1. Introduction

In replacement of Indirect Tax levies like VAT/Service Tax/Excise, the new model of GST is introduced from 1-7-2017. There is Central Goods and Services Tax Act (CGST) as well as State Goods and Services Tax Acts (SGST). Thus, GST is a fiscal statute made to raise revenue for Governments. Like any fiscal statute, GST also contains provisions for prosecution in case of default by any person. As we are aware, such provisions are for deterrence so that there should not be knowingly tax evasion by any person.

It is experience that till recently revenue authorities were not much aggressive about prosecution and it used to be launched/made applicable very selectively. However, now, it is order of the day to initiate prosecution whereever applicable. Therefore, it is necessary that there is good awareness of these provisions to avoid any undesirable action on part of authorities.

Generally, every fiscal statute contains the provisions of prosecution, although the errant taxpayer can be prosecuted with the help of general laws such as Indian Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure. The reason behind having special provisions regarding prosecution in the fiscal statute may be to describe the offences specifically considering the objects and scheme of the respective fiscal statute. On this aspect we may draw reference from judgment on Income Tax of Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case
T. S. Baliah v. T. S. Rangachari, Income-Tax (1968) 2 MLJ 451, wherein it was observed,
“The object and the purposes, therefore, of these two enactments are different. The subject-matter of the offence under Section 177, Indian Penal Code, is much wider and comprehensive than the subject-matter of the offence created under Section 52 of the Income-tax Act for the purpose of enforcing effectively the provisions of the said Act. The Indian Penal Code is a penal statute whereas the Income-tax is fiscal and deals with revenue. Can it be said in this background, that Section 52 of the Income-tax Act though creates an offence similar to that of Section 177, Indian Penal Code, but narrower in scope, takes away the entire subject-matter provided under Section 177, Indian Penal Code. The object and the purpose of the two enactments being different and the offence under the enactment being wider than the other, I am of the view that it would not have been intended by the later enactment to repeal the earlier”. Therefore, it is clear that since the special provisions are made under the GST Act, it cannot be inferred that no one can be prosecuted under India Penal Code for the offences which might be covered under GST Act.

2. Offences and punishment under GST [Section 132]

Section 132(1) specifies the offences and punishments for the same. Details of offences specified in the clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 132 are given as under:

a) Non-issuance or incorrect issuance or false issuance of invoice;

b) Issuance of invoice without actual supply of goods/services;

c) Availment of ITC based on invoice referred above in (b);

d) Failure to pay tax collection beyond 3 months of its due date;

e) Fraudulently avail ITC/refund other then (a) to (d) above;

f) Falsification or substitution of financial records or production of fake accounts and information with intention to evade tax;

g) Preventing any officer in discharging duties;

h) Acquire possession or in any way concerned with transporting, removing, depositing, keeping, concealing, supplying, or purchasing or dealing with any goods which he knew that liable for confiscation;

i) Tampers with or destroys any material evidence or documents;

j) Receives or supplies any service which is in contravention of any provisions of the GST Act;

k) Fails to supply any information which he is required to supply or supplies false information;

l) Attempts to commit or abate any offences.

The term of imprisonment for the specified offences is dependent on the quantum of tax evasion. The punishment u/s. 132(1) is explained with the help of following table:

Sr. No. Quantum of tax evasion Term of imprisonment
1. Exceeding ₹ 100 lakhs up to ₹ 200 lakhs Up to 1 year and fine
2. Exceeding ₹ 200 lakhs up to ₹ 500 lakhs Up to 3 years and fine
3. Exceeding ₹ 500 lakhs Up to 5 years and fine
4. Abetting offence under clause (f), (g) or (j) Up to six months and fine

3. Every subsequent offence punishable [Section 132(2)]

As per sub-section (2) of Section 132 if any person convicted of an offence under this section is again convicted of an offence under this section, then, he shall be punishable for the second and for every subsequent offence with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years. Here it is pertinent to note that the monetary limit with respect to evasion of tax does not apply in case of repeat offence.

4. Minimum Punishment [Section 132(3)]

By section 132(3), it is provided that the minimum punishment will be six months unless for adequate written reasons in judgment, it is waived by concerned Court.

5. Offences are non-cognisable and bailable [Section 132(4)/(5)]

Sub-section (4) of Section 132 says that all the offences under GST Act, except those referred in sub-section (5), are non-cognisable and bailable even if they are cognisable or non-bailable under Code of Criminal Procedure,1973. Sub-section (5) says that the offences involving evasion of tax as per clause (a), (b), (c) or (d) mentioned above and which exceeds ₹ 500 lakhs shall be cognisable and non-bailable. Therefore, all offences under the GST Act are non-cognisable and bailable if the amount of evasion of tax is below ₹ 500 lakhs.

6. Sanction for Prosecution [Section 132(6)]

An essential provision with regard to sanction for prosecution is made under sub-section (6). For prosecuting any person under Section 132, there must be previous sanction of the Commissioner. Further, Section 134 mandates that the Court should not take cognisance of any complaint in absence of previous sanction of the Commissioner and further that offences under this Act cannot be tried by any Court anterior to Magistrate of first class.

The term ‘Commissioner’ is defined in Section 2(24) of CGST Act as under:

“(24) “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Central Tax and includes the Principal Commissioner of Central Tax appointed under Section 3 and the Commissioner of Integrated Tax appointed under the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act.”

Thus, the officers covered by above definition will be eligible to sanction prosecution.

The term ‘tax’ is separately defined for the prosecution provision of Section 132. The Explanation is added to Section 132 which reads as under:

“Explanation — For the purposes of this section, the term “tax” shall include the amount of tax evaded or the amount of input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised or refund wrongly taken under the provisions of this Act, the State Goods and Services Tax Act, the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act and cess levied under the Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act.”

In nutshell any wrong advantage in relation to tax payment is considered to be ‘tax’ for prosecution provision.

It is settled position that to prove criminal offence of evasion under Fiscal Laws, the action should be with conscious mind to defraud revenue. The affected party/person will be required to prove its bona fide to escape the prosecution provision.

7. Prosecution of Officers [Section 133]

Section 133 is for prosecution of officers of department if they wilfully disclose an information or contents of any return furnished under GST and shall be liable for prosecution, except such disclosure is in term of requirement of law in different situation.

The punishment for such offence will be imprisonment up to six months and fine up to ₹ 25,000/-. However the prosecution of such officer should be with prior section of Government, if he is Government servant and by Commissioner, for others.

8. Presumption of culpable mental State [Section 135]

The section has wide implications and almost all burden is placed on accused person to defend. Normally, for prosecution under Indian Penal Code etc. the burden is on prosecutor/complainant to prove the charge. However, due to specific provision under section 135 of GST Act, the burden is shifted on accused person. The section is reproduced below to comprehend the scope of said section.

“135. In any prosecution for an offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution.

Explanation.— For the purposes of this section ––

(i) the expression “culpable mental state” includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact, and belief in, or reason to believe, a fact;

(ii) a fact is said to be proved only when the court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability.”

In fair justice it is felt that such provisions are not tenable. If someone is accusing other of criminal action, the burden lies on such accuser to prove the charge. We expect that the citizens will be treated with fairness and above obscure provision will be deleted from the Act.

9. Relevancy of statements under certain circumstances [Section 136]

One more such obscure provision in GST Act is about relevancy of statement made during course of issue of summons under section 70. It is provided that in specified situations the statement given will be considered to be valid and relevant for prosecution. The two circumstances mentioned in above section are as under:

“(a) when the person who made the statement is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or whose presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the court considers unreasonable; or

(b) when the person who made the statement is examined as a witness in the case before the Court and the Court is of the opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the statement should be admitted in evidence in the interest of justice.”

Normally, the parties are entitled to retract the statement based on facts. If the party finds any such eventuality it should do needful at the earliest, else the above provision may affect adversely.

Normally, if any statement is relied upon in prosecution the person making such statement is required to be made available for cross examination. By making above speaking provision, it appears that fundamental right under principles of natural justice of getting cross examination opportunity is sought to be set at naught. Citizen expect that there should not be such artificial encroachment on fundamental rights of citizen. This will also led to dereliction of duty on part of prosecutors. Appropriate changes are required in above provision.

10. Offences by companies and certain other persons

Section 137 enumerates the persons who would be guilty and be prosecuted for the offences, if the offences are committed by a firm, company, LLP, HUF, Trust.

As per Section 137(1) in case of company, every person who was in charge/responsible when offence committed, can be prosecuted and company can also be prosecuted.

As per Section 137(2), in case of the company, director, manager secretary or other officer will also be liable for prosecution, if their connivance or negligence is proved in relation to offence.

As per Section 137(3), in case of Partnership Firm or Limited Liability Partnership Firm or Hindu Undivided Family or Trust, the partner or karta or managing trustee will be deemed to be guilty of offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and liable for punishment, similar to director in case of company.

As per Section 137(4), the persons, as stated above, would not be held liable for punishment if it is proved that the offence was committed without their knowledge or all due diligence to prevent commission of offence was exercised.

11. Compounding of offences [Section 138]

Section 138 allows for compounding of offences by the competent authority either before or after institution of prosecution on payment of compounding fees as may be prescribed. Rules are prescribed vide Rule 162.

Amount for compounding of offence shall be prescribed under the GST Rules. The said compounding fees :

– shall not be less than ₹ 10,000/- or 50% of tax, whichever is greater and

– Shall not be more than ₹ 30,000/- or 150% of tax, whichever is greater.

Compounding shall not be allowed without payment of tax, interest and penalty.

On payment of compounding amount no further proceeding shall be initiated under GST Act and if any criminal proceeding is initiated, the same shall stand abated. However the compounding can be withdrawn if it was obtained by concealment etc. and if withdrawn, the trial will continue.

In following cases the compounding under the GST Act will not be allowed:

– Second time compounding is not allowed in respect of offences described in clauses (a) to (f) and (l) (read with (a) to (f) of Section 132(1).

– Second time compounding is not allowed in respect of other clauses of Section 132(1) if value of supply exceeds ₹ 1 crore.

– Compounding is not allowed if an impugned offence under GST Act is also an offence under other law.

– A person who has been convicted under GST Act by court.

– The offences under clauses (g), (j) or (k) of section 132(1) are also not eligible to compounding.

– Other notified person also will not be eligible for compounding.

12. Arrest power [Section 69)

While discussing provisions of prosecution it is also necessary to take note of section 69 of CGST Act, which provides for arrest by GST Department Officer. Similar powers are under SGST Act also. It is self contained provision for arrest and bail etc.

Under MVAT Act, such powers were not there. There is fear in mind of dealers that it may be used indiscriminately and in unjustified manner.

13. Limitation period for taking cognizance or institution of prosecution

There are no direct provisions about time limit for initiating prosecution. However, there are provisions on above line under Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC).

Section 468 of CrPC, 1973 provides for period of limitation. As per the said provision limitation periods are dependent on nature of punishment and term of imprisonment. The limitation period under CrPC is explained with the help of following table:

Sr. No. Nature of Punishment / term of imprisonment Limitation period
1. Only fine Six months
2. Imprisonment for one year One year
3. Imprisonment for term exceeding one year up to three years Three years

As per Section 469 of CrPC, 1973 talks about the commencement of the period of limitation. The following eventualities are discussed in sub-section (1) of Section 469 of CrPC for the commencement of period of limitation.

– Clause (a) says period of limitation will start on the day of offence.

– Clause (b) says, if the commission of offence is not known to the person aggrieved or police officer, then first day on which offence comes to the knowledge of aggrieved person or police officer.

– Clause (c) says, when the identity of the offender is not known, in that case the first day on which identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved or police officer.

In absence of specific provision in respect of period of limitation for prosecution under GST Act, the above provisions of Sections 468 and 469 of CPC can be made applicable. For commencement of period of limitation, clause (b) appears to be relevant in cases of offences under GST Act. However, it is required to be tried in the competent court.

Conclusion

The provisions of GST Act are new. The prosecution provisions are new but on same line as in earlier laws. The precedents in earlier laws will be useful for guidence under GST also.

We hope such stringent prosecution provisions will have positive effect to avoid tax evasion. It is also expected that the above provisions will be used with fairness and not with a view to harass the business community.

 

Introduction

1. The Wanchoo Committee Report was unequivocal when it opined that the fear of civil liabilities and penalties have proven ineffective in as much as they do not adequately deter the assessees that decide to tread upon the fine line that differentiates between the grey area of adventurous tax planning and the dark area of tax evasion. The report stressed upon the need to dole out exemplary punishment in the form of prosecutions to instil fear in the mind of the assessees seeking to traverse that grey area. “… The provisions for imposition of penalty fail to instil adequate fear in the minds of tax evaders. Prospect of landing in jail on the other hand, is a far more dreaded consequence – to operate in terorem upon the erring taxpayers. Besides, a conviction in court of law is attended with several legal and social disqualifications as well. In order, therefore to make enforcement of tax laws really effective, we consider it necessary for the Department to evolve a vigorous prosecution policy and to pursue it unsparingly.”

2. The prosecution policy of the Government in the case of economic offences has seen a varied degree of success over the years. However, it is safe to say that the Wanchoo report failed to inspire the Government of those days to take adequate steps to prosecute offenders. Times change and with the increased percolation of the internet and news, economic offences are being seen as a rising menace in todays society. The current Government with a dual motive of increasing tax collections as well as projecting itself as a hardliner on economic offences has taken the bold step of stepping up the action on errant assessees. Public perception however has traditionally been to hold economics to a lower standard than the traditional criminal offences. Lack of prosecutions in the past has also emboldened the public to skip its fundamental duty of paying their taxes on time. It may therefore be a common perception that the Courts may be softer on taxation cases than they are on traditional offences such as theft etc. This could not be further from the truth.

3. The strict approach of courts to economic offence can be summed up in a Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as far back as 1987 in the case of State of Gujrat v. Mohanlal Jitmalji Porwal & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 364 “The entire Community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book. A murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community. A disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to administer justice in an even handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the National Economy and National Interest”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Narain Popli v. CBI (2003) 3 SCC 641 reiterated its observations in Gujrat v. Mohanlal Jitmalji Porwal & Ors. further observing that “the cause of the community deserves better treatment at the hands of the Court in the discharge of its judicial functions. The Community or the State is not a persona non grata whose cause may be treated with disdain.. ..Unfortunately in the last few years, the country has seen an alarming rise in white-collar crimes which has affected the fibre of the country’s economic structure. These cases are nothing but private gain at the cost of public, and lead to economic disaster.” The approach of the Courts in treating economic offences as grave offenses against the public at large has a necessary effect widespread ramifications in as much as securing bail and in discharge / quashing proceedings. Compounding of offences therefore seems to be the simplest way out for those assessees against who prosecution proceedings are purported to be initiated.

Bail

1. The word bail refers to process of procuring the release of an accused by ensuring his attendance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. v. P.P. (1978) 1 SCC 240 has made several observations that are fundamental to Jurisprudence regarding bail. The Hon’ble Justice Krishna Iyer made an erudite attempt to balance the rights enshrined in Article 21 as against the dangers posed to the society observed “”Bail or jail?”– at the pre-trial or post-conviction stage-belongs to the blurred area of the criminal justice system and largely binges on the hunch of the Bench, otherwise called judicial discretion. The Code is cryptic on this topic and the Court prefers to be tacit, be the order custodial or not. And yet, the issue is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitised judicial process. Personal liberty, deprived when bail is refused, is too precious a value of our Constitutional system recognised under Article 21 that the curial power to negate it is a great trust exercisable, not casually but judicially, with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the community. To glamorise impressionistic orders as discretionary may, on occasions, make a litigative gamble decisive of a fundamental right. After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of ‘procedure established by law’. The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right. The doctrine of Police Power, Constitutionally validates punitive processes for the maintenance of public order, security of the State, national integrity and the interest of the public generally. Even so, having regard to the solemn issue involved, deprivation of personal freedom, ephemeral or enduring, must be founded on the most serious considerations relevant to the welfare objectives of society, specified in the Constitution. The essential distillation of the observations made by the Supreme Court can be summarised in the phrase :- “Bail is the rule, Jail is the exception.”

2. When it comes to bail, offences fall broadly into Two different categories, either bailable or Non Bailable. Bailable offences are those in which bail is granted as a matter of right. In case an offence is bailable, then upon arrest bail is automatically granted subject to the conditions imposable. The arresting officer is to complete the formalities of arrest and then grant him bail in order to secure his presence in Court. Section 496 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that “when a person charged with the commission of a bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or is brought before a Court and is prepared at any time, while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceedings before such court, to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhurkar Purshottam Mondkar & Ors. 1958 AIR 376
held that “There is no doubt that under Section 496 a person accused of a bailable offence is entitled to be released on bail pending his trial. As soon as it appears that the accused person is prepared to give bail, the police officer or the Court, before whom he offers to give bail, is bound to release him on such terms as to bail as may appear to the officer or the Court to be reasonable. It would even be open to the officer or the Court to discharge such person on executing his bond as provided in the section instead of taking bail from him.” Therefore, in case of a bailable offence, the bail is granted to the accused as a matter of entitlement either on the furnishing of a bail bond or even on his personal recognizance (without any security). It is to be noted that a large number of offences under the Income-tax Act are bailable and hence bail can be obtained in them as a matter of entitlement by conveying to the police officer upon arrest that the accused is willing to fulfil the conditions of bail. However, merely because bail is a matter of entitlement in a bailable offences would not mean that the said bail that has been secured cannot be cancelled. In
Sukar Narayan Bakhiya v. Rajnikant R. Shah 1982 GLH 778 the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court held that the Court can refuse bail even if offense is bailable if conditions imposed while granting bails are violated.

3. Contrary to the name, Non-Bailable offences are not those in which bail cannot be obtained. Non-Bailable offenses are those offenses in which bail is not a matter of right. Therefore, getting bail when accused of a non bailable offence is not automatic but is the exercise of the discretion of the Courts. Bail can certainly be granted, however an application before the Court having the jurisdiction must be made and the Court should be satisfied that the case is a fit case for granting bail.

4. At the time of granting bail the Court shall only look at the prima facie material and should not go into merits of the case by appreciating evidence. In granting or not granting of bail in a non-bailable offence, the primary consideration is the nature and gravity of the offence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of DCP (Special Branch Delhi) v. Jaspal Singh Gill (1984) 3 SCC 555 held that “at the time of granting bail in cases involving non-bailable offences particularly where the trial has not yet commenced, the Court should take into consideration various matters such as the nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial, reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or the State and similar other considerations.” Therefore the Trail Courts wide Discretion in granting or refusing bail is well established. There is however, no straight jacket formulae and the consideration for each and every bail application must be upon the merits of the matter brought before the Courts. The possibility of the accused being actually convicted of the offence keeping in mind the quality of the evidence can also often weigh in on the Court’s mind before granting bail. However, one of the most important yardstick is the flight risk that the accused presents. The entire purpose of enlarging an accused on bail is to strike a balance between the interest of the public and the fundamental right of liberty guaranteed to the citizens of India by the Constitution. It is therefore not unusual to see restrictions on travel being put in place by the court, usually involving either the deposit of the passport with the Court or to explicitly seek the permission of the court before travelling overseas. Needless to say, the accused needs to present himself / herself before the Court on every occasion as mandated failing which a bailable / non-bailable warrant may be issued against the accused to compel appearance. The terms of bail need to be strictly adhered to in both letter and spirit so as to prevent the cancellation of bail.

5. Bail also called ‘regular bail’ by its very nature can be availed of only after arrest. Therefore, being arrested is an essential precondition for seeking bail. In the case of a non-bailable offence, this would essentially mean that the accused invariably spends a little while in custody. Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for the granting of ‘Anticipatory bail’ by an appropriate Court in order to safeguard an accused from being unnecessarily taken into custody. The general scheme of anticipatory bail is as follows :- “Where any person has any reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail. The Court may, after taking into consideration, inter alia the following factors, namely:- (i) the nature and gravity of the accusation ; (ii) the antecedents of the applicant … (iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice (iv) where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him so arrested; either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for grant of anticipatory bail.” It is to be noted that there are various state wise amendments that need to be considered while applying for anticipatory bail. Needless to say, anticipatory bail is not required to be taken where the offence itself is bailable and therefore bail is available as a matter of right.

6. An anticipatory bail application can also act as a dual edged sword as upon making an application for anticipatory bail, it is crucial that interim protection from being arrested should be taken from the Court failing which the concerned officer may arrest the applicant on basis of accusation apprehended in such application. It is also of note that the person must have ‘a reason to believe’ that he may get arrested on the accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence. The person needs to make out a prima facie case that he has an apprehension that he may be arrested. This reason to believe needs to be established in the Court that is moved for the grant of anticipatory bail failing which anticipatory bail shall not be granted. The discretion given to the court in the grant of anticipatory bail is even wider than what is afforded to it for regular bail, but the yardsticks are clearly defined by the statute. Interim protection often restricts the police from placing the applicant under arrest, however the accused is often directed to assist the investigating authority in the conduct of the investigation and by filing regular appearances before the investigating authority. Anticipatory bail as well as interim protection often comes with stringent conditions and a strict adherence to the conditions is a sin qua non for availing of the protection. Anticipatory bail does not mean that the accused cannot be arrested at all, it simply means that in the event of arrest, the accused shall be released on bail as per the conditions of the anticipatory bail. The distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order of anticipatory bail is that whereas the former is granted after arrest and therefore means release from the custody of the police, the latter is granted in anticipation of arrest and is therefore effective at the very moment of arrest as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Ors (1980) 2 SCC 565 where the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “the applicant must show that he has “reason to believe” that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. The use of the expression “reason to believe” shows that the belief that the applicant may be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere ‘fear’ is not ‘belief’, for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of a vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him, in pursuance of which he may be arrested. The grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence, must be capable of being examined by the Court objectively, because it is then alone that the Court can determine whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be so arrested. Section 438(1), therefore, cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a possible arrest. Otherwise, the number of applications for anticipatory bail will be as large as, at any rate, the adult populace. Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual’s liberty; it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations, likely or unlikely.”

7. Even though the statute provides for anticipatory bail application being filed either before the Court of Session or the Jurisdictional High Court, convention dictates that only in exceptional cases shall an ‘ABA’ application be moved directly before the High Court before first approaching the Court of Session. The Gujarat High Court in the case of Rameshchandra Kashiram Vora & etc. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. 1988 Cri LJ 210 (Guj.) held that “It would be a sound exercise of judicial discretion not to entertain each and every application for anticipatory bail directly bypassing the Court of Session. Ordinarily, the Sessions Court is nearer to the accused and easily accessible and remedy of anticipatory bail is same and under same section and there is no reason to believe that Sessions Court will not act according to law and pass appropriate orders. In a given case, if any accused is grieved, his further remedy to approach the High Court is not barred and he may prefer a substantive application for anticipatory bail under Section 438 or revision application under Section 397 of the Cr. P. C. to the High Court and the High Court would have the benefit of the reasons given by the Sessions Court. It would be only in exceptional cases or special circumstances that the High Court may entertain such an application directly and these exceptional and “special circumstances must really be exceptional and should have valid and cogent reasons for by passing the Sessions Court and approaching the High Court.” This clearly establishes that though the High Court can be directly moved for grant of anticipatory bail, ordinarily the Court of Session needs to be moved first, unless special reasons can be culled out for not doing the same. Also, a revision application can be made from an order granting / refusing anticipatory bail.

8. There are two views on the aspect if the Court of Session rejects an anticipatory bail application, whether the same one can be made in the High Court. The above Judgment of the Gujarat High Court seems to suggest as such, however there are various judgments of various Courts on either side The High Court of Kerala in
Gopinath v. State of Kerala 1986 CriLJ 1742 (Ker) has held that “The Section says “may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session”. The conjunction ‘or’ appearing in between ‘High Court’ and ‘the Court of Session’ was held in that decision to have been used in an alternative or exclusive sense in contradiction with the term used in Sections 397 and 439 in non-alternative sense as equivalent to ‘and’. With due respect to the learned Judges who decided that case I beg to disagree, I do not think that the section was intended to give a restricted forum in the sense that when one forum is chosen the jurisdiction of the other is excluded. There cannot be any dispute that an accused is having the freedom to approach the Court of Session or the High Court under Section 438. But the question is only whether an accused who approached the Court of Session and got defeated is precluded from moving the High Court for the same relief. I am of the view that he is not precluded. The fact that the concerned person is given the freedom of applying to the High Court or the Court of Session need not necessarily mean that when the Court of Session is moved the option has become final and the approach to the High Court is thereafter barred. By the use of the word ‘or’ in sub-section (1) the legislature has invested the Court of Session and the High Court with concurrent jurisdiction. If the accused makes an application to the Sessions Judge and the same is rejected, nothing in the Code prevents him from making a subsequent application to the High Court. That jurisdiction of the High Court is original and not revisional.” On the other hand the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in
Amiya Kumar Sen v. State of West Bengal 1979 CriLJ 288 (Cal-DB) has held that “we have no doubt to hold that the said section gives the petitioner for anticipatory bail a choice as to the forum where he is to apply. Two Courts are empowered to grant bail under Section 438, namely, the High Court and the Court of Session, but the petitioner may choose one of the two Courts and apply to the Court of his choice. We cannot hold that if the petitioner approaches the Court of Session for the relief under Section 438 and if his prayer is rejected, he will be again entitled to approach the High Court for the same relief on the same ground under that section.” Even so, there is no bar in the High Court exercising its revisionary jurisdiction upon the order passed by the Sessions Court granting or refusing anticipatory bail and hence invoking the revisionary jurisdiction of the High Court is a better option in case anticipatory bail is denied by the Court of Session.

9. The fact that the Apex Court has held that economic offences are a grave crime and need to be dealt with firmly has already been established above. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI (2013) 7 SCC 439 held that “economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offence having deep rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds needs to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations.” The said Judgment was rendered while discussing the bail plea of an accused under the Prevention of Corruption Act, however the ‘obiter dicta’ of the Court can be said to be applicable to all economic offences and is in harmony with the practice of the Supreme Court treating economic offences as a different class of offenses being grave in nature.

10. In a departure from the principle ‘Bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ the Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan in the case of
ITO v. Gopal Dhamani [1988] 172 ITR 462 (Raj.) while dealing with a case of Section 276C of the Income-tax Act held that “in such cases where tax evasion is prima facie of very high valuation, the question of bail should be considered seriously and it should not be granted as a matter of course. Tax evasion of high value certainly jeopardises the entire economy of the country, and is an economic crime of serious magnitude. Leaving apart ‘anticipatory bail’ which should normally be out of question, even I would have considered the original application for bail after arrest, the rejection, other things remaining same, would have had edge; over acceptance at ‘jail’ and not bail should be the rule in such serious cases.”

11. In the light of the above Judgment, the prosecution in economic offences had started contending that bail should not be granted in the case of economic offences. However, the Rajasthan High Court had occasions to revisit and clarify the above Judgment in order that it may not be abused indiscriminately. In
J.P. Singh v. IACIT [1990] 185 ITR 659 (Rajasthan) the Hon’ble Court held that “There is no force in the contention of learned counsel for the Department that anticipatory bail cannot be granted in cases involving economic offences.” In Rajvir Singh v. State of Rajasthan [1990] 186 ITR 144 (Rajasthan) the Hon’ble Court held that “a general principle cannot be laid down that in all cases involving commission of economic offences anticipatory bail is to be refused. What is to be seen is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, anticipatory bail should be granted or not. Filing of a return late is an economic offence and it can be said that economic offences are on the increase every day, but in my opinion a general principle cannot be laid down that in all cases involving commission of economic offences anticipatory bail is to be refused. As seen above, what is to be seen is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, anticipatory bail should be granted or not. At the same time, it may also be considered whether the court should grant anticipatory bail or convert the non-bailable warrants issued by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate into bailable warrants. The relevant factors for deciding the bail application in cases of this type would be the deposit or non-deposit of tax as assessed, whether returns before and after submission of the delayed return were submitted within time, what is the extent of the amount due, the likelihood of the petitioners absconding and other similar matters.”

Discharge of the accused

1. The Sec. 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code deals with the discharge of an accused “If upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so”. The Magistrate after issuing process has the power to either ‘discharge’ the accused if an application is so filed or to ‘frame charges’ against the accused based upon the material available on record. It is important to note that a discharge application is to be filed in the court in which the charges are purported to be tried before the charges are framed. A discharge application must be filed before the charges are framed. At this stage, discharge shall be allowed only if there is insufficient evidence on record to show that the accused must be put on trial. Otherwise, the law put a duty on the magistrate to frame charges and appreciate evidence before discharging the accused or acquitting him.

2. Only prima facie case is to be seen, whether case is beyond reasonable doubt is not to be seen at this stage. Sections 228 and 240 of the Code deal with framing of charge. The Hon’ble High Court of Orissa in
State Bank of India, Balangir Branch v. Satyanarayan Sarangi and Anr. 1992 CrLJ 2635 (Ori.) held that “While Section 228 relates to framing of charge in respect of offences triable by Court of Session, Section 240 deals with framing of charge in respect of offences triable by Magistrate in warrant cases. The opening words of Sub-section (1) in both Sections 228 and 240 ‘that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence’ make it clear that framing of charge is not a mere formality, but a judicial act, to be performed after applying judicial mind to the consideration whether there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence of the accused. The concerned Court cannot blindly accept opinion of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. Before forming opinion as to the presumption referred to in Section 228(1) or Section 240(1), the Judge or the Magistrate, as the case may be, is required to consider the records of the case, i.e., all the materials collected by the prosecution and also hear the submissions of the prosecution and the accused on the relevant aspects. Before framing a charge, he should be satisfied that there are materials on record on the basis of which it can reasonably be concluded that the accused is in any manner connected with the incident leading to the prosecution. In State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh it was observed by the Apex Court that if the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. For the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused, the Court possesses comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on record, if unrebutted, is such on the basis of which it can reasonably be said that the accused had some link with the alleged offence. It has, however, to be remembered that at the stage of framing charge the prosecution has not yet commenced. The truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the investigating Police Officer has gathered and which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or 228 and Section 239 or 240 of the Code. At that stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged may justify the framing of charge. If on consideration of the materials it can be said that the accused has been reasonably connected with the offence, and on the basis of said materials there is a reasonable probability or chance of the accused being found guilty of the offence alleged, then framing of charge cannot be interdicted.. ..The purpose of a Sections 227 and 228 of the Code is to ensure that the Court should be satisfied that the accusation made against the accused is not frivolous and that there is some material for proceeding against him. The evidence has yet to be taken and the aspects which accused terms vulnerable can very well be clarified by evidence when the prosecution has its opportunity of placing the case through witnesses in Court. It would be hazardous to act on the discrepancies unless they are so fatal and glaring as to affect the credibility of the prosecution case without affording reasonable opportunity to prosecution to substantiate the allegations. Similar view has been taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of
Amrik Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab 1996 CriLJ 1610 (P&H). The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia and Anr. (1989) 1 SCC 715 held that “Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused”. The ‘ground in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of change. The Court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor it is necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the Court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into.”

Revision of orders

Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that “The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.” “All Magistrates whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 398”. “If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” This lays the foundation for the revisionary power of a superior court over that of the lower court within its jurisdiction. Powers of revision are exercised in case of orders against which no appeal lies.

3. The revisional jurisdiction of either the Sessions Court or the High Court can be used to challenge the issue of process against an accused. The revisional Jurisdiction in the said challenge usually includes a prayer to quash the proceedings citing correctness, legality or propriety of any finding. The revisional Jurisdiction can also be invoked in an order denying anticipatory bail/regular bail or any other order against which an appeal does not lie. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the revisional jurisdiction of High Court can be moved directly in Central Bureau of Investigation v. State of Gujarat (2007) 6 SCC 156. This is because the statute given the aggrieved party an option of whether to approach the Court of Sessions or the High Court. The High Court of Rajasthan in
Natwar Lal and Ors. v. State and Ors. 2008 CriLJ 3579 observed as follows “it is clear that there is of-course no bar for filing revision directly to the High Court under Section 397 of the Code against the order of the Magistrate but when concurrent jurisdiction is given specially under such circumstances when both are superior courts one to the Magistrate and another to the Sessions, then the propriety demands that elder superior court in hierarchy must be first approached. This is the customary common law as the first elders are always respected.” The order was passed affirming the order of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in
Shri Padmanabh Keshav Kamat v. Shri Anup R. Kantak & Ors. 1999 CRiLJ 122 (Bombay) where it was held that “In the case of Madhavlal v. Chandrashekhar (supra) there were special and exceptional circumstances which in a way justified filing of the revision application directly to the High Court. However, in the instant case no special circumstances which required the petitioner to bypass the forum of the Sessions Judge and rush directly to the High Court, are pointed out. The petitioner could have very well filed his application even before the Sessions Judge, Panaji.. ..Exercise of revisional powers is not a matter of course but it is a matter of rare and sparing use.. ..Hence, as pointed out above when two fora are available to the petitioner for getting redressal of the alleged wrong, then it will certainly be more appropriate for him to first approach the lower forum. It is certainly within the discretion of the higher forum, that is, this Court to consider whether it should entertain or not of such a revision application which can lie before the Sessions Judge.” It is therefore amply clear that though the High Court or the Court of sessions may both be approached in their revisionary jurisdiction to challenge an order of the trial court, it is preferred that the Sessions Court be approached first.

Quashing of proceedings

1. The Criminal Procedure Code does not specifically give any power to the Court to quash proceedings as strictly construed in legal parlance. This power is derived from the inherent powers contemplated under Section 482 of the Code. This was held by the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Abasaheb Yadav Honmane and Ashwini Abasaheb Honmane v. The State of Maharashtra 2008 (2) MhLJ 856 (Bom-FB).

2. Sec. 482 of the CRPC provides for saving of Inherent powers of the High Court “to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice”. The said Section which provides the High Courts virtually unbridled power in order to make any orders necessary to prevent abuse of process of any court or to secure ends of justice is so expansive that it is used both with strict judicial restraint as well as very sparingly. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Minu Kumari and Anr. v. The State of Bihar and Ors. 2006 (4) SCC 359 held that “The Section does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle “quando lex a liquid alicui concedit, conceder videtur et id sine quo res peas esse non protest” (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.

3. Quashing of the charge then is not a power excercised lightly by the High Court. As quashing of the charge means that the accused shall not stand trial at all and no evidence will be lead, it is required to show right at the outset that the provisions of Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code are directly applicable and the said proceedings shall tantamount to abuse of process of the court. The said power is exteremly wide in its scope but narrow in its implementation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of Punjab v. Kasturi Lal and Ors. (2004) 12 SCC 195 has held that quashing of charge is an exception and not the rule. It observed “Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the Section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice. While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone, courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complainant, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” Given the very nature of the power, the inherent powers of the High Court are meant to see substantive justice done and cannot be used invoked when there is another remedy made available by the statute as held by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in
Sankalchand Varchhaji v. Khengaram Varadhji & Ors. 1969 CriLJ 1501.

Conclusions

1. In summation, it can be seen that the courts have time and again held economic offences as grave crimes that cannot be treated leniently. In fact there have been cases where economic offenses have been treated as a greater offence than crimes involving harm to body or property. There are views that different standards of onus shall rest on the accused for anticipatory bail, regular bail, discharge as well as quashing of charge. In the given scenario, given that courts are loath to quash charges and deprive the prosecution for an opportunity to prove the charges sought to be brought about against the accused, compounding of charge emerges as a ‘win – win’ situation for both the revenue authorities and the assessees. A criminal trial is a long, hard, gruelling process and at the end of the process, it is possible that there are no clear winners. Unless the proceedings taken out against the Assessee are patently unjust and wrong in law, professionals may take it upon themselves to safeguard the interest of the Assessees and to compound the charges so as to spare all the parties concerned from the rigours of a long and gruelling trial.

 

1. Introduction

Numerous occasions arise when it is alleged that an offence under any Act is committed by a company and prosecution is invariably sought to be launched against the company, its directors and some of its executives. As “Company” is an artificial person created by law, and is capable of acting only through human agency occupying the position of directors and executives, it is but natural that all such persons are charged for the offence.

The provisions regarding the liability of the directors and other persons for offences committed by the company are enumerated under various Acts such as Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act; MRTP Act, Securities Contracts (Regulations) Act; Essential Commodities Act, Employees’ Provident Fund and Misc. Provisions Act, Workmen’s Compensation Act, Payment of Bonus Act, Payment of Wages Act, The Environment (Protection) Act, Water (Prevention and control of Pollution) Act, Minimum Wages Act; Payment of Gratuity Act, Apprentices Act, Central Excise and Salt Act, Customs Act, 1961, Negotiable Instruments Act etc. etc. and the pro-visions are somewhat identical in nature. Hence, when the provisions qua the directors’ liability are considered under the Income-tax Act, 1961, it is also pertinent to note the law as laid down under other Acts by the Courts.

2. Provisions of Section 278B

As per sub-section (1) of section 278B, where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. The proviso to sub-section (1) provides that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

Sub-section (2) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.

As per sub-section (3) where an offence under this Act has been committed by a person, being a company, and the punishment for such offence is imprisonment and fine, then, without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), such company shall be punished with fine and every person, referred to in sub-section (1), or the director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company referred to in sub-section (2), shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The Explanation to section 278B provides that for the purposes of section 278B — (a) “company” means a body corporate, and includes — (i) a firm and (ii) an association of persons or a body of individuals whether incorporated or not and (b) “director”, in relation to — (i) a firm, means a partner in the firm (ii) any association of persons or a body of individuals, means any member controlling the affairs thereof.

3. Legislative history and analysis of the Section

Section 278B was inserted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 reported in (1975) 100 ITR 33 (ST) w.e.f. 1-10-1975. The object and scope of this section was explained by the Board in its Circular No. 179 dated 30-9-1975 reported in (1976) 102 ITR 26 (ST).

Under sub-section (1) the essential ingredient for implicating a person is his being “in-charge of” and “responsible to” the company for the conduct of the business of the company. The term responsible is defined in the Black’s Law dictionary to mean accountable. Hence, the initial burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused persons at the time when the offence was committed were “in charge of” and “was responsible” to the company for its business and only when the same is proved that the accused persons are required to prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

Both the ingredients “in-charge of” and “was responsible to” have to be satisfied as the word used is “and” [Subramanyam v. ITO (1993) 199 ITR 723 (Mad.)]. Under sub-section (2) emphasis is on the holding of an offence and consent, connivance or negligence of such officer irrespective of his being or not being actually in charge of and responsible to the company in the conduct of the business. Also, while all the persons under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) are liable to be proceeded against it is only persons covered under sub-section (1) who by virtue of the proviso escape punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or despite his due-diligence. From the language of both the sub-sections it is also clear that the complaint must allege that the accused persons were responsible to the firm/company for the conduct of its business at the time of the alleged commission of the business to sustain their prosecution. [Jai Gopal Mehra v. ITO (1986) 161 ITR 453 (P&H)].

Insertion of sub-section (3) by the Finance (No.) Act, 2004 w.e.f. 1-10-2004 was explained by Circular No. 5 dated 15th July, 2005 reported in (2005) 276 ITR 151 (ST). The said amendment was brought to resolve a judicial controversy as to whether a company, being a juristic person, can be punished with imprisonment where the statute refers to punishment of imprisonment and fine. The Apex Court in Javali (M.V.) v. Mahajan Borewell and Co. (1998) 230 ITR 1
held that a company which cannot be punished with imprisonment can be punished with fine only. However, in a subsequent decision by majority in the case of ACIT v. Veliappa Textiles Ltd. (2003) 263 ITR 550 (SC) it was held that where punishment is by way of imprisonment then prosecution against the company would fail. In order to plug loopholes pointed by the Apex Court in Veliappa Textiles (supra) sub-section (3) was introduced whereby company would be punished with fine and other person in-charge of or conniving officers of the company would be punished with imprisonment and fine. It is also to be noted that the legal position laid down in the case of Veliappa Textiles (supra) was overruled by the Apex Court decision rendered in
Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement (2005) 275 ITR 81 (SC).

4. Nature of liability

The principal liability under section 278B is that of the company. The other persons mentioned in sub-section(1) and sub-section (2) are vicariously liable i.e., they could be held liable only if it is proved that the company is guilty of the offence alleged.

The Apex Court in Sheoratan Agarwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1984 S.C. 1824 while dealing with the provisions of section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act which are similar to section 278B has held that the company alone may be prosecuted. The person-in-charge only may be prosecuted. The conniving officer may individually be prosecuted.

The Apex Court in Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd. A.I.R 2000 S.C. 145 while dealing with section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act held that where Company is not prosecuted but only persons in-charge or conniving officer are prosecuted then such prosecution is valid provided the prosecution proves that the company was guilty of the offence.

5. Strict Construction

The Supreme Court in the case of Girdharilal Gupta v. D. N. Mehta, AIR 1971 S.C. 2162, has held that since the provision makes a person who was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business vicariously liable for an offence committed by the company. The provision should be strictly construed.

6. Mens rea

Section 278B is a deeming provision and hence it does not require the prosecution to establish mens rea on the part of the accused. In
B. Mohan Krishna v. UOI 1996 Cri.L.J 638 AP it is held that exclusion of mens rea as a necessary ingredient of an offence is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

7. Proprietary concern

In S. K. Real Estates (2002) Cr.L.J. 1689 (Mad.) it was held that prosecution against a proprietary concern is not maintainable as it is not a legal entity or juridical person.

8. Society

In Dharma Pratisthan v. Mandal (1988) 173 ITR 487 (Del.) it is held that a Society being a AOP and its members can be prosecuted.

9. Liability of Directors, Managing Directors, Manager, Partners, etc.

From the analysis of the provisions of section 278B, it could be seen that the scope and the exact connotation of the expression “every person who at the time the offence was committed was in-charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company” assumes a very important role. If a person i.e. the director or an executive of the company falls within the purview of this expression, he would be liable for the offence of the company, and may be punished therefor. If, on the other hand, the person charged with an offence is not the one who falls within the ambit of that expression, the Court will relieve him of the accusation. Therefore, the essential question that arises is as to who are the persons in-charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company. It should be noted that the onus of proving that the person accused was in-charge of the conduct of the business of the company at the time the contravention took place lies on the prosecution.

In Girdhari Lai Gupta’s case (Supra), the Supreme Court construed the expression, ‘person in-charge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company’ as meaning the person in overall control of the day-to-day business of the company. In arriving at this inference the Supreme Court took into consideration the wordings pertaining to sub-section (2) and observed:

“It mentions director, who may be a party to the policy being followed, by a company and yet not be in-charge of the business of the company. Further, it mentions manager who usually is in-charge of the business but not in over-all-charge. Similarly the other officers may be in charge of only some part of business”.

10. Firm and partners

The Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Pratap Chand & Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 335 has while dealing with prosecution of partners of a firm held that ‘person in-charge’ would mean a person in overall control of day-to-day business. A person who is not in overall control of such business cannot be held liable and convicted for the act of firm. In
Monaben Ketanbhai Shah & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (2004) 7 SCC 15 (SC) the Apex Court while dealing with the provisions of sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it was observed that when a complaint is filed against a firm, it must be alleged in the complaint that the partners were in active business. Filing of the partnership deed would be of no consequence for determining the question. Criminal liability can be fastened only on those who at the time of commission of offence were in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the firm. The Court proceeded to observe that it was because of the fact that there may be sleeping partners who were not required to take any part in the business of the firm; there may be ladies and others who may not be knowing anything about such business. The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make necessary averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. In
Krishna Pipe and Tubes v. UOI (1998) 99 Taxman 568 (All.) it was held that sleeping partners cannot be held liable for offence.

11. Manager

In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi & Ors. AIR 1983 SC 67, the accused invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 of the Code praying for quashing of criminal proceedings initiated against them under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1947. Whereas accused No. 1 was manager of the company, accused Nos. 2-5 were directors. A complaint was led by the Food Inspector of the Municipal Corporation, inter alia, alleging that ‘Morton Toffees’ sold by the accused did not conform to the standards prescribed for the commodity. The Metropolitan Magistrate issued summons to all the accused for violating the provisions of the Act. It was contended on behalf of the accused that proceedings were liable to be quashed as it was not shown that accused persons were in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of business. The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings. Aggrieved Municipal Corporation challenged the decision. The Apex Court held that so far as the manager is concerned, we are satisfied that from the very nature of his duties it can be safely inferred that he would undoubtedly be vicariously liable for the offence, vicarious liability being an incident of an offence under the Act.

12. Company and Directors etc.

In Jamshedpur Engineering & Machine Manufacturing Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1995) 214 ITR 556 (Pat.), the High Court of Patna (Ranchi Bench) held that no vicarious liability can be fastened on all directors of a company. If there are no averments in the complaint that any director was ‘in-charge of’ or ‘responsible for’ conduct of business, prosecution against those directors cannot be sustained.

In R. K. Khandelwal v. State [(1965) 2 Cri. L.J. 439 (AH)] while dealing with liability of non-working directors it has been very succinctly stated by Mathur J. as under:

“In companies there can be directors who are not in charge of, and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. There can be directors who merely lay down the policy and are not concerned with the day-to-day working of the company. Consequently, the mere fact that the accused person is a director of the company, shall not make him criminally liable for the offences committed by the company unless the other ingredients are established which make him criminally liable. To put it differently, no director of a company can be convicted of the offence under section 27 of the Act [The Drugs Act, 1940] unless it is proved that the sub-standard drug was sold with his consent or connivance or was attributable to any neglect on his part, or it is proved that he was a person in-charge of, and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company.”

In Mahalderam Team Estate Pvt. Ltd. v. D. N. Pradhan [(1979) 49 Comp. Cas. 529 (Cal.)], a case under the Employees’ Provident Fund, Act, 1952, of which section 14A is pari materia, all the directors of a company were prosecuted for the offence of non-payment of provident fund contributions of the company’s employees, the Calcutta High Court held that under the said section a company is made primarily liable for an offence committed under the Act. The liability may be extended to other persons vicariously only under the conditions laid down in the section. A director of a company may be concerned only with the policy to be followed and might not have any hand in the management of its day-to-day affairs. Such person must necessarily be immune from such prosecutions. Thus, it has to be established by placing before the Court necessary and sufficient material from which the Court can satisfy itself, that the accused directors took some part in the running of the business of the com¬pany and a mere bald statement that the accused persons are directors of the company and hence responsible for the conduct of the business and management of the company will not do.

In the case of Om Prakash v. Shree Keshariya Investments Ltd. [(1978) 48 Comp. Cas. 85 (Delhi)], had held that a distinction has to be made between directors who are on the board purely by virtue of their technical skill-or because they represented certain special interests and those who are in effective control of the management and affairs and it would be unreasonable to fasten liability on independent directors for defaults and breaches of the company where such directors were appointed by virtue of their special skill or expertise but did not participate in the management. This view has been followed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Tri-Sure India Ltd. [(1983) 54 Comp. Cas. 197 (Bom.)].

In SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla & Anr. [2005] 148 Taxman 128 (SC) wherein this Court while dealing provisions of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which is similar to section 278B laid down following important law relating to liability of directors:

(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under section 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.

(b) Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in- charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases.

(c) The Managing Director or Joint Managing Director would be admittedly in-charge of the company and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as Managing Director or Joint Managing Director, these persons are in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under section 141.

In Madhumilan Syntex Ltd. v. UOI (2007) 290 ITR 199 (SC) assessee had deducted TDS but credited the same to the account of the Central Government after the expiry of the prescribed time limit thereby constituting an offence under section 276B r.w.s. 278B. A show cause notice was issued against the company as well as its four directors as “principal officers”. The accused pleaded that the ground of “reasonable cause”. However sanction for prosecution was granted a complaint was filed against the appellants on 26th Feb., 1992 in the Court of the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Crime), Indore. The accused filed applications under s. 245 of the Cr. PC, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) for discharge from the case contending that they had not committed any offence and the provisions of the Act had no application to the case. It was alleged that proceedings were initiated mala fide. In several other similar cases, no prosecution was ordered and the action was arbitrary as also discriminatory. Moreover, there was ‘reasonable cause’ for delay in making payment and the case was covered by s. 278AA of the Act. The directors further stated that they could not be treated as ‘principal officers’ under s. 2(35) of the Act and it was not shown that they were ‘in-charge’ of and were ‘responsible for’ the conduct of business of the company. No material was placed by the complainant as to how the directors participated in the conduct of business of the company and for that reason also, they should be discharged. However the prayers of the accused were rejected. Against this rejection a Revision petition was filed which was also rejected. Against the same Criminal petition was filed before the High Court which was also dismissed. Hence the accused approached the Supreme Court. Following were the important points of law laid down by the Apex Court:

1. Wherever a company is required to deduct tax at source and to pay it to the account of the Central Government, failure on the part of the company in deducting or in paying such amount is an offence under the Act and has been made punishable.

2. From the statutory provisions, it is clear that to hold a person responsible under the Act, it must be shown that he/she is a ‘principal officer’ under s. 2(35) of the Act or is ‘in charge of’ and ‘responsible for’ the business of the company or firm. Where necessary averments have been made in the complaint, initiation of criminal proceedings, issuance of summons or framing of charge, cannot be held illegal and the Court would not inquire into or decide correctness or otherwise of the allegations levelled or averments made by the complainant. It is a matter of evidence and an appropriate order can be passed at the trial.

3. No independent and separate notice that the directors were to be treated as principal officers under the Act is necessary and when in the showcause notice it was stated that the directors were to be considered as principal officers under the Act and a complaint was filed, such complaint is entertainable by a Court provided it is otherwise maintainable.

4. Once a statute requires to pay tax and stipulates period within which such payment is to be made, the payment must be made within that period. If the payment is not made within that period, there is default and an appropriate action can be taken under the Act.

5. It is true that the Act provides for imposition of penalty for non-payment of tax. That, however, does not take away the power to prosecute accused persons if an offence has been committed by them.

Though the Apex Court did not go into the merits of the case and decided the issue in respect of maintainability of criminal complaint, the decision has given a clear warning to the corporates and their principal officers, the need for strict adherence to time schedules in the matter of payment of taxes, especially TDS. It is time that the taxpayers also realise they have to be extra careful when it comes to remittance of the TDS, as it is money due to the Government, which they have withheld from paying to a third party. However it is important that the Revenue does not take shelter of this decision and launch criminal prosecution even in case of few months of delayed remittance of tax deducted at source.

13. Accountant

In Dev v. State of A.P. 2002 Cri.L.J 4770 (Andhra Pradesh) it was held that an Accountant is in-charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business.

 

1. Introduction

Under the Income-tax Act, 1961 there are various provisions for compliance with taxing provisions and the collection of taxes. The Income-tax Act seeks to enforce tax compliance in a three fold manner; namely :-

1. Imposition of interests.

2. Imposition of penalties and,

3. Prosecutions

The genesis for the need of stringent imposition of prosecutions find its roots in the Wanchoo Committee Report. The said Committee in their final report recommended as under:-

“Need for vigorous prosecution policy, 283. In the fight against tax evasion, monetary penalties are not enough. Many a calculating tax dodger finds it a profitable proposition to carry on evading taxes over the years, if the only risk to which he is exposed is a monetary penalty in the year in which he happens to be caught. The public in general also tends to lose faith and confidence in tax administration once it knows that even when a tax evader is caught, the administration lets him get away lightly after paying only a monetary penalty- when money is no longer a major consideration with him if it serves his business interests….”The law Commission in its 47th report dt.
28-2-1972 also, after elaborate discussion on the subject recommended the changes to be made in the Income-tax Act, 1961 for incorporating provisions relating to offences and prosecutions. (http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-50/Report47.pdf)

The Comptroller & Auditor General of India in the report No 28 of 2013 for the year ended March, 2012 which was presented to the Parliament has carried out a compressive audit of all the aspects of the law relating to prosecution and procedure of the said Act, which can act as an eye opener for the tax administration. A few instances stated in the report are as follows:- (a) CBDT did not utilise the prosecution mechanism for ensuring compliance u/s. 276CC of the Act, (b) there were inadequate measure to monitoring the cases, (c) compounding of offences was not used as an alternative mechanism effectively to reduce litigation and realise the due revenue (d) prosecution mechanism was not working effectively and efficiently, (e) Central economic intelligence bureau established for gathering, collation and dissemination of information among the tax gathering agencies like CBDT, CBEC etc. had not worked in the manner as intended to arrest tax evasion by prosecution etc.; (f) Pending of cases as on March, 2012 was 2,603 cases of which 1,530 are more than 15 years old etc.

(http://saiindia.gov.in/sites/default/files/audit_report_files/Union_Performance_Revenue_Dept_Direct_
Tax_penalty_prosecution_28_2013.pdf)

A general take away from the various studies can be that even though assessees in general may not be worried by levy of interest or penalties which they can afford to pay, the idea of undergoing imprisonment if convicted of offences can be a strong deterrent from brazen tax evasion and non-compliance. Recently it has been observed that a slew of show cause notices for launching of prosecution have been issued to a large number of assessees, therefore it has became very important to be aware of the laws relating to prosecutions under direct taxes which may help tax consultants in guiding the assessees not only (a) to file an appropriate replies, (b) to make an application for waiver of penalties, (c) approach for Settlement Commission, (d) Compounding of Offences, (e) proceedings before the Magistrate Court or (f) approach the Central Govt. for immunity but also to effectively attempt to quash wrongful prosecutions that may have been initiated. In this article an attempt has been made to give an overview of the provisions relating to offences and Prosecutions under the Income-tax Act and also an attempt has been made to compile an exhaustive check-list for filing appropriate replies in response to a show cause notice.

2. Offences and prosecutions under Income-tax Act, 1961

The sections dealing with offences and prosecution proceedings are included in Chapter XXII of the Income-tax Act, 1961 i.e. S. 275A to S. 280D of the Act (hereinafter referred as “ said Act”). However, the provisions contained in said Chapter XXII of the Act do not inter se deal with the procedures regulating the prosecution itself, which is governed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The provisions of the said Code are to be followed relating to all offences under the Income-tax Act, unless the contrary is specially provided for by the Act. An appropriate example would be S. 292A of the Act that prescribes that S. 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Order to release on probation of good conduct or after admonition) and the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, would not apply to a person convicted of an offence under the Income–tax Act, unless the accused is under eighteen of age. The Finance Act, 2012, w.e.f. 1-7-2012 has inserted S. 280A to 280D, wherein the Central Government has been given the power to constitute Special Courts in consultation with the Chief Justices of the respective jurisdictional High Courts. Normally, the Magistrate Court in whose territorial jurisdiction an offence is committed tries the offence. For direct tax cases, the offence is said to committed at the place where a false return of income is submitted, even though it is completely possible that the return has be prepared elsewhere or that accounts have been fabricated at some other place. In J. K. Synthetics Ltd. v. ITO (1987) 168 ITR 467 (Delhi) (HC), the Court held that the offence u/s. 277 of the Act can be tried only at the place wherefalse statement is delivered (SLP was rejected (1988) 173 ITR 98 (st). also refer Babita Lila v. UOI (2016) 387 ITR 305 (SC). A First Class Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, should try the prosecution case under the direct taxes. If a Special Economic Offences Court with specified jurisdiction is notified, the complaint is to be filed before the respective court. For ready reference an easy to understand summary of prosecutions provisions under Income–tax Act has been reproduced in a chart as per annexure “A”.

3. S. 278E : Presumption as to culpable mental state

The concept of mens rea is integral to criminal jurisprudence. An offence cannot be committed unintentionally. Generally a guilty mind is a sine qua non for an offence to be committed. The rule in general criminal jurisprudence established over the years has evolved into the concept of ‘Innocent until proven guilty’ which effectively places the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt squarely on the prosecution. However, The Taxation Laws (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1986, inserted S. 278E with effect from 10th September, 1986 has carved out an exception to this rule. The said Section places the burden of proving the absence of mens rea upon the accused and also provides that such absence needs to be proved not only to the basic threshold of ‘preponderance of probability’ but ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. The scope and effect of this provision has been explained by the Board Circular No. 469 dt. 23-9-1986 (1986) 162 ITR 21(St) (39)

(Link: http://incometaxindia.gov.in/Communications/Circular/Others/910110000000000875/dtc476r6.htm)

Section 278E of the Act, which is analogous to S. 138A of the Customs, Act, 1962, S.92C of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, S.98B of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 and S.59 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. Similar provision was introduced under Wealth-tax Act, 1957, i.e. S. 35-0 and Gift–tax Act, S.35D. Constitutional validity of the said provision was upheld in
Selvi J. Jayalalitha v. UOI and Ors. (2007) 288 ITR 225 (Mad) (HC), Selvi J. Jayalalithav. ACIT (2007) 290 ITR 55 (Mad) (HC)
which was affirmed by Apex court in Sasi Enterprises v. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 163 (SC).The Apex Court in the afore mentioned decision observed that whereever specifically provided, in every prosecution case, the Court shall always presume culpable mental state and it is for the accused to prove the contrary beyond reasonable doubt. This is a drastic provision which makes far reaching changes in the concept of mens rea in as much it shifts the burden of proof to show the absence of the necessary ingredients of the intent to commit the crime upon the accused and is radical departure from the concept of traditional criminal jurisprudence. According to this section, wherever mens rea is a necessary ingredient in an offence under the Act, the Court shall presume its existence. No doubt, this presumption is a rebuttable one. The Explanation to the section provides for an inclusive definition of culpable mental state which is broad enough in its field so as to include intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and belief in or a reason to believe a fact. The presumption arising under sub-section (1) may be rebutted by the accused, but the burden that is cast upon the accused to displace the presumption is very heavy. The accused has to prove absence of culpable mental state not by mere preponderance of probability. In Prakash Nath Khanna v.
CIT (2004) 266 ITR 1 (SC) (12), the Court observed that the Court has to presume the existence of culpable mental state, and the absence of such mental state can be pleaded by an accused as a defense in respect of the Act charged as an offence in the prosecution. It is therefore open to the appellants to plead absence of a culpable mental state when the matter is taken up for trial. In
J. Tewari v. UOI (1997) 225 ITR 858 (Cal.) (HC) (861) the court observed that the rule of evidence regarding presumptions of culpability on the part of the accused does not differentiate between a natural person and a juristic person and the court will presume the existence of culpable state of mind unless the accused proves contrary. In ACIT v. Nilofar Currimbhoy (2013) 219 Taxman 102 (Mag.) (Delhi) (HC), prosecution was launched u/s. 276CC for a failure to file the return of income, the court held that the onus was on the assessee to prove that delay was not wilful and not on the department (SLP of assessee is admitted in the case of
Nilofar Currimbhoy v. ACIT (2015) 228 Taxman 57 (SC).

S. 278E being penal in nature is not applicable for those offences that have been committed on or before 9-9-1986 even if the
prosecution proceedings are launched after the said date.

Before the amendment to S. 276A, 276B, 276B, 276D and 276E, the onus was on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had no reasonable cause or excuse to commit any of the offences as envisaged by the aforesaid sections. However, in the light of the amendment by the Taxation Laws (Amendment and Misc. Provisions) Act, 1986 to the aforesaid, sections wherein the word “without reasonable cause or excuse” have been deleted and with the insertion of S. 278AA, the onus of proving the existence of reasonable cause has shifted on to the accused.

4. Procedure governing prosecution proceedings

The procedure governing prosecution proceedings under the Act can be divided into two parts i.e.

I. Procedure to be followed by the Department while launching prosecution proceedings, and

II. The procedure before the Court.

I. Procedure followed by the department while launching the prosecution

Though there is no specific procedure provided under the Act or Rules, the Department has framed their own guidelines and instructions for initiating prosecution proceedings. The said instructions are referred in the following cases while quashing the prosecutions under
S. 271C(1) read with Ss. 277 and 276CC of the Act. Madan Lal v. ITO (1998) 98 Taxman 395 (Raj.) (HC), Patna Guinea House v. CIT (2000) 243 ITR 274 (Pat.) (HC), Satya Narain Dalmia v. State of Bihar (2000) 110 Taxman 28 (Pat.) (HC), K. Inba Sagaran v. ACIT (2000) 247 ITR 528 (Mad.) (HC).

The Income-tax department’s manual deals with various guidelines to be followed before launching prosecution proceedings and the broad parameters as laid down are as follows:

1. The Assessing Officer on the basis of the records of the assessee sends the proposal to the respective Commissioner.

2. The Commissioner issues the show cause notice to the assessees.

3. If Commissioner is satisfied with the reply of the assessee he may not grant sanction to the Assessing Officer to file complaint before the Court.

II. Procedure before Court

On the basis of complaint filed before a court, the court sends summons to the accused along with the copy of complaint, to attend before the court on a particular date. The complaint being criminal complaint, the accused must be present before the court, unless the court gives a specific exemption.

If the accused is not present on such particular date, the court can issue a warrant against the accused. If the warrant is issued, unless the accused secures bail, he may be arrested and produced before the court. Before the trial itself is underway and regular hearings start in a matter, the court has to frame charge against the accused. Framing of the charge means that on the basis of the complaint and on seeing the primary evidence after hearing the accused, the court charges the accused of the offences purported to be committed by him. If on hearing the accused, the court feels that there is no apparent case against the said accused the court will dismiss the complaint. However, if the court feels that there is substance in the complaint the charges will be framed and the proceedings shall continues as per the Criminal Procedure Code. Many of the Assessing Officers may not be aware that Assessing Officer who has filed the complaint may have to be examined before the final decision is taken. Given the current pendency in courts, it is completely possible that prosecution that is launched in the year 2018 may very well come up for hearing after 15 or 20 years, and even though the officer who has launched the prosecution might have retired, he may still have to attend the proceedings. Therefore, it is very essential that before launching the prosecution the officer concerned may have to examine the consequences, especially the possibility of the matter being tried several years after the prosecution has been initiated.

If the trial results in a conviction, then an appeal to the court of session will lie under S. 374(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The said appeal will be heard under S.381 of the CrPC, either by the a Sessions Judge or by an Additional Sessions Judge. The petition of appeal is to be presented in the form prescribed filed by the appellant or by his pleader accompanied by a copy of the Judgment appealed against within a period of 30 days from the date of order, as per the Limitation Act.

(Reference Article of Mr. Aditya R. Ajgaonkar, Pg. No. 38)

5. Certain aspects to be kept in mind relating to launching of prosecution, proceedings are:

5.1 Sanction for launching of prosecutions

Under S. 279, the competent authority to grant sanction for prosecution is Commissioner, Commissioner (Appeals), Chief Commissioner or the Director General. Prosecution, without a requisite sanction shall make the entire proceedings void ab initio. The sanction must be in respect of each of the offences in respect of which the accused is to be prosecuted. Where the Commissioner has held that an assessee had made a return containing false entries and gave sanction for prosecution for an offence under S. 277, and the accused was found guilty of an offence under S. 276CC, and not under S. 277, it was held in revision that an offence under S. 276CC was of a different nature from that under S. 277, and as there was no sanction for prosecution for an offence under S. 276CC, the conviction was illegal (Champalal Girdharlal v. Emperior (1933) 1 ITR 384 (Nag) (HC))

5.2 Opportunity of being heard

When an Assessing Officer takes a decision to initiate proceedings or a Commissioner grants sanction for such proceedings. He has to apply his mind and on the basis of the circumstances and the facts on record, he has to come to the conclusion whether prosecution is necessary and advisable in a particulars case or not. The said Act does not provide that the Commissioner has to necessarily afford the assessee an opportunity to be heard before deciding to initiate proceedings. The absence of an opportunity to be heard will not make the order of sanction void or illegal as held in CIT v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd. (2003) 263 ITR 550 (SC) (567 to 569). However, it is being observed that the commissioners are issuing a show cause notice before sanctioning the Sanction for prosecution based on the internal manual.

5.3 Circumstances under which the Commissioner cannot initiate proceedings

S. 279(1A) has provided for the exception to the Power of Commissioner to initiate proceedings. Therefore, if a particular case falls and is established u/s. 276C or 277 of the said Act and if an order u/s. 273A has been passed by the Commissioner, by using the phrase “has been reduced or waived by an order under S. 273A” in S. 279(1A),the legislature has made it clear that the order referred to in S. 279(1A) is the order of the Commissioner waiving or reducing the penalty u/s. 273A and not the order of non imposition of penalty by the ITO or the order of cancellation of penalty for lack of ingredients as required by S. 271 by Appellate Authorities. This is relevant because in the cases where the penalty is waived partly u/s. 273A, the Commissioner is precluded from granting sanction u/s. 279 of the Act.

Therefore, the non-existence of the circumstances enumerated in S. 273A is a precondition for the initiation of proceedings for prosecution u/s. 276C or 277. Accordingly, the CIT should ascertain by himself that the circumstances prescribed in section 273A do not exist. A complaint filed for prosecution u/s. 276C or 277 would be illegal and invalid if the circumstances as provided in S. 273A exist. It may be noted that, as per the instruction No. 5051 of 1991
dt. 7-2-1991 issued by the Board stated as under:

“Prosecution need not normally be initiated against a persons who have attained the age of 70 years at the time of commission of the offence”.

In Pradip Burma v. ITO (2016) 382 ITR 418 (Delhi) (HC), the court held that, at the time of commission of offence the petitioner has not reached the age of 70 years, hence the circular was held to be not applicable.

6. Whether prosecution can be initiated before completion of assessment or when the matter is pending in appeal

The assessment proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent proceedings. The assessment proceedings are conducted by the Income Tax Authorities and are civil proceedings in nature, whereas prosecution for offences committed are tried before a competent court. The provisions of the Law of evidence that do not bind assessment proceedings, are to be strictly followed in criminal proceedings. In
P. Jayappan v. ITO (1984) 149 ITR 696 (SC), the court held that the two types of proceedings could run simultaneously and that one need not wait for the other. In
Kalluri Krishan Pushkar v Dy. CIT(2016) 236 Taxman 27 (AP& T) (HC), the court held that, existence of other mode of recovery cannot act as a bar to the initiation of prosecution proceedings. In that particular case the prosecution was initiated u/s. 276C, for non-payment of admitted tax and interest.

7. Findings of the Appellate Tribunal

The Appellate Tribunal is the final fact finding authority under the Act. Hence, the findings and the orders of the Appellate Tribunal are binding on the Commissioner of Income tax. On the aforesaid proposition, the two important questions that may arise are:

(1) If there is a finding of the Appellate Tribunal that there is no concealment and no false statement, etc., then whether or not the Commissioner of Income tax would be stopped from initiating proceedings under S. 277? and

(2) How far are the findings of the Appellate Tribunal in the assessment proceedings binding upon the trial court in respect of the proceedings for prosecution u/s. 277?

The Supreme Court, in Uttam Chand v. ITO (1982) 133 ITR 909 (SC), while dealing with prosecution proceedings u/s. 277, held that the finding given by the Appellate Tribunal is binding on the criminal courts. Therefore, when there is a finding of the Appellate Tribunal leading to the conclusion that there is no prima facie case against the assessee for concealment, then that finding would be binding on the court and the court will have to acquit or discharge the assessee.

If the penalty for concealment is quashed on technical grounds due to limitation or due to violation of the due process of law, as the penalty is not quashed on merits it cannot be said that there should not be any prosecution. Similarly, when the Appellate Tribunal holds that the assessee is liable for penalty, the conviction is not automatic. The concerned court has to examine the witnesses and has to come to an independent finding as to whether the accused is guilty of the offences by following the due process of law.

8. Penalty and prosecution – S. 271(1)(c) and S. 277

In S.P. Sales Corporation v. S. R. Sikdar (1993) 113 Taxation 203 (SC) and G. L. Didwania v. ITO (1995) 224 ITR 687 (SC), the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the principle that “The Criminal Court no doubt has to give due regard to the result of any proceedings under the Act having bearing on the question in issue and in an appropriate case it may drop the proceedings in the light of an order passed under the Act.” In
K. C. Builder v. ACIT (2004) 265 ITR 562 (SC), the court held that when the penalty is cancelled, the prosecution for an offence u/s 276C for wilful evasion of tax cannot be proceeded with thereafter. Following this principle the courts have quashed prosecution proceedings on the basis of the cancellation of penalty by the Appellate Authority (Shashichand Jain & Ors. v UOI (1995) 213 ITR 184 (Bom) (HC). When Tribunal decides against the assessee in quantum proceedings and if there is possibility of department launching prosecution proceedings, it may be desirable for the assessee to file an appeal before the High Court. Various courts have held that, when the substantial question of law is admitted by a High Court, it is not a fit case for the levy of penalty for concealment of Income
(CIT v. Nayan Builders and Developers (2014) 368 ITR 722 (Bom.) (HC), CIT v. Advaita Estate Development Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 1498 of 2014 dt. 17/2/2017) (Bom.)(HC), (www.itatonline.org) CIT v. Dr. Harsha N. Biliangady (2015) 379 ITR 529 (Karn.) (HC). A harmonious reading of the various ratios it can be contended that if penalty cannot be levied upon the admission of a substantial question of law by the Jurisdictional High Court, it cannot be a fit case for prosecution.

In V. Gopal v. ACIT (2005) 279 ITR 510 (SC), the court held that when the penalty order was set-aside, the Magistrate should decide the matter accordingly and quash the prosecution.

In ITO v. Nandlal and Co. (2012) 341 ITR 646 (Bom.)(HC), the court held that, when the order for levy of penalty is set aside, prosecution for wilful attempt to evade tax does not survive.

Non-initiation of penalty proceedings does not lead to a presumption that the prosecution cannot be initiated as held in Universal Supply Corporation v. State of Rajasthan
(1994) 206 ITR 222 (Raj) (HC) (235), A.Y. Prabhakar (Kartha) HUF v. ACIT (2003) 262 ITR 287 (Mad.) (288). However, if penalty proceedings are initiated and after considering the reply, the proceedings are dropped, it will not be a case for initiating prosecution proceedings. CBDT guidelines had instructed that where quantum additions or penalty have been deleted by the departmental appellate authorities, then steps must be taken to withdraw prosecution (Guidelines F. No. 285/16/90-IT (Inv) 43 dated 14-5-1996)

(Link: http://itgoanerunit.org/archiveviewpdf.phpfilid=NDA2NTI0Mjc4UHJvc2VjdXRpb24gTWFudWFsX1B
hcnQtSUkuUERG)

9. Abetment

S. 278 of the said Act deals with the offence of abetment in the matter of delivering any accounts or a statement or a declaration relating to income chargeable to tax. Though abetment has not been defined in the Income-tax Act the provisions relating to abetment of an offence are dealt with in Chapter V of the Indian Penal Code. In particular S. 107, 108, 108A and 110 of IPC are important. On the perusal of S. 107, it is seen that the offence of abetment is committed in three ways, namely –

(a) by instigation;

(b) by conspiracy; or

(c) by intentional aid.

In order to constitute abetment, the abettor must be shown to have intentionally aided in the commission of a crime. Mere proof that the crime charged could not have been committed without the interposition of the alleged abettor is not enough to fulfil the ingredients of the offence as envisaged by S.107. It is not enough that an act on the part of the alleged abettor happens to facilitate the commission of the crime. Intentional adding and active complicity is the gist of the offence of abetment. (Shri Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1975 (SC) (Cr. 87), 1975 AIR 175, 1975 SCC (3) 495). For an offence of abetment, it is not necessary that the offence should have been committed. A man may be guilty as an abettor, whether the offence is committed or not. (Faunga Kanata Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 673). Further, a person can be convicted of abetting an offence, even when the person alleged to have committed that offence in consequence of abetment, has been acquitted. (Jamuna Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1967 SC 553, 1967 SCR (1) 469). In Smt. Sheela Gupta v. IAC (2002) 253 ITR 551 (Delhi) (HC) (552), the Court held that, when the Tribunal has set aside the order of the Assessing Officer, the complaint filed for abetment does not survive hence the complaint was quashed.

10. Liability of an advocate or a chartered accountant for abetment

S. 278 of the said Act, imposes a criminal liability on the abettor for abetment of false return etc. Circular No. 179 dt. 30/1975 (1975) 102 ITR 9 (St.)(25) explain the provision. Under this section, if a person abets or induces in any manner, another person to make or deliver an account, statement, declaration which is false and which he either knows to be false or does not believe to be true, he shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment of not less than three months.

The section casts an onerous duty on the advocates, Chartered Accountants and Income Tax Practitioners to be cautious and careful. The legal profession is a noble one and legal practitioners owe not only a duty towards his client but also towards the court. It would be highly unprofessional if a legal practitioner is to encourage dishonesty or to file such returns knowing or having reason to believe that the returns or declarations so made are false. In P. D. Patel v. Emperor, (1933) 1 ITR 363 (Rangoon)(HC), a warning has been given of which every legal practitioner has to take a serious notice. In this case, an advocate deliberately omitted in a return submitted by him a certain amount of money and persisted in taking up false defences. The Government lost a huge amount because of the exclusion of the said amount in the return filed by the advocate on behalf of his client. A fine for the said offence was levied by the trial court on an appeal, the High Court took a serious view, of the offence and held that in a case like this, the punishment should be deterrent and exemplary and the assessee was ordered to be kept in simple imprisonment for one month. In Navrathna & Co. v. State (1987) 168 ITR 788 (Mad.)(HC)(790). The court held that, merely preparing returns and statement on the basis of the accounts placed before the Chartered Accountant, the question of abetment or conspiracy cannot arise.

The Supreme Court in the case of Jamuna Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1967 SC 553 (Supra), has held that a person can be convicted of abetting an offence even when the person alleged to have committed that offence in consequence of abetment has been acquitted.

11. Offences by companies, etc.

S.278B makes certain provisions with regard to offence committed by companies, firms, association of person and bodies of individuals, whether incorporated or not. Where an offence has been committed by a company, a firm, association of persons, or body of individuals, the person, who was in charge of and was responsible for the conduct of its business at the time when the offence was committed will be deemed to be guilty of the offence, unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence. Further, if in the case of a company it is proved that the offence bad been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part of the company, such director, manager, secretary or others will be deemed to be guilty of the offence and will be liable to be prosecuted and punished accordingly. This provision will also apply in relation to mutatis mutandis committed by
a firm, association of persons or body of individuals.

In Dhrupadi Devi (Smt.) v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 106 Comp. Cas 90 (Raj.) (HC)(93), the court held that criminal liability of partner cannot be thrust upon his legal heirs. In ITO v Kamra Trading Co. (2004) 267 ITR 170 (P&H) (HC) the court held that launching of prosecution against sleeping partner was held to be bad in law for failure to pay the tax.

(Reference Article of Mr. Rahul K. Hakani Pg. No. 32)

12. Offences by HUF

S. 278C provides for criminal liability of the Karta, or members of a HUF in respect of offences committed by the Hindu Undivided Family. Under this provision, when an offence has been committed by HUF, the Karta thereof will be deemed to be liable to be prosecuted and punished accordingly, unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the offence. If the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any other member of the family, such other member shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished accordingly. In
Roshan Lal v. Special Chief Magistrate (2010) 322 ITR 353 (All.) (HC), the Court held that a member of HUF cannot be held liable for delay in filing of return of HUF though he has participated in the assessment proceedings.

13. Offences by Credit Institutions

If an offence is committed by a credit institution, then the credit institution as well as every person, who at the time of the offence being committed was in-charge and responsible to the credit institution for the conduct of the business of such institution, shall be deemed to be guilty and liable to be proceeded against. Burden would be on such person to prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence,
then he will not be liable to be proceeded against.

14. S. 136: Proceedings before income-tax authorities to be judicial proceedings

S. 136 provides that any proceedings under the Act shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of S. 193 and 228 and for the purpose of S. 196 of the Indian Penal Code. However, all proceedings under the Act do not fall under the definition of judicial proceedings for all purposes. eg. penalty proceedings u/s.271(1)(c) do not fall within the ambit of S. 136 of the Act and therefore cannot be said to be judicial proceedings. In
KTMS Mohammed v. UOI (1992) 197 ITR 196 (SC), the Court held that Assessing Officer cannot launch prosecution for perjury in FERA proceedings in a statement recorded under FERA proceedings. However, if an assessee intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence, the said assessee is liable for prosecution under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code.

15. The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016

The definition “benami transaction” as per S. 2(9) of the said Act is very wide, hence if any action is taken against the assessee under the said Act which is affirmed by the competent Court, the assessee may also be tried under the Income-tax Act for false verification in return etc.

16. Limitation for initiation of proceedings

Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 lays down the period of limitation beyond which no Court can take cognizance of an offence which is punishable with fine only or with imprisonment not exceeding three years. But, for Economic Offences (In respect of applicability of Limitation Act, 1974) it is provided that nothing in the aforesaid chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall apply to any offence punishable under any of the enactment specified in the Schedule. The Schedule referred to includes Income tax, Wealth tax, etc. In Friends
Oil Mills & Ors. v. ITO (1977) 106 ITR 571 (Ker.) (HC), dealing with S.277 of the Act, the Hon’ble Kerala High Court held that the bar of limitation specified in section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would not apply to a prosecution, under the Income-tax Act (also refer Nirmal Kapur v. CIT (1980) 122 ITR 473 (P&H) (HC). In view of this, as there is no fixed period of limitation for initiation of proceedings under the Act, the sword of prosecution can be said to be perpetually hanging on the head of the assessee for the offences said to have been committed by him. It may be noted that this may result in injustice to the assessee because a person who is in a better position to explain the issue or things in the initial stage, may not be able to do so later, if he is confronted with the act of commission of an offence under a lapse of time. In Gajanand v. State (1986) 159 ITR 101 (Pat) (HC)), the Hon’ble High Court held that where the Criminal Proceedings had proceeded for 12 years and the Income tax department failed to produce the evidence, the prosecution was to be quashed. In State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni AIR 1980 SC 593, 1980 SCR (2) 340, the Court held that a long delay along with other circumstances be taken in to consideration in the mitigation of the sentence.

17. Whether the Courts have the power to reduce punishment

S.275A to 278A provide for punishment in terms of imprisonment but section 276D provides for fine as an alternative for imprisonment. Since the legislature has used the phrase “shall be punishable” in each of the sections, the question that arises whether the Court can interpret the phrase “shall be punishable” to mean “may be punishable” and whether the Court will have discretion to award the imprisonment or not, or to award only fine and not imprisonment. The Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Jaymanderalal, AIR 1966 SC 940, while interpreting section 3(1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, held that by using the expression shall be punishable, the legislature has made it clear that the offender shall not escape the penal consequences”. The in Modi Industries Ltd v. B.C. Goel, (1983) 144 ITR 496(All) (HC), has taken the view that Courts have no power to reduce the punishment prescribed by the statute.

18. Compounding of offences

S.279(2) empowers the Chief Commissioner or Director General to compound an offence under the Act, either before or after the initiation of proceedings. The Department has issued new set of guidelines for compounding of offences under direct taxes vide notification F.No. 185/35/2013 IT (Inv.V)/108 dated December 23, 2014 (2015) 371 ITR 7 (St) (www.itatonline.org).

(Link:http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Lists/Departmental
News/Attachments/391/Guidelines

for Compounding- FNo285-35-2013-IT-Inv-V-108
Annexure-1.pdf
)

These guidelines replace the existing guidelines issued vide F.No 285/90/2008, dated May 10 2008, with effect from January 1, 2015. However, cases that have been filed before this date shall continue to be governed by earlier guidelines. Under S.279(2), an offence can be compounded at any stage and not only when the offence is proved to have been committed. Once compounding is effected, the assessee cannot claim a refund of the composition amount paid on the ground that he had not committed any of said offences (Shamrao Bhagwantrao Deshmukh v. The Dominion of India (1995) 27 ITR 30 (SC)). The requirement under S.279(2) is that the person applying for a composition must have allegedly committed an offence. The compounding charges might be paid even before a formal show cause notice has been issued. On the other hand, even if the accused is convicted of an offence and an appeal has been preferred against the same, there seems to be no particular bar to give effect to a compounding during the pendency of such appeal and the accused shall not have to undergo the sentence awarded if he pays the money to be paid for compounding. Prosecution initiated under Indian Penal Code, if any, cannot be compounded under the provisions of the Income-tax Act. However, S. 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, provides for withdrawal of such offences.

Notwithstanding anything contained in the guidelines, the Finance Minister may relax restrictions for compounding of an offence in a deserving case on consideration of a
report from the board on the petition of an appellant.

19. Procedure for compounding

The accused has to approach the Commissioner with a proposal for compounding. A hearing has to be given to the assessee by the Commissioner on the proposal for compounding made by him and thereafter the compounding fees are finally determined. The ultimate decision as to the acceptance or refusal of the compounding proposal lies with the Commissioner. If the Commissioner accepts the proposal for compounding, the same would have to be recommended by him to the Central Board of Direct Taxes. It may be noted that offences under Indian Penal Code cannot be compounded by the competent authority under the Income-tax Act. However, generally when the alleged offences under direct tax laws are compounded, the prosecution launched for the corresponding alleged offences under IPC are also withdrawn. In
V.A. Haseeb and Co. (Firm) v. CCIT (2017) 152 DTR 306 (Mad.) (HC), the Court held that, application for compounding cannot be rejected merely because of the conviction of assessee in the Criminal Court. In
Punjab Rice Mills v. CBDT ( 2011) 337 ITR 251 (P& H) (HC), it was held that the Court will not compel the Commissioner to compound the offence or interfere unless the exercise of discretionary statutory power was held to be perverse or against the due process of law.

20. Power of the Settlement Commission to grant immunity. S. 245H

S. 245H(1)(2) (1) empowers the Settlement Commission under the specified circumstances to grant immunity to the assessee from prosecution for an offence, subject to such conditions as it may think fit to impose. However, sub-section (2) of S.245H also empowers the Settlement Commission to withdraw the immunity so granted if it is satisfied that such person has not complied with the conditions subject to which immunity was granted or that such person had in the course of the settlement proceedings concealed any particular relevant material or had led false evidence. In
Nirmal and Navin P. Ltd. And Others v. D. Ravindran (2002) 255 ITR 514 (SC), the Court held that when immunity is granted by Settlement Commission, it, was not open to Criminal Court to go behind order passed by Settlement Commission. As per the proviso to S. 245H(1), the Settlement Commission is precluded from granting immunity from prosecution in cases where prosecution has been instituted on the date of receipt of application for settlement, under section 245C. In
Anil Kumar Sinha v. UOI (2013) 352 ITR 170 (Pat.) (HC), the Court held that, if prosecution is already launched and thereafter the assessee moves Settlement Commission, the Settlement Commission was justified in not granting immunity in respect of prosecution which was already launched u/s. 276CC of the Act.

21. Power of Central Government to grant immunity. S. 291

S. 291(1) of the said Act, confers on the Central Government a power, under specified circumstances, to grant immunity to the assessee, from prosecution for any offence under the Direct taxes, IPC or any other Central Act to a person, with a view to obtain evidence. This is subject to condition of him making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances relating to the concealment of income or evasion of payment of tax on income. However, sub- section (3) of this section, empowers the Central Government to withdraw the immunity so granted, if such person has not complied with the condition on which such immunity was granted or is wilfully concealing anything or is giving false evidence.

22. Whether for the offences committed under the Income-tax Act, prosecution can also be launched under Indian Penal Code

As per the provisions of S.26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, where an Act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence and the punishment shall run concurrently. To strengthen the case of the revenue, generally the revenue also launches prosecution under the various provisions of the Indian Penal Code.

A chart indicating briefly therein the various acts or omissions under the Direct Tax laws which tantamount to commission of an offence under Indian Penal Code is given in Annexure “ B”.

23. A brief check-list for filing proper reply to avoid the prosecution

1. Whenever survey or search has taken place, if incriminating documents or unaccounted assets are found, the assessee concerned has to evaluate whether to approach the Settlement Commission or to take the said matter in appeal.

2. Whenever the additions are made in assessments on an agreed basis, it should be specifically brought to the notice of the Assessing Officer that the additions are agreed on to buy peace of mind as also with an understanding that penalty and prosecution proceedings shall not be initiated.

3. Where any large additions are made in an assessment, order should be agitated by preferring an appeal against the additions.

4. Whenever notice is issued for levy of the penalty for concealment of particulars of income, a detailed reply should be given stating therein the grounds for non-levy of the same and if the penalty is still levied, it should be agitated in appeal at least till the Tribunal stage.

5. The prosecution proceedings are launched by the department on the basis of evidence collected by them and it is necessary that proper replies, explanation, etc. be given against the said evidence collected so that it cannot be used against the assessee for launching of prosecution proceedings.

6. In the course of search, seizure or survey proceedings under the Act, statements are recorded by the authorised officers and normally these statements are used as evidences in the assessment and prosecution proceedings. Hence, it would be advisable that specific answers be given to the queries put forward and in cases where the assessee is doubtful of the answer, the said doubt as to the answer may be specifically mentioned. In case of a statement on oath is recorded by using coercion or threat, it would be advisable to retract the same immediately by filing a letter or by filing an affidavit to that effect.

7. The directors of a company, before signing any return, such as TDS returns or other documents, should get the same initialed and verified by a responsible person such as the concerned manager, accountant, etc., to show that he has taken reasonable care before signing the return.

8. The part time Directors of the company should not sign the Balance sheet, and in the Director’s report, they should make it very clear that they are not responsible for the day to day management of the Company.

9. While giving reply to show cause notice, the Assessee has to give detailed reply on facts. If certain evidences were not produced before the Authorities, they should try to produce the same while giving reply to show cause notice. However, technical mistakes need not be corrected while giving the reply.

10. The professionals generally should not use their letterhead or their name for preparation of documents unless it is absolutely necessary.

11. While giving the certificate for the paper book compilation before the Tribunal or any other authority, the contents need to be verified and only then must the certificate be given. If the certificate is held to be incorrect thereafter, the one who has given wrong certificate may get the notice from the competent authorities to initiate prosecution proceedings.

12. If certain facts are not properly recorded by the Assessing officer, the assessee should file the rectification application before the Assessing Officer. In certain circumstances, it may be desirable to mention correct facts in the form of affidavit. Assessee should be very careful in given the statement on oath in the form of an affidavit.

24. Conclusion

Tax consultants may have to guide assessees to better comply with the provisions of the Act and adopt better tax management practices to maintain the peace of mind. It may not be advisable to venture into highly adventurous tax avoidance schemes just to avoid paying the Government the taxes due. One should appreciate that the tax administration, with the help of technology and reporting system, is well equipped to catch tax evaders. It is desired that all citizens must follow the Article 51A of the Constitution of India being fundamental duties read with 265 of the Constitution of India i.e., pay the taxes which are rightfully due to Government, neither less nor more. I hope the CBDT will also try to implement the suggestions of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for better administration of prosecution proceedings. The Federation has made objective suggestions for better implementation of law and procedure of prosecution in direct taxes (www.itatonline.org). Objective suggestions from the readers will be highly appreciated.

PROSECUTION UNDER INCOME TAX ACT 1961
Annexure – “A”

Sr. No. Act or omission which constitutes an offence Section under I.T. Act, 1961 Rigorous Maximum Punishment Imprisonment Minimum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Contravention of an order u/s. 132(3) Contravention of the terms in a prohibitory order issued u/s. 132(3) 275A Up to two years and fine On the discretion of the Judge
2. Failure to comply with provisions of S.132(1)(iib) 275B Up to two years and fine On the discretion of the Judge
3. Removal, concealment, transfer or delivery of property to thwart tax recovery (w.e.f. 1-4-1989) 276 Up to two years and fine
4. Liquidator

(a) Fails to give notice u/s. 178(1)

(b) Fails to set aside the amount u/s. 178(3)

(c) Parts with assets of co.

276A (i)

276A (ii)

276A (iii)

Up to two years Not less than six months unless special and adequate reason given
5. Failure to pay tax to the credit of Central Government under Chapter XIID or XVIIB 276B Up to seven years and fine Three months and fine
6. Failure to pay tax collected at source 276BB Up to seven years and fine Three months and fine
7. a) Wilful attempt to evade tax, penalty, interest, etc. chargeable or imposable under the Act.

b) Wilful attempt to evade payment of tax, penalty or interest

276C(1)

276(2)

If tax evaded is over ₹ 2,50,000 – Seven years and fine.

In any other case two years and fine.

Two years and fine.

Six months and fine

Three months and fine.

Three months and fine

8. Wilful failure to file return of income u/s. 139(1) or return of fringe benefit u/s. 115WD(1) or in response to notice u/s. 115WD(2), 115WH, 142(1), 148 or 153A of the Act 276CC If the amount of tax evaded is over
₹ 2,50,000/- up to seven years and fine

In any other case, two years and fine

Six months and fine

Three months and fine

9. Wilful failure to furnish in due time return in response to notice under section 158BC. 276CCC Simple imprisonment for a term of three years and fine Three months and fine
10. Wilful failure to produce accounts and documents or non-compliance with an order u/s. 142(2A) to get accounts audited etc. 276D Imprisonment up to one year with fine
11. Whenever verification is required under Law, making a false verification or delivery of a false account or statement. 277 If amount of tax evaded is more than ₹ 2,50,000/- – Rigorous imprisonment up to 7 years and fine

In other cases, two years and fine

Six months and fine

Three months and fine

12. Falsification of books of account or document, etc. 277A Rigorous imprisonment for a term up to two years and with fine Three months and fine
13. Abetting or inducing another person to make deliver a false account, statement or declaration relating to chargeable income or to commit an offence u/s. 276C(1) 278 Amount of tax, penalty or interest evaded more than ₹ 2,50,000/- – up to seven years and fine

Any other case two years and fine

Six months and fine

Three months and fine.

14. A person once convicted, under any of the sections 276B, 276(1), 276CC, 276DD, 276E, 277 or 278 is again convicted of an offence under any of the aforesaid sections. 278A Up to 7 years and fine Six Months and fine
15 A public servant furnishing any information or producing any document in contravention of s. 138 280 Imprisonment up to six months and fine At the discretion of the Judge

OFFENCES UNDER THE INDIAN PENAL CODE – Annexure – “B”
Section Offence Punishment Cognizable or non-cognizable Bailable or non bailable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
109 Abetment of any offence, if the act abetted is committed in consequence, and where no express provision is made for its punishment Same as for offence abetted. [No limit to the number of years of imprisonment] According as offence abetted is cognizable or non cognizsable According as offence abetted is bailable or non bailable.
110. Abetment of any offence, if the person abetted does the act with a different intention from that of the abettor – Do – – Do – – Do –
111 Abetment of any offence, when one act is abetted and a different act is done; subject to the proviso Same as for offence intended to be abetted. – Do – – Do –
113 Abetment of any offence, when an effect is caused by the act abetted different from that intended by the abettor Same as for offence committed – Do – – Do –
114 Abetment of any offence, if abettor is present when offence is committed – Do – – Do – – Do –
Chapter X- contempts of the Lawful Authority of Public servants
172 Absconding to avoid service of summons or other proceeding from a public servant

If summons or notice require attendance in person by agent etc. in a court of Justice

Simple imprisonment for one month, or fine of 500 rupees, or both

Simple imprisonment for 6 months, or fine of 1000 rupees or both

Non cognisable Bailable
173. Preventing the service or the affixing of any summons of notice, or the removal of it when it has been affixed, or preventing a proclamation

If summons, etc. require attendance in person by agent etc., in a court of justice

Simple imprisonment for one month, or fine of 500 rupees, or both

Simple imprisonment for 6 months, or fine of 1000 rupees or both

– Non cognisable Bailable
174 Not obeying a legal order to attend at a certain place in person or by agent, or departing therefrom without authority


If the order requires personal attendance by an agent, etc. in a court of Justice

Simple imprisonment for one month, or fine of 500 rupees, or both

Simple imprisonment for six months, or fine of 1000 rupees, or both.

Non cognisable Bailable
175 Intentionally omitting to produce a document to a public servant by a personal legally bound to produce or believer such document

If the document or electronic record is to be produced or delivered to a Court of Justice

Simple imprisonment for one month, or fine of 500 rupees, or both.

Simple imprisonment for six months, or fine of 1000 rupees, or both

Non cognisable Bailable
176 Intentionally omitting to give notice or information to a public servant by a person legally bound to give such notice or information

If the notice or information required respects the commission of an offence, etc.

If the notice or information is required by an order passed u/s. sub section (1) of sec. 565 of this code

Simple imprisonment for one month, or fine of 500 rupees, or both.

Simple imprisonment for six months, or fine of 1000 rupees, or both

Non cognisable Bailable
177. Knowingly furnishing false information to a public servant Simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both;

Imprisonment for 2 years or fine or both.

Non cognisable – Bailable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
178 Refusing oath when duly required to take oath by public servant Simple imprisonment for six months, or fine of 1000 rupees or both. Non cognisable Bailable
179 Being legally bound to state truth, and refusing to answer questions. – Do – Non cognisable Bailable
180 Refusing to sign a statement made to a public servant when legally required to do so. Simple imprisonment for three months, or fine of 500 rupees, or both. Non cognisable Bailable
181 Knowingly stating to a public servant on oath as true that which is false. Imprsonment for three years and fine. Non cognisable Bailable
186 Obstructing public servant in discharge of his public functions Imprisonment for three months, or fine upto 500 rupees or both. Non cognisable Bailable
Chapter XI – False Evidence and Offences against Public Justice.
193 Giving or fabricating false evidence in a judicial proceedings

Giving or fabricating false evidence in any other case

Imprisonment for 7 years and fine.

Imprisonment for three years and fine

Non cognisable

– Do –

Bailable

– Do –

196. Using in a judicial proceeding evidence known to be false or fabricated The same as for giving or fabricating false evidence. Non cognisable According of giving such evidence is bailable or non bailable
197. Knowingly issuing or signing a false certificate relating to any fact of which such certificate is by law admissible in evidence. – Do – Non cognisable Bailable
198. Using as a true certificate one known to be false in a material point – Do – – Do – – Do –