAT perform crucial judicial functions, which can have an adverse bearing on individuals, and at times, vast commercial and fiscal ramifications. In these circumstances, the Central Government should seriously consider continuous oversight through the concerned High Courts, given that High Courts exercise appellate (and supervisory writ) jurisdiction over the orders and proceedings of ITAT and its benches. Some reporting mechanism, preferably centralised, to oversee the quality of the orders of ITAT is essential because the President of ITAT's powers over members of ITAT and Vice President are not appellate, they are administrative. Creation of this mechanism would result in adding a new and possibly crucial dimension to ensure greater scrutiny of ITAT and its orders and also provide a link in the decision making process of selection to senior judicial positions within ITAT.

R. P. Tolaniv. UOI (2014) 226 Taxmann 437(Delhi) (HC) Sunil Kumar Yadav v. UOI (Delhi) (HC), www.itatonline.org

Section 253 : Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal.**S.253 : Appellate Tribunal – Defect memo – Memo of revenue’s appeal was defective, Tribunal should have allowed revenue to correct the defect instead of dismissing appeal as duplicate** 2232

Tribunal dismissed the appeal of Revenue by observing that the appeal was defective. On appeal by Revenue the Court held that the Tribunal was not correct in observing that the department had filed copies of the appeals (appeals in duplicate). The department had challenged two different orders one passed under section 143(1)(a) and other under section 154 of the Act, separately. The memo of appeal was defective for which the Tribunal should have allowed the department to correct it and for which the application was filed on record. Tribunal should have allowed the Revenue to correct defect instead of dismissing the appeal as duplicate.

CIT v. U. P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 142 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)

S.253 : Appellate Tribunal – Power – Admission of Additional Evidence – Matter remanded by the Tribunal – Direction to consider additional evidence – Order of Tribunal was confirmed. 2233

Tribunal during the appeal proceedings, remanded the matter back to the AO, to examine afresh the claim of deduction of staff welfare expenditure and administrative expenditure with a direction to admit additional evidence. High Court held that the above order of the Tribunal did not require any interference. (AY. 2006-07)

Fibres & Fabrics International (P) Ltd. v. DCIT (2014)222 Taxmann 141 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

S.253 : Appellate Tribunal – Negative income – Loss – While considering tax effect for purpose of preferring appeal by revenue, Tribunal was required to consider notional tax effect 2234

The Tribunal had rejected appeal filed by Revenue solely on ground of low tax effect. The Revenue submitted that Tribunal had not considered notional tax effect which would exceed the monetary limit prescribed by Board. while considering tax effect for purpose of preferring appeal by Revenue, the Tribunal was required to consider notional tax effect in case of negative income of assessee. Therefore, action of Tribunal was set aside and Tribunal to decide the case on merits. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Amtrex Ambience Ltd. (2014) 222 Taxmann 211(Mag.)(Guj.)(HC)

S.253 : Appellate Tribunal – Powers – Tribunal has no power to examine validity of search u/s. 132. [S.132] 2235

It was held that in an appeal preferred against the block assessment made in pursuance of the search conducted by the IT Department, the validity of the search cannot be gone into by the Tribunal as search and seizure is an administrative power and not a quasi-judicial power. (BP. 1-4-1995, 23-8-1995)

ACIT v. P. N. Sanyal (2014) 101 DTR 385 / 225 Taxmann 193 (Mag.)(All.)(HC)

2236 **S.253 : Appellate Tribunal – Limitation – Pursuing alternative remedy – Rectification application – Delay of 198 days was condoned.**

Delay of 198 days in filing appeal was to be condoned where assessee was not keeping quiet after receipt of original appellate order but pursuing matter by filing a rectification petition before First Appellate Authority. (AY. 2007-08)

Raja & Co. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 12 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)

2237 **S.253 : Appellate Tribunal – Departmental appeal – Contempt – Filing appeals in disregard & wilful disobedience to the law laid down constitutes gross abuse of power and deserves to be punished for contempt of Court and by award of exemplary costs. Action not pursued in view of written apology of concerned officials. [S.80IB(10)]**

In AY 2004-05, the AO disallowed the assessee's claim for deduction u/s. 80IB(10). The CIT(A), Tribunal and High Court allowed the assessee's claim. Thereafter, pursuant to a search, the AO passed an order u/s. 153A for AY 2004-05 in which he again disallowed the assessee's claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10). The AO noted that in the assessee's own case for the same AY, the Bombay High Court had already decided the issue in favour of the assessee but he still made the disallowance on the ground that the matter was sub-judice before the Supreme Court. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the assessee's claim. On appeal by the department to the Tribunal HELD by the Tribunal dismissing the appeal:

(i) This case is one of gross misuse of powers by the lower authorities. The AO in complete disregard and disobedience to the orders of the Tribunal as well as of the Hon'ble High Court again confirmed the disallowance while framing assessment u/s. 153A without any incriminating material being found during the search. The act of negating the orders of the higher authorities in the very same case and thereby disallowing the claim of the assessee in the section 153A proceedings without any new evidence or incriminating material being found amounts to the gross abuse of process of law in complete disregard and disobedience to the orders of the higher authorities and is an act which tends to lower down the authority of the higher Courts. We may observe that if at all the issue will be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in favour of the Revenue, then the orders of the lower authorities in that event would automatically merge in the order of the Supreme Court and implemented accordingly. However, the mere filing of appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court gives no authority to the AO to negate, disobey and disrespect to the orders of the higher authorities in the very same case. We may further notice that even after the decision of the CIT(A) in favour of assessee, the concerned CIT-Admin has given approval for filing the second round of appeal in the same case ignoring and in complete disregard and disobedience to the orders of the Tribunal as well as of the High Court vide which the issue in dispute has already been settled;

(ii) The Bombay High Court in *CIT v. Sairang Developers and Promoters* strongly discouraged the attitude of the authorities in filing the appeals without application of mind resulting in the pendency of the frivolous appeals before the High Court. The High Court has strongly disapproved the irresponsible attitude of the officers in not applying their minds while approving for the filing of appeals, which benefits no one and rather defeats larger public interest. The High Court taking strong note of such an

act has imposed cost of ₹ 50,000/- upon the Revenue. In *CIT v. Kishan Ratilal Choksey Share & Securities* the High Court strongly discouraged the attitude of the Revenue for filing appeals on the issues which have already been settled and decided in the appeals pertaining to prior assessment years in the case of the very assessee. The High Court observed that it was a gross abuse of process of law and imposed ₹ 1,00,000/- as cost. However, later on the assurance of the ld. counsel of the Revenue that hereafter the judicial orders and directions would be abided by in all matters and appropriate averments will be made to the effect that the order of the Tribunal for prior assessment years in the case of very assessee have been challenged or decided and the outcome of the decision thereof also will also be indicated. The High Court upon the such assurance of the ld. counsel of the Revenue re-called the direction to pay cost of ₹ 1,00,000;

(iii) The Supreme Court in *UOI v. Kamalakshi Finance Corporation AIR 1992 SC 711* has categorically held that the principles of judicial discipline require that the orders of the higher Appellate Authorities should be followed unreservedly by the subordinate authorities. The Supreme Court has further held that the mere fact that the order of the Appellate Authority is not “acceptable” to the department—in itself is an objectionable phrase and is not a ground for not following the same unless its operation has been suspended by a competent court. Since the present is a case not only of a gross abuse of process of law but also a case of wilful disobedience and disregard of the orders of the higher authorities as well as of the acts which tends to lower down the authority of the Higher Court, hence we direct the concerned AO as well as the concerned CIT-Administration who accorded permission to file the present appeal to appear in person and explain their position as to why appropriate course of action be not taken against them including awarding of exemplary costs against them and also why a reference should not be sent to the High Court against them under the Contempt of Court’s Act. Thereafter, the concerned officials appeared and submitted their written apologies. The said officials *vide* their letters have submitted that there was no intention to disrespect or disobey the orders of higher judicial authorities and further that the additions/approval for filing the appeal were made on the basis of suggestions, directions and recommendations of other concerned officials for the purpose of protecting the interest of the Revenue and to maintain the consistency in the stand of the Revenue and keep the issue alive. In view of the submissions made by the above named officials, we feel that it will not be proper to proceed further against them as it was not only their decision, but it was the overall opinion of the team of officials to act in the above stated manner and also in view of their submission that there was no intention to disobey and disrespect the orders of their higher judicial authorities. (AY. 2004-05, 2006-07) *ACIT v. Veena Developers (Mum.)(Trib.) www.itatonline.org.*

S.253(4) : Appellate Tribunal – Right of respondent to support the order appealed against. [S.254(1), ITATR. 27]

2238

Grounds raised by assessee was rejected by Commissioner (Appeals), but issue ultimately decided in favour of assessee. Assessee can seek decision on ground as respondent before Tribunal but other party must be put to notice. (AY. 2008-09)

DCIT v. Gupta Overseas (2014) 30 ITR 738 / 99 DTR 162 / 160 TTJ 257 / (2015) 153 ITD 357 (Agra)(Trib.)

2239 **S.253(5) : Appellate Tribunal – Delay of 1804 was not condoned as there was no reasonable cause**

The Tribunal held that on consideration of totality of facts and circumstances of the case it is quite certain that there is no reasonable cause for the delay and the filing of the present appeal is only a knee jerk reaction of the assessee. That being so, it is not a fit case for condonation of delay. The Tribunal rejected the plea of the assessee for condonation of delay (of 1804 days) and dismissed the appeal in limine as barred by limitation. Tribunal followed the decision of Apex Court in the case of *Post Master General & Others v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr.* (2012) 3 SCC 563.

Hyderabad Urban Development Authority v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 126 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

2240 **S.253(5) : Appellate Tribunal – Affidavit – Chartered Accountants – Delay of 2984 days was not condoned – ITAT laments severe fall in standards of CA profession. Advises ICAI to take disciplinary proceedings against erring members & tackle issue on war footing. [S.254(1)]**

The assessee filed appeals for AYs. 1994-95 & 1996-97 which were delayed by 2984 days. In support of the application for condonation of delay, the assessee claimed that his CA, M/s. Rajesh Rajeev Associates, had advised him that as he had already filed an appeal for AY. 1993-94 on the same point, which was pending before the Tribunal, he need not file appeals for AYs. 1994-95 & 1996-97 and, instead, he could, after adjudication of the appeal for AY. 1993-94 by the Tribunal, move a rectification application before the AO to bring the assessment order in conformity with the decision of the Tribunal. The CA filed an affidavit in which he confirmed having given the said advice. In the condonation application, the assessee pleaded that he ought not to be made to suffer for the “incorrect” advice given by the CA. HELD by the Tribunal dismissing the application and the appeals:

(i) The advice given by the CA firm shows signs of deteriorating standards with some of the Chartered Accountants in profession, which needs to be stopped on war footing by the ICAI. The assessee is having connection with many tax professionals and, in all probabilities, the assessee might have had consultation with any one or more of them on the impugned problem. It is inconceivable that all the Chartered Accountants, whom the assessee might have had consultation or availed services, would have concurred with the view expressed by the above said CA. firm. If it is presumed for a moment that all the CAs. have concurred with the Said view, then it only shows that the CA. profession is losing its grip Over the Income tax matters, which is another cause of concern for ICAI. The self study model coupled with ‘on-site articulated clerk training’ embedded in the Chartered Accountancy course aims to achieve high quality education and training through undergoing practical training, inculcating the habit of thinking, self introspection, application of mind, analytical ability etc. and they enable the CA. students to have strong grip over the subjects and also to attain expertise in them... In the recent past, the methodology of self study is given a go-by by some CA. students and they have started depending more and more on the Commercial Coaching Centers, who undertake coaching of various subjects in the class room model. We notice that the ICAI does not appear to have taken steps to contain mushrooming growth of such coaching institutes, which indulge in manufacturing of Chartered Accountants through

class room model, which may ultimately have undesirable effect on the quality of Chartered Accountants, since the habit of thinking, introspection, application of mind is replaced by spoon-feeding, which kind of teaching discourages independent thinking. There should not be any controversy on the fact that the Chartered Accountants, till date, have occupied pioneer position *vis-à-vis* their counterparts in other parts of the World. They also contribute a lot to the building, sustenance and growth of our national economy. Any compromise on the quality of Chartered Accountants would not only affect our Country very badly, but is also expected to endanger the pioneer position enjoyed by the Indian CA. fraternity *vis-à-vis* their counterparts in other parts of the world. In our view, the ICAI should seriously take note of these alarming practices slowly emerging in our Country and should take appropriate corrective steps, lest the confidence reposed in CAs. by the public should get diluted;

(ii) In this back ground, in our view, the above said CA. firm would have given the letter as well as the affidavit only to accommodate the assessee herein. We would like to mention here that we have come to such a conclusion, since a qualified CA. firm would not commit such kind of silly mistakes while giving expert professional advice. If the CA. firm has so accommodated the assessee, without even realising that it is detrimental to its reputation, then the conduct of the CA. firm needs to be condemned strongly. In that case, we are of the view that the above said conduct of the CA. firm not only denigrates its name/reputation, but also badly affects the high standards, confidence, quality, prestige, reputation etc. enjoyed by the CA. profession;

(iii) The advice claimed to have been given by M/s. Rajesh Rajeev Associates, Chartered Accountants, if considered to have been really given, would create doubt about the efficacy of the CPE programmes, since such kind of advices is not expected from a Professional. Further these kind of advices claimed to have been given by a CA firm clearly give signals that the CPE programmes might have failed to achieve the desired objectives with some of the Chartered Accountants. It is high time that the ICAI should take note of these practicalities and should take corrective steps in order to maintain/restore the high standards and quality expected from a CA. professional. We have also expressed the view that the above said CA. firm might have given the affidavit only to accommodate the assessee, which conduct is also not expected from a Professional. If it is considered that the CA. firm has colluded with the assessee for giving such kind of affidavit, then it only warrants disciplinary action against them. Even, if it is considered that the said CA. firm has really given such advices, then also it may require disciplinary action against them for giving such kind of advices, without proper verification of facts and without proper consideration of law. In our view, strict actions and fast disposal of disciplinary proceedings would not only instill discipline among the CA. fraternity, but also help curtail these kind of undesired practices adopted by some of the Chartered Accountants. (AY. 1994-95 1996-97)

Vijay v. Meghani v. DCIT (2014) 109 DTR 57 / 165 TTJ 289 / 35 ITR 320 (2015) 153 ITD 687 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 254 : Orders of Appellate Tribunal

- 2241 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Dismissal for default – No power to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution even if the appellant therein or its counsel has not appeared when the appeal was taken up for hearing. CESTAT has to decide the appeal on merits. [Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, R. 24, Central Excise Act, 1944 S.35C(1)]**

Question of law which arises for consideration in the present case was whether the Customs Excise and Service tax Appellate Tribunal has the power to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution or not. Court held that Central Excise, Act, 1944 enjoins upon CESTAT to pass order on appeal confirming modifying or annulling the decision or order appealed against or may remand the matter. It does not give any power to CESTAT to dismiss the appeal for default or for want of prosecution in case the appellant is not present when the appeal is taken up for hearing, therefore CESTAT could not have dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee for want of prosecution and it ought to have decided the appeal on merits even if the assessee or its counsel was not present when the appeal was taken up for hearing. Matter was set-aside and was directed to decide on merit.

Balaji Steel Re-Rolling Mills v. CCE & Customs (2014) 272 CTR 205 (SC)

- 2242 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Duty of Tribunal to consider merits of case – Tribunal merely relying on High Court decision and not considering effect of subsequent notification – Matter remanded. [S.145(2)]**

Held, that the Tribunal, while dismissing the appeals filed by the Revenue, simply placed reliance upon the decision of the jurisdictional High Court to hold that the present case was squarely covered by the judgment without entering into the merits of the case or considering the findings recorded by the Assessing Officer. The order of the Tribunal and of the Appellate Authority showed that both had lost sight of the fact that Notification No. S. O. 69(E), dated January 25, 1996, issued under section 145(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was not operative when the decision of the High Court was delivered on September 12, 1995. They had also not considered the effect of the notification on the facts of the case. Matter remanded. (AYs. 2001-02, 2002-03)

CIT v. Shobha Developers P. Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 66(Karn.)(HC)

- 2243 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Duty of Tribunal – Duty to give reasons for its order – Deletion of addition set aside without reasons – Matter remanded**

Court held that, in *Kranti Associates P. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan [2010] 9 SCC 496* the Supreme Court observed that a quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. Reasons are an indispensable component of a decision-making process as observing the principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

Held, allowing the appeal, that an addition to income of an amount of ₹ 43,01,000 had been made by the Assessing Officer. It had been confirmed by the CIT(A). The Tribunal had deleted the addition without giving reasons. Its order was not valid. Matter remanded. (AY. 2008-2009)

CIT v. Jagjit Singh Chahal (2014) 369 ITR 260 (P&H)(HC)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Duty of Tribunal – Duty to consider facts – Question regarding existence of agency – Tribunal deciding case without considering facts and relying solely on its earlier decision in another case – Decision erroneous – Matter remanded. [S.40A(3)]

2244

Tribunal decided the issue of applicability of section 40A(3), in Rahumathulla's case [2011] 7 ITR (Trib) 41 (Cochin)(Trib). On appeal by Revenue the Court held that, the question of agency is a question of fact and that factual question cannot be resolved merely applying the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal in some other case. Such an issue has to be answered with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case and with reference to the material available before the Tribunal, therefore the conclusion of the Tribunal that there existed an agency between the assessee and RC, arrived at entirely relying on the Tribunal's reasoning in its order could not be sustained. Matter remanded. (AY. 2007-2008)

CIT v. Koottummal Groups (2014) 366 ITR 546 / 224 Taxmann 9 (Mag.) (Ker.)(HC)

Editorial : Order in Koottummal Groups v. ITO [2012] 16 ITR 66 (Cochin)(Trib.) is set aside.

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Duty of Tribunal to pass reasoned order – CIT(A) allowing twelve claims – Independent appeals preferred by parties with reference to various claims – Tribunal bound to deal with them independently – Failure to furnish reasons would render proceedings defective or deficient to that extent. [S.80HHC, 80Q]

2245

The assessee claimed the benefits under section 80HHC and section 80Q of the Act. The AO disallowed twelve such claims., The assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A) which he partly allowed. While the assessee challenged the denial of part of the relief by the CIT(A), the Department challenged the correctness of the relief granted before the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. On appeal Court held, that the Tribunal might have felt that the discussion undertaken by it, with reference to the appeal preferred by the assessee would hold good for the appeal preferred by the Department. When an independent appeal was preferred with reference to various claims, the Tribunal was under an obligation to deal with them independently. If any of the claims were covered by the discussion undertaken or findings recorded in the connected appeal, an indication to that effect ought to have been given. Being the last forum of facts, the Tribunal was supposed to deal with the relevant facts. Howsoever correct the conclusions arrived at by a judicial forum may be, the furnishing of reasons in support of its conclusions would make them respectable. The parties to the proceedings would know as to what

weighed with that the forum and, secondly, the appellate forum would be in a position to read the mind of the adjudicating agency. Failure to furnish reasons would render the proceedings defective or deficient, to that extent. (AY. 1993-1994.)

CIT v. Orient Longman Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 559 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 393 (T&AP)(HC)

2246 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Order of Rectification passed by AO stating no reply filed by assessee to notice – Tribunal ought to have verified whether explanation was submitted-Matter remanded to AO. [S.154, 234A, 234B, 234C]**

The AO passed the order u/s. 154 rectifying and charged the interest. CIT(A) dismissed the assessee's appeal. Before the Tribunal, a specific contention was urged by the assessee to the effect that the explanation submitted by her was not taken into account. The Tribunal refused to accept the contention saying that it was raised for the first time before it. On the merits also, it opined that the explanation could not be accepted. On appeal:

Allowing the appeal the Court held that when a specific show-cause notice was issued under section 154 a plea raised in the explanation could be accepted. The matter was to be remanded to the AO for fresh consideration and disposal. He was not to levy interest under sections 234A, 234B and 234C since there was no delay on the part of the assessee in filing the returns or paying the advance tax. (AY. 1993-1994)

Kamalabai Loya (Smt.) v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 429/52 taxmann.com 177 (T&AP)(HC)

2247 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Powers – Royalties – Foreign enterprises-Remuneration from foreign enterprise – New plea on facts before Tribunal – Tribunal finding merit and accepting plea – Order within scope of powers of Tribunal – No warrant for remand – Assessee entitled to deduction. [S.80O]**

The AO held that the services rendered by the assessee to the foreign company could not be treated as professional services. The CIT(A) concurred with the AO. On appeal although the Tribunal agreed with the finding of the AO that the services that were to be provided under the agreement by the assessee were not professional in nature, it agreed with the contention advanced before it by the assessee that the activity could be treated as the one of sharing information and experience concerning commercial and industrial activity. The Tribunal found merit in this and accepted the contention. On appeals :

Held, dismissing the appeals, that it was an appreciation of the same set of facts and record that the Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that the claim of the assessee fitted into one of the categories provided for under section 80O. The mere fact that the same set of facts constituted the basis for a category, other than the one that was pleaded before the AO did not bring about a situation, warranting remand nor did it fall outside the scope of the powers of the Tribunal. Therefore, the assessee was entitled to special deduction under section 80O. (AY. 1991-92, 1994-95)

CIT v. Compagne Indo Francaise, Be Commerce P. Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 434 / 111 DTR 226 (T & AP)(HC)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Duty of Tribunal – Binding Precedent – Duty to follow decision of jurisdictional High Court – Court directed the Bench not to repeat mistakes in future – Copy of the Order was forwarded to Registrar

2248

On writ by the Revenue allowing the Petition the Court held that, despite the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court, the Tribunal still exercised its power of rectification and remanded the proceedings to the Commissioner. This was a serious error. The Tribunal was correct in the first order holding that the Commissioner's order under section 119(2)(b) was not appealable before the Tribunal and therefore, such order did not call for rectification. The Court also made following observation" We, therefore, expect the Tribunal not to repeat such mistakes in future whenever similar applications come up for consideration, as we are told by the counsel for the revenue that similar applications have been filed in fairly large numbers in other cases. Even from the order of the Ombudsman we notice that several applications have been decided by the Commissioner." Copy of this order may be forwarded to the Registry of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal at Ahmedabad. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Shah Ravindra Derogarh (2014) 367 ITR 223 / 52 taxmann.com 64 / (2015) 116 DTR 210 (Guj.)(HC)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Additional ground – Issue raised before the AO has to be considered by the Tribunal though the CIT(A) did not render any view. [ITAT R.11]

2249

Issue specifically taken before the AO could not be refused to be considered by Tribunal merely because the CIT(A) did not have any view on it. Order of Tribunal was set aside. *Jehangir H. C. Jehangir v. ITO (2014) 112 DTR 262 / (2015) 229 taxmann 392 (Bom.)(HC)*

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Stay – Order of Tribunal granting stay of 50 per cent of amount demanded did not require any interference. [Ss.5, 6, 9(1)(vi), 90, 201(1), 201(1A)]

2250

Assessee company was engaged in business of providing telecom services to its subscribers in India. It entered into agreements with non-resident telecom operators (NTOs) for providing bandwidth and interconnect capacity outside India. AO opined that payments made in consideration of said services were in nature of royalty as per Explanations 5 and 6 to section 9(1)(vi). AO viewed that assessee did not deduct tax at source while making payments to non-resident companies, held that assessee was to be regarded as assessee in default under section 201(1) and 201(1A). In appellate proceedings, Tribunal granted stay of 50 per cent of tax demanded pending final disposal of appeal. On Writ Petition in High Court, High Court allowed the Writ and held that in view of this, a detailed discussion is required as to whether section 90(2) is of such nature as to nullify all Acts of Parliament which create tax liability under the Act, may be not in terms of the rights determined under the DTAA. However, assessee has not raised that issue for adjudication in these Writ Petitions. This aspect would have been possible had the assessee questioned the legality of the Finance Act, 2012, inserting Explanations 5 and 6 to section 9(1)(vi). From the various aspects discussed above, it is opined that assessee has not been able to make out *prima facie* case to opine that assessment of tax liability as determined by the AO is wholly untenable or illegal.

A *prima facie* case is made out by the Revenue that payments made by the assessee qualify as having been paid by the 'payer' and the payment made to NTOs/Belgacom is the amount 'received' and fall within the definition of 'income' under section 5(2). Besides, as the amounts paid are admittedly towards services rendered by the NTOs in terms of the agreement with the assessee in India, it would be 'Royalty' as defined in section 9(1)(vi) more fully elaborated in Explanations 5 and 6 inserted by Finance Act of 2012. impugned order of Tribunal granting stay of 50 per cent of amount demanded did not require any interference.

Vodafone South Ltd. v. Dy.DIT (2014) 267 CTR 544 / 223 Taxmann 281 (Karn.) (HC)

- 2251 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Tribunal without considering merits of case, set aside order of CIT(A) which had granted partial relief to assessee – Order passed by Tribunal was set aside – to decide on merits. [S.33AC]**

In appellate proceedings, Commissioner (Appeals) granted partial relief in favour of assessee in respect of deduction claimed under section 33AC. The Tribunal, without considering merits of the case, set aside the order of Commissioner (Appeals) and remanded matter back for disposal afresh. The assessee, thus filed this appeal contending that said order of Tribunal caused serious prejudice to it. In view of order passed in case of CIT v. Ganesh Builders [1979] 116 ITR 911 (Bom.), impugned order of Tribunal was to be set aside and matter was to be remanded back to it for disposal afresh on merits.

New Era Shipping Ltd. v. ACIT (2014)222 Taxmann 215 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

- 2252 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Tribunal allowed assessee's appeal by placing reliance on earlier year's order – Merits were not considered – Matter set aside to consider matter on merits**

High Court held that Tribunal did not consider appeal on merits independently, nor did it consider the alternative grounds of appeal raised and the appeal was disposed by placing reliance on earlier order. Thereby, order is set aside to Tribunal to consider appeal on merits in accordance with law. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Mascot Systems Ltd. (2014)222 Taxmann 213 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

- 2253 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Tribunal remitted the matter for fresh consideration – Assessing Officer to reconsider matter afresh on all grounds without being influenced by observations made by Tribunal or revisional authority**

Assessee filed its return for assessment year under consideration showing loss/deficit. Assessment under section 143(3) was completed after making certain additions/adjustments for both years. Subsequently, in exercise of power under section 263, matter was remitted for fresh consideration to Assessing Authority. Tribunal observed that Assessing Officer had rightly allowed appropriate deduction for exemption. However, issue regarding depreciation reserve was remitted to Assessing Officer for fresh consideration. High Court held that since Tribunal had remitted matter for fresh consideration, Assessing Authority be directed to reconsider matter afresh on all grounds without being influenced by observations made by revisional authority or Tribunal (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07)

CIT v. North Western Karnataka Road Transport Corporation (2014)222 Taxmann 213(Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – CIT being administrative in nature – Appeal before Tribunal was not maintainable – Considering peculiar facts of the case the order of Tribunal was upheld. [S.119(2), 154]

2254

For relevant assessment year, assessee filed his return after expiry of prescribed time period claiming refund of tax deducted at source. Since return was filed belatedly, assessee moved Commissioner for regularisation of such return in terms of section 119(2)(b). Commissioner rejected assessee's application. Tribunal recorded a finding that appeal which was filed against order under section 119(2)(b) was not maintainable since such order was an administrative order and, therefore, not appealable before Tribunal. Assessee sought rectification of said order. In rectification proceedings, Tribunal remanded matter back to Commissioner for consideration of assessee's application afresh. Commissioner filed instant petition challenging aforesaid direction of Tribunal. Held that, since in original order, Tribunal took a view that order passed by Commissioner was not appealable, in exercise of rectification powers, it could not have given directions to Commissioner to pass fresh order on assessee's application. However, in view of peculiar facts of case that assessee, who was a labourer and retired more than 10 years back and did not have any taxable income, impugned order passed by Tribunal in rectification proceedings was to be upheld (AY. 2000-01)

CIT v. Patel Maheshbhai Dahyabhai (2014) 222 Taxmann 153 (Guj.)(HC)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Remand by Tribunal – On remand AO has to take fresh decision in accordance with the law and the case laws available at the time of deciding the matter

2255

Tribunal during the appeal proceedings, remanded the matter back to the AO, to decide the question of allowability of lease rent of ₹ 1,89,17,094/- in accordance with the Tribunal's decision of *IndusInd Bank Ltd. v. Addl. CIT [2012] 135 ITD 165 (Mum.)(SB)*. Held that, remand is not to take a fresh decision in light of the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal only but the remand is to take a fresh decision by the Assessing Officer in accordance with law and the case law at the time he decides the matter. (AY. 2004-05)

Gujarat Alkalies and Chemicals Ltd. v. ACIT (2014)222 Taxmann 151 (Guj.)(HC)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Power to condone delay – Delay in filing appeal – 45 days – affidavit of advocate – due to work pressure he could not file appeal in time – Tribunal did not condone delay – Tribunal did not apply its mind to reasons for delay – Matter remitted to Tribunal to consider the condonation afresh

2256

Assessee appealed against the CIT(A) order but with delay of 45 days. During the course of hearing, Advocates' affidavit was filed stating that all documents were received by him on time but due to work pressure he could not file appeal in time. However, Tribunal rejected the ground for condoning the delay, without giving any reason. High Court held that Tribunal did not consider the reason for condonation of delay, and observed that it was not a case to condone the delay and deprived the appellant the remedy of Second Appeal, which is the final authority on recording findings of fact. Consequently, it set aside the matter to consider the issue of condonation of delay afresh. [AY. 1994-95]

Kishore Trading Co. v. ITO (2014)222 Taxmann 214(Mag.) (All.)(HC)

- 2257 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Additional ground – Block assessment – Can be raised when the matter is set aside to be heard on merits from the High Court to the Tribunal. [S.260A]**

On the facts of the case the High Court allowed the appeal of the revenue and set aside the matter to the Tribunal to decide on merits. When the matter was set aside the assessee raised the additional ground based on the judgment of Supreme Court. The Tribunal refused to admit the additional ground. On appeal to the High Court the High Court held that assessee can raise an additional ground, when the matter was remanded to the Tribunal to be heard on merits. (BP. 1-4-1988 to 23-2-1999)

Lekshmi Traders v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 551/(2015) 117 DTR 98 / 55 taxmann.com 390 (Ker.)(HC)

- 2258 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Condonation of delay – Appeal signed by manager of assessee – Defects were removed by filing fresh appeal memo signed by office bearers of the society – Tribunal did not permit advocate to appear on the ground that he did not have a power of attorney – Rejection of appeal by Tribunal was held to be not justified – It would be a travesty of justice to deny assessee reliefs it was otherwise entitled – Tribunal ought to have granted time to advocate to obtain power of attorney.**

The assessment was reopened and additions were made in respect of amount collected from non-members as contribution towards transfer fees, betterment charges etc. CIT(A) also confirmed the addition. Tribunal rejected the appeal of the assessee on the ground that there was delay of forty five days in filing the same. The Tribunal observed that a defect memo had been issued which required the assessee to rectify defects with in ten days, which it had failed to do so. The tribunal therefore dismissed the appeal ‘as un admitted’ being barred by limitation .Tribunal also did not permit the assessee’s advocate to appear on the ground that he did not have a power of attorney. Other three years the appeal was heard and relief was granted. The assess challenged the said order by way of Writ Petition, allowing the petition the Court observed that; it would be a travesty of justice to deny assessee reliefs it was otherwise entitled to on account of the alleged delay and negligence. The court also observed that even assuming that there was some negligence on its part, the same had caused the Revenue no prejudice whatsoever. Court also observed that the Tribunal ought to have in these circumstances, permitted the advocate the time to obtain a power of attorney. This was a mere formality. (AY. 2004-05)

Bajaj Bhavan Owners Premises Co-op-Society Ltd.v. ITAT (2014) 224 Taxmann 206 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

- 2259 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Stay – Directed the Tribunal that no recoveries could be made against the assessee till the disposal of the appeal by the Tribunal**

The assessee filed a stay application before the Tribunal for a demand of ₹ 373.68 crores. However, the Tribunal rejected the stay of demand application and directed the assessee to pay ₹ 56 crores by a certain date and thereafter a sum of ₹ 10 crores per month until 60% of the demand was to be paid.

In the Writ Petition filed before the High Court, the assessee submitted that in the previous years where similar issues were raised, the Tribunal had stayed the demand

to the extent of 78% and in the present year the Tribunal had been unduly harsh on the assessee. The High Court allowing the assessee's petition held that since the Tribunal in the earlier years on the very same issue had held that the assessee had a *prima facie* case, the Tribunal in the present case ought not to have deviated from the practice adopted in the previous year. The High Court further directed the Tribunal that no recoveries could be made against the assessee till the disposal of the appeal by the Tribunal. (AY. 2008-09)

Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 222 Taxmann 211 (Mag.)(Delhi)(HC)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Consistency – Statutory body like the ITAT is expected to show consistency – Change in constitution of Bench does not mean diametrically opposite views can be taken by the Members

2260

The assessee filed a stay application before the Tribunal requesting stay of demand and early hearing of the appeal. The Tribunal passed an order holding that it was satisfied that the assessee has an arguable case. It granted stay of the demand and directed early hearing of the appeal in June 2013. However, as the Bench of the ITAT was not available in June, the matter was adjourned to August 2013. The assessee filed an application requesting for a date in the next month on the basis that a senior counsel was to appear on its behalf. The Tribunal passed an order thereon stating that as the assessee sought an adjournment, "There thus does not appear to be any urgency for getting the dispute resolved by him". It also held that it was not "a good case for granting absolute stay" and that there was "no merit". It accordingly rejected the application for adjournment and the stay application. The assessee challenged this in a Writ Petition in the High Court. HELD by the High Court:

It is really surprising that the Tribunal having once held that the petitioner has a *prima facie* case while disposing of its stay petition, has taken diametrically opposite view when it later dismissed the stay petition. Moreover, when the stay petition was already dismissed, which stay petition was again dismissed, is not clear. Notwithstanding change of composition of the Bench, a certain amount of consistency is expected in the working of a statutory Tribunal like the ITAT. The learned senior counsel is right when he argues that if the Tribunal had formed an opinion, albeit tentatively, in the matter, it should have heard and decided the appeal itself. Having regard to the fact that already when the Tribunal had earlier observed that petitioner had an arguable case, this Court deems it appropriate to dispose of the Writ Petition directing the Tribunal to finally hear and decide the appeal.

Unique Artage v. UOI (2014) 360 ITR 468 / 102 DTR 350/ 267 CTR 456(Raj.)(HC)

- 2261 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Duty of Tribunal – Duty to consider transactions in detail and record reasons for reversing the order of CIT(A) – Matter remanded. [S.255(6)]**

The dispute raised by the assessee related to the share transactions falling under both heads – business income and capital gains. When the specific case of the assessee was that the income arising from the sale of shares could not be treated as income from business, in fairness to the claim of the assessee, the Tribunal ought to have considered it in detail to arrive at a factual finding-Matter remanded. (AY. 2005-06)

Altius Securities Trading P. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 361 ITR 332 /225 Taxmann 127 (Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)

C. Srikant v. Dy. CIT(2014) 361 ITR 332 (Mad.)(HC)

- 2262 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Stay – Unexplained Investments – Huge addition made under section 69 seemed debatable one and assessee had deposited 30 per cent of total demand – Stay is to be granted against outstanding demand. [S.69]**

Assessee claimed to have purchased cotton from certain parties. The Assessing Officer, however, found that assessee had purchased Narma and not cotton and accordingly treated alleged investment as bogus resulting in huge addition to income of assessee. The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal held that the issue involved in present appeal seems to be debatable one and since the Assessee had already deposited 30 per cent of total demand, stay is granted against outstanding demand. (AY. 2009-10)

Pushpa Devi Singla (Smt.) v. JCIT (2014) 161 TTJ 26 / 47 taxmann.com 388 / (2015) 67 SOT 129(URO) (Jodhpur)(Trib.)

- 2263 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Additional evidence – Admissibility – Application was not filed before CIT(A) – Rejection was held to be justified. [R.46A, ITAT. R.29]**

The assessee did not move to CIT(A) for admission of additional evidence nor made out a case for admission of additional evidence before Tribunal. The application of the assessee was rejected by the Tribunal. (AY. 2005-06)

Shivangi Steel Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 164 TTJ 134 / 147 ITD 166 (Agra)(Trib.)

- 2264 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Additional grounds – Determination of correct status – Cannot be an estoppel in law – AOP – First time – Matter remanded [Ss.40(a)(ia), 194C]**

Where determination of correct status of assessee impacts its ultimate tax liability, such an issue can be admitted for first time before Tribunal even if it was not raised before lower authorities. There cannot be an estoppel in law, and the factum of assessee having declared status of a firm in the return filed cannot be fatal, and the resiled position of the assessee is to be adjudicated in the light of the applicable legal position. The exercise to determine the correct status of the assessee becomes all the more important in this case because it has a bearing on the ultimate tax liability of the assessee. Matter remanded. (AY. 2006-07)

ITO v. Sew Precision Joint Venture (2014) 64 SOT 83 (URO) (Pune)(Trib.)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Cross objection – Respondent can raise an additional ground in a Cross – Objection. [Form no. 36A]

2265

The Hon'ble Guwahati High Court in *CIT v. Purbanchal Parbahon Gosthi (1998) 234 ITR 663 (Gau.)* has stated that there is no distinction between an appeal and a cross objection except for the time limit for filing the appeal being 120 days and that of CO being 30 days. Therefore, the learned DR's objection that even a pure question of law cannot be taken up in a cross objection is without any merit.

DCIT v. Silver Line(Delhi) (Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Additional grounds – Reassessment – Entitle to raise fresh ground of appeal at the Tribunal stage as the relevant facts were already on records. [S.147, 148]

2266

According to the appellant, the issue relating to the validity of the proceedings initiated under section 147/148 of the Act goes to the root of the matter and it is further contended that the same being a point of law the assessee is entitled to raise the same for the first time before the Tribunal also having regard to the parity of reasoning laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. CIT[1998] 229 ITR 383*. It is also pointed out that the facts relevant to adjudicate the aforesaid controversy are on record and prayed that the aforesaid ground be admitted for adjudication. The learned Departmental Representative has not opposed the prayer of the assessee seeking adjudication of the aforesaid ground of appeal, which has been raised for the first time before the Tribunal and was not raised before the CIT(A).

With regard to the admission of the additional ground of appeal referred to as grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 1.1 in the Memo of Appeal filed by the assessee, it is evident that the same involves a point of law and is emerging from record. The aforesaid ground is also relevant to determine the ultimate tax liability of the assessee and therefore following the ratio of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *National Thermal Powers Co. Ltd. (supra)* the same is admitted for adjudication. (AY. 2003-04, 2005-06)

Nath Developers v. ACIT (2013) 157 TTJ 224 / (2014) 61 SOT 8(URO) (Pune)(Trib.)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Duty of Tribunal – Reasons to be given – Matter remanded. [S.32AB, 154, 255(6)]

2267

The Appellate Tribunal, being the final fact finding authority, is expected to give reasons supporting its finding. If there are no reasons to support the finding and the order displays total non-application of mind, such order cannot be sustained in the eye of law and is liable to be set aside on that ground alone. An appeal cannot be disposed of without application of mind to the various materials which are placed before the Tribunal. In these circumstances, the law requires the Tribunal to record the findings supported by reasons to sustain the order. (AY. 1987-88)

CIT v. GEC Alsthom India Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 304 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 569 (Mad.)(HC)

- 2268 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Duties – Additional grounds – Concealment penalty – If a legal issue is raised (even for the first time) ITAT has the duty to deal with it and cannot remand it to lower authorities. [S.271(1)(c)]**

Before the Tribunal, the assessee raised an additional ground claiming that the penalty order was not valid as it had been passed on an assessee which was not in existence pursuant to an order of amalgamation. The Tribunal admitted the additional ground of appeal and held that as it had been raised for the first time, the matter should be remanded to the AO for fresh consideration. The assessee filed an appeal in the High Court claiming that as the issue was a legal one, the Tribunal ought to have decided the issue and not remanded it. HELD by the High Court allowing the appeal:

The Tribunal should have answered the legal issue itself. The Tribunal was not prevented in any manner and in law from considering a purely legal issue for the first time, more so, if this legal issue goes to the root of the matter. The issue was an impact and legal effect of an order of amalgamation and winding up of the assessee thereto on the penalty proceedings that have been initiated and were continuing. If they were initiated prior to the order of the winding up passed or the scheme of amalgamation being sanctioned, then, whether the subsequent act of a order sanctioning the scheme would permit continuation of the proceedings against an entity or company which is wound up and in terms of the provisions contained in the Act was, thus, a clear legal issue. It should have been answered by the Tribunal, particularly when it had admitted the question or ground and also the additional evidence filed by the assessee. The only two documents which required to be looked into were the scheme of amalgamation and the order passed in pursuance thereof by this Court. If that was the admitted factual position and based on which the legal issue was raised, then, the Tribunal was obliged to answer the legal question. Its omission to answer it, therefore, is vitiated in law. The Tribunal is a last fact finding Court and equally if it could have been approached by the assessee both on law and fact, then, in the given circumstances, the Tribunal should have answered this issue and its failure to do so can safely be termed as not performing its duty in law. The direction to remit and to remand it to the AO is not justified and in the peculiar facts and circumstances noted above.

Kansai Nerolac Paints Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 364 ITR 632/ (2015) 117 DTR 94 (Bom.)(HC)

- 2269 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Powers – Additional evidence admitted by CIT(A) without giving opportunity to AO**

CIT(A) set aside the order of the AO rejecting books of accounts after production of additional evidence without giving the AO opportunity of being heard. Held, Tribunal justified in remanding matter to the AO. (AY. 2008-09)

Jayesh Raichand Shah v. ACIT (2014) 360 ITR 387 / (2015) 55 taxmann.com 108 (Guj.) (HC)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Power – *Prima facie* case – Recovery of tax-authorities must give some reasons before rejecting the stay application – The question of irreparable loss is not the only consideration while dealing with an application for stay – Order of Tribunal and AO was set aside. [S.220(6)]

2270

Demand had been created mainly because of AMP expenses. Assessee's stay petition was rejected by the AO and the Tribunal. The assessee filed writ petition before High Court. On the facts of the case Court held that while disposing the stay application authorities must give the reasons and the question of irreparable loss cannot be the only consideration while dealing with stay application. Court also observed that several aspects must be considered while dealing with stay. Denial of stay without considering the merit was held to be not proper. Stay can not be rejected merely on the ground no irreparable loss shown was held to be not proper. Order of Tribunal was quashed. The Court also referred the judgment in *KEC International Ltd. v. B. R. Balakrishnan* (2001) 251 ITR 158 (Bom)(HC) and *UTI Mutual Fund v. ITO* (2012) 345 ITR 71 (Bom.)(HC). (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09)

Coca Cola India (P) Ltd v. Asst Registrar ITAT (2014) 364 ITR 567 / 223 Taxmann 58 / 268 CTR 417 / 103 DTR 337 (Bom)(HC)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Duty – Reasoned order – Tribunal has to pass reasoned order after dealing with arguments of both the parties

2271

Court observed that arguments advanced/points urged deserves to be dealt with, reasons from affirmation have to be indicated though in appropriate cases they may be briefly stated. Recording of reasons is part of fair procedure and reasons are harbinger between the mind of the maker of the decision in the controversy and the decision or conclusion arrived at and they always substitute subjectivity with objectivity. Court set aside 81 matters to Tribunal by observing that the judgments of Tribunal being stereo typed, non-speaking, unreasoned, arbitrary and whimsical. Court also noted the observation of the Karnataka High Court in *CIT v. Gauthamchand Bhandari* (2012) 347 ITR 491(Karn)(HC) (491) "We feel sorry that the confidence posed by the legislature is not being justified by passing orders that are outcome from the Tribunal now –a- days. It is high time the method of recruitment of Tribunal Members is also reviewed by the authority concerned and at least hence forth it is ensured that the members of some standing integrity and competence are put in place as members of the Tribunal and not all sundry." The copy of the order was sent to Law Commission of India, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs and CBDT. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. Ram Singh and others (2014) 363 TTR 417 /266 CTR 122 / 99 DTR 217 (Raj.)(HC)

- 2272 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Order – Undue delay in passing order causes prejudice & results in loss of confidence in the judicial body. Such a delayed order has to be set aside**

It is very clear that the authorities under the Act are obliged to dispose of proceedings before them as expeditiously as possible after the conclusion of the hearing. This alone would ensure that all the submissions made by a party are considered in the order passed and ensure that the litigant also has a satisfaction of noting that all his submissions have been considered and an appropriate order has been passed. It is most important that the litigant must have complete confidence in the process of litigation and that this confidence would be shaken if there is excessive delay between the conclusion of the hearing and delivery of judgment.

Emco Ltd. v. UOI (Bom.) (HC), www.itatonline.org

- 2273 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Powers – Stay – Collection and recovery – Financial position – Rejection of stay application by ITAT on the ground that “the – Financial position of the assessee is very sound” and “government also needs liquid funds to manage its day to day affairs” & without discussing prima facie case. [S.220(6), 271(1) (c)]**

The assessee filed a revised return in which it withdrew a claim for deduction of ₹ 5.86 crore paid to its AE. The assessee claimed section 10A deduction on the enhanced income. The AO held that the revised return was filed to get over section 92-C(4) and the proviso thereto which provides that no deduction u/s. 10-A would be allowed in respect of income enhanced having regard to the Arms Length Price (ALP). The AO's stand was upheld by the Tribunal. The AO levied penalty of ₹ 2.05 crore and refused to grant stay. The assessee filed a Writ Petition. The High Court held that that the assessee held a prima facie case on merits and granted partial stay of the demand till the decision of the CIT(A). Subsequently, the CIT(A) dismissed the penalty appeal and the assessee filed a stay application before the Tribunal. The Tribunal rejected the stay application on the ground that “the financial position of the assessee is very sound” and “Government also needs liquid funds to manage its day-to-day affairs”. The assessee filed a Writ Petition to challenge the said order of the Tribunal. HELD by the High Court:

The impugned order of the Tribunal has been passed in total disregard of the principles laid down in *KEC International Ltd v. B. R. Balkrishnan & Ors. (2001) 251 ITR 158 (Bom)* wherein a Division Bench of this Court laid down parameters to be observed by the Authorities while considering the stay application. The Tribunal has not even given short *prima facie* reasons recording the petitioner's case. The petitioner does have strong *prima facie* case on merits before the Tribunal. Thus, having regard to the fact that the Petitioner has already paid the full tax amount and also 25% of the penalty amount earlier, the Tribunal ought not to have required the petitioner to deposit a further sum of ₹ 50.00 lakhs. In fact, the Tribunal while passing the impugned order has not only ignored the directions in KEC but also the observations made by this Court in the Petitioner's own case.

Deloitte Consulting India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 362 ITR 46 / 224 Taxmann 209 (Mag) (Bom.) (HC)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Powers – Stay – Collection and recovery – Assessee deemed in default – AO's action of coercive recovery is illegal and shocks the conscience. The Tribunal cannot remain a silent spectator to such illegal action. [S220(6)].

The assessee received the order of the CIT(A) on 16-11-2013. It filed an appeal before the Tribunal on 18-11-2013 which was the next working day. The assessee also filed an application before the Tribunal requesting stay of demand. The said application was fixed for hearing on 22.11.2013. However, the AO, without awaiting the outcome of the stay application, attached the assessee's bank account u/s. 226(3) on 18-11-2013 and withdrew ₹ 159.84 crore. The assessee argued before the Tribunal that the coercive action of the AO was wrong because (i) the AO had taken coercive action before the expiry of time of filing the appeal against the order of the CIT(A), (ii) the action was taken even prior to the disposal of the stay application by the Tribunal and (iii) no prior notice was given to the assessee before taking the recovery action u/s. 226(3). The Tribunal accepted the submissions of the assessee and held that the action of the AO in recovering the outstanding without affording the assessee minimum reasonable time to take remedial steps is a misuse of powers and a gross violation of the directions laid down by the Courts as well as the basic rule of law and principles of natural justice. It directed the Revenue to refund the entire amount of ₹ 159.84 crore to the assessee within 10 days from the receipt of this order. The department filed a Writ Petition to challenge the said order of the Tribunal. HELD by the High Court dismissing the Petition:

(i) The action of the AO is in defiance of the directions laid down in *UTI Mutual Funds v. ITO and others (2012)345 ITR 71 (Bom.)* that no recovery of tax should be made before the expiry of the time limit for filing an appeal before the higher forum has expired. The Court also has directed that when the bank account has been attached the revenue would not withdraw the amount unless it has furnished a reasonable prior notice to the assessee to enable the assessee to seek recourse to a remedy in law. The action of the AO in not only attaching the bank account but withdrawing the money from the bank was before the expiry of the time limit for filing appeal was only with a view to foreclose the option of the assessee of obtaining a stay from the Tribunal. The assessee received the order of the CIT(A) only on 16-11-2013 and had 60 days time to prefer an appeal therefrom. However, the AO attached the bank account of the assessee on 18-11-2013 itself i.e. within two days of communication of the order of the CIT(A). Further, not only the bank account was attached but the amounts were forcibly withdrawn on that date itself from the bank so as to completely foreclose the remedy available to the assessee under the Act;

(ii) The above action of the AO was against the elementary principles of rule of law. The State is expected to act fairly. The undue haste on the part of the AO in recovering a sum of ₹ 159.84 crores was not only contrary to the binding decisions of this Court but also shocking to the judicial conscience. The entire action appears to have been directed to make the Tribunal and the assessee helpless so that no relief can be granted in favour of the assessee. Leaving aside the case laws in favour of the assessee, on first principles itself, no appellate authority and much less the Tribunal can be a silent spectator to the arbitrary and illegal actions on the part of the Assessing Officer so as to frustrate the legal process provided under the Act;

(iii) The grant of refund was in the exercise of Tribunal's inherent powers to ensure that the assessee is not left high and dry only on account of illegal and high-handed actions on the part of the AO;

(iv) The revenue would do well to remember that we live in State which is governed by Rule of law. It is primary obligation of the officers of the State that it follows the law laid down by the Courts in letter and spirit before taking any coercive action.

DIT v. Maharashtra Housing & Area Development Authority (Bom.)(HC); www.itatonline.org

2275 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Power – Additional grounds – Claim not made in the return – Claim which was not in the return can be made before appellate authorities. [S.143(3)]**

Assessee company did not claim depreciation and other expenses in ROI but such claim was made in assessment proceedings. AO refused to admit such claim for deductions claimed through revised computation. The ITAT held that, AO cannot entertain a claim made otherwise than by way of revised return. The issue is limited to the power of the AO and does not impinge on the power of the ITAT u/s. 254. The ITAT has set aside the impugned order and remit the matter to the file of the AO for question of deductibility in respect of such fresh claims as per law. (AY. 2006-07, 2007-08)

Ricoh India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT 146 ITD 798 (Mum.)(Trib.)

2276 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Additional evidence – Additional evidence can be admitted without a formal application – Additional evidence filed by the Revenue was admitted. [Ss.131, 255(6), ITAT Rule 29, IT Rule, 46A(4)]**

The department filed an application under Rule 29 of the ITAT Rules requesting permission to produce before the Tribunal the “LinkedIn profiles” of the assessee’s employees and a whistleblower petition filed in the High Court in support of the contention that the assessee had a permanent establishment in India. The assessee opposed the admission of the said evidence on various grounds. HELD by the Tribunal allowing production of the LinkedIn profiles but rejecting the whistleblower petition:

(i) S. 254(1) provides that the Tribunal may “pass such orders therein as it thinks fit”. section 255 (6) confers upon the Tribunal all the powers vested in it which are vested in the income-tax authorities with reference to section 131. section 131 confers powers regarding discovery, production of evidence etc. Rule 29 of the ITAT Rules empowers the Tribunal to admit additional evidence if it comes to the conclusion that a particular document would be necessary for consideration to enable it to pas orders or for any other substantial cause. The document can be brought to the notice of Tribunal by either party. The Tribunal is final fact finding body and, therefore, the powers have been conferred on it u/s. 131 and Rule 29 to enable it to record a factual finding after considering the entire evidence. At the time of admission of additional evidence the Tribunal is required to examine whether *prima facie* the evidence is relevant to the facts in issue or not. As per section 3 of the Evidence Act, one fact is set to be relevant to another when the one is connected with the other in any of the ways referred to in the provisions of Evidence Act relating to the relevancy of facts. The fact in issue u/s. 3 of the Evidence Act means and includes any fact from which either by itself or in connection with other facts the existence/non-existence nature or extent of any right,

liability or possibility asserted or denied in any suit or proceedings necessarily follows. Section 5 of the Evidence Act deals with the relevancy of facts and provides that evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the acceptance or non-acceptance of every fact in issue and of such other facts as are herein declared to be relevant and of no others;

(ii) On the issue regarding existence of a PE, a factual finding is required to be recorded on the basis of evidence on record and, if the Tribunal considers that additional evidence is relevant to the fact in issue, which is existence or not of PE, then in order to advance the cause of justice, the additional evidence should be admitted. In order to enable the Tribunal to decide disputes before it in a lawful, fair and judicious manner, it necessarily is required to look into and consider such and other material having a direct nexus and bearing on the subject matter of the appeal. Merely because the linkedin profiles was available in public domain and was not referred to by the AO the department cannot be prevented from bringing that information on record so as to arrive at the correct factual finding on the issue regarding PE. This cannot be said to be a case of inordinate delay because the AO had drawn an adverse inference on account of non-furnishing of information by assessee and when assessee is trying to take mileage out of its conduct, the department is bringing on record additional evidence in the form of linkedIn profile of employees to demonstrate that the conclusion drawn by department was fully justified. All the cases relied upon by the assessee & CIT(DR) are with reference to additional evidence brought before the Tribunal for the first time by assessee. But none of the cases deals with a situation where the assessee withholds some information from the department and then claims that information relevant to the facts in issue should not be admitted. The inordinate delay theory cannot be invoked in a case where cause of justice will be defeated rather than being sub-served;

(iii) Rule 46A(4) also gives wide powers to the CIT(A) to entertain fresh evidence for sub-serving the cause of justice. The assessee cannot be permitted to first scuttle the investigations/ inquiries by not furnishing the necessary information and then claim benefit out of the same. At the end of the day it is the determination of correct taxability of assessee, which should guide the proper course of action. There is no gain saying that pitted against the technicalities and cause of justice, cause of justice should prevail. It is true that either party cannot make out a new case by implanting additional evidence but where the additional evidence only supplements the information on the basis of which a factual finding is to be arrived at and not supplant the information, then the Tribunal can and should look into those details. It would be travesty of justice to ignore the additional evidence at admission stage only before arriving at a correct finding of fact. As a matter of fact assessee should have no complaints in getting the relevant information being brought on record from the appreciation of which correct factual finding can be arrived at. In the present case the LinkedIn profiles sought to be filed by the department has considerable bearing on the subject matter of appeal and therefore should be admitted by the Tribunal. The assessee will be free to rebut the information contained in the LinkedIn profiles by bringing on record contrary facts to dislodge the claims made in the LinkedIn profiles. (AY. 2001-02)

GE Energy Parts Inc v. ADIT (3014) 33 ITR 411 / 106 DTR 265 / 163 TTJ 697 (Delhi)(Trib.)

- 2277 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Stay – Stay was granted for period of six months by making payment of two installments and furnishing corporate guarantee to the satisfaction of AO. [S.220]**

The Tribunal granted the stay for a period of six months or till the disposal of assessee's appeal whichever is earlier on the condition that the assessee should pay ₹ 200 crores in two equal installments and furnish corporate guarantee(s) for the balance demand of ₹ 3538.49 crores to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer. (AY. 2008-09)

Vodafone India Services (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 159 TTJ 294 /30 ITR 218(Mum.)(Trib.)

- 2278 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Double taxation relief – Claim not made in the return – Tribunal directed the AO to allow the claim as per law. [S.90, 139(1), 143(3)]**

Assessee had inadvertently mentioned as "Advance tax" in the electronically filed tax return, instead of putting the eligible amount of double taxation credit u/s. 90. The AO rejected the assessee's contention on the ground that no claim shall be allowed otherwise than by way of return or revised return of income. He followed the ratio of *Goetage India Ltd. v. CIT (2006) 284 ITR 323(SC)*. Tribunal held that the judgment provides that operation is restricted to the AO and it does not, in any way, affect the powers of the Tribunal u/s. 254 of the Act. Therefore, the ITAT directed the AO to examine and allow assessee's claim about the eligible amount of double taxation credit as per law after allowing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. (AY. 2007-08)

Tecnimont ICB Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014)146 ITD 219 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 2279 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Additional grounds – Deduction of tax at source – Liability borne by the assessee whether deductible is question of law – Matter remitted to the AO for verification. [S.201]**

Liability borne by the assessee under section 201 which is not recovered from the recipients of payments without deduction of tax at source is deductible in computation of assessee's income is question of a legal issue additional ground was admitted. Matter was remitted to the AO for adjudication *de novo*. (AY. 2008-09)

Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Add. CIT (2014) 101 ITR 154 (Delhi) (Trib)

- 2280 **S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal – Precedent – Decision of non – Jurisdictional High Court – Binding to Tribunal including Special Bench – Authorised representative – Appearance by ex-members of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. [Ss.253, 288]**

Tribunal being a subordinate Court, is expected to follow in later and spirit an order of the non-jurisdictional High Court and the Tribunal is no longer at liberty to rely upon its earlier decision may, be a decision of a Special Bench unless and until it is reversed by the Apex Court or by an order of the Jurisdictional High Court taking a contrary view. Tribunal has no in her ant jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether an ex-member of the Tribunal can appear and practice before its Benches and therefore the *vires* of Rule 13 of ITAT Members (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1963, whether it is *ultra vires* or *intra vires* is a subject not falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

Nanubahi D. Desai v. ACIT (2014) 104 DTR 1/162 TTJ 673/149 ITD 16 (SB)(Ahd.)(Trib)

S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistakes – Failure to deduct tax at source – Amendment allowing benefit where payee has paid tax on receipts effective 1-4-2013 – Tribunal relying on decision of jurisdictional High Court rejecting application for rectification-Assessee to pursue remedy by filing appeal before High Court – Writ petition not maintainable. [S.40(a)(ia), 260A Art. 226]

2281

The assessee, for the assessment years 2005-06 to 2007-08, claimed that the interest paid by it to its sister concern in connection with the borrowal of money in the course of transactions as deductible. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The Tribunal confirmed the orders of assessments. The Tribunal also rejected the application for rectification under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. On writ petitions contending that by virtue of the amendment of the statute, invoking the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia), the rigour of the provision as to the effect of non-deduction of tax payable had been virtually watered down, that the sister concern had already satisfied the entire tax and in the circumstances, proceedings had been finalised in respect of the sister concern for the concerned assessment years and that there was absolutely no reason to have proceeded against the assessee. Held, that the remedy available to the assessee was by way of appeal under section 260A. It was open for the assessee to pursue such remedy in accordance with law and subject to available or valid and sustainable grounds. So as to enable the assessee to pursue such exercise, coercive proceedings against the assessee shall be kept in abeyance for a period of two weeks, on condition that the assessee satisfies one-third of the balance liability to be cleared in both the cases, which shall be effected within one week. (AY. 2005-06, 2007-08)

Thomas George Muthoot v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 525 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 502 (Ker.)(HC)

S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Mistake apparent from record – Undisclosed investments – Construction expenses – Nothing to indicate exact error in Tribunal's order – Tribunal need not address every aspect in greater detail – Tribunal silent on issue – Presumed to have concurred with lower appellate forum. [Ss.69B, 147]

2282

Held, dismissing the appeals, that the assessees were not able to point out what exactly was the error in the orders passed by the Tribunal in the appeals, which was apparent from the record. The thrust of the assessees' argument was that the Tribunal did not address the question pertaining to the very basis for reopening the assessment. The Court or a Tribunal is deemed to have taken every aspect that is placed before it into account and granted the relief which it felt appropriate in a manner which it felt appropriate. It is not necessary that every aspect must be addressed in greater detail. This is particularly so with the appellate fora. If on any aspect, the appellate forum is silent, it can be deemed to have concurred with the view expressed by the forum from which the order under appeal has arisen. Therefore, the petitions filed under section 254(2) were rightly rejected by the Tribunal. (AY. 1992-93)

Pothina Venkateswara Swamy v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 639 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 249 (T&AP)(HC)

Pothina Venkata Rama Rao v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 639/(2015) 53 taxmann.com 36 (T&AP)(HC)

2283 **S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Duty of Tribunal – Rectification of mistake apparent from the record – If the Tribunal accepts that a mistake has crept in the order, interests of justice is served if the entire order is recalled (*suo moto* by the ITAT) & appeal re-heard. Appeals should not be disposed off in “light hearted” and “casual manner” [S. 36(i)(viiia), 254(1), 263]**

During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, the Tribunal passed an order on the Miscellaneous Application and revived the appeal filed before it for hearing afresh on merits in relation to withdrawal of deduction u/s. 36(1)(viiia). However, as the assessee had not asked for recall of the ground challenging the exercise of powers u/s. 263 by the CIT the same was not recalled. HELD by the High Court:

(i) We are not happy in the manner in which the Tribunal has decided the Miscellaneous Application. If the Tribunal was required to devote so much time for assigning reasons in more than five paragraphs in a lengthy eight page order on the Miscellaneous Application so as to correct an obvious mistake by exercising powers under section 254(2) of the IT Act, then, interest of justice would have been sub-served and better had the Tribunal revived the entire Appeal and not partially. If there was a mistake with regard to the claim of deduction, we do not think that the Tribunal was justified in directing partial revival of the Appeal. We do not think that interest of justice and equity is served by non consideration of vital materials by the last fact finding authority, namely the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. That the Tribunal was required to recall its earlier orders and for the reasons which have been assigned by it would indicate that it failed to apply its mind at the initial stage to the grounds raised in the Appeal and in their entirety. It omitted from consideration crucial documentary material as well. In such circumstances, such partial revival of the Appeal would not meet the ends of justice.

(ii) We modify the order passed on the Miscellaneous Application and direct that the Appeal shall now be heard on its own merits and in accordance with law, permitting the assessee to raise all grounds that are to be found in the Memo of Appeal. This direction issued by us in the exercise of our further appellate and inherent powers should serve as a reminder to the Tribunal that the matters of vital importance affecting the interest of public should not be disposed of in a light hearted or casual manner. The record must be perused in its entirety and properly and minutely. That is the function and which the judicial body is required to perform and oblige to carry out as well. In these circumstances and the unsatisfactory and unhappy manner in which the Miscellaneous Application has been dealt with and decided that we have directed the revival of the Appeal.

State Bank of India v. DCIT (2015) 370 ITR 438 (Bom.)(HC)

2284 **S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Tribunal correct in upholding order of Commissioner – Tribunal not correct in rectifying order and directing Commissioner to consider application. [S.119]**

The assessee, a workman, filed his return beyond the specified time limit and claimed a refund of ₹ 16,589. Almost simultaneously he filed an application under section 119(2) of the Act before the Commissioner seeking condonation of delay. The Commissioner rejected the assessee's application under section 119(2). The Tribunal dismissed the

assessee's appeal holding that the appeal was not maintainable since the order passed by the Commissioner under section 119(2)(b) of the Act was an administrative order. The assessee filed an application for rectification. The Tribunal allowed the rectification application and directed the Commissioner to consider the application under section 119. On appeal to the High Court:

Held, (i) that despite the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court, the Tribunal still exercised its power of rectification and remanded the proceedings to the Commissioner. This was a serious error. The Tribunal was correct in the first order holding that the Commissioner's order under section 119(2)(b) was not appealable before the Tribunal and therefore, such order did not call for rectification. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Shah Ravindra Derogarh (2014) 367 ITR 223 / 52 taxmann.com 64 (Guj.)(HC)

S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Business expenditure – Marketing expenses – Conclusion recorded by the Tribunal did not suffer from any perversity – Order of Tribunal was confirmed. [S.37(1), 154]

2285

AO disallowed meeting expenses. In appeal CIT(A) restricted the disallowance. Revenue prayed for making disallowance at higher side. Tribunal confirmed the order of CIT(A). Department filed application under section 154 which had been dismissed on the ground that the department did not make any particular submission to support the claim. Department filed writ petition. Dismissing the petition the Court held that conclusion recorded in order did not suffer from any perversity nor could be termed as vitiated by any challenge did not suffer from any perversity nor could be termed as vitiated by any error of law apparent on face of record.

CIT v. Assistant Registrar, ITAT (2014) 227 Taxman 221 (Bom.)(HC)

S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – If the Tribunal accepts that a mistake has crept in the order, interests of justice is served if the entire order is recalled (*suo moto* by the ITAT) & appeal re-heard. Appeals should not be disposed of in “light hearted” and “casual manner” [S.36(1)(viia). 263]

2286

During the pendency of the Appeal before the High Court, the Tribunal passed an order on the Miscellaneous Application and revived the appeal filed before it for hearing afresh on merits in relation to withdrawal of deduction u/s. 36(1)(viia). However, as the assessee had not asked for recall of the ground challenging the exercise of powers u/s 263 by the CIT, the same was not recalled. HELD by the High Court.

(i) We are not happy in the manner in which the Tribunal has decided the Miscellaneous Application. If the Tribunal was required to devote so much time for assigning reasons in more than five paragraphs in a lengthy eight page order on the Miscellaneous Application so as to correct an obvious mistake by exercising powers under section 254(2) of the IT Act, then, interest of justice would have been sub-served and better had the Tribunal revived the entire Appeal and not partially. If there was a mistake with regard to the claim of deduction, we do not think that the Tribunal was justified in directing partial revival of the Appeal. We do not think that interest of justice and equity is served by non consideration of vital materials by the last fact finding authority, namely the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. That the Tribunal was required to recall its earlier orders and for the reasons which have been assigned by it

would indicate that it failed to apply its mind at the initial stage to the grounds raised in the Appeal and in their entirety. It omitted from consideration crucial documentary material as well. In such circumstances, such partial revival of the Appeal would not meet the ends of justice.

(ii) We modify the order passed on the Miscellaneous Application and direct that the Appeal shall now be heard on its own merits and in accordance with law, permitting the assessee to raise all grounds that are to be found in the Memo of Appeal. This direction issued by us in the exercise of our further appellate and inherent powers should serve as a reminder to the Tribunal that the matters of vital importance affecting the interest of public should not be disposed of in a light hearted or casual manner. The record must be perused in its entirety and properly and minutely. That is the function and which the judicial body is required to perform and oblige to carry out as well. In these circumstances and the unsatisfactory and unhappy manner in which the Miscellaneous Application has been dealt with and decided that we have directed the revival of the Appeal.

State Bank of India v. DCIT (2015) 113 DTR 417 (Bom.)(HC)

2287 S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Tribunal satisfied that assessee’s claim reasonable, but rejecting it relying on decision of court without analyzing facts – Tribunal justified in exercising its power under section 254(2).

On a miscellaneous petition under section 254(2), the case of the assessee was that the decision of the Karnataka High Court had absolutely no application to the facts and circumstances of its case and the Tribunal, having held that the table does not use the word “exclusively” and having been satisfied that the assessee’s claim was reasonable, committed a serious mistake in rejecting the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal was satisfied that the decision of the Karnataka High Court would not apply and, therefore, recalled the order and restored the appeal to be heard afresh on the point of depreciation alone. On appeal.

Held, dismissing the appeals, (i) that the order of the Tribunal had caused prejudice to the assessee and such prejudice was attributable to the Tribunal’s mistake. This was because the Tribunal was satisfied that the assessee’s claim was reasonable, nevertheless it rejected the claim solely relying on the decision of the Karnataka High Court, without analysing the facts, which were the subject matter of the decision before the High Court. Thus, the order passed by the Tribunal under section 254(2) was wholly within its jurisdiction and was justified. *Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. v. CIT [2007] 295 ITR 466 (SC) applied. (AY. 1995-96, 1996-97)*

CIT v. TTG Industries Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 44 (Mad.)(HC)

2288 S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Application for rectification – Limitation – Starting point for limitation – Actual date of receipt of order of Tribunal.

Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is in two parts. Under the first part, the Tribunal may, at any time, within four years from the date of the order, rectify any mistake apparent from the record and amend any order passed by it under sub-section (1). Under the second part, the reference is to the amendment of the order passed by the Tribunal under sub-section (1) when the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee

or the Assessing Officer. In short, the first part refers to the *suo motu* exercise of the power of rectification by the Tribunal whereas the second part refers to rectification and amendment on an application being made by the Assessing Officer or the assessee pointing out the mistake apparent from the record. The statute has conferred the right in favour of the assessee or even the Revenue to prefer a Rectification Application within a period of four years and, therefore, even if the Rectification Application/Miscellaneous Application is submitted on the last day of completion of four years from the date of receipt of the order, which is sought to be rectified, it is required to be decided on the merits and in such a situation the assessee is not required to give any explanation for the period between the actual date of receipt of the judgment and order, which is sought to be rectified and the date on which the Miscellaneous Application is submitted. Held, that the Tribunal passed the order which was sought to be rectified on February 20, 2007, and it had been admittedly received by the assessee on November 19, 2008. The assessee preferred the application on May 9, 2012. The application was not barred by limitation. (AY. 1996-97)

Peterplast Synthetics P. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 364 ITR 16 (Guj.)(HC)

S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Doctrine of Merger – Doctrine of Estoppel – Miscellaneous Application filed against the original order on certain issues – Tribunal passed a subsequent order allowing assessee’s miscellaneous application – Subsequently, appeal filed to High Court on certain other issues – Original order of Tribunal got merged with its subsequent order – Assessee was estopped from challenging said order on some new issues.

2289

Assessee filed a Rectification Application on some specific issues against Tribunal’s order. Tribunal instead of disposing the said application, recalled its entire order for disposal afresh. Assessee filed another Miscellaneous Application contending that it did not seek recalling of entire order of Tribunal but only the issues raised in its Rectification Application should have been adjudicated upon. Tribunal passed a subsequent order allowing assessee’s Miscellaneous Application. In said order Tribunal also allowed issues raised in original Rectification Application by assessee. Assessee thereupon filed appeal to High Court raising some other issues. High Court held that, by applying doctrine of merger, original order of Tribunal got merged with its subsequent order and, therefore, assessee was estopped from challenging said order on some new issues when those issues were not taken up in Rectification Application itself (AY. 1986-87 to 1988-89, 1993-94, 1998-99)

Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. v. CIT (2014)222 Taxman 212 (Mag.) (Cal.)(HC)

S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Tribunal must adopt a justice oriented approach and not defeat the legitimate rights on the altar of procedures and technicalities. Even a mistake by the assessee can be rectified – Tribunal and parties are not adversarial to each other – Application not to be dismissed at threshold.

2290

It is a settled position in law that every authority exercising quasi judicial powers has inherent/incidental power in discharging of its functions to ensure that justice is done between parties i.e. no prejudice is caused to any of the parties. This power has not to be traced to any provision of the Act but inheres in every quasi judicial authority. This

has been so held by the Supreme Court in *Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal 1980 SCC 420*. Therefore, the aforesaid principle of law should have been adopted by the Tribunal. It is expected from the Tribunal to adopt a justice oriented approach and not defeat the legitimate rights on the altar of procedures and technicalities. This is particularly so when there is no specific bar in the Act to correct an order passed on rectification.

(ii) It is fundamental principle of law that no party should be prejudiced on account of any mistake in the order of the Tribunal. Though not necessary for the disposal of this Petition, we express our disapproval of the stand taken in the impugned order that section 254(2) of the Act are meant only for rectifying the mistakes of the Tribunal and not of the parties. The Tribunal and the parties are not adversarial to each other. In fact, the Tribunal and the parties normally represented by Advocates/ Chartered Accountants are comrades in arms to achieve justice. Therefore, a mistake from any source be it the parties or the Tribunal so long as it becomes a part of the record, would require examination by the Tribunal under section 254(2) of the Act. It cannot be dismissed at the threshold on the above ground. (WP No. 2548 of 2014, dated 24-12-2014.) (AY. 1999-2000, 2000-01, 2001-02)

Supreme Industries Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 369 ITR 758 / (2015) 229 taxmann 387 (Bom.)(HC)

2291 S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Subsequent judgment of Supreme Court – Rectification of order was justified. [S.32A]

Assessee was engaged in the business of leasing and hiring out plant, machinery, equipment, vehicles. Assessee filed Return of Income claiming allowance u/s. 32A of the IT Act @ 20% i.e. value of bottle washer machine. The AO passed order u/s. 143(3) rejecting claim of the assessee which was confirmed order of CIT(A), relying on the judgment of *CIT V. Narang Diary Products (1993) 219 ITR 478 (SC)*. Thereafter assessee filed MA u/s. 254(2) praying for rectification of the order of Tribunal relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of *CIT v. Shaan Finance (P) Ltd. 231 ITR 308 (SC)*. Tribunal allowed MA and recalled its earlier order in part, in so far as the same confirmed the disallowance of investment allowance. The Revenue preferred an appeal in HC challenging the allowance of MA by Tribunal. The HC held that an order which is contrary to the judgment of the SC, enunciating a principle of law, it was assumed that what was enunciated by SC was in fact, the law from the inception. The Judgment of SC i.e. *CIT v. Shaan Finance related directly to section 32A*, which was in issue in the case of the assessee. HC held that the Tribunal was therefore justified in recalling its order insofar as the same confirmed the disallowance of investment allowance on bottle washer machine leased out as part of business.

CIT v. J. J. Leasing & Hiring Ltd. (2014) 266 CTR 588(Cal.)(HC)

2292 S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Remand – Unnecessary remand by the ITAT causes prejudice and amounts to a failure to exercise jurisdiction – Tribunal should not have refused to consider and decide the issue relating to service charges – Writ petition was allowed. [Constitution of India, Art. 226]

In AY. 1997-98 the assessee claimed deduction for service charges paid to a connected party. The AO & CIT(A) disallowed a part of the expenditure on the ground that benefit from the expenditure was derived by the bottler & brand owner. The Tribunal, instead

of deciding the issue, remanded the matter back to the AO for fresh consideration. The assessee filed a Writ Petition on which the High Court held (290 ITR 464) that as the CIT(A) had given specific grounds for the disallowance, the Tribunal ought to have decided the specific issues on merits and not simply remanded it. Thereafter, the Tribunal decided the issue on merits and allowed the assessee's claim (*Coco Cola India (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2008) 116 TTJ 880*). In AY. 1998-99, though the CIT(A)'s order was passed on the same date as the order passed for AY. 1997-98 and the Tribunal was aware of the High Court's order for AY. 1997-98, it still remanded the issue to the AO for fresh consideration. The assessee filed a MA which was dismissed on the ground that the remand order was a "conscious" decision and not an "apparent mistake". On a Writ Petition filed by the assessee HELD by the High Court:

The Tribunal should not have refused to consider and decide the issue relating to service charges, more so, when an identical view taken by it earlier has not found favour of this Court. This Court repeatedly reminded the Tribunal of its duty as a last fact finding authority of dealing with all factual and legal issues. The Tribunal failed to take any note of the caution which has been administered by this Court and particularly of not remanding cases unnecessarily and without any proper direction. A blanket remand causes serious prejudice to parties. None benefits by non-adjudication or non-consideration of an issue of fact and law by an Appellate Authority and by wholesale remand of the case back to the original authority. This is a clear failure of duty which has to be performed by the Appellate Authority in law. Once the Appellate Authority fails to perform such duty and is corrected on one occasion by this Court, and in relation to the same assessee, then, the least that was expected from the Tribunal was to follow the order and direction of this Court and abide by it even for this later assessment year. If the same claim and which was dealt with by the Court earlier and for which the note of caution was issued, then, the Tribunal was bound in law to take due note of the same and follow the course for the later assessment years. We are of the view that the refusal of the Tribunal to follow the order of this Court and equally to correct its obvious and apparent mistake is vitiated as above. It is vitiated by a serious error of law apparent on the face of the record. The Tribunal has misdirected itself completely and in law in refusing to decide and consider the claim in relation to service charges. (AY. 1998-99, 2004-05)

Coca Cola India (P) Ltd. v. Asstt. Registrar, ITAT (2014) 368 ITR 487 / 271 CTR 60 / 109 DTR 94 (2015) 228 Taxmann 353 (Mag)(HC) (Bom.)(HC)

S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Non consideration of decision of Jurisdictional High Court or Supreme Court constitute mistake apparent on record – Employees contribution of ESI & EPF. [Ss.43B, 139(1)]

2293

During the course of assessment proceedings, AO added amounts of the employees contributions towards ESI & EPF which was deposited beyond the stipulated period and accordingly made an addition. CIT(A) allowed the appeal. On revenue's appeal in Tribunal, Tribunal allowed the appeal and sustained the addition made by the AO relying on *CIT v. Avery Cycle Industries (P) Ltd (2007) 292 ITR 198* while the assessee relied on *CIT v. Vinay Cement Ltd. (2007) 213 CTR (SC) 268*. Accordingly assessee filed an MA u/s. 254(2) citing *CIT v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd (2008) 219 CTR*

(SC) 90 but Tribunal dismissed the Miscellaneous Application. On an appeal in High Court, High Court allowed the appeal of the assessee wherein the only point in dispute was whether non-consideration of a decision of jurisdictional High Court or the Supreme Court can be said to be a “Mistake apparent from the record?” The Hon’ble High Court allowed the appeal and held that non-consideration of the jurisdictional High Court or the Supreme Court would constitute mistake apparent from the record. In the present case assessee has deposited the amounts under ESI & EPF contributions prior to the filing of the return u/s. 139(1). (AY. 2003-04)

R. M. Exports v. CIT (2014) 264 CTR 206 / 226 Taxman 55(Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

2294 S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Limitation – Filing the application on last date of completion of four years – Held to be within period of limitation.

Where the assessee submits a Miscellaneous Application under section 254(2), it is required to be made within a period of four years from the date of actual receipt of the order passed by the Tribunal. It was held that even if the application is submitted on the last day of completion of four years from the date of receipt of the order the same is required to be decided on merits and in such a situation the assessee is not required to give any explanation for the delay in filing the application for the period between the actual date of receipt of the order which is sought to be reviewed and the date on which the Miscellaneous Application is submitted. (AY. 1996-97)

Peterplast Synthetics (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 364 3ITR 16 / 101 DTR 83 (Guj.)(HC)

2295 S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Refusal to rectify order – Appeal is not maintainable – Writ is maintainable. [S.260A, Article 226]

Appeal to High Court is not maintainable from order refusing to rectify order. Held, writ petition against such order was maintainable. (AY. 1999-2000)

Madhav Marbles and Granites v. ITAT (2012) 246 CTR 243 / 65 DTR 217 / (2014) 362 ITR 647 (Raj.)(HC)

2296 S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Bad debts – Tribunal erred in not rectifying the order – Matter remanded. [S.36(1) (vii)]

The Tribunal held that bad debts were not deductible on ground assessee did not establish that such advances had become bad. Assessee’s application for rectification of this mistake was rejected. Held, Tribunal erred in not rectifying mistake apparent from record as, after 1-4-1989, debt need no longer be proved to have turned bad and that merely writing off such advances or debts as bad debts in books of account and debiting in profit and loss account was sufficient compliance. Matter remanded to Tribunal to pass fresh order under section 254(2). (AY. 1999-2000)

Madhav Marbles and Granites v. ITAT (2012) 246 CTR 243/ 65 DTR 217 / (2014) 362 ITR 647 (Raj.)(HC)

S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Failure to apply judgment of jurisdictional High Court – Mistake apparent on record – Applicability of interest. [S.234D]

2297

Failure to apply judgment of jurisdictional High Court is a mistake apparent on record, and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to rectify such mistake. Irrespective of the year of assessment, the interest is to be levied under section 234D w.e.f. 1st June, 2003, even if the assessment year referred to was prior to 1st June, 2003. (AY. 2002-03)

South India Corporation Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 95 DTR 446 / (2014) 360 ITR 39 / 266 CTR 105(Ker.)(HC)

S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – The duty is limited to the points raised before it – Tribunal is not required to consider pleadings, material etc. to which its pointed attention is not drawn – Tribunal was justified in not rectifying the mistake. [S.68]

2298

It is true, as held by the Supreme Court in a long line of cases that the Tribunal is duty-bound to consider all the grounds, the evidence produced and consider the contentions of the parties before it and all other material brought to its notice in a judicial spirit and should not feel incommoded by technicalities. The duty is limited to the points raised before it. It would be placing an impossible burden on the Tribunal if it is ordained to rule upon aspects and contentions which were not raised by the parties before it or to deal with pleadings, evidence or material to which its pointed attention was not drawn in the course of the proceedings and which lies buried in the forest of papers filed by the parties. Writ petition was dismissed. (AY. 1998-99, 1999-2000)

Dholadhar Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT(2014) 362 ITR 111 / 227 Taxmann 146 (Mag)(Delhi) (HC)

S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Transfer pricing – Computation of arm's length price – Power of rectification does not empower to review its own order.

2299

Payment of royalty made by assessee to its associated enterprise was disallowed by AO Tribunal deleted said disallowance made by the AO the Miscellaneous Application filed by the Department and argued that Tribunal had incorrectly relied upon pre-amended section 92 to decide issue of royalty payment even though explanatory memoranda for same was available in Circular No. 14 of 2001. The Hon'ble ITAT held that since case had been decided on merits and department could not point out that wrong law had been applied by Tribunal in its order, there was no mistake in order of Tribunal which needed to be rectification scope of section 254(2) has a limited power to review the ITAT order. (AY. 2004-05)

ITO v. KHS Machinery (2014) 61 SOT 103(URO)(Ahd.)(Trib.)

2300 **S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Not pointed out incorrect recording of facts – Rectification application of revenue was dismissed.**

Revenue filed application for rectification contending that while deciding issue as to whether EOU units of assessee engaged in processing crude ore was manufacturing or not, Tribunal had misinterpreted case relied by revenue. In fact decision of Tribunal was based on appreciation of facts and cases relied upon. In application before Tribunal seeking rectification, revenue could not bring any fact before Tribunal and Tribunal had failed to consider case law as cited had not considered contentions, pleas and arguments raised before Tribunal by both sides. Even though revenue stated in its application that there were mistakes of fact, it could not point out during course of hearing that there were incorrect facts which were taken into account by Tribunal, hence application filed by revenue was dismissed. (AY. 2009-10)

ACIT v. Sesa Goa Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 81 (URO) (Panaji)(Trib.)

2301 **S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Pendency of an appeal filed in the High Court u/s. 260A bars the hearing of a MA filed u/s. 254(2) even if the appeal is not admitted.**

The assessee has moved an instant Miscellaneous Application (MA) against the order of the ITAT. At the time of hearing, the AR for the assessee-appellant informed that the assessee has filed an appeal u/s. 260A before the Hon'ble Bombay High Court, but is yet to be admitted. Since the appeal has been filed before the Hon'ble Bombay High Court, the judicial propriety does not allow the assessee to seek efficacious remedy simultaneously before two authorities and in particular where the issue is seized by a higher judicial forum, even if pending admission. On this ground, the instant MA is rejected. (AY. 2007-08)

RW Promotions Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.), www.itatonline.org

Editorial: High court in Writ petition set a side the order and directed the Tribunal to decide the MA on merits. (WP. No 2238 of 2014 dated 8-4-2015) RW Promotions v. UOI (2015) 376 ITR 126 / 119 DTR 134 / 277 CTR 401 (Bom)(HC).

2302 **S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Conclusion arrived by Tribunal is based on wrong recording of facts – Order is liable to be recalled.**

Third member held that the decision of the Tribunal in sustaining penalty rested on two considerations, one turned out to be factually incorrect. Thus the decision of the Tribunal was influenced partly by incorrect fact. If a factual aspect which is of immense importance on the ultimate decision has not been understood correctly, it is likely to prejudice the ultimate decision of the Bench. In such a situation, it is a duty, rather than prerogative of the Bench to recall its order based on such incorrect assumption of fact and thereafter order fresh hearing so that a correct decision can be arrived at. (AY. 2006-07)

Amzel Ltd. v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.); www.ctconline.org

S.254(2) : Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Tribunal relied on 22 cases of Tribunal, High Courts and Apex court, without giving an opportunity to assessee – Miscellaneous Application was allowed.

2303

Assessee has filed Miscellaneous Application stating that the author of the order relied on 22 cases of Tribunal, High Courts and Apex court in the order which was not cited at the time of hearing. Hon'ble Judicial Member held that the order required to be recalled However Accountant Member has passed dissenting order. The matter was referred to third member. Third member agreed with the judicial member and held that Tribunal having relied upon and considered as many as 22 cases of various Benches of Tribunals, various High Courts and Apex Court without giving opportunity to the parties to put forth their views on those decisions, it is violation of rule of natural justice which caused prejudice to the assessee, and therefore assessee's Miscellaneous Application is allowed by the recalling the appellate order of the Tribunal. (AY. 2006-07)

Deepak Dalela v. ITO (2014) 101 DTR 334 / 161 TTJ 718 / 147 ITD 19(TM) (Jaipur)(Trib.)

S. 254(2A) : Appellate Tribunal – Stay – Power of granting stay of demand – Limited to 365 days – Held, stay to operate till disposal of appeal.

2304

The Tribunal has power to grant stay only till 365 days. In the instant case, the Tribunal had heard the appeal but had not disposed it off. Held, since the non-disposal was not occasioned due to default of the Petitioner, the stay was to operate till such disposal. The Tribunal was requested to dispose of the appeal expeditiously and preferably within three months of receipt of certified copy of this order.

Adobe Systems India P. Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) 365 ITR 376 /228 Taxman 141 (Mag)/ 110 DTR 178 (All.)(HC)

S.254(2A) : Appellate Tribunal – Stay – Reasons to be given – Order not stating *prima facie* demand of tax is arguable on merits case – If adjournment is sought by assessee to deposit 50 per cent of tax if adjournment at instance of assessee.

2305

The assessee a public charitable trust. It claimed exemption under section 11, alternatively it claimed exemption in respect of its long term capital gains dividend income and income from mutual funds under section 10. However the AO did not accept the contention and assessed income at ₹ 714 crores. This was confirmed by CIT(A). Out of total demand of ₹ 300 crores, the assessee paid an amount of ₹ 10 crores. Tribunal granted stay of the outstanding demand of tax of ₹ 290 crores under the first proviso to section 254(2A). Revenue filed writ petition against the order of Tribunal. Allowing the petition the Court stated that the order of stay must record briefly assessee's case, look at questions involved in appeal and amount required to be deposited considering issue in appeal. In the instant case, order did not state even *prima facie* how demand of tax is arguable on merits. Held, pending appeal, assessee to deposit further 50% of demand of tax if adjournment was sought by it. (AY. 2010-11)

DIT(E) v. Jamshetji Tata Trust (2014) 362 ITR 357 / 101 DTR 145 / 267 CTR 157 (Bom.)(HC)

2306 **S.254(2A) : Appellate Tribunal – Stay – For a maximum of 365 days from date of initial order – No power to grant stay beyond outer limit stipulated in the statutory provision.**

The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is not an authority akin to a court but a special Tribunal with limited jurisdiction as indicated in the statutory provisions. Section 254 of the Income tax Act, 1961, deals with the manner of its functioning. The third proviso to section 254(2A) was inserted with effect from October 1, 2008. The third proviso merely indicates that the extension of stay order cannot be beyond a total number of 365 days but also indicates that even assuming an order of this nature had been passed, such an order of stay shall stand vacated after the expiry of the outer limit of 365 days. Held accordingly, that the Tribunal had committed a positive error in consciously extending the interim order of stay granted in the pending appeal beyond the period of 365 days, which is the outer limit stipulated in the statutory provision.

CIT v. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading P. Ltd. (2012) 209 Taxmann 190 / 252 CTR 281/ (2014) 362 ITR 204 (Karn.)(HC)

CIT v. B. Fouress P. Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 204 (Karn.)(HC)

2307 **S.254(2A) : Appellate Tribunal – Stay – The Tribunal has no power to extend stay of demand beyond 365 days even if the assessee is not at fault. If department seeks an adjournment, ITAT may either refuse it or department should undertake not to recover the demand-Assessee can file writ petition for stay and High Court can grant stay and issue direction to Tribunal as required – Appeals filed by revenue in court is disproportionately large percentage of cases.**

The Tribunal {probably following the Special Bench judgment in *Tata Communications Ltd. v. Asst. CIT (2011) 138 TTJ 257 (Mum.)* extended the stay beyond 365 days as the assessee was not responsible for the delay in disposal of the appeal. The department challenged the decision of the Tribunal by way of a Writ Petition to the High Court on the ground that after the insertion of the third Proviso to section 254(2A), the Tribunal had no power to extend stay beyond 365 days even if the assessee was not at fault. HELD by the High Court allowing the Petition:

(i) In view of the third proviso to s. 254(2A) of the Act substituted by Finance Act, 2008 with effect from 1st October, 2008, the Tribunal cannot extend stay beyond the period of 365 days from the date of first order of stay;

(ii) In case default and delay is due to lapse on the part of the Revenue, the Tribunal is at liberty to conclude hearing and decide the appeal, if there is likelihood that the third proviso to section 254(2A) would come into operation;

(iii) The third proviso to Section 254(2A) does not bar or prohibit the Revenue or departmental representative from making a statement that they would not take coercive steps to recover the impugned demand and on such statement being made, it will be open to the Tribunal to adjourn the matter at the request of the Revenue;

(iv) An assessee can file a writ petition in the High Court pleading and asking for stay and the High Court has power and jurisdiction to grant stay and issue directions to the Tribunal as may be required;

(v) Section 254(2A) does not prohibit/bar the High Court from issuing appropriate directions, including granting stay of recovery;

(vii) The constitutional validity of the provisos to section 254(2A) of the Act has not been examined and the issue is left open. Court also observed that revenue is appellant before High Court in disproportionately large percentage of cases, being aggrieved by finding/adjudication by Tribunal on question of law and fact. Appeals are preferred by revenue mostly in cases where tax demand is ₹ 10 lakhs or above. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Maruti Suzuki (India) Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 215 / 100 DTR 265 / 266 CTR 337/2014 (305) E.L.T. 199 (Delhi)(HC)

CIT v. ITAT (2014) 362 ITR 215 / 100 DTR 265 / 266 CTR 337 (Delhi)(HC)

S.254(2B) : Appellate Tribunal – Award cost – Even though action of the CIT in canceling registration u/s. 12AA(3) is illegal, costs cannot be awarded as the said action is in discharge of duty & not *mala fide*. [S.12AA(3), 13]

2308

The assessee filed an appeal challenging the order of the CIT u/s. 12AA(3) cancelling the registration granted to the assessee trust. The assessee also pleaded for award of costs u/s. 254(2B) on the ground that the action of the department of cancelling registration was illegal and an abuse of powers and that it had caused serious prejudice and injustice to the assessee. It was pointed out that wrong signals had been transmitted in the society that the assessee trust is a big fraud and that this had adversely affected the reputation of the trust and its trustees who are eminent medical practitioners. It was also claimed that there is an unpleasant social environment in Ratnagiri and that since the trustees are from the minority community, the department's action have embarrassed the trustees and the trust. HELD by the Tribunal:

(i) As per s. 12AA(3) the CIT can cancel the registration granted earlier if he /she is satisfied that the activities of such trust or institution are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust or the institution. In the instant case, there is no such finding given by the CIT that the activities of the trust are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust. While granting registration u/s. 12A, the CIT has gone through the objects of the trust and the genuineness of the activities. There is no change in the objects of the trust in the meantime. The CIT has not brought on record any material to show that the activities of the Trust are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the Trust or the institution. Once registration is granted to the trust/institution and if subsequently the AO finds during the assessment proceedings that the income of the charitable trust is applied directly or indirectly for the benefit of the persons referred to in section 13(3), then he has ample power to deny exemption to that extent u/s. 13(1)(c) of the Act

(ii) The CIT has passed the order u/s. 12AA(3) of the Act during the course of discharge of her duty as CIT. While discharging her duty, her action might have caused some hardship to the assessee due to error of judgement but that in our opinion does not warrant levy of cost on the department. In *Pooran Mal v. Director of inspection (1974) 93 ITR 505 (SC)*, it was noted that section 132 causes serious invasion of the privacy of a person. Still it was held that even though the innocent is likely to be harassed by a raid for the purpose of search and seizure, that cannot be helped. In the instant case, there is no such action of search and seizure which causes serious invasion in the privacy of the person. The CIT was discharging her quasi-judicial duty. Further, there is nothing on

record to suggest that the action of the CIT was mala fide. Therefore, there is no merit in the claim for award of costs for the action of the CIT in cancelling the registration granted earlier u/s. 12AA of the Act.

Parkar Medical Foundation v. DCIT (2014) 34 ITR 286/ (2015) 153 ITD 297 / 67 SOT 169 (Pune)(Trib.)

Section 256 : Statement of case to the High Court

2309 S.256(2) : Reference – Additional Evidence – Tribunal relying on fresh evidence – Question of fact. [S.36(1), ITAT Rule,29]

During scrutiny proceeding, the assessee asserted that the money lent to East Coast was from out of its profits and not out of borrowed monies. AO made certain addition being the interest on advance. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition. Tribunal recorded finding of fact that the assessee did not advance monies to East Coast from out of borrowed funds. On appeal in HC, the question before the court was that whether Tribunal was right in deleting the disallowance relying on the fresh evidence brought before the Tribunal. On appeal the Department contented that, the Tribunal's finding was based on fresh material brought before the Tribunal and therefore it could not have been allowed such evidence. The counsel relied on Rule 29 of ITAT Rules, 1963 and contended that it is a question of fact which did not required any consideration by the HC u/s. 256(2) and when a question of fact on which a finding has been recorded by the Tribunal, the Jurisdiction of HC to express is barred. The Hon'ble court held in favour of the assessee and held that the clear finding of fact was recorded that the assessee did not advance monies to its subsidiary from out of borrowed Funds. The Court also held that it was within the discretion of the Tribunal to permit additional evidence and if anybody has any objection, it should be taken before the Tribunal and not before the court. From the reading of the order of the Tribunal, the court held that no objection has been taken by the Revenue nor did they raise any plea that they were not specified the paper book compilation to which the attention of the Tribunal was drawn and therefore the question whether the Tribunal was right in deleting the disallowance u/s 36(1)(iii) relying on the fresh evidence brought before the Tribunal was question of fact. (AY. 1981-82, 1986-87) *CIT v. Vijaywada Bottling Co. Ltd. (2013) 356 ITR 625 / (2014) 266 CTR 307 / 220 Taxmann 51(Mag.) (AP)(HC)*

Section 260A : Appeal to High Court

2310 S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Powers – Power of court to hear appeal on any other substantial question of law not affected. [S.260A(4)]

The High Court's power to frame substantial questions of law at the time of hearing of the appeal other than the questions on which appeal has been admitted remains under section 260A(4). This power is subject, however, to two conditions, that the court must be satisfied that the appeal involves such questions, and that the court has to record reasons therefor. Accordingly the Petition of revenue under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against the judgment

CIT v. Engineers India Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 686/226 Taxmann 94 (Mag) (SC)

S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Substantial question of law – High Court can reframe the substantial question of law even at the time of hearing after recording reasons. [S.261]

2311

High Court is empowered to frame substantial questions of law at the time of hearing of appeal, other than the questions of law already admitted subjected to two conditions: (1) the Court must be satisfied that appeals involve question of law; and (2) the Court must record the reason thereof.

Convergys India Services (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014)269 CTR 127 / 221 Taxmann 114 (SC)

S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Question can be reframed by the High Court – Audit report was produced first time before the High Court – No reasonable explanation was furnished – Denial exemption was held to be justified. [S.80IB. Form 10CCB]

2312

The assessee raised the question of allowability of deduction under section 80IB before the High Court. The audit report in Form 10CCB was not presented earlier to any of the lower authorities. The High Court held that it cannot be pinned down to answer only the substantial question raised before it and it can reframe the question at any stage, more so when the question raised by the assessee ignores an important factual aspect. However, without any justification and without any indication of reasons why audit report could not be presented earlier, the assessee simply cannot for the first time present such document before the High Court and seek benefit of deduction u/s. 80IB on the basis of such document. (AY. 2003-04)

Panasonic Energy India Co. Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 367 IR 245 / 225 Taxmann 148(Mag)/(2015) 114 DTR 379 /274 CTR 250 (Guj.)(HC)

S.260A : Appeal – High Court – New plea – Appellate Tribunal – Direction of High Court – Assessee could not challenge the order of Tribunal taking a new plea that section 115JB was not applicable. [S.115JB, 254(1)]

2313

In the first round of appeal the Assessee was absent when the matter was taken up for hearing, High Court has directed that the Tribunal must determine the matter afresh by applying the relevant provisions. Even the first order passed by the Tribunal was exparte. In set aside proceedings the assessee contended that provision of section 115IB was not applicable hence recalling the order by Tribunal was not justified. Against the recalling of order the appeal was filed by the assessee. Rejecting the appeal the Court held that, all these factual matters and ought to have been raised by remaining present before this Court or pointing out to the Tribunal the relevant materials. It cannot be said that Tribunal, in recalling its earlier orders and in the direction of the Division Bench of this Court, acted perversely or has an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Appeal of assessee was dismissed. (AY. 2001-02)

Sun Polytron Industries Ltd. v. CIT (2015) 228 Taxmann 41(Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

- 2314 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – No substantial question of law – Factual findings can be challenged only on ground of perversity or if relevant evidence not considered or irrelevant material relied upon – Order of Tribunal was affirmed. [Ss.68, 153A]**
 AO has made various additions. In appeal CIT(A) after getting the remand report deleted the addition. Tribunal also confirmed the Order of CIT(A). On appeal by revenue dismissing the appeal the Court held that the order being not perverse. No Substantial question of law. (AY. 2000-01, 2006-07)
CIT v. Rama Krishna Jewellers (2014) 368 ITR 588 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 362 (Delhi)(HC)
- 2315 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Competency of appeal – Monetary ceiling limit – Measure for reducing litigation – Instruction No. 3 of 2011 raising monetary limits – Applicable to pending cases – Instruction No. 3 of 2011, dated 9-2-2011. [S.268A]**
 Instruction No. 3 of 2011 raising monetary limits was held to be applicable to pending cases.
CIT v. Sureshchandra Durgaprasad Khatod (HUF) (2014) / (2013) 214 Taxmann 59 / 253 CTR 492 / 363 ITR 556 (Guj.)(HC)
Editorial: This decision has since been disapproved by the Full Bench, CIT v. Shambhubhai Mahadev Ahir (2014) 363 ITR 572(FB)(Guj.)(HC)
- 2316 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Review / recall of judgment – altogether new grounds plea for recall / review – recall / review not permissible [Ss.220(1), 237]**
 Revenue granted Assessee period of 7 days u/s. 220(1) for payment of amount due instead of statutory period of 30 days. Said amount was recovered by the revenue after 7 days. Assessee filed a special civil application challenging the said action. High Court, then allowed the petition and had directed the revenue to return the amount to the assessee. Subsequently, revenue preferred an application to recall/review the judgment and order passed by the High Court by taking an altogether new plea that u/s. 237, refund cannot be granted unless and until the order of assessment is set aside. High Court held that it is not the case of the revenue that any of the submissions which were made at the time of hearing of the main special civil application has not been considered and/or dealt with while passing judgment and order. Revenue has come with the present application with a prayer to review/recall the order on the ground which were not canvassed at all at the time of hearing of the main special civil application, which is not permissible. Under such circumstances, as such there is no error apparent on the face of the record, for which judgment and order passed by the High Court is required to be reviewed/recalled.
ITO v. Amul Research and Development (2014) 222 Taxman 217 (Mag) (Guj.)(HC)
- 2317 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Earlier year accepted – Question cannot be raised in subsequent year. [S.40A(3)]**
 Where the question of disallowance under section 40A(3) was not raised before the High Court in an earlier appeal of the same assessee for an earlier assessment year, it could not be raised in the subsequent assessment year. (AY. 1999-2000, 2007-08)
CIT v. Ankleshwar Taluka ONGC and Land Looser Travellers Co-Op. Society (2014) 362 ITR 92 / 223 Taxmann 237 (Guj.)(HC)

S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Cross objection – Issues not raised before the Tribunal could not be raised by way cross objection before the High Court. [S.145, 254(1)]

2318

In the cross objection the assessee raised the contention that the CIT(A) should have also directed the AO to recomputed the value of opening inventory of WIP following the same valuation principle on which closing inventory of WIP was valued. The issue was not raised before the Tribunal while challenging the order of CIT(A). The Court held that the same could not be raised by way of cross objection before the High Court. (AY. 1996-97)

CIT v. Glass Equipment (India) Ltd. (2014)366 ITR 59 / 269 CTR 363 / 225 Taxmann 65(Cal.)(HC)

S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Review – Review petition being not *bona fide* and abuse of the process of the Court, it was dismissed.

2319

The assessee filed Review Application in High Court contending that the assessee is seeking review of the impugned order on the ground that the court has decided other issues which were not argued by the assessee's counsel and decision of the Tribunal was given on issues not argued before the Tribunal. The High Court dismissed the Petition of the assessee and held that Advocate who had argued the matter for the assessee has not filed any Affidavit to controvert the statement made in the Judgment. It is the duty of the court to deal with all the arguments/points raised by counsel for the parties. If the assessee had chosen to take a stand during the course of arguments, it cannot take a "u" turn and say that the Judgement may be reviewed as the points for determination were limited. Further it was well settled principles of law that statements to what transpired at the hearing recorded in the judgment of the court is conclusive of the fact so stated and no one can contradict such statement by affidavit or other evidence. Therefore no case was made out for reviewing the impugned judgment on the ground that the court has decided other issues which were not argued by the assessee's counsel, review application filed by the assessee not being *bona fide* and an abuse of the process of the court, it was dismissed with cost .

M. D. Overseas Ltd. v. DIG (Inv.) (2014) 266 CTR 158(All)(HC)

S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Unaccounted purchases – No substantial question of law. [S.69C]

2320

The question of law before the High Court was regarding addition made by the AO on account of unaccounted purchases of medicine, on account of fees and as unexplained factory and Hospital expenditure deleted by CIT(A) which decision was upheld by the Tribunal. Dismissing the appeal of the Revenue Hon'ble Court held that the findings of fact have been rendered by the two appellate authorities in accordance with law, and the orders impugned do not suffer from any perversity or wrong application of any principle of law so as to raise any substantial question of law. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Dr. Suresh Sharma (2014) 267 CTR 73 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 85 (Raj.)(HC)

2321 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Fresh Plea cannot be taken first time in High Court – Forfeiture of advance against sale of property. [Ss.4, 51, 56(2)(vi)]**

AO did not accept this treatment of the assessee since the assessee had shown this amount as an advance received from the property in the Balance Sheet and she did not offer an amount of ₹ 18 Crores for taxation in the relevant assessment year. The AO treated entire amount as sham transaction and viewed that assessee attempted to book bogus losses. CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee. Tribunal affirmed the findings of CIT(A). On appeal in HC, HC affirmed the findings of Tribunal and held that Tribunal rightly held that section 51 was applicable and no addition could be made by AO on the ground of sham transaction. The question of law rose before the Hon'ble High court was whether forfeiture of advance received against sale of property hence further the contention of section 56(2)(vi) was attracted could not be raised for the first time before the Court. Court also held that once the transaction has been held to be genuine, there was no question of the transaction being without any consideration. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Meera Goyal (2013) 214 Taxmann 298 / (2014) 360 ITR 346/267 CTR 225 (Delhi) (HC)

2322 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Perverse – A factual decision is perverse if the authority has acted without any evidence or on view of facts, which cannot be reasonably entertained. A perverse finding is one, if it is arrived at without any material or if it is arrived at or inference is made on material, which would not have been accepted or relied upon by a reasonable person conversant with the law. [S.132]**

This Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction under section 260A of the Act is not an Appellate Court for facts reprise. Factual findings can be challenged only on the ground that the factual findings recorded are perverse or relevant evidence has not been considered or irrelevant material has been relied. In such cases, pleadings in this regard have to be specific, erudite and they should indicate clearly the error or mistake. This Court in *CIT v. Sunaero Limited [2012] 345 ITR 163*, at page 187, regarding perversity of a decision of the Tribunal, has observed. "A factual decision is perverse if the authority has acted without any evidence or on view of facts, which cannot be reasonably entertained. A perverse finding is one, if it is arrived at without any material or if it is arrived at or inference is made on material, which would not have been accepted or relied upon by a reasonable person conversant with the law. If the finding is based upon surmises, conjectures or suspicion and is not rationally possible. A factual conclusion is regarded as perverse when no person duly instructed or acting judicially could act upon the record before him, have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal/authority" *CIT v. Rama Krishna Jewellers (2014) 368 ITR 588 / (2015) 229 Taxman 362 (Delhi)(HC)*

2323 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court-Issue covered by Supreme Court – Decision Senior officers of the department summoned and strictures passed for 'Irresponsible conduct' of filing an appeal on a point which is admittedly covered against the department by a judgment of the Supreme Court – Appeal of revenue was dismissed. [Article 261]**

The department conceded before the Tribunal that the issue in the appeal was covered in favour of the assessee by the judgment of the Supreme Court in *CIT v Tulsyani NEC Ltd 330 ITR 226 (SC)*. However, despite this, the department filed an appeal before the High Court to challenge the order of the Tribunal. HELD by the High Court:

These state of affairs can hardly be termed as satisfactory. It is unfortunate that the Revenue is unable to make any distinction with regard to the legal position noted in the judgment of the Supreme Court of India and it is bound by the said judgment of the highest court in the country. The Revenue seems to be unaware of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and mandate thereof. Once there is nothing to the contrary, then, the authoritative pronouncement should bind all. The Tribunal then cannot be approached and equally this Court to complain about an adverse order. We are shocked that when such is the concession recorded that the Appeals of this nature are brought before this Court and it's precious judicial time is wasted. Let the concerned Commissioner and who advised that such Appeal should be filed before this Court, remain present before us on the next date of hearing. After giving him an opportunity we would then record our dissatisfaction and proceed to impose costs. It is only to comply with the principles of natural justice and equally fairness and equity that we adopt this course.

It is very unfortunate that we had to secure the presence of the highest officers in the department of Income Tax, for seeking an explanation on the points which we have raised in our order dated 12-9-2014.

The only intent to secure personal appearance of higher officials is to impress on the Revenue that larger public interest mandates and requires it not to waste precious time of the highest Court in the State by engaging it in frivolous Appeals and applications. It may be that, at the departmental level, the officers are not satisfied with adverse orders and desire to contest the issue or raise it before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. However, when the Tribunal follows and applies the ratio of a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, then, we would expect the officers to gracefully accept an adverse verdict. Where no distinguishing feature can be pointed out, then, the law of the land must be allowed to prevail. The mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution of India is known to all. The further mandate of the Constitution as enshrined in Article 261(1) is giving of full faith and credit to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the union and of every State. Therefore, the law declared by the Supreme Court binds all and cannot be brushed aside. The repeated attempts to raise the same issues and questions in relation to same Assessee and year after year results in loss of precious judicial time and public revenue. We do not expect hereafter such an irresponsible conduct from the higher officers. Ordinarily, we would have in the absence of any explanation forthcoming, passed severe structures against the department and the officers in particular but we refrain from doing so since the concerned officials present in Court sincerely apologised for the lapse and urged that the Appeal may be disposed against the Revenue and in terms of our earlier orders so also the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, both of which are binding on us. Hence, the Appeal is dismissed.

CIT v. Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. (Bom.) (HC); www.itatonline.org

- 2324 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Condonation of delay – Delay of 117 days in filing of appeal and 1248 days in filing the review petition – Delay was not condoned – Copy was forwarded to Chief commissioner and Secretary Finance Government of India for remedial action.**

Where affidavits filed by revenue for condonation of delay provided misleading statements and failed to offer any explanation for inordinate delay, merely because revenue took plea as large public interest was involved and that its officers had admitted lapses, would not be ground for condonation of delay. Copy of order was forwarded to Chief Commissioner and Secretary in the department of Finance, Government of India so that suitable remedial action is taken.

CIT v. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. (2014) 226 Taxmann 190 / 111 DTR 129 / (2015) 276 CTR 473 (Bom.)(HC)

- 2325 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Substantial question of law – Issue which was not raised before the Tribunal cannot be raised before the High Court for the first time.**

An issue which has not been raised before the Tribunal and not discussed by the Tribunal, cannot be raised before the High Court for the first time. (AY. 2004-05)

CIT v. Parvez Poonawala (Bom.)(HC)(Un reported) www.bombay highcourt.nic.in

- 2326 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Tribunal following its earlier view on same facts and same assessee – No substantial question of law. [S.254]**

The Tribunal has not deviated from its earlier order on facts and in respect of the same assessee. No substantial question of law arises.

CIT v. Deepak Fertilizers and Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 484 / 226 Taxman 42 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

- 2327 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Penalty – Concealment – Frivolous appeals by department results in harassment to assessee & wastage of judicial time. Department to pay costs of ₹ 3 lakhs. Costs may be recovered from and disciplinary action be taken against, concerned official. [S.271(1)(c)]**

The Tribunal deleted the levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) by following the judgment of the Supreme Court in *CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. (2010) 322 ITR 158 (SC)*. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal:

(i) We are surprised if not shocked that such appeals are being brought before us and precious judicial time is being wasted that too by the Revenue. The least and minimum that is expected from the Revenue officers is to accept and abide by the Tribunal's findings in such matters and when they are based on settled principles of law. If they are not deviating from such principles and are not perverse but consistent with the material on record, then, we do not find justification for filing of such appeals. We have found that merely expressing displeasure orally is not serving any purpose;

(ii) Time and again we have to deal with such Appeals. Merely because they are filed that they get listed on the Daily Admission Board. The Advocates filing them and routinely, so also those instructing them do not have authority to withdraw them. Consequently, they are pressed and argued resulting in a hearing, may be brief and an order of this Court dismissing them. Sometimes there are at least 35 such cases on

our daily board. We do not understand why higher officials do not have the courage to take bold decisions particularly of not pursuing such matters up to this court or higher. Because the assessee is a leading Public Limited Company should not act as a deterrent for them to take a informed, rational decision and subserving larger Public Interest. A realisation of this nature is a need of the hour as higher courts do not have to deal with Tax and Revenue matters only but all those involving life and liberty of citizens, their property rights, Rights of Children, Women and Senior Citizens. These rights are also precious and the legitimate expectations of such persons or groups of easy and expeditious justice also have to be fulfilled by the higher judiciary. The biggest litigant, namely, the State ought to be aware of the Pendency of Cases in High Courts of Bombay, Madras, Calcutta and Allahabad for example. If their policies particularly on litigations are not aimed at reducing frivolous and speculative litigations, then, the least that can be said is that the State has failed to act for public good and in Public Interest. The State is expected to act as a Model Litigant. It must set an example for the Public to follow and we hope that this order acts as a reminder for all concerned to at least now take remedial steps and measures. It is therefore that despite the persuasive skills of Mr. Sureshkumar, who fervently pleaded not to pass any order imposing costs, that we are constrained to impose costs;

(iii) The Revenue officers must realise that just like other powers an executive power conferred in them is in the nature of a Trust. They hold office as trustees of the public at large. They deal with public revenue and public money and that cannot be wasted in such frivolous litigation. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals with costs quantified at ₹ 1,00,000/- each (for three appeals);

(iv) It would be open for the superior/competent authority to recover the costs personally from the officer responsible and equally take disciplinary action against him if the power to decide about filing such appeals is abused or the decision making authority is utilised to harass innocent Assesses. Every case must be dealt with on its merit and no routine exercise ought to be undertaken merely because the Revenue impact is higher or the status or financial position of the Assessee is influential and strong. That cannot be the only yardstick or criteria.

CIT v. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 502 / 272 CTR 336/ 226 Taxman 222 (Mag) (Bom.)(HC)

S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Rectification of mistake – Rejection of application for rectification – Appeal is not maintainable – Writ petition against such order is maintainable. [S.254(2), Article 226, Constitution of India]

2328

Appeal to High Court is not maintainable from order refusing to rectify order. Held, writ petition against such order was maintainable. (AY. 1999-2000)

Madhav Marbles and Granites v. ITAT (2012) 246 CTR 243/ 65 DTR 217 / (2014) 362 ITR 647 (Raj.)(HC)

- 2329 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – New ground – Grounds not raised before Tribunal – Revenue could not be permitted to urge for the first time before High Court.**

New ground not raised before Tribunal cannot be raised before High Court. (AY. 2003-04, 2005-06)

CIT v. Jayshree Gems and Jewellery (2014) 362 ITR 272 / (2015) 228 Taxman 63 (Mag) (Delhi)(HC)

- 2330 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Substantial question of law – Binding nature of finding nature of fact – Question involves legal effect of proven facts or documents – Question of law arises.**

The Apex Court while considering the substantial question of law question observed that, normally, a finding of a fact decided by the last finding authority is final and ought not to be lightly interfered with by the High Court in an appeal. The appellate Courts, however, ought to be cautious while weeding out such questions and should the question in examination involve examination of finding of fact, *excautela abundanti* the appellate courts would require to examine whether the question involves merely a finding of fact or the legal effect of such proven facts or documents in appeal. While the former would be a question of fact which may or may not be interfered with, the latter is necessarily a question of law would require consideration. Often questions of law and fact are intricately entwined, sometimes to the extent of blurring the domains in which they ought to be considered and therefore, require cautious consideration. A question where the legal effect of proven facts is intrinsically in appeal has to be differentiated from a question where a finding of a fact is only assailed.

CIT v. Dawoodi Bohra Jamat (2014) 364 ITR 31 / 102 DTR 361/222 Taxmann 228 (Mag) / 268 CTR 1(SC)

- 2331 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Cost – Block assessment – High Court imposes costs of ₹ 50,000 on AO for filing frivolous appeal & wasting public money & judicial time. [S.158BC]**

Though the Bench clearly indicated to the department's counsel that the appeal had no merit and gave the department an opportunity to withdraw, the department did not do so. HELD by the High Court, passing strictures and imposing costs:

“We do not find how Officers lower down in the hierarchy can take decisions to file Appeals and that too against the decision of the Tribunal. The tendency not to accept any adverse verdict on facts results in frivolous Appeals being filed in this Court. That causes huge loss to the public exchequer and results in wastage of precious judicial time of this Court. All this ought to have been discouraged long time back. The High Court has not adopted a strict approach and that has possibly encouraged the Revenue in filing Appeals to challenge essentially findings of fact and with regard to matters which should stand concluded at the level of the authorities. The officials should realise that the authorities like CIT(A) and the ITAT are envisaged as appellate and possibly final fact finding authorities and at least the Tribunal is last in that hierarchy. The fact finding therefore if demonstrably perverse or palpably erroneous and as would amount to unsettling the settled position in law alone should be questioned by filing Appeals to this Court. However, a routine exercise and by people who do not wish to take any

responsibility, results in number of Appeals being filed and pending. This benefits no one and rather defeats larger public interest. The Revenue collection and equally the participation of the assessee in the exercise undertaken by the authorities to assess their income, therefore is affected adversely. None takes a position or decision because of pendency of matters and for a long time. In these circumstances, while dismissing this Appeal, we impose costs quantified at ₹ 50,000/-. The costs be paid to the assessee within four weeks from today. We at least now expect the authorities to take cognizance and initiate proceedings for recovery of this amount personally from such of the Officers who do not take decisions or postpone them endlessly. A copy of this order be forwarded to the CIT Pune. It should also be forwarded to the Chief CIT, Pune who may decide as to who should pay the costs personally as between them or anybody else who has brought about this situation.”

CIT v. Sairang Developers and Promoters Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 593/108 DTR 400 (Bom.)(HC)

S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Monetary limit – CBDT’s low tax effect circulars have prospective effect. [S.119, 268A]

2332

The department filed an appeal in the High Court in 2008, the tax effect of which was more than ₹ 4 lakhs but less than ₹ 10 lakhs. The assessee claimed, relying on *Sureshchandra Durgaprasad Khatod (HUF) & CIT v. Madhukar K. Inamdar (HUF) (2009) 318 ITR 149 (Bom.)(HC)*, that as Instruction No. 3 of 2011 dated 9-2-2011 issued by the CBDT applied to pending appeals and as the tax effect was lower than the sum of ₹ 10 lakhs prescribed therein, the appeal was not maintainable. The department argued that the maintainability of the appeal had to be decided on the basis of the CBDT Instruction dated 15-5-2008 which was in force at the time of filing the appeal. The matter was referred to the Full Bench of the High Court. HELD by the Full Bench:

Clause 11 of Instruction No. 3/2011 dated 9-2-2011 specifically states that “this instruction will apply to appeals filed on or after 9-2-2011. However, the cases where appeals have been filed before 9-2-2011 will be governed by the instructions on this subject, operative at the time when such appeal was filed.” Similarly, clause 11 of instruction No. 5/2008 dated 15-5-2008 specifically provides that “this instruction will apply to appeals filed on or after 15-5-2008. However, the cases where appeals have been filed before 15-5-2008 will be governed by the instructions on this subject, operative at the time when such appeal was filed”. There is, thus, no ambiguity in the instructions of either 2011 or 2008 as regards the applicability of those instructions in respect of the appeals, and, at the same time, it has also been made clear that if those appeals are not filed after the given dates mentioned in those instructions, the fate of the appeals will be governed in accordance with the instructions prevailing on the date of presentation of such appeals. In view of such clear legislative intention, we are unable to hold that even if an appeal is filed prior to 9-2-2011, the same would be barred notwithstanding the fact that at the time of filing such appeal, the same was not barred by the then instructions of the CBDT.

CIT v. Shambhubhai Mahadev Ahir (2014) 363 TTR 572 / 102 DTR 321 / 224 Taxman 184 / 268 CTR 21 (FB)(Guj.)(HC)

2333 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Adjournments – High Court lays down zero-tolerance policy over adjournments – Appeal may be dismissed, hear them ex parte or and/or impose costs if counsel are not prepared.**

(i) We have noted that the Final Hearing Board consists of all Appeals of 2002. First two matters have been adjourned by us only because the Department or the Advocate for Appellant sought accommodation. They did not have either papers or were not ready with the case. Such state of affairs will not be tolerated hereafter. In the event, the Counsel engaged by the Department is absent without a justifiable or reasonable cause, we will invariably impose costs and to be paid by the Counsel personally. Equally, we would proceed in his absence. In the event, the Appellant or his Advocate is absent, we will proceed to dismiss the Appeal for non prosecution. Thereafter, no application for restoration of the Appeal will be considered unless the Appellant makes out a sufficient cause for absence;

(ii) We would also expect the Department and equally the Excise, Customs, Income Tax, all of which are stated to have engaged separate Advocates, to inform and caution their Advocates that their absence would result in either this Court proceeding ex parte or the Appeals of the Department being dismissed for non prosecution. This Court will not hereafter countenance that the matters are adjourned and not heard due to absence of the Advocates. The Department is equally responsible to the Court and must ensure the presence of their Advocates. In the event only one Advocate is being briefed, the Department may consider handing over and entrusting the papers to an additional Advocate so as not to cause inconvenience to this Court. The disobedience of this order or inconvenience to this Court, would result in the Joint Secretary, Department of Law & Judiciary, Government of India, so also, the Secretary, Department of Law & Judiciary, Government of India, remaining present in the Court.

Thermax Babcock & Wilcox Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 88 CCH 149 (Bom.)(HC), www.itatonline.org

2334 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Substantial question of law – Ground not raised before Tribunal – Can be raised before High Court if it is substantial question of law.**

High Court in an appropriate case where no dispute arises on factual ground but purely legal issues arises in the case, may consider a substantial question of law even though it may not have been raised/adjudicated before the Tribunal. (AY. 2007-08)

Dr. Raghuvendra Singh v. CIT (2014) 98 DTR 255 / 267 CTR 376 (2015) 229 Taxmann 554 (P&H)(HC)

2335 **S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Costs of ₹ 1 lakh levied on dept for “gross abuse of process of Court”. Later revoked on assurance that judicial orders would be abided.**

The department did not point out that its appeal for the earlier years in the case of the same assessee had been dismissed by the High Court. The High Court took a serious view of the matter and levied costs of ₹ 1 lakh on the department while observing:

“It is unfortunate that the Revenue insists in arguing Appeals in this manner and for subsequent Assessment Years. The Revenue ought to have been fair and brought to the notice of this Court the fact that its Appeal challenging the very findings and conclusions for prior Assessment Years has been dismissed by this Court on merits. The reasons assigned ought to have been pointed out to us and thereafter, any explanation

should have been offered for admission of this Appeal ... It is a gross abuse of the process of this Court. It is dismissed with costs quantified at ₹ 1,00,000/- (Rupees One lakh). Costs be paid to the assessee within 4 (four) weeks from today.”

However, later, based on the assurance of the department that hereafter judicial orders and directions would be abided by in all matters, the order on levy of costs was recalled. The Court made it clear that appropriate averments have to be made in the memo of Appeal as to whether the orders of the Tribunal for prior assessment years and in the case of very assessee have been either challenged or otherwise. If the challenge is pending even that statement has to be made and if it is decided, the outcome thereof has to be indicated.

CIT v. Kisan Ratilal Choksey Share & Securities (2014) 368 ITR 485 (Bom.)(HC)

S.260A : Appeal – High Court – Dept. given “last opportunity” and warned of “heavy costs” for wasting judicial time by filing appeal on covered matters.

2336

The assessee received an incentive/subsidy from SICOM for setting up a new undertaking. The assessee claimed that the subsidy was a capital receipt. However, the AO held the receipt to be a revenue receipt. The CIT(A) and Tribunal upheld the assessee’s claim on the basis that the issue was covered by *CIT v. Chaphalkar Brothers(2013) 351 ITR 309 (Bom.)* & *CIT v. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 306 ITR 392 (SC)*. The Department filed an appeal to the High Court. HELD dismissing the appeal:

We are afraid that if the Revenue persists with such stand and as has been turned down repeatedly, that would defeat the very object and purpose of the schemes and packages devised by the States. That would also result in frustrating the entrepreneurs and defeating the purpose of setting up new industries and particularly in backward areas. The Revenue, therefore, should bear in mind that in every such case and whenever the funds or receipts are from the schemes and packages devised by the State, it should note the object and purpose of the same. If that is of the nature specified in the judgments of this Court and equally that of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, then, the Revenue must act accordingly. We hope that this much is enough so as to dissuade the Revenue from bringing such matters repeatedly to this Court. Ordinarily and for wasting judicial time and which is precious, we would have imposed heavy costs on the Revenue while dismissing this Appeal, but we refrain from doing so by giving last opportunity to the Revenue. (1997-98)

CIT v. Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 88.(Bom.)(HC)

Section 263 : Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Co-operative Society – When the assessee was a co-operative society and not a co-operative bank, the order passed by the Assessing Officer extending the benefit of exemption from payment of tax under section 80P(2)(a)(i) was correct – Revision was not proper. [S.80P(2)(a)(i)]

2337

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the AO in his order stated that the assessee was a co-operative society and had not obtained any banking licence. The business of the assessee was to provide credit facilities to its members. Since the assessee could not

carry on any banking business, the interest on investment was taxable as income from other sources. Therefore, the assessee was not a co-operative bank. Further, the Commissioner also categorically stated in his order that the assessee was a co-operative society, which provided credit facilities to its members. Therefore, as the assessee was not a co-operative bank carrying on exclusively banking business and as it did not possess a licence from the Reserve Bank of India to carry on business, it was not a co-operative bank. It was a co-operative society which also carried on the business of lending money to its members which was covered under section 80P(2)(a)(i), i.e., carrying on the business of banking for providing credit facilities to its members. The object of the amendment was not to exclude the benefit extended under section 80P(1) to such societies. Therefore, there was no error committed by the Assessing Officer and his order was not prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The condition precedent for the Commissioner to invoke the power under section 263 is that the twin conditions should be satisfied. The order should be erroneous and it should be prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. When the assessee was a co-operative society and not a co-operative bank, the order passed by the Assessing Officer extending the benefit of exemption from payment of tax under section 80P(2)(a)(i) was correct. There was no error. When there was no error, the question of the order being prejudicial would not arise. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Sri Biluru Gurubasava Pattina Sahakari Sangha Niyamitha Bagalkot (2014) 369 ITR 86 / 230 Taxman 557 (Karn.)(HC)

2338

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Commissioner unsure whether or not bifurcation was right or wrong – Mere statement that it was possible that Assessing Officer was erroneous – Not sufficient and does not meet requirement stipulated by law – Revision not valid – Matter remanded to Tribunal to decide on merit. [S.36(1)(ii), 143(2), 143(3)]

On appeal : Held, allowing the appeal, (i) that the Commissioner, instead of commenting upon or giving a final finding whether or not the apportionment was acceptable, observed that it was possible that there was an attempt to inflate expenses on trading activity and an attempt might have been made to reduce the actual expenses of the exempt unit. The use of the word “possible” would indicate that there was no finding or adjudication by the Commissioner and his observations were based on mere suspicion and uncertain. Yet, a direction was issued to the Assessing Officer to carry out fresh inquiries to do the exercise once again and decipher whether the actual expenses relatable to the manufacturing and trading activities were correctly separated. Thus, the Commissioner was unsure whether or not the bifurcation were right or wrong. This did not show or establish that the finding of the Assessing Officer was erroneous.

(ii) That it was also clear from the order passed by the Commissioner under section 263 that the issue relating to apportionment of common expenditure had been specifically gone into and examined by the Assessing Officer, who was fully satisfied with the apportionment made. Thus, it was not a case of “no” inquiry but specific and pointed enquiries by the Assessing Officer. The finding and apportionment could have been set aside and negated only with a finding by the Commissioner that the Assessing Officer was erroneous and wrong. The Commissioner should have examined and gone into the

question of apportionment on the merits. Mere statement that it was possible that the Assessing Officer was erroneous was not sufficient and did not meet the requirement stipulated by law.

(iii) That the Tribunal did record and had reproduced the relevant portions of the notice under section 143(2) wherein details of the commission paid to related parties, etc., were mentioned. However, it did not notice the letters or replies filed before the Assessing Officer and had observed that the assessee was unable to furnish the details enclosed with the reply or to show that the questions in this regard were asked by the Assessing Officer. This finding was completely incorrect as this was not even the case of the Commissioner in the order passed and which was made the subject matter of challenge before the Tribunal. On the question of disallowance under section 36(1) (ii), the Tribunal had not recorded or given any finding. The arguments raised by the assessee on the aspects had not been considered. Thus, the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for fresh decision on the merits. (AY. 2007-08)

Globus Infocom Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 14 / 108 DTR 363 (Delhi)(HC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Agricultural land – Transfer – Assessing Officer accepting land was agricultural in nature – Commissioner not disputing classification of land but bringing profit earned from transfer to tax – Revision not valid. [S.2(47)(v), 143(3), Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S.53A]

2339

On appeal, Held, dismissing the appeal, that the rights were acquired by the assessee through the memorandum of understanding dated December 25, 1993, vis-a-vis the property. On a perusal of the memorandum of understanding, the Tribunal found that possession of the property was delivered in favour of the person who joined the transaction. Those facts in turn brought about transfer within the meaning of section 2(47)(v). Therefore, the assessee had acquired a right to transfer the property at least from the point of view of Income-tax. The sale proceeds to the extent of the share of the assessee would certainly answer the description of capital gains. However, the classification of the land as of agricultural in nature, exempted the assessee from the obligation to pay the capital gains tax. Once the Commissioner did not dispute the classification of the land, he could not have traced the income of the assessee to any other event other than that of transfer of the agricultural land. Thus, the revision was not valid. (AY. 1995-96)

CIT v. A. Vijay Kumar (2014) 369 ITR 185 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 204(Mag.) (T&AP)(HC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Payments to non-residents – Failure to deduct tax at source – Foreign agency commission – Revision was held to be not valid. [S.9(1)(vi), 40(a)(ia), 143(3), 195]

2340

The assessee was engaged in trading of yarn with parties in various countries. The original assessment order was passed under section 143(3) of the Act. Accepting the total income declared by the assessee. The Commissioner, thereafter, issued a show cause notice under section 263 stating that there was an error in the assessment order in accepting the claim to deduction of foreign agency commission paid to non-resident companies, as tax had not been deducted at source from such payments. The Tribunal considering the facts that the assessee, in order to sell its products, had only appointed agents on sales commission basis in various countries and such agent was

a link between the foreign buyer and the assessee and did not have any permanent establishment or place of business in India, held that the provisions of sections 195 and 9 relating to deduction of tax at source on payments made to foreign parties and levy of tax on payments so made were not applicable to the facts of the case and allowed the appeal filed by the assessee. On appeal :

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the services rendered by the non-resident agent could at best be called as a service for completion of the export commitment and would not fall within the definition of “fees for technical services” and, therefore, section 9 was not applicable and, consequently, section 195 did not come into play. Therefore, the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer towards export commission paid by the assessee to the non-resident was rightly deleted. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Kikani Exports P. Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 96 / (2015) 232 Taxmann 255 (Mad.)(HC)

2341 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to the interest of revenue – Indexation – Change of opinion – Revision was held to be not valid. [S.143(3)]**

Dismissing the appeal of revenue the Court held that, Tribunal held that all particulars required for computation of capital gain was furnished in the course of assessment proceedings, therefore the revision order passed by the CIT was mere change of opinion. Court held that agreement for sale conferring enforceable right and such right statutory recognised, hence view of CIT that agreement for sale confers no title in immovable property was held to be not valid. View of the CIT that separate indexation needed for two separate indexation needed for two separate sets of agreement, original agreement to sale and deed of rectification is mere change of opinion, hence revision was held to be not valid. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Bina Indrakumar (Ms.) (2015) 370 ITR 552 (Bom.)(HC)

2342 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Fringe benefits tax – Contribution towards approved super – Annunciation fund for employees – No mistake in calculation of fringe benefit tax – Revision was held to be not valid. [Ss.115WB, 115WC].**

While computing the Fringe Benefits Tax, Contribution towards approved super-annuation fund for employees, employees in whose case contribution more than one lakh was reduction of amount of exemption from aggregate and balance considered as taxable. On appeal by revenue the Court held that the order of revision under section 263 in relation to the chargeability of fringe benefit tax was not valid. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. UTI Bank Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 154 / 51 taxmann.com 544 (Guj.)(HC)

2343 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Assessment after enquiry – No finding assessment order erroneous – Commissioner not justified in setting aside assessment order and directing AO to verify documents. [S.143(3)]**

Held, dismissing the appeal, that a perusal of the assessment order would testify that the AO had consciously examined all relevant records in accepting the return submitted by the assessee. Noticeably, the Commissioner in spite of his incisive analysis of the factual details, did not find fault with any of the findings of the AO culminating in ultimate conclusion that the return of the assessee was acceptable as a whole. The

text of the decision of the Commissioner authenticated that the assessee had furnished to him all relevant records and documents in support of its return accepted by the Assessing Officer. The Commissioner did neither reject the documents or records to be irrelevant, nor lacking in their probative worth. He simply remanded the matter to the AO observing that these ought to have been laid before him and examined at the time of assessment. The order of revision was not valid. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Deepak Real Estate Developers (I) P. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 377 / 270 CTR 636 / 52 taxmann.com 75 / 107 DTR 259 (Raj.)(HC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Valuation of stock – Loss on account of transfer of securities from category “available for sale” to “held to maturity” – Amount debited to profit and loss account – Deductible – Revision on ground such loss is notional loss – Revision was held to be not valid.

2344

Assessment was completed under section 143(3). The Commissioner noticed that a sum of ₹ 87.11 lakhs had been debited to the profit and loss account by the assessee-bank, as a loss on account of transfer of securities from the category “available for sale” to “held to maturity” and the amount had been allowed by the AO. According to him, since the allowance of such a notional loss was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, he invoked his powers under section 263 of the Act and directed the AO to modify his assessment order and disallow the deduction of ₹ 87.11 lakhs. He held that since the assessee had not transferred the securities to any other third person but had only done a reclassification from “available for sale” to “held to maturity” categories, the transfer did not result in any actual loss to the assessee and, therefore, the allowance thereof was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The Tribunal held that the claim of the assessee for the loss of ₹ 87.11 lakhs on the transfer of securities from the category “available for sale” to “held to maturity” was an allowable deduction and set aside the order passed by the Commissioner under section 263. On appeal by revenue dismissing the appeal, the Court held that the assessee-bank was entitled to deduction for loss on account of transfer of securities. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. HDFC Bank Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 377 / 107 DTR 395 (2015) 228 Taxmann 350 (Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Reassessment-Limitation to be reckoned from date of intimation order u/s. 143(1) – Revision was barred by limitation. [S.143(1), 147, 148]

2345

Assessment of assessee reopened and order of reassessment passed. Commissioner seeking to exercise jurisdiction on issues which were not subject matter of consideration in reassessment but a part of original assessment. Limitation to be reckoned from date of order of intimation passed under section 143(1). Revision on those issues barred by limitation. (AY. 1999-2000, 2001-02, 2002-03)

CIT v. Lark Chemicals Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 655 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 305 (Bom.)(HC)

- 2346 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – AO has examined issue – Revision was held to be not valid. [S.36(1)(ii), 80IC]**
Where the AO had specifically examined the issue relating to apportionment of common expenditure and was fully satisfied with the apportionment made, the Commissioner could not have invoked provision u/s. 263 merely on the assumption that the order passed by the AO could possibly have been erroneous. (AY. 2007-08)
Globus Infocom Ltd. v. CIT, Delhi (2014) 369 ITR 14 / 227 Taxman 48(Mag)(Delhi.) (HC)
- 2347 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Revision was held to be justified. [Ss.40(a)ia], 194C]**
Where the CIT has demonstrated reasons as to why the order of the AO was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, it is within the powers of the CIT u/s. 263 to remand the matter directing the AO to make assessment afresh
CIT v. Rakshit Transport (2014)227 Taxman 79(Mag.)(Cal.)(HC)
- 2348 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Two views – Rental income – AO accepting the return after calling explanation allowing capitalization of rental income – Revision was held to be not valid. [S.22, 56]**
The assessee was engaged in developing a film project and while doing so it received rental income which was directly interlinked with the activity. Since the business had not yet started, it filed a nil return for the assessment year 1995-96. After examining the details, the income returned was accepted. CIT held that rental income should not have been capitalised. On appeal Tribunal held that. AO capitalising receipt as connected with main activity. Commissioner has no jurisdiction to revise because one of two possible views was taken by AO. (AY. 1995-96, 1996-97)
CIT v. Usha Kiran Movies Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 165 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 62 (Mag) (AP) (HC)
- 2349 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue-co – Operative societies – Lack of enquiry – Revision was held to be valid. [S.80P]**
Once a claim is made under section 80P of the Ac, the AO is necessarily required to apply his mind and conduct proper enquiry and verification at the time of assessment. Lack of this exercise on the part of AO leads to an erroneous order, which is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. (AY 2009-10)
Perinthalmanna Service Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 363 ITR 268 (Ker.)(HC)
- 2350 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Powers – Only challenging the absence of word “erroneous” in the notice – Notice was held to be valid – Alternative remedy [Art. 226.]**
Assessee not challenging jurisdiction of Commissioner but only absence of word “erroneous” in notice--Assessment treating proceeds of sale of immovable property sale proceeds as long-term capital gains instead of short-term capital gains prejudicial

to interests of Revenue. Expression “resulted into an order which is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Sufficient compliance for issuing notice.

Assessee to submit his reply to notice and raise all contentions available before authority. Decision of the single judge affirmed. (AY. 2009-10)

Hemanth Kumar Bothra v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 33 (Mad)(HC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Business income – Grant setoff of netting of interest – Directed by the court. [S.28(i)]

2351

It is the case of the assessee that the Assessing Officer taking into consideration the interest earned towards interest paid, has passed an order giving effect to the order passed by the Tribunal. In other words, it was submitted on behalf of assessee that the Assessing Officer while dealing with the issue whether the assessee is entitled for netting of interest by setting off of interest earned towards interest paid, examined the case of the assessee as to whether he is entitled for netting of interest and if yes, to what extent. In this view of the matter, the revenue submitted that the Commissioner may be allowed to exercise his powers under section 263 of the IT Act to examine the order passed by the Assessing Officer and to find out whether allowing of netting of interest by setting off of interest earned towards interest paid was permissible and, if yes, to what extent. The Court issued directions to the effect that the jurisdictional CIT shall examine whether the assessee was entitled for setting off of interest earned towards interest paid. If the case of the assessee, as reflected in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, was proved, the assessee would be entitled for netting of interest. (AY. 1992-93, 1993-94)

CIT v. Rewade Precision Tools (P) Ltd. (2014)222 Taxmann 229 (Karn.)(HC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Housing projects – Date of approval – More than one plausible view is reasonably possible and if Assessing Officer takes one plausible view, it cannot be said that assessment is erroneous or prejudicial to interest of revenue [S.80IB (10)]

2352

The Commissioner initiated revision proceedings on the ground that the Assessing Officer had allowed deduction under section 80IB(10) without examining whether all the conditions prescribed by the section were satisfied and, hence assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. The Tribunal in its order held that as regards the interpretation placed on section 80IB(10), there was no dispute that the project was approved by local authorities and was developed on land exceeding 1 acre, as required by the section. It further held that even if some flats exceeded 1000 sq. ft. of the built-up area that did not disentitle the assessee to the deduction rather a proportionate deduction on flats which exceed the statutory limit of 1,000 sq. ft. alone could be disallowed.

On an appeal by the revenue the Court held that a clear finding was recorded by the Tribunal that the assessee had filed the details and calculations about the built-up area of the residential units. It would be unreasonable to hold that the Assessing Officer ignored those details. Moreover, the statutory auditors had clearly mentioned the dates of approval of the layout plan of the residential colonies. The Assessing Officer was thus made aware of the dates on which the approvals were granted in respect of each of the

four housing projects. It is certainly a debatable issue on which more than one plausible view is reasonably possible and merely because the Assessing Officer has taken one plausible view, it cannot be said that the assessment is erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. (AYs. 2000-01, 2001-02)

CIT v. Ansal Housing & Constructing Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 29(Mag.)(Delhi.)(HC)

Editorial : SLP is granted, CIT v. Ansal Housing & Construction Ltd. (SLP No. 20451 of 2013 dated 13-10-2014)(2014) 227 Taxman 378 (SC)

2353 S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Capital receipt – Income from other sources – One time settlement contract – Possible view – Revision order was held to be not justified [S.4,56, 143(3)]

Assessee entered into an agreement with a German company in India for producing and selling products of said foreign company in India for a specific period. After expiry of period of agreement, German company paid certain amount to assessee as one-time settlement for termination of contract as well as issuing a NOC for setting up a 100 per cent subsidiary by then in India. AO passed assessment order under section 143(3) accepting assessee's claim that said amount was to be treated as capital receipt. Commissioner passed a revision order mainly on ground that amount received from German Company was to be taxed as 'income from other sources'. Tribunal, set aside revisional order by observing that in terms of contract, assessee was not entitled in any event, upon expiry of contract, to prevent German Concern from setting up it 100 per cent subsidiary for purpose of manufacturing and marketing its goods and, thus, payment in question was a gratuitous payment. Even otherwise, if it was assumed that by agreeing to issue NOC, assessee agreed to have its manufacturing and trading structure impaired resulting in loss of his source of income, receipt in that case would be a capital receipt. On appeal by Tribunal the Court held that Tribunal was justified in setting aside impugned revision order. The Court observed that the AO had enquired in the course of assessment and had taken the view of AO being a possible view the order of Tribunal setting aside the order of CIT was held to be justified.) (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. J. L. Morrison (India) Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 593 / 270 CTR 405 / 225 Taxmann 17(Mag.) (Cal.)(HC)

2354 S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – No jurisdiction – Change of opinion – Revision was held to be not valid. [S.263]

Particular case for a relevant year having faced the revision proceedings u/s. 263 under defective jurisdiction which was not noticed by the CIT and was decided cannot again be revised u/s. 263 by another authority as the action will tantamount to change of opinion leading to abuse of power. Order of Tribunal quashing of revision of order was held to be valid. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Kailash Chand Methi (2014)366 ITR 333 / 269 CTR 201 /(2015) 228 Taxman 45 (Mag) (Raj.)(HC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Amounts withdrawn from the reserve created – Two views – Revision was held to be not valid. [S.36(1)(vii)]

2355

The assessee claimed deduction in respect of amount withdrawn from the reserves created in terms of section 36(1)(vii) in the financial year 1996-97. The AO allowed the claim. On revision the Commissioner withdrew the deduction and directed computation of total income of the assessee after including the amounts withdrawn. The Tribunal quashed the order passed by the Commissioner holding that two views were possible on the applicability of section 36(1)(vii). On appeal by revenue the Court held that amendment with effect from 1-4-1998 creating obligation not only to create special reserve but also maintain it. AO allowing deduction of sums withdrawn from fund created prior to 1-4-1998, one of two views possible, hence revision was not valid. (AY. 2003-04, 2004-05)

CIT v. LIC Housing Finance Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 458 / 272 CTR 10/(2015) 228 Taxmann 188 (Bom.) (HC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Sales tax deferment Scheme, 1989 – Capital receipt – Two views – Revision was held to be not valid. [S.4]

2356

The surplus arising on pre payment of loan amount was credited to profit and loss account and treated as capital receipt. AO completed the assessment accepting the claim of assessee. CIT revised holding that amount in question was revenue receipt. Tribunal set aside the order of Commissioner. On appeal by revenue dismissing the appeal to Court held that no attempt was to show that the AO's view was not possible one. Even otherwise there was enough material in law to indicating that the legal position is otherwise. In such circumstances, the impugned order of Tribunal was upheld. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Grasim Industries Ltd. (2014) 226 Taxmann 165 (Bom.)(HC)

S.263: Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Provision does not envisage separate recording of satisfaction before issue of notice – Alternative remedy – Writ petition is not maintainable. [S.253, Arti. 226]

2357

The Commissioner received the records prior to the issuance of the notice and opined that the Assessing Officer failed to apply his mind objectively and failed to conduct an inquiry over the subscription to shares by various subscribers at a high premium. Section 263 does not envisage separate recording of the satisfaction before issuance of the notice and if it is clearly discernible from the facts narrated in the notice that the order of the Assessing Officer appears to be erroneous and prejudice is caused to the Revenue, it would render the notice legal and valid. The Commissioner had indicated this sufficiently in the notice and afforded opportunity to the assessee to file a reply thereto which, in fact, had been done. Whether the order was sustainable on the legal parameters or not, could be tested by a higher authority who had been bestowed with

the power of appeal. Section 253 provides a remedy of appeal against an order passed under section 263 by the Commissioner and, therefore, the assessee could have recourse to such remedy. Writ petition was held not maintainable.

Zigma Commodities P. Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 365 ITR 276 (Cal.)(HC)

Editorial: Decision of the single judge in *Zigma Commodities P. Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 365 ITR 276 (Cal.)(HC)* is affirmed, *Zigma Commodities P. Ltd. v. ITO (2015) 370 ITR 318 (Cal) (HC)*

- 2358 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Gifts – Cash credits – Gift from aunt-Revision was held to be not valid – Gifts from strangers – Revision was held to be valid. [S.68]**

Mere identification of donor and showing movement of gift amount through banking channels was held not sufficient to prove genuineness of gift. The burden on recipient is not only to establish identity of person making gift but also his capacity to make a gift and that it had actually been received as a gift. Since the recipient failed to do so, revision was held valid.

However, since one of the donors was the real aunt of the assessee the amount of ₹ 1 lakh gifted by her was to be excluded from the purview of fresh assessment proceedings. (AY. 2000-01)

CIT v. Rippen Ahuja (2014) 365 ITR 150 / 226 Taxmann 43 (Mag)/ (2015) 116 DTR 277 / 275 CTR 577 (P&H)(HC)

- 2359 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Two views-Transfer pricing – TPO's acceptance of ALP shows two views are possible & CIT has no jurisdiction to revise assessment. [S.92CA]**

The assessee filed a ROI for AY 2002-03 which was accepted u/s. 143(1). The AO issued a notice u/s. 148 dated 1-4-2004 to reopen the assessment. Before the assessee filed a ROI in response to the notice, the TPO issued a notice dated 12-4-2004 u/s. 92CA seeking details about the international transactions entered into by the assessee with its group companies. The assessee thereafter filed a ROI on 21-4-2004. The TPO passed an order u/s. 92CA in which he did not make any adjustments. The CIT passed an order u/s 263 setting aside the assessment order on the ground that it was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal quashed the CIT's order on the ground that (i) two views are possible when the TPO has accepted the arms' length valuation and the CIT had no jurisdiction to interfere with the said order u/s. 263 & (ii) on the day the reference was made by the AO to the TPO, there was no return pending for consideration. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal:

On the day the reference was made by the AO to the TPO, there was no return pending for consideration by him and therefore, the very reference was bad. Even otherwise, the said Transfer Pricing Authority did not find fault with the adjudication of determining arms length price by the Assessing Authority. In those circumstances, the CIT committed an error in exercising his power u/s 263 and the Tribunal was justified in interfering with the said order. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. SAP Labs Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 109 DTR 175 / 271 CTR 612 (Karn.)(HC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Foreign currency Convertible Bonds – Revision of order was held to be not justified. [S.37(1)]

2360

During the relevant year assessee issued Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs). FCCB holders have exercised option to convert said bonds into equity shares with in a period of one month from the date of issue of bonds. AO allowed the claim for deduction of expenditure incurred on FCCB. CIT held that FCCB's in real sense were equity shares right from the beginning and that conversion of bonds was only routine technical compliance as per regulations and guidelines. He accordingly passed an order under section 263 rejecting the assessee's claim for deduction of expenses. On appeal the Tribunal observed that the conversion is not automatic and that unless option was specifically exercised by bond holders, conversion thereof was not permissible. Accordingly the Tribunal held that the view taken by the AO was could not have been termed as prejudicial to interest of revenue. The order of Commissioner was set aside. On appeal by revenue the Court held that Tribunal was justified in setting aside impugned revision order. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Tata Teleservices (Mah.) Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 5 (Bom.)(HC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Merely because CIT held a different opinion holding that addition ought to be treated as undisclosed income – Revision was held to be invalid.

2361

Assessee disclosed the amount received by it as advance towards sale of agricultural land. The AO treated the amount as business income of the assessee and taxed the same as such. The CIT invoked jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act and set aside the order of the AO, merely because he held a different opinion that, the addition ought to have been made by the AO as undisclosed income was held not justified as the order of the AO could not be erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. (AY. 1996-97) *CIT v. Hari Singh & Associates (2014) 102 DTR 306 / 267 CTR 442 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 177 (Raj.)(HC)*

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Survey – Reasonableness of the income offered has not been properly examined by the AO while making assessment – Revision of order was upheld by the Tribunal – No substantial question of law. [S.133A, 143(3), 260A]

2362

A survey was conducted u/s. 133 A of the Act in the business premises of the Assessee Books of accounts and documents were impounded. The assessee proposed a particular estimation of income. It was proposed to estimate the income of the assessee at an average rate of 2% of the income earned by the assessee's firm as per the assessee's proposal. However the income assessed by the AO in order u/s. 143 r.w. 147 of the Act, was less than 2%. This in view of the CIT was *prima facie* erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. Order of revision was upheld by Tribunal. On appeal the Court held that the CIT found that the issue relating to reasonableness of income offered has not been properly examined by the AO while making assessment. It was also noted that the rate of 2% was mentioned in a vague manner in the assessment order without proper working. This finding was also verified by the Tribunal. The court therefore held that no question of law arose from the order of the tribunal. (AY. 2004-05)

Popular Mini Finance v. CIT (2014) 97 DTR 407(Ker.)(HC)

- 2363 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Deduction u/s. 80HHF – profits and gains from export of Film Software – AO examined the matter in detail during the assessment proceedings – revision proceedings not valid u/s. 263. [S.80HHF, 143(3)]**

Assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80HHF of profits and gains from export of Film Software. During the original assessment proceedings u/s. 143(3) AO delved deep into the issue of allowability of the deduction and allowed the deduction to the assessee. Commissioner initiated revision proceedings u/s. 263 on few grounds including, *inter alia*, that the rights of the material exported remained with the assessee, then how can it be termed as an export. Accordingly, the Commissioner set aside the assessment order after giving a finding that there was absence of proper enquiry. High Court held that AO during the assessment proceedings had examined the issue in great detail and was satisfied about the allowability of the deduction. Further, the Commissioner did not give any valid reason as to why the order was erroneous. Consequently, it held that, one of the condition for invoking section 263 that order being erroneous being not fulfilled, Commissioner cannot set aside the order by invoking section 263. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. New Delhi Television Ltd. (2013) 262 CTR 604 / (2014) 360 ITR 44 / 220 Taxmann 43 (Mag.) (Delhi) (HC.)

- 2364 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Assessment Order cannot be said to be prejudicial to interest of revenue merely because discussion not made. [S.143(3)]**

While passing assessment order u/s. 143(3), Assessing Officer had taken into account all details but also disallowed some expenditure and made addition wherever same was required. CIT (Appeals) thereby invoked revisionary powers u/s. 263 on account of lack of enquiry. Tribunal concluded that decision of Assessing Officer could not be prejudicial to interest of revenue simply because it did not make detailed discussion as Assessing Officer made enquiries on issue under consideration and assessee had given a detailed explanation by letter furnishing data. On appeal before High Court, dismissing the appeal, held that Assessing Officer has not only taken into account all the details, but also granted disallowance and addition wherever he found that the same are required to be given. It is not correct to say that the Assessing Officer did not consider all the details, as alleged. The findings of the learned Tribunal are in consonance with law and are correct.

CIT v. Anand Food Products (2014) 220 Taxmann 40 (Mag.) (AP) (HC)

- 2365 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Exemption of income from property held under trust – Permissibility of new plea [S.11, 12A]**

Assessee-trust filed nil return. The AO found that assessee had incurred more than 85 per cent of expenditure during year in question and allowed exemption under section 11 and section 12A. The Commissioner revised said order on ground that families of trustees had been paid interest in violation of terms of deed of trust, no proper records of the development fund were maintained and other discrepancies in depreciation and repayment of term loan. On appeal, the Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner. Before the High Court, the assessee took the plea that even if all such additions were

made, still tax effect was nil and therefore, it could not be said that order of AO was prejudicial to interest of revenue. However, the High Court dismissed the appeal holding that, it had never been the stand of the assessee that even if the said aspects were taken into consideration, the income of the assessee would still be nil. In the absence of any plea that the additions made would not cause loss to the Revenue, the assessee would not be permitted to raise such questions in appeal without a factual basis. (AY. 2004-05) *Kandi Friends Educational Trust v. CIT (2013) 357 ITR 84 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 50 (Mag.) (P&H)(HC)*

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Revision was held to be justified.

2366

The Assessee maintained books of account of construction activities carried out abroad for which payment was received in foreign currency. Assessing Officer opined that entire difference with Indian rupees credited to profit and loss account relate to fixed assets/ long term liabilities, and thus exchange variation reserve account (EVR) was not liable to be taxed. The CIT passed a revision order u/s. 263 with an observation that there is no mention of any reasons as to why entire EVR should relate to fixed assets. AO's silence on the issue is without meaning. On appeal, the Tribunal observed that CIT calculated the variation pertaining to three categories, i.e. income and expenditure, current assets and current liabilities and fixed assets – head office account/depreciation reserve, so it was for the assessee to explain. Hence the Tribunal dismissed Assessee's appeal. The High Court confirmed the remand to the lower authorities and declined to answer the questions of law in the said appeals. (AY. 1988-89, 1990-91) *U. P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 220 Taxmann 13 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)*

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Expenditure incurred in relation to exempt income – Order is not erroneous unless CIT holds how it is erroneous [S.14A]

2367

During the assessment year 2006-07, assessee had earned dividend income of ₹ 24,12,482 through investments made out of borrowed funds. After netting interest paid on loan obtained against interest earned from deposits, assessee offered ₹ 94,47,712 as disallowance under section 14A. Assessing Officer had conducted inquiry and accepted disallowance which was surrendered by assessee. The CIT passed order u/s 263 and recorded that the Assessing Officer should have conducted further inquiries and correct disallowance should have been made under section 14A read with Rule 8D. The Tribunal held that the Commissioner had not given or formed any opinion as to whether or not said disallowance was satisfactory or not, though Assessing Officer had applied his mind and accepted offer made by assessee. On further appeal the High Court held that the assessment order does not become erroneous because the Assessing Officer after verification accepts the claim/disallowance. It will be erroneous if the Commissioner holds that the finding recorded by the Assessing Officer is incorrect or contrary to law. In such matters, to remand the matter/issue to the Assessing Officer would imply and mean the Commissioner of Income-tax has not examined and decided

whether or not the order is erroneous but has directed the Assessing Officer to decide the aspect/question. An order is not erroneous, unless the Commissioner of Income-tax hold and records reasons why it is erroneous. Therefore the application and appeal was dismissed. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Galileo India (P) Ltd. (2014) 220 Taxmann 115(Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

- 2368 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – No Proper notice to assessee but proper opportunity of being heard given to assessee – Order of revision was held to be valid.**

CIT issued notice u/s. 263 proposing to revise the Assessment order but in the said notice it was mentioned that the assessment order was set-aside. However, the assessee was given a number of opportunities of being heard. Revision order was held to be valid. (AY. 2007-08)

Ashutosh Bandopadhyay v. CIT (2014) 363 ITR 168 / 107 DTR 344 / 270 CTR 556(Tripura) (HC)

- 2369 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Housing project – Deduction was allowed without application of mind by Assessing Officer – Revision was held to be valid. [S.80IB(10)]**

Assessing Officer even though taking a view that there existed possibility of violation of approved building plan, allowed assessee's claim for deduction under section 80-IB(10) as assessment was getting time barred, it being a case of non-application of mind, Commissioner was justified in setting aside assessment in exercise of revisional power (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07).

CIT v. Abad Constructions (P) Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 372 / 225 Taxmann 151 (Mag.) / 103 DTR 439 (Ker)(HC)

- 2370 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Order must be erroneous and also prejudicial to revenue – Commissioner cannot invoke his revisional power to correct each and every mistakes committed by the AO [Ss. 11, 13]**

In case of a charitable trust, it is only income from investment or deposit which has been made in violation of section 11(5) that is liable to be taxed and that violation under section 13(1)(d) does not tantamount to denial of exemption under section 11 on total income of assessee-trust. Revisional order held to be not valid. (AY. 2000-01, 2001-02)

CIT v. Fr. Mullers Charitable Institutions (2014) 363 ITR 230 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 319 / 275 CTR 558 (Karn.)(HC)

Editorial : SLP of revenue was dismissed (SLA No. 22223 of 2014 dated 19-9-2014)
CIT v. Fr. Mullers Charitable Institutions (2014) 227 Taxmann 369 (SC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Derived – Deduction u/s. 80 – I was allowed on Interest – Revision was held to be justified. 2371

It was held that Deduction u/s. 80I having wrongly been allowed in respect of interest on short term deposit and transportation charges, as they are not derived from industrial undertaking, CIT was justified in exercising jurisdiction under section 263. (AY. 1993-94, 1994-95).

Krishak Bharati Co-op Ltd. v. CIT (2012) 208 Taxmann 37 (Mag) / (2014) 360 ITR 209 / 101 DTR 345 / 272 CTR 130 (Delhi)(HC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Error in computing income u/s. 115JA and failure to apply s. 14A – Revision order was held to be justified. [S.14A, 115JA] 2372

Revision order was held justified as the AO made error in computing income u/s. 115JA and also failed to apply S.14A. (AY. 2000-01, 2001-02)

CIT v. Goetze (India) Ltd. (2014) 361 ITR 505 / 97 DTR 169 / 225 Taxmann 133 (Mag.) (Delhi)(HC)

CIT v. Federal Mogul Goetage (India) Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 169(Delhi)(HC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Block assessment – Order of Tribunal on block assessment attaining finality – Revision was held to be not valid. [S.143(3), 158BC] 2373

There was no overlapping of the block assessment and the regular assessment made under s. 143(3). Thus, when the regular assessment procedures were kept intact providing for appeal, revision and other remedies, when the assessment made by the AO was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, the Commissioner was justified in exercising his jurisdiction under s. 263. On the facts the Court held that facts found by the Tribunal that the transactions were reflected in the books of account and they were all genuine transactions and the order of Tribunal on the block assessment appeal having become final. Notice of revision solely on the basis of block assessment not valid for denying the deduction and depreciation. Accordingly the order of Tribunal was set aside. (AY. 1995-96, 1996-97)

Seshasayee Paper and Boards Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 360 ITR 483 / 97 DTR 416 / 265 CTR 405 (Mad.)(HC)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Erroneous and prejudicial to interests of revenue – Revision was held to be justified. [S.143(3)] 2374

The Tribunal while analysing the issue confirmed that there was no application of mind while considering assessment under s. 143. The procedure adopted would have implication on tax computation. Held, original assessment order was not only erroneous but also prejudicial to interests of Revenue, and hence, S.263 was rightly invoked by the Commissioner.

Appollo Tyres Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 360 ITR 36 / 224 Taxmann 143 (Mag) (Ker)(HC)

- 2375 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – When an order passed under section 263 was set aside – Order passed in pursuance of revision order automatically becomes infructuous. [S.143(3)]**

Where order of revision passed by Commissioner under section 263 was set aside , assessment order passed by Commissioner under section 143(3) in pursuance of such revision order automatically became infructuous. Appeal of revenue was dismissed. (AY. 2006-07)

CIT v. Aditi Developers (2014) 223 Taxmann 14(Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

- 2376 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Allowed deduction without considering the provision of sections 80IA(9), 80IB(13) – Revision was held to be justified. [S.80HHC, 80IA(9), 80IB(13)]**

AO allowed deduction u/s. 80IB as also under section 80HHC without making any reference to the provisions of section 80IB(13) and section 80IA(9). The view taken the AO was unsustainable in law and therefore, revision by CIT was sustainable. (AY. 2001-02, 2003-04)

Broadway Overseas Ltd. v. CIT (2014)98 DTR 73/223 Taxmann 218(Mag.) / 265 CTR 49(P&H)(HC)

- 2377 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Interest earned on deposits with banks (other than co-op. banks) whether exempt u/s. 80P by treating it as being part of profit and gains of business or profession or income from other sources for which deduction not available – Revision was held to be justified. [S.56,28(i), 80P]**

The assessee is a credit co-operative society, providing credit facilities to its members. The assessee accepts deposits from members and lends money only to members. The income of the society is in the form of the interest that it earns on credit facilities extended to its members. The interest income which is in dispute arises out of fixed deposit with banks. The claim of the Assessee is that the fixed deposits in banks were made to repay fixed deposits to the members and also to ensure that funds are not kept idle and they earn some interest income. As there should be nexus between the earning of interest and business of the assessee, the interest income earned on extending credit facilities will be business income as there exists nexus between the income and the business of the society which is extending credit facility to its members. One cannot say that there is such nexus between the interests earned on deposits made with the banks. Show cause notice exercising power u/s 263 issue mentioning, the Assessing Officer failed to apply the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *The Totgars Co-Operative Sale Society Ltd. Vs. ITO (2010) 188 TAXMANN 0282* wherein it is affirmed that interest earned on deposits with other Banks would fall under the head "Income from Other Sources" under section 56 and not under section 28 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and, consequently, the assessee-society would not be entitled to deduction under section 80P of the Act." Held order u/s. 263 of the Act was just and proper. (AY. 2006-07)

Sri Basaveshwara Credit Co-op. Society Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 785 / (2015) 168 TTJ 668 (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Transfer pricing – Arms’ length price – Reduction of 10A exemption – Revision was held to be valid. [S.10A, 92CA, 143(3), 144C]

2378

AO had initially aggregated business income declared by assessee and also arm’s length price adjustment and thereafter had allowed deduction under section 10A, same was in clear violation of provision of section 92C(4) and hence, order of AO was erroneous and prejudicial to interests of revenue. (AY. 2006-07).

MsourceE (India) (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2015) 152 ITD 153 (Bang.)(Trib.)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Non-mentioning in the assessment order cannot be held to be erroneous. [S.43A, 80IA, 115JB, 143(3)]

2379

The assessee was a company engaged in generation of power. After verifying the books of account and information submitted by the assessee, the AO completed the assessment under section 143(3) after allowing deduction under section 80-IA while accepting the book profit under section 115JB.

AO in course of scrutiny proceeding conducted detailed enquiry assessee also submitted its explanation explaining why it should not be treated as income. Since in view of decision of Supreme Court view taken by AO was possible view, only because view taken by AO did not appear to be correct to Commissioner, it could not be said that such view was erroneous and prejudicial to interests of revenue

Assessee treated gain derived from sale of Carbon Emission Reduction Certificates (CERCs) as revenue receipt and claimed deduction under section 80-IA which was allowed by AO. Commissioner, in order passed under section 263, held that gain from sale of CERCs having no direct nexus with eligible business of assessee, it could not be part of business profit so as to allow deduction under section 80-IA. Whether amount received on sale of CERCs was capital in nature and, therefore, even if AO had allowed deduction on that amount under section 80-IA treating it as revenue income, no prejudice was caused to revenue which is one of conditions for invoking jurisdiction under section 263.

Where reimbursement of advance tax by parties was not treated as income in assessee’s books of account, same also cannot be considered under provisions of section 115JB, which is to be computed based on profit and loss account of assessee-company.

Non-mentioning of all issues on which enquiry was made by AO in body of assessment order does not indicate lack of enquiry or non-application of mind; non-mentioning of such facts in assessment order would not make it erroneous and prejudicial to interests of revenue. (AY. 2008-09)

Lanco Kondapalli Power Ltd. v. JCIT (2014) 33 ITR 142/ (2015) 152 ITD 132 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 2380 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Lack of proper enquiry – Not authorised to substitute his own opinion – Rejection of books of account and estimation by AO – Revision of order was held to be not valid. [S.40(b), 144, 145, 184(5)]**

AO rejected the books of account and estimated net profit of assessee at 5.58 per cent of gross turnover from civil contract work. CIT invoked section 263 alleging that there was inability to produce evidences in support of assessee's claim of expenses and profit. Tribunal held that CIT could not invoke section 263 by mentioning that no proper enquiry had been made by AO when nothing had been brought on record by CIT, therefore CIT was not justified in cancelling assessment order. (AY. 2007-08)

Gopal Narayan Singh v. Dy. CIT (2014) 34 ITR 461 /164 TTJ 13 (UO) / (2015) 152 ITD 338 (Patna)(Trib.)

- 2381 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Income from other sources – Income from house property – Business income – Lease – Technology park – Income from rent for lease of space in technology park and income from operation and management of facilities is assessable as “business profits” or “income from house property” – Revision was held to be not justified – Law on the subject is explained. [S.22, 28(i), 56]**

Assessee has been consistently offering the incomes under the head “Income on House Property” as far as the receipts of rents are concerned and under the head “Business” as far as the service fee and management fee on maintenance are concerned. Not only in the impugned years, even in earlier years also, were the incomes accepted as such. Since the learned CIT cannot revise those orders, these orders are not subject matter of proceedings u/s 263 and therefore, the issues are concluded therein accepting assessee's contention. On the rule of consistency also, it cannot be modified in a later year. However, it is not on rule of consistency alone. As seen from the orders passed by the authorities at the time of assessment, they have accepted the bifurcation of rental income and services income and rental income was accepted under the head “House Property”. As rightly pointed out by assessee in the submissions before the learned CIT that assessing incomes under head Business was not prejudicial to the interests of revenue considering that a higher claim of depreciation was allowable on the properties when compared to 30% allowance for repairs on the incomes assessed, we agree that the orders are not prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. The Tribunal also held that in the absence of facts they are not able to give any findings about the correctness of the action of either AO or learned CIT in coming to a particular conclusion whether the income is assessable under ‘House Property’ or ‘Business’.

Tribunal held that CIT erred in relying only on the ITAT order in the case of Global Tech Park P. Ltd., ACIT (supra) wherein the Co-ordinate Bench relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of *Balaji Enterprises v. CIT* 225 ITR 471. As seen from the judgment of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court the facts in the said case were that assessee firm even though constituted to carry on business of dealing in real estate and setting up, development and exploitation of commercial complex in market, they have not owned the property but were developing the properties obtained on lease hold or on free hold basis and further leasing the properties after development to the lessees.

In those facts of the case, the incomes are correctly held as assessable under the head “Business”. Further, in the said case of Global Tech Park P. Ltd., (supra), the incomes received were composite incomes for both leasing as well as maintenance and AO has not bifurcated them at all. In that case construction and maintenance of industrial park was indeed held as ‘business activity’. However, in order to arrive whether a particular income is to be assessed under “House Property or Business” there are many aspects which require examination. First of all, one has to enquire whether assessee is owner of the property or not. Thereafter, assessee’s nature of activities are to be analyzed vis-à-vis the activities/agreements entered by assessee with reference to various lessees and to verify whether rental income is separately received or as a composite rent but bifurcated by assessee. The terms of agreement, the period of lease, the conditions of lease etc., also required to be examined. Therefore, in order to take a decision whether a particular income is to be assessed under the head “House Property” or under the head “Business” many more facts are required to be examined. In this case, neither the A.O. nor the learned CIT examined any of these aspects, but decided simply on the principles of law. Therefore, (AY. 2006-07, 2009-10)

K. Raheja IT Park (Hyderabad) P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 36 ITR 632(Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Transfer pricing – Aggregate value of international transactions entered into by assessee exceeded ₹ 5 crore, AO did not refer matter to TPO in terms of Instruction No. 3 – Revision order of Commissioner was upheld. [S.92CA]

2382

AO did not refer matter to TPO in terms of Instruction No. 3 dated 20-5-2013. Commissioner set aside assessment order. On appeal Tribunal held that in view of order in *Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. CIT (2012) 345 ITR 193 (Delhi(HC))*, the revision order was held to be justified. (AY. 2003-04)

Agilisys IT Services India (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 176 (Visakhapatnam) (Trib.)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Decision of the Assessing Officer cannot be held to be erroneous simply because in his order he does not make an elaborate discussion. [S.10B(3)]

2383

It is trite that an order can be revised only and only if twin conditions of ‘error in the order’ and ‘prejudice caused to the Revenue’ co-exist. The subject of ‘revision under section 263’ has been vastly examined and analysed by various Courts including that of Hon’ble Apex Court. The revisional power conferred on the CIT vide section 263 is of wide amplitude. It enables the CIT to call for and examine the records of any proceeding under the Act. It empowers the CIT to make or cause to be made such an enquiry as he deems necessary in order to find out if any order passed by Assessing Officer is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The only limitation on his powers is that he must have some material(s) which would enable him to form a *prima facie* opinion that the order passed by the Assessing Officer is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Once he comes to the above conclusion on the basis of the ‘material’ that the order of the Assessing Officer

is erroneous and also prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, the CIT is empowered to pass an order as the circumstances of the case may warrant. He may pass an order enhancing the assessment or he may modify the assessment. He is also empowered to cancel the assessment and direct to frame a fresh assessment. He is empowered to take recourse to any of the three courses indicated in section 263. So, it is clear that the CIT does not have unfettered and unchequered discretion to revise an order. The CIT is required to exercise revisional power within the bounds of the law and has to satisfy the need of fairness in administrative action and fair play with due respect to the principle of *audia lteram partem* as envisaged in the Constitution of India as well as in section 263. An order can be treated as 'erroneous' if it was passed in utter ignorance or in violation of any law; or passed without taking into consideration all the relevant facts or by taking into consideration irrelevant facts. The 'prejudice' that is contemplated under section 263 is the prejudice to the Income Tax administration as a whole. The revision has to be done for the purpose of setting right distortions and prejudices caused to the Revenue in the above context. The fundamental principles which emerge from the several cases regarding the powers of the CIT under section 263 may be summarised below:

- (i) The CIT must record satisfaction that the order of the Assessing Officer is erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. Both the conditions must be fulfilled.
- (ii) Section 263 cannot be invoked to correct each and every type of mistake or error committed by the Assessing Officer and it is only when an order is erroneous, that the section will be attracted.
- (iii) An incorrect assumption of facts or an incorrect application of law will suffice for the requirement of order being erroneous.
- (iv) If the order is passed without application of mind, such order will fall under the category of erroneous order.
- (v) Every loss of revenue cannot be treated as prejudicial to the interest of the revenue and if the Assessing Officer has adopted one of the courses permissible under law or where two views are possible and the Assessing Officer has taken one view under which the CIT does not agree, it cannot be treated as an erroneous order, unless the view taken by the Assessing Officer is unsustainable under the law.
- (vi) If while making the assessment, the Assessing Officer examines the accounts, makes enquiries, applies his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and determines the income, the CIT, while exercising his power under section 263, is not permitted to substitute his estimate of income in place of the income estimated by the Assessing Officer.
- (vii) The Assessing Officer exercise quasi-judicial power vested in him and if he exercise such power in accordance with law and arrives at a conclusion, such conclusion cannot be termed to be erroneous simply because the CIT does not feel satisfied with the conclusion.
- (viii) The CIT, before exercising his jurisdiction under section 263, must have material on record to arrive at a satisfaction.
- (ix) If the Assessing Officer has made enquiries during the course of assessment proceedings on the relevant issues and the assessee has given detailed explanation a

letter in writing and the Assessing Officer allowed the claim on being satisfied with the explanation of the assessee, the decision of the Assessing Officer cannot be held to be erroneous simply because in his order he does not make an elaborate discussion in that regard.

Meditech v. JCIT (Jodh.) (Trib.) www.itatonline.org

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Share capital – Cash credits – Creation of shell companies and subscribing for shares at high premium constitutes tax evasion by money laundering. It is a case of clear human in genuinity with the clear and contumacious intention to defraud the revenue – Revision was held to be valid. [S.56(viib), 68]

2384

The first question comes to our mind is as to why this hurry in completing the reassessment proceedings especially when substantial time is still available and detailed inquiry is expected. Normally, once reopening is done by issuance of notice under section 148, the full time as available under the Act is used by the AO but conspicuously in all such cases the assessments are closed fast. These are special cases where within such a short period of issuance of notice under section 148, assessment stands concluded without any investigation or verification or inquiry worth its name. One is left wondering as to whether it is on purpose and design or whether it was in the normal course as this feature is special only to such companies where large share capital has been introduced.

It is relevant because the creation of the shell companies and introduction of the share capital is not the only issue that comes up. This is but the tip of the iceberg. A perusal of the Balance sheet and Profit & Loss account in the case of the assessee shows that the share application monies received by the assessee along with the premium are represented in the Balance sheet in the form of current assets being the unquoted equity shares in other such companies. That is the share application money received by the assessee is used for making further investments in other such similar shell companies from whom cash is taken and rerouted through cheques. These shell companies which are acquired by the interested third parties purchase these companies at a fractional amount of the value of the shares.

These are cases of clear human in genuinity with the clear and contumacious intention to defraud the revenue. It is not the handiwork of one person alone. One person has created the shell, another has funded the shell with an intention to launder unaccounted funds and after having acquired the shell has used it for converting its funds also. There is no information as to who are the latest beneficiaries of such shell companies and for what purpose the companies are being used. This is just the reason why the provision of section 56(viib) has been introduced.

Receipt of share application money with huge share premium warranted detailed enquiry by the AO and not a perfunctory enquiry. (AY. 2008-09)

Bisakha Sales Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2015) 152 ITD 750 / 35 ITR 715 (Kol.) (Trib.)

2385 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Residence in India – Amendment to section 6(6)(a) has come w.e.f. 1-4-2004, therefore, same was not applicable to assessment year under consideration – Revision order was set aside. [S.6(6)]**

Assessee employee of foreign company filed return of income claiming status of 'Resident but not ordinarily Resident'. CIT initiated proceedings u/s. 263 based upon interpretation of section 6(6) and held assessee as Resident and accordingly directed AO to consider assessee's global income also. Assessee had claimed that he continued to be NOR as per provisions of section 6(6)(a) as he was not Resident in India in nine out of ten previous years preceding relevant previous year. Opinion of Assessee was supported by judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of *Pradip J. Mehta vs. CIT (300 ITR 231)* Held, reversing decision of High Court, that assessee was "not ordinarily Resident" in India within meaning of section 6(6)(a) as he was not Resident for 9 out of 10 years. A person would become an ordinary Resident only (a) if he had been residing in India in 9 out of 10 preceding years, and (b) he had been in India for at least 730 days in previous seven years."

Amendment to section 6(6)(a) has come w.e.f. 1-4-2004, therefore, same was not applicable to Assessment year under consideration. In view of interpretation given by Hon'ble Supreme Court to then existing law, in a way AO excluded income earned outside India and ultimately assessee was taxed on income earned in India. Therefore, to that extent there was no prejudice caused to revenue on basis of interpretation of law relevant for assessment year 2003-04. Therefore, in our opinion order u/s. 263 by CIT was bad in law and order of AO was not erroneous or prejudicial to interests of revenue. Tribunal consequently, set aside order u/s. 263 passed by the CIT. Assessee's grounds were allowed. Appeal was allowed. (AY. 2003-04)

Mihir J. Doshi v. ACIT (2013) 26 ITR 652 (2014) 61 SOT 14(URO.) (Mum.)(Trib.)

2386 **S263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – AO allowed part deduction – Revision was held to be not valid. [S.80IA]**

AO examined eligibility of assessee to claim deduction and held that assessee had fulfilled all conditions as prescribed under section 80-IA but he allowed part deduction to assessee as deduction in respect of profit earned by assessee from a contract with a builder and interest income on FDRs was inadmissible. Commissioner invoked its power u/s. 263 on the ground that as per Explanation to section 80-IA, assessee was not eligible for deduction under section 80-IA and, thus, Assessing Officer did not carry out proper enquiries. Facts revealed that Assessing Officer after examination of records and recording clear facts had allowed part deduction to assessee. Therefore, the order passed by AO was in accordance with law and could not be said to be erroneous and liable for Revision u/s. 263 of the Act. (AY. 2008-09)

Shree Narayan Built Up (I) (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 61 SOT 79 (URO) (Agra)(Trib.)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Residence in India – Revision order was set aside. [S.6(6)]

2387

Assessee employee of foreign company filed return of income claiming status of 'Resident but not ordinarily Resident'. CIT initiated proceedings u/s. 263 based upon interpretation of section 6(6) and held assessee as Resident and accordingly directed AO to consider assessee's global income also. Assessee had claimed that he continued to be NOR as per provisions of section 6(6)(a) as he was not Resident in India in nine out of ten previous years preceding relevant previous year. Opinion of Assessee was supported by judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of *Pradip J. Mehta vs. CIT (300 ITR 231)* Held, reversing decision of High Court, that assessee was "not ordinarily Resident" in India within meaning of section 6(6)(a) as he was not Resident for 9 out of 10 years. A person would become an ordinary Resident only (a) if he had been residing in India in 9 out of 10 preceding years, and (b) he had been in India for at least 730 days in previous seven years."

Amendment to section 6(6)(a) has come w.e.f. 1-4-2004, therefore, same was not applicable to assessment year under consideration. In view of interpretation given by Hon'ble Supreme Court to then existing law, in a way AO excluded income earned outside India and ultimately assessee was taxed in income earned in India. Therefore, to that extent there was no prejudice caused to revenue on basis of interpretation of law relevant for assessment year 2003-04. Therefore, in our opinion order u/s. 263 by CIT was bad in law and order of AO was not erroneous or prejudicial to interests of revenue, Tribunal consequently, set aside order u/s. 263 passed by the CIT. Assessee's grounds are allowed. Appeal was allowed. (AY. 2003-04)

Mihir J. Doshi v. ACIT (2013) 26 ITR 652 / (2014) 61 SOT 14(URO.) (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Detailed explanation was filed before the AO – Revision of order held to be not valid. [S.143(3), 154]

2388

Assessee filed several replies, as well as details, evidences before the AO. AO passed order u/s. 143(3). Tribunal held that the order of AO could not be said to be erroneous insofar prejudicial to interest of revenue. When all discrepancies were pointed out in Rectification Application u/s. 154, Commissioner should have verified all facts and should not have forwarded Rectification Application to AO for verifying discrepancies pointed out by assessee Commissioner was not justified in revising assessment order in proceedings u/s. 263. (AY. 2009-10)

PyareLal Jaiswal v. CIT (2014) 146 ITD 555 (All.)(Trib.)

- 2389 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Short term capital gains or business income – Revision not justified – Computation of peak fund deficiency – Excess outflow of cash not examined by AO – Revision justified. [Ss.28(i), 45]**

The Tribunal held that since the rate of tax for STCG and business income was the same, there was no loss to revenue and hence the pre-condition as mentioned in s. 263 i.e. ‘prejudicial to the interest of the revenue’ was not satisfied to the extent of taxing short term capital gains as business income. Further, the Tribunal also noted that closing stock was credited to the P&L under revenue-cost matching principle and this would not impact the profit from business. Accordingly, the revision proceedings initiated by the CIT for this too were quashed. The Tribunal observed that there was a huge difference in the ‘peak fund deficiency’ as calculated by AO and CIT, which showed that AO had not applied his mind during the assessment proceedings and to that extent the revision powers exercised by CIT were justified and accordingly resorted the matter to the AO. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09))

K. V. Balagangadharan v. DCIT (2014) 29 ITR 539/(2015) 152 ITD 294 (Cochin)(Trib.)

- 2390 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Transfer pricing – Binding order – CIT cannot revise the TPO’s transfer pricing order passed u/s. 92CA(3). CIT also cannot revise s. 143(3) order because such order is not erroneous if it follows binding order of TPO. [S.92CA(3), 143(3)]**

The Commissioner cannot exercise revisionary jurisdiction u/s 263 on the transfer pricing order passed u/s. 92CA(3) by the TPO. As regards the assessment order, it cannot be said to be “erroneous” because the AO is bound by the transfer pricing order u/s. 92CA(4) is binding on the AO. Consequently, the CIT’s order is without jurisdiction. (AY. 2005-06)

Tata Communication Limited v. DCIT (Mum.)(Trib.), www.itatonline.org

- 2391 **S.263 : Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Autorised activities – There was enough material on record to hold that transfer of ‘B’ building to associate concern constituted authorized activity, hence there was no error in orders of AO allowing deduction under section 80-IAB – Revision order was quashed. [Ss.80IAB, 143(3)]**

Assessee company is engaged in business of real estate development and leasing of constructed properties. Proposal for development of a sector in Special Economic Zone [SEZ] was granted by Board of Approval [BOA]. Assessee claimed deduction under section 80-IAB in respect of profit derived from transfer of building. AO completed assessment u/s. 143(3) and allowed claim. Commissioner passed the order on the ground that the AO has allowed the claim without conducting proper enquiries and examining of its eligibility as envisaged in the approval of the BOA. On appeal tribunal held that, since there was enough material on record to hold that transfer of ‘B’ building to associate concern constituted authorised activity, there was no error in order of AO allowing deduction under section 80-IAB. Revision order was quashed. (AY. 2007-08)

DLF Info City Developers (Chennai) Ltd. v. ACIT (2013) 162 TTJ 531/103 DTR 322 / (2014) 146 ITD 123 (Delhi)(Trib.)

Section 264 : Revision of other orders

S.264 : Commissioner – Revision of other orders – Assessment – Intimation – Disallowance of deductions by Assessing Officer partly confirmed on revision by Commissioner and order of remand with regard to balance – Not justified-Matter remanded to consider entire disallowance. [S.143(1)(a), 143(3), Arti. 226]

2392

The assessee filed its return for the assessment year 1998-99 before the Income-tax Officer, who passed an order under section 143(1)(a) making a *prima facie* adjustment and indicating that the deduction of ₹ 2,61,954 was *prima facie* inadmissible. The assessee filed a revision petition before the Commissioner who upheld the *prima facie* adjustments made by the Assessing Officer to some extent and remanded the matter for deleting the disallowance of ₹ 11,874 made under section 143(1)(a). On a writ petition against the order:

Held, that the Commissioner had already remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer though on a limited aspect. The entire matter needed to be remanded to be dealt with in detail by the Assessing Officer. Matter remanded. (AY. 1998-99)

Raju and Prasad v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 593 (T&AP) (HC)

S.264 : Commissioner – Revision of other orders – Best judgment assessment – Assessee not controverting that it had duly received notice on a particular date – Assessee precluded from controverting non-issue of notice at a later stage – Assessee claiming entire opening stock had deteriorated – Assessing Officer justified in not accepting such loss – No confirmation of outstanding balances from third parties – Additions on account of increase in sundry creditors and secured loans justified – No flaw in assessment – Commissioner justified in rejecting application. [S.143(2), 144]

2393

The assessment was completed u/s. 144. The revision petition filed by the assessee under section 264 was rejected. On a writ petition :

Held, dismissing the petition, (i) that the dispute with respect to non-receipt of notice was raised for the first time in the revision petition filed on January 16, 2007, more than three years after the assessment order, dated February 28, 2003, had been passed. At that stage, obtaining any evidence from the postal authorities was not possible. The delay on the part of the assessee in raising the dispute could not be permitted to prejudice to the Revenue. There was no dispute that the subsequent questionnaire/notice sent by the Assessing Officer to the assessee which mentioned that the notice under section 143(2) had been duly received by the assessee on October 31, 2001, was not controverted during the assessment proceedings. Thus, the assessee could not be permitted to raise this plea at a subsequent stage.

(ii) That it was always open for the assessee or its partners to approach the court and seek an inspection of the records even if the records were in the possession of the Local Commissioner appointed by the court. There was nothing on record to indicate that any efforts were made to obtain either copies of the books of account or other relevant records of the assessee. In the absence of the material sought by the Assessing Officer, he had no alternative but to make a best judgment assessment.

(iii) That the Assessing Officer could not accept the losses in the year 2000-01 on the basis of the financial results in the earlier years. The final accounts of the preceding

year did not indicate that the assessee had written off any stock as having perished and thus it could not be assumed that such loss was normal for the business. However, the assessee had claimed a shortage of 28,817 kgs. in the year 2000-01 and in addition, the assessee had also claimed that almost the entire opening stock of walnut kernels on April 1, 1999, had deteriorated. Such losses were clearly an aberration and in the absence of sufficient material could not be accepted by the Assessing Officer in a best judgment assessment, especially where there was no material to substantiate the loss as declared in the return and the statement of accounts furnished along with it. The Assessing Officer, therefore, rightly rejected the loss as returned by the assessee.

(iv) That the Assessing Officer also made additions on account of increase in sundry creditors and unsecured loans. The assessee could easily obtain confirmation of outstanding balances from third parties, but no confirmation was supplied to the Assessing Officer. The scale of operations of the assessee during the year was not materially different from that in the preceding year and in the circumstances a significant increase in the sundry creditors and unsecured loans was clearly unexplained and the Assessing Officer added it under section 68. The Assessing Officer also added the increase in the account of the partners. The assessee attempted to explain this by stating that the additions were from the funds withdrawn by the partners. However, the individual accounts of the partners which could have substantiated such claim were, apparently, not produced before the Assessing Officer. Thus, the explanation was also not accepted. There was no flaw in the approach of the Assessing Officer. (AY. 2000-01) *Narinder Kumar v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 49 / 52 Taxmann.127 (Delhi)(HC)*

Editorial : The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP filed by the assessee against this judgment. Narender Kumar and Ors v. CIT (SLP No. 26761 of 2014 dated 3-11-2014)

2394

S.264 : Commissioner – Revision of other orders – Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme – Commissioner is designated authority as well as authority prescribed to hear revision filed by assessee – Commissioner knowing fully well that revision application pending before him taking up revision first and dismissing it – Commissioner refusing to extending benefit under Scheme citing dismissal – Dismissal of revision not basis to deny benefit under Scheme. [S.264(3), Finance (No.2) Act, 1998.

Held, allowing the petition, that the Commissioner was the designated authority to deal with the application filed under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998, as well as the authority to hear the revision petition filed by the assessee under section 264(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Knowing fully well that the petition filed by the assessee was pending before him, he had chosen to take up the revision petition and dismissed it. He cited the dismissal thereof as a ground for refusing to extend the benefit under the Scheme. The approach of the Commissioner was totally untenable, apart from being opposed to the letter and spirit of the Scheme. In a way, he had read certain aspects into the Scheme, which Parliament did not intend. The mere fact that a revision, which was pending before him, was dismissed could not constitute the basis to deny the benefit under the Scheme. (AY. 1997-98)

East India Petroleum Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 293/52 taxmann.com 60 (T & AP)(HC)

S.264 : Commissioner – Revision of other orders – Order of single judge was set-aside and matter was to be re-adjudicated by Single Judge afresh.

2395

Original return was filed on 9-10-1997 and assessment order was passed on 27-11-1998. Assessee subsequently sought to revise return. Assistant Commissioner rejected same by order dated 28-3-2003. On 28-9-2005, assessee filed petition for revision of order/intimation dated 27-11-1998. Commissioner rejected same as delay was for 5 years 4 months. However, Single Judge allowed writ on mistaken assumption that revision petition under section 264 was filed by assessee against order of Assessing Officer dated 28-3-2003. Order of Single Judge was to be set aside and matter was to be re-adjudicated by Single Judge afresh. (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Sharavathy Conductors (P) Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 187 (Mag.) (Karn.)(HC)

S.264 : Commissioner – Revision of other orders – Filing of a revision petition under section 264 cannot be a bar for filing of an appeal before appropriate authority. [S.246]

2396

The assessee filed an application for withdrawal of revision petition before the CIT. The CIT rejected the request of the assessee on the ground that he had filed a revision petition waiving his right to file a First Appeal before CIT(a). On filing a writ petition, the HC held that the filing of a Revision Petition could not preclude filing an appeal by the assessee before the appropriate authority, as per the relevant provisions of law. (AY. 2008-09)

M. Jayabalan v. CIT(2014) 223 Taxmann 128(Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)

S.264 : Commissioner – Revision of other orders – Non disposal of application with in stipulated period does not mean that revision was granted or allowed.

2397

Revision-As per the CBDT Circular No. 772 dated 23rd Dec, 1998, the provision of 264(6) is discretionary and not mandatory. Hence, non-disposal of an application for revision u/s. 264(6) within the stipulated period does not mean that Revision was granted or allowed CIT does not become *functuo officio* in case revision is not decided within period prescribed therein or. (AY. 2004-05)

Uttam Modern Rice & Oil Mill v. UOI (2013) 357 ITR 692/(2014) 269 CTR 103 (All.)(HC)

Section 267 : Amendment of assessment on appeal**S.267 : Amendment of assessment on appeal – Assessment – Limitation – Benefit of extended period of limitation to pass assessment order pursuant to finding / direction of appellate authority not available if affected party not heard – Matter remanded. [S.153(3), 160, 251]**

2398

In the assessment of the trust, the CIT(A) held that the trust was not valid and that its income had to be taxed in the hands of the trustees. The CIT(A), however, did not hear the trustees before issuing the said direction. Pursuant to the said direction, the AO passed an assessment order u/s. 267 r.w.s. 251 in the case of the trustee and assessed the income in his hands. The assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal in which he claimed that as he was not given any opportunity of hearing by the CIT(A) at the stage of holding that the income of the trust was to be taxed in his hands, the assessment order was barred by limitation and not valid. HELD by the Tribunal:

u/s. 267, the CIT(A) and Tribunal are empowered, while making a change in the assessment of a body of individuals or an association of persons, to direct the AO to amend / make a fresh assessment on any member of the body or association. Under Explanation 3 to s. 153(3), the time limit for making an assessment in such a case of finding or direction does not apply provided such other person was given an opportunity of being heard before the said order was passed. The opportunity of hearing to the assessee in whose hands income of the assessee in appeal is to be added is a condition precedent for giving any finding adverse to such assessee vis-à-vis the time limits for completion of his assessment, reassessment or recomputations are concerned. That is the unambiguous scheme of Explanation 3 to s. 153(3). If an Appellate Authority does not do so, the affected assessee cannot be put to any disadvantage as far as the statutory time limits for completion of assessments, reassessment or recomputations. An opportunity to be so given should be a specific opportunity and the affected assessee is required to be put to notice on that issue. A general hearing given to the representative of the trusts in question cannot be equated with such specific opportunity to the affected assessee and the affected assessee being put to notice about the conclusions adversely affecting him. The scheme of the Income tax Act fiercely guards the rule of finality to income tax proceedings, whether in assessment, reassessment, revisions, rectifications or any other proceedings, and once the time limit for that course of action is over, the finality thereto cannot be disturbed except under the specific provisions of the Act. The only thing which can help the cause of the revenue is thus a specific notice of hearing having been given to the assessee before us, as mandated by Explanation 3 to s. 153(3). It is only when the AO can demonstrate that this assessee was given a specific opportunity of hearing, before the appellate order was passed in the cases of the Trust that the impugned assessment order can be treated as legally valid. Matter remnded. (AY. 2002-03)

Gaurav Luthara v. ITO (2014)149 ITD 410 / 105 DTR 201 / 163 TTJ 129(Agra)(Trib.)

Section 268A : Filing of appeal or application for reference by income-tax authority

2399 **S.268A : Appeal – Application – Reference – Instructions – Tax effect less than ₹ 10 lakhs – Appeal was held to be not maintainable. [S.68, 260A]**

Revenue filed instant appeal against order passed by Tribunal deleting addition made under section 68. Assessee raised a preliminary objection that since tax effect in revenue's appeal was less than ₹ 10 lakh, in view of Instruction No. 3, dated 9-2-2011, said appeal was not maintainable Since revenue could not controvert aforesaid submission raised by assessee, instant appeal was to be dismissed being non-maintainable. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Gulab Wire Products (P) Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 189 (Mag.) (Jharkhand)(HC)

Section 269SS : Mode of taking or accepting certain loans and deposits

S.269SS : Acceptance of loans and deposits-Repayment of loans and deposits – otherwise than by account payee cheque – Once an amount has been subjected to tax u/s. 68, the question of treating it as a transaction in violation of S.269SS or S.269T does not arise as it stands mutually excluded. [Ss.68, 269T, 271D, 271E] 2400

The assessee, to resolve certain financial difficulties, borrowed certain amounts and repaid certain amounts. The amounts obtained were by way of cash of ₹ 1 crore and the amount that was returned was ₹ 50 lakhs. This amount, in the course of the original assessment proceedings, was treated by the Assessing Authority as credit of income from an unexplained/unidentified source and is liable to tax u/s. 68. Pending this, the Department also issued a show cause notice, initiating penalty proceedings on the transaction relating to receipt of ₹ 1 crore and payment of ₹ 50 lakhs u/s. 271D & 271E. The CIT(A) came to the conclusion that since the Department had accepted the transaction that since the money came from an unexplained and unidentified source and, therefore, was liable to tax u/s.68, the provisions of S. 269SS & 269T would not be attracted. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

The Department filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court relied on the decision of *Diwan Enterprises v. CIT* [2000] 246 ITR 571 & *CIT v. Standard Brands Ltd.* [2006] 285 ITR 295 / 155 Taxman 383 and decided the appeal in favour of the assessee. (AY. 2008-09, 2009-10)

DIT(E) v. Young Men Christian Association (2014) 227 Taxmann 31(Mag.)(Mad.)(HC)

S.269SS : Acceptance of loans and deposits – Exigency – Loan taken for discharge of another bank loan could have been taken by cheque – Failure to show reasonable cause – Levy of penalty was held to be justified. [S.271D]. 2401

The CIT(A) noticed that the plea of due exigency was not acceptable as the loan was taken for discharging another bank loan which could be by cheque as well. Held, the lower authorities had taken plausible view and it could not be said that there was error in their approach. Penalty u/s. 271D was upheld. (AY. 2006-07)

Charan Dass Ashok Kumar v. CIT (2014) 365 ITR 367 / (2015) 231 Taxmann 513 (P&H)(HC)

S.269SS : Acceptance of loans and deposits – Reasonable cause – Agriculturists living in remote village – Identity of payers established – Cancellation of penalty was held to be justified. [S.273B, 271D]. 2402

Instead of taking loan in account payee cheque or bank draft, assessee took loans in cash exceeding ₹ 20,000 from agriculturists living in remote village. The assessee not only substantiated evidence like 7/12 extracts from land records were produced, but, also additionally, transactions were reflected in accounts of assessee and advancement of loan to assessee had been reflected in books of account of those persons from whom loan had been received. Identity of those persons had also been well established. Assessee also had given satisfactory reasons for taking such loan. Held, since genuineness of the very transactions was never doubted by revenue authorities, and breach was due to reason that agriculturists were living in remote areas, default was to be treated as a mere technical or venial breach and penalty was not to be levied on assessee. (AY. 2006-07) *CIT v. MAA Khodiyar Construction* (2014) 365 ITR 474/225 Taxmann 76 (Mag.) (Guj.)(HC)

- 2403 **S.269SS : Acceptance of loans and deposits – Otherwise than by account payee cheque or account payee bank draft – Book entries – Provision is not attracted. [S.269T, 271D, 271E]**

As the transactions of loans & advances were not cash transactions and were merely book entries by way of adjustment entries, there is no violation of Section 269SS / 269T of the Act and no question of levy of penalty u/s. 271D / 271E. (AY. 1994-95)
CIT v. Saurabh Enterprises (2014) 269 CTR 451(All.)(HC)

- 2404 **S.269SS : Acceptance of loans and deposits – Otherwise than by account payee cheque or account payee bank draft – Book entries – Limitation – Bar in Ss. 269SS, 269T does not apply to loans / advances accepted / repaid via journal entries – Limitation period for s. 271D penalty is as per s. 275(1)(c) & not 275(1)(a). [S.271D, 275(1)(c), 275(1)(a)]**

PACL India Ltd purchased lands on behalf of assessee from several land owners. PACL made payments through demand drafts to the said land owners. The assessee showed the land in its books and the amount as being due to PACL. The AO passed an assessment order dated 30-12-2009 in which he held that the transaction amounted to a loan from PACL to the assessee which contravened sections 269SS/269T as it was not be 'account payee' cheque. A penalty order u/s. 271D dated 10-3-2012 was passed for the said contravention. The said penalty was deleted on the ground that the penalty order was barred by limitation and also that section 269SS did not apply to journal entries. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal:

(i) Penalty u/s. 269SS is independent of the assessment. The action inviting imposition of penalty is granting of loans above the prescribed limit otherwise than through banking channels and as such infringement of section 269SS is not related to the income that may be assessed or finally adjudicated. Accordingly, the time limit in s. 275(1)(a) would not be applicable. The time limit in section 275(1)(c) is applicable.

(ii) On merits, no offence u/s. 269SS is made out section 269SS applies to a transaction where a deposit or a loan is accepted by an assessee, otherwise than by an account payee cheque or an account payee draft. The section is restricted to transactions involving acceptance of money and not intended to affect cases where a debt or a liability arises on account of book entries. The object of the section is to prevent transactions in currency. This is also clearly explicit from clause (iii) of the Explanation to section 269SS which defines loan or deposit to mean "loan or deposit of money". The liability recorded in the books of accounts by way of journal entries, i.e. crediting the account of a party to whom monies are payable or debiting the account of a party from whom monies are receivable in the books of account, is clearly outside the ambit of section 269SS because passing such entries does not involve acceptance of any loan or deposit of money. (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Worldwide Township Project Ltd.(2014) 367 ITR 433/106 DTR 139 / 269 CTR 444/ (2015) 229 Taxmann 560 (Delhi)(HC)

S.269SS : Acceptance of loans and deposits – Otherwise than by account payee cheque or account payee bank draft – Audit report and balance sheet showing outstanding amount as loan received from twelve persons – Imposition of penalty was justified. [S.271DD]

2405

The AO imposed the penalty mainly on the ground that the assessee firm had received the cash in excess of ₹ 20,000/- in violation of section 269SS. The assessee contended that the persons who have paid the cash were supposed to be partners and the investment made by the respective partners capital account was genuine and there was no violation of section 269SS. The authorities and Tribunal on verification of the material on record came to the finding that the audit report and the balance sheet of the assessee had shown the outstanding amount as loans received from the twelve persons. On appeal the Court held that on facts and materials relied on by the assessee, it was found by the authorities that the contribution made by the respective persons was treated as a loan and the explanation that they were to be made partners later was not accepted. Hence, factual issues could not be reopened and challenged in appeal. The findings of fact by the authorities were neither perverse nor illegal in any form Appeal of assessee was dismissed. (AY. 2005-06)

Soundarya Textiles v. ACIT (2014) 362 ITR 488 (Ker.)(HC)

S.269SS : Acceptance of loans and deposits – Otherwise than by account payee cheque or account payee bank draft – Reasonable causes was not established – Levy of penalty was held to be justified [S.271D, 273B]

2406

In the absence of any plea that assessee has to meet any specific urgent needs, there would be no reasonable cause for receiving loan by way of cash. If an assessee has taxable income, assessee cannot take any advantage from second proviso to section 269SS, which states that, if deposit of loan was taken by an agriculturist from an agriculturist and neither of them have any income chargeable to tax, then provisions of section 269SS is not applicable. Levy of penalty was justified. (AY. 2007-08)

ITO v. K. V. George (2013) 36 taxmann.com 548 / (2014) 64 SOT 18 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)

S.269SS : Acceptance of loans and deposits – Mode of taking/accepting Cheque discounting – Discounting of cheque does not amount to acceptance of deposit or loan within meaning of s. 269SS or s.269T. [S.269T, 271D]

2407

Assessee was engaged in cheque discounting business. In the course of his business, he discounted post-dated crossed cheques of farmers who received those cheques from traders on sale of their produce. Transactions in question would not amount to loan or deposit in hands of assessee and, therefore, provisions of S. 269SS were not applicable and no penalty could be levied u/s. 271D. (AY. 2006-07)

ITO v. Dineshchandra Shantilal Shah (HUF) (2014) 149 ITD 79 (Ahd)(Trib.)

2408

S.269SS : Acceptance of loans and deposits – Otherwise than by account payee cheque or account payee bank draft – Limitation – Journal entries – Penalty cannot be levied if the transactions are *bona fide* & genuine – The time limit for penalty u/s. 271D & 271E is governed by s. 275(1)(c) & not 275(1)(a). [S.129, 269T, 271D, 271E, 273B, 275(1)(c), 275(1)(a)]

The AO passed an assessment order dated 5.12.2011 in which he took the view that the act of the assessee of accepting and repaying loans and advances by way of journal entries was in contravention of sections 269SS & 269T of the Act as the said transactions were “not by way of account-payee cheque or demand draft”. The Addl. CIT thereafter passed a penalty order dated 28.9.2012 by which he levied penalty u/s. 271D and 271E for contravention of sections 269SS & 269T. Before the Tribunal the assessee argued (i) that the said penalty order was beyond the limitation period set out in section 271(1)(c) and (ii) that the passing of journal entries did not attract the prohibition in sections 269SS & 269T. HELD by the Tribunal allowing the appeal:

(i) The time limit in s. 275(1)(a) covers those cases where the penalty proceedings are in respect of a default related to principal assessment for a particular assessment year and the penalty proceedings are required to be initiated in the course of that proceedings only. The time limit in s. 275(1)(c) applies to case where the penalty proceedings are independent and not directly linked to the assessment proceedings. The time limit for penalty u/s 271D/ 271E for contravention of sections 269SS & 269T falls under section 275(1)(c) (ii) The acceptance and repayment of loans vide journal entries attracts sections 269SS & 269T as held in *Triumph International* 345 ITR 370 (Bom.). However, in that case penalty u/s. 271E was deleted on the basis that there was “reasonable cause” u/s. 273B as the transactions were bona fide and genuine and did not involve unaccounted money. On facts, there is no finding by the AO that the transactions constitute unaccounted money or that they are not bona fide or not genuine. The assessee’s explanation for the journal entries, viz that they are alternate mode of raising funds, assignment of receivables, squaring up transactions, operational efficiencies/MIS purpose, consolidation of family member debts, correction of errors, etc are commercial in nature and not non-business. Also, what is the point in issuing hundreds of account payee cheques / account payee bank drafts between sister concerns of the group, when transactions can be accounted in books using journal entries, which is also an accepted mode of accounting? Journal entries should enjoy equal immunity on par with account payee cheques or bank drafts provided the transactions are for business purposes and do not involve unaccounted money and are genuine. In fact, such journal entries shall save large number of cheque books for the banks. There is consequently reasonable cause to delete the penalty. (AY. 2009-10)

Lodha Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT(2014) 106 DTR 226 / 163 TTJ 778 / 34 ITR 157(Mum.) (Trib)

Aadinath Builder (P) Ltd v. ACIT(2014) 106 DTR 226 /163 TTJ 778(Mum.)(Trib.)

Aasthavinayak Real Estate (P) Ltd. v. ACIT(2014) 106 DTR 226 / 163 TTJ 778 (Mum.)(Trib)

Ajitnath Hi-Tech Builders (P) Ltd. v. ACIT(2014) 106 DTR 226 / 163 TTJ 778 (Mum.)(Trib)

Lodha Crown Buildment (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 106 DTR 226 /163 TTJ 778(Mum.)(Trib)

Lodha Properties Development (P) Ltd. (2014) 106 DTR 226 / 163 TTJ 778(Mum.)(Trib)

Section 269UD : Order by appropriate authority for purchase by Central Government of immovable property

S.269UD : Purchase by Central Government of immovable properties – Order – No effort was made even to *prima facie* determine the fair market value – Action of compulsory action was held to be vitiated and bad in law.

2409

Petitioner entered into an agreement for transfer of its leasehold rights in a piece of land in their favour. Appropriate authority placing reliance upon sale instance of another property took the view that sale consideration disclosed by the assessee was understated hence passed the order under Chapter XXC of the Act. The assessee challenged the said order. Allowing the petition the Court observed that it was noted from records that before passing the order appropriate authority had not even determined fair market value of property. Further, property under consideration was an open land situated outside limits of Municipal Corporation where as comparable sale instance property was a constructed premises on first floor of a building which was situated within area of Municipal Corporation. The Court held that no effort was made even to *prima facie* determine the fair market value Action of compulsory action was held to be vitiated and bad in law.

Indraprastha Premises (P) Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 225 Taxmann 206 (Mag.)(Bom.)(HC)

Section 271AAA : Penalty where search has been initiated

S.271AAA : Penalty – Search initiated on or after 1st June, 2007 – Neither in the assessment order nor in the order imposing penalty there was discussion – Matter remanded. [S.132(4), (264)]

2410

Assessee had not filed regular return for the year under assessment. Search & seizure Operation was conducted on 6-2-2009 itself i.e. during the continuance of the AY concerned. In its statement u/s. 132(4), the assessee submitted that the estimated tentative income on assumptive basis would be around 35 crores, but offered tax to an aggregate sum of ₹ 60 crores. He also claimed to have specified the manner in which such income was derived and adduced documents to substantiate manner in which undisclosed income was derived. Accordingly the AO levied penalty u/s. 271AAA. On revision Commissioner dismissed the petition and confirmed penalty by observing that above conduct shows that assessee has not acted in bona fides manner in filing initial return with lesser income, hence is liable for penal proceedings. In revision proceedings, CIT affirmed CIT's order without looking into these facts whether conditions u/s. 271AAA(2) of the Act was complied. There was no discussion with respect to section 271AAA in the entire assessment order. The court held that CIT and the AO respectively have not looked into this aspect of the matter, therefore the matter was remanded to the AO. The court referred the judgment of *Apex Court in Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd, 2010 JT 26 para 68*. Clarity of thoughts leads to clarity of vision and therefore, proper reasoning is foundation of a just and fair decision". (AY. 2009-10)

Crossings Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 99 DTR 436 /267 CTR 519 (All.)(HC)

- 2411 **S.271AAA : Penalty – Search initiated on or after 1st June, 2007 – Failure to specify the manner in which undisclosed income had been derived, penalty cannot be levied in the absence of query by the authorised officer during course of statement under section 132(4). [S.132(4), 271(1)(c), Explanation 5]**

On basis of certain documents found and seized during search at his premises, assessee surrendered certain amount as undisclosed income and also paid tax due thereon. In statement u/s. 132(4), assessee stated income was derived from forward/speculative and property transactions carried out in F.Y. 2009-2010. Being not satisfied with assessee's explanation, AO imposed penalty. The Tribunal held that when authorized officer had not raised any query during course of recording of statement under section 132(4) about manner in which undisclosed income had been derived and about its substantiation. AO was not justified in imposing penalty under section 271AAA, specifically when offered undisclosed income had been accepted and taxes due thereon had been paid by assessee. (AY. 2010-11)

Neerat Singal v. ACIT (2013) 161 TTJ 483 / 101 DTR 238 / (2014) 146 ITD 152 (Delhi) (Trib.)

Section 271(1)(c) : Concealment of income

- 2412 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment Survey – Revised return – When the assessee has given some reasonable explanation, it is incumbent on the part of the authority to consider the same on its own merits before proceeding further. This exercise was not done in this case and the matter was remanded back to the AO. [Ss.133A 148, Explanation 1]**

The assessee filed Return of Income. Survey was conducted in the premises of the assessee and a statement was recorded with regard to the fixed deposit made by the assessee. The assessee disclosed certain income of ₹ 20 lakhs as receipt from family partition. The AO issued notice u/s. 148 and in response to the notices issued, assessee filed revised return of income. The assessments for all the Assessment year were completed and revised returns filed by the assessee were accepted by the AO without any addition. But the AO initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) for concealment of income. The AO passed penalty order and held that the assessee had filed the revised return only after the survey was conducted u/s. 133A of the Act. But for the survey, the assessee would have disclosed the unexplained investment. CIT(A) dismissed appeal of assessee. Tribunal further upheld CIT(A)'s order. On appeal in HC, HC set aside the appeal with a remand and held that reasonable explanation was offered by the assessee as to the fixed deposit prior to 31st March, 2001 and the renewal of the fixed deposit with interest. He claimed it primarily as family income out of partition and agricultural income. Before an opportunity could be given to him to explain, he died. Legal Representative made an attempt to convince the authorities but was not successful. When the assessee has given some reasonable explanation, it is incumbent on the part of the authority to consider the same on its own merits before proceeding further. This exercise was not done in this case and the matter was remanded back to the AO. (AY. 2002-03, 2008-09)

N. R. Palanivel by L. H. P. Kailasam v. CIT (2014) 112 DTR 375 / (2015) 273 CTR 224/ 232 Taxmann 478 (Mad.) (HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Assessee making wrong claim to depreciation knowing true nature of transaction – Tribunal rejecting claim and issue attaining finality – Explanation by assessee for claiming depreciation neither *bona fide* nor substantiated – Penalty justified. [S.32]

Held, dismissing the appeal in limine, that all the three authorities in unison had come to the conclusion that the intention of the assessee was to evade tax. The Tribunal, while sustaining the disallowance of depreciation, specifically came to the conclusion that there was a colourable device between two interconnected companies. Despite adequate opportunity having been granted to the assessee by the Assessing Officer, the assessee simply wanted to defer the matter knowing fully well that the penalty proceedings would get time barred by the end of December, 2005. Therefore, the onus and the burden, which lay heavily on the assessee to place adequate material to controvert, as penalty being distinct and separate, was not availed of by the assessee. The burden which shifted on the assessee was not discharged. Even before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, no specific point was raised except that the Assessing Officer was not right in treating the transaction as a measure of tax evasion or that the conclusion of the Assessing Officer was based on suspicion and surmises and that the Tribunal had also decided the matter on the basis of suspicion and surmises. The Tribunal had sustained the penalty as no new fact or material was brought by the assessee even before the Tribunal to come to a different conclusion. Before the Tribunal, one additional fact was mentioned that “the claim was made on account of mistake on the part of the auditor and because of the mistake of the auditor, the assessee ought not to have been penalised”. However, the assessee had not been able to substantiate how there was a mistake on the part of the auditor and there was no affidavit or explanation of the auditor that a mistake was committed by the auditor in giving advice in the manner the depreciation was claimed. The finding of the Tribunal was based on facts that there was no explanation on record to suggest that the claim of depreciation made by the assessee was *bona fide*. There is a difference between a wrong claim and a false claim. If there is a wrong claim on the basis of a *bona fide* opinion, penalty perhaps is not imposable. If the claim is debatable as per the decision of different appellate authorities, then also penalty is not leviable. However, if the claim is false then penalty is definitely leviable. Therefore, the penalty leviable upon the assessee was justified. (AY. 1994-95, 1997-98)

Punsumi Engineers Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 150 / 110 DTR 231 / (2015) 273 CTR 76 / 231 Taxmann 800 (Raj.)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty-Concealment – Gold discovered during search – Presumption of concealment – Exceptions – Assessee has time to file return for relevant assessment year – No finding that acquisition of seized gold was during any earlier assessment year – Assessee makes statement under section 132(4) – Value of seized gold treated as income of assessee and tax paid thereon-Penalty not leviable. [S.132(4) S.271(1), Explanation-5, cl. (2).

The assessee was undertaking business in bullion and jewellery. On June 26, 1985, initially a survey was conducted in the business premises of the assessee. That, in turn, was converted into a search under section 132. It was found that 36 kgs. of silver and 8 kgs. of gold were not accounted for in the books. In the course of proceedings

thereunder, the explanation offered by the assessee in respect of 36 kgs. of silver was accepted. However, the explanation offered in respect of gold, as to failure to enter it in the stock books was not accepted. The Assessing Officer, for the assessment year 1986-87, treated the value of the gold as undisclosed income under section 69A and the corresponding tax was levied. The Commissioner (Appeals) granted some relief, but the relief was nullified in the further appeal preferred by the Department. The Assessing Officer initiated proceedings under section 271(1)(c) and levied penalty to the extent of 200 per cent. of the value of the seized gold. The Commissioner (Appeals) reduced the penalty to 100 per cent. This was confirmed by the Tribunal. On appeal :

Held, allowing the appeal, that sub-clause (b) of Explanation 5 to section 271(1) covers a situation where the assessee had still time to file the return, wherein it could have disclosed the income or other particulars that came to be noticed in the search. The case of the assessee fell into sub-clause (b). The reason was that by the time the search was undertaken, the assessee had time to file returns, and as a matter of fact, the returns were filed on September 30, 1986, wherein the income through which the seized gold was acquired was also disclosed. The search was made on June 26, 1985, and the returns were filed within time, on September 30, 1986. There was no finding at any stage of the proceedings that the acquisition of the seized gold was during any earlier assessment year. Therefore, the first condition could be deemed to have been complied with by the assessee. So far as the second condition was concerned, a statement was recorded from the assessee under section 132(4). As a matter of fact, the Assessing Officer made a specific reference to that statement. However, he took the view that the explanation offered by the assessee was not satisfactory. What is required in the context of clause (2) of Explanation 5 to section 271(1) is making of a statement by the assessee and not the acceptability or otherwise of it. Since the assessee made the statement, the condition was complied with. The record clearly disclosed that the value of the seized gold was treated as income of the assessee and it paid tax thereon. With this, the case fit into clause (2) of Explanation 5, which in turn, would bring about immunity to the assessee vis-a-vis section 271(1). The Tribunal proceeded on hyper-technicalities and acted as though every seizure must entail initiation of proceedings under section 271(1). Such an approach could not be countenanced. The case of the assessee was covered by clause (2) of Explanation 5 to section 271(1). Thus, the assessee was entitled to the immunity under clause (2) of Explanation 5 to section 271(1). (AY. 1986-87)

L. Giridharlal and Co. v. ITO (2014) 369 ITR 377 / 111 DTR 69 / (2015) 273 CTR 526 (T&AP)(HC)

2415 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Book profit – Long-term capital gains included with effect from 1-4-2007 – Non-inclusion of long-term capital gains because of *bona fide* belief that it was not includible – No concealment of income – Penalty could not be imposed. [S.10(38), 45, 115]B]**

Penalty was imposed under section 271(1)(c) of the Act, on the assessee because it had computed its tax liability without including long-term capital gains. The CIT(A) deleted the penalty and this was upheld by the Tribunal. On appeal to the High Court:

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the Tribunal had found that the assessee was under a *bona fide* belief unaware of the amendment whereby a proviso was inserted, and the long-term capital gains on the shares were not taken into consideration while

determining the book profits under section 115JB. It was not disputed that by the Finance Act, 2006, a proviso was inserted in section 10(38) of the Act with effect from April 1, 2007, and prior to the insertion of the proviso under section 10(38) of the Act, long-term capital gains on shares were not required to be included while determining the book profits under section 115JB. The deletion of penalty was justified. (AY. 2007-2008)

CIT v. Stock Home India Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 250/(2015) 275 CTR 229 (P&H) (HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Notice issued for inaccurate details with regard to non-furnishing of correct address of farmers in relation to advance taken from them – Tribunal deleting penalty in relation to that amount – Penalty only confined to furnishing of inaccurate particulars and not to concealment of income – Penalty for unexplained deposit not sustainable.

2416

Held, dismissing the appeal, that in view of the penalty notice, the inaccurate details were with regard to non-furnishing of the correct address of the farmers, which was in relation to the advance taken from the farmers. Since the penalty notice was only confined to the furnishing of inaccurate particulars and was not with regard to concealment of income, penalty could not be imposed for the unexplained deposits in the bank. The Tribunal was justified in deleting this penalty. (AY. 2003-04)

CIT v. Sewak Ice and Cold Storage P. Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 316 (All.)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Charitable purpose – Voluntary donations – Trust under *bona fide* belief treating entire amount as corpus donation – Commissioner (Appeals) accepting contention of trust as to part of donations and considering remaining amount as income – Tribunal justified in cancelling penalty. [S.11(1)(d)]

2417

On appeal, held, dismissing the appeal, that the Tribunal had rightly observed that the assessee was under the *bona fide* belief that the amount of ₹ 1,08,80,765 received by it from different donors could be treated as corpus donations. Even the Commissioner (Appeals) granted partial relief and accepted the contention of the assessee to the extent of ₹ 60,25,000. The Tribunal had rightly cancelled the penalty imposed on the assessee under section 271(1)(c). (AY. 2007-08)

CIT v. Oshwal Education Trust (2014) 369 ITR 91 (Guj.) (HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Disallowance of depreciation – Not challenging – Levy of penalty was not justified.

2418

Assessee constituted as an autonomous body by State. Possession over property vested to assessee. Assessee claimed depreciation in respect of properties not transferred in its name. Assessee has not challenged the disallowance of depreciation. All facts and details of assets available before AO, therefore no concealment of income. Levy of penalty not justified. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Jawahar Kala Kendra (2014) 369 ITR 132 / (2015) 273 CTR 522 / 229 Taxmann 625 (Raj.)(HC)

2419 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Depreciation and investment allowance – Disputes regarding date of installation of machinery – Disallowance of claim in quantum proceedings – Penalty could not be levied.**

The assessee claimed depreciation and investment allowance in respect of new machinery. The claim was disallowed in quantum proceedings on the ground that the machinery had been installed in the accounting year relating to the next assessment year. Penalty was imposed under section 271(1)(c) of the Act, on the grounds that inaccurate particulars of income had been furnished. The penalty was deleted by the Tribunal. On a reference High Court affirmed the view of Tribunal.

CIT v. Hindustan Hydraulics (2014) 369 ITR 255 (P&H)(HC)

2420 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Seizure of gold and cash – Explanation that belong to brother who owned the same – Levy of penalty was held to be not valid.**

Search and seizure of gold and cash from assessee by excise authorities. AO adding value of gold and cash and levying penalty equivalent to that amount rejecting plea that both owned by his brother. AO levied the penalty which was confirmed by Tribunal. On reference the Court held that, the assessee was not maintaining books of account hence there was no occasion to disclose or conceal gold for purpose of income-tax. Value of gold computed as income instead of taking seizure as loss. Non-disclosure thereof cannot be subject matter of levy of penalty, hence not valid. (AY. 1983-84)

Balaji Shivalingam v. CIT (2014) 369 ITR 274/ 51 taxmann.com 119 / (2015) 273 CTR 532 (T&AP)(HC)

2421 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Mere admission of appeal by High Court on quantum addition would not give rise to the presumption that issue is debatable and penalty should be deleted. [S.260A]**

Court held that mere admission by the High Court on quantum addition would not give rise to the presumption that the issue is debatable hence penalty should be deleted. Matter was remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration according to law.

CIT v. Prakash S. Vyas (2014) 272 CTR 353 (2015) 232 taxmann 352 (Guj.)(HC)

2422 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Debatable issue – Surrender of income – No false claim – Claim found to be incorrect – No mens rea – Divergent judicial opinions – Penalty cannot be imposed. [S.8IB, 133A]**

A survey under section 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was carried out in the business premises of the assessee. It surrendered undisclosed income amounting to ₹ 1.20 crores under different heads. The income was included in the profit and loss account and offered to tax. However, the assessee claimed deduction on the entire income under section 80-IB of the Act which included the surrendered income of ₹ 1.20 crores. The assessment was completed disallowing the deduction under section 80-IB of the Act on the surrendered income. Penalty was levied for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal holding that the issue was debatable and the Tribunal dismissed the Department's appeal on the ground that it was not a case where the assessee had made a false claim. On appeal:

Held, dismissing the appeal, that there was no false claim under section 80-IB of the Act, made by the assessee for the assessment year 2002-03 though the claim was found to be incorrect. There was no mens rea on the part of the assessee to claim the deduction and, therefore, the case did not fall under section 271(1)(c) as there were divergent judicial opinions on the claim made by the assessee. (AY. 2002-2003)

CIT v. Tudor Knitting Works P. Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 236 / 270 CTR 327 / 223 Taxmann 131(Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Delay in filing return – Return filed earlier in status of firm changed into status of individual in view of CIT(A) order – Status of assessee debatable till order of CIT(A) – Delay sufficiently explained – No imposition of penalty. [S.271(1)(a)].

2423

The assessee filed returns for the assessment years 1983-84 and 1985-86 in their individual capacity pursuant to the order of the CIT(A) and the AO, after assessing the returns, found that there had been a delay in filing the returns. Penalty was imposed under section 271(1)(a) and (c) of the Act, 1961. The CIT(A) sustained the penalty in some cases but in some of the cases he waived the penalty. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty. On appeals:

Dismissing the appeals, that the Tribunal had found that the delay was sufficiently explained and there was no reason to impose the penalty. Appreciation of facts cannot be substituted by another reasoning. Therefore, there was no reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. (AY. 1983-84, 1985-86)

CIT v. Somanadari Bhupal (2014) 367 ITR 600 / 52 Taxmann.com 91 (AP)(HC)

CIT v. Shalini Bhupal (Smt.) (2014) 367 ITR 600 (AP)(HC)

CIT v. G. Indira K. Reddy (Smt.) (2014) 367 ITR 600 (AP)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Satisfaction – Effect of amendment of section 271(1)(c) w.e.f. 1-4-1989 – Direction for initiation of penalty proceeding in assessment order deemed to constitute satisfaction – Imposition of penalty for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income – Explanation regarding particulars reasonable – Imposition of penalty – Not justified.

2424

On appeal by revenue the High Court held that, the AO would be deemed to have recorded satisfaction that penalty was imposable. However, the assessee had pleaded that the account of BPCL could not be reconciled as it did not supply a copy of the account. It was only after getting a copy of the account from BPCL that the discrepancy in the account was added as income. It was claimed that there was no intentional understatement of income or deliberate furnishing of inaccurate particulars on the part of the assessee. The plea of the assessee was plausible and it could not be held to be without any substance. Thus, under the circumstances, the levy of penalty by the AO and the CIT(A) was not justified. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Shyam Raj Singh (2014) 367 ITR 74/ 52 taxmann.com 63 (P&H)(HC)

- 2425 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Failure to show interest waived by bank as income – Assessee adopting one of several possible interpretations of provision – Penalty not leviable – Debts unilaterally written off by assessee – Failure to reflect sum written off as income – Penalty leviable. [S.41(1)]**
 Court held that mere failure to show interest waived by bank as income. Penalty held to be not leviable. However, debts unilaterally written off by assessee and failure to reflect sum written off as income, penalty was held to be leviable. (AY. 1991-92)
CIT v. Sri Kamakshi Food Products P. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 184/52 taxmann.com 57 (T&AP)(HC)
- 2426 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Denial of depreciation – No suppression or misstatement on part of assessee – Imposition of penalty was held to be not justified. [S.32]**
 Allowing the appeal the Court held that a genuine effort made by the assessee to claim depreciation on the imported machinery, must not result in double disadvantage, namely, denial of depreciation and imposition of penalty. Denial of the benefit itself would be a phenomenal disadvantage to the assessee. Penalty could not be imposed, as a matter of course. The assessee was truthful in submitting its return and making a claim for depreciation on its understanding of the complicated law of income-tax. This was not a case of claim of depreciation on machinery which was not imported at all. If any information was suppressed by the assessee and but for the attentiveness of the Income-tax Officer, it would have escaped taxation, the assessee must certainly be dealt with sternly. Thus, the assessee was not liable for imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c) for claiming depreciation on its plant and machinery. (AY. 1987-88)
Vinod Bhargava v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 122 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 302 (T&AP)(HC)
- 2427 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – concealment – Purchase of property – Undisclosed investments – Estimation of value of land based on price as discovered in an open auction – Matter remanded to CIT(A) to decide independently in accordance with law. [S.69B, 131]**
 On the basis of intimation received from the intelligence wing the AO issued the summons to the assessee. The assessee admitted the under consideration and retracted later on. AO referred the matter to Valuation Office who estimated the land at high value. AO levied the penalty, which was deleted by Tribunal. On appeal by revenue the Court held that, estimation of value of land based on price as discovered in an open auction which is reliable indicator. Retraction of statement on ground unwell at that time is an afterthought. Addition was confirmed, however the penalty was remanded to CIT (A) to decide independently in accordance with law. (AY. 2005-06)
CIT v. Narinder Kr. Budhiraja (2014) 368 ITR 709/(2015) 231 Taxmann 592 (Delhi)(HC)
- 2428 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Excess claim for liquidated damages – Not being bona fide levy of penalty was held to be justified.**
 Assessee claimed more liquidated damages than actually agreed. The Court held that it was a case of furnishing inaccurate particulars attracting the penalty. Order of Tribunal deleting the penalty was set aside. (AY. 2008-09)
CIT v. Global Associates (2014) 366 ITR 499 / 272 CTR 350 (Delhi)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Lease transactions – Depreciation – Deduction wrongly claimed – Furnishing inaccurate particulars of income – All materials were before revenue – Deletion of penalty by Tribunal was held to be justified. [S.32] 2429

The assessee entered into lease transactions. The AO disallowed the claim of depreciation on the ground that the lease transactions were not genuine and levied the penalty. Appellate authorities found that there was no concealment of particulars of income nor furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income, accordingly deleted the penalty. On appeal by revenue dismissing the appeal the Court held that all materials were before the revenue hence deletion of penalty by the Tribunal was held to be justified. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Indusind Bank Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 682/ (2015) 231 Taxmann 690 (Bom.)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Incorrect information about date of acquisition of property – Levy of penalty was justified. [S.48] 2430

Where assessee gave incorrect information about date of acquisition and cost of acquisition of a property sold during relevant year, it was sufficient to raise an inference that assessee intended to evade tax liability on capital gain and, therefore, impugned penalty order passed by Tribunal was to be upheld.

Anish Kumar v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 203 (Mag.) (P&H)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Interest – Accounting standard – Bona fide explanation – Deletion of penalty was held to be justified. [S.28(i)] 2431

Assessee earned interest on KFW grants received from Germany. Contention of assessee was that interest should not be included and shown in profit and loss account as this was contrary to Accounting Standard No. 1 issued by ICAI, in paragraph 3 of Schedule 'U', commercial audit report, specific statement to said effect was made. Tribunal had gone into explanation given by assessee and found nature and type of accounting change in accord with and as per Accounting Standard 1. Further it was found that full and true disclosure of facts were made by assessee. Since assessee proceeded in bonafidely manner, deletion of penalty would be justified (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Housing & Urban Development Corpn. Ltd. (2014) 225 Taxmann 203 (Mag.) (Delhi) (HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Appellate Tribunal – Additional ground – Amalgamation of companies – Levy of penalty on transferor company – Additional ground raised before Tribunal with evidence contesting levy of penalty on non-existing entity – Impact and legal effect of a order of amalgamation and winding up of assessee on penalty proceedings pure legal issue – Tribunal ought not to have remitted legal issue to Assessing Officer – Tribunal directed to decide legal issue. [S.254(1)] 2432

Court held that the Tribunal should have answered the legal issue itself. The Tribunal was not prevented in any manner and in law from considering a purely legal issue for the first time, especially, if this legal issue went to the root of the matter. The issue was of the impact and legal effect of an order of amalgamation and winding up of the assessee on the penalty proceedings. If the proceedings were initiated prior to the order of the winding up being passed or the scheme of amalgamation being sanctioned

then whether the subsequent act of an order sanctioning the scheme would permit continuation of the proceedings against an entity or a company which was wound up and in terms of the provisions contained in the Act was, thus, a clear legal issue. It should have been answered by the Tribunal, particularly when it had admitted the question or ground and the additional evidence filed by the assessee. The only two documents which required to be looked into were the scheme of amalgamation and the order passed in pursuance thereof by the court. The Tribunal was obliged to answer the legal question. Its omission to answer it, therefore, was vitiated in law. The direction to remit and to remand it to the Assessing Officer was not justified and in the peculiar facts and circumstances. The Tribunal was directed to decide the legal issue. (AY. 2004-2005)

Kansai Nerolac Paints Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 632 / (2015) 117 DTR 94 (Bom.) (HC)

2433 S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Penalty on basis of addition made to assessee's income u/s. 69A – Addition had been deleted by Tribunal in quantum appeal – Penalty was also liable to be quashed. [S.69A]

A search proceeding was carried out at premises of 'A' in course of which two cheques issued in name of assessee were recovered. It was undisputed that there was a sale agreement of property executed between 'A' and assessee. The AO took a view that assessee having received sale consideration in cash and returned those cheques to 'A'. He thereafter, passed a penalty order u/s. 271(1)(c). The Tribunal deleted the addition. relying on the said order of quantum appeal, the Tribunal set aside penalty order as well. The revenue took a stand that it did not file an appeal against the Tribunal's order due to low tax effect, however, it could not substantiate the said stand. Even otherwise, there was not infirmity in Tribunal's order deleting addition in quantum appeal. In view of the above, Tribunal was justified in setting aside penalty order relying upon its decision in quantum proceedings. (AY. 2008-09)

CIT v. Babul Harivadan Parikh (2014) 222 Taxmann 159 (Guj.)(HC)

2434 S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Assessee acted bonafidely – All relevant details disclosed – There were divergent views available – Penalty deleted

Assessee claimed a net loss on account of derivative trading and the said loss was set-off with business and other sources of income. During assessment, AO treated the loss as speculative loss and consequently speculative loss which was debited under normal business income was disallowed by the AO. Thereby, AO imposed penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act by observing that assessee deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of his taxable income by treating speculation loss on derivatives transaction as business loss to evade tax. High Court held that CIT(A) and Tribunal have not committed any error in deleting the penalty imposed under section 271(1)(c) as it was a *bona fide* claim on the part of assessee. Since all relevant particulars in respect of loss were correct and law in respect of said item was not very clear because there were divergent views of various Tribunal at relevant time on said point. (AY. 2005-06)

CIT v. Navinchandra & Co. (2014) 222 Taxmann 156 (Guj.)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Sale and lease back – Depreciation – Levy of penalty was not justified. [S.32, 43(1)]

2435

Dismissing the appeal of revenue the court held that in penalty order the Assessing Officer had not given any independent finding in support of his conclusion that there was a deliberate design on the part of the assessee to inflate the cost of acquisition. All the details of the transactions were placed before the Assessing Officer and an explanation was given as to why the market value of the property need not be equivalent to the written down value. The Assessing Officer, while completing the assessment proceedings, chose to adopt the written down value. However, that by itself would not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars with a view to conceal the actual income. The deletion of penalty was justified. (AY. 1996-97)

CIT v. Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Co. Ltd. (2014) 364 ITR 680 / 227 Taxmann 18 (Mag) (Mad.)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Revised return – Income from Hindu undivided family was not disclosed in original return – Income disclosed after detection in the course of assessment – Levy of penalty was held to be justified.

2436

The assessee filed his return in the declaration made in the return filed at the time of filing the return, the assessee categorically mentioned that since the Hindu undivided family had been abolished in the State of Kerala with effect from December 1975, the income of the Hindu undivided family in the hands of the assessee was also included in the return of income. When the matter came up for scrutiny, it was noticed that the declaration made by the assessee while filing the return was incorrect and he had made a false statement that he had disclosed the income of the Hindu undivided family as personal income. Factually, only a small portion of the income of the Hindu undivided family was declared leaving out a major portion of the income of the Hindu undivided family. Ultimately, in response to the scrutiny notice, a revised return was filed making additional income. Penalty was levied but the Tribunal deleted it. On appeal to the High Court.

Held, allowing the appeal, that there was no honest and *bona fide* disclosure made by the assessee at the time of filing the original return. On the other hand, but for the scrutiny taken up by the Department, the additional income from the Hindu undivided family would have gone unnoticed and it would have escaped from computation of tax. The criterion was not the contents of letter voluntarily disclosing the income of the Hindu undivided family written by the assessee to the Assistant Commissioner nor the revised return filed in response to the scrutiny notice. The criterion was the categorical declaration made by the assessee at the time of submission of original return. Penalty was imposable. (AY. 1996-97)

CIT v. L. Vishnudas (2014) 364 ITR 642 / 271 CTR 100 (Ker.)(HC)

2437 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Interest claimed knowingly on wrong basis – Levy of penalty was held to be justified.**

Deduction on account of interest claimed knowingly on wrong basis. Furnishing inaccurate particulars to avoid liability to pay tax on that basis. No evidence that inaccurate particulars furnished accidentally or by mistake. Levy of penalty was held to be justified. Penalty was reduced to 50%. (AY. 2007-08)

Gourav Goenka v. ACIT (2014) 364 ITR 186/ 271 CTR 183 (Cal.)(HC)

2438 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Wrong entries penalty not leviable, however failure to disclose amount received on account of refundable empty bottle deposit either in profit and loss account or in balance-sheet, levy of penalty was justified. [S.132]**

Court held that for wrong entries penalty was not leviable, however failure to show the refundable empty bottle deposits by not disclosing the such receipts either in the profit and loss account or balance sheet, levy of penalty was held to be justified, especially when the assessee itself for the assessment years 1981-82 and 1983-84 had treated such deposit as a trading receipt. (AY. 1982-83)

Kuldeep Wines v. CIT (Appeals) (2014) 364 ITR 195 (AP)(HC)

Editorial: SLP of assessee is dismissed. SLA (C) No. 22377 of 2014 dated 29-8-2014)
Kuldeep Wines v. CIT (2015) 228 Taxmann 64 (SC)

2439 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Survey – Where a penalty notice had been issued not in the course of survey proceedings, but after their closure, the assessee could not be prosecuted for concealment of income. [S.133A]**

A survey under section 133A was conducted at the business premises of the assessee. During the survey, the assessee failed to produce regular books of account. The AO after taking into consideration all the impounded material indicating concealment of income, made an addition in income and imposed penalty and demand notices were issued accordingly. The CIT(A) confirmed the levy of penalty. On appeal, the Tribunal quashed the penalty on the ground that the penalty notice was issued not in the course of survey proceeding but after its closure. Thus, there was a jurisdictional defect in assumption of jurisdiction for levy of penalty, which could not be cured. Revenue's appeal before the HC was dismissed.

On petition by the assessee before the HC for dropping criminal prosecution charges, the HC observed that admittedly, the order of the Tribunal quashing penalty proceedings has become final. Since the penalty notice has been set aside, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted for concealment of income. (AY. 1993-94)

Prem Tailor v. ITO (2014) 223 Taxmann 132 (Mag.)(P&H)(HC)

2440 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Voluntary offer of income – Failure to explain the source – Levy of penalty was not justified.**

There was cash deposits in the bank of the assessee, when confronted with this the assessee offered the amount to buy peace. AO levied the penalty, which was confirmed by Tribunal. On appeal High Court deleted the penalty. Ratio of *CIT v. MAK Data Ltd. 358 ITR 593(SC)* explained.

Jai Palace v. CIT (2014) 51 taxmann.com 462 (All.)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – In the absence of a clear-cut finding by the AO as to whether it is a case of ‘concealment’ or ‘furnishing inaccurate particulars’, penalty cannot be levied.

2441

It is incumbent upon the AO to come to a positive finding as to whether there was concealment of income by the assessee or whether any inaccurate particulars of such income have been furnished by the assessee. In the absence of a clear-cut finding reached by the AO, and, on that ground alone, the order of penalty passed by the AO is liable to be struck down (AY. 1992-93)

Mitsu Industries Ltd. v. DCIT(2014) 112 DTR 273(Guj.)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Non-offering of stamp duty / DVO value as consideration for capital gains does not attract penalty if facts are on record. [S.50C]

2442

The assessee was the owner of office premises which were sold in AY. 2004-05 for ₹ 2 crore. The AO noted that the stamp duty valuation of the property was ₹ 3,72,42,000 and that the DVO had valued the property at ₹ 2,70,03,920. The value adopted by the DVO was taken as the consideration for sale of the property u/s. 50C and capital gains was assessed on that basis. The assessee accepted the same. The AO levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. This was upheld by the CIT(A) though deleted by the Tribunal. Before the High Court, the department relied on *Chuharmal v. CIT (1988) 172 ITR 250 (SC)* and argued that even though s. 50C created a liability for deemed income, still penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) could be levied. HELD by the High Court dismissing the appeal:

The Tribunal finding that the case was not one of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income or of concealment inasmuch as there was a registered sale deed and the consideration was mentioned therein cannot be faulted. Also, the DVO determined the value at a figure from that of the stamp value. The larger question posed for consideration as to whether s. 271(1)(c) penalty can apply to deemed income is left open for consideration in an appropriate case.

CIT v. Fortune Hotels and Estates Pvt. Ltd. (Bom.)(HC) www.itatonline.org

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Accrual of income. The word “conceal” inherently and per se refers to an element of mens rea, albeit the expression “furnishing of inaccurate particulars” is much wider in scope – Penalty should not be imposed if the contention of the assessee was plausible and *bona fide*. Of course full facts should be disclosed. While applying the test of *bona fide*, we have to also keep in mind that even best of legal minds can have difference of opinion. It is not uncommon to have dissenting opinion on the question of law, in the courts.

2443

The word “conceal” inherently and per se refers to an element of mens rea, albeit the expression “furnishing of inaccurate particulars” is much wider in scope. The word “conceal” implies intention to hide an item of income or a portion thereof. It amounts to suppression of truth or a factum so as to cause injury to the other. (See *CIT v. A. Subramania Pillai [1997] 226 ITR 403 (Mad)*). The word ‘conceal’ means to hide or to keep secret. As held in Law Lexicon, the said word is derived from the latin word ‘concelare’ which implies ‘con’ & ‘celare’ to hide. It means to hide or withdraw from observation; to cover or keep from sight; to prevent discovery of; to withhold knowledge

of. The word ‘inaccurate’ in Webster’s Dictionary has been defined as ‘not accurate; not exact or correct; not according to truth; erroneous; as inaccurate statement, copy or transcript’. The word ‘particular’ means detail or details of a claim or separate items of an account [see *Commissioner of Income Tax v. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd.* [2010] 322 ITR 158(SC)]. Thus the words “furnished inaccurate particulars” is broader and would refer to inaccuracy which would cause under-declaration or escapement of income. It may refer to particulars which should have been furnished or were required to be furnished or recorded in the books of accounts etc. [See *CIT v. Raj Trading Co.* (1996) 217 ITR 208 (Raj.)] Inaccuracy or wrong furnishing of income would be covered by the said expression, though there are decision that *ad hoc* addition per se without other or corroborating circumstances may not reflect “furnished inaccurate particulars”. Lastly, at times and it is fairly common, the charge of concealment and “furnishing of inaccurate particulars” may overlap.

Primary issue which arises for consideration is whether the conduct of the assessee was bonafide. We have used very strong words like erroneous, fallacious, untenable etc. with reference to various contentions and submissions made by the assessee in the quantum appeal, but we do not think we will be contradicting ourselves when we hold that the conduct of the assessee was bonafide and the onus to show and establish bonafides has been discharged. The observations and adjectives used by us in the quantum appeal rejecting the submission of the assessee have been made after having advantage and benefit of the assessment order, appellate orders and hearing arguments of the counsel for the appellant assessee and the Revenue. Hindsight results in greater clarity and wisdom. Test of bona fide has to be applied keeping in mind the position as it existed, when the return of income was filed. The Act, i.e. the Income Tax Act, is a complex legislation involving intricate and often debatable legal positions. The legal issue involved may relate to principles of accountancy. Invariably, on questions of interpretation, the assessee do adopt a legal position which they perceived as most beneficial or suitable. This would not be construed as lack of bona fides as long as the legal position so adopted is not per se contrary to the language of the statute or an undebatable legal position not capable of a different connotation and understanding. When two legal interpretations were plausible and there was a genuine or credible plea, penalty for concealment/furnishing of inaccurate particulars, should not and cannot be imposed. If the view taken by the assessee required consideration and was reasonably arguable, he should not be penalized for taking the position. The tax statutes are convoluted and complex and there can be manifold opinions on interpretation and understanding of a provision or the tax treatment. In such cases, even when the interpretation placed by the Revenue is accepted, penalty should not be imposed if the contention of the assessee was plausible and bona fide. Of course full facts should be disclosed. While applying the test of bonafide, we have to also keep in mind that even best of legal minds can have difference of opinion. It is no

t uncommon to have dissenting opinion on the question of law, in the courts.

New Holland Tractors (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2015) 228 Taxmann 66 / 115 DTR 32 / 275 CTR 291 (Delhi)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Search and direction for special audit – Discrepancies in accounts found by special auditor – No explanation regarding discrepancies – Assessment on basis of estimate – Reduction of estimate not relevant – Income concealed by assessee – Imposition of penalty was held to be justified. [S.142(2A)]

2444

Held, allowing the appeal, that the number of discrepancies and irregularities listed by the special auditor in his report which were reproduced in the assessment order bore testimony to the fact that the books of account maintained by the assessee were wholly unreliable. The Assessing Officer gave due opportunity to the assessee to explain the discrepancies and also to show why the profit rate of 11 per cent. could not be adopted but these opportunities were not availed of by the assessee. He also had recorded in the assessment order that the assessee was permitted to inspect the seized documents and was given photocopies of the desired documents. This was not denied by the assessee. In these circumstances, the mere fact that the estimate was reduced by the Tribunal to 8 per cent. would in no way take away the guilt of the assessee or explain its failure to prove that the failure to return the correct income did not arise from any fraud or any gross or wilful neglect on its part. The imposition of penalty was justified. (AY. 1995-96) *CIT v. Kalindi Rail Nirman Engg. Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 304 /269 CTR 304 (Delhi) (HC)*

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Set off and carry forward of loss of earlier years – Belated filing of return – No penalty is leviable. [S.72, 139(1), 139(4)]

2445

The assessee claimed setoff and carry forward of loss of earlier years which was disputed by the revenue that assessee ought not to have claimed set off of loss carried forward of the AY: 1998-99 despite the assessee being informed by the revenue wherein it was clearly informed that he was not entitled to carry forward the business loss since the return of income for the ay; 1998-99 was filed belatedly, was not sustainable. The revenue levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the act for the concealment & filing inaccurate particulars of income. Dismissing the penalty court held that assessee claimed setoff of the loss carried forward of the AY. 1998-99. Merely because the assessee claimed set off of the loss carried forward would not mean that there was concealment of income as alleged or such claim would amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars. As a matter of fact, the particulars that were furnished were based on the facts of loss. It was not in dispute that the assessee did not suffer loss or the loss shown in the return for AY. 1998-99 was not suffered by the assessee. That being so, claiming set off of the loss carried forward of the AY. 1998-99 would not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. That being so, claiming set off of the loss carried forward of the AY. 1998-99 would not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars of Income. That would amount to furnishing incorrect return of income. Court further held that assessee who is otherwise not entitled to claim set off of the loss carried forward of the AY. 1998-99 would not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. Court further held that assessee who is otherwise not entitled to claim set off of the loss carried forward of the business should avoid making such claim. But such claim would not attract levy of penalty. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. Makino Asia (P) Ltd. (2013) 95 DTR 9 / (2014) 264 CTR 172 (Karn.) (HC)

- 2446 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Revised return – Long term capital gains on sale of agricultural land – Levy of penalty was held to be not justified. [S.45, 148]**
 Assessee filed original return of income. On receiving 148 notice, revised return of income was filed by the assessee which was accepted by the AO. Penalty proceeding was initiated against assessee considering it as a deliberate concealment of Income. CIT(A) cancelled penalty. On an appeal in Tribunal, Tribunal upheld CIT(A)'s order. On further appeal in HC, HC held that CIT(A) & Tribunal both have considered the matter in detail and finally arrived at conclusion that the income declared by the assessee from the Long Term Capital Gain by selling agricultural land, was disclosed by the assessee in his return of Income filed u/s. 148 which was accepted by the assessing authority and there was no material available on record by which there could be inference drawn by the authority that it was a deliberate concealment on the part of assessee and it could not be considered that there was inaccurate particulars of Income that was made the basis for inflicting penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of Act. (AY. 2004-05)
CIT v. Puspendra Surana (2014) 264 CTR 204 / 227 Taxmann 151(Mag) (Raj.)(HC)
- 2447 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Merely because the quantum appeal is admitted by High Court penalty does not become unsustainable. [S. 260A]**
 The court held that admission of a tax appeal by the High Court, in many a cases is ex parte and without recording even *prima facie* reasons. Further the admission of a tax appeal by the High Court only indicates that a *prima facie* case has been made out and the court feels that the issue requires further consideration, Mere admission of an appeal by the High Court cannot be an indication that the issue is debatable one so as to delete the penalty under section 271(1)(c), unless there is some indication in the order of admission itself that the issue is a debatable one. (AY. 1995-96)
CIT v. Dharamshi B. Shah (2014) 366 ITR 140 / 112 DTR 277(Guj.)(HC)
- 2448 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Revision – Penalty cannot be levied in the absence of satisfaction recorded by the Commissioner under section 263. [S.263]**
 Commissioner directed the AO to complete the assessment. Commissioner neither recorded the satisfaction about the concealment nor gave any such directions to the AO for initiation of penalty proceedings. Assessment in pursuance to revision initiated the penalty proceedings. Court held that in an assessment pursuant to section 263, the AO cannot levy penalty, in absence of any satisfaction recorded by Commissioner.
CIT v. Padmini Mishra (Delhi)(HC) (Unreported) www.delhihighcourt.nic.in
- 2449 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Recording of satisfaction – There being no specific direction in the AO's order for initiation of penalty proceedings, Tribunal was justified in setting aside the order imposing penalty, more so when there was no finding as to concealment. [S.271(IB)]**
 Assessee made a claim of diminution in value of investment. On scrutiny, when explanation was sought for, said claim was withdrawn. Assessing Authority was not satisfied that there was any concealment. However, at end of assessment order, it was merely written that 'Penalty under section 271(1)(c) be initiated separately'. The AO levied the penalty. Tribunal set aside the order levying penalty. On appeal by the

revenue the Court held that a direction by a statutory authority should be in nature of an order requiring positive compliance and when an option is left open to Income Tax Officer, whether or not to take action, such a writing cannot be described as a direction. In such circumstances penalty under section 271(1)(c) could not be levied, as there was no concealment and, furthermore, no direction for initiation of penalty proceeding could be gathered from assessment order. Mere mention of 'Penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) initiated separately' in assessment order, does not amount to a direction under section 271(1)(c) for levy of penalty. Order of Tribunal cancelling the levy of penalty was upheld. (AY. 2002-03)

CIT v. MWP Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 395 / 264 CTR 502 (Karn.)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Disallowance of claim – Liquidated damages on delay in execution of work – Levy of penalty was not justified. [S.37(1)]

2450

Assessee entered into a contract with a company named HMIL for supply, procurement and erection of automobile assembly equipment. Contract provided for a clause by which HMIL could claim liquidated damages from assessee for delay caused in executing work. Though HMIL did not invoke said provision, assessee took precaution and provided for penalty and, claimed same as deduction in earliest point of time as provision for liquidated damages. assessing Officer disallowed said claim on ground that no such claim was raised against assessee by HMIL. Further, he levied penalty. Tribunal deleted the penalty. On appeal by revenue the Court held that, penalty being a civil liability, requirement of mens rea is not an essential element, but claim of assessee should be *bona fide* and mere submission of inaccurate particulars by itself cannot be held against assessee. On the facts the assessee's claim for deduction could not be stated to be lacking in *bona fides* or with *mala fide* intention and, thus, concealment penalty was not leviable, therefore deletion of penalty by the Tribunal was held to be justified. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Durr India Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 97 DTR 160(Mad.)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Addition on account of shortage of stock – Surrender of income – Levy of penalty was held to be not justified. [S.133A]

2451

Addition was made by the AO on shortage of stock. It was the case that the assessee has given reasonable explanation for excess of stock. It was also the case that the assessee had disclosed in the return and also had paid tax on the surrendered income and the AO had accepted the return filed by the assessee in this regards. Both the appellate authorities observed that there was no deliberate or intentional concealment and therefore on this count penalty could not be imposed. On appeal by revenue the court held that it was not a deliberate intention of the assessee and interference with the penalty imposed would arise only if it is found and established that the concealment was deliberate. Once the concurrent findings with regards to excess stock is held not to be a concealment, no question of law arises. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Home De Royal (2014) 97 DTR 374 (MP)(HC)

2452 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Merely disallowance of claim – Levy of penalty was held to be not justified.**

Court held that merely because the assessee raised a claim which was eventually disallowed that did not mean that the ingredients of clause (c) were satisfied or fulfilled so as to justify imposing of a penalty. Such a finding essentially based on the facts and in the circumstances peculiar to the assessee, did not raise any substantial question of law. Court awarded cost of ₹ 1 lakh each on the revenue for filing unwarranted appeals. Followed *CIT v. Reliance Petro products Pvt. Ltd.* (2010) 322 ITR 158 (SC)
CIT v. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. (2014) 366 ITR 502 / 272 CTR 336 (Bom)(HC)

2453 **S. 271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Assessed Income is loss - Priority liable (Finotech 4)**

The Tribunal deleted the penalty on the ground that the assessed income is loss. On appeal by revenue to High Court, penalty was confirmed on the basis that as per Explanation 4(a) to section 271(1)(c) (which was substituted by the Finance Act, 2002, with effect from April 1, 2003) is retrospective in operation as held by decision of *Apex Court in CIT v. Gold Coin Health Food (P) Ltd.* [2008] 304 ITR 308]] penalty is leviable not only in a case where after addition of concealed income, a loss returned, after assessment becomes positive income but also in a case where addition of concealed income reduces the returned loss and finally the assessed income is also a loss or a minus figure. (AY. 1990-91)

CIT v. Balaramakrishna Engineering Contractor Corporation (2013) 356 ITR 524 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 91(Mag.) (AP)(HC)

2454 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Disallowance made on account of curtailment of deduction under section 80-IB, duty drawback and dividend income from foreign companies was offered to tax by assessee voluntarily – No penalty. [S.80IB]**

During assessment, deduction claimed under section 80-IB of the Act was curtailed, duty drawback was disallowed and dividend income from foreign companies was taxed. Thereby Penalty was levied. CIT(Appeals) and Tribunal deleted the penalty on the basis that amounts were offered to tax by the assessee on its own and not after detection on the part of the Assessing Officer. On appeal by revenue to High Court, Tribunal's order was upheld. (AY. 2001-02)

CIT v. Blue Star Ltd. (2013) 357 ITR 669 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 91(Mag.) (Bom.)(HC)

2455 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Mere admission of Appeal by High Court on substantial question of law is sufficient to disbar levy of concealment penalty. [S.260A]**

In quantum proceedings, the Tribunal upheld the addition of three items of income. The assessee filed an appeal to the High Court which was admitted. The AO levied penalty u/s 271(1)(c) in respect of the said three items. The penalty was upheld by the CIT(A). The Tribunal deleted the penalty on the ground that when the High Court admits substantial question of law on an addition, it becomes apparent that the addition is certainly debatable. In such circumstances penalty cannot be levied u/s. 271(1)(c). It held that the admission of substantial question of law by the High Court lends credence to the *bona fides* of the assessee in claiming deduction. It added that once it turns

out that the claim of the assessee could have been considered for deduction as per a person properly instructed in law and is not completely debarred at all, the mere fact of confirmation of disallowance would not *per se* lead to the imposition of penalty. On appeal by the department to the High Court HELD dismissing the appeal:

This Appeal cannot be entertained as it does not raise any substantial question of law. The imposition of penalty was found not to be justified and the Appeal was allowed. As a proof that the penalty was debatable and arguable issue, the Tribunal referred to the order on Assessee's Appeal in Quantum proceedings and the substantial questions of law which have been framed therein. We have also perused that order dated 27.09.2010 admitting Income tax Appeal No. 2368 of 2009. In our view, there was no case made out for imposition of penalty and the same was rightly set aside. (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. Nayan Builders and Developers (2014) 368 ITR 722/ (2015) 231 Taxmann 665 (Bom.)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Failure to file confirmation can not be held to be either concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income – Deletion of penalty by the Tribunal was held to be justified.

2456

Dismissing the appeal of revenue the Court held that the assessee had come with explanation for filing a revised return by deleting the outstanding entries regarding five traders. The reason as noticed by the Tribunal was that the dealers that the dealers belonging to a particular community had left town during riots or otherwise refused to give confirmation letters. The fact that the assessee could not obtain confirmation letters of the outstanding entries from only five traders out of 15 could in no manner be construed that in its return it mentioned inaccurate particulars. Accordingly deletion of penalty by the Tribunal was held to be justified. (AY. 1991-92)

CIT v. Mathura Commercial Co. (2014) 361 ITR 380 / 101 DTR 371 / 226 Taxmann 109 (All)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Non furnishing of confirmations from traders – Levy of penalty was not justified.

2457

Assessee could not obtain confirmation letters from five out of 15 traders as those traders left the town during communal riots or otherwise refused offered; in the absence of a finding that the assessee had failed to prove such explanation was *bona fide*, no penalty could be imposed. As long as there was no finding by the Commissioner (Appeals) that the explanation offered was not a bona fide one, the imposition of penalty for the first time in the appellate proceedings was illegal.

CIT v. Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 160 / 226 Taxmann 109 (Mag) (Karn.)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Lease found bogus – Depreciation – Sale and lease back – Penalty was held to be justified. [S.133A]

2458

Depreciation was claimed on lease. However, the lease was found to be bogus. Hence, penalty was rightly levied. (AY. 1997-98)

CIT v. BPL Sanyo Finance Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 630 / 265 CTR 163 / 95 DTR 257 (Karn.)(HC)

- 2459 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Book profits – Penalty for concealment cannot be levied under normal provisions if the income is assessed on the basis of book profits. [Ss.115], 115JB]**

No doubt, there was concealment but that had its repercussions only when the assessment was done under the normal procedure. The assessment as per the normal procedure was, however, not acted upon. On the contrary, it is the deemed income assessed u/s. 115JB which has become the basis of assessment as it was higher of the two. Tax is thus paid on the income assessed u/s. 115JB. Hence, when the computation was made u/s. 115JB, the concealment had no role to play and was totally irrelevant. Therefore, the concealment did not lead to tax evasion at all and no penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is leviable. (AY. 1998-99)

CIT v. Jindal Polyester & Steel Ltd. (2014) 365 ITR 225 / (2015)232 Taxmann 488 (All.) (HC)

- 2460 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Satisfaction – If, in the assessment order, AO directs initiation of penalty on specific issues but not on others, he is not entitled to levy penalty on the other issues. [S.271(1B)].**

Section 271(1)(c) empowers the AO, where he is satisfied in the course of any proceedings under the Act that the assessee had concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, to direct the payment of penalty. Sub-section (1B) was inserted with retrospective effect from 1-4-1989 to provide that where any amount is added or disallowed in computing the total income or loss of an assessee and the assessment order contains a direction for initiation of penalty proceedings, such an order of assessment shall be deemed to constitute satisfaction of the AO for initiation of penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c). In order that the deeming fiction in sub-section (1B) must apply, two requirements must be fulfilled. The first requirement is that an amount must have been added or disallowed in computing the total income or loss of an assessee in any order of assessment or reassessment. The second is that the order of assessment must contain a direction for the initiation of penalty proceedings under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 271. Where both the conditions as aforesaid are fulfilled, the order of assessment must be deemed to constitute satisfaction of the AO for initiating penalty proceedings. In the present case, it is abundantly clear that in respect of those heads where the AO considered it appropriate to initiate penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c), he made a specific direction to that effect. In respect of the claim of interest on the SDF loan, there is no direction by the AO. The absence of a reference to the initiation of proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) is not an inadvertent omission since it is clear that in respect of several other heads, where the AO did consider it appropriate to initiate penalty proceedings, he made an observation to that effect. In fact, even in the concluding part of his order, the AO issued a direction for initiating penalty notice u/s. 271(1)(c) “as discussed above”. The expression “as discussed above” is material because it refers to those heads in respect of which a specific direction was issued by him for initiating steps u/s. 271(1)(c). *CIT v. Triveni Engineering & Industries Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 660 (All.) (HC)*

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – *Bona fide* claim – Exemption from capital gain – Agricultural land – Deletion of penalty was held to be justified.

2461

The assessee annexed a note to the return claiming exemption from capital gains tax. He pleaded before the AO that the property was situated beyond 8 kms from the municipal limits of Sonapat. After collecting information regarding the distance from various authorities, the AO came to the conclusion that the property was situated within 8 kms of the municipal limits of Sonapat. Consequently, the AO rejected the claim of the assessee and brought the capital gains to tax. He levied penalty. The Tribunal noticed that the assessee had furnished a certificate dated June 19, 1996, from the Sub-Divisional Engineer Maintenance Sub Division, B & R wherein it was specified that the distance from Sonapat Municipal Committee to village Kamaspur, Tehsil and District Sonapat was 8.2 kms. It was also noticed that there were various certificates wherein different distances had been mentioned. After considering the matter, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that there was no intention on the part of the assessee to furnish inaccurate particulars. Held, order of the Tribunal was justified. (AY. 1996-97)

CIT v. Rajiv Bhatara (2013) 263 CTR 707 / (2014) 360 ITR 121 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 205 (P&H)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Disallowance of claim under section 80IA – Quantum was confirmed by Tribunal – Levy of penalty was not justified.

2462

Assessee filed the return of income claiming the deduction under section 80IA. In appeal Tribunal dismissed the claim of assessee in respect of deduction under section 80IA, however the penalty was deleted. On appeal by revenue dismissing the appeal the court held that as the claim was *bona fide*, mere disallowance of claim levy of penalty was not justified. (AY. 1994-95)

CIT v. Petals Engineers (P) Ltd (2014) 223 Taxmann 15(Mag.) / 264 CTR 577 / 97 DTR 251(Bom.)(HC)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Interest levied u/s. 234A, 234B and 234C was claimed as financial expense – Levy of penalty was held to be justified.

2463

The assessee being company claimed interest levied and paid u/s. 234A, 234B and 234C as finance expenses in their return of income filed. The assessing officer disallowed the expenses which were accepted by the assessee. The AO levied Penalty under said section which was argued by assessee as mistake due to ignorance in-as-much as the assessee was managed by technocrats which had assigned this work to a firm of Chartered Accountants and to be considered as a *bona fide* mistake.

The tax under the Act as well as the interest on the short fall in its payment is paid by the assessee not in his capacity as a trader, but as a taxable entity under the Act, levying tax on income or profits from any activity, including from business or profession, hence argument of commercial expediency also rejected. The Hon'ble tribunal further mentioned that the line of distinction between 'gross negligence' or an 'unfounded statement' on one hand, and 'mistake' on the other, is very thin, with the

law, per the rules of evidence, deeming concealment and/or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income in the former case, implying deliberateness. Held levying of Penalty is correct. (AY. 2009-10)

Mitsuba Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 151 ITD 201 / (2015) 168 TTJ 507 (Mum.)(Trib.)

- 2464 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Even if S.50C is applicable, computing capital gain de hors it does not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars of income or concealment of income for levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c). [S.50C]**

The assessee sold office premises to its sister concern for a sale consideration of ₹ 1.55 crores. The Assessing Officer considered the full sale consideration as per stamp duty authority valuation at ₹ 2,00,08,000 in accordance with section 50C of Income Tax Act. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer made an addition to the Short term Capital Gain. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) for levy of penalty against the addition made to the Short Term Capital Gain and levied penalty. The CIT(A) has deleted the penalty. On appeal by the department to the Tribunal HELD dismissing the appeal:

The Assessing Officer has not given any finding that the sale consideration disclosed by the assessee is not actual amount received as per the agreement of sale. The addition was made by invoking the deeming provisions of section 50C whereby the full value of consideration was adopted as per the valuation of the stamp duty authority for levy of stamp duty. The assessee has disclosed all relevant details as well as documents in support of its computation of Short term Capital Gain by taking into consideration the actual sale consideration received by the assessee. Consequently penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) cannot be levied. (AY. 2008-09)

ACIT v. Sunland Metal Recycling (Mum.) (Trib.) www.itatonline.org

- 2465 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Fringe benefits – Quantum was set aside – Penalty was deleted.**

Assessee had changed its method of accounting to mercantile system of accounting, but installments received on sale of houses/flats under various schemes were not recognized as income while computing its income for relevant years. Addition was made in assessee's hands on account of such receipts and on that basis penalty was levied. In quantum appeal, issue of aforesaid addition had been remitted to AO to decide the same *de novo*. Tribunal held that levy of penalty under section 271(1)(c) in relation to addition did not stand and penalty was liable to be deleted. (AY. 2004-05, 2009-10) *Dy. CIT v. Punjab Urban Planning & Development Authority (2014) 32 ITR 668 / (2015) 152 ITD 305 (Chd.)(Trib.)*

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Where exemption of income was claimed bonafidely on the basis of certificates issued by taxing authorities, AO is not justified in levying penalty relying upon Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c). [Explanation-1] 2466

Where assessee, a Mauritius based company, claimed exemption of income from operations of ship in international traffic on the basis of tax residency certificate issued by authorities of Mauritius as well as tax exemption certificate issued in India, Assessing Officer merely taking a view that place of effective management of assessee was situated in India and, thus, its income was taxable in India, could not pass penalty order relying upon provisions of Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c). (AYs. 2000-01, 2001-02)

Addl. DIT v. R. Liners Ltd. (2014) 61 SOT 3 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Bona fide claim of deduction under section 80IB – Levy of penalty was not justified. [S.80IB] 2467

Assessee's claim for deduction under section 80IB was *bona fide* since it was based on its legal perception that the relevant date for deduction is the date of inception and hence it is eligible for the benefit, although this perception was incorrect and liable to be rejected. Therefore, assessee was not liable for penalty under section 271(1)(c). (AY. 2006-07)

Meridian Impex v. ACIT (2014)149 ITD29 / 164 TTJ 289/ (Rajkot)(TM)(Trib.)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Disallowance of illegal payments under section 37(1) expenses – Levy of penalty was justified. [S.37(1)] 2468

The Tribunal held that if an assessee incurs expenditure prohibited by the explanation to section 37(1) and claims deduction thereof, it is liable for penalty under section 271(1)(c). (AYs. 1998-99, 2002-03, 2003-04)

J. M. Baxi & Co. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 148 ITD 152/ 164 TTJ 378 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Deferred taxes – Levy of penalty was held to be not valid – FBT and prior period expenses levy of penalty was held to be justified. 2469

Tribunal held that the claim of deductions made by the assessee with regard to FBT and prior period expenses was not justified and claim falls in the category of false claim and penalty is justified but as far as deferred taxes is concerned, it had not filed any false claim. Penalty imposed by the Assessing Officer in respect of deferred taxes is deleted. (AY. 2007-08)

Deraj Agrotech Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 164 TTJ 495 / 148 ITD 133 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Reducing the sale proceeds of trial production from work in process-Not liable penalty. [S.28(i)] 2470

Assessee company was engaged in business of scientific research and informatics services for drug discovery units. Assessee filed its return declaring certain taxable income. During assessment proceedings, AO noticed that certain amount representing trial run receipts was reduced from total sales and credited to work-in-progress capitalised in balance sheet. Assessee had not offered said amount to tax contending that project in respect of such trial run receipts were incomplete. AO treated amount received during trial run period as a regular activity and included it in total sales. He also levied penalty. It was noted that entire working of computation of work-in-progress

by reducing amount of trial run receipts was properly disclosed in balance sheet which was a part of books of account produced before AO. Moreover, stand of assessee in reducing trial run receipts from work-in-progress for capitalisation was consistent with one taken in preceding year. On facts, there was no concealment of particulars of income and, therefore, impugned penalty order was to be set aside. (AY. 2004-05)

Jubilant Biosys Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 99 (URO) / 32 ITR 343 / 163 TTJ 417 / (2015) 153 ITD 500 (Delhi)(Trib.)

2471 S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Writing off some debit balances – Not able to demonstrate how it was allowable as business loss – Levy of penalty was held to be justified. [S.37(1)]

Assessee claimed deduction by writing off some debit balance. On being called up to justify deduction, assessee admitted that it was an advance given to a person which had no relation with sales. Thus, in absence of any justification for deduction, AO made addition for said amount and also levied penalty. Since no material was brought on record to demonstrate as to how said advance claimed to be given in ordinary course of business was deductible, disallowance of such amount was fully covered within mischief of section 271(1)(c), therefore, penalty was confirmed. (AY. 2004-05)

Jubilant Biosys Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 99 (URO) /32 ITR 343 / 163 TTJ 417 / (2015) 153 ITD 500 (Delhi)(Trib.)

2472 S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Addition eligible deduction – Total income – Taxable income nil – Exemption u/s. 80IB(8A) – Penalty was held to be leviable. [Ss.80B(5), 80IB (8A, Explanation-4.)]

The assessee company was engaged in the business of scientific research and informatics services for drug discovery units. The assessee filed its return declaring certain taxable income. Assessee challenged penalty order contending that even though amount of additions in dispute constituted income, yet total taxable income would be to Nil because of availability of deduction under section 80-IB(8A). Once amount of deduction under section 80-IB was deemed to have been already granted in computing 'total income' for purposes of Explanation 4(a) to section 271(1)(c) being amount of addition representing concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income, then there could be no scope for inferring that total income representing amount of addition would be again eligible for deduction under section 80-IB(8A), thereby reducing total income to Nil. Therefore, plea raised by assessee was to be rejected. (AY. 2004-05)

Jubilant Biosys Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 99 (URO) / 32 ITR 343/163 TTJ 417 / (2015) 153 ITD 500 (Delhi)(Trib.)

2473 S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Appeal admitted by High Court on substantial question of law – If the High Court admits the appeal u/s. 260A, it means that the issue is debatable and penalty cannot survive. [S.260A]

When the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court has admitted substantial question of law on the addition, it becomes apparent that the addition so made has become debatable. The penalty was imposed on the basis of addition so made, therefore, when the addition on

the basis of which the penalty was imposed has become doubtful/debatable, therefore, penalty imposed u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act cannot survive. Following the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court, in *CIT v. Nayan Builders and Developers* (ITA No. 415/2012 dt 8-7-2014), the appeal of the assessee is allowed. However, it is made clear that if at any stage, the order of the Tribunal on quantum addition is upheld by the Hon'ble High Court, the Department is free to proceed in accordance with law on penalty proceedings. (AY. 2004-05)

Schrader Duncan limited v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – ESOP – Assessable as salary – Not liable to penalty. [S.45, 54F]

2474

Assessee contended that benefit arising from Employees Stock Option is assessable as long term capital gains and benefit of section 54F is entitled. Revenue contended that the same is chargeable to tax under head 'salaries' and consequently, denied benefit of section 54F. Tribunal held that as *bona fides* of assessee could not be doubted and assessee was entitled to benefit of Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c). (AY. 2006-07) *ACIT v. Chittaranjan A. Dasannacharya (2014) 64 SOT 226 (Bang.)(Trib.)*

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Search and seizure – Penalty to be worked out on net. (Unrecorded expenditure less unrecorded income). [S.69C]

2475

In course of search and seizure operation, it was found that assessee had not recorded certain income as well as expenditure in regular books of account. Assessee admitted and offered amount covered by expenditure which was found unrecorded in documents seized. However, assessee did not declare income which was detected in consequence of search and seizure operation AO having completed assessment, passed a penalty order under section 271(1)(c). CIT(A) gave set-off of undisclosed income against amount of unrecorded expenditure for determining amount of income for purpose of levying penalty. Tribunal held that what is taxed under section 69C is amount covered by unrecorded expenditure and ultimately it is nothing but income applied. Since, in instant case, unrecorded income was also found, so to extent of quantum of unrecorded income relating to relevant assessment years assessee had source to incur unrecorded expenditure, therefore, AO was to be directed to work out penalty on net of unrecorded expenditure i.e. unrecorded expenditure less unrecorded income. (AY. 2003-04 to 2006-07)

ACIT .v. Mulay Constructions (P) Ltd. (2014) 64 SOT 142 (URO) (Pune)(Trib.)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment-Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Business connection – Liaison office in India – Engaged in paying salary and managing pay rolls of corporate audit staff (CAS) employees hence it had undertaken a business activity – Held to be liable penalty – DTAA – India – USA. [S.9(1)(i), 133A, Art. 5]

2476

Assessee, a foreign company, had set up a liaison office in India to act as a communication channel between head office and customers in India. A survey under section 133A was carried out at premises of LO and documents were found which revealed that apart from acting as a communication channel, LO was also engaged in

paying salary and managing pay rolls of corporate audit staff (CAS) employees and, thus, it had undertaken a business activity. AO opined that assessee must have earned income from said transaction and computed income by making addition, further, he imposed penalty at rate of 100 per cent of tax sought to be evaded. Assessee submitted that LO did not constitute a PE under provisions of tax treaty and, therefore, income for execution of CAS programme by maintaining their pay rolls was not to be construed as earned by assessee with any business connection or from any PE in India. However, no evidence was produced to substantiate said statement. Further it was found that activity undertaken by assessee did not fall within ambit of communication channel but it was akin to administrative set up in line of human resources which demonstrated business connection. Tribunal confirmed the penalty on the ground that the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars and fell within ambit of section 271(1)(c). (AYs. 2002-03 to 2006-07)

General Electric International Operations Company Inc. v. ADIT (2014) 64 SOT 187 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)

2477 S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Provision for doubtful debt – Penalty initiated without specifying whether it is for concealment or for furnishing inaccurate particulars was held to be invalid. [Explanation-1]

Tribunal held that, it is incumbent upon the A.O. to state whether penalty was being levied for concealment of particulars of income by the assessee or whether any inaccurate particulars of income had been furnished by the assessee. There are two different charges i.e. the concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. The penalty can be imposed for a specific charge. Furnishing of inaccurate particulars means when the assessee has not disclosed the particulars correctly or the particulars disclosed by the assessee are incorrect. Concealment of particulars of income means when the assessee has concealed the income and has not shown the income in its return or in its books of account;

(ii) In the case of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, the onus is on the Revenue to, prove that the assessee had furnished the inaccurate particulars, while in the case of concealment of particulars of income, where the Explanation (1) is applicable, the onus is on the assessee to prove that he has not concealed the particulars of income;

(iii) The AO failed to discharge his onus as he was not sure at the initiation of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) for which specific charge penalty has been initiated by the Assessing Officer. Even while levying the penalty also, the Assessing Officer simply relied on the explanation to section 271(1)(c) even though he levied the penalty for furnishing the inaccurate particulars of income. This is apparent from the provisions of section 271(1)(c) that explanation of section 271(1)(c) is not applicable in case inaccurate particulars are furnished. Therefore the basis of levy of penalty itself is not correct. (AY. 2003-04) *DCIT v. Nepa Limited (2014) 112 DTR 212 / (2015) 167 TTJ 124 / 58 taxmann.com 137 (Indore.)(Trib.)*

S. 271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Depreciation – Land-No penalty can be levied for a *bona fide* “wrong” claim which is not a “false” claim. [S.32]

2478

The Tribunal held that the addition by way of disallowing the depreciation claimed has rightly been made in the quantum proceedings which fact has been accepted by the assessee by filing a revised return and not agitating the issue further. Considering the explanation offered by the assessee in the penalty proceedings, it is seen that repeatedly it is claimed that the return was finalised on the basis of figures appearing in the Sale Deed. This fact has not been disputed by the department and is found to be supported from the assessment order itself. In the aforementioned peculiar facts and circumstances, considering the fact that even after the said addition the assessee was allowed business loss to be carried forward to the extent of ₹ 2.96 crores odd, we have no hesitation in following the judicial precedent relied upon to hold that the explanation offered is *bona fide* and deserves to be allowed. It is seen that at best the claim of the assessee can be called a wrong claim and by no stretch of imagination on the facts as they stand can it be called a false claim. Penalty levied was deleted. (ITA No. 1721 / Del / 2013. dated 5-9-2014.) (AY. 2007-08)

Povsha Goyal v. ACIT (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Long term capital gains – Revised return – Offering at 10% tax – *Bona fide* mistake – Chartered Accountant – Explanation that *bona fide* mistake was committed on advice of CA is a reasonable one as per Explanation 1B of S.271(1) and does not attract penalty.

2479

When there is no attempt on the part of the assessee to show the Long Term Capital Gain in a different category then merely because a concessional rate of tax was applied in the revised return does not if *so facto* lead to the conclusion that the assessee has concealed the particulars of income. Even otherwise, all these facts and circumstances supports the explanation of the assessee that the concessional rate of tax on Long Term Capital Gain was applied on the basis of the advice of the Chartered Accountant, therefore, it was a *bona fide* mistake. This explanation, in our view is quite reasonable as per the Explanation 1B of section 271(1) of the Income tax Act particularly in view of the fact that the assessee did not claim the benefit of indexed cost while computing the Capital Gain in question. This is not a case that the Long Term Capital Gain in question is not eligible for benefit of indexed cost. The claim of concessional tax applied on the Long Term Capital Gain, though, is against the provisions of Income Tax Act, however, it is based on the fact that the benefit of indexed cost was available to the Capital Gain in question which was not claimed by the assessee. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any error or illegality in the impugned order of CIT(A) in deleting the penalty by following the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of 348 ITR 306 (SC). (ITA No. 2661 / Mum / 2013, dated 5-11-2014.) (AY. 2009-10)

ACIT v. Cecilia Haresh Chaganlal (Smt.) (2015) 37 ITR 567 / 58 taxmann.com 312 (Mum.) (Trib.)

- 2480 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Debatable – Capital gains – Agricultural income – Apart from falsity of the explanation, the department must have cogent material or evidence from which it could be inferred that assessee has consciously concealed particulars of income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of income**

The Tribunal held that as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *CIT vs. Khoday Eswarsa & Sons (1972) 83 ITR 369 (SC)* the penalty proceedings being penal in character, the Revenue itself has to establish that the receipt of the amount undisputedly constitute income of assessee. Apart from falsity of the explanation given by assessee, the department must have before levying penalty, cogent material or evidence from which it could be inferred that assessee has concealed particulars of income or had deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars in respect of the same and that the disputed amount is taxable receipt. No doubt, in the original assessment proceedings AO can take an opinion that claim of capital gains cannot be allowed and has to be taxed under the head "Business" but that is not enough for considering penalty proceedings. Assessee has not found the explanation of assessee to be false in assessment. He only deferred on the basis of the memorandum and articles of Assessee Company and also the fact that very high price was received by assessee at the time of sale. These factors may be enough for bringing amount to tax as business income but cannot establish that assessee has consciously "concealed particulars of income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of income". learned CIT(A) also in our opinion, has wrongly considered that assessee has falsified accounts ignoring the fact that at the time of purchase way back in 3-4 years before, assessee could not have imagined that price will go up and assessee would get a good price for the land purchased. The fact that assessee has shown lands as assets in the books of account consistently cannot be brushed aside just because AO took a different view which was upheld by ITAT. On the facts of the case, we are of the opinion that it is only a difference of opinion on a debatable issue which does not lead to furnishing of inaccurate particulars. (ITA No.1803 / Hyd / 2013, dated 16-9-2014.) (AY. 2007-08).

G. K. Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 36 ITR 344 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

- 2481 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Claim for carry forward capital loss was denied due to change in majority shareholding – Levy of penalty was not justified.**

Tribunal held that concealment penalty was not leviable in case where claim to carry forward capital loss denied due to change in majority shareholding. (AY. 2008-09) *Century Metal Recycling Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (2014) 35 ITR 143/(2015) 67 SOT 351 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)*

- 2482 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – No penalty can be levied solely on the basis of admission made during survey if there is no corroborative evidence and no fault is found with the return of income. [S.139(1)]**

Though the assessee offered a sum of ₹ 1 crore during the survey on account of discrepancies, errors and omissions in the accounts, at the stage of the assessment, there is no reference to any incriminating material found during the course of survey consequent upon which the assessee was cornered to surrender the said sum of ₹ 1 crore. Mere admission by the assessee in the statement given during the course

of survey itself cannot be a conclusive piece of evidence, unless, such a surrender is corroborated by any evidence or materials discovered during the course of such survey proceedings or by any enquiry thereafter. The amount which was surrendered during the course of such survey has already been reconciled and disclosed in the regular books of account which has been subjected to audit. These audited statements of accounts were filed along with the return of income under section 139(1). It is an undisputed fact that at the time of survey, which was conducted on 29th March, 2007, the return of income for the assessment year 2007-08, was not due, as the due date for filing of the return of income u/s 139(1) for the assessment year 2007-08, was 31st October, 2007. The assessee had duly disclosed all the particulars of its income in the return of income and the assessment was completed without finding any defect either in the audited statement of account or in the books of account produced before him. The question whether there is any concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income has to be determined on the basis of the return of income as held in *SAS Pharmaceuticals 335 ITR 259 (Del)*. (ITA No. 2770 / Mum / 2012, dated 19-6-2014) (AY. 2007-08) *ACIT v. Crescent Property Development (Mum.) (Trib.)*; www.itatonline.org

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Set off unrecorded expenditure against unrecorded income – Directed to levy penalty on net amount. [S.69C]

2483

In the present case, in the course of search and seizure operation it was found that assessee had not recorded certain income as well as expenditure in regular books of account. Assessee admitted said position and offered amount covered by expenditure which was found unrecorded in documents seized. However assessee did not declare income which was detected in consequence of search and seizure operation. AO having completed assessment, passed a penalty order under section 271(1)(c) CIT(A) gave set-off of undisclosed income against amount of unrecorded expenditure for determining amount of income for purpose of levying penalty.

It was held in the present case that as unrecorded income was also found, so to extent of quantum of unrecorded income relating to relevant assessment years assessee had source to incur unrecorded expenditure. Therefore Assessing Officer was directed to work out penalty on net of unrecorded expenditure. i.e. unrecorded expenditure less unrecorded income. (AY. 2003-04, 2006-07)

ACIT v. Mulay Constructions (2014) 64 SOT 142(URO)(Pune)(Trib.)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Reassessment – Disclosure after reassessment notice – Levy of penalty was justified only in first assessment year. [S.148].

2484

Tribunal held that assessee, at first instance, had not accounted for amount in question and when notice under section 148 was issued then only assessee chose to disclose receipt, therefore levy of penalty was justified when assessee had been continuing with this practice of alleged concealment and furnishing inaccurate particulars in all six assessment years. Adopting 'Doctrine of continuity' and concurrence penalty was confirmed only in first assessment year. (AY. 2000-01, 2005-06)

Dr. Bapuji Cherukuri v. Dy. CIT (2013) 21 ITR 714 / (2014) 149 ITD 502 (Chennai)(Trib.)

2485 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Disallowance on Transfer Pricing provision – Levy of penalty was not justified. [S.92C]**

The Tribunal held that the disallowance of an amount that too on transfer pricing provisions does not attract penalty as it cannot be considered as either the concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. (AY. 2005-06)

TNS India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 163 TTJ 576/32 ITR 44/(2015) 152 ITD 123 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

2486 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Capital gains – Wrong claim of exemption – Surrender of claim of exemption – Levy of penalty was held to be justified. [S.54B]**

The assessee declared the capital gain as long term capital gain and never filed any revised return before the issue of notice under section 143(2) and mistake was not brought to the notice of the Assessing Officer *suo motu* before it was detected by the Department where after the assessee had to surrender the claim of exemption. The CIT(A) was not justified in deleting the penalty levied by the Assessing Officer. (AY. 2007-08)

ACIT v. Vinay A. Joneja (2014) 163 TTJ 652/(2015) 153 ITD 109 (Pune)(Trib.)

2487 **S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Depreciation – Finance lease – Wrong claim for depreciation by showing a finance or loan transaction as a lease transaction – Levy of penalty was held to be justified.**

Tribunal held that the detailed findings of the AO, the assessee not agitating the findings of the AO in quantum proceedings, no plea of factual discrepancies during quantum proceedings and appeals, even no such plea before AO during penalty proceedings and no rebuttal to the findings of the AO that the transactions were bogus and sham are sufficient facts to hold that the assessee had put a false claim of depreciation during the assessment proceedings. The plea of the assessee that he did not contest the addition to avoid litigation or to buy peace etc. even does not seem plausible. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of "*MAK Data P. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax-II*" Civil Appeal No. 9772 of 2013 date of decision 30-10-2013, has categorically held that it is the statutory duty of the assessee to record all its transactions correctly and to clear its true income in the return of income. The AO should not be carried away by the plea of the assessee like "voluntary disclosure", "buy peace", "avoid litigation", "amicable settlement", etc. to explain away its conduct. The question is whether the assessee has offered any explanation for concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. Explanation to section 271(1) raises a presumption of concealment, when a difference is noticed by the AO, between reported and assessed income. The burden is then on the assessee to show otherwise, by cogent and reliable evidence. When the initial onus placed by the explanation, has been discharged by him, the onus shifts on the Revenue to show that the amount in question constituted the income and not otherwise on the facts as the transaction was held to be non genuine by the AO, which was not challenged by the assessee in quantum proceedings levy of penalty was held to be justified. (AY. 1993-94)

Times Guaranty Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 41 CCH 147 (Mum.)(Trib.). www.itatonline.org

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Amounts not deductible – Deduction of tax at source for s. 40(a)(ia) disallowance is permissible. [S.40(a)(ia)]

2488

The law, in our humble view, would hold even where the disallowance leading to the variation between the assessed and returned incomes is u/s. 40(a)(ia), being independent of the provision whereunder the same (disallowance) is effected. That is, the question of levy or otherwise of penalty would have to be necessarily examined w.r.t. the assessee's case for the claim of expenditure in view of non-obstante clause of section 40(a)(ia), as indeed would be the case for any other provision.

Mulla Associates v. ACIT (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Disallowance of claim – Unexplained jewellery and investment in property – Penalty could not be sustained. [S.69]

2489

AO made certain addition to total income of assessee on account of Unexplained Jewellery and Unexplained investment in Property. Based on said addition, penalty under section 271(1)(c) was also imposed upon assessee. ITAT Held that, "Adverting to the facts of this case, when we apply the above law to the facts of this case we are of the considered opinion that no penalty under s. 271(1)(c) can survive. The assessee has made certain claims which could not be found to be plausible and additions have been made. But levy of penalty under s. 271(1)(c) is not automatic. In fact the assessee has not concealed any particulars of income as has been alleged. Therefore, we cannot sustain the impugned penalty and thus, hold that this penalty cannot survive and has to be deleted". (AY. 2007-08)

Om Prakash Lohiya v. Dy. CIT (2013) 157 TTJ 65 (2014) 61 SOT 15 (URO) (Jodh.)(Trib.)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Search and seizure – As there was no addition over and above income declared by assessee in return of income filed in response to notice under section 153A, no penalty under section 271(1)(c) was to be imposed. [S.132, 153A, 271(1)(c), Explanation-5A]

2490

The assessee was engaged in the business of jewellery and related activities. Assessee's Premises were subjected to search and seizure under section 132(1). In pursuance to notices under section 153A, the assessee filed their returns for relevant assessment years. The income declared by the assessee in the returns filed in response to the notices under section 153A were accepted in all these cases and no further addition was made. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer imposed penalty for concealment of the particulars of income or for furnishing the inaccurate particulars of income in respect of the additional income offered by assessee in the returns filed in response to notices under section 153A and also in those cases where for the first time in respective assessment years, the returns of income were filed only after issuance of the notices under section 153A. On appeal Tribunal held that, on the perusal of the assessment orders in all these appeals, it is admitted fact that there is no addition over and above the income declared by these assessee in the returns of income filed in response to notices under section 153A. It is also admitted fact that no declaration is based on any money, jewellery, bullion or any other valuable articles detected or seized in the course of the search operation. At the first instance, the counsel pleaded that these assessee are entitled for the immunity in view of Explanation 5 to section 271(1)(c) because the income admitted during the

course of the search has been declared in the return of income as well as the tax on the admitted income has also been paid. In all the appeals Explanation 3 cannot be applied, as held in the case of *Chandan K. Shewani v. Dy. CIT* [IT Appeal Nos. 235 and 236 (PN.) of 2010, dated 29-8-2012]. So far as Explanation 5A is concerned, it is brought on the statute book with effect from 1-6-2007, i.e., from the assessment year 2007-08. So far as the assessments in all these cases are concerned, no addition is made by the Assessing Officer over and above the income declared in the returns of income filed in response to notice under section 153A as the expression 'tax sought to be evaded' appearing in clause (c) to section 271(1) is to be understood as a difference between the income declared by the assessee in the return of income and the income finally assessed. After introduction of section 153A with effect from 1-6-2003, there is no specific penalty provision to deal with the assessments framed in consequence of search and seizure action under section 132. In the present case, as the returned income and income assessed are the same, otherwise also, no penalty can be levied. Therefore, in all the appeals the Assessing Officer was not justified in levying the penalty under section 271(1)(c). Accordingly, the penalties levied by the Assessing Officer in all the appeals are to be deleted for the above mentioned reasons.) (AYs. 2000-01 to 2004-05) *Pramila D. Astekar v. ITO (2013) 154 TTJ 46 / (2014) 61 SOT 113 / (Pune)(Trib.)*

2491 S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Explanation 5-No material was found in the course of search, deeming provision cannot be applied – Penalty was not leviable. [S.69A, 69B, 142(1), 153A]

A search action was conducted in the case of the father of assessee in August, 2005. In response to notice the assessee filed the return. During the assessment proceedings the assessee filed the statement of assets and liabilities of him and wife and offered short fall as undisclosed investment under section 69B of the Act. The AO levied the penalty by invoking Explanation 5 to section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Tribunal held during the course of search proceedings no material was found with regard to ownership of any asset by assessee, hence the deeming provision of explanation 5 to section 271(1)(c) cannot be applied. Deletion of penalty by CIT(A) was held to be justified. (AY. 2005-06, 2006-07)

ITO v. V. R. Rathish (2014) 65 SOT 79(URO)(Cochin)(Trib.)

2492 S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Show cause notice – Defective notice – Order imposing penalty was held to be invalid. [S.153A, 271AAA, 292BBB]

The assessee is an individual. Consequent to search and seizure action return was filed u/s. 153A. Income returned pursuant to search and seizure action was exceed the return of income shown in the return under section 139(1). AO initiated penalty proceedings under section 271 AAA, however levied the penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. CIT (A) confirmed the levy of penalty. On appeal Tribunal held that the show cause notice refers section 271AAA, however the penalty was levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Tribunal held that the aforesaid defect cannot be curable under section 292BBB of the Act. Tribunal following the ratio in *CIT v. Manjunatha Cotton and Ginning Factory 359 ITR 565 (Karn) (HC)* held that the orders imposing penalty in all assessment years to be invalid and consequently cancelled the penalty imposed. (AY. 2006-07, 2009-10) *K. Prakash Shetty v. ACIT (2014) BCAJ-August-P.24 (Bang.)(Trib.)*

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Surrender of income – Bogus shares – Capital gains – Levy of penalty was justified. [S.68, 148]

2493

Assessee filed return of income declaring long term capital gain arising from sale of shares. Getting information of bogus transaction of shares, capital gain transactions in question were sham, AO issued notice u/s. 148, in response to said notice, assessee surrendered income earned on sale of shares as income from undisclosed sources. AO made addition u/s. 68 and levied penalty order u/s. 271(1)(c). Tribunal held that the assessee had conducted enquiries into matter of sale of said shares prior to surrender made by assessee and duly established on record that share transactions were sham and bogus. Tribunal held that the assessee intentionally and deliberately filed inaccurate particulars of his income in original return and, therefore, penalty was justified as per law. (AY. 2002-03)

Dy. CIT v. Mukesh Kumar Agarwal, (HUF) (2014) 146 ITD 562 (Agra)(Trib.)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Debatable – Relief by CIT(A) on merits (though reversed by ITAT) means claim is debatable

2494

The assessee, a film actor, went to Jodhpur for shoot for a Hindi movie called “Ham Sath Sath Hain”. During his stay at Jodhpur, he was implicated in criminal proceedings on the allegation that he shot a black buck, an endangered specie. He was arrested by the local police and in order to get himself released, he had to engage lawyers. The criminal proceedings as a result of this case have continued thereafter and the assessee has been regularly incurring legal expenses to defend himself and obtain exemptions from the personal hearings from this case. He contended that if he had not defended himself in the criminal proceedings and asked for personal exemptions, it would have resulted in his absence from all the movies/projects undertaken by him causing loss of revenue to him as well as to the producers of his films. He contended that it was thus necessary for him to incur the legal expenses during the years under consideration to preserve and protect his profession and the said expenses therefore were claimed by the assessee as deduction. The CIT(A) accepted the stand of the assessee and allowed deduction for the legal expenses. However, the Tribunal reversed the decision of the CIT(A) and disallowed the claim. The AO levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. This was upheld by the CIT(A). On appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal HELD allowing the appeal:

The fact that the claim of the assessee was accepted by the CIT(A) on merit clearly shows that the claim made by the assessee was based on a possible view of the matter. It also shows that the claim for deduction on account of legal expenses was a *bona fide* claim. In subsequent years, the assessee has capitalised similar legal expenses after having come to know about the disallowance made in the years under consideration. This shows the *bona fides* of the assessee. All material particulars relevant to the claim were fully and truly furnished by the assessee and there is no allegation made by the AO in the penalty order that any inaccurate particulars were furnished by the assessee while making the claim on account of deduction of legal expenses. It is also not in dispute that the legal expenses claimed by the assessee were actually incurred

by him and it is not the case of the Revenue at any stage that the expenses so claimed by the assessee were bogus. When no information given in the return is found to be in-correct or in-accurate, the assessee cannot be held guilty of furnishing in-accurate particulars of its income and unless the case is strictly covered by the provision, penalty cannot be imposed. Where there is no finding that the particulars furnished by the assessee in the return are in accurate or erroneous or false, there is no question of imposing penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act merely because the claim of the assessee for deduction is disallowed in the quantum proceedings. (AY. 2003-04)

Salman Khan v. ACIT (2014) 40 CCH 594 (Mum.)(Trib.), www.itatonline.org

2495 S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Stamp valuation – Levy of penalty for failure to compute capital gains as per section 50C is not justified. [S.50C]

The assessee sold property for a sale consideration of ₹ 4.50 lakhs. The said plot of land was valued for Stamp Duty purposes at ₹ 15,89,000. The AO applied section 50C and considered the difference between the sale price and Stamp Duty value for purposes of computation of capital gain. He also levied concealment penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) on such difference. The levy of penalty was confirmed by the CIT(A). Before the ITAT, the assessee claimed that the issue was covered in his favour by Renu Hingorani (ITAT Mum), *Chimanlal Manilal Patel (ITAT Ahd) & CIT v. Madan Theatres Ltd. (2013) 260 CTR (Cal)*75 where it was held that as the AO had not questioned the actual consideration received by the assessee and as section 50C was a deeming provision, it could not be said that the assessee had filed inaccurate particulars of income so as to attract levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. The department claimed that as the assessee was aware of section 50C, it ought to have applied it and failure to do so was a deliberate attempt to furnish inaccurate particulars of his income which entailed concealment penalty. Reliance was placed on *CIT v. Zoom Communications P. Ltd. (2010) 327 ITR 510 (Del.) & CIT v. Escort Finance Ltd. (2010) 328 ITR 44 (Del.)* HELD by the Tribunal:

There are direct judgments which hold that where addition is made on account of application of section 50C and there is no material on record to show that the assessee had received more amount than that shown by it on sale of property then penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) cannot be levied. The decisions relied upon by the Dept are not directly on the issue and distinguishable on facts. The context in which the decisions have been rendered is entirely different from the context of the present case. The law in this regard is well settled as held in *CIT v. Sun Engineering Works P. Ltd. (1992) 198 ITR 297 (SC)*. When there is a direct decision available on the issue, then it will be appropriate to follow the same particularly when no contrary decision on the same very issue is cited by the opposite side. (AY. 2007-08)

Harish Vooyaya Shetty v. ITO (Mum.)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org.

2496 S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Explanation 5 – Gift disclosed in the balance sheet – Amount disclosed in the return filed pursuance of notice u/s. 153C – Levy of penalty was held to be not justified. [S.139, 153C]

The assessee received gifts of certain amounts from two persons; gifts were credited to the capital account of the assessee. In the original return filed u/s. 139, the assessee

did not include amount of said gifts. Thereafter, search conducted on third party, proceedings u/s. 153C were initiated in case of assessee, return filed in response to notice issued u/s. 153C, the assessee included the amount of gifts. AO levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) on the ground that assessee having not disclosed the impugned income in return of income filed u/s. 139(1), but had declared impugned income in return filed in response to notice issued u/s. 153C, was guilty of concealing income. Commissioner (Appeals) upheld levy of penalty.

Tribunal held that, Explanation 5 cannot be said that assessee was found to be owner of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing. What has been made basis is entry in the capital account of the assessee which was already part of the accounts maintained by the assessee. Therefore, even according to the provisions of Explanation 5, concealment penalty cannot be linked to the return filed by the assessee under section 139. (AY. 2002-03)

Vrajlal T. Gala (HUF) v. ACIT (2014) 146 ITD 742 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Surrender of income – Revised return – Bogus transaction – Capital gains – Levy of penalty was held to be justified. [S.68, 148]

2497

Assessee filed return of income declaring long term capital gain arising from sale of shares. On getting information of bogus transaction of shares, AO issued notice u/s. 148. Assessee surrendered income earned on sale of shares as income from undisclosed sources. AO taking a view that capital gain transactions in question were sham, made addition u/s. 68 and also levied penalty order u/s. 271(1)(c). Tribunal held that the assessee had intentionally and deliberately filed inaccurate particulars of his income in original return hence levy of penalty was confirmed. (AY. 2002-03)

Dy. CIT v. Mukesh Kumar Agarwal (HUF) (2014) 146 ITD 562 (Agra)(Trib.)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Surrender of income – Revised return – Return accepted – Levy of penalty was not justified. [S.132]

2498

In the course of search various documents were found and seized which indicated unaccounted sales. The assessee declared the unaccounted receipts in the revised return. Revised return was accepted by the AO and certain other additions were made on estimate basis. The AO levied the penalty. Tribunal held that levy of penalty on the basis of revised return was held to be not valid and other additions were on estimate basis hence penalty cannot be levied. (AY. 2001-02, 2002-03 to 2004-05)

Poonam Marble (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2014) 62 SOT 137 (URO)/157 TTJ 59 (Jaipur)(Trib.)

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Fact that assessee has huge carry forward losses and depreciation and filed a nil return suggests that there is no motive or incentive to make a bogus claim in the return – Levy of penalty was not justified

2499

The expenses payable to APR Limited were shown separately by the assessee in the profit and loss account and the same has been also discussed by the auditor in the audit report. Thus, assessee has made a claim which was transparent and *bona fide*. Assessee has not concealed anything in this regard. Therefore, it cannot be a case of concealment of facts. As far as the filing of inaccurate particulars of income is concerned, the assessee was having huge carry forward losses and depreciation and the return was

filed at nil income. In our considered view, there cannot be a motive or incentive for the assessee to make any bogus claim in the return of income. These facts show that whatever claim made by the assessee was under good faith and with the advice of the auditors and the employees. The assessee has furnished an explanation which has not been found false. (AY. 2000-01)

Toscana Lasts Limited v. ITO (2014) 164 TTJ 145 / (2015) 67 SOT 267 (URO) (Delhi)(Trib.)

2500 S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Wrong claim of deduction under section 80P even after cancellation of licence which was up held by the Supreme Court – Levy of penalty was held to be justified. [S.80P, 176(3)]

Assessee is notified as state co-operative Bank by Maharashtra Government and was granted license from RBI. Said notification of State Government was quashed. On appeal, Supreme Court upheld such action. Assessee's licence was cancelled by RBI and it was directed to sell all investments and to refund deposits. It was found that assessee continued to operate banking activities, even after striking down of notification preventing assessee to continue to operate as State Co-operative Bank and, thus, had not discontinued business as required under section 176(3). Assessee proceeded to claim deduction under section 80P without considering advice of auditors that income was ineligible to be classified as banking income in conformity of Supreme Court judgment. Assessee was fully aware of all facts, but claim for deduction was made, it was held to be a false claim made continuously and deliberately and, thus, amount claimed as deduction would be deemed to represent income in respect of which particulars had been concealed. Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) was held to be justified. (AY. 2005-2006)

Apex Urban Co-op. Bank of Maharashtra & Goa Ltd. v. ITO (2013) 163 TTJ 438 / 102 DTR 410 / (2014) 146 ITD 791 (Mum.)(Trib.)

2501 S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – When assessee has declared undisclosed income after search and paid tax and interest – Entitled to immunity under the Explanation-5 to section 271(1)(c)

Pursuant to search and seizure and the statement recorded by the director of the assessee company, undisclosed income of ₹ 151 lakh was disclosed in the return of income and tax was paid on it. The AO levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) which was confirmed by the CIT(A).

On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal allowing the appeal held that since the three conditions mentioned in Explanation 5 to section 271(1)(c) were satisfied and assessee had paid the tax along with interest, the assessee was entitled to the benefit available and penalty levied was to be deleted. (AY. 2004-05, 2006-07)

Kalpna Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (OSD) (2014) 29 ITR 633 / 66 SOT 190 (URO) (Jodh.)(Trib.)

2502 S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Explanation 7 – Addition on account of transfer pricing adjustment – TPO rejected methodology adopted by assessee – Levy of penalty was not justified

TPO determined ALP of international transaction after rejecting the transfer pricing study report submitted by the assessee primarily on account of difference of opinion

with regard to use of multiple year data and selection of certain comparables. It could not be said that the difference in ALP arose on account of concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars or income by the assessee. Therefore, penalty was not leviable. (AY. 2004-05)

ACIT v. ADP (P) Ltd. (2014) 98 DTR 413 / 160 TTJ 50 (Hyd.)(Trib.)

S.271(1)(d) : Penalty – Concealment – Surrender of amount of fringe benefit in the course of assessment – Calculation of mistake – *Bona fide* mistake – Levy of penalty was not justified. [S.271(1) Explanation 1]

2503

During scrutiny assessment, AO found that amount of ₹ 11,55,634 on account of conveyance was not considered in the value of fringe benefit & he made addition thereof to the income of the assessee & also imposed penalty u/s. 271(1)(d). CIT(A) confirmed penalty as well as Tribunal. High Court held in favour of the assessee & held that when the assessee is offering the huge amount of fringe benefit amounting to ₹ 2.55 crores for taxation, the said calculation mistake cannot be said to be an act of furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. Assessee had shown its *bona fides* on two counts, firstly when the mistake was pointed out by the AO, the assessee came forward & voluntarily surrendered during the assessment does give immunity to the assessee from penalty, as per Explanation 1 to section 271(1). The explanation offered by the assessee that it was simply a mistake of omission was not found to be false by the lower authorities. There was no finding from the authorities below that it was not a mistake of omission. Once the omission was identified by the AO, the assessee accepted the same without any dispute. Therefore explanation offered by the assessee was acceptable & penalty was not imposable. (AY. 2006-07)

Hindustan Coca Cola Marketing Co. (P) Ltd. v. DCIT(2014) 99 DTR 225 / 160 TTJ 382 / 65 SOT 147 (Delhi)(Trib.)

Section 271AAA : Penalty where search has been initiated

S.271AAA : Penalty – Search initiated on or after 1st June, 2007 – Statement u/s. 132(4) offering income – Return filed u/s. 142(1) declaring income said income – Thereafter revised return filed declaring income – AO levied penalty u/s. 271AAA – Held reasons not given for non-compliance of conditions of section 271AAA(2) – Matter set aside.

2504

Assessee was engaged in business of real estate, developer, builder and colonizer. A search and seizure operation were carried out at assessee's premises and its subsidiary companies in which valuable and documents/ papers were seized. During the course of search, assessee made a statement under section 132(4) offering income of ₹ 60 crore. Assessee, thereafter filed returns of income in compliance of notice u/s. 142(1) declaring total income of ₹ 46.38 crores. The department issued notice requiring assessee to show-cause as to why he filed return of ₹ 46.38 crores instead of ₹ 60 crores as stated in his statement u/s 132(4) during the course of search and seizure. Assessee thereupon filed a revised return declaring total income of ₹ 61.05 crores. Revenue authorities passed assessment order accepting income filed in terms of revised return. A penalty order was also passed on ground that assessee failed to comply with all the requirements u/s. 271AAA(2). High Court held that ACIT only recorded his conclusions that assessee

failed to comply with the provisions of section 271AAA(2) without giving any reason. Consequently, High Court set aside the matter and remanded back of fresh disposal. [AY. 2009-10]

Crossings Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 222 Taxman 26 /267 CTR 519 (All.)(HC)

Section 271B : Failure to get accounts audited

2505 S.271B : Penalty – Failure to get accounts audited – Distributor – Principal to principal – Turnover exceed ₹ 40 lakhs – Levy of penalty was held to be justified. [S.44AB]

The assessee was a distributor of Indian Oil Cooking Gas and was also engaged in sale of gas stove and spare parts. The Assessing Officer imposed a penalty under section 271B on the ground that the assessee had failed to get its account audited under section 44AB as it had failed to disclose the turnover on sale of cylinders and since by including such sale the turnover exceeded ₹ 40 lakh, the assessee was under a legal obligation to get its books of account audited under section 44AB. The Court held that, the agreement clearly indicated that the assessee was appointed as a distributor on principal-to-principal basis for sale of gas cylinders to consumers. The terms and conditions show that the appellant was carrying on business of supply of gas cylinders to the consumers and that the assessee was carrying on the business of purchase and sale of gas cylinders and not on a commission basis. Consequently, the sale of gas cylinders was liable to be included in the turnover of the assessee. Since the turnover exceeded ₹ 40 lakh for the year in question, the books of account were liable to be audited under section 44AB. Since the books of account were not audited, penalty proceedings were rightly initiated. The explanation given by the assessee for non-compliance of the provision of section 44AB was neither sound nor justifiable. The reason given that the assessee was only a commission agent and that his commission being less than ₹ 40 lakh, he was not required to get his books of account audited cannot be accepted nor is reasonable. In the light of the aforesaid, the imposition of penalty was justified. (AY. 1999-2000)

Attara Gas Service v. CIT (2014) 227 Taxmann 159 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)

2506 S.271B : Penalty – Failure to get accounts audited – AO failed to record its satisfaction in the assessment order pertaining to it – Deletion of penalty was held to be justified. [S.44AB]

The A.O. found that the audit report under Section 44AB was not obtained well on time so he levied the penalty. High Court held that no penalty is levyable under section 271B of the Act when AO failed to record its satisfaction in the assessment order pertaining to it. There was no whisper in the assessment order regarding the levy of the penalty. (AY. 1987-88)

CIT v. E.C.C. Project (P) Ltd. (2014) 227 Taxmann 159 (Mag.) (2015) 374 ITR 44 (All.)(HC)

2507 S.271B : Penalty – Failure to get accounts audited – Speculative business of shares – No *bona fide* reasons – Levy of penalty was held to be justified. [S.44AB]

The assessee an individual entered into speculative business of the shares, The transactions entered in to by her were more than the prescribed monetary limit as envisaged by the provisions of section 44AB for tax audit. No *bona fide* reasons were

furnished by the assessee for not getting the books of accounts audited, it was observed by the ITAT that total turnover indicated the aggregate price of the commodities received by an assessee during the course of his trading or business activities. Considering the principles governing the imposition of penalty u/s. 271B and the facts of the case AO was justified in levying penalty for not getting books of accounts audited. (AY. 2004-05) *Anahaita Nalin Shah v. Dy. CIT (2014) 149 ITD 171 (Mum.)(Trib.)*

S.271B : Penalty – Failure to get accounts audited – Reasonable cause shares shown as capital gains – Assessed as business income – Levy of penalty was held to be not justified. [S.10(38), 44AB, 273B]

2508

The assessee declared income from sale of shares as long term capital gain and claimed exemption u/s. 10(38). The AO held such income as business income instead of capital gain. And also imposed penalty u/s. 271B as the sale proceeds exceeded the monetary limit of ₹ 40 lakhs prescribed u/s. 44AB.

While deciding the issue before the Tribunal it is observed that the requirement to get the accounts audited and furnish audit report has arisen because of the change in the head under which income from sale of shares was offered by the assessee. The assessee declared income from sale of shares under the head 'Capital gains'. This view was canvassed on the basis of treatment of similar income offered and accepted by the Revenue in the immediately preceding year as capital gain. The acceptance by the Revenue of income from sale of shares as capital gain in the immediately preceding year constituted a *bona fide* ground for the assessee to entertain a belief that such income was liable to be taxed under the head capital gain and not as business income. Once this view is accepted, then failure of the assessee to get its account audited and furnish the audit report, constitutes reasonable cause for default. The acceptability of the reasonable cause for the failure to get the account audited and furnish the report in due time constitute a reasonable cause within the meaning of section 273B, in the failure to comply with the provisions of section 44AB. (AY. 2006-07)

Bunkim Finance & Investments (P) Ltd. v. ITO (2014) 146 ITD 796 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.271B : Penalty – Failure to get accounts audited – Reasonable cause – Business income or capital gains – Sale of shares – Levy of penalty was held to be not justified. [S.10(38), 44AB]

2509

The assessee declared income from sale of shares as long term capital gain and claimed exemption u/s. 10(38). AO held such income as business income instead of capital gain and imposed penalty u/s. 271B as the sale proceeds exceeded the monetary limit of ₹ 40 lakhs prescribed u/s. 44AB. Commissioner (Appeals) upheld penalty. On appeal Tribunal held that section 273B provides that no penalty shall be imposable on the person for any failure referred to in the relevant penalty sections prescribed in section 273B, if the assessee proves that there was a reasonable cause for the said failure. section 271B finds place u/s. 273B. It transpires that the imposition of penalty u/s. 271B on the failure to get the account audited or furnish the audit report before the prescribed period is not automatic. If a reasonable cause is shown for such a failure, then the penalty otherwise imposable u/s. 271B, shall be waived in terms of section 273B. Levy of penalty was deleted. (AY. 2006-07)

Bunkim Finance & Investments (P) Ltd. v. ITO(2014) 146 ITD 796 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Section 271BA : Penalty for failure to furnish report under section 92E**2510 S.271BA : Penalty – Transfer pricing – Failure to furnish report from accountant – No reasonable cause was established – Levy of penalty was justified. [S.92E, 275]**

In the present case, the AO found that the assessee had not furnished audit report regarding its international transactions as required to be furnished under section 92E. The AO initiated penalty proceedings. The assessee submitted that the audit report was obtained before due date of filing the return but the same could not be filed as the provisions of section 92E were new provisions about which the assessee's CA was not aware. According to the assessee this constituted a reasonable cause for not levying penalty u/s. 271 BA. The AO imposed penalty in the assessee u/s. 271BA. The C.I.T. (A) & Tribunal upheld the order of the AO and held that as the assessee had failed to make out a reasonable cause no penalty u/s. 271BA was leviable. (AY. 2003-04, 2005-06) *Ajit Singh Rana v. ACIT (2014) 61 SOT 251 (Asr.)(Trib.)*

Section 271C : Penalty for failure to deduct tax at source**2511 S.271C : Penalty – Failure to deduct tax at source – Not deducted based on the order of Tribunal – Held to be reasonable cause**

At the relevant time, there was a Tribunal decision and in view whereof the assessee was under a *bona fide* belief that tax was not liable to be deducted on commission/trade discount. It was held that there being a reasonable cause, penalty was rightly deleted. *CIT v. G.M. (Telecom) BSNL (2014) 101 DTR 401(All.)(HC)*

2512 S.271C : Penalty – Failure to deduct tax at source – Remuneration – Director – Not deducting the tax at source on the basis of declaration by Directors was held to be not justified – Levy of penalty was held to be justified. [Ss.192, 209]

A survey carried out by the department revealed that assessee-company had not deducted the tax on remuneration paid to the directors. The assessee-company submitted that directors had given a declaration to the company to the effect that they would pay the advance-tax and, therefore, TDS should not be made from the payments of remuneration to them. The advance tax was paid by them accordingly and thus, there was no loss of revenue. Accordingly, penalty under section 271C should not be levied on assessee company. The AO did not accept the above explanation on the ground that if above explanation would be accepted, then there would not be any meaning of TDS provisions under section 192. He thereafter levied the penalty under section 271C. The CIT(A) held that the plea raised by the directors showed only intention to pay the tax and it was not a confirmation of having paid tax and secondly, if said plea was accepted as a reasonable cause then provisions of Chapter XVII-B would become redundant. He upheld the penalty. On appeal Tribunal held that there is no case for interference in the orders passed by the CIT(A). (AY. 2003-04, 2004-05) *Standard Pesticides (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 64 SOT 282 (Ahd.)(Trib.)*

Section 271D : Penalty for failure to comply with the provisions of section 269SS

S.271D : Penalty – Takes or accepts any loan or deposit – Reasonable cause – Loan from agriculturists – Revenue verifying genuineness of creditors and accepting without doubting *bona fides* of transactions – Tribunal justified in deleting penalty. [S.269SS] 2513

Court held that where the authorities on the facts clearly accepted, after proper verification, that the sundry loans had been extended to the assessee by the agriculturists within the limits prescribed under section 269SS of the Act, the *bona fides* of the transactions were not doubted, the genuineness of the sundry creditors were also verified and the assessee had also given reasonable explanation for availing of such loan, which had been accepted by the authorities below and the facts were not in dispute. Deletion of penalty was held to be justified. (AY. 2007-08)
CIT v. Rashi Injection Moulders (2014) 368 ITR 527 (Mad.)(HC)

S.271D : Penalty – Takes or accepts any loan or deposit – Matter remanded to consider the explanation and decide accordingly. [S.269SS] 2514

Matter was remanded to the AO who shall proceed with the matter and decide the controversial issue either accepting or rejecting the explanation depending upon the nature of the explanation.
N. S. S. Karayogam v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 81 (Ker.)(HC)

S.271D : Penalty – Takes or accepts any loan or deposit – Reasonable cause – Assessee not able to demonstrate that he required cash urgently to meet his requirements – Tribunal was justified in confirming the penalty levied by the AO. [S.269SS] 2515

The assessee received substantial amount in cash from his creditors. The assessee was not able to demonstrate with sufficient material that he required cash urgently to meet his requirements. Thus, in absence of proof to show that the transaction was genuine and there was a reasonable cause for receiving the amount in cash, penalty under section 271D was leviable. (AY. 2007-08)
K. V. George v. CIT (2014) 102 DTR 167 / 42 taxmann.com 261 (Ker.)(HC)

S.271D : Penalty – Takes or accepts any loan or deposit – Receipt of share application money in cash far in excess of authorised share capital – Levy of penalty was held to be justified. [S.269SS] 2516

Tribunal held that in the absence of any evidence or any material showing that the amount received by the assessee company was share application money, it has to be held that intention of the assessee was not to receive share application money but to receive loan or deposit in the garb of share application money. The Tribunal further held that there was no business exigency or urgency for accepting cash, hence, there was no valid, taxable or reasonable cause for contravention of section 269SS. Penalty under section 271D rightly confirmed by CIT(A). (AY. 2007-08)
M. G. Estate (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT (2014) 148 ITD 77 / 164 TTJ 325 (Delhi)(Trib.)

Section 271FA : Penalty for failure to furnish annual information return

- 2517 **S.271FA : Penalty – Annual information return – Failure to furnish – Appeal is not maintainable to Tribunal – Appeal is maintainable to CIT (A). [S.246A, 253]**

DIT(I) levied penalty. In demand notice it was mentioned that an appeal could be filed under Part B of Chapter XX to Tribunal in Form No. 36. Against order of DIT(I) levying penalty the assessee filed appeal before Tribunal. Nowhere in section 253 it was mentioned that order passed by DIT(I) or any other officer of Income-tax department levying penalty under section 271FA was appealable before Tribunal, therefore, instant appeal was not maintainable before Tribunal. (AY. 2010-11)

SRO, Meppayur-Kozhikode v. DIT (2014) 64 SOT 10 (URO) / (2013) 26 ITR 341 (Cochin) (Trib.)

Section 271G : Penalty for failure to furnish information or document under section 92D

- 2518 **S.271G : Penalty – International transaction – Transfer pricing – Discretionary – Notice should specify the information or documents to be furnished – Deletion of penalty was held to be valid. [S.92D, IT Rule, 10D]**

The penalty imposable is discretionary and not mandatory. section 271G has to be interpreted reasonably and in a rational manner. Information or documentation, which is assessee-specific or specific to the associated enterprises, should be readily available, whereas other documentation or information relating to databases or transactions entered into by third parties may require collation or collection from time-to-time. There cannot be any end or limit to the documentation or information relating to databases or third parties. When there is general and substantive compliance with the provisions of Rule 10D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, it is sufficient.

CIT v. Leroy Somer and Controls (I) P. Ltd. (2013) 218 Taxman 216 / 261 CTR 561 / (2014) 360 ITR 532 (Delhi)(HC)

Section 272A : Penalty for failure to answer questions, sign statements, furnish information, returns or statements, allow inspections, etc.

- 2519 **S.272A(2)(c) : Penalty – Appeal – CIT(A) – Tribunal – Appealable orders – Levy of penalty – Appealable to CIT(A) and not Tribunal. [Ss.246A, 253]**

JDIT levied penalty under section 272A(2)(c) upon assessee. Against penalty order, assessee directly filed appeal before Tribunal. Tribunal held that penalty order passed by JCIT, who was lower in rank than CIT(A), was appealable before CIT(A) section 246A(1) (q), therefore, assessee had to file appeal before CIT(A) instead of directly filing before Tribunal. (AY. 2011-12)

Branch Manager, Punjab National Bank v. ITO (2014) 64 SOT 24 (URO) (Cochin)(Trib.)

Section 272B : Penalty for failure to comply with the provisions of section 139A

S.272B : Penalty – Permanent account number – Penalty for failure to comply with section 139A is linked to the deductor and not to the number of defaults and hence, it cannot be imposed by calculating the number of defective entries in each return and by multiplying them with ₹ 10,000 [S.139A]

2520

The respondent assessee could not quote certain Permanent Accounts Numbers (PAN) in the Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) returns as they were not furnished to him by the truck owners. The AO imposed penalty by calculating the number of defective entries in each return and by multiplying them by ₹ 10,000/- which amounted to ₹ 30,70,60,000. The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal on two counts-firstly that the AO had not specifically referred to any default or failure by the respondent assessee even when the said details were available, and secondly that the stand taken by revenue was contrary to the Central Board of Direct Tax (CBDT) circular dated 5-8-2008 *vide* No.275/24/2007-IT(B) which clarified that penalty under section 272B is linked to the deductor and not to the number of defaults and thereby, the High Court held that maximum amount of ₹ 10,000/- can be imposed on deductor

CIT (TDS) v. DHTC Logistics Ltd. (2014) 221 Taxmann 83 (Delhi)(HC)

Section 273A : Power to reduce or waive penalty, etc., in certain cases

S.273A : Penalty – Commissioner – Power to reduce or waive – Disclosure after confrontation – Rejection of waiver petition was held to be justified

2521

The assessee filed an application u/s. 273A(4) for waiver of penalty application, which was rejected by the Commissioner. The assessee in the instant petition prayed for the issuance of a writ of *certiorari* to quash that order. The HC, upholding the order of the Commissioner, held the assessee voluntarily made the disclosure of additional income only after he was confronted with documents recovered during the assessment proceedings of another assessee and hence, the Commissioner had rightly rejected the application for waiver of penalty under section 273A(4).

Yash Pal Khanna v. CIT (2014) 223 Taxmann 19 (P&H)(HC)

S.273A : Commissioner – Power to reduce or waive – Penalty – Concealment – Voluntary disclosure under search & seizure – Rejection was held to be justified. [S.148, 271(1)(c)]

2522

Search & Seizure operations were carried at the premises of the father of the partners of the assessee firm. After the operations, assessee voluntarily offered additional income. When the assessee got information from the Department for issuing notices u/s. 148 for all the AYs & also notice for penalty was issued to the assessee. Thereafter assessee filed application u/s. 273A for waiver of penalty. Rejecting the application penalty was levied by the AO and was confirmed by the CIT(A) as concealment and filing inaccurate particulars of income. Tribunal deleted the penalty on the basis of good faith and genuine hardship. On appeal in High Court, High Court reversed the decision of the assessee and held that the chain of events and concomitant conduct of the assessee was clear indicator that there was complete absence of good faith and when the assessee was placed in a very tight and rather vulnerable position consequent upon search & seizure

proceedings, only then the additional income was confirmed and held that that CIT was justified in rejecting prayer for waiver or reduction of penalty. (AYs. 1982-83 to 1986-87) *CIT v. Bansal Abhushan Bhandar (2014) 362 ITR 476 / 264 CTR 102(P&H)(HC)*

2523 **S.273A : Penalty – Commissioner – Power to reduce or waive – CIT is confined within the powers of only 273A and not governed by powers of AO – Order of Commissioner was set aside. [Wealth-tax Act, 1957, S.18B]**

Writ Petition was filed by the assessee for adjudicating an application u/s. 273A of the Act, by contending that CIT exercises powers specially conferred by various sub-sections, clauses and sub- clauses of section 273A of the Act and not by the powers of an AO and therefore while accepting or rejecting an application u/s. 273A of the Act, CIT was required to confine his consideration to factors referred in sub-section, clauses & sub-clauses of section 273A of the Act .CIT however rejected the application by assigning reasons that fall within the domain of the AO, without taking into consideration factors set out in section 273A of the Act. Allowing the writ, the Hon'ble court held that discretion conferred under section 273A has to be exercised within the informed parameters set out in sub-clauses(a),(b),(c) read along with Explanation-1, as prevalent on the date of the application, order of CIT referring to the very same factors that led the AO to impose penalty was liable to be set aside. An adjudication based on grounds, other than grounds referred to in section 273A would necessarily invite a valid charge that the order is null and void for an illegal exercise of jurisdiction, or a failure to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with statutory parameters set out in section 273A of the act. (AYs. 1985-86 to 1987-88)

Kahan Chand v. CIT(2014) 264 CTR 322 (P&H)(HC)

2524 **S.273A : Penalty – Concealment – Waiver – Application for several years – View of Commissioner holding that waiver can be done for one year at one instance was held to be not valid – Matter was set a side where the assessee has shown that the taxes and interest were paid. [S.220, 271(1)(c)]**

The assessee, filed returns belatedly in respect of income under the head “Income from house property”. She preferred an application seeking waiver of penalty and interest for those years. The Commissioner opined that having regard to S. 273A(3), the assessee was a persistent defaulter and, therefore, could not be granted the benefit of waiver sought for. He also proceeded on the footing that the assessee had neither paid tax nor made satisfactory arrangement for payment of tax. On a writ petition:

Held, allowing the petition, (i) that the question of the assessee having to pay the amounts of penalty and interest in the first instance in order to qualify for relief u/s. 273A did not arise. If such a construction were to be given, the object of conferring discretion itself would be defeated. (ii) The language of S. 273A(3) does not talk of one year but of one instance. The Commissioner proceeded on the assumption that the relief could be given once for one year was erroneous. (AY. 1980-81, 1988-89)

Asha Pal Gulati v. CBDT (2014) 361 ITR 73 / 98 DTR 361 / 265 CTR 332 / 226 Taxmann 97 (Delhi)(HC)

Section 275 : Bar of limitation for imposing penalties

S.275 : Penalty – Concealment – Bar of limitation – Refund – Assessee’s claim for refund of penalty with interest cannot be defeated by inaction of revenue – Assessee was entitled to refund of penalty amount with interest. [S.240, 244A, 271(1)(c)], 275(IA), Article 226]

2525

(i) What is provided by Section 275(1A) is that the order imposing or enhancing or reducing or cancelling the penalty may be passed on the basis of the assessment as revised by giving effect to the order in appeal. The concerned authority was thus required to make specific order for cancelling the penalty by giving effect to the order in appeal made in favour of the petitioner. However, failure of Assessing Officer or concerned authority to pass such order would not mean that the assessee has no right of refund on his becoming successful in appeal against the order of assessment. Further, if there is failure to exercise power under section 275(1A) within outer limit of six months, the assessee would be justified in approaching before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our view, word ‘MAY’ should be construed to create an obligation upon the authority to pass consequential order upon conclusion of the litigation.

(ii) Though time limit of six months is provided for the order contemplated to be passed of imposing, enhancing, reducing, cancelling penalty or dropping the proceedings for imposition of penalty for giving effect to any order passed in appeal, but when such order is to be passed in favour of the assessee, time limit for passing such order by the concerned officer should not come in the way of the assessee for cancelling the penalty on his getting success before the higher forum in appeal merely because the concerned officials failed to discharge his duty of giving effect to the order made in the appeal in favour of the assessee.

(iii) A “tax refund” is a refund of taxes when the tax liability is less than the tax paid. As held by the Courts while awarding interest, it is a kind of compensation of use and retention of the money collected unauthorisedly by the Department. When the collection is illegal, there is corresponding obligation on the revenue to refund such amount with interest in as much as they have retained and enjoyed the money deposited. (AY. 2005-06)

Shanti Enterprises v. ACIT (2014) 111 DTR 89 / 272 CTR 105(Guj.)(HC)

S.275 : Penalty – Limitation – Loan or deposit – Section 275(1)(c) which is applicable not section 275(1)(a) – Levy of penalty was barred by limitation. S.269, 269T, 271, 271E, 275(1)(a)]

2526

Search action was on June 1999, Block assessment was completed on June 2001. JCIT issued show cause notice dated 15th Jan, 2002 for levy of penalty under section 271D and 271E in the course of block assessment proceedings and levied penalty on 30th March, 2006. Before CIT(A) it was contended that penalties having been initiated in the month of January 2002, the same could not have been levied after 31st July 2002, which was clearly the last date for levying these penalties under section 275(1)(c) of the IT Act. Since the penalties have been levied as late as on 30th March 2006, i.e.; after three full years and eight months of the period of limitation, the same are clearly barred by limitation and hence bad in law. CIT(A) deleted the penalty levied on the ground

that the order was time barred as per section 275(1)(c) of the Act. Before the Tribunal the department challenged the order passed by the CIT(A) deleting the penalty under section 271D & 271E imposed for violation of sections 269SS & 269T on the basis that it was barred by the limitation under section 275(1)(c). Both the Tribunal Members did not agree on the issue, then on the difference of opinion between AM & JM, the issue was referred to third member. The third member followed the view taken by Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of Jitendra Singh Rathore (2013) 352 ITR 327 the Hon'ble High Court after considering the relevant provisions of the Act has concluded that the order imposing penalty was hit by the limitation prescribed under the Act under section 275(1)(c). The Tribunal confirmed the order of CIT(A) and deleted the penalty as it was section 275(1)(c) which is applicable and not section 275(1)(a).

ACIT v. Dipak Kantilal Takvani (2013) 145 ITD 35/ (2014) 159 TTJ 304(TM) (Rajkot)(Trib.)

Section 276B : Failure to pay tax to the credit of Central Government under Chapter XII-D or XVIIB

2527 S.276B : Offences and prosecutions – Dismissal of complaint – Documents in judicial custody

Revenue had filed a complaint before the Trial Court against the assessee-company and its director for failure to remit tax deducted at source. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint as the department had failed to produce the documents. On appeal, the High Court, restored the case to the Trial Court holding that, where documents listed against assessee could not be produced before Trial Court owing to fact that said documents were in judicial custody in some other cases, Trial Court was not justified in dismissing complaint for want of production of documents. (AY. 1988-89)

P. Jayanandan, ITO v. Sri Ramakrishna Steel Industries Ltd. (2013) 355 ITR 528 / (2014) 220 Taxmann 92(Mag.) (Mad.)(HC)

Section 276CC : Failure to furnish returns of income.

2528 S. 276CC : Offences and prosecutions – Firm – Partner – Failure to furnish return of income – Prosecution for failure to file ROI can be initiated during the pendency of assessment proceedings. The statement in the individual returns of the partners that the firm has not filed an ROI as its accounts are not finalised does not absolve the firm of prosecution for non-filing of ROI – Onus to prove circumstances – Prosecution proceedings were allowed to be continued and directed the Criminal Court to complete the Trial with in four months of receipt of the judgment. [Ss.139(1), 142,144, 148, 278E]

The assessee firm had two partners i.e. Ms. J. Jayalaitha and Mrs. N. Sashikala. Firm did not file its returns for the AYs. 1991-92 and 1992-93. Following the survey conducted in respect of the firm on August 25, 1992 a notice under section 148 was served on the firm, thereafter notice under section 142(1)(ii) was also served. AO made best judgment assessment on the firm and demanded tax and interest. For the assessment year 1993-94 also no return was filed and best judgment assessment was made. Department issued show cause notice for prosecution against the firm and two partners and filed compliant before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate against the firm and two partners for the

wilful and deliberate failure to file returns of income for the AYs 1991-92 and 1992-93 offences punishable under section 276CC and also for the AY. 1993-94. The firm and two partners filed discharge application before Chief Metropolitan Magistrate which was dismissed. The revision petition before the High Court was also dismissed. On appeal to Supreme Court the Court held that the assessee failed to file ROI within due date prescribed u/s. 139(1) or within time allowed in notices u/s. 142 and 148. Further opportunity to file return in prescribed time was also not availed of. Thus, the onus was on assessee to prove circumstances which prevented it from filing returns. Held, a case for wilful failure and offence was made out. Also, held that prosecution need not await culmination of assessment proceedings and that best judgment assessments made would not nullify liability of assessee to file return. Order of High Court was confirmed and appeal of assessee was dismissed. Court directed the Chief Metropolitan Court to complete the trail within four months from the date of receipt of judgment. (AYs. 1991-92 to 1993-94)

Sasi Enterprises v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 163 / 98 DTR 329/222 Taxmann 78 / 265 CTR 225 (SC)

S.276CC : Offence and prosecutions – Culpable mental state – Failure to furnish return of income – Onus is on the assessee. [S.278E] 2529

High Court held that since the assessee had not filed return of income timely, it could be prosecuted under section 276CC on presumption that there existed a culpable mental state as onus to prove that delay was not wilful was on assessee and not on department. (AY. 1994-95)

ACIT v. Nilofar Currimbhoy (2013) 219 Taxmann 102 (Mag.) (Delhi) (HC)

Editorial: SLP is granted to the assessee SLA(CRL) No. 3714 of 2013 dated 22-8-2014, *Nelofar Currimbhoy v. ACIT (2015) 228 Taxmann 57 (SC)*

Section 279 : Prosecution to be at instance of Chief Commissioner or Commissioner

S.279 : Offences and prosecutions – Sanction – Criminal proceedings are independent of recovery proceedings – Proceedings are allowed to be continued by Trial Court. [S.2(35)(b), 201(1), 201(1A), 276B, 278B] 2530

Criminal proceedings are not dependent on the recovery proceedings. Therefore, the pendency of proceedings initiated u/s. 201(1) and section 201(1A) is not a legal impediment to continue the criminal prosecution against the petitioner. Proviso to s. 279(1) is not a condition precedent for issue of an order of sanction by the CIT or the CIT(A) u/s. 279(1). Subsequent treatment of an individual as the principal officer of the petitioner company will not result in quashing of the proceedings against the individual who was treated as principal officer while initiating the proceedings. Proceedings are allowed to be continued by trial court. (AY. 2009-10 to 2011-12)

Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 98 DTR 245 / 265 CTR 240 (Karn.)(HC)

Section 281 : Certain transfers to be void

- 2531 **S.281 : Certain transfers to be void – Recovery of tax – Attachment and sale of property – Transfer of property during pendency of proceedings – Tax Recovery Officer has no power to declare sale deed void – Whether conveyance is a void document – Appropriate proceedings to be taken in Civil Court. [Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S.52]**

The assessee purchased a property. A demand was in relation to the assessment year was raised against the seller of the property. Pursuant to that assessment order a notice under section 281 was issued to the assessee to show cause why the sale deed executed by the seller in favour of the assessee should not be treated as a void document. The assessee's objection was overruled by the Income-tax Officer holding that there was inadequate consideration for the transfer of the property by the seller in favour of the assessee and, therefore, the conveyance was a void document. On a writ, allowing the petition the Court held that the Income-tax Officer had exceeded its jurisdiction in adjudicating the matter under section 281. He had no jurisdiction to declare the sale deed as void. Consequently, the order cannot be sustained and was quashed. Ratio in *TRO v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (Decd.) [1998] 234 ITR 188 (SC)* applied. The Income-tax Officer, in order to declare the transfer void under section 281 and being in the possession of the creditor, is required to file a suit for declaration to the effect that the transaction of transfer was void under section 281. An appropriate proceeding in accordance with law is required to be taken under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Manoj Kabra (Dr.) v. ITO (2014) 364 ITR 541/ 227 Taxmann 20 (Mag.) (All.)(HC)

- 2532 **S.281 : Certain transfers to be void – Recovery of tax – No power to declare transfer void – Only civil suit to lie – Revenue could not proceed with the auction sale of the properties under attachment to recover the dues of the defaulter**

Notices were issued to the tax defaulter during the years 1989 to 1994 for recovery of unpaid taxes. Such taxes were however, not paid. In the meantime, the defaulter sold certain properties to various persons including the petitioners. Such sale deeds were executed in May 1995. It was only thereafter that the Department attached the property in question by issuing an order dated May 22, 1995. On November 8, 1995, the Tax Recovery Officer passed an order declaring the sale transactions as void. This order was passed without any notice to the petitioners. On a writ petition:

Held, allowing the petition that the Revenue could not proceed with the auction sale of the properties under attachment to recover the dues of the defaulter.

Karsanbhai Gandabhai Patel v. TRO (2014) 362 ITR 374 (Guj.)(HC)

Section 281B : Provisional attachment to protect revenue in certain cases

- 2533 **S.281B : Provisional attachment – SLP of assessee was dismissed against the interim order of High Court was dismissed.**

SLP was filed by the assessee against the order of the High Court modifying the interim order of the provisional attachment u/s. 281B attaching the bank accounts and all the

book debts of the assessee and permitting the assessee to sell its assets to MI as part of transfer of devices and services business of the assessee's present company NC at global level to MI subject to the specified conditions including deposit of ₹ 2,250 crores in an escrow account was dismissed

Nokia India (P) Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 266 CTR 353(SC).

S.281B : Provisional attachment – Recovery of tax – Notice to pay arrears mandatory – No demand notice issued to assessee – Assessee not in default or deemed to be in default – No notice to pay arrears of tax – Provisional attachment not justified. [Ss.156, 220, Sch. II, Part III, R.51]

2534

To bring an assessee under the definition of “assessee deemed to be in default”, there should be a demand notice under section 156 of the Act, and only if the demand is not paid within the time frame, can the assessee be deemed to be in default. Even to make a provisional attachment of the property of the assessee, there should be a notice to pay the arrears as per Rule 51, Part III of the Second Schedule. Without any notice to the assessee, the provisional attachment cannot be made under section 281B.

Held accordingly, allowing the petition, that no notice under section 156 had been issued to the assessee. Since no demand notice was issued to term the assessee either as “assessee in default” or “assessee deemed to be in default”, the assessee would not come within the meaning of either “assessee in default” or “assessee deemed to be in default”. Without any notice of demand to pay arrears, the Assessing Officer had passed an order for provisional attachment in arbitrary manner. Similarly, in the absence of any notice to pay the arrears of tax in terms of Rule 51 Part III, of the Second Schedule, there could not be any provisional attachment under section 281B. Hence, the orders were liable to be quashed. (AY. 2010-11, 2013-14)

T. Senthila Kumar v. ITO (2014) 369 ITR 101 (Mad.)(HC)

Section 282 : Service of notice generally

S.282 : Service of notice – A strict procedure has to be followed for service by affixture. If done improperly, the notice and the resultant assessment order are null and void. [Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908)]

2535

As per sub-section (1) of section 282, the notice is to be served on the person named therein either by post or as if it was a summons issued by Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908). The relevant provision for effecting of service by different modes are contained in rules 17, 19 and 20 of Order V of CPC. Rules 17, 19 and 20 of Order V of CPC lay down the procedure for service of summons/notice and, therefore, the procedure laid down therein cannot be surpassed because the intention of the legislature behind these provisions is that strict compliance of the procedure laid down therein has to be made. The expression after using all due and reasonable diligence' appearing in Rule 17 has been considered in many cases and it has been held that unless a real and substantial effort has been made to find the defendant after proper enquiries, the Serving Officer cannot be deemed to have exercised 'due and reasonable diligence'. Before taking advantage of Rule 17, he must make diligent search for the person to be served. He therefore, must take pain to find him and also to make

mention of his efforts in the report. Another requirement of Rule 17 is that the Serving Officer should state that he has affixed the copy of summons as per this rule. The circumstances under which he did so and the name and address of the person by whom the house or premises were identified and in whose premises the copy of the summon was affixed. These facts should also be verified by an affidavit of the Serving Officer. The reason for taking all these precautions is that service by affixture is substituted service and since it is not direct or personal service upon the defendant, to bind him by such mode of service the mere formality of affixture is not sufficient. Since the service has to be done after making the necessary efforts, in order to establish the genuineness of such service, the Serving Officer is required to state his full action in the report and reliance can be placed on such report only when it sets out all the circumstances which are also duly verified by the witnesses in whose presence the affixture was done and thus the affidavit of the Serving Officer deposing such procedure adopted by him would also be essential. In the instant case, the whole thing had been done in one stroke. It was not known as to why and under which circumstances another entry for service of notice by affixture was made on 27-7-2012 when sufficient time was available through normal service till 30-9-2012. Nor there is any entry in the note-sheet by the AO directing the Inspector for service by affixture and had only recorded the fact that the notice was served by the affixture. It appears that the report of the Inspector was obtained without issuing any prior direction for such process or mode. In view of the above, it is clear that there was no valid service of notice u/s. 143(2) by way of affixation and the assessment made on the basis of such invalid notice could not be treated to be valid assessment and, hence, such assessment order deserves to be treated as null and void and liable to be quashed and annulled. (AY. 2008-09), *Sanjay Badani v. DCIT (2014) 35 ITR 536/50 taxmann.com 457 (Mum.)(Trib.)*

Section 288 : Appearance by authorised representative

- 2536 **S.288 : Authorised representative – Appellate Tribunal – Power – (Majority view) Special Bench has no jurisdiction to consider whether an ex-Member of the ITAT can practice before it. (Dissenting view) Special Bench is duty bound to answer the question. On merits, Ex-Member cannot be debarred from practice before it. [S.253,254, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Members [S.254, Recruitment and conditions of service) Rules,1963, R.13E]**
- In view of judgment in *Denesh Agarwal v. UOI (2012)206 Taxmann 29 (All.)(HC)*. Tribunal cannot decide *vires* of rule 13 of Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal Members Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1963, consequently the Tribunal has no inherent jurisdiction to decide question as to whether an Ex-member can appear before Income tax Tribunal Benches. Consequently, the answer to the question referred to the Special Bench is that Shri Deepak R. Shah cannot be debarred by the Tribunal from practising before the Tribunal Benches. (AY. 2002-03)
- Nanubhai D. Desai v. ACIT(2014) 104 DTR 1/162 TTJ 673/149 ITD 16(SB) (Ahd.)(Trib.)*

Section 295 : Power to make rules

S.295 : Power to make rules – Notification – Depreciation – Higher rate of depreciation – Not violative – Grant of higher depreciation was held to be valid. [S.32, Constitution of India, Article 14.]

2537

Notification No. 37 of 2009, dated 21st April, 2009 as well as Notification No. 10 of 2009 dated 19th Jan, 2009 were measures introduced to cater a particular situation that existed in the economy. It was necessary taking into account the impact of the global financial crisis on the automobile industry where recessionary trend was observed. Extension of benefit of higher depreciation of 50% to the acquisition of new commercial vehicles during the period specified in the above notifications cannot be viewed as discriminatory and therefore not violative of the rights of the assessee under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was a settled law that when it comes to laws relating to economic activities, they have to be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights.

R. Surendran v. UOI(2014) 369 ITR 536 / (2015) 114 DTR 34 (Ker) (HC)

Gift-tax Act, 1958

- 2538 **S.2(xxii) : Deemed gift-Firm – Dissolution – Allotment of house property. [S.45(4)]**
 The assessee not disputed the existence of firm. Assessee, his brother and their mother owning house property. Two brothers also owning open land. Mother and two sons constituting firm and contributing house property and open land towards their respective shares. House property exclusively allotted to mother in dissolution. Open land allotted to one of the sons and assessee allotted cash. On reference court held that assessee cannot be said to have gifted his one-third share in house property to mother is not liable to pay gift-tax. (AY. 1987-88)
Arjundas v. CGT (2014) 367 ITR 137 / (2015) 228 Taxmann 163(Mag.) (T&AP)(HC)
- 2539 **S.4(1) : Deemed Gift – Subscription of shares of a company at their face value**
 The assessee acquired shares of certain companies at their face value. According to the AO, the fair market value of said shares was equal to zero. He, thus, opined that there was a transfer of money from assessee to those companies without adequate consideration which brought assessee's case within the scope of section 4(1)(a). The Tribunal recorded a categorical finding that in the case of assessee, shares were sold on face value because the companies had no power to sell shares at less than the face value. In such circumstances, the assessee had not made any gift within meaning of section 4(1)(a). Hence revenue went in appeal before HC. The HC observed that it was apparent from a perusal of the section 4(1)(a) that certain conditions had to be fulfilled before any charge could be sustained. The conditions are that one property (other than cash) is transferred; and secondly, the said transfer should be otherwise than for adequate consideration. If these conditions are fulfilled, then the amount of gift is to be calculated as the difference between the value of the property transferred determined in the manner laid down in Schedule II and the consideration for the transfer. The fact that the property that is transferred has to be other than cash is borne out by computation provision in the latter part of the said clause. The computation provision contemplates that the property that is transferred must be capable of being valued in the manner laid down in Schedule II. It is apparent that the subscription to the shares at the face value by the assessee, who are the promoters of the company whose shares are subscribed for cannot, in a commercial sense, be regarded as inappropriate. If the company seeks to raise funds by way of equity, it can only do so by way of issuing shares at a value which is not less than the face value in view of section 79(1) of the Companies Act. If the company desires to issue shares at a discount, then, it can do so only by complying with the conditions provided for in sub-section (2) of section 79. There is force in the submissions of the assessee that the act of subscribing to the shares at the face value cannot be said to be one which shocks the conscience of the Court so as to justify the transaction as falling within the parameters of section 4(1)(a). Applying a broad commercial sense approach the only conclusion that can be reached is that there are no inadequate considerations. Hence HC held that the conclusion of the Tribunal to that effect is essentially a question of fact and does not give rise to any question of law. *CIT. v. O. P. Srivastava (2013) 357 ITR 1 / 263 CTR 693/(2014)222 Taxmann 55(Mag.) (All.)(HC)*

Interest-tax Act, 1974

S.2(5A) : Chargeable interest – Finance charges – Financing and leasing of vehicles business. [Ss.2(7), 4]

2540

Assessee Company was engaged in the business of “Financing & leasing”. On hire purchase transaction, the assessee charged “Finance Charges” as well as interest on repayment of Principal amount, which were shown in the Balance Sheet as capital receipt. AO charged interest u/s. 2(5) r.w.s. 2(7) of Interest tax Act, 1974 and consequently charged u/s. 4 of the IT Act as the interest charges on the money was financed to the hirer and it was chargeable to tax. CIT(A) upheld the AO. On appeal in Tribunal, Tribunal set aside the case by taking a view that the transactions involved were in the nature of contract of hire-purchases having an element of bailment as well as that of sale and therefore hire purchases transactions were not considered as lending or advancing of loans. On appeal in HC, HC reversed the decision of Tribunal and held that excess amount so paid by the hirer to the assessee was nothing but interest on loan. The amount so invested by the assessee in the purchase of vehicles was the amount of loan advanced by it to the hirer & also promising note was also executed by the hirer in the favour of the assessee company for total hire charges payable for the motor vehicle as collateral security and the assessee company was given the right to the said demand promissory note in favour of their bankers or any other party for valuable consideration and also sue upon the same. (AY. 1992-93, 1997-98)

CIT v. Commercial Motors Finance Ltd. (2014) 264 CTR 217 / 221 Taxmann 90 (Mag.) / 221 Taxmann 90 / 97 DTR 137(All.)(HC)

S.2(5B) : Credit institution-Finance company – One among primary objects of assessee to grant loans or advances to any company – Assessee is credit institution within meaning of “any other financial company” liable to pay Interest-tax

2541

The assessee, received substantial amount by way of interest, besides dividend income. The interest was derived from loans and advances made by the assessee to the company promoted. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s plea that the assessee did not come within the purview of the definition of the term “finance company”, under section 2(5B) of the Act and, therefore, was not a credit institution within the meaning of section 2(5A) of the Interest-tax Act. On appeal by revenue, allowing the appeal the Court held that, a bare reading of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the assessee, in no uncertain terms, made it clear that one among the primary objects of the assessee was to grant loans or advances to any company. The nature of business conducted by the assessee and the transaction of finance, for which interest had been received for all the assessment years running to several crores of rupees, established that the assessee was engaged in the business of financial company. Therefore, the interest earned by the assessee was liable to tax under the provisions of the 1974 Act. The assessee was

a credit institution falling within the definition of “financial company” under section 2(5B) and, therefore, liable to pay Interest-tax. (AY. 1993-1994, 1997-1998)

CIT v. Tamil nadu Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (2014) 368 ITR 545/ (2015) 231 Taxmann 368/120 DTR 410 (Mad.)(HC)

Editorial: SLP of assessee was dismissed. [SLA (C) Nos 2027 to 2051 of 2015 dated 14-2-2015) Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. v. CIT (2015) 231 Taxmann 224 (SC)

2542 **S.2(7) : Interest – Subsidy – Subsidy received from the RBI under the Export Credit (Interest Subsidy), 1968 is not liable to interest tax**

The assessee–bank is a subsidiary of the State Bank of India and has been in the industry for the past several years and is in the activity of advancing and receiving money from various persons. The assessee on receipt of the said money advances them to various exporters (packing credit) to carry out their export business. Under the scheme, the banks are required to charge interest at the specified rates provided under the said scheme. The RBI would give subsidy to the bank for shortfall in interest received from the customer. As per the facts, it is clear that such subsidy is not received from the customers and therefore, not relatable to what has been advanced/lent by the bank and therefore, cannot be treated as interest provided u/s. 2(7) of the Act or accordingly taxed. The CIT(A) and Tribunal uphold the order of the AO.

On Appeal, the Court held that subsidy received from the RBI cannot be equated with interest from customers and hence, the same cannot be taxed. State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. CIT (2015) 115 DTR 184 (Raj.)(HC)

2543 **S.2(7) : Interest on debentures – Notional interest – Not chargeable interest**

The assessee was engaged in the business of investment and share broking. AO held that interest on advance for shares should also be included for the purpose of the Act. The CIT(A) held in favour of the assessee. This was confirmed by the Tribunal. On appeals : Held, dismissing the appeals, that interest on debentures would not form part of chargeable interest under the Act. Notional interest could not be considered as part of chargeable interest under the Act.

Ratio in, CIT v. Sahara India Savings and Investment Corporation Ltd. [2010] 321 ITR 371 (SC), applied. (AY. 1993-94, 1994-95)

CIT v. Golden Investments Ltd. (2014) 369 ITR 544 (Mad.)(HC)

2544 **S.2(7) : Chargeable interest – Overdue interest on demand bills – Purchase of bills of exchange – Not on par with transaction of loans and advances – Not chargeable to tax. [S.4(1)]**

Held, that when the Act covers just the interest on loans and advances, transactions of purchase of bills of exchange could not be brought within its fold. Had Parliament been of the view that a transaction of purchase of bills of exchange is on par with transactions of loans and advances and wanted to levy tax on every amount recovered in the form of interest, penal or otherwise, it would have included such transactions

in the definition clause or in the other charging sections. That not having been done, the assessing authority could not be permitted to widen the scope of the Act. (AY. 1976-77 to 1993-94)

CIT v. State Bank of Hyderabad (2014) 367 ITR 128 / (2015) 232 Taxmann 358 / 115 DTR 181 (T&AP)(HC)

S.2(7) : Interest – Hire purchase – Not loan – Do not fall with in definition of interest 2545

Transaction entered in to by assessee with third party is hire purchase and not loan transaction hence interest tax is not applicable. (Followed *Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. State of Kerala* (1966) 17 STC 489 (SC), AIR 1966 SC 1178)

CIT v. M. G. Brothers (2014) 360 ITR 603 (AP)(HC)

S.4: Charging of interest – Stick loans – Interest not credited in profit and loss account as recovery extremely doubtful – Not chargeable to interest. [Ss.5, 6, Income-tax Act, 1961, S.43D] 2546

If the interest, recovery of which is doubtful, was not credited in the profit and loss account of the previous year, the interest would not fall within the scope and ambit of chargeable interest. (AY. 1975-76 to 1979-80, 1981-82 to 1986-87)

UCO Bank v. CIT (2014) 360 ITR 567 / 225 Taxmann 136 (Cal.)(HC)

S.8(3) : Chargeable interest-Finding that transaction was one of hire – Purchase – Interest-tax cannot be levied 2547

Held, dismissing the appeal, the Court held that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the transaction was a hire-purchase agreement. Interest-tax could not be levied. (AY. 1992-93 to 1994-95)

CIT v. N. K. Leasing and Construction P. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 720/51 taxmann.com 18/ (2015) 231 Taxmann 371 (T&AP)(HC)

Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998 Finance (No.2) Act, 1998.

2548 **S.88 : Pendency of proceedings-Revision petition – Designated authority – Pending – No power to reject the application if the conditions are satisfied.[Ss.95, 264]**

The assessee filed declarations in terms of the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998, before the due date as prescribed under the Scheme, as the application under section 264 was pending. CIT rejected the application stating that the subject matter of the relief sought for was not within the scope of the revisionary jurisdiction under section 264. On writ the Court held that designated authority is required to consider is whether the assessee is eligible to file such declarations in terms of the Scheme, and if so, the designated authority is left with no option but to process the declaration. Further, since the assessee had paid the disputed arrears of tax in terms of the Scheme, the designated authority was to consider the fact of the payment of arrears of tax and give appropriate credit. Order of CIT was set aside. (AY. 1995-96)

Y. V. Chander v. UOI (2014) 364 ITR 190 (AP)(HC)

K. Mahesh Kumar Raj (Dr.) v. UOI(2014) 364 ITR 190 (AP)(HC)

Rajwant Singh Gulati v. UOI(2014) 364 ITR 190 (AP)(HC)

Twin Cities Steel Re-Rolling Mills P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 190 (AP)(HC)

2549 **S.88 : Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998-Finance (No.2) Act, 1998. – Pendency of proceedings – Appeal addressed to wrong officer – Assessee was not informed – Rejection of application was held to be not justified. [S.89]**

Assessee filed an appeal addressed to wrong officer who has not disposed of on technical grounds. The assessee has filed the application under Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme on the ground that the appeal is pending before the Competent authority. Designated authority refused to grant benefit under Scheme on ground appeal not filed before competent authority on the ground that appeal was not filed before competent authority. On Writ allowing the petition, the Court held that, the Designated authority ought to have intimated officer to return papers to enable assessee to file appeal before appropriate authority. Assessee was not informed of its appeal not being accepted. Refusal to grant benefit under scheme on ground appeal not filed before competent authority was held to be not justified. Authorities were directed to consider declaration filed by assessee on merits. (AY. 1989-90)

Radha Vinyl P. Ltd. v. CIT (2014) 364 ITR 199 (AP)(HC)

S.90 : Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998-Finance (No.2) Act, 1998. – Designated authority – Power to levy interest though not quantified at earlier point of time – Levy of interest is terminable up to date of payment, which in case of Scheme is 31-3-1998. [S.156, 220(2)]

2550

While processing the declaration filed by the assessee under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998, the designated authority levied interest under section 220(2) of the Act, for the assessment years 1988-89, 1989-90 and 1991-92 though not quantified at earlier point of time. On a writ petition :

Held, dismissing the petition, that the designated authority is within his powers in adding up the interest as the levy of interest is terminable to the date of payment, which date in the case of the Scheme is March 31, 1998. He added the interest only up to March 31, 1998, for the purpose of computation and thereafter given necessary deduction as envisaged in the Act. There was no legal infirmity in the order passed by the designated authority. (AY. 1988-89 to 1991-92)

Punjab Crockery House v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 614 / 52 taxmann.com 71(AP)(HC)

S.90 : Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998-Finance (No.2) Act, 1998. – Pendency of proceedings – Revision petitions filed by assessee before Commissioner pending by time Scheme made available – Commissioner denying benefit of Scheme on ground he had no power to waive interest and no power to cancel penalty – Reasons outside scope of Scheme – Commissioner directed to extend benefit of Scheme. [S.234A, 234B, 234C, 264, 271(1)(c)]

2551

Revision petitions filed by the assessee under section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in relation to the assessment year 1995-96 were pending by the time the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998, was made operational. The Commissioner, however, declined to extend the benefit of the Scheme observing that he did not have the power to waive the interest leviable under sections 234A, 234B and 234C and that the notice issued to the assessee under section 271(1)(c) proposing to levy penalty was also outside his powers. On writ petitions :

Held, that the reasons for refusing to extend the benefit under the Scheme were outside the scope of the Scheme. The Commissioner was directed to extend the benefit of the Scheme to the assessee, after ensuring due compliance, as to payment of the stipulated amount. (AY. 1995-1996)

S. Prasad Reddy v. CIT (2014) 368 ITR 430/226 Taxmann 265 (T&AP)(HC)

National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005

2552 The National tax Tribunal Act is clearly breach of law declared by Supreme Court, it “crosses the boundary” and “encroaches the exclusive domain” of the High Courts is unconstitutional. Chartered Accountants and Company Secretaries are specialists on and accounts & facts and are not capable of arguing/deciding ‘Substantial questions of Law’- Not eligible to represent party to appeal in Tribunal. Composition of National tax Tribunal would have to be on the same parameters as Judges of the High Courts. Appointment process of members of the NTT was also held to be unconstitutional. Most of the provisions were held to be unconstitutional the remaining provisions have been rendered otiose and worthless, and as such the provisions of the NTT as a whole set aside. Parliament must ensure new Tribunal conforms to salient characteristics and standards of court sought to be substituted, failure to do so will be violative of “Basic structure” of Constitution. [Ss.5, 6, 7,8 &13, Arts, 225, 226, 227 247, 323B]

The Full Bench of the Supreme Court had to consider whether the National Tax Tribunals Act, 2005, which sought to take away the jurisdiction of the High Courts in tax matters was constitutional. The Full Bench has struck down the entire Act as being unconstitutional on the ground that though “Tribunalization” has been allowed subject to safeguards, the NTT Act “crosses the boundary” and “encroaches the exclusive domain” of the High Courts. In the course of the judgment, the Supreme Court had to consider whether Chartered Accountants could be appointed Members of the NTT and whether 13(1) of the Act which permitted Chartered Accountants to represent a party to an appeal before the NTT was valid in law. It also had to consider the application by the Company Secretaries that they are equal in all respects to the CAs and should also be permitted to appear and plead before the NTT. HELD by the Full Bench:

A perusal of the reported judgments shows that while deciding tax related disputes, provisions of different laws on diverse subjects had to be taken into consideration. The Members of the NTT would most definitely be confronted with the legal issues emerging out of Family Law, Hindu Law, Mohammedan Law, Company Law, Law of Partnership, Law related to Territoriality, Law related to Trusts and Societies, Contract Law, Law relating to Transfer of Property, Law relating to Intellectual Property, Interpretation of Statutes, and other Miscellaneous Provisions of Law, from time to time. The NTT besides the aforesaid statutes, will not only have to interpret the provisions of the three statutes, out of which appeals will be heard by it, but will also have to examine a challenge to the *vires* of statutory amendments made in the said provisions, from time-to-time. They will also have to determine in some cases, whether the provisions relied upon had a prospective or retrospective applicability. Keeping in mind the fact, that in terms of section 15 of the NTT Act, the NTT would hear appeals from the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the CESTAT only on “substantial questions of law”, it is difficult for us to appreciate the propriety of representation, on behalf of a party to an appeal, through either Chartered Accountants or Company Secretaries, before the NTT. The determination at the hands of the NTT is shorn of factual disputes. It has to decide only “substantial questions of law”. In our understanding, Chartered Accountants and Company Secretaries would at best be specialists in understanding and explaining issues pertaining to accounts. These issues would, fall purely within the realm of facts.

We find it difficult to accept the prayer made by the Company Secretaries to allow them, to represent a party to an appeal before the NTT. Even in so far as the Chartered Accountants are concerned, we are constrained to hold that allowing them to appear on behalf of a party before the NTT, would be unacceptable in law. We accordingly reject the claim of Company Secretaries, to represent a party before the NTT. We simultaneously hold s. 13(1), in so far as it allows Chartered Accountants to represent a party to an appeal before the NTT, as unconstitutional and unsustainable in law. (TC(C) No.150 of 2006, dated 25-9-2014)

Madras Bar Association v. UOI (2014) 109 DTR 273/ 227 Taxman 151 / 187 Com cas 426 (2014) (308) E.L.T. 209(FB)(SC)

Wealth-tax Act, 1957

- 2553 **S.2(ea) A vacant piece of land, even if it can be sold as, 'land' as such, continues to be a business asset as long as it is an integral part of factory.**
 Scope of section 2(ea) does not include 'urban land' but once land so held is part of industrial undertaking or factory, it ceases to have independent character as urban land; it is part of industrial undertaking or factory, it ceases to have independent character as urban land; it is a part and parcel of industrial undertaking, factory or business premises. A vacant piece of land, even if it can be sold as, 'land' as such, continues to be a business asset as long as it is an integral part of factory. (AY. 2004-05)
Dy. CIT v. HSIL Ltd. (2013) 38 taxmann.com 45 / (2014) 61 SOT 1 (Kol.) (Trib.)
- 2554 **S.7 : Valuation of assets – Immoveable property – Guest house – Residential flat at Mumbai – Impracticable to apply Rule 3-Reference to Valuation Officer and assessment by Valuation Officer was held to be proper. [S.16A, Schedule III, Rules, 3, 8, 20]**
 Assessee owned a residential flat at Mumbai which was used as a guest house. Assessee disclosed the value at ₹ 1.55 lakhs. AO referred the valuation to the Departmental valuer who valued at under Rule 20 of Schedule III valued flat at ₹ 2.61 crores. Appeal of assessee was dismissed by CIT(A) and Tribunal. High Court also affirmed the view of Tribunal. On appeal the Supreme Court held that AO was justified in holding that it was not practicable to apply Rule 3 and rightly referred matter to Valuation Officer under section 16A for determination of value of asset. Court held that the AO has discretionary power to determine Rule 3 or Rule 8 as applicable to a particular case. If AO is of opinion that it is not practicable to apply Rule 3, AO can apply rule 8 and value of asset could be determined in manner laid down in Rule 20 or section 16A. Appeal of assessee was dismissed. (AY. 1993-94)
Amrit Banaspati Co Ltd. v. CWT (2014) 365 ITR 515 / 126 Taxmann 147 / 226 CTR 113 (SC)
- 2555 **S.7 : Valuation of assets – Immoveable Property – Properties covered under ULC Act have to be valued at some discount**
 Valuation of properties covered under the Urban Land Ceiling Act is not to be valued at market rate as large properties have to be valued at discounted rate.
CWT v. H. H. Maharaja Jyotindrasinhji (2014) 102 DTR 393 (Guj.) (HC)
- 2556 **S.7: Valuation of assets – No change in circumstances – Valuation was accepted in earlier years – Same may be accepted.**
 The Tribunal was correct in accepting valuation in relevant assessment year as valuation accepted by Revenue in earlier years and there was no change in circumstances. (AY. 1982-83)
CWT v. Trustees of H. E. H. the Nizam's Jewellery Trust (2014) 361 ITR 668 / 225 Taxmann 118 (AP) (HC).

S.7 : Valuation of assets – Motor cars – 80 per cent of insurance value of motor cars to be accepted for wealth tax purpose instead of written down value of motor cars.

2557

The assessee declared the value of motor cars on the basis of the written down value as per the balance sheet. However, the AO adopted the insurance value as the value of the motor cars for the purpose of computing the net wealth of the assessee, the Commissioner of Wealth-tax (Appeals) confirmed the action of the AO. On appeal, the Tribunal directed the AO to adopt 80 per cent of the insurance value. (AYs. 2005-06, 2006-07)

Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. v. ACWT (2014) 61 SOT 34 (URO)/ (2013) 40 taxmann.com 533 (Mum.)(Trib.)

S.7(4) : Valuation of assets – Residential property – Exclusive possession – Valuation date – Benefit of exemption was not available. [S.7]

2558

Residential property must have been in exclusive possession of assessee for twelve months preceding the valuation date. Since the Assessee admitted that possession of property was given to purchaser of property, Assessee was not entitled to benefit of s. 7(4). Assessee entered in to agreement with promoter for development of property. Promoter was given possession of property. There was no transfer of right in the property. Assessee was liable to pay wealth tax on value of share in the property as co-owner. (AYs. 1987-88 to 1992-93)

Siddharth Pratap Chand v. CWT (2014) 360 ITR 30/102 DTR 140 (Delhi)(HC)

S.16(5) : Assessment – Best Judgment – Assessment – Opportunity of being heard [S.14(4)]

2559

In this case the department has raised 3 grounds and the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) confirming all the three grounds in favour of assessee the first ground relating to best judgment of assessment. The Tribunal held that the AO is bound to give opportunity to the assessee before passing the assessment order. On second ground the Tribunal held that both the plots of land are agricultural land and hence not covered by the definition of asset and as regards the last ground the assessee has produced evidence in the form of actual sale consideration to support his claim and the department has not placed anything on record to controvert the findings of the CIT(A), therefore no interference is warranted. (AY. 2003-04 to 2006-07)

ACWT v. Vasantrao Sudam Pingle (2013) 145 ITD 97 / (2014) 159 TTJ 805 (Pune)(Trib.)

S.18(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment – Succession to business otherwise than on death – Wealth-tax Act did not have any equivalent section as section 170 for recovery of dues of predecessor – Recovery proceedings was held to be bad in law. [IT Act, S.170(3)]

2560

Petitioner had taken over all assets and liabilities of brokerage business of one S.C. Mangal & Co. Assessing Officer directed petitioner to pay liabilities and dues of S.C. Mangal & Co. under Income-tax Act and Wealth-tax Act as successor of S.C. Mangal & Co. Petitioner contended that Assessing Officer should record a finding under section 170(3) that sum payable in respect of income of such business or profession could not be recovered from predecessor. The revenue contended that the assessee had taken over

the liabilities payable by S. C. Mangal & Co and therefore under common law recoveries can be made from the assessee. The assessee filed the Writ petition challenging the recovery proceedings. Allowing the petition the Court held that recovery proceedings cannot be initiated against the assessee successor for recovery of the dues under the Income-tax Act without the AO first passing an order under section 170(3). If and when any adverse order is passed by the AO the assessee would be entitled to file an appeal as provided under section 246. As regard the penalty under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, since the Wealth-tax Act did not have any equivalent section as section 170 for recovery of dues of predecessor from successor and recoveries sought to be made in instant case under Wealth tax Act were on account of penalty imposed under section 18(1)(c) of Wealth-tax Act, which were passed after date of transfer, same was not recoverable from petitioner. Court held that successor cannot be made liable for penalty imposed on predecessor, more so when penalty orders were passed after the date of transfer. (AY. 1991-92 to 1995-96)

Moongipa Securities Ltd. v. ACIT (2014) 97 DTR 241 / (2015) 228 taxmann 124 (Delhi) (HC)

- 2561 **S.18B : Commissioner – Waiver of penalties and interest – Section under Wealth-tax is *pari-materia* with Income tax and ratio of case laws under Income-tax Act would also apply to Wealth tax. [S.273A]**

Writ Petition was filed to challenge the order passed under 18B of the WT Act, 1957. The court held in this case that section 18B of the WT Act, 1957 is *pari-materia* to S.273A of the IT Act, 1961 and requires the CWT, while considering a prayer for reduction/waiver of penalty etc, court needs to consider parameters set out in section 18B of the Act. The ratio recorded that ratio relating to S.273A of the IT would necessarily apply u/s. 18B of the WT Act. Further the court held that CWT had committed an error as has been noticed in cases relating to section 273A of the IT Act, 1961. Therefore in view of the same the matter was set aside to CWT.

Inderjeet Mehta v. CWT (2014) 264 CTR 322 (P&H)(HC)

- 2562 **S.18B : Commissioner – Waiver of penalties and interest – Section under wealth tax is *pari-materia* with Income tax – CIT is confined within the powers of only section 273A and not governed by powers of AO – Order of Commissioner was set aside. [S.273A]**

Assessee filed Writ Petition praying for reduction/ waiver of penalty etc., to consider parameters set out in 18B of the Act. The Court held that CWT has committed the same error as has been indicated in cases, relating to section 273A of the IT Act. Therefore the impugned order was set aside and the matter was remitted to CWT to decide the matter afresh, in accordance with law. The court held that CWT has assumed the role of an AO and while dismissing the Petition and rejecting the plea for reduction/waiver of the amount of penalty imposed has referred to the very same factors that let the AO to impose penalty. Order of Commissioner was set aside. (AY. 1985-86 to 1987-88)

Kahan Chand v. CIT (2014) 264 CTR 322 (P&H)(HC)

S.21(1) : Assessment – Higher rate of tax – Trust deed providing for devolution of property to children of named women – Beneficiaries identified clearly – Provision relating to higher rate of tax under section 21(4) not applicable. [S.21(4).]

2563

The assessee-trust was created for the benefit of the Nizam's two grand daughters. The trust deed provided that the two women mentioned therein shall be entitled to wear the jewels on ceremonial occasions without any right of ownership. It was only the children of those two women who were conferred with the rights of beneficiaries in the form of ownership in the respective shares. The WTO levied tax applying section 21(4). The CIT(A) allowed the appeals filed by the trustees. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals preferred by the Revenue. On references:

Held, that the terms of the trust deed were clear and unambiguous. Even while conferring a limited privilege of wearing the ornaments in favour of the named women, the trust deed had clearly mentioned that on the death of the named women, the jewellery shall devolve upon their children. During the life time of the two women, no particular individual could be treated as the immediate beneficiary, particularly when the right was restricted to that of wearing and returning the jewels. Therefore, the assessments under section 21(4) were not valid. (AY. 1984-85 to 1988-89)

CIT v. Trustees of H. E. H. Nizam's Wedding Gifts Trust (2014) 367 ITR 147 / 52 taxmann.com 59 (T&AP)(HC)

Trustees of H. E. H. Nizam's wedding Gifts Trust and others v. CIT (2014) 367 ITR 147 / 52 taxmann.com 59 (T&AP)(HC)

S.21(1) : Assessment – Trust – Higher rate of tax – Tribunal finding beneficiary known and his share determinate – Pure question of fact. Section 21(4) not applicable. [S.21(4)]

2564

On a reference, the Court held that, that the Tribunal, as a matter of fact, found that Price Shamat Ali Khan alone had the remainder interest, definite and determinable interest in the assessee-trust. In as much as this aspect of the matter was a pure question of fact in the absence of a specific plea being raised by the Revenue assailing this fact as perverse, there was to be no interference with the finding of the fact as recorded by the Tribunal. Question was answered in favour of assessee. (AY. 1978-79 to 1988-89)

CIT v. Trustees of Prince Moazam Trust, Trustees of H. E. H. the Nizams Trust (2014) 367 ITR 416 / (2015) 230 Taxmann 323 (AP)(HC)

S.27 : Reference – Observation of High Court directing the reference was not conclusive-Tribunal is final fact finding authority. [S.256]

2565

While dealing with an application seeking to call for the reference of a question of law said to be arising from an order of the Tribunal, the opinion expressed in a *prima facie* view and the examination of the order of the Tribunal is only for the purpose of coming to a conclusion as to whether or not a question of law arises. As a matter of fact, consideration by the court at that stage is perfunctory. Merely because a reference was called for u/s. 256(2) at a later stage, observations made at that stage are not conclusive and not binding on the Court while answering the reference.

The Tribunal is the last fact finding authority and the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction u/s. 27 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, and section 256 of the 1961 Act has to accept the finding as recorded by the Tribunal as correct unless a specific question as to the perversity of such finding of fact has been raised in the given case. (AY. 1982-83) *CWT v. Trustees of H. E. H. the Nizam's Jewellery Trust (2014) 361 ITR 668/225 Taxmann 118 (AP)(HC)*

Interpretation of taxing statutes

- 2566 **Interpretation of taxing statutes – Concession given by counsel pertaining to question of law is not binding Amounts not deductible – Deduction at source-Matter set a side to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. [S.28(i), 40(a)(ia), 254(1)]**

On account of unexpected administrative exigencies, there was delay in deducting and remitting amount at source under various heads payable to Government account within time stipulated ,however, assessee deducted tax at source as stipulated under Chapter XVIIIB and remitted above amount to Government account with late fee stipulated in Act and Rules. Tribunal disallowed total expenditure simply based on concession given by counsel pertaining to question of law and proceeded to opine that expenditure could be claimed in year of payment of TDS. On appeal the Court held that Law involved and process of making interpretation was never discussed, further, consequences which would result in incurable hardship to assessee was never discussed. Matter remitted back to Tribunal for fresh consideration of relevant provisions. Court relied on the ratio of judgment in *Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet v. Noor Ahmed Sheriff AIR 2011 SC 2057*, for the proposition that if consent is given on question of law, it is not binding, if it is on question of fact then binding. (AY. 2008-09)

Time Ads & Publicity v. CIT (2014) 225 Taxmann 356 (Ker.)(HC)

- 2567 **Interpretation of taxing statutes – Exemption – Res-judicata**

Provision conferring exemption should be construed strict interpretation. Principle of *res judicata* and estoppel is not applicable to income-tax proceedings.

CIT v. Maharao Bhim Singh of Kota (2014) 365 ITR 485 / 268 CTR 369 / 45 taxmann. com 350 (FB) (Raj.)(HC)

- 2568 **Interpretation of taxing statutes – Words – Interpretation with reference to context**

A word or expression used in a legislative provision should be interpreted in the context in which the expression or the word is used to be in consonance and to further the legislative intent. The word “engaged” if it includes to mean “part of” would include activities which are integral and directly connected with mining but may not by themselves result in earning of income by the undertaking by way of winning or extraction. Extraction itself may be undertaken by a third person.

Dewan Chand Ram Chandra Industries P Ltd. v. UOI (2014) 364 ITR 70 / 223 Taxmann 161 / 270 CTR 569 / 108 DTR 170 (Delhi)(HC)

Interpretation of taxing statutes – Rules against retrospectively – Onerous provision – Not to be given retrospective effect 2569

Though provision for surcharge under the Finance Acts has been in existence since 1995, the charge of surcharge with respect to block assessments having been created for the first time by the insertion of the proviso to section 113 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by the Finance Act, 2002, it is clearly a substantive provision and is to be construed as prospective in operation. The amendment neither purports to be merely clarificatory nor is there any material to suggest that it was intended by Parliament.

CIT v. Vatika Township (2014) 367 ITR466/271 CTR 1 / 109 DTR 33 / 227 Taxmann 121(FB)(SC)

Interpretation of taxing statutes – Purposive construction of provisions granting relief 2570

A purposive interpretation should be given to the provisions of the Act while considering a claim for exemption from tax. [S.2(47), 54]

Sanjeev Lal v. CIT(2014) 105 DTR 305 / 365 ITR 389/225 Taxmann 239 / 269 CTR 1 (SC)
Shail Motilal (Smt) v. CIT(2014) 105 DTR 305/365 ITR 389(SC)

Interpretation of taxing statutes – Clear and unambiguous words 2571

A taxing statute should be strictly construed even if the literal interpretation results in hardship or inconvenience; common sense approach, equity, logic and morality have no role to play.

CIT v. Calcutta Knitweaves (2014) 362 ITR 673 / 101 DTR 217/ 267 CTR 105 / 223 Taxmann 115 (SC)

Interpretation of taxing statutes – Plain and unambiguous words – Grammatical meaning. 2572

It is well settled principle that Courts must interpret the provisions of the statute upon ascertaining the object of the legislation through the medium or authoritative forms in which it is expressed. It is well settled that Court should not while interpreting the provisions of the statute, assign its ordinary meaning. Words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to the contrary; efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature.

UOI v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 658 / (2014) 267 CTR 89 / 101 DTR 193 / 222 Taxmann 225 (Mag.) (SC)

DIT v. Reliance Infocom Ltd. (2014) 363 ITR 658 / 267 CTR 89 / 101 DTR 193(SC)

UOI v. Set Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. (2014)267 CTR 89 / 101 DTR 193(SC)

2573 Interpretation of taxing statutes – Meaning of words – Meaning given by body of accounts having statutory recognition can be adopted.

When a recognised body of accountants, such as the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, after due deliberation and consideration publishes certain material for its members, one can rely upon it. The meaning given by the Institute clearly denotes that in normal accounting parlance the word “turn over” would mean “total sales”. The sales would definitely not include scrap which is either to be deducted from the cost of raw material or is to be shown separately under a different head. There is no reason not to accept the meaning of the term “turnover” given by a body of accountants, having statutory recognition. If all accountants, auditors, businessmen, manufacturers normally interpret the term “turnover” as a sale proceeds of the commodity in which the business unit is dealing, there is no reason to take a different view.

CIT v. Punjab Stainless Steel Industries (2014) 364 ITR 144 / 103 DTR 49 / 268 CTR 113 / (2015) 229 Taxmann 423 (SC)

CIT v. Dharam Industries (2014) 364 ITR 144 / 103 DTR 49 / (2015) 229 taxmann 423 (SC)

2574 Interpretation of taxing statutes – Precedent-Decision of Supreme Court interpreting Excise Act – Not binding in interpreting provisions of Income-tax Act – Ambiguity – Object of legislation

While it is true that any law declared by the Supreme Court is one to be followed and applied by all Courts in the country in view of the mandate under article 141 of the Constitution of India, it is only such law that is declared in a particular context and in respect of the particular statutory provisions and not in general. An interpretation placed on a particular enactment cannot be just engrafted to the provisions of another enactment.

CIT v. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading P. Ltd. (2012) 252 CTR 281 / 209 Taxmann 190 / (2014) 362 ITR 204 (Karn.)(HC)

CIT v. B. Fouress P. Ltd. (2014) 362 ITR 204 (Karn.)(HC)

2575 Interpretation of taxing statutes – Documents – Agreements – General principles – Name of document is not conclusive

Nomenclature of a document or deed is not conclusive of what it seeks to achieve; the court has to consider all parts of it, and arrive at a finding in regard to its true effect. (Referred *Fuzhakkal Kutappu v. C. Bharavi (1977) AIR 1977 SC 105* and *Faqir Chand Gulati v. Uppal Agencies Pvt. Ltd. (2008) 10 SCC 345 (SC)*). In the Income-tax law the position is no different, as can be seen from the judgment of the Supreme Court in *CIT v. Motors and General Stores P. Ltd (1967) 66 ITR 692(SC)*, following *Duke of Westminster v. IRC (1935) 19 TC 490 (HL)* and *IRC v. Welsleyan General Assurance Society (1948) 16 ITR (E.C.)101 (HL)*

Radials International v. ACIT (2014) 367 ITR 1/103 DTR 316(Delhi)(HC)

Interpretation of taxing statutes-Binding precedent-Jurisdictional High Court is binding 2576
 A High Court must not brush aside the binding precedent or the judgment of a co-ordinate Bench simply because some of the arguments were either not canvased or if canvased were not considered. The binding precedent can be ignored only if it is *per incuriam*.

CIT v. Impact Containers Pvt. Ltd(2014)367 ITR 346 / 48 taxmann.com / 107 DTR 145 / 270 CTR 337 / 225 Taxmann 322(Bom.) (HC)

Interpretation of taxing statutes – Legal fiction. 2577

Scope of a deeming provision has to be restricted to what is expressly stated in such a provision. There can be no inference or intendment as regards such a provision. Such a deeming provision cannot be extended beyond what is expressly stated therein. (AY. 2009-10)

Jai Surgicals Ltd. v. ACIT (2014)150 ITD 60 / 106 DTR 333 / 163 TTJ 724(Delhi)(Trib.)

Interpretation – Precedent – If there is a conflict of judicial opinion, the view in favour of the assessee must be taken 2578

Tribunal held that there is a judgment of Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in favour of the Revenue, namely, *CIT v. Madhya Bharat Energy Corporation Ltd* reported in (2011) 337 ITR 389 (Del.) which states that the non issuance of notice u/s. 143(2) does not vitiate the assessment. However, there are also two subsequent judgments of Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court directly in favour of the assessee, as regards the service of notice u/s. 143(2). The Hon'ble H. C. held that service of notice u/s. 143(2) is mandatory. If there is a conflict of judicial opinion, the view in favour of the assessee must be taken.

DCIT v. Silver Line (Delhi)(Trib.); www.itatonline.org

The Central Excise Act, 1944

2579

Stay – Officer should not take recovery action before expiry of statutory period – Action to recover tax before expiry of statutory period for filing appeal is high-handed & in defiance of law.

Though the assessee had a statutory period of three months to file an appeal along with stay application before the CESTAT, the Asst. CST directed the assessee to pay the demand within two days and threatened to take coercive action to recover the dues. The assessee filed a Writ Petition contending that the AO's action was in breach of Circular dated 1-1-2013 issued by CBEC, and the demand was premature because the assessee had the right to file an appeal within 3 months. HELD by the High Court allowing the Petition:

(i) The AO's insistence that the assessee should pay the amount is contrary to the provisions of the Finance Act which provides for a period of 3 months to file an appeal to the Tribunal. It is also contrary to the circular dated 1-1-2013 issued by the CBEC. The impugned communications, to say the least, is high handed. The statute has advisedly provided a period of three months to an assessee to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority and also obtain a stay. This is with a view to enable the assessee to seek proper advice and considered opinion on the adjudication order before taking a decision and then challenging the adjudication order in appeal proceedings;

(ii) In case, the Revenue is allowed to adopt coercive measures and/or if the assessee is required to pay tax determined immediately, it would lead to injustice to an assessee, as his opportunity to obtain a stay from the Appellate Authority would stand foreclosed. Moreover, the inherent right of an appellate authority to stay the order being appealed against would be rendered futile. In fact, this Court in *Mahindra & Mahindra Limited (1959-ELT-505)* had directed the Revenue to return the amounts recovered by encashing the bank guarantee of the assessee as it was done before the expiry of three months to file an appeal;

(iii) The officers of the Revenue would do well to realise that their job is much more than merely collecting the tax. They are officers of the State, administering the Finance Act, 1994 and fairness in approach to the taxpayers and acting in accordance with the Rule of Law is a *sine-qua-non* in discharge of all their functions;

(iv) The impugned communications are not only in defiance of the CBEC circular dated 1-1-2013 but also in breach of the statutory provisions which gives a period of 3 months to enable the aggrieved party to file an appeal before the appellate authority.

Tata Teleservice (Maharashtra) Ltd. v. Ministry of Finance (2014) 43 taxmann.com 410/44 GST 548/307 ELT 90(Bom.) (HC)

Service Tax – Finance Act, 1994

S.65 : Providing Car Parking facilities – Non Taxable services – At Airport. [S.56]

2580

Assessee was engaged in the business of management of cars/ International Airport facilities at Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi *vide* agreements with airport authorities. As per the Service Tax authorities, it was taxable service w.e.f. 10-9-04. The respondent investigated into the issue and became aware of two agreements. It alleged that providing the car parking facility was covered under Airport service as defined u/s. 65 (10J)(ZZZM) of the Finance Act and accordingly raised service tax demand along with it penalties u/s. 76, 77 of Finance Act was also levied by them. The said order was confirmed by the CIT (A), which was confirmed by the Tribunal also. On Revenue's appeal in HC, HC reversed the finding of lower authorities and held that Explanation (1)(V)(C) to section 65(105)(ZZZ) makes it clear beyond any doubt, that Parliament had intended that renting of immovable Property was to be taxed, for the first time from 1/6/07. Its intention that parking was to fall within the expression "renting of immovable property" again w.e.f. 1-6-07 was also clear from section 65(909). Yet, the definition of taxable services, while introducing section 65(105)(ZZZ) specifically excluded parking services. Therefore Parking Services regardless of wherever it was carried on stands excluded in entirety. Therefore it was not open for the Revenue to argue that it falls within the expression "airport services" u/s. 65(105)(ZZZ). Therefore demands and penalty imposed upon as through impugned order and Commissioner's order was set aside.

Mahesh Sunny Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. CST (2014) 267 CTR 327 / 100 DTR 395 / 44 GST 234/ 71 VST 215 / 43 taxmann.com 80 (Delhi)(HC)

S.65 : Levy of service-tax on Advocates is constitutional [Constitution of India, Art, 13, 14, 19(1) (g), 39A, 226, 246, 265, 268A, Finance Act, 1994, S 65 (105) (zzzzm), 66, 66B]

2581

A Writ Petition was filed to challenge the levy of service-tax on advocates. It was claimed that an advocate renders services which cannot be said to be commercial or business like. They cannot be equated with the service providers mentioned in the Finance Act 1994. It was also contended that advocacy is not a business but a profession and a noble one. An advocate is a part and parcel of the administration of justice and which is a sovereign or regal function and hence providing for a Service Tax on advocates would mean that their services will no longer be available or accessible to those seeking justice from a Court of law. That would defeat the Constitutional guarantee of free, fair and impartial justice. HELD by the High Court dismissing the Petition:

(i) The legislature has neither interfered with the role and function of an advocate nor has it made any inroad and interference in the Constitutional guarantee of justice to all. The services provided to an individual client by an individual advocate continues to be exempted from the purview of the Finance Act and consequently service tax but when an individual advocate provides service or agrees to provide services to any business entity located in the taxable territory, then, he is included and liable to pay Service Tax. The classification between those who can afford professional legal services and are ready

to pay the fees or charges demanded without seeking any reduction or concession and those who cannot pay legal fees but can at best bear meagre expenses has been made. This classification has a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved.

(ii) The economic realities are that even, legal services are rendered in an organised manner. When advocates group organise themselves by making huge investments in acquiring immovable properties for professional work, heavy overheads, in the form of clerical and support staff, with facilities of cabins or rooms, then, legal services are rendered to organised groups or business entities predominantly. These persons can very well pay the fees and charges without any demur or complaint;

(iii) What holds good for chartered accountants and architects must equally apply to other professionals such as advocates, and who too are well conscious of their status.

P. C. Joshi v. UOI (2015) 273 CTR 113/113 DTR 41 (Bom.)(HC).

Advocates Association of Western India & Ors v. UOI (2015) 273 CTR 113 / 113 DTR 41 (Bom.)(HC)

Bombay Bar Association & Anr v. UOI (2015) 273 CTR 113 / 113 DTR 41 (Bom.)(HC)

Editorial: Supreme Court stayed the operation and implementation of order of Bomaby High Court. (SLA No 13944 / 2015 dated 10-8-2015

2582 **S.65(50) : Levy of service tax on restaurants – Constitutional validity – Held valid. [S.65(105)(zzzzv), Constitution of India, Arts 14,19(1)(g), 226, 248, 300A,366 (29A)(f), Sch. vii, list-I, Entry 97 & Schd. VII, List II, Entry 54.**

The assessee filed Writ Petition under Art 226, of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner were claiming a writ order or direction declaring cl. (zzzzv) of section 65(105) of the Finance Act,2010 as *ultra vires* of the Constitution of India be struck down as violative of the mandate of art 14, 19(1)(g), 45, 246, 265, 300A & 366(29A)(f) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner No.1 is an assessee registered under the Trade Union Act, 1926 and claims that it has 2000 hotels in greater Mumbai & within the State of Maharashtra. They are all holding licences to serve the foreign liquor. The Petitioner 2 is one of the restaurant serving food and drinks. Dismissing the WP, the High Court held that levy of service Tax on restaurants with air condition facility serving alcoholic beverages will attract Service Tax. Inclusive definition in Art. 366(29A)(f) was inserted so as to leave any room for argument that a tax on sale or purchase of goods does not include a tax on the supply of goods which may be food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating), by way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever. Section 65(105)(zzzzv) of the Finance Act, 1994 as inserted by the Finance Act,2011 provides for service Tax on any service provided to any person by a restaurant, having the facility of air-conditioning in any part of the establishment, at any time during the Financial year, which has license to serve alcoholic beverages, in relation to serving of food or beverage, including alcoholic beverages or both, in its premises is constitutionally valid.

India Hotels & Restaurants Association & Anr. v. UOI (2014) 268 CTR 241 / 103 DTR 65 / 34 STR 522 / 45 GST 455 / 71 VST 386 / 44 taxmann.com 455 (Bom.)(HC)

Allied Laws

Advocates Act, 1961

Advocates – Representation-Interim order passed that non-advocates cannot appear before VAT authorities or advertise services relating to filing of returns / arguing before VAT authorities[Advocates Act, 1961, section 33,U.P. Value added Tax Rules 2008, R.73,79(3)]

2583

The Tax Lawyers Association filed a Writ Petition claiming that Rule 73 read with Rule 79(2)(f) of the U.P. Value Added Tax Rules 2008 which permits outsiders to practice in the field of Law before the VAT Authorities under the VAT Act is *ultra vires* section 33 of the Advocates Act 1961 which provides that only Advocates are entitled to practice before any Court or authority. It was claimed that under the garb of the impugned Rule, outsiders have been permitted to appear before the authorities under the VAT Act to practice in the field of Law. Attention was drawn to certain leaflets which seem to be advertisement by certain persons who are not registered Advocates inviting assesseees with regard to filing of return on payment of ₹ 400 and odd. It was submitted that under the garb of said Rule, persons who are not skilled lawyer or have no knowledge in the field of Law, are appearing before the authority under the VAT Act, are spoiling the academic atmosphere of the profession. HELD by the Court admitting the Petition: As an interim measure, we direct the respondents that no person whosoever, may be permitted to advertise in the Newspaper or any leaflet, inviting assesses for the purpose of filing of return or arguing before the authority under the VAT Act. Any person, who is not a registered advocate, shall not be permitted to appear before the Authority under the VAT Act.

Tax Lawyers Association v. State of U.P. (2014) 49 taxmann.com 307 / 48 GST 92 (All.) (HC)

Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.

2584 S.21 : Misconduct of Members of Institute

Petitioner No. 1 was a partner of PWC, a firm of Chartered Accountants. PWC were statutory auditors of 'G' Bank. Institute, respondent No. 1, received information from Reserve Bank of India (RBI) about certain irregularities alleged to have been committed by petitioners in relation to statutory audit done by them on behalf of PWC of 'G' Bank. Respondent No. 1 formed a prima facie opinion that petitioners were guilty of misconduct and in accordance with section 21 referred matter to its Disciplinary Committee. During pendency of proceedings before Disciplinary Committee, provisions of Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 relating to misconduct and procedure and penalties, underwent substantial modification and amendments by Chartered Accountants (Amendment) Act, 2006. By amended Act, section 21 of unamended Act was replaced with sections 21, 21-A, 21-B, 21-C and 21-D. In another case wherein similar issue was involved, question as to whether amended or unamended provisions of sections 21, 22 and 22-A would apply was pending adjudication before Supreme Court. Petitioners thus filed instant petition contending that unless and until Supreme Court decide said matter, proceedings adopted by respondent No. 1 against them should also be stayed. The Court held that if petitioner's contention was accepted, it would result in a standstill of numerable proceedings before various Courts and Tribunals all over country merely due to pendency of appeal before Supreme Court. Even otherwise, if Supreme Court comes to a conclusion that procedure to be adopted by respondent No. 1 was different from what it adopted, still entire evidence collected may be of some use though it might necessitate holding a fresh inquiry adopting new procedure. Therefore, there was no reason for adjourning proceedings before respondent No. 1 *sine die* and, consequently, instant petition was dismissed.

Partha Ghosh v. ICAI (2014) 220 Taxmann 50 (Bom.)(HC)

Constitution of India

Art. 366 : Works contract – Distinction between “contract for sale of goods” and “works contract” explained.

2585

A Constitutional Bench of 5 Judges of the Supreme Court had to consider whether the law laid down by a three-Judge Bench in *State of A.P. v. Kone Elevators (India) Ltd. (2005) 3 SCC 389* that a contract for manufacture, supply and installation of lifts in a building is a “contract for sale of goods” and not a “works contract” is correct or not. HELD by the Constitution Bench over-ruling the three-Judge Bench judgement:

(i) In the case of a “contract for sale of goods”, the entire sale consideration is taxable under the sales tax or value added tax enactments of the State legislatures. In the case of a “works contract”, the consideration paid for the labour and service element has to be excluded from the total consideration received and only the balance is chargeable to sales tax or value added tax;

(ii) Four concepts have clearly emerged from the numerous judgments of the Supreme Court on the point. They are (a) the works contract is an indivisible contract but, by legal fiction, is divided into two parts, one for sale of goods, and the other for supply of labour and services; (b) the concept of “dominant nature test” or, for that matter, the “degree of intention test” or “overwhelming component test” for treating a contract as a works contract is not applicable; (c) the term “works contract” as used in Clause (29A) of Article 366 of the Constitution takes in its sweep all genre of works contract and is not to be narrowly construed to cover one species of contract to provide for labour and service alone; and (d) once the characteristics of works contract are met with in a contract entered into between the parties, any additional obligation incorporated in the contract would not change the nature of the contract;

(iii) The “dominant nature test” or “overwhelming component test” or “the degree of labour and service test” are really not applicable. If the contract is a composite one which falls under the definition of works contracts as engrafted under clause (29A) (b) of Article 366 of the Constitution, the incidental part as regards labour and service pales into total insignificance for the purpose of determining the nature of the contract; (iv) On facts, the three-Bench judgment erred in taking the view that the major component was the equipment and that the skill and labour employed for converting the main components into the end product were only incidental. The principal logic applied, i.e., the incidental facet of labour and service is not correct because in all the cases, there is a composite contract for the purchase and installation of the lift. The price quoted is a composite one for both. Various technical aspects go into the installation of the lift. There has to be a safety device. In certain States, it is controlled by the legislative enactment and the rules. In certain States, it is not, but the fact remains that a lift is installed on certain norms and parameters keeping in view numerous factors. The installation requires considerable skill and experience. The labour and service element is obvious. The preparatory work has to be done taking into consideration as to how the lift is going to be attached to the building. The nature of the contracts clearly exposit that they are contracts for supply and installation of the lift where labour and service element is involved. Individually manufactured goods such

as lift car, motors, ropes, rails, etc. are the components of the lift which are eventually installed at the site for the lift to operate in the building. In constitutional terms, it is transfer either in goods or some other form. In fact, after the goods are assembled and installed with skill and labour at the site, it becomes a permanent fixture of the building. However, if there are two contracts, namely, purchase of the components of the lift from a dealer, it would be a contract for sale and similarly, if separate contract is entered into for installation, that would be a contract for labour and service. But, a pregnant one, which is a composite contract for supply and installation, has to be treated as a works contract, for it is not a sale of goods/chattel simpliciter. It is not chattel sold as chattel or, for that matter, a chattel being attached to another chattel.

Kone Elevator India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of T.N.(FB 5 Judges)(SC) ,www.itatonline.org

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

2586

S.15(2) : Contempt – Income tax Appellate Tribunal – Proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are quasi-criminal in nature and hence, no action under the Act can be taken unless a clear case of criminal contempt is made out – The lawyers and other representatives of the litigants in the subordinate courts and Tribunals are expected to conduct themselves in a manner which protects the dignity and decorum of the judicial proceedings.

The Lucknow Income Tax Tribunal Bar Association passed a resolution, and addressed a letter to the President of the ITAT, stating that they had resolved not to appear before the Bench in which Shri B. R. Jain, Accountant Member, is one of the members. It was requested that the appeals be adjourned till such time a decision is taken by the President of the ITAT. The senior Member of the Bench, Hon'ble Sunil Kumar Yadav adjourned the matter. However, the other Member of the Bench, Shri. B. R. Jain, passed a separate order stating that certain practitioners had joined hands in "forum shopping" and that the allegations against him were "motivated, false, frivolous" and unacceptable. He also stated that being a junior member of the Bench, he was not objecting to the adjournment granted by the Sr. Member. Thereafter, one Mr. S. K. Garg, Advocate, filed a representation to the President in which he denounced the resolution passed by the Bar against Hon'ble B. R. Jain and claimed that B. R. Jain was "judicious". At the same time, S. K. Garg made a complaint against Hon'ble S. K. Yadav and cited instances which according to him showed impropriety and judicial indiscipline by Hon'ble S. K. Yadav. Hon'ble S. K. Yadav took the view that the representation of S. K. Garg contained "scandalous and scurrilous allegations" with the object of "scandalising" the Lucknow Bench and "intention to create fear/terror in the mind of members of the ITAT". Though Hon'ble Sunil Kumar Yadav proposed an order for making reference for initiation of criminal contempt proceedings against the opposite parties u/s. 15(2) of the Contempt of Court Act, Hon'ble B. R. Jain did not concur with the proposed order though he also did not pass any dissent thereon. Accordingly, Hon'ble Sunil Kumar Yadav filed a contempt petition in the High Court against S. K. Garg in his individual capacity. Hon'ble S. K. Yadav also passed an order stating that "in order to maintain the dignity of the institution" no appeal would be heard "unless and until Bar Association passes a resolution condemning this act of a particular advocate and reposing confidence

in the bench” However, Hon’ble B. R. Jain passed a separate order disassociate and disagreeing with the view of Sunil Kumar Yadav. HELD by the Court on the said contempt petition:

(i) The reference made by Hon’ble Sunil Kumar Yadav singly is not a reference by a subordinate Court within the meaning of section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act for the reason that the other member of the Division bench has not concurred with it. While this does preclude the Court from taking *suomotu* cognizance of alleged criminal contempt, the facts and circumstances do not make out a case for criminal contempt against the opposite parties. Certain startling facts are noted. One Bar Association passes a resolution against the conduct of one member of the ITAT whereas members of another Bar Association condemn the same and lodge the complaint against the other member of the ITAT. Both the members of the Tribunal did not concur in their views on various occasions. The complainant who is the Judicial Member of the ITAT has gone even to the extent of saying in his order that the Tribunal will not hear any appeal unless and until Bar Association passes the resolution condemning the particular act of an Advocate of moving the representation against him. The complainant has even observed in the said order that Bar Association should pass the resolution in a particular manner giving assurance that in case of decision in the any case, no such type of representation or complaint will be made to the President of ITAT and further that the protection be give Chartered Accountants Act from President of the ITAT with the assurance that such type of complaint/representation would not be entertained and erring Advocate will be dealt with severely. The said view expressed by the complainant S. K. Yadav, who is Judicial Member of the ITAT, though was not agreed to by the other member, namely, B. R. Jain, Accountant Member, however, such observations, as the one made by the complainant in a judicial order are unacceptable. Further, the instructions issued by the complainant, in his capacity as senior member of the Tribunal to the Assistant Registrar, ITAT, Lucknow to obtain consent of the individual assesseees in respect of the application moved by the opposite party No.1 regarding transfer of cases from Lucknow Bench to some other Bench, also does not appear to be a sound act on his part, if measured or judged on acceptable judicial standards;

(ii) The language used in the representation dated 28-8-2012 also cannot be said to be in good taste, which we also do not appreciate, as the words like “deeper evil”, “conspiracy” and “ill motivated” have been used but the same in itself may not amount to criminal contempt. The emphasis of the representation made by the opposite party No.1, *prima facie*, appears to be on “judicial precedences” not allegedly being followed by the complainant and on the alleged “judicial indiscipline” and “impropriety”. It is well settled that proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are quasi-criminal in nature and hence, no action under the Act can be taken unless a clear case of criminal contempt is made out;

(iii) The lawyers and other representatives of the litigants in the subordinate courts and Tribunals are expected to conduct themselves in a manner which protects the dignity and decorum of the judicial proceedings. Use of words, as narrated above, by

the opposite party No.1 in his representation is not worthy of approval. We express our hope that lawyers will always be guided by the following observations of Supreme Court in *Hargovind Dayal Srivastava v. G. N. Verma AIR 1977 SC 1334* “It is the duty of lawyers to protect the dignity and decorum of the judiciary. If lawyers fail in their duty, the faith of the people in the judiciary will be undermined to a large extent. It is said that lawyers are the custodians of civilisation. Lawyers have to discharge their duty with dignity, decorum and discipline”. (Case No. 310 of 2013, dated 28-5-2014.)

State of U. P. v. S. K. Garg (2014) 89 CCH 115 (All.)(HC), www.itatonline.org

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,

S.197 : Judgment or order – High Court – Signature – Pronouncement – Despite pronouncement of verdict in open Court & signing of draft judgment, Judge entitled to alter verdict until judgment is signed & sealed – Unless the judgment is signed and sealed, it is not a judgment in strict legal sense and therefore, in exceptional circumstances, the order can be recalled and altered to a certain extent. [S.362]

2587

In a case relating to the prosecution of police personnel for alleged dereliction of duty, the High Court dictated an order in open Court in which it held that in the absence of sanction of the State Government u/s. 197 of the CrPC, the prosecution was not permissible and the petitioner had to be acquitted. However, later, the said order was recalled by the Court *suo moto* on the ground that the issue required to be examined further. The Petitioner challenged the order of recall on the ground that once the order had been dictated in open court, a review or recall is not permissible in view of s. 362 CrPC which provides that a judgment or order passed in a criminal case cannot be reviewed or recalled once it has been pronounced and signed. HELD by the Supreme Court dismissing the appeal:

Up to the moment the judgment is delivered Judges have the right to change their mind. There is a sort of '*locus paenitentiae*' and indeed last minute alterations often do occur. Therefore, however much a draft judgment may have been signed beforehand, it is nothing but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment of the Court. Only then does it crystallise into a full fledged judgment and become operative. It follows that the Judge who "delivers" the judgment, or causes it to be delivered by a brother Judge, must be in existence as a member of the Court at the moment of delivery so that he can, if necessary, stop delivery and say that he has changed his mind. There is no need for him to be physically present in court but he must be in existence as a member of the Court and be in a position to stop delivery and effect an alteration should there be any last minute change of mind on his part. If he hands in a draft and signs it and indicates that he intends that to be the final expository of his views it can be assumed that those are still his views at the moment of delivery if he is alive and in a position to change his mind but takes no steps to arrest delivery. But one cannot assume that he would not have changed his mind if he is no longer in a position to do so. A Judge's responsibility is heavy and when a man's life and liberty hang upon his decision nothing can be left to chance or doubt or conjecture; also, a question of public policy is involved. As we have indicated, it is frequently the practice to send a draft, sometimes a signed draft, to a brother Judge who also heard the case. This may be merely for his information, or for consideration and criticism. The mere signing of the draft does not necessarily indicate a closed mind. We feel it would be against public policy to leave the door open for an investigation whether a draft sent by a Judge was intended to embody his final and unalterable opinion or was only intended to be a tentative draft sent with an unwritten

understanding that he is free to change his mind should fresh light drawn upon him before the delivery of judgment.

Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit. v. State of Gujarat (2014) 104 DTR 2 / 269 CTR 11 / 45 taxmann.com 250 / 126 SCL 442 (SC)

Editorial: Refer ITO V. Meenakshi (Smt.) (2010) 128 TTJ 619 / (2011) 128 ITD 11 (TM) (Chennai)(Trib)

Evidence Act, 1872

2588 **S.65A : New technology – Recording of evidence – An Attitudinal change in Judges is required. It is high time for us to change our mind set and see whether this new technology can help us to increase the speed and also we have to take into account the convenience of the parties. [S.65B]**

In the said judgment, the Supreme Court has reproduced valuable observations of Justice Bhagwati in the case of *National Textile Workers' Union v. P. R. Ramakrishnan* at page 256 as follows:

“We cannot allow the dead hand of the past to stifle the growth of the living present. Law cannot stand still it must change with the changing social concepts and values. If the bark that protects the tree fails to grow and expand along with the tree, it will either choke the tree or if it is a living tree, it will shed that bark and grow a new living bark for itself.”

It is to be noted that our legislature has wisely taken note of this fact and accordingly has made the changes in the Evidence Act by amending section 65 and thereby sections 65A, 65B are inserted on the point of recording of evidence relating to electronic record and admissibility of electronic record. When the legislature has expanded the scope of term ‘Evidence’ acknowledging advance technology and scientific methods used by people in their day to day activities, it is the duty of the Judicial officers to put life to those letters of law by interpreting them effectively.

An attitudinal change in Judges is required. We need to train ourselves to understand the pulse of the new generation who are avidly technosavvy. Though it is difficult for the Judges, especially who are in their middle age, to accept and digest the entry of new language and methods of evidence in the established judicial system, it is high time for us to change our mindset and see whether this new technology can help us to increase the speed and also we have to take into account the convenience of the parties as our judicial system is necessarily litigant centric.

The presence of the person can be obtained physically so also virtually. What is important is that a person should be seen and be heard and vice versa. These are the methods of distant communication, which is possible by *virtual measures* and microspeakers. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Judge to insist for the physical presence of the witness when it is not possible especially in the circumstances of this case, a virtual presence can be secured which is very much legal and for this purpose, it is not necessary for the Judge himself to give time but such evidence can be recorded by appointing Commissioner. (WP No. 6514 of 2014, dated 9-9-2014)

Suvarna Rahul Musale v. Rahul Prabhakar Musale (Bom.)(HC);www.itatonline.org

Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act 1991

S.35(2) : Recovery of tax – Limitation for passing the order – Amended order was passed beyond limitation period – Recovery proceedings was held to be not valid. [S.57]

2589

As per the provision of the Agricultural income-tax Act (Kerala), assessment shall be completed with five years from end of year for which agricultural income was first assessable. Amended assessment was passed beyond five year period. The Court held that recovery proceedings were not valid. (AY.1988-89)

Savy L. Purayidam v. Agrl IT and CTO (2014) 360 ITR 551 (Ker.)(HC)

Right to Information Act, 2005

2590 **Settlement Commission – A statutory order, even if a nullity, continues to be effective unless set aside by a competent authority – Such orders cannot be nullified by an administrative order**

The principal controversy to be addressed is whether the Chairman of the Income Tax Settlement Commission could, as administrative head of the Income Tax Settlement Commission, declare the order passed by the CPIO and Joint Commissioner of Income Tax directing information to be supplied to the Petitioner, as being void *ab initio*. HELD by the High Court:

(i) It is not disputed that the orders dated 26-9-2013 and 21-10-2013 were orders passed under the RTI Act and in that sense were in exercise of statutory powers. I am unable to accept that such orders passed in exercise of statutory powers could be declared as a nullity or void by an administrative order without recourse to the hierarchy of authorities as specified in the statute – the RTI Act. In the event, the respondent no.1 was of the view that the orders passed by respondent nos. 2 & 4 were without authority of law, the proper and the only course would be to file an appeal before the Central Information Commission (hereafter the 'CIC') or any other competent judicial forum. However, the said orders could not be nullified by an administrative order.

(ii) It is well settled that even if an order is a nullity, it would continue to be effective unless set aside by a competent body or Court. In this case respondent no. 1 is not authorised under the RTI Act to interfere with the orders passed under the RTI Act. (WP No. 2939/2014, dated 5-12-2014.)

R. K. Jain v. Chairman, Settlement Commission (2015) 370 ITR 1 (Delhi.) (HC)

2014 – Circulars / Notifications / Articles etc.

Circulars

10th December, 2013–C.B.D.T. Instructions–Sub–Standardising the process of filing application for approval of an Electoral Trust–reg–Check list. (2014) 360 ITR 32(St)

10/DV of 2013 dated 16th December, 2013 (Departmental View)–Circular section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (2014) 360 ITR 36(St)

1 of 2014, dated 13th January, 2014–TDS under Chapter XVII-B of the Income–tax Act 1961 on service tax component comprised in the payments made to residents–Clarification reg. (2014) 360 ITR 53(St)

2 of 2014, dated 20th January, 2014–Taxability of Act awards for sportsmen–Clarification. (2014) 361 ITR 63(St)

3 of 2014, dated 24th January, 2014–Sub–Finance Act, 2013–Explanatory notes to the provisions of the Finance Act, 2013 (2014) 361 ITR 1(St)

4 of 2014, dated 10th February, 2014–Non filing of ITR V in returns with refund claims –Relaxation of time–limit for filing ITR–V and processing of such returns–Regarding – (2014) 361 ITR 64(St)

5 of 2014, dated 11th February, 2014–Clarification regarding disallowance of expenses under section 14A of the Income-tax Act in case where corresponding exempt income has not been earned during financial year–Regarding (2014) 361 ITR 94(St)

6 of 2014, dated 11th February, 2014–Scope of additional income-tax on distributed income under section 115R of the Income tax Act(2014) 361 ITR 98(St)

7 of 2014, dated 4th March, 2014–EX-facto extension of due date for filing TDS/TCS statements for the financial years 2012-2012 and 2013-2014 – Regarding (2014) 361LTR 112(St)

Circular dated 18th March, 2014–Office Memorandum–Sub–Waiver of guarantee fee procedure thereof (2014) 362 ITR 30(St)

8 of 2014, dated 31st March, 2014–Interpretation of provisions of section 10(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in case where income of firm is exempt–Clarification regarding (2014) 362 ITR 33(St)

9 of 2014, dated 23rd April 2014–Clarification regarding treatment of expenditure incurred for development of roads/highways in BOT agreements under Income–tax Act 1961–reg (2014) 364 ITR 1(St)

10 of 2014 dated 6th May 2014–Eligibility of deduction under section 80IA for the unexpired period–reg–(2014) 364 ITR 15(St.)

Off 11/2014 [F. NO. 279/MISC/M-115/2013-ITJ] dated 15-05-2014–Section 264 of the Income-tax Act 1961–Revision of other orders–Administrative supervision of orders passed under section 264. (2014) / 366 ITR 86(St) / 223 Taxmann 8(St)

12 of 2014, dated 18th July, 2014–Clarification regarding allowability of deduction under section 10A/10AA on transfer of technical man–power in the case of software industry (2014) 366 ITR 1(St.)

13 of 2014 dated 28th July, 2014, Clarification regarding taxation of ‘Alternate Investment Funds’ having status of non charitable trusts under the Income–tax Act, 1961 (2014) 366 ITR 2(St.)

Order dated 20th August, 2014 : [F.No.133/24/2014-TPL0]. order under section 119: Extension of due date for obtaining and furnishing of the report of audit under section 44AB for the assessment year 2014-15 (2014) 366 ITR 104(St.)

Order under section 119: [F.NO.225/268/2014/ITA-11] Extension of due date for filing returns of income in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (2014) 367 ITR 1(St.)

6 of 2014, dated 2nd September, 2014–Compulsory manual selection of cases for scrutiny during the financial year 2014-15–regd (2014) 367 ITR 2(St.)

15 of 2014 dated 17th October, 2014–Approval of long term bonds and rate of interest for the purpose of section 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, (2014) 368 ITR 11(St.)

16 of 2014 dated 17th November, 2014–Clarification in respect of circular No 3 of 2008 dated March 12, 2008 of CBDT–Regarding–Settlement of cases. (2014) 369 ITR 1(St.)

17 of 2014 dated 10th December, 2014. Sub-Income tax deduction from salaries during the financial year 2014-15 under section 192 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (2014) 369 ITR 9(St)

Order under section 119: Extension of due date of deposit of TDS/TCS statements – Order dated 1st October, 2014 (2014) 368 ITR 10(St.)

Order under section 119: Extension of due date for filing returns of income in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (2014) 369 ITR 7(St.)

Press Notes/Release-Date of payment of the second installment of advance tax for companies and first installment of advance tax for others extended from 15th September, 2014 to 15th December, 2014 for the taxpayers in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (2014) 368 ITR 11(St.)

Press Notes / Releases–Last date of filing of TDS / TCS statements for second quarter of financial year 2014-15 for deductors / collectors in States of Andhra Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Odisha and Telangana extended. (2014) 368 ITR 26(St.)

Press Notes / Releases–Press Release on the filing of I.A. No. 14 in W.P.(C) No. 176 of 2009 (*R* (2011) 339 ITR 107 (SC), by UOI (2014) 368 ITR 26 (ST)
Notification under section 92C(2) Second proviso: Arm's Length Price (2014) 368 ITR 28(ST)

Notification under section 245N: Resident undertaking transactions of ₹ 100 crores can apply before AAR to determine his tax liability–Notification No. S.O. 3014 E. dated 28th November, 2014 (2014) 369 ITR 7(ST)

Finance Bill, 2014

- Budget speech of Minister of Finance for 2014-15 (2014) 361 ITR 64(ST)

- Finance Bill, 2014 (2014) 361 ITR 84(ST)

Finance Act, 2014 (Act, No. 11 of 2014). (Assent on 4th March, 2014) (2014) 361 ITR 101 (ST)

Finance (No.2) Bill, 2014

- Budget Speech of Hon'ble Finance Minister for 2014-15 (2014) 365 ITR 1(ST)

- Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2014(Bill no 35 of 2014) dated 10th July, 2014) (2014) 365 ITR 44(ST)

Notes on clauses–Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2014, (2014) 365 ITR 103(ST)

Memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance (No.2) Bill, 2014, (2014) 365 ITR 149(ST)

Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2014 : Notice of amendments (2014) 366 ITR 4(ST)

Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014 (Assent of the President on 6th August, 2014) (2014) 366 ITR 21 (St.)

Notifications.

S.90 : Agreement between the Government of Republic of India and the Government of Belize for the exchange of information with respect of taxes–No. S.O.48(E), dated 7th January, 2014 (2014) 360 ITR 44(ST)

Other Acts.

The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (Act No. 1 of 2014) (2014) AIR 13(Act)

Kisan Vikas Patra Rules, 2014–Notification No G.S.R.No 705(E), dated 23rd September, 2014 (2014) 368 ITR 13 (St.)

Articles:

Section wise:

S.2(IA) : Agricultural income–Taxability on sale of Agricultural land (2014) 364 ITR 15 (Journal)

S.2(15) : Charitable Purpose Charity v. Business by Panakj R. Thoprani (2014) 32 ITR 16(Trib.)(Journal)

S.2(15) : Charitable bodies-GAG's Scrutiny of implementation of income-tax exemption provisions concerning charitable bodies discloses substantial unintended revenue loss by T. N. Pandey (2014) 222 Taxmann 143 (Mag.)

S.2(15) : Charitable Trusts-Taxation of Charitable Trusts by P. N. Shah (2014) ACAJ – September-P. 330

S.2(15) : Charitable trusts- The IT department needs to take broader view in interpreting provisions of the IT Act concerning public charitable institutions by T. N. Pandey (2014) 227 Taxmann 1 (Mag.)

S.222(e) : Deemed dividend–Whether current profits included in accumulated profits? By Pankaj R. Thoprani (2014) 362 ITR 79 (Journal)

S.2(47)(v) : Transfer-No deemed transfer on date of development agreement unless possession of property is handed over to developer by Krishan Malhotra, Vinayak Srivastav (2014) 220 Taxmann 23 (Articles)

S.4 : Charge of Income-tax–Nature and taxability of subvention money by Minu Agarwal (2014) 268 CTR 17 (Articles)

S.4 : Charge of Income-tax–Accrual–Resjudicator and Appeal –Supreme Court-Additional evidence–S.261 by Rahul Hakani (2014) The Chamber's Journal-April–P. 21

S.4 : Charge of Income-tax-Application and diversion of income in taxation laws: Perusing the judicial discourse and urging for greater clarity by Sunil Arora and Aanchal Basur (2014) 222 Taxmann 122(Mag.)

S.4 : Charge of Income-tax Income–Can seller and buyer both be taxed under the same transaction of sale by N. R. Chakrabarti (2014) (Articles)53

S.9(1)(i) : Liaison Office-tax liability of Foreign Company's Liaison Office in India by Tanya Nayyar, (2014) 360 ITR 14(Journal)

S.9(1)(vi) / 9(1)(vii) : Provisions of TDS with regard to telephone expenses, mobile phone, service fees and internet connectivity charges by Pankaj R. Toprani (2014) 361 ITR 32(Journal)

S.9(1)(vii) : Fees for technical services–Office of Director amount to PE/Fixed base in India–Export commission payments–Article 14 and article 15 adversely applicable by Gopal Nathani (2014) 362 ITR 37 (Journal)

S.10(23C)(iii) : Exemption–Can opinions from basis for judgments of courts by T. C. A. Ramnujam (2014) 257 CTR 4(Articles)

S.10A : Free trade zone by Sameer Dalal (2014) The Chamber's Journal–April–P. 25

S.10A : Free Trade Zone–Restriction on the transfer of technical manpower under Circulars Nos. 14 and 12 of 2014–Is invalid for claim of deductions under section 10A, 10AA by S. K. Tyagi (2014) 369 ITR 1 (Journal)

S.10A/10AA : Free Trade Zone–Restriction on the transfer of technical man power under circulars Nos. 14 and 12 of 2014, is invalid for claim of deduction under sections 10A/10AA By. S. K. Tyagi (2014) 369 ITR 1(Journal)

S.11 : Charitable trust-Denial of exemption under section 11, in view of violation of section 13. By S .K. Tyagi (2014) 364 ITR 21(Journal)

S.11 : Charitable Trust-tax exemption to trust *qua* unexplained v notary contributions by Ramesh Chander (2014) 265 CTR (Articles)44

S.11 : Charitable or religious Trusts is application of Income outside India is permitted ? by Pankaj R. Thoprani (2014) 31 ITR 10 (Journal)(Trib.)

S.12A : Application for registration under section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by T. N. Pandey (2014) 365 ITR 21 (Journal)

S.12AA : Trust (Fund) to help others engage in public utility on consideration, such trusts cannot claim registration under section 12AA, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for getting exemption of its income by T. N. Pandey (2014) 31 ITR 6 (Journal)(Trib.)

S.14A : Disallowance under section 14A, in the light of the case of Deepak Mittal by S. K. Tyagi (2014) 361 ITR 1(Journal)

S.14A : Section 14A–Whether contemplates notional expenditure also by Mini Agarwal (2014) 266 CTR (Articles) 17

S.14A : Disallowance u/s. 14A cannot be added back to the “book profits” while computing MAT u/s. 115JB–Judicial analysis by Tushar Hemani (2014) ACAJ–September–P. 356

S.14A : Expenditure incurred for earning exempt income: Guide to law on section 14A by Dr. K. Shivaram Sr. Advocete and Rahul R. Sarda (2014) The Chamber’s Journal (2014) October–P. 61

S.15 : Incentive bonus of a Development Officer is salary income under section 15 and Provisions of section 234D could not be applied as assessment was completed prior to 1-6-2003 by Neelam Jadhav (2014) The Chamber’s Journal–April–P.28

S.22 : Whether building owned by a partner and used by the partnership firm is exempt under section 22 of the Income-tax Act,1961–Controversies by Kaushik D. Shah (2014) ACAJ–January–P.561

S.22 : A case study : House property under Income tax, Wealth Tax and Fema by Pradip K. Modi (2014) ACAJ–March–P. 646,
Income from House property–Income from renting in case of real estate enterprises–Relevant head by Rajat Mohan (2014) 32 ITR 46(Trib)(Journal)

S.24 : Income from house property–Treatment of interest on housing loans while computing taxable income–Two interesting Tribunal decisions by v. Pattabhiraman (2014) 220 Taxmann 99 (Articles)

S.28(1) : Profession–The Clairvoyant (Astrologer) as a professional by T. C. A. Rmanujam (2014) 268 CTR 9 (Articles)

S.28(1) : Business income or property income–Freehold v. Leasehold Tax implications by T. C. A. Sangeetha (2014) 271 CTR 13 (Articles)

S.28(i) : Business loss–Some peculiar features by Minu Agarwal (2014) 270 CTR 49 (Articles)

S.32 : Depreciation–Depreciation under Companies Act and IT Act–The concept of ownership by Dr. K. R. Chanratre (2014) 265 CTR 6 (Articles)

S.32 : Depreciation–Ownership of asset and used for business by Asifa Khan (2014) The Chamber’s Journal–April–P.33

S.32 : Controversies–Additional depreciation where assets used for less than 180 days by Pradip Kapashi / Gautam Nayak (2014) July-BCAJ-P.52

S.35(1)(iv) : Does deduction on research activity cover consulting business by Gopal Nathani (2014) 32 ITR 13(Trib.) (Journal)

S.35D : Amortization–The amortization of expenses incurred in feasibility / Project report by Akhilesh Kumar Sah (2014) 223 Taxmann 1(Mag)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital–Interest on funds borrowed for acquisition of assets–Revenue or capital expenses by Rajat Mohan (2014) 220 Taxmann 93 (Articles)

S.36(1)(iii) : Interest on borrowed capital–Ponge loan transaction–Should it be permissible by Minu Agrwal (2014) 267 CTR 1(Articles)

S.36(1)(v) : Contribution to approved Gratuity fund –Interpretation by Hitesh R. Shah (2014) The Chamber's Journal–April–P.50

S.36(1)(vii) : Bad debt–Deduction of bad debts by D. S. Walia (2014) 256 CTR (Articles) 1

S.37(1) : Business expenditure–Corporate Social responsibility(CSR) expenditure, an application of income? by Hiten Chande (2014) 32 ITR 33(Trib.) (Journal)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure–Allowability of abortive expenditure by Pankaj R.Thoprani (2014) 32 ITR 1 (Trib)(Journal)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure – Expenses opposed to public policies too need to be disallowed under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on illegal expenses by T. N. Pandey (2014) 360 ITR 31(Journal)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure–Deduction of illegal expenses relating to illegal business –Whether permissible by T. N. Pandey (2014) 265 CTR 17 (Articles)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure–Contribution to labour welfare fund–An irrational tax consequences, by Minu Agarwal (2014) 265 CTR 33 (Articles)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure–Judicial boost to software development by T. C. A. Sangeetha (2014) 265 CTR 3 (Articles)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure–Allowability of corporate social responsibility (CSR) Expenditure under the Income-tax Act (2014) BCAJ–June–P.5

S.37(1) : Business expenditure–Controversy regarding capital or revenue expenditure : An attempt for settlement by Aklesh Kumar Sah (2014) 224 Taxmann 1 (Mag.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure–Secret commission and all that by T. C. A. Ramanujam (2014) 265 CTR 6 (Articles)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure–Capital or revenue–Replacement of non-marble flooring with marble flooring–Does it give to an enduring advantages by Gopal Nathani (2014) 34 ITR 41 (Journal)(Trib.)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure–Taxation of corporate responsibility by V. N. Muralidharan (2014) 270 CTR 65 (Articles)

S.37(1) : Service tax–Service tax liability on TDS deductible under the Income-tax Act, 1961 by, T. N. Pandey (2014) 226 Taxmann 85 (Mag)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure–Education cess under Chapter II of the Finance Act–Not an allowable deduction under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by S. K. Tyagi (2014) 368 ITR 6 (Journal)

S.37(1) : Business expenditure–Service-tax not recovered from service receiver could be claimed as deduction by T. N. Pandey (2014) 271 CTR 30 (Articles)

S.40(a)(ia) : Paid v. Payable controversy under section 40(a)(ia) by Nikita Kudva (2014) 220 Taxmann 55 (Articles)

S.40(a)(ia) : Confusion worse confounded by P. C. Chadga (2014) 269 CTR 10 (Articles)

S.40A(2) : Pay your relatives with caution By Rajat Mohan (2014) 33 ITR 29 (Journal) (Trib)

S.40A(3) : Disallowance of cash expenditure beyond certain limit(2014) 32 DTR 26 (Trib) (Journal)

S.43 : Meaning of actual cost–Implication in determining written down value by Jagdish T. Panjabi (2014) The Chamber's Journal–April–P.43

S.43(3) : Plant–Depreciation–Nursing home building is a plant by T. N. Pandey (2014) 270 CTR 27 (Articles)

S.43B : Controversies–Employees contribution of PF & ESI S.2(24)(x), 36(1) (va) by Kaushik D. Shah (2014) ACAJ–P.472

S.44AB : Does section 44AB apply to partner's remuneration Hiten Kishore Chande (2014) 364 ITR 1(Journal)

S.44AB : Tax audit–Analysis of major changes made in tax audit report by Paresb P. Desai and Kush Paresb Desai (2014) ACAJ–September–P.335

S.45 : Capital gains–Retirement of partner–Liability to capital gains in the hands of firm and partner by Pankaj R. Thoprani (2014) 364 ITR 4 (Journal)

S.45: Capital gains–Computation–over view by Keshav Bhujle (2014) The Chamber's Journal–January–P.15

S.45 : Taxability of capital gains in the hands of firm and partners in case of restructuring of partnership firm by C. N. Vaze (2014) The Chamber's Journal–January –P.21

S.45 : Capital gains–non–residents–Taxation of capital gains earned by non-residents by Rutvik Sanghvi (2014) The Chamber's Journal–January–P.64

S.45 : Capital gains–Shares and securities by Jitendra Singh (2014) The Chamber's Journal–January–P.92

S.45 : Capital gains–Other sections dealing with specific situations under capital gains by Mandar Vaidya (2014) The Chamber's Journal–January–P.102

S.45 : Capital gains–TDS–When elephant slips by T. C. A. Ramanujam (2014) 265 CTR (Articles)19

S.45 : Capital gains–Capital gains under family arrangement by Pankaj R. Thoprani (2014) 31 ITR 5 (Journal) (Trib.)

S.45(2) : Capital gains–Tax implications of conversion of stock in trade in to investment by Pankaj R. Thoprani (2014) 362 ITR 40 (Journal)

Ss.47(iv),(v),(xiii)(xiiib)&(xiv)–Capital gains–Business restructuring –Selected issues by Nikil Ranjan(2014) The Chamber's Journal–January–P.87

S.50 : Depreciable assets–Is sale of depreciable asset always result in short term capital gain/loss by V. K. Subramani (2014) 221 Taxmann 161 (Mag.)

S.50C : Depreciable assets – Capital gains–Issues arising u/s. 50C. by Rahul K. Hakani (2014) The Chamber's Journal –January–P.39

S.50C : Depreciable assets – Capital gains – Is it fair to ignore prior agreement for section 50C Income tax Act, 1961-Vis-a-Vis section 43CA and section 56(2) (vii)(b) by Akshay Avinash Puranik (2014) BCAJ–June–P.97

S.50C : Depreciable assets – Stamp valuation–Travesties of full value of consideration by Chetan A. Karia (2014) The Chamber's Journal–September–P.63

S.54 : Capital gains–Holding period of booking rights in an apartment to be determined from date of signing of buyers agreement by S. Krishnan (2014) 223 Taxmann 101 (Mag.)
S.54, 54F and 54EC : Capital gains–Exemption from capital gains, by Ketan Vajani (2014) The Chamber's Journal–January–P.27

S.54/54F : Whether it is fair to disallow the deduction under section 54 / 54F based on surrounding circumstances? By Gopal Nathani (2014) 361 ITR 9 (Journal)

S.54/54F : Issues under section 54 and 54F by Sneha Parwal (2014) 220 Taxmann 63 (Articles)

S.54/54F : Capital gains–Exemption for investment in construction of residential property by T. N. Pandey (2014) 267 CTR 33 (Articles)

S.54 : Exemption under the head capital gains–Few beneficial issues by Jainee Shah & Manthan Khokhani (2014) ACAJ–December–P.506

S.54EC : Exemption under section 54EC of the Act in case where six-month period for investment of capital gains is spread over two financial years by V. Pattabhiraman (2014) 220 Taxmann 21(Articles)

S.54EC : Amendment to remove ambiguity–Bad news or good news? Gopal Nathani (2014) 34 ITR 1 (Journal)(Trib)

S.54F : Ownership of a part of the House and exemption u/s. 54F–Controversies by Pradip Kapashi, Gautam Nayak (2014) BCAJ–March–41

S.54F : Is Section 54F exemption available for second House ? by Gopal Nathani (2014) 33 ITR 17(Journal)(Trib)

S.55A(a) : Capital gains–Reference to valuation officer–Critical analysis of the Judgment in CIT v. Puja Prints (2014) 265 CTR 124 (Bom)(HC) by B. V. Venkataramaiah (2014) 270 CTR 6 (Articles)

S.56(2) : Income from other sources–Understanding provisions of section 56(2) by Ankit Virendra Sudha Shah (2014) BCAJ–January–P. 21

S.57 (iii) : Income from other sources–The marginal effect of section 57(iii) of the IT Act by Minu Agarwal (2014) 271 CTR 33 (Articles)

S.69 : Income from undisclosed sources–Proof for receipt of money by T. C. A. Sangeetha (2014) 270 CTR 25 (Articles)

S.69 : Income from undisclosed sources–Draconian law of undisclosed assets, investments and expenditure by Rajat Mohan (2014) 34 ITR 30 (Journal)(Trib)

S.72A : Loss, No set off and carry forward of losses on amalgamation of co-operative Societies by R. Santhanam (2014) 270 CTR 49 (Articles)

S.73 : Transactions in stock derivatives–Whether speculative in nature by Anand Shah and Rikish Devnani (2014) The Chamber's Journal–January–P.105

S.80IA : Controversies : Whether the unutilised balances of deduction u/s. 80IA can be carried forward and set off against the profits of the assessee in the subsequent year?–(Wind mills–Power generation) By Kaushik D. Shah (2014) ACAJ–September P.353

S.90 : Double taxation–An insight in to law relating to Double Taxation in India–By Akshay Maheswari and Anjali Bhatt, Students (2014) 34 ITR 5 (Journal)(Trib.)

S.90 : Double taxation–An insight in to the case of tax treaty override by Shagun Mahajan (2014) 226 Taxmann 1(Mag.)

S.92 : Trasfer pricing–Transfer pricing under Income-tax Act, 1961 comparability in functions performed with respect to purchase of CKD kits and components by Vishal Mishra and Rahul Singh (2014) 360 ITR 57(Journal)

S.92 : Transfer pricing–The concept of bright line test by Tarunkumar G. Singal (2014) BCAJ–January–P.10

S.92CA : Transfer pricing–Transfer pricing officer's power over international transactions not referred to him by Gopal Nathani (2014) 362 ITR 46 (Journal)

S.92C : Transfer Pricing–Clarity on transfer pricing law by T. C. A Ramanujam and T. C. A Sangeetha (2014) 368 ITR 1 (Journal)

S.92C : Transfer pricing–Comparable uncontrolled Price (CUP) method–Introduction and analysis by Darpan Mehta and Sujay Thakkar (2014) BCAJ–October–P.10

S.92C : Transfer pricing–Transfer pricing methodology–Resale price method and Cost Plus method by Sudhir Nayak (2014) BCAJ–October–P.10

S.92CC & 92 CD–Advance pricing agreement–A Review by Aastha Dhawan and Arjun Singh (2014) 223 Taxmann 55 (Mag.)

S.92CC & 92CD–Advance Pricing Agreements by Smriti Tripathi & Vasu Nigam (2014) AIFTPJ–January–P. 27

S.133(6) : Nature and scope of enquiry by department by Jitendra Singh (2014) The Chamber's Journal–April–P. 48

S.139 : Controversies–Fresh claim outside return of income or in appeal by Pradip Kapashi & Gautam Nayak (2014) BCAJ–August–P. 39

S.139(5) : Revised return–Goetze case and Tribunal's power under the Income-tax Act, 1961 by Vishal Mishra and Rahul Singh (2014) 361 ITR 7(Journal)

S.142(2A) : Special audit under section 142(2A)–Assessing Officer’s difficulty in understanding vis-a-vis complexity of accounts by Gopal Nathani (2014) 32 ITR 8(Trib) (Journal)

S.142(2A) : Special audit–Special Audit under section 142(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961–Needs a review By T. N. Pandey (2014) 369 ITR 17 (Journal)

S.142A : Estimation by Valuation Officer–Change introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act 2014 by T. N. Pandey (2014) 271 CTR 35 (Articles)

S.143(2) : Validity of notice under section 143(2) Income-tax Act served after expiry of the period prescribed by section 143(2)(II), Proviso by Manish K. Kaji (2014) 360 ITR 8 (Journal)

S.143(2) : Amount – Notice–(S.292B and 292BB), *CIT v. Salman Khan* (Bom)(HC)–Department’s loss due to poor representation by T. N. Pandey (2014) 362 ITR 69 (Journal)

S.143(3) : Assessment-Immunity against self-Incremination cannot be claimed in an enquiry under the Income–tax Act 1961 by O. P. Mody (2014) 221 Taxmann 165 (Mag)

S.143(3) : Assessment–Inefficiencies in scrutiny methods and practices–central Board of Direct taxes must bring reforms to up sale confidence of the tax payer in the assessment system by Gopal Nathani (2014) 362 ITR 51 (Journal)

S.143(3) : Assessment-Role of evidence / Material and onus in assessment by N. M. Ranka (2014) 267 CTR 21 (Articles)

S.143(3) : Assessment-Precautions for scrutiny assessments by N. M. Ranka (2014) 270 CTR 81(Articles)

S.145 : Method of accounting–*Accounting principles v. Tax provisions* by Pankaj R. Thoprani (2014) 362 ITR 57 (Journal)

S.145 : Method of accounting–Valuation of stock by Ketan Varjani (2014) The Chamber’s Journal–April–P.54

S.145 : Method of accounts–Deferred tax implications under the ‘tonnage tax’ Regime –The Accounting conundrum by S. Ramachandran (2014) 267 CTR 41 (Articles)

S.145 : Method of accounting-Provision for allowance of future losses while valuing inventories/work –in –progress at year end by Pankaj R. Toprani (2014) 31 ITR 1 (Journal)

S.145 : Controversies-Method of accounting-Can the opening stock be disturbed when value of stock is changed due to a change in valuation method or due to any other reason by Kaushik D. Shah (2014) ACAJ–December-P.523

S.147 : Reassessment-Validity of reopening of assessments by S. K. Tyagi (2014) 363 ITR 46 (Journal)

S.147 : Reassessment–Scope of section 147 with special reference to Explanation 3 by D. S. Walla (2014) 270 CTR 8(Articles)

S.147 : Reopening of assessment by Keshav B. Bhujle (2014) The Chamber's Journal –August-P.25

S.154 : Rectification–Record–My lord, the decision could have been different by T. C. A. Sangeetha (2014) 268 CTR 5 (Articles)

S.158BD : Undisclosed income of any other person-Interpretation of section 158BD-Analysis of recent Supreme Court decision (*CIT v. Calcutta Knitwewers* (2014) 267 CTR 105 (SC) By R. L. Sangani (2014) 268 CTR 12 (Articles)

S.192 : Deduction at source-Compensation under Motor Vehicles Act–Deduction from salary by Nikil Ranjan (2014) The Chamber's Journal-April–P.19

S.194C : Tax – Deduction at source–TDS on Aircraft landing & Parking charges – Controversies-(S.194C, 194I) by Pradip Kapasi and Gautam Nayak (2014) BCAJ – January–P.50

S.194I : Deduction at source–Whether TDS on service tax portion to be deducted in the absence of agreement? By Hiten Kishore Chande (2014) 362 ITR 65 (Journal)

S.194I : Deduction at Source–Controversies–TDS on premium paid for grant of lease by Pradip Kapasi & Gautam Nayak (2014) BCAJ-June–P.39

S.194IA : Deduction at source–Transfer of immovable property–Understanding the various implications of section 14A–(S40(a), 201(1), 201(IA), 271C) by Hiten Kishor Chande (2014) 360 ITR 1(Journal)

S.195 : Deduction at source – Is provisions for expenses subject to tax withholding? By H. Padamchand Khincha and P. Shivanand Nayak (2014) 361 ITR 35(Journal)

S.195 : Deduction at source-TDS on commission paid to foreign agents counter, re-counter and encounter by Rajat Mohan (2014) 222 Taxmann 115 (Mag.)

S.226 : Recovery-tax recovery by taxman –Is public provident fund deposit immune from attachment by Rama Gupta & Nisha Malpani (2014) 267 CTR 17 (Articles)

S.234E : “Fees” payable under section 234E of the Income-tax Act by V. Pasupati (2014) 264 ITR 39(Journal)

S.244A : Refunds –Interest on refund by Arati Sathe and Kalpesh Turslkar (2014) The Chamber's Journal-April–P.36

S.244A : Refund–Interest on refund of self assessment tax : A need less controversy by Tarun Jain (2014) 365 ITR 1(Journal)

S.244A : Refund–Interest on refund of tax paid in excess by R. Santhanam (2014) 270 CTR 1(Articles)

S.244A : Refund-Interest on refunds by Sanjiv Chaudhary (2014) 225 Taxmann 139 (Mag)

S.244A : Refund-Interest on delayed refund of self –assessment tax–Lingering controversy by Minu Agarwal (2014) 271 CTR 9(Articles)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal- Tribunal’s power of stay – A new hope by Minu Agarwal (2014) 268 CTR 1 (Articles)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal–Powers of Appellate Tribunal to extend stay granted by R. Santhanam (2014) 269 CTR 87 (Articles)

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal–Tribunal cannot escape deciding an appeal on merits because appellant fails to appear by T. N. Pandey (2014) 270 CTR 78 (Articles).

S.254(1) : Appellate Tribunal-Is Appellate Tribunal an assessing authority by Minu Agarwal (2014) 271 CTR 1 (Articles)

S.255 : Appellate Tribunal–Precedent–Precedential value of the Tribunal’s special Bench decision by Ramesh Chander (2014) 271 CTR 4 (Articles)

S.260A : Substantial question of law: When “a finding of fact” gives raise to a substantial question of law by Pankaj R. Thoprani (2014) 30 ITR 4(Trib.)(Journal)

S.263 : Revision–Section 263 of the IT Act cannot be invoked to revise well reasoned order of the AO by T. N. Pandey (2014) 266 CTR 28 (Articles)

S.269SS : Loan–Deposit–Stumped by journal entries by Minu Agarwal (2014) 270 CTR 38(Articles)

S.269SS : Controversies–Acceptance and repayment of loans & Deposits–Applicability journal entries by Pradeep Kapasi and Gautam Nayak (2014) BCAJ–October–P. 43

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty–Concealment–by Mandar Vaidya (2014) The Chamber’s Journal–April –P. 39

S.271(1) (c) : Penalty – Concealment – Penalty on undisclosed income unearthed during the Search & Survey-Analysis in present scenario by Vidhan Surana & Sunil Maloo (2014) ACAJ–March–P. 654

S.271(1)(c) : Penalty – Concealment Penalty–Agreed addition whether amounts to concealment of income penalty provision–Concealment By M. V. Purushottam Rao (2014) AIFTPJ–July–P.21

S.276B : Whether prosecution under section 276B of the Income–tax Act, 1961 can be initiated if the TDS is paid late –Controversies by Kaushik D. Shah (2014) ACAJ–August–P.281

S.285BA : Financial transactions–New obligations to furnish financial transactions statements by R. Santhanam (2014) 270 CTR 17(Articles)

Subject wise

A.

Accounting for real Estate Transactions by Aniket Talati and Sanket Nanavati (2014) ACAJ–January–P. 536

Accounting Standards relating to Real Estate by Jayant Gokhale (2014) AIFTP–April–P. 10

Accounts- Treatment of Inventories as non-Current assets and related issues on current/non-current classification by S. Ramachandran (2014) 269 CTR 46 (Articles)

Accounting & Tax Implication–Oil & Gas Industry by Chintan Shah & Sandip Gupta (2014) ACAJ–October–P.394

Assessment–Income-tax authorities need to take assessment and appeal work seriously and in right spirit by T. N. Pandey (2014) 366 ITR 10 (Journal)

AAR : Expand role for the authority for Advance Rulings by T. C. A. Ramanujam (2014) 270 CTR 74 (Articles)

AOP–Delhi High Court clears the AIR on taxation of consortium as ‘AOP’ by Neha Pathakji (2014) 226 Taxmann 57 (Mag.)

B.

Banking transaction tax–Can Banking transaction tax oust Income–tax Act, 1961 – Editorial–(2014) AIFTPJ–Feb.–P. 5

Black money : Flushing out unaccounted money by T. C. A. Sangeetha (2014) 265 CTR (Articles) 36

Budget–The Interim Budget : is it insignificant by T. C. A. Sangeetha (2014) 266 CTR 25 (Articles)

Black money–Menace of black money : Analysis of Supreme Court decision : *Ram Jethmalani v. UOI* by Pankaj R. Thoprani (2014) 32 ITR 46(Trib.)(Journal)

Black money–On the black money trial by T. C. A. Ramanujam and T. C. A. Sangeetha (2014) 367 ITR 23 (Journal)

C.

Chamber's Journal–Income Tax Review / Special Story–During last decade–(2014) March–P 52

Evolution of the Competition Regime by Manas Kumar Choudhury (2014) The Chamber's Journal–March 15

The Competition Act–overview by Ananth Malathi (2014) The Chamber's Journal–March 18

CAG's appraisal of Income Tax Department's function during 2011-12 –An analysis by T. N. Pandey (2014) 220 Taxmann 133 (Articles)

C&AG reports in consistencies in the income-tax provisions conferring exemptions to charitable trusts and institutions by T. N. Pandey (2014) 362 ITR (Journal) 5 ?

Capital gains–Issues under capital gains covering share transactions and exemptions by Ajay Singh (2014) AIFTJ–March–P.20

Co-operative societies–Income–tax assessments of Co-operative Societies–Benefits and handicaps by T. N. Pandey (2014) 366 ITR 1(Journal)

Corporate Governance–Overview of Corporate Governance in India by Yogesh Bhattarai (2014) The Chamber's Journal–August–P.9

Corporate Governance and Mergers and Acquisition by Amit Maru (2014) The Chamber's Journal–August–P.18

Corporate Governance and Auditor by Rajan Kamat (2014) The Chamber's Journal–August –P. 21

Charitable Trust and practical guidance by Rajat Mohan (2014) 34 ITR 19(Journal)(Trib)
Chartered Accountants–ICAI needs to ensure integrity in chartered accountants by T. N. Pandey (2013) 31 ITR 14 (Journal)(Trib.)

Carbon credits–Taxability of carbon credits–controversies by Pradip Kapasi and Gautam Nayak (2014) BCAJ–October–P. 55

Capital account convertibility and the Internationalisation of the Indian Rupee by Aditya Gaiha (2014) TCJ –Nov.-P. 47

D

Directors Liabilities for “Cheque Bouncing under” Negotiable Instruments Act by Rabindra Jhunhunwala & Stuti Galiya (2014) The Chamber’s Journal–March 67

Direct Taxes Code–Key proposals on International Aspects of the Direct Taxes Code, 2013 by Karthik Ranganath (2014) 223 Taxmann 27 (Mag.)

Direct Taxes code–How to clear the 18 years mess to enact an ideal code?. by T.N.Pandey (2014) 361 ITR 13(Journal).

Direct Taxes Code –Placing of the fourth draft of Direct Taxes Code on the website will merely be a futile exercise by T. N. Pandey (2014) 265 CTR (Articles) 22

Duties and responsibilities of Independent Directors under the Companies Act, 2013 by P. N. Shah (2014) AIFTP–March–P.8

DTAA and conflict of laws (A conceptual study) by V. N. Murlidharan (2014) 224 Taxmann 37 (Mag.)

Direct Taxes code–Clause 321–Principal of CIT vs. B. C. Srinivasa Setty Buried by Hiten Chande (2014) 33 ITR 22 (Journal)(Trib.)

Directors’ duties and liabilities under Companies Act, 2013 by Rabindra Jhunhunwala & Stuti Galiya (2014) The Chamber’s Journal–August–P.12

E.

Enhanced Income–Allowability of Enhanced Income under Part C of Chapter VI-A of Income-tax Act, 1961 by B. L. Purohit (2014) 36 ITR 46 (Trib.)(Journal)

F.

Relevancy of the Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act in India by Gautam Swarup & Prasad Subramanyan (2014). The Chamber’s Journal–March 40

Firm–Firm, partners and Co-owners by B. V. A. Rao (2014) 268 CTR 21 (Articles)

Firms- GAGs Examination of the assessment of firms–Disclosure deficiencies and system failures–Part–1 by T. N. Pandey (2014) 367 ITR 1(Journal)

Financial Services Sector–Part 1(Banks and Mutual Funds)–(2014). The Chamber's Journal–December

Financial Services Sector in India–History and the Road Ahead by Abizer Diwanji (2014) The Chambers Journal–December–P.9

An overview of Key Banking Regulations by Himanshu Vasa & Siddarth Gandotra (2014). The Chamber's Journal–December–P.16

Issues in Audit and Tax Audit of Banks by Sarvesh Warty (2014). The Chamber's Journal–December–P. 25

Direct Taxes and Transfer Pricing Issues faced by Banks by Sunil Kothare (2014). The Chamber's Journal–December–P.31

Key Indirect issues faced by Banks by Smita Bhandari (2014). The Chamber's Journal–December–P.35

Mutual Funds and Asset Management Companies–Accounting and Audit Aspects by Jayesh Gandhi (2014). The Chamber's Journal–December–P.41

Issues in Direct & Indirect Taxes faced by Mutual Funds / AMC's by Sunil Badal & Bharat Jain (2014). The Chamber's Journal–December–P.47

Fundamental Duties and Constitutional Perceptions by Honourable Justice Mr. Dipak Misra (2014). AIFTP J-December-8

Finance Bill–2014–2015–Income tax proposals concerning personal taxation by T. N. Pandey (2014). 365 ITR 49 (Journal)

Finance Bill–2014–15–Some suggestions on the proposals in the Finance (No.2) Bill 2014 by S. Rajaratnam (2014) 365 ITR 57 (Journal)

Finance Bill-2014-2015–Amendments – By T. C. A. Ramanujam and T. C. A Sangeetha (2014) 365 ITR 66(Journal)

Finance Bill–2014–Salient features of the Finance (No.2) Bill, 2014 (Relating to Direct taxes) by S. K. Tyagi (2014) 365 ITR 92 (Journal)

Finance Bill–2014–“One” Residential house under section 54 and 54F : Meaning and implications of the proposed amendments by Jignesh R. S. Shah (2014) 365 ITR 115(Journal)

Finance Bill–2014–Transfer Pricing –Transfer Pricing law and Rules are proposed to streamlined to cut litigation by T. N. Pandey (2014) 269 CTR 28 (Articles)

Finance Bill-2014–Union Budget-2014–15–Some Crucial Issues by N. M. Ranka (2014) 269 CTR 33 (Articles)

Finance Bill-2014–Income–New Scheme for taxing forfeited advance–The Obvious Haste by Minu Agarwal (2014) 269 CTR 41 (Articles)

Finance Bill-2014–Finance Bill, 2014–The Personal Angle by T. C. A. Ramanujam (2014) 269 CTR 43 (Articles)

Finance Bill-2014–Arun Jaitley’s Growth oriented Budget by Dr. C. V. Jayamani (2014) 224 Taxmann 91 (Mag.)

Finance Bill-2014–Budget-2014–15 : Appraisal of a new mandate and Era By Prof. C. S. Balasubramaniam (2014) 224 Taxmann 95 (Mag)

Finance Bill-2014–Budget Stimulus–Additional Investment allowance for manufacturing sector by Amit Aggarwal and Viabhav Chaudhary (2014) 224 Taxmann 145 (Mag.)

Finance Bill-2014–Sweet & Bitter for NGOs & Trusts by Dr Manoj Fogla (2014) 224 Taxmann 152 (Mag.)

Finance Bill-2014–Budget-2014–Roll over of investment for section 54 and 54F Exemptions to restricted to one house only by S. Krishnan (2014) 224 Taxmann 158 (Mag)

Finance Bill-2014–Budget 2014–Jaitl’s Penalty shootouts by Meenakshi Subramaniam (2014) 224 Taxmann 163 (Mag.)

Fiance Bill 2014–Budget 2014–Direct tax praposals with back to back suggestions By Gopal Nayhani (2014) 33 ITR 42 (Journal) (Trib.)

Finance (No.2) Bill, 2014–An over view of Direct tax proposals in the Finance (No.2) Bill, 2014 By Jayant Gokhale (2014) The Chambers Journal–July–P.9

- Rates of taxes, by Shailesh Bandi–(2014) The Chambers Journal–July–P.15
- Taxation of Foreign Portfolio Investors & REITS and Inv. ITs by Anish Thacker–(2014) The Chambers Journal–July–P. 18
- Proposals relating to business income by Atul T. Suraiya, (2014) The Chambers Journal–July–P.24
- Proposals related to Taxation of Individuals and Capital Gains, by Ketan Vajani (2014) The Chambers Journal–July–P. 30
- Proposals relating to Transfer pricing by Rajesh S. Athavale (2014) The Chambers Journal–July–P. 37
- Proposals related to Tax deduction at source and AIR by Hitesh R. Shah, (2014) The Chambers Journal–July–P. 42
- Proposals related to procedural and other matters, by Bhadresh Doshi (2014) The Chambers Journal–July–P. 48

- Amendments related to Charitable Trusts by Arvind H. Dalal (2014) The Chambers Journal-July-P56
- Proposals related to Survey and Search by Ajay Singh & Rahul R. Sarda (2014) The Chambers Journal-July-P60
- Proposals related to acceptance or repayment of loans & deposits and prosecution by Rahul K. Hakhani (2014) The Chambers Journal-July-P63

Finance Bill–New Government and retrospective tax levies by R. Santhanam (2014) 259 CTR 65 (Articles)

Budget–2014–15–Black Money on back burner in budget exercises–By T. N. Pandey (2014) 366 ITR 28 (Journal)

Finance Bill, 2014–Corporate tax angle by T. C. A. Sangeetha (2014) 269 CTR 84 (Articles)

Finance Bill, 2014–Some Questionable budgetary proposals by Minu Agarwal (2014) 269 CTR 81 (Articles)

Finance Bill, 2014–Amendments to Finance (No.2) Bill, 2014 by Kiran Nisar (2014) The Chamber's Journal–August P41

Finance (No 2)Act–2014–An analysis by P. N. Shah & H. N. Motiwalla (2014) BCAJ-September-P12

Finance (NO.2)Act, 2014–Amendments made by the Finance (N0.2) (Act, 2014 not so friendly by Gopal Nathani (2014) 225 Taxmann 183 (Mag.)

Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014–Retro-Changes a Critique by V. Swaminthan (2014) 226 Taxmann 143 (Mag.)

H.

Hindu law –Rights of Hindu minor by T. C. A. Ramanujam (2014) 265 CTR (Articles) 26

Hospitality Industry–The Chamber's Journal–May 2014

Hospitality Industry–The Chamber's Journal–June-2014

I.

International taxation- Recent developments in USA by Mayur Nayak (2014) BCAJ-January–P54

Indian Professional Firms–Road Ahead by T. N. Manoharan (2014) AIFTPJ–March–P8

Interpretation of Statutes: The Doctrine or *Ejusdem Generis* / *Nocitur a Sociis* by Ashwin Acharya & Arpita Acharya-Mukerjee (2014) AIFTPJ–December–P.15

International taxation–Recent Developments in USA by Mayur Nayak (2014) BCAJ–January–P.54

International taxation–Indirect Transfer and capital gains by N. C. Hegde (2014). The Chamber's Journal–February–P.15

International taxation–Royalties and fees for technical Services–Recent developments, by Vispi T. Patel & Rajeev G. Shah (2014) The Chamber's Journal–February–P.23

International taxation–Current issues in International taxation relating to certain payments by Tarun Singhal (2014) The Chamber's Journal–February–P.34

International taxation–Taxation of Expatriates by C. A. Gupta and Samir Parekh (2014) The Chamber's Journal–February–P.43

International taxation–PE with reference to ecommerce by Rahmin Sanghvi (2014) The Chamber's Journal–February–P.51

International taxation–Income arising out of International Transactions–Charging provisions, MAP and Article 9, by Sudir Nayak (2014) The Chamber's Journal–February–P.55

International taxation–Indian Transfer pricing (TP)–Revenues approach on TP Assessment by Rajendra Nayak (2014) The Chamber's Journal–February–P.61

International taxation–Transfer pricing–Inter-Corporate Financial Guarantees by Gautam Nayak and others (2014) BCAJ–June–P.45

International taxation–Bharati Airtel TP case–Flawed on both merits and under the law –Overstretched findings (2014) 33 ITR 36 (Journal) (Trib.)

International taxation–Impact of Retrospective Amendments to section 9 of the Income –tax Act, 1961 by Mayur Nayak, Tarunkumar G. Singal and Anil D. Doshi (2014) BCAJ –August–P.43

International taxation –Inaugural address at the 8th Annual Conference on International Taxation on the theme” “Cross-border taxation” (18-7-2014) by Justice V. Ramasubramaniam (2014) 366 ITR 22 (Journal) P.22

Income includes loss–A revisit by P. Shivanand Nayak (2014) BCAJ–March P.10

International taxation–TP reports and documents–How far reliable? by Gopal Nathani (2014) 362 ITR (Journal) 1

International Taxation–Transfer Pricing Rewind by Gopal Nathani (2014) 362 ITR (Journal) 29

International taxation–India–Safe Harbour Rules Issued under Transfer Pricing Regulations by Vispi T. Patel (2014) AIFTP–April–P.32

International taxation- Recent developments in USA by Mayur Nayak, Tarunkumar G. Sinhaal and Anil D. Doshi (2014) BCAJ–September–P.75

Interpretation-Rules of Interpretation relating to tax laws by V. H. Patil (2014) AIFTP–April P.21

Interpretation of taxing Statutes by D. H. Joshi (2014) AIFTJ–June.-P.10

Interpretation–Proviso as a Distinct and New provision–Unusual, but invalid by Ishan v. Patkar (2014) AIFTPJ–September–P.8

J.

Judicial Independence versus Judicial Appointments by Abhishek Swaroop 2014) 3 SCC (J)9

Joint venture-Contribution of land to Joint Venture–Taxability by Deepa Khare (2014) AIFTPJ–September–P.13

K.

Taxation issues relating to Keyman Insurance Policy by Chandrakant Thakkar (2014) ACAJ–Nov–P.454

L.

Laws for a Changing India (2014). The Chamber's Journal–March–P.15 to 47

Evolution of the Competition Regime by Mamas Kumar Chaodhuri (2014). The Chamber's Journal–March–P.15

The Competition Act–Overview (2014). The Chamber's Journal–March–P.18

Merger review by CCI–Trends by Aparna Mehta (2014) The Chamber's Journal–March 28 India's new law on Prohibition of Sexual Harassment at the Work place by Veena Gopalkrishnan & Vikram Shroff (2014). The Chamber's Journal–March–P.31

Prevention of Sexual Harrassment of Women at the Work Place : What does law expect?
By Amit Bhasin (2014). The Chamber's Journal–March 37

Relevance of the Foreign Accounts Tax compliance Act in India by Gautam Swarup &
Prasad Subramanyan (2014). The Chamber's Journal–March 40

Directors Liabilities for Cheque Bouncing under Negotiable Instruments Act (2014). The
Chamber's Journal–March 47

Limited liability partnership (LLP)–Juggling of letters creates difference : AMT vs. MAT
by Anushree Agarwal (2014) 31 ITR 14 (Journal)(Trib.)

Lease-Taxability of a lessee–Is ignorance of settled legal position sustainable by Minu
Agarwal (2014) 272 CTR 1 (Articles)

M

Mutual concern–Tax liability in case of mutual concern by (2014) 364 ITR 9 (Journal)
Mesne profits–Taxability by Pankaj R. Thoprani (2014) 362 ITR (Journal) 17

Mutual concern–Taxability of mutual association–Taxes paid even though not required
to by Rajat Mohan (2014) 33 ITR 8(Trib.)(Journal)

N

Namaskar –“Our dreams are within our reach” by Pradeep Shah (2014) ACAJ–October
–P. 5

Namaskar–Gratitude by K. C. Nraang (2014) BCAJ–October-P.5

Namaskar–Leaving a legacy by Pradeep Shah (2014) BCAJ–August–P.8

Namaskar–The difficult path by Pradeep Shah (2014) BCAJ–December P.5

National Tax Tribunal- The depth of an idea by. T. C. A. Sangeetha (2014) 271 CTR 17
(Articles)

National Tax Tribunal–Thinkering with Tax Appeal Jurisdiction of High Courts by N. M.
Ranka (2014) 271 CTR 20 (Articles)

NRI–Returnee NRI–FEMA & Tax by Rajesh H. Dhruva (2014) ACAJ–December–P.540

Natural Justice–Opportunity of Hearing in Income-tax Proceedings and Appeals by
Naryan Jain (2014) 360 ITR 21(Journal)

Natural Justice–Principles of natural justice and Speaking Orders by Narayan Jain and
Deepak Jain (2014) 363 ITR 25 (Journal)

P

Partition–Case study of *CIT v. Ashwani Chopra* (2013) 352 ITR 620 (P&H)(HC) on owelty by V. S. Jaya Kumar (2014) 266 CTR (Articles) 6

Prosecution direct taxes–GAG’S report on Prosecution Proceedings by T. N. Pandey (2014) 363 ITR 7(Journal)

Penalty–Review of Law and Procedure relating to levy of Penalties under the Income-tax Act by the Controller & Auditor General of Indi–Report No.28 of 2013 by T. N. Pandey (2014) 267 CTR 6 (Articles)

Prosecution: Strong Prosecution Provisions backed by effective implementation can only curb tax evasion by T. N. Pandey (2014) 270 CTR 59 (Articles)

Prosecution under Income-tax Act 1961–The Chamber’s Journal–(2014) October P.11 to 52

Introduction and Overview by Krshav B. Bhujle. The Chamber’s Journal–(2014) October-P.11

Prosecution for obstructing recovery and failure to pay to Government by Paras S. Savla & Dharm v. Ghandhi The Chamber’s Journal –(2014) October–P.17

Prosecution –Wilful attempt to evade tax, etc. by Sameer Dalal The Chamber’s Journal (2014)October-P.23

Exemption from punishment, immunity from prosecution in case of juristic entities by Rahul Hakani The Chamber’s Journal (2014) October–P.34

Procedure before Sanction of Prosecution and compounding by Nimesh Chothani & Dharan v. Gandhi The Chamber’s Journal (2014) October–P.45

Procedure and Trial after Sanction of Prosecution by Vijay Garg. The Chamber’s Journal (2014) October–P.52

R

Return forms–Key Takeaways in New ITR Forms by Naveen Wadhwa (2014) 223 Taxmann 135(Mag.)

Real Estate Transactions–General Principles on Drafting of Agreements relating to Real Estate Transactions by Dhruti Trivedi (2014) ACAJ–January-P.536

RTI & Taxation by Narayan Varma (2014) AIFTPJ–January –P.17

Return–Whether claim for deduction, not made in the return, can be made subsequently by A. K. Srivastava (2014) AIFTPJ–March–P.41

Refunds–War of refunds by Rajat Mohan (2014) 33 ITR 24 (Journal) (Tri.)

The Right to Information Act, 2005–Filing of appeal by S. K. Sadhwani (2014) ACAJ–August–P.264

Related Party transactions–Variety of complexities–(2014) The Chamber’s Journal–Nov–P.9-40

Evolution of Regulations RPTS–Impacts on Corporate Governance and Sustained Growth by Dr. Paritosh Basu (2014) TCJ–Nov–P.9

Glass Half Empty or Half Full? By Anup Shah (2014) TCJ–Nov–P.13

RPTs under listing agreement by Sandeep Parikh (2014) TCJ–Nov–P.13

Broad Overview of Transfer Pricing provisions and current key issues faced by tax payers by Vispi T. Patel (2014) TCJ–Nov–P.20

Legal provisions under Central Excise and Service tax laws by Amitab Khemba (2014) TCJ–Nov–P.27

Accounting and Auditing Aspect by Jayesh Gandhi (2014) TCJ–Nov–P.34

Related parties Transactions and corporate law-Case studies (Companies Act, 2013 and clause 49) By Jayant Thakur (2014). TCJ–Nov–P.34

Returns-Revised returns by D. S. Walia (2014) 271 CTR 25 (Articles)

S

Settlement Commission–Editorial–Income-tax Settlement Commission is not achieving the desired objective due to lack of transparency in appointment of members and failure to appoint members from profession (2014). AIFTPJ–January–P.5

India’s New Law on Prohibition of Sexual Harassment at the work place by Veena GopalKrishnan & Vikram Shroff (2014). The Chamber’s Journal–March 31

Prevention of Sexual Harassment of women at the Workplace: What does the law expect? By Amit Bhasin (2014.) The Chamber’s Journal–March 37

Setting up of business Versus Commencement of Business by Pankaj R. Thoprani (2014) 362 ITR (Journal) 23

Urgent need to amend law of Sucession in case of Female Hindus dying intestate by Dr. Rakesh Kr. Singh (2014) AIR–May–Journal P.81

Speaking orders-Are tax authorities duty bound to pass peaking orders? By Dr. K. R. Chandrate (2014) 67 VST 1 (Journal)

Show Cause Notice-Show cause notice and Opportunity of Hearing in Tax Disputes–Some Critical aspects by Dr. K. R. Chandrate (2014) 67 VST 12 (Journal)

Subsidy-Subsidy by a Government company to Loss-Making subsidiary–Whether a good case for lifting corporate veil? (2014) 34 ITR 26(Journal)(Trib.)

Salary–Profession–Employment consultancy: A tax planning Tip By T. C. A.Sangeetha (2014) 270 CTR 56 (Articles)

Suggestions–Some suggestions for the Finance Minister by D. S. Walia (2014) 270 CTR 70 (Articles)

Shares- Issue of shares at a discount –Does income accrue- By T.C.A.Rananujam (2014) 272 CTR 6 (Articles)

Service tax–Clubs providing services to the members whether liable to service tax by Ravindra N. Vepari (2014) 267 CTR 38 (Articles)

Service tax-Service tax *vis-a-vis* Advocates by Darshana Poddar (2013) 23 GSTR 21 (Journal)

Service tax–Penalty for offences by Director etc. of company (2014) 268 CTR 29 (Articles) Service tax–Assessment / Business Audit under Indirect taxes (2014) The Chamber's Journal–September-9 to 56

Service tax–Recent Service tax issues in Education sector by Vikarm Nankani & Rohit Jain (2014) The Chamber's Journal–September–P. 68

T

Tax administration–Setting up short-term administration reform commission-Apparently a futile exercise with obscure role by T. N. Pandey (2014) 360 ITR 45(Journal)

Tax Jurisprudence-Challenges Ahead by N. M. Ranka (2014) AIFTPJ–January–P. 8

Transaction tax- Idea of transaction tax–Whether worthwhile by Minu Agarwal (2014) 265 CTR (Articles) 1

TDS- CBDT Circular no 1 of 2014 –Applicability of withholding tax on service tax component included in the payments made by Rama Gupta & Nisha Malpani (2014) 266 CTR (Articles) 29

Tribunal orders-High Court reactions to a summary non-speaking orders by T. N. Pandey (2014) 363 ITR 35(Journal)

TDS : How to minimize TDS mismatches to prevent withholding of refunds by Gopal Nathani (2014) 33 ITR 13 (Trib.)(Journal)

Taxation–Moden Perspective & Challenges by Honourable Justice C. Nagappan (2014) AIFTPJ–July–P.11

Taxation–Medan Perspective & Challenges by Honourable Justice Satish K. Agnihotri (2014) AIFTPJ–July–P.14

Taxing off Shore Services under Income-tax Act: Are Service tax principles relevant? By Tarun Jain (2014) 365 ITR 30 (Journal)

Trust–No tax on beneficiaries in India on the Income of Discretionary Trust abroad by R. Santhnam (2014) 269 CTR 1 (Articles)

Tax Planning–Tax planning in respect of interest payable on borrowed capital for acquisition, construction, repair or reconstruction of property by T. V. Ganesan (2014) 224 Taxmann 99 (Mag.)

Transfer pricing–Indian Transfer pricing–The Journey so far by T. P. Ostwal (2014) BCAJ–September–P.29

Transfer pricing–Tides of Transfer Pricing crash against share capital subscription –An appraisal of the Bombay High Court ruling in the case of Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd. by Krishna Malhotra & Ankur Goel (2014) 227 Taxmann 53(Mag.)

Transfer Pricing- Transactional Net Margin Method- Overview and Analysis by Samir Gandhi & Parag Gor (2014) BCAJ–December–P.10

Tax Residency–Converging tests of Corporate Tax Residency by Neha Pathakji (2014) 227 Taxmann 105(Mag.)

Taxability of a subvention receipt–Controversies by Pradip Kapasi & Gautam Nayak (2014) BCAJ–December–P.43

Tax rate of selected countries–Comparative analysis of Individual income tax rate structure of selected countries by Dr. Indu Jain (2014) 224 Taxmann 195 (Mag.)

Tax Articles for your reference by Kishor Vanjara (2014) The Chamber’s Journal–April –P.116

Tax articles for your reference by Kishor Vanjara (2014) The Chamber’s Journal–August –P. 97

Tax articles for your reference by Kishor Vanjara (2014). The Chamber's Journal –September–P. 119

Tax Articles for your reference by Kishor Vanjara (2014). The Chamber's Journal –November–P.93

Tax Articles for your reference by Kishor Vanjara (2014). The Chamber's Journal –December–P.96

U

Unjust enrichment in the Realm of Income-tax Act by Minu Agarwal (2014) 269 CTR 73 (Articles)

V

Valuation of Shares and Business by Sujal Shah (2014) AIFTP–April–P.16

Valuation of Closing Stock when MOD-AVAT adjustments are involved–Controversies by Kaushik D. Shah (2014) ACAJ–October–P.415

Vodafone wins Land mark case- Assessment & Emerging Issues by T. N. Pandey (2014) 227 Taxmann 7 (Magazine)

W

Writ Jurisdiction–Reassessment and Alternative Remedy by Mihir Naniwadekar (2014) The Chamber's Journal–April–P.15

Writ Petition in relation to taxation matters by P. Ravi Kumar (2014) AIFTPJ–July–P.17

Tax world – AIFTP Journal

Editorial–Professional organisations can play a proactive role in bringing accountability in tax administration and better implimentation of tax law by the use of The Right to Information Act, 2005 and forwarding objective suggestions to the authority concerned by Dr K.shivaram (2014) AIFTPJ–April P.5

Editorial-Whether prosecution is justified for technical failure in performing honorary task on behalf of the Government ? Failure to pay tax deducted at source with in specified time (2014) AIFTPJ–June–P.5

Editorial : An open letter to Honourable Prime Minister of India-Tax Professionals' wishlist by Dr. K. Shivaram (2014) AIFTPJ-June–P.5'

Editorial : Union Budget–Some crucial Issues–Bharat Vikas Bond, 2014 by N. M. Ranka (2014) AIFTPJ–July P.5

Suggestions–ITAT Bar Association’s Co-ordination Committee (2014) AIFTPJ–April–PT54
Income tax Review/The Chamber’s Journal Special Story during last decade (2001 to 2014) (2014) The Chamber’s Journal–March–P. 52

Pendency of appeals as on 1-1-2014 (2014) AIFTPJ–January–P 77

Pendency of appeals as on 30-5-2014(2014) AIFTPJ–June–P.56

Pendency of appeals as on 1-12-2014 (2014) AIFTPJ–December–P.53

Special Bench cases pending as on 30-5-2014 (2014) AIFTPJ–June–P.53

Special Bench cases pending as on 1-12-2014 (2014) AIFTPJ–December–P.53

Opinion

Sales tax- Sales under ss.3(a) & 3(b) in Inter State Works contract by Vinay Patkar (2014) AIFTPJ–January–P. 66

C. Form & Local Body Tax (LBT) By Vinay Patkar (2014) AIFTPJ–April P. 44

Licence to Manufacture–Whether intangible goods by P. C. Joshi (2014) AIFTPJ–June–P.35

Sales in course of import/export–Local sales or CST by Vinay Patkar (2014) AIFTPJ–June–P.39

Extension of time and granting of time after expiry of time limit for making pre deposit by Vinay Patkar (2014) AIFTPJ–December–P.46

