DIRECT TAXES – Supreme Court

  1. S. 4: Charge of income-tax – Mutuality – Contributions both from members and non-members and one member was vested with powers to control functioning and interests of other members, such an assimilation could not be termed as a social intercourse devoid of commerciality –Assessee, being not a mutual concern, could not be entitled to tax exemption- Exemptions are to be put to strict interpretation – Principle of mutuality is held to be not applicable – Order of AO is affirmed. [S. 2(24)]

    Assessee-company was incorporated by YRIPL as its fully owned subsidiary after having obtained approval from the Secretariat for Industrial Assistance for purpose of economisation of the cost of advertising and promotion of YRIPL franchisees as per their needs. Approval was granted subject to certain conditions as regards functioning of assessee, whereby it was obligated to operate on a non-profit basis on principles of mutuality. However, assessee-company undertook a commercial venture wherein contributions were accepted both from members as well as non-members. The assesse filed its returns stating the income to be “Nil” under the pretext of the mutual character of the company. The same was not accepted by the AO Order of AO is up held by the CIT (A) Tribunal and also High Court. On appeal the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of mutuality bestows a special status to qualify for exemption from tax liability. It is a settled proposition of law that exemptions are to be put to strict interpretation. If the assessee fails to fulfil the stipulations and to prove the existence of mutuality, the question of extending exemption from tax liability to the assessee, that too at the cost of public exchequer, does not arise. Taking any other view would entail in stretching the limits of construction. (CA No. 2847 of 2010, Dt. 24-4-2020) (AY. 2001-02)

    Yum! Restaurants (Marketing) Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2020) 116 taxmann.com 374 (SC) www.itatonline.org

  2. S. 5: Scope of total income – liaison office of the non-resident – A liaison office which is only carrying on such activity of a “preparatory or auxiliary” character is not a PE in terms of Article 5 of the DTAA. The deeming provisions in Sections 5 and 9 of the 1961 Act can have no bearing whatsoever – DTAA – India-UAE [S. 2(24), 4, 9(1)(i) Art. 5, 7]

    Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that, the activities carried on by the liaison office of the non-resident in India as permitted by the RBI, demonstrate that the liaison office must steer away from engaging in any primary business activity and in establishing business connection as such. It can carry on activities of preparatory or auxiliary nature only. A liaison office which is only carrying on such activity of a “preparatory or auxiliary” character is not a PE in terms of Article 5 of the DTAA. The deeming provisions in Sections 5 and 9 of the 1961 Act can have no bearing whatsoever. (CA No. 9775 of 2011 dt. 24-4-2020)

    UOI v. U.A.E. Exchange Centre (2020) 116 taxmann.com 379 (SC) www.itatonline.org

  3. S. 43B: Deductions on actual payment – Leave encashment – Method of accounting – Section does not place any embargo upon the autonomy of the assessee in adopting a particular method of accounting, nor deprives the assessee of any lawful deduction. It merely imposes an additional condition of actual payment for the availment of deduction qua the specified head – Provision is not unconstitutional [S. 37(1), 43B(f), 145, Art . 14]

    Court held that, argument (inter alia) that s. 43B(f) is unconstitutional because it supersedes the judgement of the Supreme Court in Bharat Earth Movers v. CIT (2000) 245 ITR 428 (SC) is wrong. S. 43B does not place any embargo upon the autonomy of the assessee in adopting a particular method of accounting, nor deprives the assessee of any lawful deduction. It merely imposes an additional condition of actual payment for the availment of deduction qua the specified head. (CA No. 3545/2009 dt. 24-4-2020)

    UOI v. Exide Industries Ltd (2020) 116 taxmann.com 378 (SC) www.itatonline.org

  4. S. 68: Cash credits – Bogus purchases – Unregistered dealers – Addition is held to be not justified. [S. 143(3)]

    The AO treated the purchases as “Cash credits” under S. 68 of the Act. Aggrieved, the appellant/assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT (A) who allowed the appeal of the assessee partially. Tribunal confirmed the order of the AO. On appeal to High Court, The High Court dismissed the appeal vide impugned judgment and order dated 21-8-2008, as being devoid of merits. The High Court opined that the amount shown as credits was nothing but bogus entries and was justly added to the income of the appellant/assessee. The Court also noted other reasons to dismiss the appeal. On appeal the Supreme Court held that though the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of the purchases during the assessment proceedings, he filed affidavits and statements of the dealers in penalty proceedings. That evidence fully supports the claim of the assessee. The CIT (A) accepted the explanation of the assessee and recorded a clear finding of fact that there was no concealment of income or furnishing of any inaccurate particulars of income by the assessee. Consequently, the quantum addition will also have to be deleted. The addition of ₹ 2,26,000/- by the Officer under S. 68 of the 1961 Act, towards cash credit amount shown against the names of concerned unregistered dealers for the assessment year 1998-1999, is hereby set aside. The rest of the assessment order dated 30-11-2000 as modified by the CIT(A) vide order dated 9-1-2003, shall remain undisturbed. (CA No. 6110 of 2009 dt.  24-4-2020 (AY. 1998-99)

    Basir Ahmed Sisodiya v. ITO (2020) 116 taxmann.com 375 (SC) www.itatonline.org

  5. S. 80-O: Royalties – Foreign enterprises – Services rendered in India and not the ‘services rendered from India – Merely having a contract with a foreign enterprise and mere earning foreign exchange does not ipso facto lead to the application of S. 80-O of the Act – Without any claim for expertise capable of being used abroad rather than in India, would not be entitled to deduction – The burden is on the assessee to prove eligibility to an incentive or exemption provision and it is subject to strict interpretation – Interpretation of taxing statutes – When there is ambiguity in exemption which is subject to strict interpretation, the benefit of such ambiguity cannot be claimed by the subject/assessee and it must be interpreted in favour of the revenue.

    The assessee who had been engaged in providing services to certain foreign buyers of frozen seafood and/or marine products and had received service charges from such foreign buyers/enterprises in foreign exchange, claimed deduction under S. 80-O of the Act as applicable for the relevant assessment year/s. The AO denied the deduction essentially with the finding that the services rendered by respective assessees were the ‘services rendered in India’ and not the ‘services rendered from India’ and, therefore, the service charges received by the assessees from the foreign enterprises did not qualify for deduction in view of clause (iii) of the Explanation to S. 80-O of the Act. Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee. On appeal High Court affirmed the order of the AO. On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the High Court. The Supreme Court observed that the sweeping proposition in some Supreme Court decisions that when two views are possible, the one favourable to assessee has to be preferred & that a tax incentive provision must receive liberal interpretation, is disapproved by the Constitution Bench in Commissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar (2018) 9 SCC 1 (FB). when applied to incentive provisions like those for deduction, would also be that the burden lies on the assessee to prove its applicability to his case; and if there be any ambiguity in the deduction clause, the same is subject to strict interpretation with the result that the benefit of such ambiguity cannot be claimed by the assessee, rather it would be interpreted in favour of the revenue. In view of the Constitution Bench decision in Dilip Kumar & Co. (supra), the generalised observations in CIT v. Baby Marine Exports (2007) 290 ITR 323 (SC) with reference to a few other decisions, that a tax incentive provision must receive liberal interpretation, cannot be considered to be a sound statement of law; rather the applicable principles would be those enunciated in UOI v. Wood Papers Ltd. (1990) 4 SCC 256, which have been precisely approved by the Constitution Bench The burden is on the assessee to prove eligibility to an incentive or exemption provision and it is subject to strict interpretation. If there is ambiguity, the benefit of the ambiguity has to go to the Revenue. However, if the assessee proves eligibility, a wide and liberal construction of the provision has to be done. Merely having a contract with a foreign enterprise and mere earning foreign exchange does not ipso facto lead to the application of s. 80-O of the Act. (CA Nos. 2506-2509 of 2020 dt. 5-6-2020) (AY. 1993-94 to 1997-98)

    Ramnath & Co. v CIT (SC) www.itatonline.org

    Editorial : CIT v. Ramnath & Co. (2016) 388 ITR 307 / 289 CTR 355 / (2017) 79 taxmann.com 416 (Ker.)(HC) is affirmed.

  6. S. 143(1A): Additional tax – The object of S. 143(1A) is the prevention of evasion of tax –The burden of proving that the assessee has so attempted to evade tax is on the Revenue which may be discharged by establishing facts and circumstances from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the assessee has, in fact, attempted to evade tax lawfully payable by it- Levy of additional tax was quashed. [S. 32, 143(1) 154, 264 Art. 226]

    An intimation under S. 143(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 12-2-1992 was issued by the Assessing Officer disallowing 25% of the depreciation, restricting the depreciation to 75%. Additional tax under Section 143(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 amounting to  ₹ 8,63,64,827/- was demanded. The assessee filed an application under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 18-2-1992 praying for rectification of the demand. The assessee also filed a petition under Section 264 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against the demand of additional tax. In the petition it was stated that even after allowing only 75% of depreciation the income of the assessee remained to be in loss to ₹ 3,43,94,90,393/-. The assessee prayed for quashing the demand of additional tax. The application filed under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was rejected by the Assessing Officer on 28-2-1992. The revision petition under Section 264 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 came to be dismissed by the Commissioner of Income Tax by order dated 31.03.1992. Aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax challenging the demand of additional tax which was reduced to amount of ₹ 7,67,68,717/- Writ Petition No. 2267 of 1992 was filed by the assessee in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur. Learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 19-1-1993 allowed the writ petition quashing the levy of additional tax under Section 143(1-A). The Revenue aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge filed a Special Appeal which has been allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court vide its judgment dated 13-11-2007 upholding the demand of additional tax. The assessee aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench has come up in this appeal. On appeal to Supreme Court held that the object of s. 143(1A) is the prevention of evasion of tax. As it has the deterrent effect of preventing tax evasion, it should be made to apply only to tax evaders. It can only be invoked where it is found on facts that the lesser amount stated in the return filed by the assessee is a result of an attempt to evade tax lawfully payable by the assessee. The burden of proving that the assessee has so attempted to evade tax is on the Revenue which may be discharged by establishing facts and circumstances from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the assessee has, in fact, attempted to evade tax lawfully payable by it. Order of division bench is set aside and levy of addition tax was quashed. (CA No. 8590 of 2010, Dt. 19-3-2020) (AY. 1991-92)

    Rajasthan State Electricity Board v Dy. CIT (2020) 115 taxmann.com 330 (SC) www.itatonline.org

    Editorial: Order in Dy. CIT v. Rajasthan State Electricity Board (2008) 171 Taxman 331 / 299 ITR 253 / 217 CTR (Raj.)(HC) is set aside .

  7. S.147: Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – Full & true disclosure of material facts, the assessee has the duty to disclose the primary facts, It is not required to disclose the secondary facts – If the AO intends to rely upon the second Proviso to s. 148 for the extended period of 16 years limitation, the same should be stated either in the notice or in the reasons in support of the notice – It cannot be done in the order rejecting the objections or at a later stage – Reassessment was quashed. [S. 69A, 148, 149 Art. 226]

    Court held that, (i) Merely because the original assessment is a detailed one, the powers of the AO to reopen u/s. 147 is not affected, (ii) Information which comes to the notice of the AO during proceedings for subsequent AYs can definitely form tangible material to reopen the assessment, (iii) As regards “full & true disclosure of material facts”, the assessee has the duty to disclose the “primary facts”. It is not required to disclose the “secondary facts”. The assessee is also not required to give any assistance to the AO by disclosure of other facts. It is for the AO to decide what inference should be drawn from the facts, (iv) If the AO intends to rely upon the second Proviso to s. 148 for the extended period of 16 years limitation, the same should be stated either in the notice or in the reasons in support of the notice. It cannot be done in the order rejecting the objections or at a later stage. (AY. 2007-08, 2008-09) [CA No. 1008 of 2020 dt. 3-4-2020]

    New Delhi Television Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2020) 116 taxmann.com 151 (SC) www.itatonline.org

    Editorial: Order in New Delhi Television Ltd v. Dy. CIT (2017) 84 taxmann.com 136 / 288 CTR 430 / (2018) 405 ITR 132 (Delhi) (HC) is set aside.

  8. S. 194E: Deduction at source – Non-resident – Sport person – Sports association – Liable to deduct tax at source – The obligation to deduct tax is not affected by the DTAA. [S. 9(1), 115BBA]

    As the payments to the Non-Resident Sports Associations represented their income which accrued or arose in India u/s 115BBA, the assessee was liable to deduct Tax at Source
     u/s 194E. The obligation to deduct Tax at Source u/s 194E is not affected by the DTAA. In case the exigibility to tax is disputed by the recipient, the benefit of DTAA can be pleaded and the amount in question will be refunded with interest. But, that by itself, cannot absolve the liability to deduct TDS u/s 194E of the Act. (CA No. 5749 of 2012. Dt. 29-4-2020)

    PILCOM v. CIT (2020) 116 taxmann.com 394 (SC) www.itatonline.org

    Editorial : PILCOM v. CIT (2011) 198 Taxman 555 / 355 ITR 147 / 238 CTR 387 (Cal.)(HC) is affirmed.

  9. S. 223: Collection and recovery – Tax Recovery Officer – Charge over property – Attachment of property under Schedule II – Unless there is preference given to the Crown debt by a statute, the dues of a secured creditor have preference over Crown debts – As a charge over the property was created much prior to the notice issued by the TRO under Rule 2 of Schedule II to the Act and the sale of the property was pursuant to the order passed by the DRT, the sale is valid. [S. 222]

    The Appellant filed the Writ Petition in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay seeking a restraint order against the Tax Recovery Officer for enforcing the attachment made under the Income Tax Act, 1961 for recovery of the dues. The Writ Petition was dismissed by the High court, aggrieved by which the Appeal has been filed. A recovery certificate in terms of the order passed by the DRT was issued and recovery proceedings were initiated against BPIL. The Recovery Officer, DRT III attached the property on 29-11-2002. A public auction was held on 28-9-2004. The DRT was informed that there were no bidders except the Appellant. The offer made by the Appellant to purchase the property for an amount of ₹ 23,00,000/- was accepted. On 14-1-2005, a certificate of sale was issued in favour of the Appellant. The possession of the disputed property was handed over to the Appellant on 25-1-2005. The Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation informed that it received a letter dated 23-3-2006 from the Tax Recovery Officer stating that the property in dispute was attached by Respondent No. 4 on 17-6-2003. The Appellant requested the Regional Officer, MIDC by a letter dated 10-4-2006 to transfer the property in dispute in its favour in light of the Sale Certificate issued by DRT on  25-1-2005. As the MIDC [failed to transfer the plot in the name of the Appellant, the Appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court seeking a direction for issuance of ‘No Objection’ in respect of the plot and to restrain Respondent from enforcing the attachment of the said plot, which was performed on 11-2-2003. The question posed before the High Court is whether the Appellant who bona fide purchased the property in auction sale as per the order of the DRT is entitled to have the property transferred in its name in spite of the attachment of the said property by the Income Tax Department. Relying upon Rule 16 of Schedule II to the Act, the High Court came to the conclusion that there can be no transfer of a property which is the subject matter of a notice. The High Court was also of the view that after an order of attachment is made under Rule 16(2), no transfer or delivery of the property or any interest in the property can be made, contrary to such attachment. The High Court held that notice under Rule 2 of Schedule II to the Act was issued on 11-2-2003, and the property in dispute was attached under Rule 48 on 17-6-2003, whereas the sale in favour of the Appellant took place on 912.2004 and the sale certificate was issued on 14.01.2005. Therefore, the transfer of the property made subsequent to the issuance of the notice under Rule 2 and the attachment under Rule 48, is void. The submission made on behalf of the Appellant that the sale in favour of the Appellant was at the behest of the DRT and not the defaulter i.e., BPIL was not accepted by the High Court. In view of the above findings, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition. Apex Court held that the High Court failed to take into account the fact that the sale of the property was pursuant to the order passed by the DRT with regard to the property over which a charge was already created prior to the issuance of notice on 11-2-2003. As the charge over the property was created much prior to the issuance of notice under Rule 2 of Schedule II to the Act by Respondent the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the Appeal is allowed. The MIDC is directed to issue a ‘No Objection” certificate to the Appellant and the tax recovery officer is restrained from enforcing the attachment order dated 17-6-2003. [CA No. 1919 of 2010, dt. 6-3-2020]

    Connectwell Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI (2020) 115 taxmann.com (SC), www.itatonline.org

  10. S. 241A: Refund – Withholding of refund in certain cases – Satisfaction to be recorded by the AO – The withholding of refund requires the previous approval of the PCIT with reasons to be recorded in writing – When assessment pursuant to notice under section 143(2) was pending and likelihood of substantial demands upon assessee after completion of scrutiny could not be ruled out, refund claim could not be allowed – When no action is initiated the Court directed the revenue to grant the refunds with in four weeks. [S. 143(1), 143(2), 245]

    Till AY 2016-17, if a scrutiny notice u/s. 143(2) is issued, the return is not required to be processed u/s 143(1) for grant of refund to the assessee. From AY 2017-18 & onwards, a different regime is prescribed by Parliament. S. 241A requires separate recording of satisfaction on part of the AO that having regard to the issue of notice u/s 143(2), the grant of refund is likely to adversely affect the revenue. The withholding of refund requires the previous approval of the PCIT with reasons to be recorded in writing. When assessment pursuant to notice under section 143(2) was pending and likelihood of substantial demands upon assessee after completion of scrutiny could not be ruled out, refund claim could not be allowed. Court observed that since the requisite action is not even initiated court directed that the amount of ₹ 733 crores shall be refunded to the appellant within four weeks from today subject to any proceedings that the Revenue may deem appropriate to initiate in accordance with law. Court also directed the respondents to conclude the proceedings initiated pursuant to notice under sub-section (2) of Section 143 of the Act in respect of AY 2016-17 and 2017-18 as early as possible. (AY. 2014-15 to 2017-18) [CA No. 2377 of 2020 Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 1169 of 2019, Dt. 29/4/2020]

    Vodafone Idea Ltd (Earlier Known as Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd) v. ACIT (2020) 116 taxmann.com 393 (SC) www.itatonline.org

    Editorial: Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd v ACIT (2018) 100 taxmann.com 310 / (2019) 260 Taxman 417 (Delhi) (HC) is affirmed.

    Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005

  11. S. 21: Assessment – Alternative remedy – Limitation – Power of Supreme Court & High Court under Articles 142 and 226 to entertain a challenge to the assessment order on the sole ground that the statutory remedy of appeal against that order stands foreclosed by the law of limitation. [S. 31, Constitution of India 1949, Art. 142, 226]

    Allowing the petition of the revenue the Court held that, Power of Supreme Court & High Court under Articles 142 and 226 to entertain a challenge to the assessment order on the sole ground that the statutory remedy of appeal against that order stands foreclosed by the law of limitation. The statutory period prescribed for redressal of the grievance cannot be disregarded and a writ petition entertained. Doing so would be in the teeth of the principle that the Court cannot issue a writ which is inconsistent with the legislative intent. That would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the statutory provision otiose. [CA No. 2413/2020 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12892/2019) dt. 6-5-2020]

    ACCT v. Glaxo Smith Consumer Health Care Ltd (SC) www.itatonline.org

    Constitution of India 1949

  12. Art. 141: Extension of limitation period – Corona Virus – Period of limitation in all such proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed under the general law or Special Laws, whether condonable or not, shall stand extended w.e.f. 15th March 2020 till further order/s to be passed by this Court in present proceedings. (Art. 142)

    Court held that to obviate difficulties caused by Corona Virus in filing petitions / applications / suits / appeals / all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under Special Laws (both Central and/or State), it is ordered that the period of limitation in all such proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed under the general law or Special Laws, whether condonable or not, shall stand extended w.e.f. 15th March 2020 till further order/s to be passed by this Court in present proceedings. Suo Motu WP No. 3/2020 dt. 23-3-2020

    Suo Motu Cognizance For Extension of Limitation (SC) www.itatonline.org

    Constitution of India, 1949

  13. Art. 141: Corona Virus (COVID 19) – Extension of limitation period – All periods of limitation prescribed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 shall be extended with effect from 15-3-2020 till further orders to be passed by this Court in the present proceedings. [Art. 142]

    Taking into consideration the effect of the Corona Virus (COVID 19) and resultant difficulties being faced by lawyers and litigants and with a view to obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers / litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts / Tribunal across the country including this Court, it is hereby ordered that all periods of limitation prescribed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 shall be extended with effect from 15-3-2020 till further orders to be passed by this Court in the present proceedings. (Suo Moto Writ (CIVIL) No. 3 of 2020 dt. 6-5-2020) (Cogniznance for extension of limitation SUO MOTO WRIT (C) No. 3 of 2020 dt. 6-5-2020)

    Suo Moto Writ (SC) www.itatonline.org   

    Constitution of India 1949

  14. Art. 142: Guidelines for Court functioning through video conferencing during covid-19 pandemic [Art. 141]

    Court held that, all measures shall be taken to reduce the need for physical presence of all stakeholders within the court premises and to secure the functioning of courts in consonance with social distancing guidelines. The Supreme Court and all High Courts are authorized to adopt measures required to ensure the robust functioning of the judicial system through the use of video conferencing technologies. Every High Court is authorised to determine the modalities which are suitable to the temporary transition to the use of video conferencing technologies [WC. No. 5 /2020 dt. 6-4-2020]

    Suo Motu (SC) www.itatonline.org   

    Contempt Court Act, 1971.

  15. S. 5: Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt – No party has the right to attribute motives to a Judge or to question the bona fides of the Judge or to raise questions with regard to the competence of the Judge – Judges are part and parcel of the justice delivery system – When there is a concerted attack by members of the Bar, the Court cannot shut its eyes to the slanderous and scandalous allegations made. If such allegations are permitted to remain unchallenged then the public will lose faith not only in those particular Judges but also in the entire justice delivery system and this definitely affects the majesty of law. [Advocate Act, 1961, S. 7(b), Constitution of India, 1949 Art. 129, 142]

    There can be no manner of doubt that any citizen of the country can criticise the judgments delivered by any Court including this Court. However, no party has the right to attribute motives to a Judge or to question the bona fides of the Judge or to raise questions with regard to the competence of the Judge. Judges are part and parcel of the justice delivery system. When there is a concerted attack by members of the Bar, the Court cannot shut its eyes to the slanderous and scandalous allegations made. If such allegations are permitted to remain unchallenged then the public will lose faith not only in those particular Judges but also in the entire justice delivery system and this definitely affects the majesty of law. (Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Criminal) No. 2 of 2019 dt. 27-4-2020) [CA No. 2413/2020 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12892/2019) dt. 6-5-2020]

    Vijay Kurle & Ors. (SC) www.itatonline.org

    Contempt Court Act, 1971.

  16. S. 5: Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt – Contempt of Court by Advocates – It is obvious that this is a concerted effort to virtually hold the Judiciary to ransom – All three contemnors are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months each with a fine of ₹ 2000. [Advocate Act, 1961 S. 7(b) Constitution of India, 1949 Art., 129, 142]

    The main Contempt Petition was heard at length and disposed of on 27-4-2020. After the judgment was pronounced, the case was fixed on 1-5-2020 for hearing the contemnors on sentence. The contemnors filed applications for recall of the judgment and, therefore, the matter was listed today. One of us (Deepak Gupta, J.) is to demit office on 6-5-2020 and, therefore, the matter had to be heard and we see no ground for one of us to recuse. The application is accordingly rejected. Court held that there is not an iota of remorse or any semblance of apology on behalf of the contemnors. In view of the scurrilous and scandalous allegations levelled against the judges of this Court and no remorse being shown by any of the contemnors we are of the considered view that they cannot be let off leniently. It is obvious that this is a concerted effort to virtually hold the Judiciary to ransom. All three contemnors are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months each with a fine of ₹ 2000. Court also held that Keeping in view the COVID-19 pandemic and the lockdown conditions we direct that this sentence shall come into force after 16 weeks from today when the contemnors should surrender before the Secretary General of this Court to undergo the imprisonment. Otherwise, warrants for their arrest shall be issued. (Interim Application No. 48502 of 2000 dt 4-5-2020 [CA No. 2413/2020 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12892/2019) dt. 6-5-2020]

    Vijay Kurle & Ors. (SC) www.itatonline.org

    Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005

  17. S. 21: Assessment – Alternative remedy – Limitation – Power of Supreme Court & High Court under Articles 142 and 226 to entertain a challenge to the assessment order on the sole ground that the statutory remedy of appeal against that order stands foreclosed by the law of limitation. [S. 31, Constitution of India 1949, Art. 142, 226]

    Allowing the petition of the revenue the Court held that, Power of Supreme Court & High Court under Articles 142 and 226 to entertain a challenge to the assessment order on the sole ground that the statutory remedy of appeal against that order stands foreclosed by the law of limitation. The statutory period prescribed for redressal of the grievance cannot be disregarded and a writ petition entertained. Doing so would be in the teeth of the principle that the Court cannot issue a writ which is inconsistent with the legislative intent. That would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the statutory provision otiose. [CA No. 2413/2020 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12892/2019) dt. 6-5-2020]

    ACCT v. Glaxo Smith Consumer Health Care Ltd (SC) www.itatonline.org

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